Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Rule 118 and 119 Digests
Rule 118 and 119 Digests
PRE-TRIAL
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE v. AMIL SAJOLGA Y OMERA
G.R. No. 146684, August 21, 2002, EN BANC, (MENDOZA, J.)
Genlei Abejaron stayed in the house of her teacher, Mrs. Erlinda Alceso, during weekdays as a working student
because the Maramag Elementary School in Bukidnon, where she was studying. She went home to her mothers house
only on weekends.
Genlei testified that at about 5 oclock in the afternoon, while she was alone in her mothers house playing cards,
someone knocked on the door, and, it was her half-brother, accused-appellant Ramil Sajolga, who was drunk. The latter
boxed her in the abdomen, causing her to fall on the floor on her buttocks. Genlei said accused-appellant dragged her
to the bedroom, made her lie on the bed, and took off her shorts and panties. When Genlei recovered, she found
herself naked and lying on the bed. Her body was aching and her vagina was sore, with a sticky substance, presumably
semen, in her private part. She was afraid that her mother would not believe her. However, with the assurance of
teachers that they would help her, she filed a case of Rape. Her half-brother was found guilty by the trial court and was
sentenced to death. The accused filed an appeal.
ISSUE: Is the stipulation of minority in the pre-trial order sufficient absent birth certificate?
HELD: YES.
Although no birth certificate or document was presented to prove that complainant was 15 years old at the
time she was raped, the parties stipulated that she was born on February 15, 1983. This stipulation is contained in a
Pre-Trial Order issued by the trial court. A stipulation of facts in criminal cases is now authorized to be made by
Rule 118, 1 and 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, not only was complainants age alleged in the
information, it was proven, having been made the subject of stipulation and admission.
Accused-appellant is not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or the common-law spouse of the victims
mother, but a relative by consanguinity. Hence, as this Court has held, it must be alleged in the information that he is a
relative by consanguinity or affinity, as the case may be, within the third civil degree.[29] Not only should relationship by
consanguinity or affinity be alleged, it is also necessary to specify that such relationship is within the third civil
degree.[30] Mere allegation and the stipulation that accused-appellant is the brother of the victim because they have a
common mother are not enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship.
Anent accused-appellants contention that he is guilty only of simple rape and not qualified rape because he is not a
full-blooded brother of the victim sister and there are no half measures in the Heinous Crime Law, suffice it to say the
law does not distinguish between full blood and half blood relatives. The law does not in fact speak of full blood and
half blood relatives but of relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. As a recent study has
found, around 92% of the perpetrators in rape cases are known to the child and 39% of these cases were committed
by legal or common law relatives.
In any event, because of the failure of the prosecution to allege that accused-appellant is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree of the offended party, accused-appellant can only be held liable for
simple rape even if it was proven and stipulated that the victim was under eighteen (18) years of age and that
he is a half-brother of complainant.
Is the time gap of 105 days from his arraignment (February 12, 2003) up to May 28, 2003(the first pre-trial
setting), and another gap of 148 days from the latter date up to the October 23, 2003(second pre-trial setting) or for a
total of 253 days - a clear contravention of the 80-day time limit from arraignment to trial?
RULING:
NO.
On his arraignment on February 12, 2003, petitioner interposed no objection to the setting of the pre-trial to
May 28, 2003 which was, as earlier stated, later declared a non-working day. Inarguably, the cancellation of the
scheduled pre-trial on that date was beyond the control of the trial court.
The Court stressed that the exceptions consisting of the time exclusions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of
1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that "speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily involves a
degree of flexibility.
R.A. No. 8493 and its implementing rules and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerate certain
reasonable delays as exclusions in the computation of the prescribed time limits. They also provide that "no
provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge
of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article III, Section 14(2), of the 1987 Constitution."
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be
definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends
upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the
rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that
intent.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a
speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants
assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
To the Court, the reasons for the postponements and delays attendant to the present case reflected above are
not unreasonable. While the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of the resetting of the
pre-trial to October 23, 2003, the same appears to have been occasioned by oversight or simple negligence which,
standing alone, does not prove fatal to the prosecutions case. The faux pas was acknowledged and corrected when the
MeTC recalled the arrest warrant it had issued against petitioner under the mistaken belief that petitioner had been duly
notified of the October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting.
CUENCO v. RISOS
TOPIC: Prosecution Evidence, Sec. 15, Rule 119 (TRIAL)
CRIME: Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document
PLACE OF CRIME: Cebu City
FACTS: On November 4, 1999, he respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document
before the RTC of Cebu City. The case arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly
committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as
the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document. Hence, the criminal case.
Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila,
was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to
stay in Manila for further treatment.
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition. He explained the
need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom
of mobility. The RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcions deposition be taken before the Clerk of
Court of Makati City. The court ratiocinated that procedural technicalities should be brushed aside because of the
urgency of the situation, since Concepcion was already of advanced age. After several motions for change of venue of
the deposition-taking, Concepcions deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001 at her residence.
Aggrieved, respondents assailed the August 25 and November 3 RTC orders in a special civil action for
certiorari before the CA. On August 15, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision favorable to the respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 25, 2000 and November 3,
2000 orders of the court a quo are hereby SET ASIDE, and any deposition that may have been
taken on the authority of such void orders is similarly declared void.
SO ORDERED.
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the respondents petition by not impleading the
People of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the matter on its
merit, declaring that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the
appellate court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions
deposition should have been taken before the judge or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu,
and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed
grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: WON RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE APPLIES TO THE DEPOSITION OF
PETITIONER.
RULING:
NO. It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the
judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties
and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position
or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor. This
rule, however, is not absolute. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and health condition exempt her from the application of
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of Rule 23 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. The contention does not persuade.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the
conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be
notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the
manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that
is, through question and answer.
We agree with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination in this wise:
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution witness shall be made
before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to petitioners contention, there is nothing in the rule which
may remotely be interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the witness is within the
jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court may not
introduce exceptions or conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not
contemplated. When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation. There is only
room for application.
Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the rules on civil procedure apply
suppletorily to criminal cases.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all
actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory
application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the
instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
EUGENE C. YU vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC OF TAGAYTAY CITY, BRANCH 18,
REYNALDO DE LOS SANTOS et al.
Facts: An information was filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City against Messrs. Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Rojas, Capt. Alfredo
Abad, Toto Mirasol, Venerando Ozores, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon and private respondents de los Santos and Ochoa
for the kidnapping and murder of the late Atty. Eugene Tan (former President of IBP) and his driver, Eduardo Constantino
that happened on 14 November 1994. While under custody of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), private
respondents Ochoa and de los Santos executed separate sworn statements implicating petitioner in the crime. The PACC refiled the complaint against petitioner. Thereafter, three (3) separate informations were filed against him. The RTC found
probable cause and directed the prosecution to amend the information to include him as an accomplice. However, the
prosecution maintains that the petitioner should be charged as a principal and impugns the resolution of the judge. The
prosecution then filed a Petition to Discharge as State Witnesses and Exclude from the Information accused Ochoa and de
los Santos and the judge granted the said motion. The CA affirmed the said order and concluded that there was no necessity
for a hearing to determine a persons qualification as a state witness after the DOJ had attested to his qualification. Republic
Act No. 6981, Witness Protection and Security Benefit Program (WPSBP), conferred upon the DOJ the sole authority to
determine whether or not an accused is qualified for admission into the program. It held that under Section 12 of the said act,
upon the filing by the prosecution of a petition to discharge an accused from the information, it is mandatory for the court to
order the discharge and exclusion of the accused.
Issue: Whether the discharge of the accused as state witnesses needs prior determination of the trial court for their
qualification.
Ruling: No, Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is only one of the modes of the discharge of
the accused as a state witness.
The prosecution availed of RA 6981 in the discharge of the accused as state witnesses. It is distinct and separate from
Section 17, Rule 119. The immunity provided under the former is granted by the DOJ while the latter is granted by the court.
The former only requires compliance with Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On the other
hand, Section 17, Rule 119, contemplates a situation where the information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned
and the case is undergoing trial. The discharge of an accused under this rule may be ordered upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case, that is, at any stage of the proceedings, from the filing of the information to the time the defense starts
to offer any evidence.
As pointed out by the Court in the case of Soberano v. People, Section 14, Rule 110 allows the amendment of the
information made before plea excluding some or one of the accused to be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with
notice to the offended party and with leave of court in compliance. It does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the
accused and therefore, applies when it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case, or on some other
ground. At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for the prosecution to present evidence
and the sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come into play. This is
because the determination of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one.
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides that the issuance of a certification of admission into the program shall be given
full faith by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required not to include the witness in the criminal complaint or
information, and if included, to petition for his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a state witness. This provision
justifies the regularity of the procedure adopted by the prosecution for the discharge of the private respondents. Section 9 of
Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial
prerogative. Under this provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired
jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.
The petitioner argues that the petition to discharge is not supported by any proof or evidence. There is no
requirement under Republic Act No. 6891 that the sworn statement and memorandum of agreement between the private
respondents and the DOJ be first presented in court before an accused may be admitted to the WPSBP. Moreover, the DOJ
which is tasked to implement the provisions of RA 6981, has determined that the private respondents have satisfied the
requirements for admission under the WPSBP.
PEOLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON. NAZAR U. CHAVES, Judge RTC-Cagayan de Oro City
FACTS.
Criminal information for Multiple Murder for the killing of members of the Bucag family were filed against Felipe
Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe. It was
originally filed before the RTC of Gingoog City, however by virtue of Administrative Order, the case was transferred to
RTC of Cagayan de Oro which was presided by Judge Nazar Chaves. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted. All
the other accused were at large.Two years later, Felizardo Roxas was identified as another member of the group who
was responsible for the murder. With that, an amended information was filed before the same court. During the
preliminary investigation, Roxas implicated Atty. Miguel Paderanga, his counsel, as the mastermind of the killings.
Consequently, the amended information was again amended to include Atty. Paderanga as one of the accused.
During the trial, the court ruled that before Roxas be presented as a witness for the prosecution, he must first be
discharged as a state witness, otherwise the prosecution can not present him as a hostile witness. The prosecution filed a
motion for reconsideration, in the alternative, to discharge Roxas as a state witness. The trial court issued an Order
allowing the presentation of the testimony of Felizardo Roxas for purposes of proving the conditions of Rule 119,
Section 9 of the Rules of Court on the discharge of a state witness. However, the trial court ruled against Roxas on the
ground that the presentation of Roxas testimony will be tantamount to allowing him to testify as a state witness even
before his discharge as such; that the qualification of a proposed state witness must be proved by evidence other
than his own testimony; and that at the hearing for the discharge of a proposed state witness, only his sworn
statement can be presented and not his oral testimony, thought the prosecution may still present any other
evidence in support of the discharge. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Thereupon,
the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the CA assailing the order of the trial
court, but it was denied. Hence, the present petition in SC.
ISSUE: Is the evidence that needs to be presented by the prosecution in its motion to discharge limited to the sworn
statement executed by its proposed witness?
HELD.
NO. Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the trial court may direct one
or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state after requiring
the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in
support of the discharge. The provision does not make any distinction as to the kind of evidence the prosecution
may present. What it simply requires, in addition to the presentation of the sworn statement of the accused concerned,
is the presentation of such evidence as are necessary to determine if the conditions exist for the discharge, so as to meet
the object of the law, which is to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary exclusion from the complaint of persons guilty of the
crime charged. No exemption from the term evidence is provided by the law as to exclude the testimony of the
accused. When the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
In the case at bar, there is no other evidence more competent than the testimony of the proposed witness himself
to prove the conditions that his testimony is absolutely necessary; that there is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense; that his testimony can be corroborated in its material points; that he does not appear
to be the most guilty; and that he has not been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Further, the trial
judge will not be able to clarify matters found in the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses if they are not allowed
to testify.
EDUARDO ROSALES, HON. RODOLFO G. PALATTAO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NELSON EXCONDE and RONILO AONUEVO
G.R. Nos. 80418-19 October 23, 1992 FIRST DIVISION
(BELLOSILLO, J.)
FACTS:
Topic: Effect of discharge Sec. 18
Crime: Murder
Place of commission: Lucena City
An Information was filed before RTC of Lucena City charging Eduardo Rosales, together with Crisanto Bautista and
private respondents Nelson Exconde and Ronilo Aonuevo for the murder of Marcial Punzalan, an ex-Mayor of San
Antonio and Tiaong towns in Quezon Province, and his leader, Demetrio Ramos. In the trial of the case, the
prosecution presented Eduardo Rosales and then Crisanto Bautista as witnesses before moving for their discharge.
Admittedly, their testimonies led to the identification of the alleged masterminds of the slayings, which included
prominent local political leaders like ex-Mayor Ananiano Wagan of San Antonio and ex-Mayor Francisco Escueta of
Tiaong as well as two (2) barangay captains, and to the filing of an information against the four. The trial court granted
the discharge of Rosales but deferred action on the motion to discharged Bautista pending resolution of this case.
Private respondents pleaded for the reconsideration of Rosales' discharge by the same was denied. Upon petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, however, the order of discharge was recalled as the appellate court found no
plausible reason for the discharge of Rosales after he admitted his guilt in the course of his testimony. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution denying reconsideration.
ISSUE: Is the Court of Appeals correct in annulling the discharge of the accused?
HELD:
NO. At the time of Rosales' discharge, the corresponding Information against the alleged masterminds had
not yet been filed. His testimony, if ever, was then to be a future undertaking on his part, and the successful prosecution
of those responsible for the dastardly acts would hinge solely on his testimony as a state witness. As such, his discharge
satisfied the intent of Sec. 9 of Rule 119 that one or more discharged accused "may be witnesses for the State" and was
therefore in accord with law.
The rule is that the discharge of an accused is left to the sound discretion of the lower court, which has the exclusive
responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the Rules are met. While it is the usual practice of the
prosecution to present the accused who turns state witness only after his discharge, the trial court may nevertheless
sanction his discharge after his testimony if circumstances so warrant. In this case, the imminent risk to his life justified
the deviation from the normal course of procedure as a measure to protect him while at the same time ensuring his
undaunted cooperation with the prosecution. Indeed, as is explicit from the Rule, as long as the motion for discharge of
an accused to be utilized as a state witness is filed before the prosecution rests, the trial court should, if warranted, grant
it.
Once a discharge is effected, any subsequent showing that not all the five (5) requirements outlined in Sec. 9 of Rule
119 were actually fulfilled cannot adversely affect the legal consequences of such discharge which, under Sec. 10 of the
Same Rule, operates as an acquittal of the accused thus discharged and shall forever be a bar to his prosecution for the
same offense. The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it annulled and set aside the order for the
discharge of the accused Eduardo Rosales there being no showing that he actually failed or refused to testify against his
co-conspirators.
Finally, the Court brushes aside Maritess disclaimer of participation in killing the victim. It was she who
bound the hands and gagged the victim. When Estacio, in Maritess company, brought the victim to the scene of the
crime and thereafter returned to the car, her and Estacios hands were bloodied.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 12, 2005 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The Court finds appellants Maritess Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder, with the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle.
PONTEJOS v. DESIERTO
CRIME: Grave misconduct
TOPIC: Effect of discharge
FACTS:
In a case decided by petitioner arbiter Pontejos, Rasemco, through Aquino, asked for the nullification of all the
proceedings conducted before said petitioner for alleged extortion, bribery and graft and corruption committed by him
in conspiracy with Director Wilfredo Imperial and Ms. Carmen Atos, both of HLURB and one Roderick Ngo, officer
of Hammercon, Inc.
Respondent Ombudsman Desierto issued an order placing petitioner Pontejos under preventive suspension for 6
months without pay and further directing him and Dir. Imperial to file their counter-affidavits and other controverting
evidence to the complaint. Thereafter, the Evaluation and preliminary investigation bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a joint resolution recommending that: an Information for Estafa (one count), direct bribery and
unauthorized practice of profession in violation of RA 6713 be filed against respondent Pontejos; complaint against
Director Imperial and Ngo be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence; and respondent Atos be extended immunity
from criminal prosecution in accordance with Section 17 of R.A 6770 and be utilized as a state witness. So the Office of
the Ombudsman filed criminal informations for bribery and estafa against respondent Pontejos. Then in a Resolution
dated June 21, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman granted Atos immunity from criminal prosecution for bribery and
estafa filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the above decision but was denied by the Ombudsman. Filed Petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court in the CA, denied also and upheld the Ombudsman's decision finding petitioner guilty of
grave misconduct. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied his motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Did CA err in not declaring that the grant of immunity to Ms. Atos was improper.
HELD:
NO, the power to choose who to discharge as state witness is an executive function. Essentially, it is not a judicial
prerogative. It is constitutionally permissible for Congress to vest the prosecutor with the power to determine who can
qualify as a witness and be granted immunity from prosecution. The Court has previously upheld the discretion of the
DOJ, Comelec, and the PCGG to grant immunity from prosecution on the basis of the respective laws that vested
them with such power. The OMB was also vested with the power to grant immunity from prosecution.
According to Pontejos, the OMB's authority to grant immunity is subject to the "pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court (Sec.17)." He claims that the procedural rules allow the discharge of an accused as state witness only upon
conformity of the trial court. An information against the accused must first be filed in court prior to the discharge.
Moreover, the prosecution could only recommend and propose, but not grant immunity. The Court has already held
that this provision is applicable only to cases already filed in court. The trial court is given the power to discharge an
accused as a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The fact that
an individual had not been previously charged or included in an information does not prevent the prosecution from
utilizing said person as a witness.
Section 17 of the Ombudsman Act requires conformity with the Rules of Court, thus requiring the following
circumstances prior to the discharge: (1) absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged; (2)
no direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed except the testimony of the said
accused; (3) the testimony of the said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (4) said accused
does not appear to be most guilty; and (5) said accused has not any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
There must be a standard to follow in the exercise of the prosecutor's discretion. The decision to grant immunity
cannot be made capriciously. Should there be unjust favoritism, the Court may exercise its certiorari power.
In the present case, certiorari is not proper. Pontejos' allegations do not show, much less allege, grave abuse of
discretion in the granting of immunity to Atos. The OMB considered Atos' position, record and involvement in the
case prior to the discharge. DENIED.
ANTONIO Y. DE JESUS, SR., ANATOLIO A. ANG, and MARTINA S. APIGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
4TH DIVISION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Section 23. Demurrer to Evidence
FACTS.
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Mayor Antonio De Jesus, Sr. as well as his Vice Mayor and Treasurer
of falsification of public document before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 26764. The three accused along with the
Mayors son were also charged of violation of RA 3019 before the same court in Criminal Case 26766. The first
information allege that the accused local officials falsified the Requests for Quotation and Abstract of Proposal of
Canvass by making it appear that Cuad Lumber and Hinundayan Lumber submitted quotations for the supply of coco
lumber, when they did in fact do so, in violation of Article 171 of the RPC. The second information alleges that, taking
advantage of their positions, the three municipal officers gave unwarranted advantage to De Jesus, Jr., who operated
under the name Anahawan Coco Lumber Supply, by awarding to him the supply of coco lumber worthP16,767.00.
On April 12, 2005, after the prosecution rested its case, all three accused filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to
evidence, which motion the Sandiganbayan denied. Rather than present evidence, however, they proceeded to file their
demurrer, in effect waiving their right to present evidence. The prosecution opposed the demurrer. Sandiganbayan
rendered judgment convicting the accused local officials, but acquitted the mayors son.
ISSUE. WON the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the accused local officials of the opportunity to present their
defense after it denied their demurrer to evidence.
HELD.
NO. The accused local officials assail the Sandiganbayans refusal to allow them to present evidence of their
defense after it denied their demurrer to evidence. But, contrary to their claim, the Sandiganbayan did not grant these
officials leave to file their demurrer. It in fact denied them that leave without prejudice, however, to their nonetheless
filing one subject to the usual risk of denial.
Having denied the accused local officials demurrer to evidence, the Sandiganbayan was justified in likewise
denying their motion to be allowed to present evidence in their defense. The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
particularly Section 23, Rule 119, provide:
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. x x x
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the
accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Sandiganbayan Decision promulgated on March 7,
2007 and its Resolution dated April 16, 2008.
guilty,
homicide.