Understanding Performance Management and Appraisal:

Supervisory and Employee Perspectives

Michelle Brown and Victoria S. Lim

INTRODUCTION
SUPERVISORY STRATEGIES IN PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
EMPLOYEE STRATEGIES IN PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
CONCLUSIONS
ENTRY CITATION

INTRODUCTION
The employment relationship is open ended, meaning that the level of employee effort
is neither fixed nor guaranteed. In response, many organizations establish mechanisms
to provide clarity of organizational expectations through the evaluation of an
employee's performance. The early systems were referred to as performance appraisal
(PA) systems. PA usually involves evaluating performance based on the judgments
and opinions of subordinates, peers, supervisors, other managers and even workers
themselves (Jackson and Schuler, 2003: 455). Fletcher (2001) suggests that the
definition of this term has expanded from a narrow focus on the completion of an
annual report on an employees performance to a term that encompasses a variety of
activities through which organizations seek to assess employees and develop their
competence, enhance performance and distribute rewards' (p. 473). The outcome of
performance appraisals are used to provide career counselling, identify training and
development opportunities, adjust rates of pay and provide information for discipline
and dismissal decisions. PA has been seen as part of a broader approach known as
performance management. In this chapter we will use the term PA and focus on the
motivations and tactics that supervisors and employees use in the formal evaluation of
an employee's performance.
The research on PA falls into three broad themes. The early work focused on the
psychometric properties of appraisal (Milkovich and Widgor, 1991). There are a great
many studies that examined the different types of rating scales and formats for
evaluating performance (for example, see Arvey and Murphy, 1998). Much of this
early research regarded PA sasatest, resulting in an emphasis on validity, reliability
and freedom from bias. The basic assumption was that rating inaccuracy was due to
inadvertent cognitive errors (Tziner, 1999). The response was to provide supervisors
with scales impermeable to cognitive rating biases (Tziner, 1999) and training. For
example, researchers examined the impact of behaviourally anchored rating scales or
graphic rating scales and identified a range of common errors made by supervisors,
such as halo (a favourable rating for all job duties based on good performance in just
one job duty), central tendency (rating all employees close to the midpoint of a scale
irrespective of true performance) and recency effects (placing too much emphasis on
recent performance) (Milkovich and Newman, 2002).
The quest for precision was replaced by an emphasis on how PAs could be engaged to
further organisational goals (Milkovich and Widgor, 1991 refer to this as the applied
tradition'). Research on supervisors continued but the emphasis was on their

knowledge of the PA and the level of trust employees had in their supervisor. Debate
about the use of performance ratings also commenced about this time: ratings used for
developmental purposes were seen to be more lenient than ratings intended to
determine pay outcomes (Boswell and Boudreau, 2002).
The third and most contemporary approach focuses on employee reactions to
appraisal and the social context in which appraisals occur as these are seen as critical
in determining the effectiveness of an appraisal system (Keeping and Levy, 2000;
Levy and Williams, 2004). The rationale behind this body of research is that the way
employees respond to a system is important to understanding whether the appraisal
system is ultimately effective (Cardy and Dobbins, 1994).
The focus of this chapter is on how supervisors and employees manage the processes
of PA. The impact of various systems has been extensively researched so few practical
or theoretical gains are to be made with further research into design issues (see
Milkovich and Widgor, 1991; Keeping and Levy, 2000; Levy and Williams, 2004).
We also have a sizeable body of research that examines the outcomes of appraisal.
What is less well understood are the motivations and tactics of the participants
operating within the system of appraisal. Survey evidence (Nankervis and Compton,
2006) demonstrates that the use of performance appraisal is now common among
Australian organizations for both supervisors and employees. A supervisor is likely to
find the assessment of their performance is partly a function of the way they manage
the evaluations of their employees (Curtis et al., 2005) while employees are likely to
face a PA system that is likely to impact on their pay, promotion and job security
(Nankervis and Compton, 2006). Further, Treadway et al. (2007) argue that
performance appraisals are becoming increasingly subjective. In combination, this
provides an incentive for both participants to manage the process in order to ensure
that it does them no harm or enhances their prospects within the organization. The
way the participants manage the process may ultimately impact on the effectiveness
of the PA system.
There is a relatively large body of research that has examined the motivations of
supervisors in order to ensure that they provide accurate ratings. We review this
literature and provide an agenda for future research. We then turn our attentions to
employee motivations and tactics in PA. This is a much smaller body of research and
represents a particularly fertile line for future research. We devote our attentions
towards more contemporary research publications and provide examples from those
publications that are representative of key findings and debates.

SUPERVISORY STRATEGIES IN
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
Introduction
The supervisor plays a critical role in the PA process. Supervisors are typically
responsible for observing performance, rating performance and conducting the
performance appraisal interview (PAI). The way in which supervisors put these major
PA activities into practice ultimately determines the effectiveness of the organization's
PA system (den Hartog et al., 2004). Consequently, there has been a great deal of PA

research that has focused on helping supervisors rate employees more accurately, and
how supervisors make decisions when rating employees. More recently, research has
started concentrating on the contextual factors that influence the way supervisors rate
employees. The following section reviews these main research themes in PA.

Motivation
Early research commonly assumed that supervisors aimed to rate employee
performance accurately, and that accuracy in performance ratings was a function of
the supervisor's cognitive capability. However, Murphy and Cleveland (1995) argue
that rather than being incapable of rating accurately, inaccuracies in ratings were
likely to be due to the supervisor's motivation to provide accurate ratings. A number
of situational and personal factors contribute to a supervisor's motivation (Harris,
1994). Recent studies have found that a number of situational factors, such as
organizational commitment, organizational climate, performance appraisal purpose
(PAP), trust in the PA system, confidence in the system and accountability impact the
supervisor's motivation to rate accurately. In addition to situational factors, there are
also several personal variables that influence the supervisor's motivation, including
individual differences, self-efficacy, performance appraisal discomfort (PAD), and
goals.

Situational determinants
Organizational climate and organizational commitment A number of studies
demonstrate that organizational climate and organizational commitment play an
important role in shaping a supervisor's motivation when conducting PA (Tziner and
Murphy, 1999; Tziner et al., 1998, 2001, 2002, 2005). A participative organizational
climate was found to impact supervisors motivation to provide accurate ratings and
helpful performance feedback (Tziner et al., 2001). Characteristics of a participative
organizational climate include cooperative relationships, individual responsibility,
trust and communication. A participative organization is likely to reduce supervisorsubordinate conflict and political distortion of ratings. Similarly, supervisors who had
higher levels of attitudinal commitment provided more accurate ratings (Tziner and
Murphy, 1999).

Trust and confidence in the PA system

The perceptions supervisors hold about the PA system also have implications for their
motivation in putting the system into practice. Harris (1994) argues that low levels of
trust in the PA system will adversely affect the supervisor's motivation to rate
accurately. Super visors with trustin the PA systembelieve that the performance data
will be utilized in a fair and objective manner. If a supervisor has low levels of trust in
the PA system, he or she is likely to rate leniently rather than accurately due to the
likelihood of negative outcomes for the employee. Tziner et al.'s (1998) study found
that supervisors who had lower levels of trust in the PA system provided higher
ratings compared to supervisors with higher levels of trust.
Similarly, a supervisor's confidence in the organization's PA system can also impact
rating behaviour. Supervisors who have confidence in the PA system perceive it to be
a credible activity that provides accurate and useful information about individual

employee performance (Tziner and Murphy, 1999). Confidence in the PA system is

influenced by whether political factors generally play a role in the formulation of
ratings. Perceptions that performance ratings are largely used for political purposes in
an organization (e.g., Longenecker et al., 1987) will reduce a supervisor's confidence
in the PA system. Consequently, if rating inflation or distortion is the norm in the
organization, supervisors are also likely to provide inaccurate ratings. Tziner and
Murphy's (1999) study found that supervisors with low levels of confidence in the PA
system were more likely to give elevated ratings.

Performance appraisal purpose and accountability

An organization's PA system may serve administrative and/or developmental purposes
and this has been found to influence the supervisors motivation in ratings given to
employees. When the purpose of PA is administrative or evaluative, ratings of
employee performance are used to determine important human resource decisions
such as pay and promotion. In contrast, when PA serves a developmental purpose, the
focus is on identify the employee's strengths and weaknesses for training needs and
feedback (Jawahar and Williams, 1997; Taylor and Wherry, 1951). Research findings
clearly indicate that when ratings are used for administrative purposes, supervisors
rated employees more leniently than when rating was used for developmental
purposes (Curtis et al., 2005; Jawahar and Williams, 1997; Tziner et al., 2001, 2005).
In his model of rater motivation, Harris (1994) proposed that accountability would be
a key situational factor influencing motivation. More recently, there have been a
number of studies that have examined the relationship between accountability and the
supervisor's motivation in rating employee performance. Accountability refers to the
amount of social pressure on the supervisor to justify their rating to others (Harris,
1994). According to accountability theory, holding an individual accountable for the
decisions he or she makes will impact the individual's motivational state, and
consequently highlight the significance of the task at hand, as well as prompting
behaviour that leads toward task accomplishment (Mero et al., 2003)
Mero and Motowidlo (1995) found that when supervisors were made to feel
accountable by having to justify their ratings, more accurate ratings were provided.
Similar accountability pressures also resulted in reduced contrast effects and halo
errors (Palmer and Feldman, 2005). When made accountable, Mero et al. (2003)
found that supervisors increased their attentiveness to performance and recorded
better notes relating to the performance and this resulted in greater rating accuracy.
Overall, these studies highlight the positive aspects of accountability. However, other
studies have found that the audience' to whom supervisors are accountable to plays
an important role in shaping rating behaviour.
When supervisors are accountable to their superiors they tended to rate less leniently
(Curtis et al., 2005). Curtis et al. (2005) argue that if the supervisor's superiors are
likely to check the ratings and could potentially change their ratings, accountability is
increased. Supervisors are motivated to appear competent to their superiors and hence
rate less leniently. In contrast, research findings suggest that when supervisors are
held accountable to their employees, they are more likely to inflate their ratings
(Curtis et al., 2005; Klimoski and Inks, 1990; Roch, 2005; Shore and Tashchian,
2002; 2003). This is especially true when supervisors anticipate a face-to-face

meeting with employees who are poor performers (Klimoski and Inks, 1990; Yun et
al., 2005).
In general, supervisors do not like giving negative feedback (e.g., Tesser and Rosen,
1975) and employees do not welcome negative feedback about their performance
(e.g., Geddes and Baron, 1997). When supervisors know that they are answerable to
their employees, the anticipation of adverse employee reactions is likely to motivate
supervisors to inflate their rating in order to avoid communicating negative feedback
(Curtis et al., 2005; Klimoski and Inks, 1990; Shore and Tashchian, 2002). Another
explanation for rating inflation in the context of downward accountability is that when
supervisors are aware of the employee's views, they are likely to provide ratings that a
similar to that of the employee's expectation. Employees often have an unrealistically
positive view of their own performance and are likely to rate themselves highly
(Meyer, 1980). For supervisors, this approach towards making rating decisions
involves the least amount of effort in information processing (Mero and Motowidlo,
1995).

Personal determinants
Individual differences
A supervisor's personality has also been found to be an important determinant of
rating behaviour (Costa and McCrae, 1992). Research suggests that a supervisor's
tendency to distort ratings is a relatively stable characteristic of the individual. For
example, Bernadin et al. (2000) found that high conscientious supervisors tended to
give lower ratings, while supervisors high in Agreeableness were more likely to
provide elevated ratings (Costa and McCrae, 1992). Other studies have found that a
supervisor's personality influences the relationship between situational factors and
rating behaviour. For example, Tziner et al. (2002) found that conscientiousness
moderated the relationship between situational determinants (e.g., PA purpose and
confidence in the PA system) and the supervisor's rating behaviour. Low conscientious
supervisors were more likely to provide ratings that were consistent with their
perception of contextual factors. In Roch et al.'s (2005) study high conscientious
supervisors felt more accountable. When supervisors where accountable to their
employees and expected a face-to-face meeting, Yun et al. (2005) found supervisors
high in agreeableness provided more elevated ratings compared to those low on
agreeableness.
Researchers have also begun to examine another dispositional characteristic of the
rater: self-monitoring. In one such study, Jawahar (2001) found that high selfmonitors tended to produce more elevated and inaccurate ratings. Self-monitoring is a
stable dispositional characteristic that is related to an individual's tendency to consider
and to be influenced by situational conditions. High self-monitors are good at
interpreting cues in the social environment and are able to adapt their behaviour to fit
the social context. While it seems to suggest that supervisors who are high selfmonitors tend to inflate ratings, this may not necessarily be problematic. Jawahar
(2005) also found that high self-monitors are better at noticing situational constraints
that impede employee performance, and adjust their ratings accordingly.

Self-efficacy

Some studies have found that the level of a supervisor's self-efficacy affects rating
choices. Supervisors with high levels of self-efficacy are expected to be motivated to
provide more accurate ratings, as they believe that they have the necessary
information, tools and skills to perform the task (Bernadin and Villanova, 2005;
Tziner et al., 2005). In contrast, supervisors with lower levels of self-efficacy are
likely to lack the motivation to undertake the appraisal task and provide accurate
ratings that have been carefully documented (Tziner et al., 2005). Bernadin and
Villanova (2005) found that training designed to improve self-efficacy to be effective
in reducing rating elevation. However, the role of self-efficacy in shaping supervisors
rating behaviour is not clear-cut. For example, Tziner et al. (1998) found that
supervisors with higher levels of self-efficacy were less likely to discriminate between
different aspects of performance. Other studies have found a positive relationship
between self-efficacy and rating leniency (Tziner and Murphy, 1999; Tziner et al.,
2002).

Performance appraisal discomfort

Research suggests that supervisors are uncomfortable about monitoring employee
performance, rating performance and communicating feedback (Murphy and
Cleveland, 1995). Studies indicate that supervisors reporting high levels of discomfort
also tended to rate more leniently (Tziner and Murphy, 1999; Tziner et al., 2001;
Villanova et al., 1993). Supervisors are likely to provide lenient ratings to avoid
unpleasant consequences that are potentially attached to lower ratings. Smith et al.
(2000) also found that supervisors who perceive that PA is associated with important
outcomes experienced higher levels of discomfort. In contrast with personality, both
self-efficacy and performance appraisal discomfort have been found to be personal
factors that can be changed via training interventions (Bernadin and Villanova, 2005).

Goals and appraisal politics

The pursuit of certain goals is also likely to influence a supervisor's motivation
(Murphy and Cleveland, 1995). Supervisors will tend to assign employees a rating
that facilitates the achievement of their goals and not necessarily the most accurate
rating (Cleveland and Murphy, 1992). According to Cleveland and Murphy (1992) the
goals supervisors pursue generally relate to 1) the employee's task-performance, 2)
maintenance of interpersonal relationships, 3) strategic purposes, and 4) the
individual's personal values and beliefs. Murphy et al. (2004) found that when
supervisors are observing the same performance, different ratings are given that are
consistent with the supervisor's goals.
Appraisal politics is an example of goal-directed behaviour (Cleveland and Murphy,
1992). In studies employing open-ended interviews, supervisors reported
manipulating performance ratings to achieve a particular end state (Gioia and
Longenecker, 1994; Longenecker et al., 1987). For example, supervisors explained
that they inflated performance ratings in order to maintain or improve employee
performance (Longenecker et al., 1987). Supervisors also recognized that such
political behaviour can produce undesired consequences that include undermining
organizational goals and exposing the organization to lawsuits when employees are
terminated (Gioia and Longenecker, 1994). In addition to these qualitative studies,
Tziner et al. (1996) developed the Questionnaire of Political Considerations in

Performance Appraisals (QPCPA) to encourage quantitative studies of appraisal

politics. The QPCPA has subsequently been used in recent research examining
appraisal politics (e.g., Poon, 2004). Poon's (2004) study examined the outcomes of
appraisal politics. This study found that appraisal politics resulted in lowered job
satisfaction and, in turn, increased turnover intentions, when political behaviour
stemmed from personal bias or was used to punish employees. However, if political
behaviour was exercised for the purpose of motivating employees, it had no effect on
job satisfaction and turnover intentions.

Future research
PA research should not merely make theoretical contributions, but also facilitate
improvements in practice. A criticism of the PA literature is the lack of attention
directed towards how research might inform practice (Bretz et al., 1992). The
widespread use of laboratory settings and student samples in many studies fosters the
gap between research and practice. However, many recent studies of the social and
contextual factors have continued to be conducted within laboratory settings (e.g.,
Curtis et al., 2005; Roch et al., 2005). While researchers have made attempts to
simulate real-life organizational conditions in the laboratory, findings of their studies
still need to be replicated in field settings.
As researchers continue to examine the social and contextual factors that influence
PA, it is important to ensure that attempts are made to bridge the research-practice
gap. Studies examining individual differences have been useful in demonstrating that
rating behaviour is a function of the supervisor's personality (e.g., Bernadin et al.,
2000; Jawahar, 2001). However, personality is a stable disposition with little
applicability to organizations (Bernadin and Villanova, 2005). For example, what
measures can organizations implement to encourage supervisors high in Agree
ableness to rate more accurately? In order to minimize the research-practice gap,
researchers should direct their attention towards examining contextual factors that
strengthen or weaken the relationship between personality and rating behaviour. For
example Yun et al. (2005) found that supervisors high in Agreeableness were more
likely to inflate ratings when a face-to-face meeting was expected. On a practical
level, organizations can implement interventions relating to the PAI to moderate the
rating behaviour of supervisors with certain personality characteristics.
A key concern within PA research is the tendency of supervisors to inflate ratings.
Accountability research indicates that when supervisors expect to justify their ratings
to employees in a face-to-face context, ratings are likely to be inflated (for example,
Klimoski and Ink, 1990). Thus, in organizations where supervisors are required to
formally communicate the rating and provide feedback to employees in a face-to-face
during the PA interview, rating inflation is expected to be particularly problematic. It
appears that one reason for rating inflation is that supervisors are uncomfortable and
lack self-efficacy in communicating lower ratings to employees during the PAI
(Bernadin and Villanova, 2005; Villanova et al., 1993). Accurate ratings are likely to
be below the employee's own assessment of how well he or she has performed and
hence perceived by employees as negative feedback. In general negative feedback is
not readily accepted and can result in adverse employee reactions such as aggression
(Geddes and Baron, 1997; Ilgen et al., 1979; Meyer, 1980).

Thus it seems useful for future research to focus not only on rating behaviour but also
examine how supervisors manage the PA interview. For example, what tactics do
supervisors employ when communicating negative feedback to employees during the
PA interview? Which tactics help supervisors communicate negative feedback in a
way that results in performance improvements whilst minimizing adverse employee
reactions? On a practical level, these research findings can be applied to the design of
training interventions that help equip supervisors to deliver negative feedback
effectively. Furthermore, culture may play a role in the feedback process (Shipper et
al., 2007). For example, in high power distance cultures (Hofstede, 2001) employees
may accept negative feedback from their supervisor more readily compared to
employees from low power distance culture. It would also be interesting to examine
whether the tactics managers use to communicate negative feedback differs across
cultures.
Previous research suggests that the supervisor's experience in conducting PA provided
more accurateratings (Barnes-Farrel et al., 1991; Cardy et al., 1987; Ostroff and Ilgen,
1992). Similarly, we might anticipate that a supervisor with little experience of PA
will utilize different tactics to one with many years of experience. For example, an
inexperienced supervisor might be more likely to stick more closely to the rules of the
system while an experienced supervisor may be more willing to regard the rules as
guidelines. Experienced supervisors may also have a wider range of tactics compared
to supervisors with less experience.
Aside from ratings, supervisors may also employ a more subtle approach towards
achieving their PA goals (Murphy and Cleveland, 1995; Murphy et al., 2004). The
blatant distortion of ratings is associated with the risk of sanctions from the
organization, if detected. Tziner and Murphy (1999) found that when supervisors
perceived a high risk of being caught they were less likely to distort their ratings. The
use of influence tactics in managing the PA process is comparatively less obvious
(Falbe and Yukl, 1992; Yukl et al., 1996; Yukl and Tracey, 1992). For example, if
supervisors are interested in improving employee performance, they may adopt
certain tactics to motivate employees to exert extra effort in order to improve their
performance during the PA cycle before the rating stage. Improved employee
performance will subsequently be reflected in performance ratings. Hence supervisors
are able to achieve their goals through the use of influence tactics without rating
distortions. Furthermore, we might anticipate different outcomes from these different
approaches: rating distortion is a blunt approach and possibly more likely to lead to
unintended outcomes. However, little is known about how supervisors manage other
stages of the PA process besides rating, and how this may differ as a result of PA
experience.
Future researchers should examine the extent to which supervisors vary their ratings
of employees over time. As employees become more familiar with a task, it is likely
to be completed more efficiently. Changes in motivation over time and the acquisition
of job knowledge can also contribute to changes in performance. Performance ratings
should reflect changes in employee performance (Sturman et al., 2005). At present we
know very little about whether supervisors are sensitive to changes in employee
performance, and to what extent they change their ratings of employees. However,
supervisors may not always have the opportunity to observe employee performance
for full PA cycle. Under these circumstances, supervisors may avoid evaluating the

employee's performance altogether (Fried et al., 1992). However, when avoidance is

not an option, how do supervisors manage the PA process when they are limited by
time?
Finally, PA researchers have typically focused on a single participant in the PA
process either the supervisor or the employee (Levy and Williams, 2004).
Examining the interaction between the participants within the PA process can also be
useful in understanding the motivations and strategies of supervisors. To what extent
do supervisors alter their approach depending on their reading of the employee? For
example, the feedback tactic employed may differ depending on whether the
supervisor believes the employee prefers straight talking or a more subtle approach.
Furthermore, do supervisors attempt to read all of their employees or maintain a
consistent approach in order to be seen as fair?

EMPLOYEE STRATEGIES IN PERFORMANCE

MANAGEMENT
Under the measurement tradition, employees were often regarded as passive
participants in the PA process: employees working under a well-designed system with
an appropriately trained supervisor would respond with high levels of performance.
Under the applied tradition, employee reactions to appraisal have been extensively
researched. This section looks behind employee reactions to employee motivations
and tactics in a PA system. We first review the literature on employee motivations and
tactics and then outline an agenda for future research.

Motivation
Appraisals have at their core a desire to maximize the performance of employees in
order to further organizational performance (Cardy and Dobbins, 1994). The
assumption is that employees are motivated by the desire for a high rating in order to
access the financial and non financial rewards (for example, merit bonuses,
promotional opportunities and access to training and development programmes). A
theoretical basis for this assumption derives from expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964),
which predicts that job motivation is improved when employees link job performance
and organizational rewards. The anticipation of rewards can motivate people to a
higher level of performance (Heneman, 1992).
There is a sizeable body of research that has examined the impact of performance
ratings on employees. The rating is a valued outcome as it represents an assessment of
the employee's worth to the organization and can be important in maintaining selfesteem (Folger, 1987). An employee's self esteem is affected by performance ratings
because research has shown that employees usually rate themselves higher than their
supervisors do (Meyer and Walker, 1961). Further, self enhancement theory
(Schrauger, 1975) suggests that individuals will react more positively to higher ratings
than to lower ratings. Positive evaluations are seen as more accurate, are valued more
and are better accepted than negative ratings. Positive ratings elicit positive reactions
toward the appraisal (Kacmar et al., 1996). This suggests that employees are
motivated to pursue higher ratings. Jackman and Strober (2003) suggest that
employees are motivated to avoid a low rating

Employee reactions to performance appraisal

PA has been associated with a range of outcomes. Mayer and Davis (1999) reported
that PA systems can build trust in the organization. Taylor and Pierce (1999) measured
organizational commitment and job satisfaction. They report differences based on the
rating of the employee. There was an increase in assessments of job satisfaction and
co-operation with one's supervisor upon the introduction of the PA system for low
performers (particularly following the planning/goal setting phase). This was in
contrast to high performers who had a high base line level of these attitudes towards
supervision, followed by substantial drops immediately after receiving appraisal and
bonus pay distributions. A study by Taylor and Pierce (1999) found that a PA system
did not have a significant impact on the subsequent level of employee effort.
We also have a small body of research that has examined adverse employee reactions
to appraisal processes. Brown and Benson (2003) report that PA can stimulate
employee efforts beyond that which employees regard as manageable. Difficult
performance objectives and the pursuit of higher performance ratings were associated
with employee reports of work overload. Gabris and Ihrke (2001) find that procedural
and distributive injustice in a performance appraisal system was associated with
employee reports of burnout, a form of stress.

Participation in performance appraisal

The perceived fairness of a performance appraisal can have an impact on the overall
effectiveness of the system (Dobbins et al., 1990). Employees perception of
performance appraisal fairness is determined, in part, by the capacity to participate in
its processes: individuals view procedures as most fair when control is vested in the
participants (Konovsky, 2000: 493). Two types of participation have been identified:
instrumental and non instrumental (Korsgaard and Roberson, 1995). Instrumental
participation is seen to permit some level of control by employees over processes and
decisions. Jawahar (2006) suggests that employees value instrumental participation
as they may believe that they could use the performance appraisal feedback session
to highlight their accomplishments in a manner that would result in higher
evaluations (p. 216). Non instrumental participation is valued because it offers the
opportunity to express an opinion regardless of its actual impact, as it satisfies the
desire to have one's opinions considered (Korsgaard and Roberson, 1995).
After a meta analysis of participation studies, Cawley et al. (1998: 624) concluded the
analysis has firmly established that participation in performance appraisal is
positively associated with a diverse number of favourable subordinate reactions. The
value of participation is further demonstrated by a link between low involvement and
employee reports of stress. Michie and Williams (2003) report high levels of distress
among student nurses caused by a low level of involvement in PA decision-making.
They also report that employees who have learned to participate, and hence control
their work, have lower stress hormones. An alternative perspective on participation is
provided by Newton and Findlay (1996: 43) who asked do employees really want to
take responsibility for improving themselves through their active participation in
appraisal or rather might they view appraisal as a manipulation which places the

burden of development on the employee and encourages them to see themselves as

a resource which they must polish and refine according to their employer's needs.

Impression management
Impression management (IM) refers to the process by which individuals try to
influence the impressions others have of them. a persons overarching goals when
engaging in impression management is to create a desired image in the minds of
others which can be achieved by using a variety of tactics (Harris et al., 2007: 278).
The tactics of IM fall into two broad categories: supervisor focused and job focused
(Wayne and Liden, 1995).
Supervisory focused impression management techniques involve ingratiation
behaviours that are intended to make employees more likeable (for example, flattery
or favour rendering) (Bolino et al., 2006). There is a body of research supporting the
value of supervisory focused IM as demonstrated by a positive impact on performance
evaluations (see Gordon, 1996; Vilela et al., 2007; Wayne and Ferris, 1990; Wayne
and Liden, 1995). A supervisor who feels liked and admired by a subordinate is more
likely to rate the employee favourably (Wayne and Ferris, 1990; Wayne and Liden,
1995). Job focused impression management techniques are designed to make
employees appear more competent at their job (for example self promotion and taking
credit for positive events at work (Bolino et al., 2006)). Wayne and Ferris (1990) and
Ferris et al. (1994) found that job focused techniques were less liked by supervisors
and employees who used them received lower performance ratings from their
supervisor. There is also some research that suggests that impression management can
create adverse consequences for employees. Crant (1996, quoted in Lam et al., 2007)
noted that the use of impression management techniques may result in employees
being seen as untruthful, unreliable and calculating.
Attention has now turned to how impression management tactics work. Kacmar et al.
(2004) reported that dispositional factors (i.e. self esteem, need for power, job
involvement and shyness) were significant in explaining the use of ingratiatory tactics
(these include flattery, false modesty, and opinion conformity). Harris et al. (2007)
found that individuals who use IM tactics and were high in political skill were more
likely to be seen as better performers. Individuals low in political skill who engaged
in IM tactics were seen as less effective performers. The explanation for these
findings is that those employees with a high level of political skills were able to use
the range of IM tacticsm or eeffectively as they tailored their use based on their
knowledge of their supervisor.
The challenge for supervisors is to be alert to the use of IM tactics in order to be less
susceptible to its effects. Supervisors need to be aware that their performance ratings
may be contaminated by the IM tactics of their subordinates. This is particularly
significant when the outcomes of a performance appraisal are linked to critical HRM
decisions such as pay or promotion (Vilela et al., 2007).
Hochwarter et al. (2007) examine the role of employee reputation and its impact on
perceived effectiveness. Individuals who have developed a more favourable
reputation are seen as more legitimate, competent and trustworthy and typically

enjoy the benefits of being viewed as possessing a higher level of status' (p. 568).
Further individuals perceived as reputable are progressively more prone to be
afforded the benefit of the doubt. Hochwarter et al. (2007) found that reputation
moderated the relationship between political behaviour and job performance, such
that those with a high reputation were more likely to have higher supervisor reported
performance.
The nature of the relationship between an employee and their supervisor has been
shown to be critical in assessments of employee performance. In the leader-member
exchange (LMX) literature, the higher the quality of the relationship, the better
subordinates perform. As the quality of the LMX increases, supervisors provide more
support and resources to their subordinates in various tasks that aid career
development. Such positive contributions create obligations for the subordinates to
reciprocate, which they do by performing more effectively (Chen et al., 2007).
At the other end of the spectrum, there is research on abusive supervision, which is
defined as subordinates perception of the extent to which their supervisors engage in
the sustained display of hostile verbal and non verbal behaviours, excluding physical
contact (Tepper, 2000: 178). Tepper et al. (2001) investigate employee responses to
abusive supervision, suggesting that there are two broad types of employee resistance:
functional and dysfunctional responses. Functional responses involve constructive
efforts designed to open a dialogue with their supervisors (e.g. requesting clarification
and negotiation), while dysfunctional responses involve passiveaggressive
responses (e.g. acting like one is too busy to complete a request, acting like one did
not hear the request or acting like one has forgotten to perform the request (p. 975).
This has implications for PA as Tepper et al. (2001) report that employees in their
study retaliated against abusive supervisor by resisting downward influence attempts
in a dysfunctional manner.
In combination these studies suggest that employees are not always passive agents in
the PA process and when they use IM tactics, work on developing a good reputation
or a high quality relationship with their supervisor, they will be more likely to be seen
as good performers.

Feedback and performance appraisal

Feedback seeking is a proactive employee behaviour typically seen as an explicit
verbal request for information on work behaviour and work performance (Lam et al.,
2007: 349). For organizations, feedback provides an opportunity to give direction to
employee behaviours and stimulate employee effort, while feedback for employees
satisfies a need for information about how they are doing at work (Jawahar, 2006).
Kluger and DeNisi (1996) found that while feedback typically improved employee
performance, in just over a third of the studies feedback lowered performance.
Feedback can be positive or negative, though employees are not typically receptive to
negative feedback. This is because negative feedback may be based on unjust
interpersonal treatment (Leung et al., 2001), may cause the recipient to lose face or
may damage his or her self image (Bernichon et al., 2003). Jackman and Strober
(2003) point out that some employees avoid seeking feedback for fear that it will
result in impossible demands (p. 101). Information and clarity of expectations will

ensure employees realise the full extent of their supervisor's performance

expectations. This fear of feedback is partly based on a view that supervisors focus on
the negatives in performance, a product of PA scheme design that requires supervisors
to identify improvements. This is particularly the case when the performance
objectives are numerical as the suggestions for changes are likely to involve doing
more (Coens and Jenkins, 2000). Reaction to negative feedback can vary but, as
Bourguignon et al. (2005) point out, reactions to negative feedback may depend on
the employees opportunities for external mobility, relative strength, and loyalty to the
organization. Employees who are in a weak position may become cynical.
On the other hand, Chen et al. (2007) suggest that seeking negative feedback is a
means of obtaining an accurate view of how employees are perceived and determining
how they can reciprocate in ways that will satisfy their supervisors expectations.
Chen et al. argue that negative feedback has a higher instrumental value than positive
feedback. Negative feedback gives recipients a better idea of inadequate work
behaviour and performance and suggests how they can make improvements according
to their supervisor's preferences. Chen et al. (2007) found that a better relationship
between the employee and supervisor (measured by LMX, leader member exchange')
encourages subordinates to seek negative feedback from their immediate supervisor
more frequently. This is because such an interaction requires a high level of mutual
trust such that subordinates feel able to seek potentially embarrassing or difficult
information from their immediate boss.
Supervisors may interpret employee feedback seeking as a desire to improve
performance (performance enhancement motive') or to create a positive impression
with their supervisor (impression management motive'). Researchers have found a
positive relationship between employee feedback seeking and objective work
performance when supervisors interpreted the feedback seeking behaviour as being
driven more by performance enhancement motives and less by impression
management motives (Lam et al., 2007: 348). When a supervisor views employee
feedback seeking driven by a performance enhancement motive they regard the
employee as achievement focused and intending to meet a high standard in
accomplishing work tasks (Lam et al., 2007: 350). When are employees likely to be
proactive in seeking feedback? Barner-Rasmussen (2003) demonstrated that perceived
trust and frequent interaction with supervisors were determinants of the feedback
seeking behaviour of subordinates.
Lee (1997) distinguishes feedback from help seeking behaviour. Feedback can be
used by employees to monitor their performance, even in the absence of any specific
problems. In contrast, help seeking is a more proactive behaviour focussed on solving
specific problems. It involves the search for another to provide assistance and relief
(Lee, 1997: 338). There are many obstacles to help seeking behaviour, acknowledging
incompetence and increasing dependence on others, which can negatively impact on
an employee's public image. However, employees who are able to seek help tend to
have higher performance evaluations (Lee, 1999). Lee (1997) found that individuals
were more likely to seekhelp more from equal status than unequal status helpers.
Employees are not only the recipients of feedback but are often asked to provide
feedback on their supervisors as part of a 360 degree feedback model of performance
appraisal. Kudisch, For tunanto & Smith (2006) noted that employees are typically

reluctant to provide feedback, which is a problem for the effectiveness of an upward

appraisal system (which requires the input of many in order to get a clear picture of a
supervisor's performance). Kudisch et al. found that providing employees with
knowledge of the upward appraisal system (and its consequences), support from coworkers and top management and confidence to provide ratings, were important in
encouraging employees to provide an assessment of their supervisor. Antonioni
(1994) examined employee tactics in an upward feedback system. In his study,
employees indicated a strong preference for anonymity when providing feedback on
their supervisor for fear of reprisal (p. 354). Further, when they were made
accountable for their feedback (by including their name with the feedback) employees
rated their supervisor more favourably than those able to remain anonymous.

Resistance in performance appraisal

Employees have a choice in their response to the downward influence tactics used by
their supervisors through an appraisal system. Yukl (2002) suggested that employees
resist managerial influence attempts by making excuses about why the request cannot
be carried out, try to persuade the agent to withdraw or change the request, ask higher
authorities to overrule the agent's request, delay acting in the hope that the agent will
forget about the request, make a pretence of complying but try to sabotage the task or
refuse to carry out the request (p. 143).
Does resistance have any impact on an employee rated performance? Tepper et al.
(1998) identified two approaches to resistance: refusing negatively and negotiating.
They found that negotiating was positively related to performance, demonstrating that
employees choice of resistance tactics can have an impact of their performance
rating. In a subsequent study, Tepper et al. (2006) distinguish between two managerial
views of resistance. A uniformly dysfunctional perspective (i.e. supervisors who
regard all manifestations of resistance as indicators of ineffective influence and rate
subordinates unfavourably when they resist) and a multi-functional perspective (i.e.
supervisors regard some manifestations of resistance as more constructive than others
and rate subordinates more favourably when they employ constructive resistance
tactics). They find that supervisors adopt a uniformly dysfunctional perspective when
they have a low quality LMX relationship and adopt a multifunctional perspective
when they have a higher quality LMX relationship.

Future directions
Researchers need to focus attention on the tactics used by employees in a PA system.
The PAI is in many ways equivalent to a job interview in that it provides the
employee an opportunity to manage their supervisor in order to make the right
impression and maximize the rewards or minimize any anticipated punishments (Ellis
et al., 2002). The selection literature tends to regard the job interview as consisting of
three broad parts: preparation for the interview, the interview and dealing with the
aftermath of the interview (Bardwell, 1991). This provides a useful research
framework for understanding the PA interview from an employee's perspective.
How do employees prepare for the PA interview? We might anticipate that the
employee will focus on collecting data for their appraisal, for example locating a copy
of the goals set in the first stage of the cycle and their indicators. Jackman and Strober

(2003) suggest that this stage might also include collecting feedback by others to take
into the meeting with the supervisor. The objective in this phase is to catalogue
evidence of activities and achievements during the evaluation cycle.
After the preparation of the formal documentation, the emphasis is likely to shift to
developing tactics. Tactical considerations might include timing of the PA interview
(e.g. early in the day, late in the day), best way to present the documentation, listening
versus talking in the PAI, anticipating supervisory reactions and deciding on how to
dress for the interview. Jackman and Strober (2003) identify the importance of
developing questions to be asked in the meeting. They also suggest that the employee
give thought to how these questions are framed, especially when they deal with issues
of negative feedback.
How do employees manage the actual exchange with their supervisor? Do employees
get anxious? McCarthy and Goffin (2004) have developed a scale to measure anxiety
in a selection interview, which might provide the basis for assessments of anxiety in
the PA interview. What tactics do employees invoke when the PA interview is not
going as they had anticipated in the preparation phase? Employees need to consider
their verbal and non-verbal reactions to issues raised in the interview: should they
remain physically and emotionally neutral (Jackman and Strober, 2003: 106) or
express their reactions in some way? Should employees take notes in the PA
interview? It might be an effective tactic for demonstrating an interest in the
observations of the supervisor (see Houdek et al., 2002 for a review of research on
note taking in an interview). How do employees read and respond to the non-verbal
messages provided by the supervisor? What effect does the tenure under a particular
supervisor have on the choice of tactics? The tactics employed during the first PA
interview with a supervisor might differ from those employed in subsequent PAI as
the employee learns how to read their supervisor more effectively. What effect does
previous experience with PA interviews impact on the choice of tactics? Employees in
their first appraisal interview might access a narrow set of tactics compared with a
veteran of PA interviews. Do employees talk about the tactics they used after the PAI?
We might anticipate that employees who have their PAI after other colleagues might
approach the interview differently based on the experience of those who went before
them. For example they will know of any particular issues that the supervisor is
emphasizing in the current round of PA interviews and possibly how the supervisor
has rated colleagues.
Do employees use different tactics to accomplish their objectives in a performance
appraisal system? The communication literature suggests this is the case with other
issues. For example, Lim (1990) found that respondents were more verbally
aggressive when their task was to persuade someone who resisted in an unfriendly
manner as opposed to a friendly manner. Is an employee's reaction to PA a function of
their assessment of how well they managed the process and their supervisor? To what
extent do the experiences of one PA impact on the choice of tactics in a subsequent
cycle?
Researchers should also be alert to the possibility of dysfunctional tactics.
Bourguignon et al. (2005) acknowledge that people manage performance measures
in ways that might create dysfunctional outcomes (p. 689). We also need to think
about the role of counter productive employee strategies, for example cheating.

Hochwarter et al. (2007) note that backstabbing and upmanship is undertaken to

secure benefits only for the actor' (p. 567) and is an ingrained component of virtually
all work settings (p. 567). As the consequences of performance appraisal escalate we
may anticipate greater use of these tactics.
Once we have established the range of employee tactics researchers should turn their
attention to understanding what kinds of employees make the best use of these tactics.
These individual differences might also be seen as sources of illegitimate strength
(Bourguignon et al., 2005) as not all employees will be effective in invoking appraisal
tactics. Researchers should consider the following as potential explanators: age,
gender, education and personality (for example as identified by the Big Five
personality measure [Costa and McCrae, 1992]: openness to experience,
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism). The orientation to
work might also provide a way of understanding who uses the tactics to what effect:
for example, achievement motivation, status aspiration, work ethic, acquisitiveness,
dominance and excellence orientation (Cassidy and Lynn, 1989).
We also need research on the limits to the effectiveness of tactics: three of interest are
the responsiveness of the supervisor, the structure of the PA and the orientation of the
PA system. Implicit person theory suggests that supervisors can be broadly
categorized as entity theorists or as incremental theorists (Heslin et al. 2005). The
former believe that personal attributes are largely fixed which leads them to quickly
form strong impressions of others that they resist revising even in the light of
contradictory information (p. 843). Incremental theorists are more likely to
appreciate the dynamic personal and situational determinants of behaviour and they
reconsider initial impression after receiving new information (p. 843). This
potentially limits the effectiveness of employee tactics with an entity
theorist'supervisor. It also suggests that the timing of tactics can be crucial as the first
assessments tend to become the anchor for subsequent assessments. Employees who
report to an instrumental theorist are more likely to find their tactics effective as
these supervisors are more receptive to new information framed by a tactically savvy
employee.
Does the level of structure in a PA system limit the extent to which any tactics
invoked by an employee can be effective? Campion et al. (1997) suggested that
structured job interviews limited the scope for IM techniques. This finding was
challenged by Ellis et al. (2002) who found that employees are able to invoke the full
range of IM tactics in a structured interview, depending on which tactic they thought
would be most likely to succeed.
Tsui and Wu (2005) suggest that human resource management (HRM) is currently
focused on employee monitoring and under this approach appraisals are adopted as a
cost cutting tool. Under a headcount management (p. 115) approach the emphasis is
on current job performance, which they see as inferior to a mutual investment'
approach which emphasizes broad based contributions. A cost cutting approach may
set limits to the effectiveness of employee tactics as supervisors may have less
discretion and unable to provide the kinds of outcomes that an employee's tactics in
PA were intended to generate.

CONCLUSIONS

PA researchers have typically focused their attentions on either the employee or the
supervisor (Levy and Williams, 2004), with an emphasis in trying to make PA systems
effective. It is now time to move from a focus on PA systems and their consequences
to a focus on how the participants operate within these systems. Our review has
identified a complex set of motives for both participants in PA and these are an
important element in the choice of tactics.
Understanding the motives and tactics of supervisors and employees raises many
methodological challenges. We will need to invoke qualitative techniques to identify
the full set of motives and tactics while quantitative research will help us identify the
extent to which they are used and their implications. We also need a dynamic
approach to research in PA as the tactics used by one participant will be a function of
those used by the other participant and how these actions and reactions of the
participants change over time (Bourguignon and Chiapello, 2005).
Performance appraisals are a widely used tool of human resource management and the
outcomes of these systems are used to inform many other HR functions. Investigating
the tactics used by the participants in a PA process is an exciting new way to
understand the role and consequences of this HRM tool.
Further Readings

Entry Citation:
Brown, Michelle, and Victoria S. Lim. "Understanding Performance Management and
Appraisal: Supervisory and Employee Perspectives." The SAGE Handbook of Human
Resource Management. 2009. SAGE Publications. 14 May. 2010. <http://www.sageereference.com/hdbk_humanresourcemgmt/Article_n12.html>.
Chapter DOI: 10.4135/978-1-8570-2149-3.n12