Review

Reviewed Work(s): Reason and Human Good in Aristotle by John Cooper

Review by: J. L. Ackrill
Source: Nos, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Nov., 1978), pp. 470-474
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214501
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 CRITICAL REVIEWS

John M. Cooper's Reason and

Human Good in Aristotle
J. L. ACKRILL

OXFORD UNIERSITY

Two central questions about Aristotle's ethics concern his account of practi-
cal thinking and his idea of the best life for a man. Professor Cooper's book,
devoted to discussion of these questions, will be of more than specialist
interest. I shall therefore try to indicate the broad lines of his treatment and
resist the temptation to argue points of detail.

DELIBERATION, PRACTICAL SYLLOGISMS, AND INTUITION

There has commonly been felt to be some conflict between Aristotle's

account of deliberation in book III of Nicomachean Ethics and his remarks
about practical wisdom and the practical syllogism in books VI and VII. For
the former seems to confine deliberation to the calculation of means to ends,
while the latter concentrate on the recognition of an action as being of a
certain kind. Since actual deliberation surely involves both types of thinking
it is curious that Aristotle treats of them separately and without connecting
them. Moreover, the means-end type of thinking described in the official
account of deliberation in book III seems very much less relevant to ques-
tions of good and bad action than the 'subsumptive' type illustrated in the
later books. For according to Aristotle it is making (poiesis) that is for the sake
of an outcome, while action (praxis) is performed for its own sake. So it would
appear that to do x as a means-in order to bring abouty-is not a case of
action at all; doing x because it is (say) honourable looks more like what is
required.
Cooper's solution to these difficulties embodies two main claims. First,
he argues that the book III account should not be understood as confined to
means-end deliberation in the strict or narrow sense that generates the
problemjust mentioned. The idea of doing something 'for an end' (pros telos)
covers not only doing x in order to bring abouty, but also doing x because
doing x is a part of doingy, and doing x because it has some characteristic.
Secondly, Cooper contends that the 'practical syllogism' of books VI and VII
has nothing to do with deliberation-it is neither a form nor a part of
deliberation, but has a quite different role. Deliberation carries on until the
agent reaches a decision to perform an action of some definite specific type.
The conclusion of the deliberative process does not mention an individual
picked out by a personal or demonstrative pronoun. The practical syllogism

NOOS 12 (1978) 470

01978 by Indiana University

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COOPER'S REASON AND HUMAN GOOD IN ARISTOTLE 471

does precisely this: it involves the recognition of this individual as the thing
to act on, and now as the time to act. It explains how the results of practical
thinking are carried out (with the aid of perception), not how they are
reached.
In the course of developing these claims Cooper argues for a number of
theses, of which the following are samples. (i) 'Deliberation is not about ends'
means that in deliberating the deliberator must take some end(s) for
granted, not that there are ends that cannot even in principle be deliberated
about. (ii) To understand Aristotle's view that all virtuous action presup-
poses deliberation we must recognize that 'deliberation' may refer either to a
process of thought preceding choice or to a reconstructed explanation or
justification of choice, given afterwards in terms of the agent's desires and
reasons for action. (iii) The question how it is possible to argue for some
particular view of the final good, given that deliberation presupposes and
cannot establish such a view, is not really faced by Aristotle, and no coherent
answer can be extracted from what he says. Some help may possibly be
derived from a distinction between an agent's having reasons for pursuingx
and there being reasons to believe thatx is the best end for him to pursue-a
distinction between the practical and dialectical modes. (iv) The correct
account of deliberation can accommodate the point that moral value is
inherent in action: 'morally virtuous activity is itself part of the end that is
held in view when moral reasoning is being engaged in.' (v) Those passages
inNicomachean Ethics VI and VII where it has been claimed that the practical
syllogism is explicitly brought into connection with deliberation are not
really about the practical syllogism at all. For they do not involve a 'this',
application to an actual individual thing or situation. The term 'last' (escha-
ton) which occurs in these passages means 'last in the order of deliberation'
and refers not to an individual thing or act but to a specific kind.
These and many other points are discussed clearly and in most cases
persuasively. About the two main claims some reservations may be felt.
Cooper is certainly right to say that the phrase 'for an end' need not refer to
the normal means-end relation, and that Aristotle's idea of eudaimonia as an
end in book I is not that of an outcome-end. (His case here could be
strengthened: [2], [10], [11].) But it remains odd that the official analysis of
deliberation in 111.3 gives no clear indication of anything other than the
straightforward means-end structure, and this oddity Cooper has not
explained away. (I suspect that it is connected with Aristotle's wider failure
to be clear about the concepts of praxis and poiesis). Cooper says indeed that
'there is evidence, even in the discussion of deliberation in Nicomachean
Ethics III, that the broader application of the expression tapros ta tel is to be
insisted upon in interpreting Aristotle's theory' (p. 20). But the only evi-
dence he offers from that discussion is the passage drawing an analogy
between deliberation and the analysis of a geometrical problem, a passage
whose interpretation is a matter of notorious difficulty and doubt.
Cooper's second claim, about the practical syllogism, is original and
interesting. It has often been held that the 'doctrine' of the practical syllo-
gism does two jobs, giving both a causal analysis of how animal movement is
brought about and a logical analysis of (part of) practical thinking. Cooper's
claim that it does not have this second job merits serious consideration,
which will call for a fuller study of texts inDe Motu Animalium and Nicomach-
ean Ethics than Cooper attempts. It is in any case important to distinguish

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 472 NOOS

sharply, as he tells us to, between passages which refer to the application of

concepts or rules to this now and passages which concern the subsuming of
one sort of thing or action under a more general kind.
One query may be raised here. Does Cooper hold that deliberation
never gets as far as the individual action or only that it does not need to do
so? (This is connected with the question what he counts as an 'individual
action'). Is his thesis that the practical syllogism is not usually a part of
deliberation, or that it is not capable of being a part of deliberation-because
even the decision to open this door now is something which has to be
executed and whose execution (the actual individual action) will have in-
numerable characteristics not indicated in that decision? I suspect that he is
not clearly distinguishing two different theses:

(i) it is normally not necessary to deliberate to a 'this, now' conclusion,

because after one has reached a specific conclusion habit, training,
and perception can take over;

(ii) however far one deliberates (even if to a 'this, now' conclusion)

action always involves something other than deliberation, namely
the execution of what has been decided upon; and this is a matter of
perception, habit, and training.

MORAL VIRTUE AND HUMAN FLOURISHING

In this section Cooper expounds the familiar problem whether Aristotle's

idea of eudaimonia is intellectualist or whether he attaches independent
value to practical activity as well. He thinks it hard to deny that certain
passages inNicomachean Ethics I commit Aristotle to the view that the correct
end for a human being to aim at in life is the active exercise of theoretical
wisdom, and that therefore morality has value only as a means to the
enhancement of one's intellectual life. Yet the moral theory of the middle
books of the Nicomachean Ethics, with their insistence that the phronimos does
what he does because it is kalon (noble) and that goodness of action is itself
his end, is very different. And passages in book VI imply that Aristotle's
conception of the ultimate end is not purely intellectualist but 'bipartite':
human flourishing calls for both morally virtuous activity and excellent
theorising, the former not being only for the sake of the latter.
Before seeking to unravel this knot in the Nicomachean Ethics Cooper
turns to a discussion of the Eudemian Ethics, and claims that in it Aristotle
consistently holds to a conception of human flourishing that makes provi-
sion for two fundamental ends, neither subordinated to the other: 'moral
virtue comes first, in the sense that it must be provided for first, but once
moral virtue is securely entrenched, then intellectual goods are allowed to
predominate.' To possess the moral virtues is to be in the best position to
secure the basic, first-order goods. ('The conception of the ultimate end as
partly consisting in a life of morally virtuous action, therefore, is in effect a
conception of eudaimonia as a comprehensively inclusive second-order end.')
Intellectual activity, however, is not just one first-order good among many
(sophia is not a 'good of fortune' as the other first-order goods are); the
achievement of the theoretical excellences is a further task, over and above

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 COOPER'S REASON AND HUMAN GOOD IN ARISTOTLE 473

the attainment of a morally virtuous character. 'So in addition to pursuing

intellectual values, along with the others, by maintaining a good moral
character, the man who flourishes will pursue them directly by maintaining
and exercising a well-developed theoretical intellect.' Intellectual goods are
the most valuable of the goods sought by moral virtue but are also to be
pursued single-mindedly, and preferred to any amount of other goods, once
the requirements of the moral virtues are met.
Cooper's discussion of the Eudemian texts is welcome, and much of
what he has to say is certainly right. The attempt to extract from them a
coherent and interesting theory is commendable and stimulating, though
the above summary maybe sufficient to indicate that the proposed concep-
tion of a bipartite end is by no means without difficulty. (Cooper's use of
Magna Moralia is controversial; see Rowe's criticism of his view ([9]).)
I think that Cooper gives in too readily to the orthodox view that in
Nicomachean Ethics 1.7 ('the chief intellectualist passage in book I') the phrase
'activity expressing the best and most final excellence' commits Aristotle to a
monolithic intellectualist view. He fails to consider fully the arguments for a
different interpretation ([2]: 16-8) and hence for the contention that book I
as a whole advances the idea of a composite or comprehensive end. This
contention does not of course solve the whole problem, since book X in any
case raises the question whether, and if so how, theoretical activity is to be
combined with practical activity in the best life; but it makes better sense of
book I and of its connections with the middle books.

INTELLECTUALISM IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Cooper turns finally to Nicomachean Ethics X. 6-8. He dismisses three 'in-

adequate interpretations' of Aristotle's position here, and argues (i) that
Aristotle in speaking of the theoretical life and 'the life of the other sort of
virtue' is indeed referring to two lives, notjust two aspects of a single life; (ii)
that the first is a life devoted exclusively to intellectual values; but (iii) that the
second need not be exclusively practical-Aristotle has in mind a life de-
voted jointly to moral and intellectual cultivation, the Eudemian 'mixed
ideal.'
Aristotle is led to advance the purely theoretical life-ideal by the idea
that the intellect is the true self. This idea can be traced back to Plato. But he,
and Aristotle in the well-known passages of Nicomachean Ethics IX, are
speaking of an intellect that is practical. The new step, which produces the
extreme ideal of book X, is the identification of the true self with the
theoretical intellect. This results from the psychological theory of the De
Anima, which sharply distinguishes the highest intellectual function from all
other powers: reason is not, as they are, the form of a living body.
Cooper holds that though Aristotle does in book X adopt an intellec-
tualist ideal he does so only with three important reservations. (i) This ideal
is explicitly associated with a particular conception of human identity 'which
will hardly recommend itself to everyone, even though for Aristotle it is the
most preferred conception because most in accord with his technical psycho-
logical theory'. (ii) The ordinary, mixed life is counted as a flourishing life.
(iii) It is this last life that the morally good person aims at: Aristotle is not in
book X putting forward a revised account of moral virtue, since moral virtue
plays no role at all in the ideal intellectualist life.

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 474 NOOS

Cooper's interpretation of book X follows Rodier's and in its main lines

is probably correct, though the inclusion of an intellectual component in the
second life rests more on common sense than on definite textual evidence.
On one point Cooper's position is less than clear. Is the extremist ideal of
book X an afterthought (although foretold, according to Cooper, in 1.7)?
Does he regard the intellectualist passages in the Nicomahean Ethics as late
additions? If not, he must surely allow that the work does contain a grave
internal incoherence. The 'reservations' listed above hardly help. For how
can Aristotle, if he holds the intellectualist view of the self, himself recom-
mend the practical life as any sort of human flourishing? (That others will
not accept that view is neither here nor there.)

SUMMARY

To sum up, this is a lively and important contribution to the understanding

of Aristotle's ethics. (For other recent works on the same topics see [1] - [1 1].)
Some of his theses need further refinement and clarification. But he has
written a book full of argument and interest. It contains and should provoke
good discussion of good questions.

REFERENCES

[1] Ackrill, J. L., Aristotle's Ethics (London: Faber and Faber, 1973).!
[2] ,"Aristotle on Eudaimonia" (Dawes Hicks Lecture), Proceedings of the
British Academy 60(1974): 3-23.
[3] Allan, D.J., "Aristotle's Account of the Origin of Moral Principles,"Proceedings
of the XI International Congress of Philosophy, 12(1953): 120-7; reprinted in [4].
[4] Barnes, J., Schofield, M., Sorabji, R. (eds.) Articles on Aristotle (2. Ethics and
Politics) (London: Duckworth, 1977).
[5] Etheridge, S. G., "Aristotle's Practical Syllogism and Necessity," Philologus
112(1968): 20-42.
[6] Irwin, T. H., "Aristotle on Reason, Desire, and Virtue,"Journal of Philosophy
72(1975): 567-78.
[7] ,"First Principles in Aristotle's Ethics", in Midwest Studies in Philosophy,
edited P. A. French, T. E. UehlingJr., and H. K. Wettstein (Minnesota: 1978).
[8] Nagel, T., "Aristotle on Eudaimonia," Phronesis 17(1972): 252-9.
[9] Rowe, C., "A Reply toJohn Cooper on the Magna Moralia," AmericanJournal of
Philosophy 96(1975): 160-72.
ox [10] Sorabji, R., "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue,"Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society 74(1973/4): 107-29.
[11] Wiggins, D., "Deliberation and Practical Reason," Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 76(19756/:29-51.

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