Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

RESOLUTION
Acting on the compliance dated 05 July 2004 and on the proposed Rules on
Notarial Practice of 2004 submitted by the Sub-Committee for the Study,
Drafting and Formulation of the Rules Governing the Appointment of
Notaries Public and the Performance and Exercise of Their Official Functions,
of the Committees on Revision of the Rules of Court and on Legal Education
and Bar Matters, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the proposed Rules on
Notarial Practice of 2004, with modifications, thus:
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2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

RULE I
IMPLEMENTATION
SECTION 1. Title. - These Rules shall be known as the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.
SEC. 2. Purposes. - These Rules shall be applied and construed to advance
the following purposes:
(a) to promote, serve, and protect public interest; chan robles virtual law library
(b) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the rules governing notaries public;
and
(c) to foster ethical conduct among notaries public. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 3. Interpretation. - Unless the context of these Rules otherwise
indicates, words in the singular include the plural, and words in the plural
include the singular.
RULE II
DEFINITIONS
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - Acknowledgment refers to an act in which
an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally
complete instrument or document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by
the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules; and (c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or
document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the
instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or
document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a
particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that
capacity.
SEC. 2. Affirmation or Oath. - The term Affirmation or Oath refers to an
act in which an individual on a single occasion: chan robles virtual law library
(a) appears in person before the notary public; chan robles virtual law library
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary
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THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7350 : February 18, 2013
PATROCINIO V. AGBULOS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROSELLER A.
VIRAY, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The case stemmed from a Complaint1 filed before the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) by complainant Mrs. Patrocinio V. Agbulos against
respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray of Asingan, Pangasinan, for allegedly
notarizing a document denominated as Affidavit of Non-Tenancy 2 in violation
of the Notarial Law. The said affidavit was supposedly executed by
complainant, but the latter denies said execution and claims that the
signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) she allegedly presented
are not hers. She further claims that the CTC belongs to a certain Christian
Anton. 3 Complainant added that she did not personally appear before
respondent for the notarization of the document. She, likewise, states that
respondent's client, Rolando Dollente (Dollente), benefited from the said
falsified affidavit as it contributed to the illegal transfer of a property
registered in her name to that of Dollente. 4?r?l1
In his Comment,5 respondent admitted having prepared and notarized the
document in question at the request of his client Dollente, who assured him
that it was personally signed by complainant and that the CTC appearing
therein is owned by her.6 He, thus, claims good faith in notarizing the subject
document.
In a Resolution7 dated April 16, 2007, the OBC referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their
respective Position Papers.8Complainant insists that she was deprived of her
property because of the illegal notarization of the subject
document.9 Respondent, on the other hand, admits having notarized the
document in question and asks for apology and forgiveness from
complainant as a result of his indiscretion.10?r?l1
In his report, Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa (Commissioner Funa)
reported that respondent indeed notarized the subject document in the
absence of the alleged affiant having been brought only to respondent by
Dollente. It turned out later that the document was falsified and the CTC
belonged to another person and not to complainant. He further observed

G.R. No. 114829 March 1, 1995

MAXIMINO GAMIDO Y BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner, v. NEW
BILIBID PRISONS (NBP) OFFICIALS, Respondents.
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DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In the Resolution of 7 September 1994, we required Atty. Icasiano
M. dela Rea of No. 42 National Road corner Bruger Subdivision,
Putatan, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for making it appear
in thejurat of the petition in this case that the petitioner subscribed
the verification and swore to before him, as notary public, on 19
April 1994, when in truth and in fact the petitioner did not.
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In his Explanation of 23 December 1994 which was received by this

Court on 25 January 1995, Atty. Icasiano M. dela Rea admitted
having executed the jurat without the presence of petitioner
Gamido. He alleges:
Firstly, I must honestly admit that I notarized it not in his presence.
I did it in the honest belief that since it is jurat and not an
acknowledgement, it would be alrights [sic] to do so considering
that prior to April 19, 1994 and thereafter, I know Mr. Gamido since
I have been in and out of New Bilibid Prisons, not only because my
office is here only across the Municipal Building of Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila but because I handled a number of cases involving prisoners
and guards of NBP as well as some of its personnels [sic]. That in
fact, I attempted to have the document personally signed by him
but considering that I have to strictly observe rules and regulations
of the NBP, particularly on visit, I did not pursue anymore my
intention to have it notarized before me.
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Secondly, that in notarizing the document, I honestly feel and by

heart and in good faith, that as a notary public and as a practicing
lawyer, I could modestly contribute in the orderly administration of

justice. The Gamido family use to come in the office and in fact
hiring the legal services of the undersigned but I refused to handle
since I am already pre-occupied in other cases of similar
importance. That on December 13, 1994 I receive a letter from Mr.
Gamido, last paragraph of which is read as follows:
Sanay po Atty. ay maawa kayo sa akin na nagdudusa nang walang
kasalanan. Alang alang po sa kaawa awa kong familiya, kailangan
ang aking kalinga. Ang tulong ninyo ang siyang daan upang ako ay
makaalis sa pagpapahirap nang mga taong walang puso at
kaluluwa, walang awa sa kapwa, at sa sambayanang Pilipino.
Then he apologizes to the Court and assures it that henceforth he
would be more careful and circumspect:
That I am praying for an apology to the Hon. Supreme Court if what
I did was wrong and the Hon. Supreme Court is assured that
perhaps what transpired was a wrong judgment or honest mistake.
That the Hon. Chairman and its Hon. Members are assured that
when I signed the petition not in Gamido's presence it is never
intended to do a wrong, to commit illegal or criminal acts but
merely in the honest and sincere belief that it is valid and legal. The
Hon. Supreme Court is assured that it is never intended for malice
or for money.
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This Hon. Chairman and its Hon. Members are further assured that
from hereon, I am more careful and circumspect in the exercise of
this noble and grand profession and that no amount or consideration
will sway or change this conviction. This is my life. This is the life of
my family.
Atty. dela Rea's explanation is unsatisfactory; however, his
spontaneous voluntary admission may be considered in mitigation of
his liability.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroble s virtual law library

As a notary public for a long time, as evidenced by the fact that his
questioned jurat is indicated to have been entered in Book 45 of his

notarial register, he should know the similarities and differences

between a jurat and an acknowledgement.
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A jurat which is, normally in this form:

Subscribed and sworn to before me in _______________, this ____
day of ____________, affiant having exhibited to me his
Community (before, Residence) Tax Certificate No. ____________
issued at ______________ on ____________.
"is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies that the
instrument was sworn to before him (Theobald vs. Chicago Ry. Co.,
75 Ill. App. 208). It is not a part of a pleading but merely evidences
the fact that the affidavit was properly made (Young vs. Wooden,
265 SW 24, 204 Ky. 694)." (LORENZO M. TAADA and FRANCISCO
A. RODRIGO, Modern Legal Forms, vol. I, sixth ed., 1985 printing,
31). The jurat in the petition in the case also begins with the words
"subscribed and sworn to me."
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To subscribe literally means to write underneath, as one's name; to

sign at the end of a document (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth ed.,
1279). To swear means to put on oath; to declare on oath the truth
of a pleading, etc. (Id., 1298). Accordingly, in a jurat, the affiant
must sign the document in the presence of and take his oath before
a notary public or any other person authorized to administer
oaths.
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As to acknowledgment, Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:

(a) The acknowledgement shall be made before a notary public or
an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where
the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free
act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if

he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall

so state. (See Lorenzo M. Taada and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Modern
Philippine Legal Forms, vol. II, 1964 Fifth ed., 735).
It is obvious that the party acknowledging must likewise appear
before the notary public or any other person authorized to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents.
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The claim or belief of Atty. dela Rea that the presence of petitioner
Gamido was not necessary for the jurat because it is not an
acknowledgment is patently baseless. If this had been his belief
since he was first commissioned as a notary public, then he has
been making a mockery of the legal solemnity of an oath in a jurat.
Notaries public and others authorized by law to administer oaths or
to take acknowledgments should not take for granted the solemn
duties appertaining to their offices. Such duties are dictated by
public policy and are impressed with public interest.
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His prior acquaintance and friendship with petitioner Gamido

provides no excuse for non-compliance with his duty. If Atty. dela
Rea were faithful to his duty as a notary public and if he wanted to
accommodate a friend who was inside a prison, he could have gone
to the latter's cell since he openly admitted that he has "been in and
out of New Bilibid Prisons, not only because [his] office is here only
across the Municipal Building of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila but
because [he] handled a number of cases involving prisoners and
guards of NBP as well as some of its personnels [sic]."
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Administratively, as a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, Atty.

Icasiano M. dela Rea committed grave misconduct when he agreed
to prepare the jurat in the petition in this case in the absence of
petitioner Gamido, thereby making it appear that the latter
personally signed the certification of the petition and took his oath
before him when in truth and in fact the said petitioner did not.
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WHEREFORE, for grave misconduct, ATTY. ICASIANO I. DELA REA is

hereby FINED in the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00),

without prejudice to criminal prosecution as may be warranted

under the circumstances. He is WARNED that the commission of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
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SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6655 : October 11, 2011]
PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
VICTORIANO G. PASCUA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is the verified affidavit-complaint[1] of Pacita CaalimVerzonilla seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua
for allegedly falsifying a public document and evading the payment of correct
taxes through the use of falsified documents.
Complainant alleges that on September 15, 2001, respondent prepared and
notarized two Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased
Lope Caalim with Sale. The first deed[2] was for a consideration of P250,000
and appears to have been executed and signed by Lope's surviving spouse,
Caridad Tabarrejos, and her children (complainant, Virginia Caalim-Inong
and Marivinia Caalim) in favor of spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. The
second deed[3]was for a consideration of P1,000,000 and appears to have
been executed by and for the benefit of the same parties as the first deed.
The two deeds have identical registration numbers, page numbers and book
numbers in the notarial portion.
Complainant avers that both deeds are spurious because all the heirs'
signatures were falsified. She contends that her sister Marivinia does not
know how to sign her name and was confined at the Cagayan Valley Medical
Center, Tuguegarao City, at the time the deeds were allegedly signed by her,

as shown by a certification[4]from said hospital. The certification, dated

February 6, 2004 and signed by Dr. Alice Anghad, Medical Officer IV, attested
that Marivinia has been confined at the Psychiatry Ward of the Cagayan
Valley Medical Center since May 3, 1999 after being diagnosed of "Substance
Induced Psychosis" and "Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type."
Complainant further alleges that the two deeds were not presented to any of
them and they came to know of their existence only recently. She further
claims that the Community Tax Certificates[5](CTCs) in her name and in the
names of her mother and her sister Marivinia were procured only by the
vendee Shirley and not by them. Complainant submits the
affidavit[6] executed by Edwin Gawayon, Barangay Treasurer of C-8, Claveria,
Cagayan, on August 3, 2002, attesting that the CTCs were procured at the
instance of Shirley and were paid without the complainant and her co-heirs
personally appearing before him. Gawayon stated that the signatures and
thumbmarks appearing on the CTCs are not genuine and authentic because
it can be seen with the naked eyes that the signatures are similar in all three
CTCs.
Lastly, complainant alleges that the two deeds were used by respondent and
Shirley to annul a previously simulated deed of sale[7] dated June 20, 1979
purportedly executed by Lope in favor of the spouses Madki and Shirley
Mipanga. Said deed was likewise a complete nullity because at that time
Shirley Mipanga was only sixteen years old and still single.
In his comment,[8] respondent admits having prepared and notarized the two
disputed Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Sale (subject
deeds), but denies any irregularity in their execution. He claims that the
preparation and notarization of the subject deeds were made under the
following circumstances:
In the morning of September 15, 2001, complainant, Caridad, Virginia and
Shirley Mipanga went to his house and requested him to prepare a deed of
sale of a residential lot located in Claveria, Cagayan. He was informed by the
parties that the agreed purchase price is P1,000,000 and was presented the
certificate of title to the property. Upon finding that the registered owner is
"Lope Caalim, married to Caridad Tabarrejos" and knowing that Lope already
died sometime in the 1980s, he asked for, and was given, the names and
personal circumstances of Lope's surviving children. He asked where
Marivinia was, but Caridad told him that Marivinia remained home as she
was not feeling well. As Caridad assured him that they will fetch Marivinia
after the deed of conveyance is prepared, he proceeded to ask the parties to
present their CTCs. Caridad and Pacita, however, told him that they have
not secured their CTCs while Virginia forgot to bring hers. So he instructed

them to get CTCs from Claveria.

An hour later, Caridad and Shirley came back with the CTCs of Caridad,
Virginia, complainant and Marivinia. After he finished typing the deed and
the details of the CTCs, Caridad said that she will bring the deed with her to
Claveria for her daughters to sign. He then told them that it was necessary
for him to meet them all in one place for them to acknowledge the deed
before him as notary public. It was agreed upon that they will all meet at the
house of the Mipangas between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon on that same
day.
Respondent arrived at the Mipanga residence shortly before 12:00 noon.
There he saw Shirley, Caridad, complainant, Pacita and Marivinia with two
other persons whom he later learned were the instrumental witnesses to the
execution of the document. Upon being informed that the parties have
already affixed their signatures on the deed, he examined the document
then inquired from the heirs if the signatures appearing therein were theirs
and if they were truly selling the property for P1,000,000. The heirs
answered in the affirmative, thereby ratifying and acknowledging the
instrument and its contents as their own free and voluntary act and deed.
Thus, he notarized the document and then gave the original and two carbon
copies to Shirley while leaving two in his possession.
Respondent adds that Shirley thereafter asked him what steps were needed
to effect registration of the deed and transfer of the title in her and her
husband's name. He replied that all the unpaid land taxes should be paid
including the capital gains tax, documentary stamp taxes and estate tax to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) which will then issue the necessary
clearance for registration. When asked how much taxes are payable, he
replied that it depends on the assessment of the BIR examiner which will be
based on the zonal value or selling price stated in the deed of sale. He added
that the estate taxes due, with interests and surcharges, would also have to
be paid. Since the consideration for the sale is P1,000,000, the taxes
payable was quite enormous. Shirley asked him who between the vendor
and the vendee should pay the taxes, and he replied that under the law, it is
the obligation of the vendors to pay said taxes but it still depends upon the
agreement of the parties. He asked if there was already an agreement on
the matter, but the parties replied in the negative.
Shirley then told the vendors that they should shoulder the payment of
taxes. Caridad and her co-vendors, however, refused and said that a big
portion of the P1,000,000 paid to them was already used by them to pay
and settle their other obligations. Shirley then offered to pay one-half of
whatever amount the BIR will assess, but Caridad insisted that another

document be prepared stating a reduced selling price of only P250,000 so

that they need not contribute to the payment of taxes since Shirley was
anyway already willing to pay one-half of the taxes based on the selling price
stated in the first deed. This resulted in a heated discussion between the
parties, which was, however, later resolved by an agreement to execute a
second deed. The prospect of preparing an additional deed, however,
irritated respondent as it meant additional work for him. Thus, respondent
went home.
Later, the parties visited respondent at his house and pleaded with him to
prepare the second deed with the reduced selling price. Moved by his
humane and compassionate disposition, respondent gave in to the parties'
plea.
In the presence of all the heirs, the vendees and the instrumental witnesses,
respondent prepared and notarized the second deed providing for the lower
consideration of only P250,000. He used the same document number, page
number and book number in the notarial portion as the first deed because
according to him, the second deed was intended by the parties to supplant
the first.
Respondent denies complainant's assertions that the two deeds are
simulated and falsified, averring that as stated above, all the parties
acknowledged the same before him. Likewise, he and his clients, the
spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga, presented the subject deeds as exhibits
in Civil Case No. 2761-S also pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 12, of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
As to the allegation that Marivinia did not appear before him as she was
allegedly under confinement at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center on
September 15, 2001, respondent cites a medical certificate[9] stating that
Marivinia was confined in said hospital from May 3, 1999 to August 10,
1999. He also points out that Marivinia is one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 2836-S pending before the RTC, Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, for
the annulment of the subject deeds, and nothing in the complaint states that
she is mentally or physically incapacitated. Otherwise, her co-plaintiffs
would have asked the appointment of a guardian for her.
By Resolution[10] dated August 10, 2005, this Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In a Report and Recommendation[11] dated May 3, 2007, Commissioner Jose
Roderick F. Fernando found respondent administratively liable on account of

his indispensable participation in an act designed to defraud the

government. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for three months and that his notarial commission, if still
existing, be revoked and that respondent be prohibited from being
commissioned as a notary public for two years.
According to Commissioner Fernando, respondent did not offer any tenable
defense to justify his actions. As a notary, it was his responsibility to ensure
that the solemnities of the act of notarization were followed. As a lawyer, it
was likewise incumbent upon him that the document he drafted and
subsequently notarized was neither unlawful nor fraudulent. Commissioner
Fernando ruled that respondent failed on both counts since he drafted a
document that reflected an untruthful consideration that served to reduce
unlawfully the tax due to the government. Then he completed the act by
likewise notarizing and thus converting the document into a public
document.
On June 26, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
Commissioner Fernando's report and recommendation but imposed a higher
penalty on respondent. Its Resolution No. XVII-2007-285 reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A;" and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent's violation of Notarial Law and for his participation to a
transaction that effectively defrauded the government, Atty. Victoriano G.
Pascua is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years
and SUSPENSION of his Notarial Commission for two (2) years
with Warning that a similar violation in the future will be dealt with
severely.[12]
The above resolution is well taken.
By respondent's own account of the circumstances surrounding the
execution and notarization of the subject deeds of sale, there is a clear basis
for disciplining him as a member of the bar and as notary public.
Respondent did not deny preparing and notarizing the subject deeds. He
avers that the true consideration for the transaction is P1,000,000 as
allegedly agreed upon by the parties when they appeared before him for the
preparation of the first document as well as the notarization thereof. He then
claimed to have been "moved by his humane and compassionate disposition"

when he acceded to the parties' plea that he prepare and notarize the
second deed with a lower consideration of P250,000 in order to reduce the
corresponding tax liability. However, as noted by Commissioner Fernando,
the two deeds were used by respondent and his client as evidence in a
judicial proceeding (Civil Case No. 2671-S), which only meant that both
documents still subsist and hence contrary to respondent's contention that
the second deed reflecting a lower consideration was intended to supersede
the first deed.
As to the charge of falsification, the Court finds that the documents annexed
to the present complaint are insufficient for us to conclude that the subject
deeds were indeed falsified and absolutely simulated. We have previously
ruled that a deed of sale that allegedly states a price lower than the true
consideration is nonetheless binding between the parties and their
successors in interest.[13] Complainant, however, firmly maintains that she
and her co-heirs had no participation whatsoever in the execution of the
subject deeds. In any event, the issues of forgery, simulation and fraud
raised by the complainant in this proceeding apparently are still to be
resolved in the pending suit filed by the complainant and her co-heirs for
annulment of the said documents (Civil Case No. 2836-S).
With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did
not state the true consideration of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains
and other taxes due on the transaction, respondent cannot escape liability
for making an untruthful statement in a public document for an unlawful
purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount much lower than the
actual price paid for the property sold, respondent abetted in depriving the
Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. His act clearly
violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibilitywhich
reads:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Xxxx
Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at
defiance of the law, he likewise displayed lack of respect for and made a
mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. By notarizing
such illegal and fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith and credit
upon its face, which it obviously does not deserve considering its nature and
purpose.

In Gonzales v. Ramos,[14] we elucidated on how important and sacrosanct

the notarial act is:
By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the
Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document.
Such act is no empty gesture. The principal function of a notary public is to
authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to the due execution
and delivery of a document under his hand and seal, he gives the document
the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to
be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which
should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize
such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and
delivery. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able
to rely upon the acknowledgement executed before a notary public and
appended to a private instrument. Hence, a notary public must discharge his
powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy
and fidelity.[15]
Moreover, while respondent's duty as a notary public is principally to
ascertain the identity of the affiant and the voluntariness of the declaration,
it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement or at least refrain from being a party to its
consummation.[16]Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice in
fact proscribes notaries public from performing any notarial act for
transactions similar to the herein document of sale, to wit:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial
act described in these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he
tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or
transaction is unlawful or immoral;
xxxx
In this case, respondent proceeded to notarize the second deed despite
knowledge of its illegal purpose. His purported desire to accommodate the
request of his client will not absolve respondent who, as a member of the
legal profession, should have stood his ground and not yielded to the
importunings of his clients. Respondent should have been more prudent and
remained steadfast in his solemn oath not to commit falsehood nor consent
to the doing of any.[17] As a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to

uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any
act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the integrity of the legal profession.[18]
Respondent also failed to comply with Section 2, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice when he gave the second document the same document
number, page number and book number as the first:
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. - x x x
xxxx
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in
his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s
of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left
between entries.
Xxxx
Respondent admitted having given the second deed the same document
number, page number and book number as in the first deed, reasoning that
the second deed was intended to supplant and cancel the first deed. He
therefore knowingly violated the above rule, in furtherance of his client's
intention of concealing the actual purchase price so as to avoid paying the
taxes rightly due to the Government.
Even assuming that the second deed was really intended to reflect the true
agreement of the parties and hence superseding the first deed they had
executed, respondent remains liable under the afore-cited Section 2(e)
which requires that each instrument or document, executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before the notary public shall be given a number
corresponding to the one in his register. Said rule is not concerned with the
validity or efficacy of the document or instrument recorded but merely to
ensure the accuracy and integrity of the entries in the notarial register.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any
fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
[19]
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
herefore. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason

of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, of for any violation of

the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Xxxx
In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document despite the nonappearance of one of the signatories was meted the penalties of revocation
of his notarial commission and disqualification from re-appointment for two
years. The notary in Gonzales was likewise suspended from the practice of
law for one year. Said penalty was in accord with the cases of Bon v. Ziga,
[20]
Serzo v. Flores,[21]Zaballero v. Montalvan[22] and Tabas v. Mangibin.[23]
The Court found that by notarizing the questioned deed, the respondent
in Gonzales engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. [24]
In the instant case, we hold that respondent should similarly be meted the
penalty of suspension and revocation of his notarial commission for having
violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. In line withcurrent
jurisprudence, and as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the
revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as notary public for two years is in order.
With respect, however, to his suspension from the practice of law, we hold
that the one-year suspension imposed in Gonzales and the other cases is not
applicable considering that respondent not only failed to faithfully comply
with the rules on notarial practice, he also violated his oath when he
prepared and notarized the second deed for the purpose of avoiding the
payment of correct amount of taxes, thus abetting an activity aimed at
defiance of the law. Under these circumstances, we find the two-year
suspension recommended by the IBP Board of Governors as proper and
commensurate to the infraction committed by respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED,
and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a
period of two (2) years. He is further WARNED that any similar act or
infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the
Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal
records of the respondent.
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta,
Abad, Mendoza, Sereno, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Bersamin and Perez, JJ., on official leave.
Del Castillo, J., on leave.
Endnotes:

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 5377 : June 15, 2006]
VICTOR LINGAN, Complainant, v. ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB
and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Victor Lingan against
Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga on November 16, 2000.
Complainant alleged that respondents, both notaries public, falsified
certain public documents.
The case has its roots in a complaint for annulment of title with
damages2 filed by Isaac Villegas against complainant with the
Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, docketed as Civil Case
No. 5036. Respondent Calubaquib signed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping3 of the complaint as notary
public and entered the same as Doc. No. 182; Page No. 38; Book
No. CLXXII; Series of 1996. Complainant alleges that this document
was falsified because according to the records of the National
Archives, the document entered as Doc. No. 182; Page 38; Book
No. CLXXII; Series of 1996 in respondent Calubaquib's notarial
register was an affidavit of one Daniel Malayao.4

The trial court decided Civil Case No. 5036 in favor of

complainant5 and, as a result, the plaintiff there, through
respondent Calubaquib, appealed it to the Court of Appeals, where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 55837.
On file with the records of this case is a special power of
attorney6 dated September 10, 1996 executed by Isaac Villegas
appointing respondent Calubaquib as his attorney-in-fact to "enter
into a compromise agreement under such terms and conditions
acceptable to him" which was notarized by respondent Baliga and
entered as Doc. No. 548, Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of
1996.7 Complainant alleged that this special power of attorney was
also falsified because, according to respondent Baliga's notarial
register, Doc. No. 548; Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996
pertains to an affidavit of loss of one Pedro Telan,8 dated August 26,
1996.
In addition, on January 2, 1995, respondent Baliga filed a petition
for reappointment as notary public for and in Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
which was notarized by respondent Calubaquib and entered in his
notarial register as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08, Book No. CXXX,
Series of 1995. However, Notarial Register Book No. CXXX was for
the year 1996 and entered there as Doc. No. 31, Page No. 08 was a
cancellation of real estate mortgage dated January 11, 1996.
In his answer,9 respondent Baliga admitted the incorrectness of the
entries and simply attributed them to the inadvertence in good faith
of his secretary to whom he had left the task of entering all his
notarial documents.
Respondent Calubaquib's comment,10 however, contained a much
lengthier account of the alleged events leading up to this case, the
bulk of which was meant to cast complainant and his motives in a
sinister light. In a nutshell, he made it appear that the reason for
the complaint was that he (respondent) thwarted a fraudulent
attempt by complainant to grab a parcel of land. He also stated that

complainant had filed a case for falsification of documents against

him with the Ombudsman but it was dismissed.
In the end, however, he (like his co-respondent Baliga) admitted to
the mistaken entries and also ascribed the same to his "legal
assistants." Similarly, by way of defense, he pointed out that the
Notarial Law "provides that only contracts need to have their copies
included in the notarial records. It does not require affidavits,
verifications or subscriptions of petitions which are mere allegations
of facts to be entered in the Notarial Register, despite widespread
practice to the contrary."
Upon receipt of respondents' comments, we referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In the course of the proceedings before the IBP, complainant alleged
that respondent Calubaquib, with the help of respondent Baliga and
several other persons, was trying to deprive him (complainant) of a
parcel of land he had bought from Isaac Villegas' mother-in-law.
According to complainant, respondent impersonated Villegas, who
was in hiding due to several civil and criminal cases pending against
him, by forging his signature in all documents and pleadings related
to the civil case filed against him (complainant). He pointed to the
incorrect notarial entries as proof of this falsification.
He presented in evidence a motion for withdrawal11 filed in the Court
of Appeals, apparently by Villegas, disavowing any involvement in
the case filed by respondent Calubaquib.
To further buttress his allegations of falsification, complainant
pointed out that respondent Calubaquib seemed unable to physically
produce Villegas. For example, when the Ombudsman ordered him
to produce Villegas, respondent Calubaquib merely presented an
affidavit12 supposedly executed by Villegas and sworn to before a
"highly regarded [Department of Justice] official."

In the IBP's report and recommendation,13 dated December 7,

2001, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found respondents
"liable for inexcusable negligence" and recommended the revocation
of the commission of respondents Calubaquib and Baliga as notaries
public for two years from receipt of the final decision. Commissioner
Maala's report did not touch on complainant's allegations of forgery.
When the IBP resolved14 to adopt Commissioner Maala's report and
recommendation, both complainant15 and respondent Baliga16 filed
motions for reconsideration17 with this Court. Respondent
Calubaquib opposed18 complainant's motion for reconsideration.
In his motion for reconsideration, complainant assailed the penalty
recommended by the IBP as grossly inadequate. Reiterating his
allegation of forgery, he attached documents bearing Villegas'
allegedly forged signature as well as documents with his supposed
real signature19 for comparison.
In his opposition/comment, respondent Calubaquib refuted
complainant's scathing accusations of fraud and abuse of his public
position, and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. In his
motion for reconsideration, respondent Baliga decried the penalty
imposed as disproportionate to the infraction he had committed.
The respondents having admitted responsibility for the notarial
entries, the question now is whether these were the product of a
mere mistake or evidence of larger scheme to defraud complainant
whose allegations, if true, are serious enough to merit the
disbarment of both respondents.
The missing link, as it were, between the admitted infractions of
respondents and the nefarious machinations alleged by complainant
is whether or not the latter was able to prove that Villegas'
signature on the documents notarized by respondents was in fact
forged.

Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive

and convincing evidence. Mere allegation thereof is not
evidence.20 One who alleges forgery has the burden of proving the
same.21 We find that complainant failed to discharge this burden.
Complainant alleged mainly that Villegas could not possibly have
signed the documents in question because he was a fugitive from
justice, with "several civil and criminal cases pending against him."
Assuming this allegation to be true, it proved nothing. The mere fact
that Villegas was a fugitive from justice did not preclude the
possibility that he might have secretly met with his lawyer for
purposes of filing a suit. It would have been different had
complainant presented evidence that Villegas was, at the time the
questioned documents were executed, definitely somewhere else.
But the bare argument that Villegas' being a fugitive rendered it
impossible for him to sign some documents was simply too nebulous
to inspire belief.
As additional evidence, complainant presented, as attachments to
his motion for reconsideration, a number of documents purportedly
bearing Villegas' real signature, the latest of which was the motion
to withdraw allegedly filed by Villegas himself. However, the veracity
of the last of those documents was vigorously contested by an
affidavit also purportedly filed by Villegas. The two documents, both
notarized, effectively cancelled each other out, absent some other
credible proof.
It is true that there were dissimilarities between the signatures
purportedly belonging to Villegas and his genuine signature on
the conforme of the general power of attorney22executed by his wife
in favor of his mother-in-law. However, the fact of forgery cannot be
presumed simply because there are dissimilarities between the
standard and the questioned signatures.23 If complainant was so
sure the signatures were fake, he should have submitted them for
expert analysis to the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Philippine National Police or some other handwriting expert. The

records are bereft of any such analysis or even any attempt to have
the signatures examined.
Furthermore, all the documents on which the contested signature
appeared were notarized. Notarial documents carry the presumption
of regularity. To contradict them, the evidence presented must be
clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.24Complainant's uncorroborated theory of an entire
conspiracy of lawyers and government officials beholden to
respondent Calubaquib did not constitute such evidence.
The forgery of Villegas' signature having remained unproven, we
can only hold respondents liable for their omissions that have
actually been proved.
In this respect, we find that the recommendations of IBP
Commissioner Maala adopted by the IBP were supported by the
evidence on record, particularly the documents themselves as well
as the respondents' own admission.
In response, on the other hand, to respondents' feeble attempts to
deflect the blame from themselves and onto their staff, we call their
attention to Sections 245, 246 and 249(b) of the Notarial Law.25
Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law provided:
SEC. 245. Notarial Register. Every notary public shall keep a
register to be known as the notarial register, wherein record shall be
made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a certified
copy of such record, or any part thereof, to any person applying for
it and paying the legal fees therefore. (emphasis supplied)
xxx
SEC. 246. Matters to be entered therein. - The notary public shall
enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the
person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument,

the witnesses, if any, to the signature, the date of execution, oath,

or acknowledgment of the instrument, the fees collected by him for
his services as notary in connection therewith, and, when the
instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof as part
of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief
description of the substance thereof and shall give to each entry a
consecutive number, beginning with number one in each calendar
year. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to,
or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in
his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or
pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line
shall be left between entries.
xxx
In this connection, Section 249(b) stated:
SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. The following
derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the
discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground
for the revocation of his commission:
xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in
his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner
required by law.
xxx
From the language of the subsection, it is abundantly clear that the
notary public ispersonally accountable for all entries in his notarial
register. Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility for the
violation of the aforesaid sections by passing the buck to their
secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists
despite our open condemnation.26 Respondents, especially
Calubaquib, a self-proclaimed "prominent legal practitioner," should
have known better than to give us such a simple-minded excuse.

We likewise remind respondents that notarization is not an empty,

meaningless or routinary act but one invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
to do so may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act
must be prevented from inflicting themselves upon the public, the
courts and the administrative offices in general.27
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public one and makes it admissible in evidence without further proof
of its authenticity.28 Notaries public must therefore observe utmost
care with respect to the basic requirements of their duties.29
Being not only lawyers but also public officers, respondents should
have been acutely aware of their responsibilities. Respondents' acts
did not amount to mere simple and excusable negligence. Having
failed to perform their sworn duty, respondents were squarely in
violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility30and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly and willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to
do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondents Atty. Romeo I.
Calubaquib and Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga are hereby found guilty of
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility and of their lawyer's oath. They are both

orderedSUSPENDED from the practice of law
for ONE YEAR effective immediately, with a warning that another
infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
Their present commissions as notaries public, if any, are
hereby REVOKED, withDISQUALIFICATION from reappointment
as notaries public for a period of two years.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of
Atty. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga, and copies
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Court Administrator and Office of the Bar Confidant for
dissemination to all courts nationwide.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 129416 : November 25, 2004]
ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI B.
TIGNO, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ESTAFINO AQUINO and
FLORENTINA AQUINO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility
of a single document, a deed of sale involving interest over real
property, notarized by a person of questionable capacity. The
assailed ruling of the Court of Appeals, which overturned the
findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court, relied primarily on the

presumption of regularity attaching to notarized documents with

respect to its due execution. We conclude instead that the document
has not been duly notarized and accordingly reverse the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are as follow:
On 11 January 1980, respondent spouses Estafino and Florentina
Aquino (the Aquinos) filed a complaint for enforcement of contract
and damages against Isidro Bustria (Bustria).1 The complaint sought
to enforce an alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a one
hundred twenty thousand (120,000) square meter fishpond located
in Dasci, Pangasinan. The property was not registered either under
the Land Registration Act or under the Spanish Mortgage Law,
though registrable under Act No. 3344.2 The conveyance was
covered by a Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1978.
Eventually, Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise
agreement, whereby Bustria agreed to recognize the validity of the
sale, and the Aquinos in turn agreed to grant to Bustria the right to
repurchase the same property after the lapse of seven (7) years.
Upon submission, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch
VII, approved and incorporated the compromise agreement in a
Decision which it rendered on 7 September 1981.
Bustria died in October of 1986.3 On 1 December 1989, petitioner
Zenaida B. Tigno (Tigno), in substitution of her deceased father
Isidro Bustria,4 attempted to repurchase the property by filing a
Motion for Consignation. She deposited the amount of Two Hundred
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the trial court, now
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55 at Alaminos, Pangasinan. On
18 December 1989, the Aquinos filed an opposition, arguing that
the right to repurchase was not yet demandable and that Tigno had
failed to make a tender of payment. In an Order dated 10 October
1999, the RTC denied the Motion for Consignation.5
In June of 1991, Tigno filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution, which
was likewise opposed by the Aquinos, and denied by the RTC. Then,
on 6 September 1991, Tigno filed an action for Revival of

Judgment,6 seeking the revival of the decision in Civil Case No. A1257, so that it could be executed accordingly.7 The Aquinos filed an
answer, wherein they alleged that Bustria had sold his right to
repurchase the property to them in a deed of sale dated 17 October
1985.8
Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were
Jesus De Francia (De Francia), the instrumental witness to the deed
of sale, and former Judge Franklin Cario (Judge Cario), who
notarized the same. These two witnesses testified as to the occasion
of the execution and signing of the deed of sale by Bustria.
Thereafter, in their Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, the
Aquinos offered for admission as their Exhibit No. "8," the deed of
sale (Deed of Sale)9 purportedly executed by Bustria. The admission
of the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it
was a false and fraudulent document which had not been
acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and that its existence was
suspicious, considering that it had been previously unknown, and
not even presented by the Aquinos when they opposed Tigno's
previous Motion for Consignation.10
In an Order dated 6 April 1994, the RTC refused to admit the Deed
of Sale in evidence.11A Motion for Reconsideration praying for the
admission of said exhibit was denied in an Order dated 27 April
1994.12
Then, on 18 August 1994, a Decision was rendered by the RTC in
favor of Tigno. The RTC therein expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the Deed of Sale, characterizing the testimonies of
De Francia and Cario as conflicting.13 The RTC likewise observed
that nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there any statement
that it was acknowledged by Bustria;14 that it was suspicious that
Bustria was not assisted or represented by his counsel in connection
with the preparation and execution of the deed of sale15 or that
Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale in his previous
Opposition to the Motion for Consignation.16 The RTC then stressed
that the previous Motion for Execution lodged by Tigno had to be
denied since more than five (5) years had elapsed from the date the
judgment in Civil Case No. A-1257 had become final and executory;

but the judgment could be revived by action such as the instant

complaint. Accordingly, the RTC ordered the revival of the judgment
dated 7 September 1981 in Civil Case No. A-1257.17
The Aquinos interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.18 In the
meantime, the RTC allowed the execution pending appeal of its
Decision.19 On 23 December 1996, the Court of Appeals Tenth
Division promulgated a Decision20 reversing and setting aside the
RTC Decision. The appellate court ratiocinated that there were no
material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of
Cario and De Francia that would taint the document with doubtful
authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment and
substitution instead of a jurat did not render the instrument invalid;
and that the non-assistance or representation of Bustria by counsel
did not render the document null and ineffective.21 It was noted that
a notarized document carried in its favor the presumption of
regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence to
contradict the same. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the
RTC erred in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale, and that the
document extinguished the right of Bustria's heirs to repurchase the
property.
After the Court of Appeals denied Tigno's Motion for
Reconsideration,22 the present petition was filed before this Court.
Tigno imputes grave abuse of discretion and misappreciation of
facts to the Court of Appeals when it admitted the Deed of Sale. He
also argues that the appellate court should have declared the Deed
of Sale as a false, fraudulent and unreliable document not supported
by any consideration at all.
The general thrusts of the arguments posed by Tigno are factually
based. As such, they could normally lead to the dismissal of this
Petition for Review. However, while this Court is not ordinarily a trier
of facts,23 factual review may be warranted in instances when the
findings of the trial court and the intermediate appellate court are
contrary to each other.24 Moreover, petitioner raises a substantial
argument regarding the capacity of the notary public, Judge Cario,
to notarize the document. The Court of Appeals was unfortunately

silent on that matter, but this Court will take it up with

definitiveness.
The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October
1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both parties known to me to be the
same parties who executed the foregoing instrument.
FRANKLIN CARIO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan

There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the

document is certified by way of a jurat instead of an
acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court
and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is that part of an
affidavit where the officer certifies that the same was sworn before
him.25 Under Section 127 of the Land Registration Act,26 which has
been replicated in Section 112 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,27 the
Deed of Sale should have been acknowledged before a notary
public.28
But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one
which is determinative of this petition. This pertains to the authority
of Judge Franklin Cario to notarize the Deed of Sale.
It is undisputed that Franklin Cario at the time of the notarization
of the Deed of Sale, was a sitting judge of the Metropolitan Trial

Court of Alaminos.29 Petitioners point out, citing Tabao v. Asis,30 that

municipal judges may not undertake the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts, and other acts of
conveyance which bear no relation to the performance of their
functions as judges.31 In response, respondents claim that the
prohibition imposed on municipal court judges from notarizing
documents took effect only in December of 1989, or four years after
the Deed of Sale was notarized by Cario.32
Respondent's contention is erroneous. Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to
perform the functions of notaries public ex officio under Section 76
of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative
Code.33 However, as far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya,34 the Court
explicitly declared that municipal court judges such as Cario may
notarize only documents connected with the exercise of their official
duties.35 The Deed of Sale was not connected with any official duties
of Judge Cario, and there was no reason for him to notarize it. Our
observations as to the errant judge in Borre are pertinent in this
case, considering that Judge Cario identified himself in the Deed of
Sale as "Ex-Officio Notary Public, Judge, MTC:"
[A notary ex officio] should not compete with private law
practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing
business.
In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should
notarize documents involving private transactions and sign the
document in this wise: "GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Notary Public ExOfficio, City Judge" (p. 16, Rollo, Annex D of Complaint). In doing
so, he obliterated the distinction between a regular notary and a
notary ex officio.36
There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this
matter, as Supreme Court Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public
ex officio to perform any act within the competency of a regular
notary public provided that certification be made in the notarized
documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in
such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only when there are no

lawyers or notaries public that the exception applies.37 The facts of

this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge Cario's
improper notarial activity. There was no such certification in the
Deed of Sale. Even if one was produced, we would be hard put to
accept the veracity of its contents, considering that Alaminos,
Pangasinan, now a city,38 was even then not an isolated backwater
town and had its fair share of practicing lawyers.
There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge Cario, who
ceased being a judge in 1986, for his improper notarial activity.
Perhaps though, formal sanction may no longer be appropriate
considering Judge Cario's advanced age, assuming he is still
alive.39However, this Decision should again serve as an affirmation
of the rule prohibiting municipal judges from notarizing documents
not connected with the exercise of their official duties, subject to
the exceptions laid down in Circular No. 1-90.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not
having been notarized at all. The validity of a notarial certification
necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the
notary public does not have the capacity to notarize a document,
but does so anyway, then the document should be treated as
unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may
prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the
proferred authority of the notary public or the person pretending to
be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render merely officious the
elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may
receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule, the notarization
of a document by a duly appointed notary public will have the same
legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in
pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect.
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a
public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof
of its authenticity.40 Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to
the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and
the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not

qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon

the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.41
On the other hand, what then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it
was not notarized? True enough, from a civil law perspective, the
absence of notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily
invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil
Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or
extinguishes real rights over immovable property should be in a
public document, yet it is also an accepted rule that the failure to
observe the proper form does not render the transaction invalid.
Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form required in Article
1358 is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the
transaction, but required merely for convenience.42 We have even
affirmed that a sale of real property though not consigned in a
public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and
binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a
verbal contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects between
the parties.43
Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications of the lack of
valid notarization of the Deed of Sale from the perspective of the
law on evidence. After all, the case rests on the admissibility of the
Deed of Sale.
Clearly, the presumption of regularity relied upon by the Court of
Appeals no longer holds true since the Deed of Sale is not a
notarized document. Its proper probative value is governed by the
Rules of Court. Section 19, Rule 132 states:
Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last

wills and testaments; and
cralawlibrary

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents

required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under
the enumeration of public documents; hence, it must be considered
a private document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted
notarization performed by Judge Cario is sufficient to exclude the
document in question from the class of public documents. Even
assuming that the Deed of Sale was validly notarized, it would still
be classified as a private document, since it was not properly
acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.
Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the
requirement of proof under Section 20, Rule 132, which states:
Section 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting
of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which is
claimed to be.
The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as authentic by the
Aquinos, who likewise insist that its enforceability militates against
Tigno's claim. Correspondingly, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to
prove its authenticity and due execution. The Court of Appeals
clearly erred in not appreciating the Deed of Sale as a private
document and in applying the presumption of regularity that
attaches only to duly notarized documents, as distinguished from
private documents.

Did the RTC err then in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale? We hold
that it did not. Section 20, Rule 132 provides ample discretion on
the trier of fact before it may choose to receive the private
document in evidence. The RTC wisely refused to admit the Deed of
Sale, taking great lengths as it did to explain its doubts as to its
veracity. The RTC was not convinced of the proffered proof by the
Aquinos, and the exercise of its sound discretion as the primary trier
of fact warrants due respect.
The most telling observation of the RTC relates to the fact that for
the very first time respondents alleged the existence of the Deed of
Sale when they filed their answer to petitioner's current action to
revive judgment.44 Prior to the initiation of the present action, Tigno
had tried to operationalize and implement the Compromise
Agreement through two judicial means: consignation and execution
of judgment. The Aquinos duly opposed these prior attempts of the
petitioner to exercise the right to repurchase, but they did not raise
then the claim that such right to repurchase was already
extinguished by the Deed of Sale. Tigno attempted to exercise the
right to repurchase only a few years after the execution of the Deed
of Sale to which respondents themselves were signatories. Thus, it
is incredulous that the Aquinos did not invoke the Deed of Sale
when they opposed in court petitioner's successive attempts at
consignation and execution of judgment. The Deed of Sale, if in
existence and valid, would have already precluded Tigno's causes of
action for either consignation or execution of judgment. The only
believable conclusion, as drawn by the RTC, was that the Deed of
Sale had yet to be created when petitioner moved in 1990 for
consignation and execution of judgment an existential anomaly if we
were to agree with the respondents that such document had been
signed and notarized back in 1985.
The dubiousness in origin of the Deed of Sale is not alleviated by
the other observations of the RTC. It also pointed to certain
incredible aspects in the Aquinos' tale of events. It noted that no
receipts were ever presented by the respondents to evidence actual
payment of consideration by them to Bustria, despite the allegation
of the respondents that the amount was covered by seven (7)
receipts.45 The Aquinos claimed that Bustria kept all the receipts, an

assertion which the RTC found as unbelievable, citing ordinary

human nature to ask for receipts for significant amounts given and
to keep the same.46In itself, the absence of receipts, or any proof of
consideration, would not be conclusive since consideration is always
presumed. However, given the totality of the circumstances
surrounding this case, the absence of such proof further militates
against the claims of the Aquinos.
We can appreciate in a similar vein the observation of the Court of
Appeals that Bustria did not bother to seek his lawyer's assistance
as regards the execution of the Deed of Sale, considering that the
subject property had previously been fiercely litigated. Although the
Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the document would not
be rendered null or ineffective due to the lack of assistance of
counsel, the implausibility of the scenario strikes as odd and
therefore reinforces the version found by the RTC as credible.
The Court likewise has its own observations on the record that
affirm the doubts raised by the Court of Appeals. Isidro Bustria, who
would die in 1986, was already ninety-three (93) years old when he
allegedly signed the Deed of Sale in 1985. Still, the Aquinos
asserted before the RTC that Bustria traveled unaccompanied from
his home in Dasol, Pangasinan, passing through two towns to
Alaminos, to execute the Deed of Sale. Without discrediting the
accomplishments of nonagenarians capable of great physical feats,
it should be acknowledged as a matter of general assumption that
persons of Bustria's age are typically sedentary and rarely so
foolhardy as to insist on traveling significant distances alone.
Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the
alleged signature of Bustria on the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise
appears on the judicial record. Bustria's signature in the 1981
Compromise Agreement is noticeably shaky which is not surprising,
considering that it was subscribed when Bustria was eighty-nine
(89) years old. However, Bustria's signature on the Deed of Sale,
which if genuine was affixed when he was already ninety-three (93)
years old, is remarkably steady in its strokes. There are also other
evident differences between Bustria's signature on the Deed of Sale
and on other documents on the record.

Admittedly, these doubts cast above arise in chief from an

appreciation of circumstantial evidence. These have to be weighed
against the findings of the Court of Appeals that the fact that
Bustria signed the Deed of Sale was established by the respective
testimonies of witnesses De Francia and Judge Cario. In its own
appreciation of these testimonies, the RTC alluded to notable
inconsistencies in their testimonies. As a final measure of analysis,
the Court shall now examine whether the appellate court was in
error in reversing the conclusion of the RTC on these testimonies.
The inconsistencies cited by the RTC were that De Francia testified
that Judge Cario himself prepared and typed the Deed of Sale in
his office, where the document was signed,47 while Judge Cario
testified that he did not type the Deed of Sale since it was already
prepared when the parties arrived at his office for the signing.48 On
this point, the Court of Appeals stated with utter nonchalance that a
perusal of the record revealed no material or substantial
inconsistencies between the testimonies of Judge Cario and De
Francia.
Strangely, the appellate court made no comment as to the
inconsistency pointed out by the RTC as to who prepared the Deed
of Sale. If the only point of consideration was the due execution of
the Deed of Sale, then the Court of Appeals should have properly
come out with its finding. Other variances aside, there are no
contradictions in the testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia on
the question of whether or not Bustria signed the Deed of Sale.
However, as earlier established, the Deed of Sale is a private
document. Thus, not only the due execution of the document must
be proven but also its authenticity. This factor was not duly
considered by the Court of Appeals. The testimonies of Judge Cario
and De Francia now become material not only to establish due
execution, but also the authenticity of the Deed of Sale. And on this
point, the inconsistencies pointed out by the RTC become crucial.
The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being disputed, the
identity of the progenitor of this all-important document is a
material evidentiary point. It is disconcerting that the very two
witnesses of the respondent offered to prove the Deed of Sale, flatly

contradict each other on the basis of their own personal and sensory
knowledge. Worse, the purported author of the Deed of Sale
disavowed having drafted the document, notwithstanding the
contrary testimony grounded on personal knowledge by the
documentary witness.
Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale
would not ordinarily be necessary to establish the validity of the
transaction it covers. However, since it is the authenticity of the
document itself that is disputed, then the opposing testimonies on
that point by the material witnesses properly raises questions about
the due execution of the document itself. The inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia are irreconcilable. It is
not possible to affirm the testimony of either without denigrating
the competence and credibility of the other as a witness. If Judge
Cario was truthful in testifying that he did not write the Deed of
Sale, then doubt can be cast as to the reliability of the notarial
witness De Francia. It takes a leap of imagination, a high level of
gumption, and perverse deliberation for one to erroneously assert,
under oath and with particularities, that a person drafted a
particular document in his presence.
However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity
of the notary public, Judge Cario, would be obviously
compromised. Assuming that Judge Cario had indeed authored the
Deed of Sale, it would indeed be odd that he would not remember
having written the document himself yet sufficiently recall notarizing
the same. If his testimony as to authorship of the document is
deemed as dubious, then there is all the reason to make a similar
assumption as to his testimony on the notarization of the Deed of
Sale.
These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need
to indubitably establish the author of the Deed of Sale. They are
important because they cast doubt on the credibility of those
witnesses of the Aquinos, presented as they were to attest to the
due execution and authenticity of the Deed of Sale. The Court of
Appeals was clearly in error in peremptorily disregarding this
observation of the RTC.

As a result, we are less willing than the Court of Appeals to impute

conclusive value to the testimonies of de Francia and Judge Cario.
The totality of the picture leads us to agree with the trial court that
the Deed of Sale is ineluctably dubious in origin and in execution.
The Court deems as correct the refusal of the RTC to admit the
Deed of Sale, since its due execution and authenticity have not been
proven. The evidence pointing to the non-existence of such a
transaction is so clear and convincing that it is sufficient even to
rebut the typical presumption of regularity arising from the due
execution of notarial documents. However, for the reasons stated
earlier, the Deed of Sale is ineluctably an unnotarized document.
And the lower court had more than sufficient basis to conclude that
it is a spurious document.
Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed,
Tigno's right to repurchase was not extinguished at the time of the
filing of the Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly concluded
by the RTC. The Court of Appeals being in error when it concluded
otherwise, the reinstatement of the RTC Decision is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
23 December 1996 and Resolution dated 9 June 1997 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49879 is REVERSED, and the Decision
dated 18 August 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1918 is REINSTATED.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.