CRITIQUE OF HEGEL ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2020.

The root of the manifold errors in the ethical theory of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
(1770-1831) lies in its erroneous gnoseology and metaphysics, that is, in its immanentistic
absolute idealism1 and absolute monism (a total pantheism leading to determinism,2 despite

1
“Idealism is the philosophical theory that considers that all things, partially or totally, are only immanent to
thought, to the consciousness of the thinking subject. Its basis is the principle of immanence: something beyond
thought is unthinkable. There does not exist a reality or thing in itself independent from thought, precisely because
the being of things is a thought being (this is the reduction, in Scholastic terminology, of beings to beings of reason).
If one admits that some things are independent from consciousness (as it takes place in Berkeley, and also in Kant),
then idealism is partial; in the opposite case it is absolute (Hegel). As long as one recognizes the existence of things
outside the mind, the gnoseological problem of the correspondence between thought and thing still subsists. Instead,
in absolute idealism one arrives at the identity between reality and thought, which, applied to man, means a sort of
divinization of the human intelligence. Obviously, the conclusions of idealism are gravely contrary to common
sense, but for the idealistic philosophers this is an objection carrying little weight, because they strongly ridicule
common sense, and also because the appearance of reality, in this vision, would be proper to the knowledge of the
senses, which lacks the profoundness of thought. Idealism can be attacked with arguments of common sense (for
example, the idealist forgets to be an idealist in practical life), but a satisfying response must be rather an integral
interpretation of reality and of knowledge.
“The idealistic doctrine is born when nominalism, skepticism, rationalism, empiricism, etc. end up in a crisis of
truth. At this point, idealism, above all absolute idealism, is not a simple theory of knowledge, but a true and proper
metaphysics, a determination of the sense of being, in which all the properties, facts or events that preoccupy
philosophers are returned to a single principle of origin: the act of thinking, the consciousness. At that point it will
not only be said that being is immanent to consciousness, but moreover that the latter produces the former, entirely
or partially. Consciousness acquires a creative power, and likewise in this sense idealism tends to human
divinization.
“The cause of idealism is to be found in the exasperation of the critique of knowledge…It has been the critique
against the value of the universals, against the objectivity of the secondary and later on the primary qualities, against
the immediate persuasion of the existence of the world – all this is the complexive cause that historically led to the
idealistic philosophy, in the measure in which both in rationalism and in empiricism there failed the attempts to
explain the mode of knowing those objects.
“The diversity of the idealistic solutions depends in part on the modalities that the principle of consciousness may
assume. Normally the idealism that makes consciousness the root of being, does refer to human consciousness; but,
the principle of immanence makes it difficult to explain the reality of other consciousnesses insofar as they are
independent of my personal consciousness, a reason for which idealism always experiences a notable tendency
towards solipsism (only I exist). Hence also the propensity to reduce the consciousness to a single impersonal
subject, such as the transcendental Kantian ‘I’, while nonetheless recognizing the ‘empirical’ plurality of the
particular subjects.
“A step forward is to make of this subject an infinite ‘I’, the Absolute, the supreme impersonal Reason that
radicalized idealism at times uses as a denomination for God. Such a pantheistic conclusion is consonant with the
intimate inspiration of idealism, which tends to reduce everything to a single principle (monism), outside of which
there is nothing: that is, a principle conceived as the Identity to which every diversity is repugnant. The particular
beings would only be manifestations of that supreme Consciousness. We shall find this explanation in the absolute
idealists.
“It may be asked whether the doctrine according to which all things depend on a transcendent God who is pure
Intelligence or Thought would lead to an idealistic conception – that is, a reduction of being to consciousness.
However, this is not so, if one recognizes that things exist in themselves, albeit not independently from their Creator,
thus affirming the reality of God and that of the world as two different realities. For theistic idealism, the finite
things are thoughts of God – that is, they belong to His infinite Consciousness: theistic idealism is a type of
pantheism.

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Hegel’s affirmations to the contrary, very much like his rationalist, monist predecessor the
determinist Spinoza), wherein metaphysical realism/methodical realism/moderate realism3
grounded in the certainties of common sense4 are rejected in favor of a pan-logicism
(identification of logic and metaphysics), rooted in the principle of immanence,5 where

“Finally, let us consider the bond between idealism and relativism. Idealism obviously retains that reality is
relative to thought, but it is not strictly relativistic if it refers to a transcendental consciousness with necessary laws
(such as the idealism of Kant), while it falls into relativism if consciousness is seen as historical and mutable
(Hegel). Relativistic idealism does not recognize any absolute truth, and is thus liable to the Aristotelian reproach to
admit contradiction (in fact, Hegel opposes the real value of this principle).
“On its part, relativism is not to be believed as identical to idealism. While the latter affirms that things are
relative to consciousness, relativism sustains that the truth is relative to the subjects. Now, one can be a relativist (or
rather a skeptic) without making reality immanent to thought, perhaps because one thinks that reality exists, while
not being knowable with certainty, if it is believed to be reduced to pure movement (Heraclitus). Nonetheless,
relativism tends to idealism, because truth and reality are parallel, and if the truth is declared to be a human creation,
then there is little lacking to make reality a product of the human mind.”(J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic and
Gnoseology, Urbaniana University Press, Rome, 1987, pp. 168-172).
2
“The doctrine opposed to free will is styled determinism or necessitarianism. Modern psychology has adoped the
former term. According to this doctrine, the will is not intrinsically free, but is determined by the antecedent
psychical and physical conditions and causes to act as it does; it is necessitated in its volition. Determinism appears
in a variety of forms.
“Among the ancients, many held the view that the entire course of man’s life is predetermined by an inexorable
fate or destiny. Astrology is akin to this…In modern times, we find free will denied by materialists and pantheists.
The materialists admit the existence of nothing but matter and material activities. Since matter is governed
completely by the necessary laws controlling chemical, physical, and mechanical agencies, there is no place for a
free-acting cause like free will. The will is determined in its volition by physical factors, such as the hereditary
constitution of man and the environment in which he lives, and by psychical factors, such as images, feelings,
emotions, and the preponderance of motives. If ‘psychical’ factors are mentioned, they are usually considered to be
mere refinements and complexes of material factors. The pantheists maintain that all reality is ultimately one, God
or the Absolute. The world, man included, is but a phase in the eternal evolution of the Absolute, and this evolution
takes place according to laws which operate with inevitable necessity. There is no freedom of action anywhere.
Among the materialistic theories denying free will we must place the philosophical systems of associationism,
positivism, and behaviorism; the systems of Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and their offshoots are representative
of pantheism in one form or other. All are deterministic.
“Some modern philosophers and psychologists speak of the will as if they admitted its freedom of action.
Analysis of their ideas and explanations, however, reveals that they interpret ‘free will’ in a fashion which is either a
perversion of the true concept of freedom or which makes the will so dependent on the conditioning factors as to
preclude genuine indeterminacy. It is a case of what William James has described as ‘soft determinsm.’”( C. N.
BITTLE, The Whole Man, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1956, pp. 381-382).
3
For a defense of methodical realism against the principle of immanence, varieties of immanentism, and forms of
mediate ‘realism,’ see: É. GILSON, Methodical Realism, Christendom Press, Front Royal, VA, 1990 (Ignatius Press
of San Francisco has published a new edition of the book and is currently available) ; É. GILSON, Thomist Realism
and the Critique of Knowledge, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1986 (Ignatius Press has republished the book and is
currently available).
4
For an detailed explanation of the philosophy of common sense of the Italian philosopher Antonio Livi (1938-
2020), see William J. Slattery’s The Logic of Truth: St. Thomas Aquinas’s Epistemology and Antonio Livi’s Alethic
Logic, Casa Editrice Leonardo da Vinci, Rome, 2015. For Antonio Livi’s critique of Hegel’s absolute idealism, see
his Il principio di coerenza, Armando, Rome, 1997, pp. 101-146. Casa Editrice Leonardo da Vinci, Rome, has re-
issued Il principio di coerenza and is currently available.
5
Llano’s Critique of the Principle of Immanence: “Il principio di immanenza. …considereremo il corso intrapreso
dalla gnoseologia in vasti settori della filosofia moderna e contemporanea, che indicheremo, in un senso molto
ampio, con il termine di «idealismo». La caratteristica principale di tale orientamento teoretico è di intendere il
pensiero come fondamento dell’essere, ribaltando così la concezione realista, per la quale la conoscenza si fonda
sull’essere.

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 “Si tratta di una prospettiva essenzialmente criticista, in cui viene radicalmente contestata la capacità umana di
cogliere la realtà così come è in se stessa. Cià sappiamo che non si può stabilire una equazione fra filosofia antica e
realismo: anche lo scetticismo classico ha realizzato una critica acuta alla conoscenza. Nemmeno si può pensare che
la filosofia moderna nella sua interezza sia idealista, fra l’altro perché né il suo contenuto forma un blocco
omogeneo, né il suo sviluppo storico presenta un corso necessario. Comunque, l’atteggiamento gnoseologico cui ora
ci riferiamo è caratteristico dei tempi nuovi. Non si tratta di una posizione semplicemente relativista o scettica:
infatti, si vuole elaborare una filosofia e, più in generale, un sapere umano, completamente al riparo da qualsiasi
ambiguità o dubbio, grazie allo stretto controllo esercitato dal soggetto umano. Tali autori ritengono che chi
considera la propria mente misurata dalla realtà è un ingenuo e «dogmatico»; è necessario invertire rotta teoretica,
affinché il soggetto dia a se stesso le proprie regole. Soltanto tale ideale di autonomia è degno di un’umanità matura.
Avviatasi in questa direzione, la ragione non accetta alcun condizionamento esterno e presume di avere in se stessa
ciò di cui abbisogna.
“Trascendenza e immanenza. La concezione che abbiamo appena abbozzato rifiuta la trascendenza e vuole
mantenersi esclusivamente nell’ambito dell’immanenza. Chiariamo innanzitutto il significato di questi termini.
“Il senso immediato e fondamentale della parola «trascendenza» si rifà ad una metafora spaziale. Trascendere (da
trans, oltre, e scando, salire) significa passare da un ambito ad un altro varcando la linea di demarcazione. Dal punto
di vista filosofico, il concetto di trascendenza include inoltre l’idea di superamento o superiorità: trascendere
equivale a «oltrepassare» una dimensione determinata, superandone il limite o confine.
“Il concetto di «immanenza» è simmetricamente opposto a quello di «trascendenza», e indica il «permanere in»
se stessi. L’ammissione della trascendenza non comporta l’eliminazione dell’immanenza, ma la supera aprendola.
La Psicologia filosofica insegna appunto che gli unici esseri capaci di trascendere, cioè i conoscenti, sono quelli
dotati di operazioni immanenti. Al contrario, l’«immanentismo» o «idealismo», è la dottrina filosofica in cui non si
capisce come le operazioni immanenti possano raggiungere un oggetto trascendente.
“È opportuno distinguere i due principali versanti in cui si pone il problema della trascendenza: l’ontologico e il
gnoseologico. La trascendenza gnoseologica riguarda la possibilità di conoscere delle realtà distinte dalla coscienza
e dalle sue rappresentazioni: per trascendente si intende, cioè, l’extrasoggettivo. La trascendenza ontologica
riguarda invece l’esistenza di realtà che superano i dati di fatto dell’esperienza empirica, e sopratutto l’esistenza di
Dio come Essere assolutamente trascendente: trascendente si identifica qui con sopramondano. La storia della
filosofia mostra che le due questioni sono strettamente legate fra loro, anche se la reciproca connessione ammette
modalità molto differenti. Il rifiuto della trascendenza gnoseologica, pur nonsempre in modo diretto e immediato,
impedisce il riconoscimento di un’autentica trascendenza ontologica.
“Gli argomenti dell’idealismo. In prima approssimazione, intendiamo per idealismo la negazione della
trascendenza gnoseologica, cioè l’immanentismo conoscitivo.
“Il problema della trascendenza gnoseologica, nei termini in cui lo pongono gli idealisti, potrebbe essere posto
nel modo seguente:
“Con quale fondamento possiamo affermare che la coscienza esce «fuori» dai propri limiti e riconosce una realtà
a sé esterna? Non si può negare che il conosciuto è, in quanto tale, qualcosa di immanente alla conoscenza; il
conoscere, infatti, implica il coglimento e l’assimilazione del conosciuto da parte del conoscente. Abbiamo allora il
diritto di ritenere che l’oggetto conosciuto possiede un altro modo di essere «oltre» quello che ha in quanto
conosciuto? A tali interrogativi le gnoseologie idealiste rispondono negativamente. Esse sostengono che la mente
umana non coglie altro oggetto immediato che le proprie rappresentazioni, le uniche «realtà» che si possono
conoscere; infatti, la nostra intelligenza non può avere a che fare che con idee, e la nostra sensibilità con fenomeni o
apparenze empiriche. Ed ecco il fondo dell’argomentazione: nonostante ogni sforzo che si faccia per conoscere
qualcosa di distinto dalla coscienza, tale supposta realtà trascendente rimarebbe, essendo conosciuta, «dentro» la
stessa coscienza.
“Già sappiamo che la impostazione stessa del problema non è corretta; anzi, la questione della trascendenza
gnoseologica costituisce un autentico problema solo per il criticismo, mentre l’atteggiamento naturale, che accetta la
realtà extrasoggettiva, si basa su di un’evidenza immediata. D’altra parte, il ragionamento degli idealisti si fonda su
una estrapolazione indebita: infatti si può accettare, poiché è vero, che l’oggetto dell’atto di conoscenza è, in quanto
oggetto di quest’atto, qualcosa di immanente alla conoscenza, e negare, tuttavia, che la realtà del conosciuto si
esaurisca nell’«essere oggetto di conoscenza». L’affermazione per cui si può conoscere qualcosa come esistente
fuori della conoscenza, non comporta alcuna contradictio in terminis. Vi sarebbe contraddizione solo se si pensasse
che il conosciuto, in quanto tale, fosse totalmente trascendente il soggetto conoscente. Ma nulla impedisce, anzi
l’esige la natura della conoscenza, che «oltre» ad essere conosciuto, l’oggetto abbia una realtà propria; che sia di per

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sé un ente indipendente dalla conoscenza umana. Il conosciuto «sta» nella mente solo mentre è conosciuto, ma, se ci
è vera conoscenza, esso è anche un ente reale.
“Illustriamo questa discussione con un esempio contemporaneo. Un secolo fa, il filosofo statiunitense Charles
Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), pragmatista di formazione idealista, espresse nei seguenti termini il principio di
immanenza: «Se mi si domanda se esistono realtà interamente indipendenti dal pensiero, chiederei a mia volta che
significa e può mai significare tale espressione. Quale idea si può applicare a ciò di cui non si ha idea? Poiché, se
possediamo una qualche idea di tale realtà, stiamo parlando dell’oggetto di tale idea, che così non è indipendente dal
pensiero. Evidentemente è del tutto fuori del potere della mente avere un’idea di qualcosa che è complementamente
indipendente dal pensiero: questa idea dovrebbe tirare se stessa fuori da se stessa. Ora, poiché tale idea non c’è, la
predetta espressione non ha significato» (C. S. PEIRCE, The Logic of 1873, in «Collected Papers», ed. di A. A.
Burks, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965-1966, vol. II, p. 211). Un successore di Peirce
all’Università di Harvard, Hilary Putnam, ha così replicato: non è lo stesso essere rappresentato in un concetto ed
essere un concetto. Perché qualcosa sia concepibile deve essere, come è ovvio, rappresentabile in un concetto, ma
non per questo deve essere un concetto. Non vi è alcuna contraddizione dell’ammettere che vi sono cose che non
sono concetti e nel parlare di esse. Così facendo, non si pretende di concepire l’inconcepibile, ma soltanto di
concettualizzare il non-mentale (H. PUTNAM, Mind, Language and Reality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1979, p. 273). (La posizione di Putnam è indicativa dell’orientamento realista condiviso da buona parte della
filosofia attuale).
“Essenzialmente e originariamente, il principio di immanenza consiste nella negazione della trascendenza
dell’essere rispetto alla coscienza (sia questa individuale o sociale, spirituale o sensibile, strutturale o storica).
L’essere si costituisce nell’immanenza del soggetto pensante.
“Nella metafisica realista, l’essere è l’atto radicale dell’ente, il principio cioè della sua posizione. L’atto di essere
è, in ogni ente, il principio interno della sua realtà e della sua conoscibilità, il fondamento, quindi, dell’atto di
conoscenza. Con ciò si considera certo la conoscenza come un modo, anzi il modo più elevato, dell’essere; ma non
si prende l’essere per un elemento o una dimensione della conoscenza.
“L’idealismo, invece, considera l’ente (ciò che si conosce) come un’attuazione della conoscenza. Secondo tale
prospettiva, l’essere è posto dal pensiero. L’essere (o ciò che, come tale, può avere significato per l’uomo) è posto
dalla coscienza, è un suo risultato o effetto; non la può trascendere, quindi, ma le appartiene. Data poi
l’impostazione criticista, qualunque fondamento soggettivo venga posto, esso può venire ulteriormente fondato in
senso più radicale: la coscienza conoscitiva può risolversi, a sua volta, nella prassi sociale, nella storia, nel
linguaggio…Questo movimento regressivo della riflessione, nel quale si finisce per smarrire le cose stesse,
costituisce una delle linee più caratteristiche dello svillupo del principio di immanenza.
“L’idealismo e metafisica. Sotto il titolo di «idealismo» o «immanentismo» si raccolgono sistemi o concezioni
che, almeno apparentemente, sono fra loro molto diversi. Per di più, nessuno di essi è caratterizzato dal semplice
rifiuto della trascendenza gnoseologica, diffatti presentano spesso delle analisi complesse e sofisticate. Tuttavia,
senza indulgere a semplificazioni eccessive a cui sfuggirebbero le differenze, se ne possono ricercare i principi
ispiratori comuni e le connessioni storiche.
“L’idealismo non è soltanto una dottrina gnoseologica: esso include alcune posizioni metafisiche contrarie a
quelle della metafisica dell’essere. Ciò spiega perché vi siano immanentismi che difendono tesi apparentemente
realiste, anche se spesso rimangono su posizioni empiristiche o materialistiche.
“Le due posizioni si distinguono in base a una diversa fondazione: la metafisica realista sostiene che l’essere
fonda la verità del pensiero, mentre l’immanentismo idealista ritiene che il fondamento dell’essere sia ben radicato
nella coscienza.
“L’immanentismo è sempre, in un modo o altro, un umanesimo radicalizzato, un antropocentrismo che sbocca
necessariamente in un antiumanesimo pratico e teorico. Se si pone l’uomo come fondamento originario, la
trascendenza – prima quella gnoseologica e poi quella ontologica – viene emarginata, delibitata e, infine, eliminata.
Tale negazione della trascendenza ha trovato diverse articolazioni e diversi inquadramenti teorici. Come abbiamo
visto nel capitolo precedente, già agli albori della filosofia occidentale vi sono degli elementi immanentisti; essi,
tuttavia, non hanno ancora un valore fondante e costruttivo, a differenza di quanto avverrà con la crisi moderna, il
cui inizio può essere considerato il nominalismo di Ockham. Il cogito cartesiano e l’«io penso in generale» di Kant
saranno le formulazioni più caratteristiche del impostazione moderna, alla quale si ispireranno in modi diversi tutte
le altre.
“La metafisica dell’essere parte dall’ente come prima nozione intellettiva, che esprime le singole realtà in quanto
dotate dell’atto di essere. L’idealismo, invece, priva l’ente della sua condizione di primum cognitum, e l’essere della

4
contradiction lies at the heart of reality.6 We shall concentrate upon a general description and
critique of Hegel’s ethical system, a description and critique of conscience as the Universal or
impersonal Reason, and finally a description and critique of Hegel on the nature of the State.
Michael Cronin’s Description of Hegel’s System of Ethics. “Hegel’s Ethical System. Like most
Ethical systems Hegel’s begins with an analysis of will. Will is the faculty in which morality
resides. It is not a distinct faculty from thought. Will and thought are but two functions, the one
conative, the other cognitive, of mind. Will is ‘thought translating itself into reality’ (that is,

sua proprietà di attuare ogni atto e ogni perfezione; muove dall’immanenza della coscienza in se stessa e cerca di
fare di essa la verità prima, l’azione e perfezione somma.
“Sartre (1905-1980) espone tale inizio con grande chiarezza: «Il nostro punto di partenza è, in effetti, la
soggettività dell’individuo, e ciò per ragioni strettamente filosofiche (…). In un punto di partenza non vi può essere
altra verità che questa: penso, dunque esisto; sta qui la verità assoluta della coscienza che apprende se stessa. Ogni
teoria che considera l’uomo fuori da questo momento nel quale apprende se stesso, è in primo luogo una teoria che
sopprime la verità, poiché, al di là del cogito cartesiano, tutti gli oggetti sono soltanto probabili; e una dottrina delle
probabilità che non dipenda da una verità, affonda nel nulla. Pertanto, perché via sia una qualunque verità, è
necessaria una verità assoluta; e tale verità è semplice, facile da apprendere, è alla portata di tutti: consiste nel
cogliere se stessi senza intermediari» (J. P. SARTRE, L’existencialisme est un humanisme, Nagel, Paris, 1964, pp.
63-64; cfr. C. CARDONA, Metafísica de la opción intelectual, Rialp, Madrid, 1973, pp. 88-89).
“L’immanentismo aspira alla perfetta identità del soggetto con se stesso, mentre la metafisica dell’essere muove
dalla conoscenza dell’ente e dal principio di non-contraddizione, in coerenza con il carattere finito della realtà cui fa
riferimento.
“La possibilità dell’idealismo e le sue conseguenze. L’idealismo è possibile e spiegabile perché «il fatto di essere
‘io’ colui che conosce, e il fatto che l’uomo è, per il suo intelletto, secondo l’espressione classica, quodammodo
omnia (in certo modo tutte le cose), dato che, nel conoscere le cose, l’atto del conosciuto in quanto tale e l’atto del
conoscente in quanto tale si identificano in un solo e medesimo atto vitale di conoscenza; questo fatto, dicevo, offre
un’altra possibilità: tutto ciò che esiste, esiste in me e per me, e io mi scopro come totalità inclusiva nella quale e per
la quale ogni cosa esiste (ovviamente, soltanto in quanto conosciuta)»(C. CARDONA, op. cit., pp. 90-91). Tutto ciò
che è può cadere sotto lo sguardo intellettuale dell’uomo, sicché, per lui, si dà una certa convertibilità fra ciò che è e
ciò che egli conosce. In termini grafici, potremmo dire che si può considerare la sfera della conoscenza tanto ampia
quanto quella dell’essere, e finire per sostituire questa con quella. L’idealismo è possibile perché l’uomo è
intenzionalmente aperto a tutta la realtà.
“Questo spiega perché idealismo costituisca, con la sua razionalità totalizzante, una specie di «tentazione della
ragione». In un primo momento, l’idealismo può anche sembrare un atteggiamento speculativo più scientifico e
rigoroso, dato che vuole ottenere una completa trasparenza della conoscenza – e, più in generale, di ogni atto umano
– di fronte a se stessa, senza lasciare nulla di oscuro o incompleto nel procedimento discorsivo. Esso costituisce,
inoltre, una tentazione di potere, di svincolamento e autonomia assoluta, di liberazione, poiché il soggetto non
accetta più nulla di imposto, ma vuole dominare tutto per trasformarsi, secondo l’ideale cartesiano, in «signore e
padrone della natura». Si esalta, di conseguenza, il potere della ragione, in quanto all’atto conoscitivo viene
attribuito un potere creatore o, al meno, produttore. Con ciò, l’uomo non accetta il posto che gli corrisponde nella
realtà, e rivendica per sé un ruolo che è proprio del solo Dio. L’idealismo non può pertanto essere, né sul piano
storico né su quello individuale, un atteggiamento naturale o spontaneo (come il realismo), ma ricercato e voluto.
“L’atteggiamento intellettuale che mette fra parentesi la realtà degli enti e inizia con una totale riflessione su di
sé, ostacola, quando non impedisce, l’incontro con la verità trascendente: una trascendenza vera e non una semplice
proiezione dell’io pensante. Logicamente una tale prospettiva fomenta una implacabile avversione verso tutto ciò
che è ricevuto, ciò che mi si impone con la forza della realtà, o ciò che mi viene dato gratuitamente, senza che sia io
a inventarlo o produrlo. Dal punto di vista della metafisica dell’essere, si comprende perché la suddetta tendenza,
quando venga portata alle sue ultime conseguenze, conduce prima all’«oblio dell’essere», poi alla «morte di Dio», e,
infine, alla «morte dell’uomo»: al nichilismo…”(A. LLANO, Filosofia della conoscenza, Le Monnier, Florence,
1987, pp. 89-95).
6
For a detailed critique of Hegel’s absolute idealism in relation to his ethical theory, see part II, chapters 7, 8 and 9
of Jacques Maritain’s Moral Philosophy, Scribner’s, New York, 1964. Italian edition: La filosofia morale,
Morcelliana, Brescia, 1971. French edition: La Philosophie morale, Ed. Universitaires – Ed. Saint-Paul, Fribourg
and Paris, 1994.

5
tending to an end outside thought). Now, Ethics is the science of the freedom of the will, for
goodness is freedom,7 and therefore the ‘account’ of moral goodness is the ‘account’ of freedom.
What, therefore, is freedom? Freedom means self-determination. ‘It is will which through
thinking gives itself direction and end, whose object is itself, which therefore is independent of
everything and every person outside itself. Will is free intelligence.’8 But the self is, in Hegel’s
philosophy, not what Kant represented it to be—mere Reason or pure will—the self is made up
of Reason and Sense, will and desire. And since pure Will is the universal will, and desire (i.e.,
the wish for pleasure or for sense-objects) the particular will, or the will of the individual, so
self-determination means the identification through conduct of the individual desire and the
Universal Will. The individual can realise his full self, Hegel maintains, and thereby fulfil his
duty by furthering this identification, by realising the Universal in his own particular will. Not,
indeed, that nature is waiting on individual caprice for its realisation of particular and Universal.
For already particular and Universal are identified in Society or the State, and all that the
individual does in fulfilling the moral law in his own case is to participate in this process of
identification of particular and Universal, the identification of particular and Universal being not
only the end of all but the underlying principle and the very Being of all reality. In the moral
sphere the State is itself this process of identification—not the result of the process but the
process itself — for in the State is realised the identification of the many and the one, and the
form of their unity is Universal Law. The State is the realisation of the whole self of man,
particular and Universal, Will (that is, pure or Universal Will) and Desire,9 Reason and Sense.
‘The State,’ writes Hegel,10 ‘which is the realised substantive will having its reality in the
particular self-consciousness raised to the plane of the Universal, is absolutely rational. This
substantive unity is its own motive and absolute end. . . . This end has the highest right over the
individual whose highest duty in turn is to be a member of the State.’

“Following then these three headings of the Universal Will or Universal Self, the
particular Will or particular Self, and the Absolute Self11 or the State, Hegel, in the Philosophy of
Right, divides his Ethical system into three parts. In the first he treats of Universal Will or
abstract Will, ‘Will without individual interests or responsibilities.’ This is the sphere of abstract
right, for ‘theory of right’ or ‘justice’ is that domain of Ethics in which no account is taken of
individual conscience or individual responsibility. The man who discharges his debt, discharges
it whether he intended to discharge it or did not; and he who has not paid what he owes is still a
debtor even though he may not be blamed for not discharging his debt. In the second part Hegel
treats of responsibility, sin, conscience, moral good and evil, and everything in the sphere of
Ethics that characterises the individual will as opposed to mere abstract Right. The Good Hegel
here defines as the ‘idea of the unity of the conception of the Will (i.e., the universal will) with
the particular will.’ It is therefore the realisation in man of the Absolute Self. In the third part he
treats of ‘Absolute Will,’ of that, namely, in which the identification of particular wills with the

7
This doctrine, it will be remembered, Hegel borrowed from Kant.
8
JODL, Geschichte der Ethik, II., page 108. This unification of Reason and will which is so opposed to the
philosophy of Schopenhauer is also to be found in other philosophers—for instance, in Herbart. According to this
latter philosopher, the law of the will — the moral law—is grounded not in will itself, but in the judgment.
9
The particular will with Hegel means ‘particular wish for particular object,’ and as object and subject are one in his
system, it also means particular subject.
10
G. W. F. HEGEL, Philosophy of Right, translated by Dyde, page 240.
11
Hegel calls the State the Ethical Idea. ‘Idea’ with Hegel signifies the concept made real, or the universal made real
by its identification with particulars.

6
Universal Will, of nature with freedom is actualised. This Absolute Will he calls ‘Ethical
system,’ ‘Ethical observance,’ ‘Ethical Custom’ — i.e., that outer system, observance, or custom
which at once enshrines the moral beliefs and principles of the human race, and has actually
become a law to the world. In the common system of law and custom, particular and universal
are made one. This Ethical system is the Absolute. Ethical observance or system has three forms
into which it develops in order—viz., the family, the civic community, and the State. The perfect
form is the State; it is the end of all and the beginning and ground of all. The State is even the
underlying principle of matter and movement, for it includes all things; but as underlying
principle of the evolutionary process of all things, including matter and movement, the State does
not manifest itself to us as a State. As the underlying principle of all we should call it not ‘State’
but the ‘Absolute’ simply. As ‘conscious of itself’ as ‘will which thinks and knows itself, and
carries out what it knows in so far as it knows,’ it is called State. Yet these two—the State and
the Absolute — are one. The State is Absolute Spirit. ‘The State,’ writes Hegel, ‘is the spirit
which abides in the world, and there realises itself consciously; while in nature it is realised only
as the other self or the sleeping spirit. Only when it is present in consciousness knowing itself as
an existing object, is it State.’ The rule of conduct, therefore, is to obey the State, not this or that
particular State, but State in the abstract, or what Hegel calls the essential moments of the
State.”12

Michael Cronin’s Critique of Hegel’s Ethical Theory. “…in the first place, the Absolute
itself, which is supposed to be the ground unity of all existence, in which all things subsist as
parts or moments or phases—whatever be the name we give to the individual things within it—is
a gratuitous hypothesis. It is neither seen, nor felt, nor is its existence proved by reasoning upon
observed phenomena. It is not necessary as an explanation of any admitted facts. It is itself not
only a contradiction, but a sum of contradictions. For instance, it issues particular judgments and
the opposite of these judgments at one and the same moment in different people. It not merely
exists in one man and in another, but it is one and the other.13 It is also the unity of both and at
the same time their diversity, for unless it is everything that is, it is not the Absolute. It is one
and simple, for through it all things are reduced to unity, and yet all things are parts of it and
subsist through it—subsist through it and compose it even in their diversity. It is, therefore, one
and many secundum idem. On this impossible conception is grounded the ethical theory of
Hegel…

“Morality, we claim, is not a phase in the supposed evolutionary process of the Absolute
unfolding itself into the manifold objects of the Universe. This proposition we might establish
according to a variety of considerations. The following two will suffice: (a) Morality is an
attribute of the individual person. It is the individual person that is under obligation to do certain
things. It is the acts of the individual that are good or bad. The individual alone is morally
responsible for his acts. There is no common receptacle for the moral responsibilities of the acts
of different men. Our responsibilities are not interchangeable nor continuous with one another.
My responsibilities are my own, as my wishes and actions are my own. Now, if the ground
reality of all men be one, and if the ‘good’ means identification with this ground reality, then my
responsibilities are not my own, for, a common substance can originate only common

12
M. CRONIN, The Science of Ethics, vol. 1, M. H. Gill and Son, Dublin, 1930, pp. 445-448.
13
“A separation between the Absolute and finite Beings is meaningless” (BRADLEY, Appearance and Reality,
page 418).

7
responsibilities. (b) Again, a moral being directs and controls his individual acts. But if all men
and all actions are but necessarily evolved phases of one original object or condition, then I no
more control my individual actions than I control my own existence or my entry into this world,
and hence I am not more moral than animal or tree or stone.

“Morality, then, is not a phase in the evolution of the Absolute into the manifold objects
of the Universe.

“Critique of Hegel’s View that the Good is the Identification of the Particular with the
Universal Will or the State. (a) We have already clearly shown that the good is not and cannot be
identity of or relation of any kind between the particular and the universal will or the State. The
good individual will is the will that tends to the final natural end of the individual, not the will
that identifies itself with any other will, even though that other includes the individual will. Even
then, if it were certain that what is called the universal will was good in itself, an individual will
would still be good only in so far as it sought the natural ends of its own individual natural
capacities. Hence, goodness cannot consist in fulfilment of the end of the universal will.

“(b) The good will of an individual man is individual and particular. For it is the same
will which is responsible for evil and which merits by the doing of the good. Now, the evil will
is, on the theory of the transcendentalists, essentially particular, essentially unidentified with the
Universal (the Universal cannot be evil), therefore, the good will is particular also, and is not
identified with the universal will.

“(c) There is no such thing as a universal will. There is no abstract State comprising in
itself all individual States and the ground of all. All existing States and all existing wills are
particular. This we have had occasion to remark more than once before in this work. To prove
this proposition would, of course, be quite outside the scope of a work like the present. But the
reader will, we think, not need proof to understand this at least, that the existence of a universal
will such as is supposed by Hegel is a pure hypothesis, that it could not be established by
reasoning, and that consequently an Ethics built upon such a theory can never have more than a
suppositional value.

“(d) But whether a universal will exists or not, an identification of particular and
universal wills, of my own with the eternal will by individual effort, is a sheer impossibility.
Identity of end might, indeed, be theoretically possible—that is, their ends might be made con-
formable to one another, but identity of being would not be possible even theoretically. For the
Absolute Will and the will of the individual are not only different entities, they are the very
contrary of each other. One particular will could not become identical with another particular
will, a fortiori it could not become identical with the universal will. There is a sense, indeed, in
which a universal is recognised in the singular even according to the teaching of Aristotle—
namely, by participation. In this sense a universal is realised in all the singulars that participate
in it, as whiteness is realised to some extent in each white object. But it never does and never
could become identical with the particular. Nothing can be identical with its contrary. This latter
principle, that ‘nothing can be its contrary,’ Hegel would, of course, deny; but we think we are
safe in assuming it, and if we are not allowed to do so then argument becomes impossible, since
otherwise no term, and no proposition, could have any meaning.

8
 “Hegel’s theory, therefore, of identification of universal and particular is quite different
from Aristotle’s theory of participation, and whereas the latter represents a truth of common
sense, the former is a contradiction and impossible. There is no conceivable sense, then, in which
Hegel’s theory of the individual effort to make the individual will identical with the universal
could represent anything even theoretically possible. Much less could it be made a practical rule
of morals.”14

Michael Cronin’s Critique of Conscience as Universal or Impersonal Reason.

“Conscience the Universal or Impersonal Reason. The tendency of certain schools of modern
Ethics is to regard the individual Conscience as merely a phase or moment in the Universal
Reason, which latter, it is asserted, is the only true and genuine Conscience—the only
Conscience to be followed and believed. This universalisation of Conscience is not always
expressed in the same way by Ethicians, and consequently it is often not easy to find anything
like common ground amongst theories which are usually classed as universalistic. Thus Hegel
describes conscience as ‘the objective Universal Spirit’; Clifford, as ‘the voice of the tribal self’;
Leslie Stephen, as ‘the utterance of the public spirit of the race.’ These latter two expressions
represent, indeed, modified forms of the universalistic theory of Conscience which at present we
shall not further consider. Our examination will be confined to the theory expressly stated by
some Transcendentalists and Monists and implicitly held by all, that Conscience is the Universal
Reason, the absolute Reason, in which all things subsist and through which they come into being.

“Criticism—We shall here set forth just one of the arguments adducible against this
theory of the ‘Universal Conscience.’15 If men be ruled by a single universal conscience it is
impossible that they should consciously entertain opposed moral beliefs. Now that there are such
differences in our moral beliefs will not readily be denied. The question then is—how could
these differences be reconciled with the theory that there is but one single Conscience existing
amongst men, since if there be but one universal moral Conscience it is in that one Conscience
that such opposed beliefs must consciously reside? Opposition between judgments consciously
entertained are possible only in some one of the three following ways—(1) Same principle of
judgment —i.e., same mind judging, same time condition, but distinction in the objects about
which one judges.16 Thus a man could judge that one object is white and that another is not
white: that two and two are four, and that two and three are not four.17 (2) Same principle or
mind judging, same object of judgment, but difference in time conditions. Thus, about a
particular object the same intellect can elicit one judgment today and its exact contradictory
tomorrow. (3) Identity of object and time, but difference in the judging principle, as when many
minds hold various opinions simultaneously about the same subject-matter. We can, of course,
have distinctions under all three heads together —distinction of knowing mind, of time, and of
object, and correspondingly different acts of judgment. But where the judging intellect is one, the

14
M. CRONIN, op. cit., pp. 452, 454-456.
15
As we are here dealing with moral questions only, it is not in our province at present to disprove the general
Metaphysical theory (advocated by Green and others) that there exists a Universal Ego or Self in which all
individual selves subsist. This theory has been severely handled by many modern ethicians, notably by Professor
Taylor in his ‘Problems of Conduct.’ Here we can only examine the question on its moral side. See, however, note,
page 457 ; also chapter on Evolutionist Ethics, page 451.
16
Note.—If the subject be out of all-time conditions, as is supposed in the theory of the ‘Timeless Self,’ then the
laws stated above in (1) and (3) hold good. For such a being any contradiction once effected or asserted is eternal.
17
This is ‘opposition’ only in a very loose sense of the term — opposition of quality in judgments.

9
time one, and the object one, a qualitative opposition in the conscious moral judgment becomes
absolutely impossible. Indeed, in any mind there can be but one conscious act of judgment at any
particular moment, and it could no more be positive and negative than an object could at the
same time be black and white. Hence, if the conscience of all men be one, it is quite impossible
that at one and the same time there could be opposing conscious moral convictions about any
particular subject-matter. Bui contradictory judgments do exist in the consciousness of different
men. Therefore, the theory of the Universal Conscience is untrue.

“To this argument there are three replies which we must consider:

“I. There is, in the first place, the obvious reply that the ‘Absolute,’ as the monists or
transcendentalists teach, contains many individuals. Now, individuals are opposed to one
another, consequently it is possible that an Absolute Consciousness should contain many
different and opposed moral judgments also.

“We rejoin.—(a) The monistic theory that all individuals are contained as parts in the one
all-embracing Absolute is untrue and impossible. The disproof of this theory, however, belong to
Metaphysics not to Ethics, (b) Even if it were true that many individuals could subsist in the one
Absolute it does not follow that many contradictory judgments could subsist in the one
consciousness, for individuals are not opposed in the same sense in which contradictory
judgments are opposed. Individuals are opposed in the sense that one is not and could not be the
other. Contradictory judgments are opposed in the sense that if one is true the other is false.
Individuals, therefore, can exist together in the one world. But contradictories cannot subsist
consciously together in the one mind.

“II. A second reply to our argument that there cannot be a single Universal Conscience,
since such a Conscience should consciously harbour opposed moral judgments, is given by
Fichte as follows: —Conscience is not a judging faculty at all, and consequently a universal
conscience could not contradict itself18 even though all consciences were contained in it.
‘Conscience,’ Fichte writes, ‘is no power of judgment,’ its office is legislative not judicial. It
does not tell us what is right, but it commands us to do the right and for the sake of the right. In
Kantian language (Fichte only develops Kant’s own view) Conscience is not a judgment proper,
but the ‘pure form of the moral judgment.’ Its act is not a judgment that something is good, but
an imperative to do the good for the sake of duty. It is what Lass calls the ‘pure empty form of
scrupulosity.’ To know what is the good or our duty in any particular case is, according to Fichte,
the work not of conscience but of a man’s individual Reason, and it is in that work alone that
error and variation appear. The command to do the good is a necessary dictate of every man’s
conscience. Hence, it is possible that all individual consciences should be contained as parts in
the one Universal or Absolute Conscience, nor need the diversity of men’s judgments on moral
matters render the Universal Conscience a repository of contradictory moral decisions.

“Reply to this second argument: —We assume that since a man does sometimes reason
on moral matters, and since in these cases his conclusions are expressions of some particular
duty—assertions, namely, that something is to be done, two premisses at least are required from
which to reason, one, that the good is to be done, another, that this act is good. Two things follow
18
The Science of Ethics, page 183.

10
— (a) that our two premisses must both be judgments ; (b) that they must both reside in the same
faculty as that which draws the conclusion. For (a) if the two premisses be one a judgment and
another a mere command, they could not yield a conclusion. Hence, Conscience, in giving the
premiss ‘the good is to be done,’ is a judicial and not a dictatorial faculty—that is, its act is an act
of judgment, not a command, (b) The same faculty that draws the conclusion, ‘this ought be
done,’ must be the faculty which issues the two judgments, ‘the good ought to be done’ and ‘this
is good.’ If not, no conclusion could be drawn. And since the drawing of the conclusion is the
work of the individual Reason, so the law ‘the good is to be done’ cannot come from the
Universal Reason.

“III. A third reply is given by Hegel, and is as follows: — In man, there is a double
conscience—one, the ‘true conscience,’ in which all men agree; the other, the ‘moral
conscience,’ which is proper to each individual, and by which they may differ. The first is the
pure ‘Universal Conscience,’ the second is the Universal Conscience working along with the
individual intellect in an individual mind. The first is always true and cannot go wrong; the
second may err,19 but the ground of the error is the individual element or individual intellect—
the element which the Universal Conscience has not wholly ‘taken up into itself’ or with which it
is not wholly identified.

“Reply to Hegel.—-Now, the question is—are there in each man two consciences, one the
individual and one the Unversal? No doubt, according to Hegel, the true Conscience is the State.
But this true conscience is supposed to be a formative principle of the individual Reason. For
State and individual are, according to Hegel, only phases of the Absolute. If, then, this Universal
Conscience exists at all it must exist in individuals. If not we have nothing to do with it, for our
present question relates to errors in individual moral judgments, and Hegel’s theory is meant to
solve the difficulty of the individual error.

“If, then, in the individual there are two consciences, how is it that when we do actually
err in conscience we are never conscious of two judgments, one that of the Universal Conscience
(a true judgment), and one a judgment of the individual and false? If the Universal Intellect be
part of ourselves or in ourselves, its judgment, if there be any, ought be recognisable within us,
and then there is no reason why we should not be conscious of it in cases in which the individual
Conscience falls into error. But when in error we are conscious of one judgment only—viz., the
false judgment —and hence we conclude that it (the false judgment) is the only one which is
issued in case of error. Someone may say that the Universal Conscience is as yet not able to
assert itself, so buried is it in the individual elements from which it is struggling to free itself, and
that hence its judgment may not be able to rise above the threshold of our Consciousness even
though it exists within us. Our reply is that if after so many years of development it has not yet
sufficiently freed itself within us, or sufficiently gained possession of us to make itself felt or
heard at least faintly and, as it were, from afar, it is idle to hope that it is ever going to free itself
or manifest itself to us in any way. But in reality there is no trace of any such second judgment

19
G. W. F. HEGEL, Philosophy of Right, page 131 (Dyde). The True or Universal Conscience is none other than the
State or the Ethical objective Spirit (the absolute Universal) or a phase of it. Subjective or formal conscience belongs
to the individual. The first cannot err. It is ‘the disposition to desire what is absolutely good.’ Subjective conscience
should be made to conform to the true conscience.
A full and interesting account of Hegel's theory is to to found in Elsenhans’ Entstehung des Gewissens.

11
within us. It is the purest imagination. There is present in our consciousness but one moral
judgment in the case of each moral decision. What then, if it exists, is the Universal Conscience
doing? Its judgment, it is maintained, is true; but where is its judgment to be found?20 And if it is
not to be found, how is this Universal Conscience known, or how is it part of us or we part of it?
At all events, the individual conscience being the only one of which we have any knowledge, the
individual conscience is the only one that does the work we have attributed to conscience, and
hence the judgments of the Universal Conscience are of very little consequence to Moral
Science.

“Again, there are such things as controversies upon moral matters. Controversy means
that two men, A. and B., have opposite convictions, that these convictions are pitted one against
another, until finally one conviction—namely, the false one—vanishes. Now, it is quite certain
that he in whom a particular conviction has vanished is conscious that the substitution of another
conviction for the one that is gone is the work of the very same faculty as that which formerly
was convinced of the opposite view. That individual faculty therefore which has now created in
him the true view of the case is the same that once was false. The true judgment and the false
belong to one and the same faculty. Further, as one of these two opposing convictions grows
stronger and stronger the other of necessity grows weaker and weaker, until finally it disappears.
But the law of inverse proportion in opposing characteristics holds only where the subject is a
single unit. If a thing be one, then increase of black on its surface means diminution of white.
But if the objects are two, no such law of inverse proportion holds; one can be black and the
other white, and increase of white in one does not mean decrease of black in the other. So neither
could the law of inverse proportion hold in the case in which a true moral judgment replaces the
false unless that very same faculty or thing which was subject of the false judgment (on Hegel’s
own confession the individual Reason) is subject also of the true.

“It will be said, however, that our representation of this theory of the Universal
Conscience is crude and inadequate, that an individual man need not be conscious of this
universal intellect or its judgments, whilst yet it may so transform individuals as gradually to
harmonise all differences of moral opinion and bring out the true scientific conviction of the
race. We can only say that, whether our account of it is adequate or inadequate, the existence of a
Universal Conscience is a pure hypothesis; that its existence has not been proved; that it is not
necessary for moral science; that, on the contrary, it runs counter to the very root elements of the
science. Also, we may repeat, if this Universal Conscience exists in me and if I subsist in it, if it
be the ‘true conscience,’ it must influence me in every act in which conscience has a part; and
since it must have, in all the years gone by, to some extent at all events, shaken itself free of the
individual fetters — i.e., have overcome the individual instead of being overcome by the
individual—it must by this time have so asserted itself in me as to make me at least faintly
conscious of it when it speaks. But I am not conscious of it. I know from experience that in many

20
The pure Universal Conscience, according to Hegel, finds its objective expression in the State, not indeed in this
or that State or any State that we know, but in the Universal State. To look, therefore, for attestations of the
Universal Conscience in the laws of the State would be quite as irrational as searching for them in our self-
consciousnoss, for the only States which we know are the individual States, just as the only Conscience that we
know is our individual conscience.

12
acts it exerts no influence whatsoever over me, so that I can and often do err without the faintest
suspicion that I am in error.21

“There is, therefore, in each man but one Conscience — which is his own individual
Reason. But it is right to add that above us and distinct from us there is one Universal Reason
which is the ultimate type and foundation of the truth for every man—namely, God’s Reason—
to which all our judgments must conform if knowledge is to be true.”22

Critique of Hegel on the Nature of the State. In Hegel’s absolute idealist, absolute monist,
panlogicist system, “all particular truth disappears in the edifice of history; the individual is
absorbed by the State as a realization of the universal which surpasses the negative appearance of
the singular; faith is overcome by philosophy; the consciousness of man undoes itself in its
limitation which denies him in order to come to integrate itself into God as infinity: but it is a
God becoming, who achieves himself by recovering himself. The logical process of reduction to
the foundations is, in Hegel, the real process of the coming to be of absolute self-
consciousness”23 “In his Philosophy of Law (1821) Hegel teaches that the political state is the
moving progress of God in the world, to be honored as a reality at once human and divine.
‘Progess’ is the operating word in this concept: it denotes the presence of the dialectic, the
dynamic process or mechanism by which political states are constituted as the embodiment of
social movement in human history. From the viewpoint of the present study it is clear that the
fundamental metaphysics of pantheism is leading directly to the divinization of the state as the
supreme manifestation of the World Spirit moving in historical time”24 “When Hegel presents
the German world as the goal of the dialectic of the World spirit across six thousand years of
human culture, he has explicitly in mind the Prussian state of his own day. For him this is the
final embodiment of the World Spirit and the final aim of its progression, a concept to which one
now must turn in order to understand fully what Hegel has in mind with the application of his
dialectic in the Philosophy of History. ‘The principles of the successive phases of Spirit’, he
writes, ‘that animate the nations in a necessitated gradation are themselves only steps in the
development of the one universal Spirit…This necessarily implies that the present form of Spirit
comprehends within it all earlier steps…The life of the ever-present Spirit is a circle of
progressive embodiments.’ With this concept of the embodiment of the World Spirit in the
succession of political entities across time, the student of Hegel stands before his work The
Philosophy of Law, which may well be called the rationale of the totalitarian state, and which
reveals how truly it has been said that Marx can be understood only in the light of Hegel’s
philosophy but in an application that Hegel himself did not forsee. Hegel writes: ‘The state is the
Spirit that lives in the world and there consciously realizes itself…The state is the march of God
through the world…The state is the world that the Spirit has made for itself…We must therefore

21
This difficulty of the ‘erring conscience’ is, indeed, the nightmare of Universalism. Schleiermacher also attempts
to answer it, but he can only repeat Hegel’s reply. Conscience, he tells us, is God Himself. How, then, can
conscience err? Conscience, he answers, is the Infinite God only in so far as it is true. In so far as it is false it is
identified with the individual. God is the Universal fully developed. In the false conscience the Universal is not fully
developed.
Such childish reasoning can really only bring the Science of Ethics into disrepute.
22
M. CRONIN, op. cit., pp. 491-497.
23
C. CARDONA, Metafisica de la opción intelectual, Rialp, Madrid, 1973, pp. 202-203.
24
R. CHERVIN and E. KEVANE, Love of Wisdom, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1988, p. 281.

13
worship the state as the manifestation of the Divine on earth’”25 “Hobbes’s conception of the
Great Leviathan, an accumulation of irresistible force and the origin of morality, laws, and rights,
has given fresh impetus to the totalitarian idea in modern days. Some pantheists like Schelling26
and Hegel27 have gone to the extreme of identifying the State with God – the State is the absolute
being, the all-sufficient one whose end is itself. In his Outlines of the Philosophy of Right
(Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts), no. 258, Hegel says: ‘It is the course of God through
the world that constitutes the State. Its ground is the power of Reason actualizing itself as will.
When conceiving the State, one must not think of particular States, not of particular institutions,
but one must much rather contemplate the Idea, God as actual on earth, alone.’28”29

Answer to Hegel on the Nature of the State: Celestine Bittle on the Nature of the State.
“The Concept of the State. The state is a form of society, and a society is the stable union or
association of a number of persons for the mutual realization of a common end. This definition
of a society in general must also be verified in the state. Depending on the nature of a particular
society, this definition will have to be modified in a manner which befits the nature of the society
in question. The full nature of the state will be understood best at the end of our discussion.
However, a definition must be given now, even though many of its elements will only
established in the subsequent sections of our analysis.

“We define the state as a natural and perfect society, consisting of many families and
individuals, established for their common good under the direction of the supreme authority of a
common ruler. Each item of the definition calls for explanatory remarks.

“The state is ‘a natural society.’ It is not a mere ‘conventional’ society like a bowling
club or a labor union, but a ‘natural’ society in the same sense that the family is ‘natural,’
namely, because man is ordered by the natural law to form civil society.

“The state is ‘a natural and perfect society.’ It is self-sufficient and contains within its
organization all the means required to realize its proper end, namely, the common good of the
community in general.

“It is ‘a natural and perfect society, consisting of many families and individuals,’ because
its constituents are primarily the families and secondarily the individual persons.

“It is ‘a natural and perfect society, consisting of many families and individuals,
established for their common good.’ The proper and specific end and purpose of civil society is
the ‘common good’ of all or ‘public welfare’; not the particular good or welfare of any special
groups or classes.

25
R. CHERVIN, E. KEVANE, op. cit., p. 282.
26
F. W. J. VON SCHELLING, Neue Deduktion des Naturrechts, See his Sämmtleche Werke, vol. 1, pp. 247-280.
Stuttgart, 1856. See also System des transcendentalen Idealismus in the same set, vol. 3, p. 583.
27
G. W. F. HEGEL, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in Werke, vol. 8, nos. 257-272.
28
G. W. F. HEGEL, op. cit., no. 258
29
T. HIGGINS, Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1958, p. 418.

14
 “In our definition of the state we claim that the state consists essentially of a ruler and
those ruled, and the common ruler has the supreme authority to direct all members of the state
toward the realization of the proper end of civil society by exacting from all full cooperation in
the use of the means necessary to the attainment of this end of the state.

“The inclusion of these various items in the definition of the state is obviously not self-
evident. Their necessity will have to be proved.

“The State a Natural Society. Since the state consists of human beings and is intended for
the welfare of human beings, it will have to be either a ‘conventional’ or ‘natural’ society. If it is
a ‘conventional’ society, it is the result of a voluntary convention or agreement of men, and this
agreement is prompted by expediency; men unite in such a society, for instance, an orchestra or
labor union or business association, because it is to their advantage to gain a particular end by
pooling their efforts. If it is a ‘natural’ society, it is the result of a dictate of human nature, and its
formation is based on moral necessity.

“The state, we claim, is a natural society.

“Man has the natural aptitude, propensity, and need to associate himself in a permanent
union and companionship with his fellow men for the purpose of attaining temporal happiness or
felicity. But such a permanent union and companionship is found in the state; and any society
which is formed under the impulse of such a natural aptitude, propensity, and need is the result
of a dictate of man’s nature and as such is a natural society. Hence, the state is a natural society.

“No two persons are alike in every respect. The two sexes differ greatly, whether viewed
from a biological, physiological, emotional, or mental viewpoint. All persons differ in ability,
talent, tastes, temperament, character, and personal requirements. The one thing which all
persons, no matter what their condition, have in common is their human nature; they are rational
animals, with a composite nature consisting of a material body and a spiritual soul. Now, the
existence of the state is a constant and universal fact. Such a constant and universal phenomenon
demands a constant and universal explanation, and this explanation can be found only in the one
changeless and constant thing present in man — his human nature.

“Man’s uniform nature manifests itself in a natural aptitude, propensity, and need to live
in the state. That man is by nature a ‘social being’ has been proved in the preceding chapter.
Conjugal society is a ‘natural’ society, because man has the natural aptitude, propensity, and
need to live in conjugal society, in order to develop the potentialities of his nature and thus
realize the natural end of his life. For the same reason the state is a natural society.

“That man possesses the natural aptitude to live in the state is evident from the very fact
that everywhere and always, as history and experience show, he actually lives in the society of
the state. Notwithstanding all selfish interests present among human beings, they practice mutual
love and benevolence, assist one another in mutual helpfulness, unite into various groups and
associations for mutual advancement and welfare.

15
 “The societies people form in consequence of this natural aptitude are manifold. The
members place themselves under definite rules and regulations and let themselves be directed in
their activities by a president or board with authority to govern the members in all matters
pertaining to the special ends for which these societies were formed. This same aptitude comes
into play in the wider scope and larger organization of the state. If men had no natural aptitude to
live in the state, the state simply would not function, and there would be no state. But the state
exists everywhere and always. Therefore men have the natural aptitude to form the state.

“That man possesses the natural propensity to live in the state is equally clear. Anarchy is
a most uncommon phenomenon. People have often rebelled against their rulers and governments.
However, when rulers and governments were overthrown, people never remained for any length
of time without rulers and governments, but immediately set about establishing a state more to
their liking. Men thus instinctively seek their common temporal welfare by uniting in mutual co-
operation under the directive guidance of some governing authority. If men possessed no natural
propensity to live in the state, rebellion would be the rule, and they would seek to live without
rulers and governments as their natural mode of life. Since the opposite is true, it is manifest that
man, by his very nature, is impelled to live in the state as a normal mode of existence.

“That man possesses the natural need to live in the state is evident from the fact that it is
impossible for him to bring about the physical, intellectual, and moral development of the
potentialities befitting his human nature except in the organized existence characteristic of the
state. Neither the individual person nor the family is capable of supplying all the means
necessary for the complete development of the human personality, although this development
lies within the natural scope of the common end of human life as intended by the Creator of man.
Individual persons and families cannot adequately cope with the dangers to property, bodily
integrity, and life, which threaten them from the forces of nature and the evil intentions of
criminally minded malefactors, without the organized protection of a properly constituted state.
Nor are they, as isolated individuals and families, capable of procuring or manufacturing the
things required for the proper development of their physical life and economic existence; only
through the extensive cooperation of everyone for mutual assistance, as is found in the
organization of all groups directed toward the common welfare, in the state, can this
development be accomplished. The arts and sciences are the outgrowth of the concentrated
efforts of many generations working in dependence and unison; they are the result of coordinated
observation, experimentation, exchange of ideas, and reasoning processes. Single persons and
families, and even smaller groups, are incapable of inaugurating and maintaining the facilities
necessary for bringing education to that high level of perfection which the innate potentialities of
man can attain; to accomplish this, the personal and economic resources of a highly organized
society, such as is found in the state as a stable and permanent union of a large number of
families and individuals, are a practical necessity. To reach the plenitude of his moral capacities,
man must be able to practice the social virtues which are connatural to his human nature, because
he is by nature a social being. The family, however, is too restricted in numbers to give full
scope for the exercise of the many social virtues. The moral growth of people, therefore, would
be correspondingly restricted and stunted, if individuals and families lived more or less in
isolation. By living the group life of civil society in the state in all its ramifications and
diversified activities, man can exercise all virtues, personal and social, and thus attain to the full

16
growth of his moral personality as intended by God. Even for the complete moral development
of man, therefore, life in the state is a natural need.

“Now, any society which man is prompted to form and in which he is required to live, in
consequence of a natural aptitude, propensity, and need, is a dictate of his nature and of the
natural law and as such is a ‘natural society.’ The perfection of man’s physical, intellectual, and
moral life is always found in civil society and nowhere else, as is evident from the testimony of
history and experience. Hence, civil society or the state is a natural society, a requisite of human
nature.

“The State is a Perfect Society. There are two natural societies directing man toward the
attainment of his natural end here on earth — the family and the state. The family is an
‘imperfect’ society, whereas the state is a ‘perfect’ society. A society is said to be ‘perfect’ if it
possesses within itself all the means necessary for the attainment of its proper end, so that it is
not dependent on any society of a higher order for the attainment of its end; it is ‘imperfect’ if it
does not possess within itself all the means required for the attainment of its end.

“The family of itself is incapable of providing for peace and prosperity in any full
measure. The family cannot ward off a concerted attack on the part of a band of individuals or
families, as is evident; it needs the active assistance of others. Nor is the family, by itself,
sufficient to furnish all the means necessary for the complete physical, intellectual, and moral
development of its members, as was pointed out in the foregoing section. These means must be
supplied by the organization of civil society or the state. Since the family is thus dependent on
the society of the state for its complete protection and the full attainment of its end, it is an
‘imperfect’ society.

“On the other hand, the state is a perfect society.

“The state possesses within itself all the means necessary for the attainment of its proper
end, which end is the common good of peace and prosperity. In other words, the state is self-
sufficient in its own sphere of activity; it is a ‘perfect’ society.

“In the process of the development of man’s social nature, the community of the family is
the first and most natural. As the number of families increases in a locality, the physical,
intellectual, and moral requirements lead gradually to a division of labor and social functions in
different directions among the various families. A community, with community interests, is
formed. And as various communities of families develop in a given territory, this division of
labor and social functions becomes still more diversified. The interests of the various groups,
though common in a general sense, will often conflict with one another, especially in the
economic field. While cooperation is necessary, jealousy, discontent, and moral delinquency will
often disturb the social order and threaten to disrupt the peace. The family as a society is
evidently not sufficient to meet the rising demands of social charity and justice. A new
community order is necessary in order to coordinate the social and economic activities of all
families and communities and to safeguard the rights of everybody concerned. A greater
authority than that of the father of the family is needed if peace and order are to be preserved and

17
fostered; laws must be imposed on all for the common good, and justice must be maintained and
administered. And thus the social process passes from the family to the political state.

“The state does not abolish the family and the free associations of particular groups; but
they are assimilated into the broader organization of the state which has a goal of its own and its
own authority. The state is a unity of order, and in it man’s social nature is able to develop in a
more perfect manner. The self-sufficiency of the state is primarily social and political, a self-
sufficiency of unity, order, and peace; it is a legal and moral self-sufficiency, for the regulation
of internal matters and for independence in matters pertaining to other states. These are goals
which the families and individuals could not attain through their efforts with the limited means at
their disposal.

“To effect this order and to achieve this unity, the state enacts laws and regulations
through its legislative power; makes decisions and ends disputes through its judiciary power; and
enforces the laws of the land and the decisions of the courts through its executive power. To
protect the commonwealth from external attack and internal sedition, the state uses the might of
its armed forces. The comprehensive order of the state and its constituents is thus a complete and
self-sufficient order, capable of leading its members to the common good of peace and unity for
the benefit of all as a self-contained community.

“To say that the state is self-sufficient and perfect does not necessarily imply that it can
provide for all the wants of its citizens, especially in the economic field. What is meant is that the
state possesses the organization which normally is capable of providing or procuring the means
necessary to satisfy the wants of the community in a reasonable measure, even if it must
negotiate with other states to import certain raw materials or finished products not available in its
own territory.

“Self-sufficiency also implies that the state is a complete organization in itself, with all
the rights, powers, and competences necessary to carry out its activities, so that it is independent
of any other society of a similar nature. That is why we see that people never set up a social
order higher than that of the state for the attainment of temporal happiness. Some countries, for
example, the United States, have a union of separate states. These states, however, are only semi-
autonomous and are limited in their activities. The federal government, of which they are integral
parts, is the real state, and it alone is self-sufficient and a perfect society.

“The Origin of the State. When the problem of the origin of the state is raised, the
problem does not refer to the origin of any particular state in the setting of its special historical
circumstances. It is a question here of the origin of the state in general as a social institution
with its supreme juridical moral power, with its right over life and death and over peace and war.
Whence comes the institution of the state? Why do people found a state at all? What is the origin
of the state?

“The state is an institution composed of human beings. It is a human institution. It must,

we claim, find its explanation in human nature. It must, therefore, have a natural origin derived
from the peculiarity of human nature. The nature of man, considered in its full philosophical
meaning, is both bodily and spiritual, and the state must have its origin in the bodily and spiritual

18
nature of man. Now, the nature of man is not something static; it is the dynamic principle of all
the activities of man tending toward the realization of the inherent and native potentialities of
man as the natural end of man’s being and existence. Consequently, to live in the political status
of civil society, in the state, is the necessary result of man’s sociality as a part of his nature, for
the attainment of man’s natural end of being and existence. Because man seeks happiness in the
completion and perfection of his personality, and because this completion and perfection can be
achieved only through social living with his fellow men in the permanent union of political life,
the formation of the state and life in the state is a moral necessity imposed on man by his nature.
Civil society is thus an intentional disposition of man’s nature which he cannot escape, if he
intends to find temporal happiness in the completion and perfection of his personality while
living here on earth.

“It follows, then, that human nature is the reason for the existence of the state and the
cause of its origin. The state is the necessary outgrowth of man’s nature seeking its completion
and perfection in the status of civil life. Since the development of man’s nature is natural, the
origin of the state, which is the result of this development, is also natural. God, therefore, is not
the direct and immediate cause of the origin of the state, as if He established it through some
superhuman, supernatural act. God, of course, wills the state as an integral part of the human and
cosmic order, because He is the Author of human nature and therefore indirectly and mediately
also the Author of the state as an institution to the formation of which human nature naturally
tends.

“Man is a rational being, and rationality implies intellectual insight and freedom of the
will. The normal life of man is based on his rationality, free will included, even if certain lines of
activity are prompted by his nature. Conjugal life, and therefore conjugal society, are prompted
by human nature; but in concrete instances the marriage of two individuals will only be effected
by mutual free consent. So, too, civil life and therefore civil society, are also prompted by human
nature; but, as in the case of marriage, the state cannot be formed and originated except through
the co-operation of the free will of men. The origin of the state, therefore, cannot be the result of
some blind, irrational, biological urge of man’s nature, but must find its cause in the free consent
of the men who form the state.

“The actual origin of the state must be envisioned somewhat as follows. Man is by nature
a social being who must seek the completion and perfection of his nature in dependence on other
human beings. Since man in isolation and solitariness cannot achieve the full end of his being,
because he would lack many aids necessary for his complete welfare, God ordered man’s life in
such a manner that he is born and reared in society. Primarily, man is born and reared in the
family. Then, since the family is not self-sufficient, the families, upon increasing in number and
as a result of diversification and specialization of interests and activities, combine to form the
political community, because only the state possesses the self-sufficiency necessary for the full
development of human life as required by the family and the individual.

“The state, therefore, originated through a natural growth out of the natural combination
of families. Families of the same kin would gravitate into more or less concentrated
communities. A single clan or tribe, as its population grew, would consist of a number of such
communities, under the leadership of a chief or patriarch. The expansion of the clan and tribe,

19
and possibly also the juxtaposition of other clans and tribes in the same general territory, would
gradually develop a concord of interests in some matters and a clash of interests in others. The
need for protection and security would become more urgent, so that the family organizations of
itself, would be insufficient to meet the rising needs of all. Through imperceptible stages, then,
the family passed over into a new form of society, possessing an autonomous sovereignty and
sufficiency. This is the view expounded by Aristotle,30 and it is the view almost universally
accepted by the sociologists who have made a comprehensive study of primitive peoples and
ancient states.

“In later periods of history some states, no doubt, had their origin in virtue of a direct
effort to form a state, and not as the natural outgrowth of families united through the ties of
blood. Such, for example, was the formation of the Orange Free State in 1854. Here, however,
we are speaking, not of the origin of a particular state, but of the rise of the state in general as a
new form of social life superior to that of the social life of the family in general…

“The Constituents of the State. Every society must consist of constituent members. They
are the material cause of the composition of the state. While the state as a ‘society’ is a moral
unity, it consists basically of a plurality bound into unity. Conjugal society is a simple society,
because it consists of individual physical persons. The state, on the other hand, is a composite
society, because it consists of subordinate societies or associations as moral persons.

“The matter in general of the state is all those persons, moral or physical, who belong to
the state and are its constituents. This matter is either ‘proximate’ or ‘remote.’ It is proximate if
the persons are subject to the jurisdiction of the state directly, and not through the social bond of
some subordinate society of which they are members. It is remote if the persons are primarily
members of a subordinate society, and this sub ordinate society is proximately subject to the
jurisdiction of the state.

“Primarily, we contend, the proximate matter of the state as a natural society is the
families.

“Since civil society is a natural society, natural law determines both its proximate and
remote matter. Hence, those persons who are ordered directly and primarily to assume the social
bond of civil life in the state are the proximate matter of the state.

“Now, the natural law orders the families directly and primarily to assume the social
bond of civil life in the state. There are three natural units among men: the individual, the family,
and the state. The individual is ordered by natural law to the family: the individuals are not only
born and reared in domestic society according to the dictates of natural law; they also have the
natural destiny to be the fathers and mothers of the race. Only in the family does the average
person find the means to perfect his personality. And the families are ordered by the natural law
to the social life of civil society in the state, because it is only in the political state that the
families, and in the family the individuals, can find the perfection desired and sought as a result
of the needs and demands of human nature. Families gather into communities, and communities
gather into colonies and provinces; then they naturally take the final step and establish the state.
30
ARISTOTLE, Politics, Bk. I, ch. 2.

20
Man, therefore, in seeking his connatural development, is directly ordered by the natural law
with regard to the family; and the family, without any further sort of mediation, is directly
ordered by the natural law to the civil society of the state. Primarily, therefore, the families are
the proximate matter of the state.

“It happens, of course, that adult individuals, who are unmarried, have left the domestic
society of the parental roof and lead a life of their own. Since there exists no social bond
mediating between them and the state, they, too, belong to the proximate matter of the state, but
only secondarily and per accidens.

“Children belong to the state through the mediation of the family of which they are
members. Immediately and directly they are under the jurisdiction of the father as the juridical
head of the domestic society of the family; only ‘mediately’ and ‘indirectly’ as remote matter, do
they belong under the jurisdiction of the state. This applies also to the wife, in so far as she is
subordinated to the husband.

“The state, therefore, is the natural expansion of the families, rather than of the
individuals. The families are by nature and existence prior to the state and do not lose their
identity by being incorporated in the state.

“The Proper End of the State. It is not a question here of the ‘ultimate’ end of the state,
because the ultimate end of the state coincides with the ultimate end of the family and of all
individuals, namely, the glorification of God and the eternal happiness of man in the possession
of God. What we seek to determine is the proper and immediate end of the state; it is that end
which distinguishes the state from every other type of society and determines its specific nature.
The concrete states may be monarchies, aristocracies, democracies, or blendings of these
fundamental forms. Since, however, all forms agree in this that they are ‘states,’ there must be a
‘proper end’ of the state as such in all of them. And since the state is a mandate of human nature
and of the natural law, the proper end of the state must be determined by nature itself.

“Three main theories regarding the proper end of the state have been advanced. The
theories differ according to the scope which the proponents ascribe to the state’s activities.

“The first general theory restricts the purpose of the state to the protection and
furtherance of the individual rights and liberties of the subjects. The proper end of the state,
therefore, consists solely in forbidding and hindering all those external acts which interfere with
the exercise of the personal rights and liberties of other members of the community.

“This is essentially the theory of Kant. According to Kant, the juridical order is divorced
from the moral order. The moral order pertains merely to the ‘internal’ liberty of man as an
autonomous being, while the juridical order pertains to the ‘external’ liberty of man as a social
being. Hence, the proper end of the state is exclusively ‘peace,’ i.e., the preservation of the
liberty of all subjects so that they can live in harmony.

“The individualistic, liberalistic Manchester School maintained that material prosperity is

the highest good of man on earth. Private property is the keystone of a healthy social order, and

21
each individual has the right to accumulate as much wealth as possible in free competition with
others. Hence, it is the duty of the state to give free rein to personal initiative, and it is the end of
the state to protect each one in the acquisition, possession, and enjoyment of private property.

“Evolutionary utilitarians also advocate the restriction of the proper end of the state. In
their view, mankind is in a continuous process of evolution toward the chiliastic state of the
future. This process is a sociological ‘struggle for existence,’ in which the less useful members
are gradually eliminated, until none remain but those ideally suited for the future ideal state. The
‘survival of the fittest’ is a biological law governing the evolutionary process, and the state must
not interfere with its operation. Hence, the state has as its end nothing more than the protection
of individual rights. The welfare of all subjects cannot be the proper end of the state, or it would
be forced to protect the weak and unfit and thus nullify the evolutionary process.

“The second general theory expands the purpose of the state to such an extent that it
considers the state as an end in and for itself, submerging all individual rights and liberties in the
omnipotent will of the state.

“This view was dominant in the political philosophy of classical paganism. Thus, Plato
maintained that man existed solely for the state, and the state is the great pedagogue of the
citizens; it is the purpose of the state to educate its subjects to virtue, and all subjects must
subordinate themselves completely to the state. The state, therefore, has unlimited power over
property, marriage, children, and family life. Even Aristotle conceded far too much power over
the individual to the state.

“Toward the end of the Middle Ages, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469—1527) revived the
pagan concept of the absolutism of the state. Politics has nothing to do with morality. The
individual virtues must give way to the interests of the state. The state is everything; and all
things are good, if they are good for the state. Results count, not the means employed, because
the moral law which binds the individuals does not bind the nations. Hence, treaties need not be
kept and rights need not be respected, if they run counter to the objectives of the state. Hobbes,
too, gave absolute power to the ruler, once the state is established. The pantheists, such as G.
Hegel (1770—1831) and F. Schelling (1775—1854), saw in the state the supreme embodiment
of the Absolute in its internal deterministic evolution. The state is an end-in-itself, and the
individuals are mere means.

“In our day, the omnipotence of the state has been proclaimed by the totalitarianism of
national socialism in Germany, fascism in Italy, and communism in Russia. The state is supreme,
and everything and everyone is subservient to the interests of the state.

“The third general theory is the one defended by most Christian thinkers and scholastics.
It represents a middle course between the extremes of the foregoing general theories. They
contend, in opposition to the first general theory, that the proper end of the state includes more
than the mere preservation and protection of individual rights and liberties; they also contend, in
opposition to the second general theory, that the state is not an end-in-itself and that the
individuals and families must not lose their identity in the state. The proximate and proper end of
the state is public welfare, namely, the common good of peace and prosperity, through the

22
realization of a social status which offers the citizens security in their rights and the opportunity
to achieve true temporal felicity by means of self-activity. True temporal felicity is achieved,
when the citizens live in peace, which is tranquility of order internally and externally, and in
prosperity, which is the abundance of all the means necessary for the complete self-perfection of
the individuals and families in their physical, intellectual, social, and moral life. It is not the end
of the state to furnish temporal felicity ready-made to its citizens, because temporal felicity is not
a commodity which can be manufactured and then handed over to a person. But it is the proper
end of the state to furnish the opportunity and the means, so far as is possible with the material
and human agencies at its disposal, to its citizens, so that they may find it possible of achieving
temporal felicity through free self-activity. This possibility the state must strive to place within
the reach of all its members, not only of a privileged class or group, because the proper end of
the state is the ‘common good’ or ‘public welfare’ of all.

“We subscribe to the scholastic theory and contend that the proper end of the state is
public welfare.

“If we desire to know what the proper end of the state is, we must go back again to the
reason why people form the state. They do so because they come to the realization that neither
the individuals nor the families nor the conventional voluntary societies are self-sufficient, since
they are not able to supply the bodily and spiritual goods necessary for the developed life which
man seeks and needs. To supply these necessary goods they combine to form the state; and the
state is a new form of social living, a qualitatively different society, different from that of the
family and all other conventional societies. The individual good merges in many ways with the
common good sought in the state, for the simple reason that the state consists of and in the
individuals and families and exists for their benefit. But there is a difference. The individual
good is a ‘private’ good, and the individuals and families are best able to look after their own
private interests in their own way. There is, however, also a ‘common’ good which contrasts
with the ‘private’ good, and it is the good of the social body as an organized community of
individuals and families; it is the welfare of the ‘society as such,’ public welfare, and this cannot
be achieved by the individuals and families but only through the state. It is, therefore, the proper
end of the state to work for the ‘public welfare’ of the social body as a unit, and that is the reason
why people combine to form the state.

“M. Cronin31 explains what is contained in the ‘common good’ as the characteristic end
of the state. ‘It is the business of the State to protect the community from enemies without, and to
furnish the machinery and prepare the organization required for this end. Again, it is the business
of the State to make laws for the community, to set up tribunals for administering justice, to
establish a proper educational system, to regulate commerce so that the whole community may
not suffer by the inordinate action of a few individuals. All these things are matters appertaining
to the good of the community as such. Again, it is the business of the State to provide and
maintain such an environment, physical and moral, as is required for the welfare of individuals,
physical and moral, for though individuals may benefit by such an environment, it really is,
properly speaking, a ‘good’ of the whole community, and the providing of it is wholly outside
the capacity of individuals. Men could not be healthy in unsanitary surroundings. Virtue can

31
M. CRONIN, The Science of Ethics, vol. 2, Benziger Brothers, New York, 1929, p. 473.

23
prosper only with difficulty where the level of public morality is low and the atmosphere morally
offensive.’

“It is obvious that the individuals and families are incapable of defending themselves,
alone and by themselves, against the aggression of a powerful foreign enemy. An army is
required for this defense, and an army requires the conscription of citizens as soldiers who can
be ordered into battle and death, if necessary, for the preservation of the community. But this
raising of an army and this ordering of fellow men into battle and death far exceeds the right and
power of individuals and families. This one point alone is sufficient to disprove the contention of
the first theory, mentioned above, that the state is nothing more than an institution to protect
individual rights and liberties. The fact that citizens can be conscripted, and the fact that the
soldiers must be ready to sacrifice their life in battle, is justifiable only on the supposition that
the state has a proper end of its own and that this end consists in the public welfare, the common
good of the community as such, distinct from the private good and the private rights of the
individual. Radical pacifists are of the opinion that the state has no right to send citizens as
soldiers into war, no matter how just the cause. However, the generality of men, and this includes
the wisest and best, have always conceded this right to the state, and they cannot be wrong in a
matter which affects the most vital rights of man.

“We contend that the second theory, which defends the absolutism of the state as an end-
in-itself, contradicts the natural law, because it reduces human beings to a mere means for the
progress of the state; this is a violation of the essential dignity of man. The state exists for the
benefit of man; not man for the benefit of the state. When men form the state, they form it as an
organization of service for themselves. The state is not a substance, an entity existing for itself
apart from the individuals and families who compose it: they are the state. The destiny of the
state is temporal and mortal, while the ultimate destiny of man is eternal and immortal; and the
temporal and mortal must be in the service of the eternal and immortal; otherwise there would be
a subversion and perversion of the right order. Totalitarianism is slavery of the people.

“Authority and Power. The authority of the state and its power are, strictly speaking,
distinct realities. The ‘authority’ of the state is the right of jurisdiction, or the moral competence
to issue commands and impose obligations on the wills of its subjects in matters pertaining to the
public welfare. The ‘power’ of the state is the right of coercion, or the legal competence to
enforce obedience to these commands and fulfillment of these obligations. Since mere authority
without power is an empty shell and mere power without authority is nothing but tyranny, the
two are so closely interwoven in actual fact that it is customary to consider them as synonymous,
so far as all practical purposes are concerned.

“Whence is this supreme civil authority and power of the state derived?

“The question presents a distinct problem. In posing the problem, we are not concerned
with the particular bearer or bearers of this supreme authority and power. Nor are we concerned
with the particular type of government in which it is found. What concerns us in this connection
is the cause of the supreme civil authority and power as such of the state in general.

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 “The contractualists, such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and their followers, maintain
that the supreme authority and power of the state arises from the individuals who originally set
up civil society or the state; and they do this by yielding their individual rights to their ruler or by
pooling their individual rights and efforts for mutual protection and advantage. Evolutionists
maintain that the immediate cause of the state’s supreme authority is collective human nature
developing through biological necessity.

“We subscribe to the scholastic teaching that the supreme civil authority and power as
such proceeds immediately and proximately from God, without the intervention of any other
cause, on the basis of natural law as a requirement of the natural order.

“It is a valid principle of science and philosophy that no effect can be greater than its
cause. No cause can produce an effect superior to itself, for the self-evident reason that ‘no one
can give what one has not got. Now, it is obvious that supreme authority and power is an
essential element of the equipment necessary for the state in the realization of public welfare.
Without this authority and power it would be impossible for the state to direct efficaciously its
members toward the specific end for which the state is formed, namely, the public welfare of the
community as such. This specific end is a requirement of natural law, and as a consequence the
supreme authority and power of the state is also a requirement of the natural law, because any
society which by nature has a specific end must also be entitled by nature to the means necessary
for the attainment of that end. But since the specific end of the state, in as much as it is
prescribed by natural law, is independent of the will and consent of the persons forming the state,
the supreme authority and power of the state, as an essential means to that end, is also
independent of the will and consent of these persons. That the state is really a requirement of the
natural law, was proved when it was shown that the state, like the family, is a ‘natural’ society.

“The natural law, as was shown before, is a participation in the eternal law. The order of
the natural law, therefore, is a divinely established order, with God, the Eternal Lawgiver, as its
immediate, proximate Cause. In consequence of this fact, man is in no way the author or cause of
the natural law, but is subject to it in all things, even without his consent. He may violate the
natural law, but he still cannot on that account escape its binding force. Just as the essence of
conjugal and family society is a mandate of the natural law and has God as its immediate author,
so the essence of the state is a mandate of the natural law and has God as its immediate Author;
and since the supreme authority and power of the state is an essential element of the state, this
authority and power must also have God as its immediate Author.

“As soon, therefore, as men form the state by mutual consent, God, without their consent
and intervention, gives to the new political body (the state) the supreme authority and power
required by natural law for the attainment of its specific end. This does not demand a special
supernatural act on the part of God; authority and power are given to the new political body (the
state) by God in virtue of the natural law. The process, therefore, is natural, not supernatural, and
belongs wholly to the natural order as instituted by God. The process is neatly characterized by
I. W. Cox.32 ‘Because in human generation,’ he says, ‘the parents initiate a procreative process
which demands a human soul, and in consequence of which God creates a human soul, the
parents can rightly be called the efficient causes of the concrete individual generated. So too,
32
I. W. COX, Liberty, Its Use and Abuse, Fordham University Press, New York, 1946, p. 374.

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citizens constituting civil society start a process which demands supreme civil authority, and in
consequence of which God grants immediately and as sole proximate cause this authority,
although the citizens still remain the efficient cause of the concrete civil society. The members,
who organize the state by their consent, place the foundation of the civilly social bond. This
bond, by the Natural Law, descends immediately on those giving consent, and immediately there
arises by the Natural Law supreme civil authority as an essential property of civil society.’

“The whole argument, of course, revolves around the question whether the state’s
supreme authority and power is qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the authority and
power vested in the individuals and families who form the state. It is. The state’s proper end
being the public welfare, it can and actually does, in order to efficaciously realize this end, levy
taxes upon its citizens, condemn private property when necessary, preserve peace and order
through law enforcement agencies, enact general laws affecting all individuals and families,
inflict capital punishment on those guilty of serious offenses against public order and the welfare
of the community at large, establish military forces for the preservation of the state against
internal and external enemies, declare war, and conclude international treaties. Since individuals
and families possess no such authority and power, it is evident that they cannot be the cause of
this authority and power in the state. Only God, through the natural law, can give such supreme
authority and power to the state formed by the citizens.

“We can now understand better why St. Paul33 wrote to the early Christians of Rome that
they must obey their (pagan) civil rulers: ‘Let everyone be subject to the higher authorities, for
there exists no authority except from God, and those who exist have been appointed by God.
Therefore he who resists the authority resists the ordinance of God.’ And that is also why
Christ34 said to Pilate: ‘Thou wouldst have no power at all over me were it not given thee from
above.’

“When, therefore, a state has been legitimately established by its constituting members,
its authority and power is present in virtue of the natural law, and the duty of obedience and
loyalty is also incumbent on the members of the state in virtue of the natural law. This obedience
is then not a servile submission to mere physical might, but a ‘reasonable’ obedience, because it
is really an obedience to God, the Author of the natural law and of the authority and power of the
state.

“Such is the ethical concept of civil society or the state. It represents the culmination of
man’s natural tendencies in the sphere of social life. The state, since it consists of persons who
are weak and often immoral, often falls short of the ideal. In itself, however, and as intended by
the Creator, it is the perfect, self-sufficient society, endowed with the high purpose of working
out the common welfare of all.”35

33
Romans 13:1 ff.
34
John 19:11..
35
C. BITTLE, Man and Morals: Ethics, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1953, pp. 527-537, 549-558.

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