Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Rule 117 Digests
Rule 117 Digests
President Ferdinand Marcos created the Agrava Fact- Finding Board to investigate the assassination of Ninoy Aquino and the
alleged gunman Rolando Galman. The President then referred the Agrava Board reports to the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)
for its resolution. The report contradicted the version of the military. The reported concluded that Galman was only a fall
guy and that Ninoys assassination was the product of a military conspiracy and not a communist plot. Nevertheless, the
President disdained and rejected his own Boards findings and insisted on the version that Galman was Aquinos assassin.
Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman and twenty-nine other petitioners filed the action for temporary restraining order to
nullify the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and to restrain the court from rendering a decision on the merit. The
petitioners alleged that Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in
miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law. The petitioners pray for a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor.
However, the Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and
totally absolving them of any civil liability.
After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila
Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," revealed that President Marcos had ordered the Sandiganbayan, the Tanodbayan, and
the prosecution panel to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal.
With that, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and such was granted by the Sandiganbayan. A three- member
commission was created to investigate the charges of collusion. Their Report concluded that the proceedings in the case have
been vitiated by lack of due process because the prosecution and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of the president, which not only prevented the prosecution from fully ventilating its position and offering all the
evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case. The Sandiganbayan
approved and adopted such report. However, the respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy and argued that the
previous judgment of acquittal of the Sandiganbayan rendered the case moot and academic.
ISSUE. Did the Sandiganbayan violate the rule against double jeopardy?
HELD.
NO. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or
acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction and the court rendering such decision is ousted of its jurisdiction.
As a rule legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a
valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. However, the court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process. In effect, the further hearing of the case does not constitute double jeopardy.
In the case at bar, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased
Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the
carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal is a void judgment. In legal contemplation,
it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw". Therefore, the Sandiganbayans resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction and hence no double jeopardy attaches. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all by it no rights are
divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It
neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
PEOPLE v. BALUNSAT
Crimes: two counts Statutory rape against AAA and Attempted rape against BBB
RTC: guilty of both crimes
CA: guilty of one count of statutory rape and act of lasciviousness against BBB
SC: affirmed the decision of CA
FACTS:
Three information were filed against Nelson Balunsat before the RTC of Tuao, Cagayan which alleged that
Balunsat committed statutory rape against his ten year old first cousin AAA and attempted rape against his eleven year
old first cousin BBB. It was narrated during the trial that the rape happened when AAA was alone in their house,
Nelson took off the shorts and underwear of AAA and, thereafter, took off his short pants and underwear. He forced
AAA to lie down on the floor and, opening wide her legs, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. While the
attempted rape was committed when AAA and BBB were sleeping in their grandmothers house, Nelson arrived and
removed his shorts and underwear and lay down beside BBB. The accused tried to insert his fully erect penis into
BBBs private parts. However, BBB resisted and the accused could not make any penetration of his penis on the
former. Failing to satisfy his lust on BBB, the accused told her to move over and then lay himself down beside
AAA. He removed the shorts and panties of AAA and had sexual intercourse with her. Nelson pleaded not guilty. The
RTC rendered decision finding Nelson guilty of both crimes and the sentenced him to suffer the penalty of 17 years of
reclusion temporal as minimum to reclusion perpetual as maximum.
He filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court rendered decisions finding Nelson guilty
of the crime of statutory rape against AAA in the first criminal case but acquitted him in the second criminal case, while
the crime of attempted rape was downgraded to acts of lasciviousness. The penalty was reduced to four month of
arresto mayor as minimum to two years, four months and 1 day of prison correctional as maximum. He filed the
present appeal on the ground that the guilt of the accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Can the court review the three criminal cases?
HELD: No, the courts review will only be limited to his conviction of rape in the first criminal case and his
conviction on the acts of lasciviousness.
Given that Nelson was already acquitted of the charge of rape in second criminal case on the ground of
reasonable doubt, his instant appeal relates only to his convictions for rape in first criminal case and for acts of
lasciviousness. The Court can no longer pass upon the propriety of Nelsons acquittal because, the judgment acquitting
the accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its
review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of
double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the Court of Appeals.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals modified the guilty verdict of the RTC against Nelson from attempted rape to acts
of lasciviousness. The court can no longer review the downgrading of the crime by the appellate court without
violating the right against double jeopardy, which proscribes an appeal from a judgment of acquittal or for the purpose
of increasing the penalty imposed upon the accused. In effect, the Court of Appeals already acquitted Nelson of the
charge of attempted rape, convicting him only for acts of lasciviousness, a crime with a less severe penalty. Hence, the
court is limited to determining whether there is enough evidence to support Nelsons conviction for acts of
lasciviousness.
GELIG v. PEOPLE
The Prosecution's Version
Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school teachers at the Nailon
Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydia's son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time material to this
case.
On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from
Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby
causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydia's violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her
"maxillary area", as shown by a medical certificate issued by a doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma
continued to experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was
admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion.
Accordingly, a medical certificate was issued.
The trial court convicted Lydia of the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion. The CA
vacated the trial court's judgment and convicted Lydia of Slight Physical Injuries instead. The accused appealed to the
SC.
ISSUE: Is the re-opening of the case for appellate review will constitute Double Jeopardy?
HELD:
NO. When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he waives his constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy and throws the entire case open for appellate review. We are then called
upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate in the exercise of our concomitant authority to review and sift
through the whole case to correct any error, even if unassigned.
The prosecution's success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct assault does not necessarily
mean that the same physical force she employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of unintentional abortion. There
is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was
the proximate cause of the abortion. While the medical certificate of Gemma's attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr.
Jaca), was presented to the court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that
her medical condition was a direct consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident.[18] It was therefore vital for the
prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydia's assault and
Gemma's abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the assault on Gemma's
abortion.
It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981,
which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of
the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal pain two days
after the said incident were not substantiated by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the
abortion may have been the result of other factors.
PEOPLE v. TAN
Tan, being the beneficial owner of 84,030,000 Best World Resources Corporation (BWRC) shares, a registered
security which has been sold pursuant to the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership constitutes 18.6% of
the outstanding shares of the company, way above the 10% required by law to be reported, fail to file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and with the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) a sworn statement of the amount of
all BWRC shares of which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days after he became such beneficial owner. Thus,
informations for violation of Rules of the Revised Securities Act, were filed by the People of the Philippines (People)
against Dante Tan in the Pasig RTC.
Tan filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and to admit the attached Demurrer to
Evidence. The RTC issued another granted it. The People filed a petition before the CA assailing the orders of the
RTC. In denying the petition, the CA ruled that the dismissal of a criminal action by the grant of a Demurrer to
Evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for which reason, the prosecution cannot appeal as it would
place the accused in double jeopardy.
ISSUE. Did the CA err in applying the rules on double jeopardy?
HELD.
NO. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;
and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
These elements are present here: (1) the informations filed in against Tan were sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction; (2) the RTC had jurisdiction over the criminal cases; (3) Tan was arraigned and entered a plea of
not guilty; and (4) the RTC dismissed the criminal cases on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.
This Court finds that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it conducted the proceedings of the
trial, as well as its grant of Tan's demurrer to evidence.
There is no showing that the conclusions made by the RTC on the sufficiency of the evidence of the
prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case, is manifestly mistaken. Assuming, however, that there is an error
of judgment on the denial of admission of certain exhibits of the prosecution and the appreciation of the prosecution's
case, there is to this Court's mind, no capricious exercise of judgment that would overcome the defense of double
jeopardy.
Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government
oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. While petitioner insists that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion, this Court finds that none can be attributed to the RTC. Consequently, the CA did not err when it affirmed
the assailed Orders of the RTC.
Moreover, when the petitioner brought forth the denial of the Motion to Amend the Information to exclude his name
from the charge, and to seek the quashal of the Information before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, he was in error in
his choice of remedy. This Court emphasizes the established rule that the writ of certiorari will not lie against the denial
of a motion to quash an information. The remedy is for petitioner to go to trial on the merits, and if an adverse decision
is rendered, to appeal therefrom in a manner authorized by law. We have, however, sanctioned a writ of certiorari on the
basis of a patent, capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion by a trial judge or when an appeal will not promptly
relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the disputed orders. No such special circumstances are herein present
that would convince us to treat the instant case as an exception.
NO. In cases falling under Section 5 of Rule 117, where the motion to quash is sustained on grounds other
than those stated in Section 6 of the same Rule, the trial court has the discretion to order the filing of another
information within a specified period which is extendible to such further time as the court may allow for good cause.
The order to file another information, if determined to be warranted by the circumstances of the case, must be
contained in the same order granting the motion to quash. If the order sustaining the motion to quash does not order
the filing of another information, and said order becomes final and executory, then the court may no longer direct the
filing of another information.
It is gathered that Gonzales never asserted the propriety of amending the Information, he having maintained
that the allegations in the Information provided sufficient and adequate bases to confer jurisdiction. When the RTC
granted the motion to quash, Gonzales did not assail the same within the reglementary period. The order quashing the
Information thus became final and executory.
The clause denotes no other construction than a plain extension of time. The allowance of additional time
qualifies the period of filing a new information pursuant to an order, and not the period of issuing an order to file a new
information. It presupposes that an order has been previously issued, as signified by the prior phrase "if having been
made." As earlier stated, this order to file another information, ifthe RTC finds that circumstances warrant its issuance,
must be included in the order granting the motion to quash. The time limitation in the rule was intended to prevent the
accused from being unnecessarily detained at the whim of the prosecution. Since the order granting the motion to
quash had attained finality, it had become immutable.
At all events, the prosecution is not, under the circumstances attendant to the case, precluded from refiling an
information against respondent as long as prescription has not set in.
"Putang ina mong bata ka namumuro ka na sa akin, at susunugin ko `yung pamilya mo!"
He was shouting "Putang ina ninyo, zone leader ako papatayin ko [ kayong] lahat!"
respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of the criminal cases. Neither did he ever agree,
impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases.
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal of the criminal cases or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before
said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, even if the respondents
motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his
motion for a provisional dismissal of the criminal cases, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof
prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims
were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases.
It should also be noted that when the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000,
the State only had one year and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The issue
which arose from such event was whether the time-bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 thereof should be applied prospectively
and not retroactively against the State, to which the Court ruled that procedural laws may be applied retroactively.
The time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the
State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of
the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. The time-bar under the new rule
does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the
right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the
State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused.
The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year
periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the delay.
MR granted. The Resolution of the Court is set aside.
and a provisional dismissal under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has been
provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section
6. The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution
shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be
confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely
provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3. Conversely, when a
dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-bar does not apply.
The Court notes also the following differences stressing that a motion to quash and its resulting dismissal is a
unique class that should not be confused with other dismissals:
First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question the efficacy of the complaint or
information filed against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may be provisionally dismissed
at the instance of either the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the conditions enumerated under
Section 8, Rule 117.
Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117; these
requirements do not apply to a provisional dismissal.
Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information for defects or
defenses apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may be grounded on reasons other than the
defects found in the information.
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a provisional
dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of the case is already underway provided that the required consents are
present.
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies, at which
time it becomes a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays quashed until revived; the
grant of a motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by
law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case, what is important is the question of whether the action can still be
brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no
re-filing after the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules refer
to different situations that should not be confused with one another. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or
extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a motion to quash
under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or
information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under provisional
dismissal.
The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule
117]. We find from our examination of the records that the Information duly charged a specific offense and provides
the details on how the offense was committed. Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit. On the other hand,
we do not see on the face or from the averments of the Information any legal excuse or justification. This
COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to
quash grounded on legal excuse or justification found on the face of the Information. Significantly, no hearing
was ever called to allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness of the COMELEC certification.
As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.