This document discusses dialectical materialism and the concept of matter. It makes three key points:
1) It is impossible to view matter as a supreme principle of being, as men produce based on concrete forms of matter, not matter as an abstract concept.
2) There is no fundamental or autonomous substance in dialectical materialism that could independently exist outside of its concrete attributes.
3) Neither spirit nor matter can be viewed as a uniform, fundamental principle for explaining the world, as dialectical materialism rejects the idea of an immutable essence or ultimately fundamental substance that all things can be derived from.
This document discusses dialectical materialism and the concept of matter. It makes three key points:
1) It is impossible to view matter as a supreme principle of being, as men produce based on concrete forms of matter, not matter as an abstract concept.
2) There is no fundamental or autonomous substance in dialectical materialism that could independently exist outside of its concrete attributes.
3) Neither spirit nor matter can be viewed as a uniform, fundamental principle for explaining the world, as dialectical materialism rejects the idea of an immutable essence or ultimately fundamental substance that all things can be derived from.
This document discusses dialectical materialism and the concept of matter. It makes three key points:
1) It is impossible to view matter as a supreme principle of being, as men produce based on concrete forms of matter, not matter as an abstract concept.
2) There is no fundamental or autonomous substance in dialectical materialism that could independently exist outside of its concrete attributes.
3) Neither spirit nor matter can be viewed as a uniform, fundamental principle for explaining the world, as dialectical materialism rejects the idea of an immutable essence or ultimately fundamental substance that all things can be derived from.
It is not just because the working Subjects mediate the
material o f nature through themselves that is is impossible to speak o f matter as a supreme principle o f being. Men are not concerned in their production with matter as such, but always with its concrete, quantitatively and qualitatively determined forms o f existence. Its general form,i.e.its independence o f consciousness, exists only in particular shapes. There is no fundamental matter, no fundamental ground o f being. M aterial reality can no more provide an ontological principle in die being for the other it owes to its reladvity to men, than it can in its being-in-itself. There is even less justification for describing dialectical materialism as a philosophy o f origin' than there is in the case o f Hegels dialectical idealism. Dialectical materialism admits no autonomous substance such as could exist independendy o f its concrete determinations. Engels expressed him self in the following manner on the concept o f matter in his notes to Anti-Dukrm g: N .B . M atter as such is a pure creation o f thought and an abstraction. W e leave out o f account d ie qualitative distinctions between things in subsum ing them as corporeally existing things under the concept matter*. M atter as such, as opposed to definite, existing pieces o f m atter, is therefore som ething which has no sensuous existence.*1
H e dealt again with the question o f matter in the Dia
lectics o f N ature-. M atter and m otion cam tot. . . be known in any other way than through the investigation o f d ie separate m aterial things and form s o f m otion, and b y knowing these w e also, in the sam e measure, know m atter and m otion as such.**
T h e latest attempts to systematize dialectical materialism
dispense just as explidd y with the concept o f matter as a substantial bearer* o f secondary accidents. N either Spirit nor matter is a uniform, 'fundam ental' principle for ex plaining the world: In opposition to m etaphysical m aterialism , dialectical materialism rejects the notion o f a final, im m utable essence o f things, o f an absolutely fundamental substance', from whose ultim ate properties and appearances everything that exists can be derived. In nature there finfhtng jmmufaMf. anrl q q