be gor Din se one “oe NARRATION AND KNOWLEDGE (including the integral text of ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY) ARTHUR C. DANTO. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK 1985Analytical Philosophy of History ie cxittence of historical laws would not enable us to discharge | lnouwledge ofthe fature would remain abszact in contest with -novledgeof the pat, And the task ofhistory self woald sil beg thestory of what precisely happened, evea ifthe story should fll ange 4 general historical Ia as an instance, and even i€ the aw shoul lkzown, History alone would beable to exhibit che amazing vai temporal wholes which none the esa fll ndera single historia iy (Ou fascination with che details of the past would, ifanything, inerag (One docs not find sonnets les intresting or beautifal upon being that all sonnets have an invarianc form. IFanything our admication fy poctic creativity increases upon leatning that 0 many distinctly, vids and disimlar wor shold al ave boon pode formity with the most igid and invariant se of rules! 256 xu METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM AND METHODOLOGICAL SOCIALISM have sought to make out a case against substantive philosophy of jiry by emphasizing certain logical features of what one might cll fhelmguage of ime. And inthe couse of ths Ihave tied to explicate tur concept of history, soggesting chat itis the lic extension of modes tf description which are essentially historical beyond the domain in which hey have applicaion which defines che aspiration of substantive jlsophy of hiory. Ihave sough, then, to deawa borderline which fee are tempted to cross but cannot. The analyses of history and of fabcantve philosophy of history ae interdependent, roughly in the ‘numer in which the Transcendental Analysical and the Transcendental Diktic ace in Kane's Critigueof Pure Reason: forthe Dialectic exhibis theunhappy destiny which attends Reason wen tsecks to extend those ‘ams of understanding specified in the Analytic beyond the domain ‘here they have application, the domain, namely, of experience Iti ‘sthespiricofcritial philosophy shat I should wish tohavemy argument adertood. "To this cate, however inadequately it may have been stated, I have ‘oshng further to add. But before ending Ishould like to dismiss another Jind of charge, which is sometimes made agains substantive philosophy «finory, narsely chat i holds the view that history is not something, hich men make, but thatthe moving agents of history are certain ‘egethuman o¢ superorganic entities. T do not wish to say that itis insocent of this charge, but rather that i sno philosophical erime to te gully oft and if philosophical historias subscribe to such entities, they may or may not be wrong, but their wrongnes will be facta tol empirical, and not conceptual and philosophical, To show this, bomever, requires some deiled conceptual analysis, forthe issues here ze exceedingly tangled, and the discusion is compose of topics in tology, meaning, methodology, and language which resemble one 287Analytical Pilosaphy of Hiory ote alot to mich fo ut expect ents tae the ig Dbahennt ial enanoe Ce oer ne eae to contribute somewhat further to the coxtectstlyis of bitoni sentence, ‘By historical seuence I shall mean: a sentence which states some fy about the pst. Historical writings consis chiefly ofiorial entexcg and ar further distinguished by the fice shat a considerable marabr gp the historical sentences which compose them employ, as grammatig subjecs, proper names (eg. ‘Frederick V') or definite description, (eg. “The Elector Palatine in 1618") of individual human beings hy ctally exined, Neither ofthese linguistic features cartes us very fy towards an adequate characterization of hiorieal writings, Historia sentences do not uniquely occur in historical writings, and whe its pethaps (logically) inconceivable that chee should be an histo ‘writing which contained ae historical seatences, ther site dif jn conceiving an historical writing in which nove of the histrial sentences which compose itemploys expressions which refer directo individual human beings who actually existed. Indeed, an histori ‘writing ll the sentences of which employed such expresions would be far more dificult w imagine, Individual human beings ae not the only individual directly refered to by the subject of historical seneences. There ate, in addition, what] shall tem soil individual, individuals which we ray provsonly characterize as containing individual human beings amongst thee ars, Examples of socal individuals might be social clases (The German bourgoisie in 168), national groups (the Bavarian), religious organize tions (the Protestoat Church), large-sale events (The Thitty Year Wat), largoscale social movements (the Counter Reformation), and 49 on Soc individuals are not the oly kind of individual, other tha individual human beings, which may be refereed to by the subject of bistorcal sentences, so these two kinds of individualcefering historia sentences donot make up the entre cs of historical sentences. Never= theless, itis with ust these wo kinds ofsentence that shal be concerned here. ewill, thnk, be universally admitted thas, rom the pointofviewe 258 Methodological Individualism ey communication ncither kind ofsentencecould easly beeliminated fon thelanguage ofthe historian, leis dificult ta sechow, for example, phistorian could convey, by means only of sentences which referred Secly to indvidval human beings, the information +0 neatly and Selly communicated by "The Thsty Years War began in 1618" Aertel, case of commminiation and considerations of marative couomy aotwitheanding, certain philosophers and historians have ‘pres a certain mistrust with regard to this latter kind ofentence— isrst the source of which lie in mistrust with regard to socal jpividuals a8 such, These chinkess exhibit « pardonable reluctance to ‘enced thatthe social world is made up of individual human beings (nl othc, superhuman individvls which, though they may be sido ‘onan harnan beings amongst thee pats, none thelesarenot whollyso heidemified with these parts, and which enoy, s0 to speak, a ie of tei own, In some sense or other, they appear to be saying thatthe pia worlds made up of individual human beings lone, and that there i nothing which both contains individoal human beings amongst ‘parts ad is telf an ulate occupant ofthe social world. Soat fist, fhnce what sem to bein issue is a question in ontology. Thus Mr L.W.N, Watkins philosopher, writs ‘he ulmateconsiscnts of the socal word are individual people who act reo as appropriately inthe light of their understanding oftheisituacion. ‘ery complex rial stuation, stiton, o even isthe esl ofa parcelat ‘eniguration of individuals their dspostions, belie, and physical resowces ‘ed environments! dd Profesor HL. Mazou, an historian who otherwise never wearies tf cautoning ws that theze are more things on earth and in heaven than se dreamed ofin ou philosophy, wits: ‘equi‘anéelmenteint! cent niet de cision, i este ou e ‘psystne, mais Tee bumain done Fndidalié etl el vse ‘spuiime suthentquemen our’ par expéxence® ‘Th we ofthe word ‘ciuiston” here is almost certainly polemics, co Je taken in antagonistic reference wo Profesor Toynbee’ wellknown ‘bis tht ciation do indeed have aif oftheir own, and that they, 259= Analytical Philosoply of History moreover, constitute the least units of historical stady. But in fit je is rejecting al allegedly superiumman entities in hseary: A lire certains travaux contemporsins, on 3 Timpreson que Ie accu ge Thisoienesont ps de hommes, mals desea, Cl antigo a Jabourgose captain, proetaarrévltionnaeIy als en ene And Watkins impugn in gee the view that "tome speh “healed ong-eeycalwave in economics which s spp obese poplin, unontolable and inceplible terme tcivity'and ini at “haman one aretesale moving spe in history’? * abe ‘Thee ris xk in hoe pesages uch nent nai attiade, dha it mut seem sheer pedantry to distinguish betwen her pow Nevertheless to met ay aren ft ag finn, aod posly'cren independent views, Pofner Manat views scm que enequvediobea has inontolgy He ica that hes worl, onyhnnindvidabrerelsndaaperhney or ocial inividy ate no. Hetero for applying ta nly anepicmologial one: ‘xis rea iand oui we expect EM: Watkhs, by eta mayo my at bedtendlng an ono thesis cha id nytt buna begat teat contest ‘howell word and the conten qt eal pli thar he mena by "cate at human Geng ae the only meget hoo wor Ido not illo fom theft hat human nda se tle moving genie sol ocd that chy eth ony embed the soil worl, but only a, whatever ele ay bes member of docal word snot a moving age So Wali, whether ait te would ako sabrbe to Marrou's owologicd hes, tama concened with the abot eplonaton, What he ems to be ag ith: fndad there ae soch hing scald ebb is to be explained, ultimately, with reference only to the behaviour of individual human beings, and not with reference to the behaviout of cer socal invideay: Tha rca be would clin) human ns Aloe te ca open say ‘here oe we dle, athe fences it wl be wei fort 260 Methodological Individualism penphasze, But, because cach of thie posiions beat smilrty to Gd posible thes, the thesis ately, that sentences which ostensibly ‘eo social individuals ae ‘reducible’ to sentences which only refer ‘individual human beings, iti imporeant to recognize that acter of Jems advocating hr sort of reductions programme. The strategy of 3h philosophical reductionism in current or recent philosophical Fessionis this: if wekavease{S}ofentenceswhichemploy emsof Ja T oneniblycefeting to objects of kind O, and another st {3} of fences employing terms of kind ¢ oxtenubly refering to objects of blo, then, if we can replace every context... T.in{S} with one or fave contests. 1. in{), we will onlyneedtoadaitabjctsof kind a ou ontology. If such a programme vere in fact to succeed, of| ‘gut would nofollow that there ate no objects of kind O, but oly the we do not require to suppose chat there ate such objees, Nether tohor i opgeting tha sentences ontesibly refering to socal indi- {Boas is liminable in chi on ary other sere from the langage of Yori Tadd, I think, even if Profesor Marrou were adamant in geting vocal individ, he might sil feel that sentenes of hi sort Jeveanindapenable ble to play i historical writings. And fr him, | elt thi role doesnot consi in expressing some fct about social ‘avdas bt perhaps, inscad, in expresng, in some fon or otber, ‘up aboutindividal human being which pechaps could nots ealy teespresed by means of sentences which dict ate about individual | taman bing, if indeed thoe fc canbe expressed by means of those | tence all | | chs poine deem ic advisable to introduce a concrete example in | hich secrs to me that an historian x expresng sme fact about 3 | oc individual, however we ate firally 10 analyse the concept of 2 | ciel individual, In this example, the historian is seeking to explain {changes in which, tobe sure, mare of individual human beings were isone manner or other involved, but a change, never the les, which thy were very likely notaware of, This change took place “tsensbly’, to was completed fier roughly seventern yeu Teis a change de ath as fllows: the loss of whatever spiital meaning the [Tiery Yea War] had’ e-will prove parclalyiatructive to note in what 261Analytical Philosophy of History vy reference to individual human beings is made. Miss Wedgnag describes the background ofthe change in this way: ‘While increasing pre-oecupation wich natal scence had philosophy to the educated world, the tragic reve of 3 ‘discredited the Churches asthe dieetors ofthe state le was uot that ih op ow anon nar erage ccd her {Gly mater between the individeal ands ear = wept treet ea merece tes ging aie ee eis eee on eee 2 ene eer aera Sa sens, it-was only lip service, The emall group of educated me wip appreciated the valu ofthe new learning disseminated litle sve the tao ofthcirknowldge. A new emocional urge had eo be found oil paced? spirits couveton; nacional feling welled upto fil the gap. Thesbolunand ercativepicip werloing he apportotelng th gael aa asain, arthekaytohedelp nee inthe later pod. The ens Potts Case pedal le at ve hetcons German, Rehnaa Sedeasmes pte at Thearggleof he Hap dyn adit opponents coed wo be cae fice of evo slg and se the sugele of aon for» bleed power UP ey Dey and ih exes wth, Mis Welgvend tein nd esplaning the wey n wih he Thy ere We Changed fo cgi wo poll coi nd whe he ma ‘sotaeste diac, tinal inorder thane ti cang to prvidcvecehta cage ein en gs ni ‘aking soundings in the flow of history. Here are some examples: Teaeing Engr he Ete Sen, rab nd Drie Seen Castioc tila aed ht coune Bel ed had grown up a new generatcn of soldiers and statesmen. War-breds de py a elgion hd | ‘Methodolegical Individualism je the mark ofthe taining in cation, a ei, anda contempt for (Gidea orig to thei the. ‘ad again: ic of Bohemia had los his crown beeas he had ofeded subject in ‘Geto obey his Calvin chaplain; ison, Prince Rupert, Calvnisinclgion SF morality, fought in England againe Presbytetans and Independens ‘Esse his rcligion was for him, as for most of his generation, nobody’s tenets ba his own? ‘hse various individuals ate selected for special mention, and certain js about them singled out and contrasted with one another, not “| jesus of any intrinsic interest chey may have—for indeed they may Jive no intrinsic intrest—but because oftheir historical significance: sey make clear to us that a great change in atitade and behaviour of, ‘advidualsin roughly the same socal positions hasten place. Consider ‘ae farther example, The batle-cry shouted by soldiers at White Hill ‘ns ‘Suncta Maia!” ‘The batl-ry shouted, later, at Nordlingen, was "iva Bap’. Those who might have wimesed these two bats ould slanost certainly not have seen the significance of these shouts, fer the significance lies in the contrast between them, a contrast which ‘isguifcane to an historian who ses in ther signs that ‘insensibly and ply, che Cross gave way to the fag’ chink it reasonably certain that very few of these changes were innded by anyone. Men followed their own purposss, acted in the Ighrof ther views oftheir situations, were notalivetothesgnifcance” sdvwhat they were doing. Moreover, the changes here described may tothave been reproduced within the biography of any singleindividual ‘ho lived through the change: to modify slightly an example as old as Labair, we may change the eolour of adh of blue powder by the | lve afading yellow powder so thatthe contenc ofthe dish changes, 7 fom Blue to green without any single particle having to change colour. tren if certain individual did in fact change, we sill could not, from thxalone deducethescope ofthechanges which incontestaby took place. Bren we had complete biographies of every individel burnan being veduring this peciod, we would sillhaveto make efuleomparisons | slconteasts co infer that changes of thi sorta happened. To put the | iter bldly, che change wok place, notin individuals, but in soi. 263y. 2 Analytical Philosophy of History Now i seems to me that wh tok plas he prod covey thisaccountis ily clearexampleof what Watkins terms organic social chavo’ which to sy hat, Mens of rome soci pen (bt cilleton of indivi wh scive dry and incnce one sors) mesaly sus theme tutions created by othe a nay tc wou decton fore hoe onde the uci or pesevaon or devclopment othe ee ‘Wortkns forthe sys hat Such fr-ung organiclike behaviour involving geople widely sepa iy space and largely ignorant of one another, cannot be simply observed rag only be theoreiallyreconszueted--by dedacing the dite sil cone ‘quences ofthetypicalesponsetof large numberof peepleto cerita Miss Wedgwood! account ia instance ofthis for a variety of reasons ‘but for the present I with to dravr attention to the fact that the so ‘changes she has drawn our attention to are not, as such, observable All that ean be observed, indeed —vvaiving for now questions concerning problems of verifying, though observation, statements about th pestis the behaviour of individual human beings, But this behaviou is nevertheless to be appreciated and understood with reference 1 4 socal system in course of modification, and is to be taken a8 esdene forthe fact that the sysem iself is being modified. Ie would enky through accepting the most thoroughgoing veriicationisrn that ye could say that her account was cbou the individuals, statements abo whore behaviour provide, pechaps, the only evidence in the nature of the ease available forthe verification of statements about che changiag socal system. ‘With this in mind, we may now recognize those further diferenes, cate alluded to, between the positions of Watkins and Macros. The fact that we cannot obscrvesocal ystems ae sch, but only the behaviour of a ser of individuals, must entail by Marrou's criterion, that soc systems as such are no: ‘ral’. Nover the less, he i prepared to cancel that the concept of a social system may have a dheotetial se, in he sense that we might requice such a concept in order to explain the behaviour of individual human beings. Consistent with tis, I suppor the would insist that electro-magnetic fields are not ‘real’ ther, nl 264 ‘Methodological Individualism gotthe us of field cheories in no way commits us to supporing fields artofthe physical world, Fields, lke social systems, would be ‘abstrac- fons. The ame sil apport a Texamen de tours données docementires, que tel roméne historique vexplique par Ian de ces absraitscoco-cultuels, fiorien devra toujours se garder doubler et de aiwcr oui, que ce est haven constuction de espe, inéveable, sane dow (comme ant le sel inven dsaisirla compen del, dan les limiter empl, lgitime— fois tout de mime une aburaction, un produit deriv, et non pat le rél [isméme, i, comme on fini toujours pa le eric, du sue!" ‘Watkins, by contrast, seems quite prepared to allow that the social vyeeld contains, in addition to individual human beings (who may ver thelesbeits'ulkimatecomponent’), social system, the behaviour «which is Yorganiolike’. Ia fact he is concerned preczely with the siplanation of just such things as these, but quite oppositely to Professor rou, be does not believe-and this is his main contention—dhat we ‘nny ultimate way requite reference o fae about such social systems lnorder to explain ocher facts about them. Theoties which do make that sac of reference are what he terms ‘half-way theories’, and these are ‘ontrsted with ‘rock-bottom explanation ‘We dll nor have arcved a rackcborom explanations of sich Largescle ‘sil phenomena und we have deduced an account of tem rom statements out the disposition, bli, resources, and inter-elation of ndividals* And the plain suggestion here is that Watkins docs not believe that, in ‘peaking of such large-scale social phenomena, we are merely speaking (individual human beings and their belief, dispositions, resources, ‘ad inter-relations, for then the distinction beeween ‘half-way’ and ‘tockcbottom’ explanations collapses. {hall now begin to concern myself in aertical way with Watkins's tescon, owhich he has seemed Methodological Individualism, for it seems to me that Professor Marrou's views can best be appreciated and stewed in the light of such a discusion, Let me begin by emphasizing that there are a number of closely ‘ted bur nevertheles distinguishable theses which must be cacefully 265 ONAL DE COLOMBIA pLIOTECA NACIO! 2 SAnalytical Philosophy of History kept apart from Methodological Individualism, Here are some thing, iets nor (0) isnot theory f meaning. I doss not hod hat every tatemey about social phenomena is ‘reilly’ or ‘ultimately’ a statement show individual human beings, Nor does it propose to demonstrate tht every predicate, nominally eue of social individuals, may be expli defined by means of predicates which range over individual hime boing. Hence itt not an analy theory, in accordance with wid sentences sbost social individuals are held to be, atleast in prince translatable, without loss of meaning, into sentences wholly cba, individual human beings. On the other han, it does requir that tee be some kind of relation between these two clases of sentence, For instance, iemay very well be thatonly through verifying, by observa, extn sentences ahost ndividval, shall we ever be ale to confirm sentence about social systems. But this does not mean that see shout social individuals are really to be understood as about thi, ke observation of which will confirm them. The Methodological Inde vidual s noe neecesily committed tothe Verfbility Ceteron sé reaning, Indeed, ss we sl se, i is important chat these ewo die of sentences have, and retin, thei distinctive sorts of meanings. fn general then, it would be itrelevent to demonsteate that sexta: shout social individuals (or social phenomena however undertoo]) are iredacibe’. (@) If it is pot an analytical theory, neither is it a construed theory. Iedoes not subscribe to Ruse celebrated dictum chat infeed entities should always, in the imerests of parsimony. be replaced wih logical constructions. It does not hold that societies are logical cot: structions out of individeals inthe way in which Rosell wed 1 9 that stars and tables are logics constructions out of senseata. The Methodological Individuals i not afte a Legiche Aub der Gene schafiswelt, Such 2 programme, lke its snalytical counterpart, might bbe philosophically interesting and intellectally challenging. tf possibly even important, but the wabilry of Methodological ind vidual does not depend upon is viability, nor would the shipwe ‘ofsuch programme be of more than external intrest the Method logical individualist, When Watkins speaks of censtctions, he ha 266 ' ‘Methodological Individualism gad the construction of theory ofa scientific, and nota metaphysical {and whose purpose is not to eliminate, bu 9 account for social fpuens. Such a theory indeed has sentences about individeal human, ‘ngs in its base, but we must distinguish between the base ofa theory ia the rst of the theory; quite clearly the concept ofa be loses all soning if there is not something che, diingushable from it, for ic che base building cannot be al foundation, {@) Methodological Individualism is not an ontological theory, in cordance with which only human beings are real in the social world fomeone may wih to sey that societies, or soil individuals, depend fe thee existence upon individual human beings, and chat if there ‘ee 20 individual human beings, there would be no soca individuals der. Bue phinly, if something exis contingently it sll exis. The Vebodological Individuals is not motivated by a metaphysical pons, and the controversy between him and his opponents i not salogots tothe controversy beeween those who hold tha images ere inply brainatates, nd those who deny chey ae brin-tates. Indeed, esalmost miltandy dualist His postion is analogous tothe epipheno- tnalit who, holding chat images (end! mental events generally) are fine from brain proceses (and physical events generally), still ‘thatthe former are cxwsally connected with thelaterina uulteral ‘ny, and can only be explained with reference othe latter. (¢) Accordingly, the Methodological individealt does not deny in slrance that there are, or may be found, general lawelike sentences, ‘hich eelate various properties of social systems. Nor does he maintain ® 270 ‘Methodological Individualism clave no means of verifying any statemens we may make concer nom yng any y ng Societal ies may depen for this existence ‘upon the existence of a beings who poss cersin capaci for ought and fr ston Bet esnt a drs omer seo cs ona wi eof, gon whose exinence is contingent fp) Theexienceofscieral facts doesnotenal hur thererenoindividual eso hatindividal ae no rel’ Rather, there are thse ew dnc fs whic nay besaid'to interact’, Ths: “There ate socal facts which vse external constraints over individals, no les than there are its feceing indvidel vltion which often come into conics with thee eins. tow it should bbe plain that very litle of this i incompatible with Netodologicl Individualism as Thave charactried it, but at best it compatible with some ofthe things which mighe be thought eo [zmble Methodological Individualism. ‘The sole point of conflict asin thesis (v) wher, since quite clealy vo way ineractonim x swaded there isan incompaabilty with (0), and withthe thesis which vinates Mandelbau’s argument, namely: Insley asinine sony memo en igri tin the organo he yn ‘us ws now take a close look at Mandelbaumn’s argunnents fo (9). fe lists of two pars, an informal (or Witgenseiian) part, and a nal (aon-Witigensteinian) pare. The informal pati his: one could teach someone, who is strange to our culture, what a member of reukureis doing when he presents withdrawal-lip toa bankecer, Jrthot, in process of doing so, teaching him something about the {yn which withdrawal-slips funtion in that system of operations ‘ich make up our banking system, But since tefrence toa banking ‘nem is ipo ft reference ca societal fc, we cannot explain to acon, who is strange to our culture, what such a man is doing, bout bringing into our explanation reference to a societal fact. "ow notice how the word explain is being used her. Is being used in suse: explaining fo someone what that person doesnot understand. Fethe sense in which a tacher explains a lesion, or the meaning of an= Analytical Philosophy of History art te Sandie’ neg i ocr malig Se emi te oe ak ot ae ee ease ong ae Tyo of in mp cam eco i ee Tie ene a accel nel Meee Se al erent econ ee a ee oer Ee ee ame nee Ne oe Sina nao gle ae Se ne eee re een Se Te eins ise toe 2 ee tates ieioo ai phan ener ear oe 2 seemed acco keene be Ce eee a enon Se ee oe wrens SN nT a teonione a ee ange clayean ate ee die oceans cee ee oe st rein tie ee ec evita mes dog and action which presuppose something about societal facts, and sone | terms which refer to individual human dhooght and action wiih # te invelve hac sort of prespposton. Ido not know if theres init the later set of term, bu et ws suppose cere is Now any teeny correct application of which to an individual human being presoppos some ft about the orgsization of society, [shall all an S-prdia and any term the correct application of which to an individual dost involve such » prespposition, I shll call an Tpredicate. A set? ‘which employs an Séprodicate will be called an S-entene, 3) an Methodological Indvidualion ie ch wee tpi de oc mo (et) The bank-llée certs the withdrwallip, (63) The man makes marks on the pive of paper | esespectively instances ofan S=and sn sentence, But (63) "The man cenifies the withdsawallip 5 sin an S-sentence, since it doesnot wean pedicel, but ao faim Spreicate. ‘We may weal thee ofthese semencs to scribe one andthe same ge, We may farther sy tht (nt) aed) do, but that es) doc net, eippettome fact sbost the orgniationofour soir. A Trobiand fader could be taught ro wndercnd (2) without beng aught in ie proces, any sich fc, We may indeed say that F-pediates ae arcu. Any term, the meaning of which en be aught without aging in some fat about the organizational pelt of 2 given [iy natu belongs tothe voebulay, Wemay nov reconstruct, (hdelbaam’s thee at fllowa: en S-sentence cannot be tansated rioureminderinto an Feenencorasetf sentences, The question ish with remainder” so be interpreted 1 hllimerpet it jeavay which will Thope, ot merdy be congenial to Mandela, {eich wil demonstrate my reed version of his thesis Consider the following is of tea, the oncs in the right-hand sma being Eteems which corepond tothe S-erms inthe lee nd column, The tem in either column fer to an individual human ng an action and a material object spectively bankeeller man ; cers sakes marks on ‘withdeawallip ce of paper meen che correspondent terms in either column, there ate no entail et relations. We cannot deduce chat someone is man from only ieinformation that someone sa banker, nor vice vers, Not every ektler is a man noe every man a bankller not every pice of he isa withdrawal-tip, and even if every withdrawal-lip were per ns piece of paper, nological ditfcalty would face bale which ansy Analytical Philosophy of History resolved to introduce plastic withdtawal-ips; and finally, one cerafy a withdrawal-lip without making marks on anything (fy banker could just sy ‘O.K.), and itis plainly true that not instanceof making marks oa something is case of certifying omnething {not even when the marks are made on a withdrawal slip: che edly might write No good’). Henceitisquite feaiblethat if" ..man offered asa translation of. banketeller. the former could bei, ‘while the later is tae; and since the weakest condition we cn pi Upon trandations is that they be equvelet, he former would not bez warslation ofthe ater. "Butmow there may be societies in which such entailments hold, Th, ittmay have been the cae ins certzn period in Engi history, th only males could be banktellers. But this would be only in vite of Some organizational feature, hence societal fact, having t do with temporary pecliarity of Britsh society. So the transation coud through only ehrough presupposing this sentence: ‘All bank-tlles in this society are male,’ And this would bean S-entence. ‘By "without remainder’ I shall dhecefore mean; you cannot trie an Sentence into an Lentence without presupposing another sentence, This is generally true. Hence anyone who proposed te liminte, by translation, S-prediates in favour of Ipredicates, cult conly do so on the basis of allowing exactly the sor of sentece: be ‘proposed to eliminate. Hence any such programe i inherently 1 defeating, and she prograame is demonstrably imposible, “What, however, are we more precisely to undertand by thee societal fics, impli reference to whichis presupposed in any sak itatsation or, for that mater, in instructing cultora ousider?{ saggest that they are rules, norms, and conventions, as “Only mals ‘an be bankctellers” Indeed, it scems o me that this is che most rate ‘way in which we may interpret Mandelbaum’s thes (x), for naturally speak of people being constrained to actin secordance wit this rte or that, and of people chafing under chese roles and wishing have them changed, Thus a woman whose great ambition in life 2 become 2 banketellerin a major bank might find herself fusteted by such a rue, and this might, with some latitude, be regarded 3 28 instance ofthe interaction between an individal and soil i 274 ‘Methodological Individualism ut understood inthis way, iis hard to see how either (jv) ot (is aay longer incompatible with Methodological Individuaim...The logical individuals s clearly not denying that there ae ules, fat people actin conformity with them, change them, ace frstated Sythe andso on. Ae for(sithastured out tobe very litle more than esis about meaning, andthe Individuals: may very well agre with sdebaun that, when called upon to explain a given piece of bcha- our toa strange, i exactly the sense of ‘explain’ which ppliesin such nents, we may have Co tell him some of the rules, norms, and con setons. I may further be agrod ha in the categoria sense mentioned ler, we understand actions, under ain descriptions of them, with ference to some rules, norms, and conventions. But this is not the fave of ‘explain’ which interests the Methodological Individuals. ules he may go on to point out, are broken all the time, and when a ales broken, i is not by that fact alone to be considered abrogated. ‘nly rles which hol es be broken. But he wil add hat his interest, bes in laa, in the precise sense in which we speak of scientific laws, ‘When such a lw is broken, this demonstrates that the ‘law’ does not Jol and that isthe end of che matter. The question for him is not bather there are rules in the former sense, not whether we understand ‘ons with reference to them. The question, rather, is whether chere az laws covering the behaviour of societies, whether these laws are ‘imate, and wheter, in the socal sciences, we ate o be able to explain fe workings of societies simply by refeence to the behaviour of | idvidoal human beings. Even when tightened up, therefore, Mande! ‘aun’ theses are not merely compatible with Methodological Indi~ ‘iam, but they are ureelyirclevane to questions concering the ‘ters status, The fact shat they could have been so mach as considered ioberelevantis du, in the end, toanequivocationonthe word ‘explain’. ‘The natural wish ofthe Methodological Individuals i to demonstrate the logical imposiilty of Methodological Socialism—a wish, whose falment would very nearly confer, upon his own postion, the scilde of logical necenity. Watkins has attempted to demonsteate te logical impossibly of historical materialism, and while iti wwe tht che refutation of historical materialism would no more demolish 275= Analytical Philosophy of History Methodologies! Socal than a eefoation of Paychologism woalg ‘emolth Methodological Individuaien—snce these are only ian ‘of the main postons—the fit is that Watkins's argument could exc, ‘bear transfert the more general postion. The demonstration pre supposes fou diner these: (@)_ There are predicates which ange over socal individuals (There are predicates which range over individeals 6), Kisanccesary condition for Eto be an adeguate explnation of ‘Phenomenon that aentence describing ebe exhibited as adedacne Tc be a nro em inh conan of eae re can be no non-logcl term in the conclusion of a srpument which doesnot appear inshat argument’ premises, Now, if there isto be an explanation F of some pee of individu) bochaviour c, the explanandum, ic. the sentence which i ied w formulate e, must employ predicates which range over individu) human beings. Let be sucha sentence. The explanation wil ini require that S be exhibited a deductive consequence (y) of premise, and amongst these premises must appett at list one sentence Wt contains atleast one predicate which ranges over individual humm beings (6). Accordingly, ffom premises containing sentences whith ‘employ only predicates ranging over socal individuals, $ cannot be ddedaced, and hence ecannat be explained. As Watkins pus it No desciption, however complete, of the productive apparstis of tociece fay other nonpyeologial fos lee you to dda ge prjehoogileoacaon fom , bee arent logiely «ennot be dedaced from wholiy non-psycbolgical satemens? ‘And heads: ® ‘That an explanation which begies by imputing some socal phenomence human factors anne go onto explain those actors in terns of somethin decerminane of them, sa necesary ert 11 do notin fact think i isa necessary eth, though I do agree shatie isa necesary consequence ofthe theses (2)(8), but che chief dificult ‘with thi, forthe Methodological Individuals, that an exactly alg argument wll show that Metkodlegial individual ls. This argon is eaily constructed by substituting, inthe above proof, ‘pedi 276 ‘Methodological Individualism hich range over socal individual” for ‘prdicates which range over | pivdual human beings’ nd vice vers. Thus the argument boomier~ fogs cis cogent, and entails the imposibility of Methodological Sscalsm, it abo entails the impossibility of Methodological Individ- alm. The wisest course at tis point appears tobe logical disarmament el peaceful philosophical co-existence. ‘On the other hand, the conflic beeween our methodologies, if we senoW to assume that each of thems posible, can be pitched at another nt. Let us accept the general corretion ofthe four theses (e)~), at consider in more detail precisely what is required if we are both (0 cept them and regard each of our methodologies as posible seems, fp me eat che following adjustment mast be made: an explanation, ceptable to Methodological Individualism, ofthe behaviour of some fecal individual, must employ, amongst its premises, at least one estece which employs as least one predicate ranging over socal dividuals, Similarly for Methodological Socialism. It must allow, saongst the premisse ofits explanations a least one sentence which eoploys at least oe predicate which ranges over individeal human [éngs. Not merely ean this condition be met, but in meeting it, we vil have something which seems to me a fr more plusible way of rgecienting cither methodology than any we have so far discussed. ‘condition could be met ifamongsethe premisesoftheexplanations, chad at east one lawsike sentence ofthe following forms: (Lr) (3) (Rx > Pa) () Oe Ry> Ps, | vhere P,is a predicate which ranges over individual human beings, and ‘here Psa predicate which anges ove social individuals, and where ‘beanecedent it understood st deterbing ase of initial conditions for be sate of afirs described by the consequent. Now any explanation, hich included a law-ike sentence of the form (L-1) amongst it, emis, would to that extent satisfy Methodologieal Individualism, fc cerain fits about the behaviour of individsl human beings would th be intial conditions or certain ts pertaining to socal inivideals ti, for exactly similar considerations, an explanation containing, nongst its premises, a lawelike sentence ofthe form (L-2) would! to a7= Analytical Philosophy of History that extent satisfy Methodological Socialism. Historical Mateilin, incidentally, i prcizly the claim that chee are known Laws ofthe form (L-2), in which cersin facts about the prevaling producing fare intal conditions for eexainpsychologial facts petaing for individual human beings. Now we can give a more general interpretation of these lake sentences. We can simply lay down the rule that che predicate in he antecedent range over a diffrent kind of phenomena than the predicita in the consequent. Such Iaw-lke sentences then would be ndertood to describe causal connections berween phenomena of diferent kinds for example, chat causal connections hold between certain brains ‘ofan individu, and certain pychologial tates ofthat sare individ assuming that “brain-eates’ and ‘psychological states’ are instanceof diferearkinds of phenomens.Ieisthrough the establishment oflawlks ‘sentences of thi sor that we speak of reduction ina scientific sense, And it is importa to stress that we ean only speak of reduction, dite from ordinary causal explanation, when weare dealing with sentally diferent kinds of phenomena. Reduction inthis sense will mean explin ing on kindof phenomena with teference ro phenomena of difiex ad. This ca rutin, fone, nd mote ings in sophical reduction, is. where a given sot of terms is held 10 vende mee dod fem Tare eel MothodologicalIndivivalism isnot thesis about philosophical edu tionism, and isnot concerned to demonstrate that the meaning of pl ‘cates which range over socal individuals isto be rendered by means of predicates which range over individual human beings. Bus Iam nav ‘ying thats a thesis about cof edveton; indeed it could not wal subscribe £0 both kinds of reductionist programmes, for scent: reduction clearly presupposes chat we are dealing with distinct kinds of henometa: otherwise we could effect any redaction we chose bye simple device of making definitions. 1 am further sopgesing tht “Methodological Socialis it alo a thesis about scientific eduction aad if this construction ofthe matter i correct, Methodologies dvi ‘amis che clan tha explanations erapoying laws of the forts (Loa) to be alone accepted as ultimate, of ‘rock-bottom’ explanatios in social cence, and that laws ofthe form (-a} and allso-called expo a8 Methodological Individualism sont which employ them, are to be rejected. Exactly the reverse ofthis sl hen be the claim of Methodological Socialism. ‘Having put che conflict in chis form, we may ance agen ak whether any good reason may be Found for choosing between Methodologies! fedividualism and Methodological Socialism, and Thal say in advance bat Tam quite unable to find one, Never the les, a fewr words more right profitably be devoted to analysing the confit inthe fori it has tken, and so to suggesting why itis hard to find good reasons for deciding it one way or another, ‘he concept of reduction in science has been analysed in considerable dail by Emest Nagel, and in what follows I shall asume che essential erecnes of hit analysis! and shall refer the reader to his work for srguments I shall not seck to summarize here, He is, of course, not sponsible for the following remarks. Suppose we were to speak of macro~ and of mico-propertes of cities. As a mode, one might think of individual human beings as sanding to societies in somethin like the relation in which molecoles ‘and to gases. This might ultimately prove a misleading analogy, bat fx the moment it wll be convenient to employ it orate some prob- | es Now, in the cae of ges, we peak of reduction in the following sve: some telationships and proportions between some macro= rropetes of gases are explained with reference to some relationships id proportions between molecules, for example variations in the temperature of a gas are explined with reference to variations in the ‘ean kinetic energy of molecules in random motion, and hence with | eference to che mechanical behaviour of aggregates of molecules. 1 | appose the Methodological Individualit,s fara he would accept chs | milogy, would speak of reduction in an exactly similar sense: relations | eween properties of societies, considered macroscopically, are t6 be | alaned with reference ro relations between individual hari beings, ie to societies considered ‘microscopically Now before the reduction of thermodynamics to mechanics was hieved, in the nineteenth exntury, scientists had reasonably clear ea for applying the terms ofthe formes theory to gues reasonably ta lboratory procedures for measuring variations in the properties 279Analytical Philosophy of History denoted by these terms, and hence eaonably clear ways of confieming, tor disconfitming, law-like sentence intended correctly to describ relationships of co-varation amongst these propertics. All ofthis way retained after the reduction was effected. All he known laws of therm. dbynamice were preserved. What had been achieved (in unspeakbly rough terms) was this: the behavion of gus, as described by thema. dynamics, had been explained with reference to the behaviour of solecules, as described by mechanics, and so one nigh, if one with, speak of mechanics as the more ‘ultimate’ of the ewo theories, and of tolecaes a ‘theultimate constituents’ of gases. In general, we cou speak as follows: if Tris a theory which explains and predic ike behaviour of phenomena P-1, and T-2 is a theory which explains ant predicts the behaviour of phenomena P-2, then, if T-2is reduced to “Ty in the sense that we can now alo explain and predict the behavior of Pea with reference to P-t, T-1 isa more ultimate theory than Ta, (Or, so revere to Watkin’ slanguage, T-2 may be considered ahalfay theory for Pea, and Tota ‘rock-bottom’ theory for P-2. This does, ‘of course, mean that ether Pa’s are not “eal” or that sentences aboit Poa'sare “relly bout’ P's [Now lee us suppose there were a theory of society comparble 2 thermodynamics, ie. a theory which is concerned with socetis fn macroscopic way. Imagine that such terms as ‘socal density” ad “altura-economic claticty’ were among the terms of this theory, and that there were wel-confimed lav lke" Socal density varies iver asthe cube ofeuleual economic elasticity’. Should here Besuch 2 then, the Methodologiil individualist would say one can ultimately exp the vaiations in these properties, one can ultimately account for a> variations beeween them, by means of a theory concerned with he bchaviour of individual human beings. To tis dheory we shall be al imately to reduce the macro-theory of society. But, of couse, frit tw speak of reductions in the scientific sense, eis fs required thas have two theories. OF course, one might interpret: Methodologial Tndividaaism as a negative injunction agains secking macro-theors of society Iso, it becomes extremely dificult to see what could now b= meant by ‘reduction’ or by ‘individuals being ulimate’. Moreover by the Methodological Inividals's own admision,thereare popes ato Methodological Individualism of societies which are diferent lteter from the properties of inde | ius. Arethese proprio beleftumaecounte or? Surely che ale | pin of Methodological Individuals shat ll relations and propor. fous between sch properties ae tobe explained, ultimately, by rls taceto the behaviour ofindvidual himan beings Sothe Methodologies! Iuividalt would fnd i slf-defaing to adhere to such a negative iajnction. When Wats sas, of Methodological Indidalisy, that iis a regulative principle, pre of whose purpose ist dicoarage tezach in certain drcetons, he place himself in the ionic posion of king the wabilty of his methodological programe dependent spon the success of exacly the sore of research it calculated to di ‘euage, and we ean complete this uncanny daletc by making esetly inl poinessbout the Methodologieal Sociale. | bur ler ws suppose chat the socialsciences advance, and that one day reduction is achieved which s excl ofthe sore to bring joy wo the | vethodological Socialis’ heart! The behaviou of india! human igs realy is explained with reference to large-scale variations in the | ro-propets of soiees! The resale would bein many way the | pene of the example of gates. Not merely would the direction of | eyaation—von abe birater—be diferent, bu the operational prob jens would be dient a well. For while the macro-properts of |p ie within che realm of obervable, the mceo-propers do nat | Sues, th behaviour of human individuals es within the realm of | dervabes, while has ong since been agreed that we donot observe | te workings of cies such So itis with ehis erence thf shall tow concern mpl sa commonplace consideration, Ishould think, that when a esa | sory is advanced inthe scenes, sertng, sy, that changes i a [farsa yeabl tae expla pele by rene 9 anges in an independent variable v2, ic isnecssary chat we have some ‘ndeendent means of measuring variations in these ewo variables | The Boyle-Charles law i thusconfirmable by observationson pressure uges and thermometers, Yee suppose the ale way in which we could signa value to the mean kinetic energy of unobservable molecules ms by measuring the temperature of an observable body of gas. One ight begin to wonder about the status of a law which held chat aea Analytical Philosophy of History aston ene were expe and rode by nl ‘centaur themes Knee energy of ss males Imagine ‘Ra tera ue cht the modn ofan ough water isd to Qetanous moon of ans of u-mieoseopie Hinks comeced wipe ea immense oly. Ae he tation quency Sovmabensilean ices snort tein pope bs whe oy apneic wean agave he ne pe than othe “let conta’ of the el wot be ‘Setting thee st whch the eel moves dough the ware Zena nigh ec ge thet soa 83 By-aea fact the reduction of thermodynamics to mechanics did not consist ix ‘Sevtny sample emmetn of comaonberneen the micr=and Taro foperts of gue Th selon was ft more comple, Tneder cl had ong and dings history bee i wa ‘Rolfe snd extend eo aceunt for teal phenomena. The at taht the os weypn hich ween sig vale heme Unt ergy or don ty, of oe Use SREP Zann othe ate inde, nd va coe ficas of Uborscy tnd mathenaeal apart Never, & esis pone abe dub above les A rail cmp ‘Ceri he option fying to linia efecto them in vr Team tary whch makes we ony of bevel fits Cr oe my eg them aoe Maron gud tai se coney ny, ough nes ee sdnton of experince Bt thee opts have wo do wih ine Sreingy and in aning, andi be common grond dt ‘heard hrantoconteedexplantryandpredicvepont No pec fh opin woul remain with hor of eit chery Tam sapaing The aac and th nue “Tcl spesynepetton of elas an guage of hit eo ofan ony aloo ste wich he wold ne Lint toy oft apoio nosey, there woul be for them to choo becween mol “The poston, ne eee the Metso Indiv, whose cain, ey 2 MethodelgialIndviduliom beory isnot‘ ultimate’ even if, re epore ie might be supposed to have genine predictive and explanatory power. His objection certainly {annot be based on ontological grounds, nor upon thesortof reservations encerning meaningfilness which animates the radical empiricist. ‘ac what is it exactly chat his objections are based on? What exactly would be wrong with such a theory? Ie is thi T find very hard 00 ermine. I thine Fknow what he fears such a theory would entail. I fall tum to this in a moment. Bu I should like, before doing s0, to joint out how very litle philosophical intrest remains inthis con troversy. The philosophical interest it might sppcar to have derives fom the other, interesting, issues which resemble it. Once isolated from ths, i quickly degenerates into a quite unphilosophical preoccupation ‘ih siencescton. Bur itis a dargeous preoccupation, for it might Jecome 2 self-fulfilling thesis. Socal scents, persuaded in advance the a certain sore of theory is suspect, might abandon the quest for such theories. And this might, inthe end, have consequences of exactly ‘sort fared by the Methodological Individuals. ‘What the Individuals fears, Lsubmit is this He fels chat cheories of Ae sorthe wishes to reject would entailthat wedonothold ou destinies ‘nour own hands that we ae, ait were, dragged along by the develop- sent of the social individuals we ae part of and which have a life of ‘ir ovn.? Now even if this were entailed by such theories, ie would wholly contrary tothe spitc of Philosophy to refas to look for such ores. We may sympathize with, buesarcely approve ofthe atétude ich, cecording to legend, led Pychagorans to do away with the tn who discovered that chere is no rational number, the square of [Sls equal to 2. On he other and it sems to meta hetheocs | nisve ental no such thing, and an important sep towards seizing our [aii our own hands might be taken with the discovery ofxactly ee sors of theories, Ie doesnot follow, from the Fact that we success explain the gross, thermal behaviour of guae with ference othe ‘echancal behaviour of molecules, that we cannot contol the mech- ‘ical behaviour of molecules. By applying gross heating and cooling Sparatacs to bodiss of gas, we may modify dhe value of the mean ec energy of the molecules contained init, but, by symmetecal, 283Analytical Philosophy of History analogy, should we ever be able to explain he behaviour of individs kings wih cence ote tebavious of large proce in socal individeals, nothing would prevent us from similarly contolg those large-scale proceses by operating at the ‘microlevel’ i. upon individual human beings. Science is not noted for diminishing one control over hings. Nevertheless, even were we t0 assume the correctness of method. logical individualism in asuming that social process are but the ‘complicated outcome of individual actions, the extent to which wedy Ihave contol over our own dennis i in some measure limited. Fe ‘usually, Thave argued, che outcomes of our actions i seldom intended by as, and actor, unless they survive, and know retrospectively, ae bind to the significance of their actions because they ae bind toe facure. We se this nowhere more clearly than inthe sort of historic account atthe beginning of this chapece. The changes Miss Wedgwood described wereinsensble" and few were aware they were taking plac, “This not beeauses more delicate instrument could have detected them, for no such instrument could be built: the changes could not have been detected atthe time, fri is only in the light of fnure event chit they could so much a have been described. To have been able to conta for modify these changes would accordingly have required that mente their own actions in a perspective unfortunately not avaiable to ther, the perspective, namely, of historians future to their actions, Not [knowing how our actions wil bescen from the vantage point ois, ‘we to that degree lack control over the present, Ithere is such athingat inevitability in history its not 90 much due to socal proceses moving forward under their own seam and in accordance with thet ow atures 2 isto che fact that by the ime tis clear what we have dons, iris too late to do anything about it. “The ow! of Minerva takes fight only with the falling of the dusk.’ Philosophies of history atempt 9 capture the fature without eliing that ifwe knew the facure, we could control the present, and so filsfy statements about the Future, and 9 such discoveries would be wiees. We capture the future only when is to late ro do anything about the relevant presen, fri then pat and beyond our control. We can but find out what its significance and this isthe work of historians: history is made by them. 384 XUL HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM OF OTHER PERIODS cae ea an | the inside, as it were: from the viewpoint of those who lived them Bean ircieee ea eee sieerce perenne Seis datbeah shor ue geal ne Way re Ratti nd dae Se aly of it's eds Pee eee eae ee eee ilcee eran ita Se or dbad a lal pelos ae ratio of Ge als g be ce ont Bene tat oe ee ee ee ee eee 285