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The Dialectic of Duration GASTON BACHELARD Translated and annotated byMary McAllester Jones Introduction by Cristina Chimisso CLINAMEN PRESS = 2000. 80 The Dialectic of Duration Meee fre, Gaon Balt Subeise Haminse, Teth en Roclny Aldson open os eA ed av hls pe gsr mane foe shee nunimpe cu eres’ mfnen ey amp ome os ‘SOE DN US teetering me opie Lino Pon, hr ado et ee TORE fe on tm st et mone dere. Snide free deme tp on cae Ho amorous arent "Gerda tact ha os veneer cme ilk acing hm So st ae ‘Sami fue Chapter Four Duration and intellectual Our intention in taking the problem of temporal effectiveness into the domain of physics was simply to confront possible ‘objections and to conform to philosophical custom: tis in fact sual to wanr time to he, to begin with, an objective power and ‘ro sce movement as giving us the clearest measure of duration fe seemed 10 us that in this domain itself, cemporal links were beither a strong nor as uniform or general as they are said to be. ‘The thread of time has knots all along it. And he easy continuity of trajectories has been torallyeuined by microphysics. Reality does not stop flickering around our abstract reference points. ‘Time with ts small quanta twinkles and sparks Teis noe though by reflecting on physical phenomena that we can realy fel the metaphysical duality of duration, In abject ia fact, breaks remain accidents and clude all attempts to systematise ‘hem. lo higher psychic activity, breaks are on the contrary insepas able from reasons; or beter, tke small variations in energy involved in higher psychic activity being about new ideas. Here wwe can say that small variations have great effects, Our mind, i its pure activity, is an ulkra-sensitive time detector. Te is very ood at detecting the discontinuities of time, For cis to happen, all we need do is turn aside from all practical chores and all social cars, and listen to time's cascades within us. Furthermore, physical or physiological phenomena would always teach us to submie to time and be an object among ‘The Dialectic of Duration cobjccrs, A whole aspect of the phenomenology of time is ‘obscured when we limit ourselves (0 reflecting on the develop tent of phenomena, Theie kinematics can so easily be deserved thar we come co believe that their dynamic character is less Certain, less general, and more concealed. fw actual fact, the history of science shows fairly cleasy that dynamics is added ro kinematis as secondary and derived knowledge, which is harder and mote fallacious. Yet if we leave objective refleeion and come to our own innermost expetience, everything changes and what as obscure ‘Becomes cleat: the experience of ner dynamics now moves (0 the foce while that of our movements seems derived and secondary. From chis standpoint, movements seem to us t0 be simply the consequences of our decisions, aking into consideration ~ which ie vey important ~ the difficulties of earying, out our decisions. ‘West not noglect this very fist and wholly intellectual aspect cof the difficulty of our acts, It is this aypec that ean best teach vs tour active time, In any case, when the dynamic and the kine atic are studied in ourselves they should give two very different Jimpressions of time. ‘And there is, more besides. la us, the dynamic initially appears inthe form of impulses, jerks, and rushes of felings here ina discontinuous forss. And to illustrate the dialectic of the continuous and the discontinuous in relation to time, the implests perhaps to confront our movements and the origina border of the will that governs them. The dualism of the eon: Cinuous and the discontinuous is then homologous with the ‘Guallm of things and the mind, Having already argued in a previous chapter that continwous effort is behaviour that is Eccondary, learned and difficult, we need only look now atthe impulse in its dynamic aspect as an active clement, Yet if Continuous movement is a physiological consequence and if che sscntial element of an act is the impulsey i it nor in the Srmanisation of impulses that the control of intelligent action Shust be sought? We should therefore establish, as Paul Valery hav so well put it, a algebra of acts. An action thus appears as having 2 nevessanly complex formula with many arsculacios, land hosing between the impulses well-defined dynamic relations. Duration and wntellectul eesality 8 I devdranBebonie theories Qumfctonbrppns a te ede ian im he mi tar nt Cay conmdloony acon and Serine se Silo cnc syecioget ied tare fevealeleetvene dernier sce 0 iy aang se ple of reg nd il ha no ‘ier ft auesecent edt ose cul be ade of thy ey Uereminedcecverc, which bs derady veo te level of the wil A Sil pce Is one that has ben ected. I tanages coer. UE os aot low cer ey ow say OF txplde ie proveds by making mal wry peste movercs Wh consousness ol thee comes sn cnr geometry that i necenany compoued of sraght hes ad ede a cone De wie & has as a per oul W conse Guntiy. doe ts ben to erase the davon ofthe ising proces and ves unin the wos aid acon Sl thus onthe cone) arp the fandom Mercy of er Soremens ris Lalsldotope. eis tal quate. Grace icine me fr crc wa embroidery asaiaton, Sil mist ot amuse el And why oot el dic coals etry is eer Sxpoang i einded rus akin moving aay from te pur arta of separate wil From tu nandpon, these carves with th iy ilecons arenes of leacr tough, of ser mera ie Ty appene vie here saben wht he conus being ie ml on ‘anguihed by extemal estances These crves cold doen beregarded as more natal bar cis perly te prot that thy rue ls conlounen let spersion andes mental inp Fr kil nae bth within sand ouside set and 84 ‘The Dialectic of Duration foremost an obstacle. Ie isthe innermost obstacle especially that sakes skill areal energetic controversy, areal dialectic. Rignano has very perceptively indicated this fandamental dualism in the perfecting of cern skilful movements. Let us for instance look again, as be does, atthe skills involved in a game of billiards; we shall sce this psychologist concerned not with peripheral descriptions af effort, hu instead with describing the contrat scructure, just tthe leve! ofthe dialectic of more and les: The billiard player who has already aimed ie cue atthe balls impelled above all bythe desire to make his stroke and he prepares binsel for his. But too much tension in his acm muscle leads him to fear making too song 2 stroke as he has aleady dene a short time before this then thanks to this antagonistic actity bi smumcls rel a Title. But the lescing of tesion thac the player the felting place which in its ttn iinet the memory af some presious stoke he bunsled by nor giving te bliaed alla suFScient rr of speed, agelkens the contrary fe i hie of sing too weak a force. The co a fro moverints as his sem bring he tip of the eve ether closer to or farther from the ball before the stroke i made will be seen by somenne watching the game a8 Feflectig the very wife succession of config festings produced fone after the other. These feelings grows weaker or stronger by tums in order to seach the end result of imparting the required force coche ball? Rignano has only studied the quantcaive framework of ms cular energy here; but he has clearly shown that the intelligent tse of strength needs te contrary reference points, more and less. He has also clearly show that the impression carried tothe centre for an over-tense muscle determines, through teflection, a relaxation that is exactly the opposite of the action prepared by physiological causality. Physiological causality ought not 10 wait; if ought to initiate the stroke that is too steang. Yet feflection imposes an interval of inaction and then an apposite conclusion, The aetion takes place through a contradiction, Skilful willis never good will in order eo ac, skilful wil has to 0 through had will Skil can really not be conctived as some ‘hing unitary, taking place in an unbroken duration, We do not really have at our disposal a substantial, positive, and unified Duration and intellectual causality 8s memory that would allow us to reproduce exactly a skilful action. We must first weigh up contradictory memories and achieve the balance of opposite impulses. These discursive opeta sions make time uneven; they break the continuity of natural development. There can be no real cerainty in the success of a skilful action without consciousness of errors that have been «liminated. Then thoughe time takes precedence over lived time and the dialectic of reasons for hesitacing ix transformed into a temporal dialectic, a1 Ewe domo always the mpocance ofthe role played by the pestaton impose by ttletion a the hel of ato the isbecse we rarely soy the pocholoy of scans which have been wel lene and well undercooe and which ae fly conscious of tee sors Usaly infact we endeavour sane Al to ink the psychology of ineligentbehavons to that of behaviour thas more of less instinctive, more oes ata Ths is no doubea uct thing to do. Yet in making the ony thing psychology dors, we maybe leo direnar the pete meaning of eerain problems. In parscuae, ara ction, asin that i marked by rection is ofen ation with no Simul or even agains the tims, o imply when there a stimuls. esheets introduces 2 whole range of wmlstng events in which she mont diverse casas nerfee, We th Begin tose how a whole psychology of mena iberaton could worked ou by disemanging all these itererences In onder to stay the fs stage ofthis ibertion from the emul, we cou look gain a exesthing Rian bast sa abou senses that act without making any contact, a trom the sent howl ofthe word of bjs, We would setae thee snes fst ater ave veto the prt sate of am acre senkeney that inte and bein suspense’ (49) Here ee Iuvea kindof als equlibium uniting oppostes ad peeing hus been well prepared; ur lee wating to be implemented. Seong fom as sags, which sil ently poynilopea we 6 The Dialectic of Duration realise that what initiates action is not just the effecuation of physiological coincidences. There has to he permission to act, and the mind mos lend its fall support co being. We only fel this support, we only feel the mind's presence, in the repose that precedes action, when the possible and the real are clearly com pared. The mind's suppor is therefore strictly contemporaneous ‘with an impulse or beter, with a kind of impulse, the impulse of an absolute beginning. Consequently, while in its elementary form behaviour relative co beginning was still dependent on objective signs, in a purely intellectual form the will to begin appeas in all its gratuitousness, and is fully conseious of is Supremacy over the mechanisms that have been set in motion. The physiological eauses ofthe sequence of actions cannot there fore be confused with the psychological causes of is initiation. A philosophy thar erases this duality in eauses i based on a danger ‘ous metaphysics, on & unity that isnot sufficiently discused Were our criticism accepted, we would suggest that schema of initiating acts should double every moxor schema. The psychology of 2 compesite action could not in fact be eaught tanles the order and dynamic importance of decisive instants had first en fixed, The action will then be execoted mote ot less suifly, Order thus dominates duration. Order really gives 1 the algeia of action: the figure Follows from it. An analysis sinus of active instants can disregard the length of the intervals just asthe arabs situs of geometrical elements disceyards their ‘magnitude.’ The only thing that counts 8 the way they are {grouped, There s thus the causality of order, the causality ofthe troup. We are all the more aware of the effectiveness of this Causality as we move higher up towards aetions chat are more composite, more intelligent, and thar we Keep under close sucvellance ‘When a motor schema is seen robe dominated by its schema of initiating acts, it is s00n nothing mote Haan an unconscioas| system. Its functioning can be slowed down or impeded by tiredness, wear and tear, and illness, and Bergson has proved with great clarity that these kinds of destruction do nae in any ‘way ental the ruin of pure memories, Our conception of a rationalised memory, made more alert by the elimination ofall Duration and intellectual causality 8 memories of duration so that only the memory of the order of cloments is preserved, would lead us ro conclude that pure ‘memories remain valid not just in chemselves but in their grouping. The schema of initiating acts would allow us +0 become aware of the preservation of composite memories, of fonctional memories. We can also understand that a schema of imitating acts is able to eransfer its power from one mind to another. Through this schema, we suggest, we keep close watch and we command. The importance of this action of interpsycho- Jogy must not be underestimated since this aspect is reflected in very human being, and an inner dialectic of command and execution makes us see very clearly within ourselves the supremacy of willed time ove lived time. Vv Iris in fact when we become aware of the order of initiating acts that we achieve self mastery in a complex, cfficult action, When We entrust ourselves inthis way to che supremacy of intellectual over physiological causality, we are protecting ourselves from indeesion and mastering the hesitation to which every detail of the act could give ise. Te whole isin command of the parts Rational coherence gives cohesion to development. For instance, 4 Jong speech will be held together by the cational coherence of its wellocdered reference points. Should there be a moment when language is unclear, or when an obscure detail or an anacoluthon‘ in expression occurs, the confusion will only be short-lived and will not destroy the continuity of the whole. The plan ofthis speech acts as a unifying principe, asa formal cause. Teas schema of initiating aces. Ii held in the mind through a whole which is made up of brie, simple signs. Moreover, this orarorical schema provides an excellent illustration of the causality of order. We also know that a whole speech can be distorted when the order of two arguments is reversed, even when these arguments are very independent of ‘one another. In the same way, we realise when we think about it thar what makes the bes inks is not a continuity that advances, by degrees, shar is contemporaneous with real and more or less 88 The Dialectic of Duration contingent develont Looking hs rua cont TTnligent audience that cannot cally appeeiat incest onuuity. No, good links are tow: etasbed between at ‘Sone nbch a clealydstigoiched and earculy caters saNecodance with the amiable peincple of dialed Tanignaum so well expressed in Jacques Maritain’ maxim Phe action, thought, and spech are gathered in this way Of mpention shat very ebviusly cosmands the subordinate cae ae etree ana eration tht ete loi and Senet need» Gpnate gua Te brings with trai. This pon fiw we to afoot, Expt ySheiogy no dou takes many measurements of reaction Paar iene snaps concer ellen sors at I dos Shee problems see fest. This duration of compotion ae cg bette wings nousand neat SERIE Mich sow te down, and in prtcuar interes of tree or noncalanceherween the composing ats sem 10g tab sho, th cnt of omen sean vagal an we do ntti of bringin ou its psychic ale a8 see oven ve comidr te pgches cary cea Tiana oat asm contin Ad ei wee Tg to retest on ourselves, weal soon be avare ofa ¥ry ws cnc tea bye spiey of cue aan Cetin the stage in» wellmade acgument. Ts ity wot ust sped. also has the characteristic of ease, creas nnd momentum, characteiics which could give + cane maning wa Waly specific Kind of energy hat ih Wa be cted rational energy. This dynamin of understanding wales snaconanes of th poscaon of form, We are 20 se tea drs aaemptand do not at fist ee its vale trctecua causality mse indeed be stn place. This dynam weeapceaneaus with anew bepaning. 1 therefore Duration and intellectual causality 86 serueture and construction. Ie is a cause that has the ability to start all over again after it has had ts effect. Iisa rhythm. We master it by preparing the succession of intellectual events, artaining in this way what is euly succession in itself, totally emptied of the durations of development and expression and relieved, as far as itis possile to be, of the burden of all physiological obligations. All psychological durations, sly represented as they are incarefully thought out convictions, are constituted in this way, thanks co the heterogeneity of form aiid content and to a rational law that experience endlessly confiems. Durations are frst of al jormed. They are fleshed out and filled later. What is in them is rot always what really constitu them, At the very most, the apparently continooos ducation of the subordinate psyche, the monotonous and formless psyche, consolidates the more broken form of intelligent thoughts and actions, broken by all its lacunae. Yer willed order remains quite plainly the antecedent temporal reality. When we ignore this essential distinetion, we lack the hierarchical principle we need in order to analyse temporal knowledge correctly. We do not see thatthe story of & journey is a funetion of is geography. [eis not possible to describe something properly sf we do not already possess pre- ‘existing principle for finding reference points. Nor sit posible to describe cemporal psychology if we do not give decisive instants theie major causality A theory of filling of this kind does not moreover mark a rerum co a metaphysics of fillnes, since there is always the heterogeneity of conraine and contained and also the supe macy of the form. The fundamental nacure of this duality will pethaps be berter understood from examples of temporal ‘onsolidacion in whick the heterogeneity of comtainer and con tained is especially clea. In dealing with this problem, we shall draw on a theory of consolidation developed by Dupréel in work that is of great significance. This theory provides us with good examples of the aetive constitution of duration, It shows very early that ducation is nota datum but something that is made, ‘We shall devote a chapter ro this theory in arder to preserve its “The Dialectic of Duration Notes, eins vader of Begon's i of 1 Wirh hie cfeene ro gee acl capes rs pestis of has Ei a es SEiconcetony esha sn Backlad soomes Patasot pce nthe ronal ore oe wt ary pelo, the seme of place whch us tbe 8 en Reason phoma properties of geomerse obit Sea a i por and mage. Te homology fo whkh Backlad re book om ses olny RRR nad ac of gamma eure Chapter Five Temporal consolidation 1 Dupréel’s argument starts feom the same point as ours feom the opposition of instants and intervals. In other words, he distin {gulshes berween the rime we reuse and the time we use, berween ‘the one ha time which is ineffective, scattered in @ cloud of disparate instants and on the other, time which is cohered, Drganised, and consolidated into duration, Dupréel righty takes eto be a fact both fundamental and patent that when we describe the psyche temporally, we have to postulate lacunae. Weecan subsequently study how these lacunae are filled, and we can claim that they were made to be filleds obviously chough, a void must be postulated between the successive states charac+ terising the psyche's development, even if this void may be simply a synonym for the difference between states that are Uifferensiated. Thece is moreover a metaphysical reason that backs up this methodological need for intervals dieectly oF indirectly, we must give way t0 finality, chat is to say ro the determination of the present by a furuze which is by no means close and to which we ascribe above alla certain depth. If we are ready to accept the existence of a hierarchy of active instants we shall come, quite naturally, ro accept the fundamental reality of 2 temporal framework. The adapration of subordinate psychic events to this framework will thus be a recurtent adaptation. This kind of adaptation with its orderly sequence and strict hierarchy will not be subject t0 the objections raised to an 2 ‘The Dialectic of Duration adaptation satis continuous and obscure, in which doce i hothing to indicate the importace payed by stant thi ae really aie. Ii akin eo that aapuation through the formal CGuse which is fundamental to Bergiow's theory of cestie Crt ihe meee adaption to Dope toy describes ae consolidating ta mos hough provoking books! Anyone rection Dupré's method il Soon be convinced by the clay that fara examples bring Suc ae be ncaa yo eng of wer mm gi on wth out owe appareny porloce mcod, whi tmouno explaining the ower by the higher and lived ae by thonght nef Dypeel takes cetain soil forms tbe "he biel nits ascent ste’, thon we may be correct fe carrying outa sini eevera vith reference tthe psychology of drain and in ae tat ho ve ned nen tascerestnoher words, tonghr is ahways fn some rrp 2 tryng-out of ora fiat move towards atew ie, an attempt co ie rete ve more oer Smel haga all cogo beyond ie, Wve tink snc mean hae place Hein 2 ramework ie doce not mean We take a particular aspect fie that wil be beter understood the longer we have ined. Ths alton always means intending to ive diferendy. ro reciy Bi frat and enrich it later Thus ccm hla, and srt steal. We sal sets vo moments of ediar soon in cles apparent ase flow Dupes piesophy oftime which nw simple yer te sue cme so profound 1 1 we are o understand Duprée's book properly, the best thing ista star withthe image he has suggested inorder co define that hich coexistence consolidate’ since the latter will also be very halptul in enabling us to grasp the reality of “that which suce ‘cession consolidates’ in whieh we are especially interested Generally speaking, whenever something i made chee are wo very clear scesive states: ist ofall dhe parts of he objec tobe Constructed ace assembled and placed in the onder in which they should emai. Ath pont thongh, this onder ely saintained Temporal cossolidation 93 by external and provisional means. Only in a second, defnive sate will the parts themselves, tough an internal scons keep the posiion in relation to each other that inthe niched ‘objet. When for instance a crate is tobe male fat @ fv moments ‘tis the makers hands which hold the pieces of wond agar cach ‘other that hei going to nal. Once these have bees hanameed the erate hold ogee allby itself thas gone fem te ett the Second of the two states to whose sascession we have just eer ‘This clearer sil inthe mauleing process he dusty of te in this proces is marked by the dualcy ofthe mould and the objece ‘hat is moulded. Before the cement poured i, the abjeces pasts ate already place inthe correct order bt the force msitaaing ‘this onde is external to them, isthe soicty ofthe mould. ‘We thus pass from an ephemeral ocder ro one chat lass, from an catiely estemal and contingent order 1 one that is internal aad necessary. Dupréel therefore puts forward his argument con: seeming that which succession consolidate Sito he evs shac what happens with regatd to spatial relations also happens with regard to emporal ones? Are not cera orders sf secesion frst ected by an extemal cause and te later come to hold togeher, that isto say come 10 tepredaceshemecloe rough an ineeraction of conditions wich is less forego the, ‘through «cause which as in some way become internal? ip. 36) This very pertinent question imniediately suggests to us the Frossiility of a theory of che gradual interioisation of life and thought. in our view, this kind of inside made from the outside — the very opposite of what happens wisen a substance expands ~ &s particulary suited o giving us the schema ofa duration thas ‘enriched wich events and that constitutes distinc emaporal realities Let us therefore see the constitution of all that succession consolidates, of all hese abjecte of the psychology of duraton let us see how duration is moulded in precise temporal forms, Here again, the best ching is to stare with the very simple, very clear example that Dupréel gives Industry inthe tre sense of che term, the acvity of humans who are asiociated and directed by sii, fumishes uw at once with ‘xamples of ching that swecesion consolidates, A clock simpy and solely one ofthese. By the time the person whe made eink 4 The Dialectic of Duration shout setting it correctly already something that coexistence Consolidates and that in addition has now to be made imo Something succession consolidates. For the finger of the clock to ove round the dal tice every day, no more and no les, the clockemaker mute peed up ores low down the locks king in accordance witha cheonorneter that is elf adjusted tothe eats rotation, Hers, the extemal onder of suppor is the earth the chronometer, andthe clock-maker all combined, Once. the movement has been duly perfected, the order to. whieh i Cortespori has become internal tothe mechanism the operation thar cransiers and fixes has been completed and an order of ssxcestion has been consolidated. This order has indced been hroughe from the outside, going from the whole ro the par. ‘We can now find this process of temporal consolidation every time an order stabilises, be this in sociery, memory, or reason. “Thus Dupréel shows us tha che transition from a social custom to-a truly moral dictate rakes place through consolidation: the ‘external order of intereses has been replaced by the internal trder of conscience’, Intriorisation is again seen very clearly here, When we mave on to the prychology of individuals, interiorisation may well be harder to discern, bue if Dupré's schema is kept in mind we shal, even so, be able to see it at work, For example: When children learn a fable by hear, they frst find the order ofits lines on the pages of thei eader, Everytime memory fails hem, they glance at the texts they read and bic by bit every lacuna disappears from ther memory. The onder ofthe printed! word Ihanhed Knowing mean chat we have learned the order of what swe know was fest upheld hy a force exzeral to our understanding, the at having consolidated ths order for il thus making any external pattern supertuous (p19 We can sce very plainly here that ordet is not purely and simply registered bur reconstructed svth a faithfulness which has been thought out and willed, and sustained by reasons for coherence which are specific 10 the learner. Were we to take examples ‘where the mind is more free, we wosid see that consolidation takes place on more subjective hierarchical bases. Temporal consolidation 9s A whole theory of kuowledge could easily be developed by ‘emphasising the process of consolidation. We would see in particular that, as Dupréel points out in a note, induction is a Consolidation of experience and deduction a consolidation of induction. This general application would, we believe, also lead to. conclusion we wish fo indicate: all the means by which we consolidate, however artificial they may appear, are in the end tatitely natural, They seem artificial to us because we still se in them the mark of our own effort; We indeed feel thatthe giver comes to usin temporal and spatial disconnectedness, or at least that its original solidity is shattered by the very slightest peecise tse, we therefore come to consolidate the givens we consolidate itin our own way, using mnemonic methods and rational ones equally. We readily accuse these attempts 10 consolidate of {forming natuce. In making this kind of enticism, we do nor see that nature always needs to be formed and that it seeks forms through human activity, in fact. If, as we ought, we put human activity back into aature’s ine of action, we shall acknowledge that intellect isa natural principle and that what is formed by teason is quite obviously formed by a force of nature. "We can therelore affirm that consolidation applies naturally in the realm of knowledge as in the realms of life and sosial autivity. This consolidation really does govern the constitution of forms. To he very exact iti the sum of formal and material fausality. We shall understand it sell better when we have refleced on this highly significant corollary stated by Dupréel there 1s only growth throug intercalation’. Wis impossible 0 tach to0 much importance to this principle which in our view fasts an unexpected light on all theories of evolution, AM chat frows is first enriched within itsell I is this inner enrichment that detecmines growth, Growth is bata consequence. As Dupréel says very perceptvely Life has not moved fom an ofigina nucleus cowards an indeterminate development; it acems to have resulted from an advance fom the external tothe icernaly from a state of dispersal fo a final state of consnuty. fe has never been ike a begining from which a consequence results, bu i a fom the fis ike a framework that i fille, of like an order that has gained in 96 “The Dialectic of Duration See ain. fecal roma Seacrest ie fae thar sches or indie ca Sati i et I lr cn eel might be remped 0 se this iatensive progres 3 2 Dee cary there noshing 3 all mserins abot i Ine very nana ons anoint cet and so speaks geomeiial. is develope resem (inal cre. dani eet, My thc comider a temporal stoner nts anal aque wl wot tise be cree to esse contin ae renccomiry oa temporal movement 0 be rely oa alan sre, thon the tees oust be eopAY vasa eed Without th neal organisation, he ors el ot Penne sppear ike sone failed. ist are at rg eontmey must thrcore always be upheld by Gel the come to dncove ave in cones Tefen te proces of somsolaton For Sea pete Jey of intercaly acts or ee hy regulating pense ercary nt apps. Basal ic drain and ae Mlonare no ver diesen types consi. Hour ee at digurbances oF temporal paeholY AS EP pencil nce scoring 0 whether the feamenorks ts eoitnd onto ate affeted or, onthe oer band to Sore gcrnalorgatsson of itera dtubed. There ee ls nde badypmychy: scoring whether he Tieeaempy arate shared by disordered organisation See ae cms tos tae tht metaphysics of com soldniee Sad inereaaton legates and completes ou tear nn a al pecs Cen mes ores form ana raced inecalon are eh £80 aera sheen a aleaherrs other soe act of ae gars nor patel and stp ade of scien fh ind oleae cy canbe renewed and cas constitea rece epoca ray Temporal consolidations ul In addition co chis actempr co describe the constitution of something succession consolidates, that is t0 say the determin: ation of a real temporal object, Dupréel’s philosophy also. ‘examines the precise nature ofthe fabric of ume. Here, Dupréel develops a critique of causality and reveals that itis, oF necessity, full of lacunae, He then shows the intervention of probability in the lacunae of the causal sequence. He thus prepares a renewal of probabilism to which we wish to draw attention, The founda- tions of is new probalilism wil be found in ewo works, a book and an article. Dupréel in face argues that beeween cause and effet there is alvways a necessary distinction; even when ths dstinetion would simply be the result of the aced 10 put forward two definitions 0 determine the 1wo phenomena under consideration, it would nonetheless sill establish the existence of logical distance. To this logical distance there always corresponds an interval of time. And this interval, even where causality is coacemned, is fundamentally diferent in essence from causality. Indced, it isin the interval of ime thar impediments, obstacles, and deviations can ingervene and these will sometimes shatter causal chains, This possibilty of intervention must be wholly rogacded as a pure possibilty and not as a reality we do not know. It is not because we do not know what will imervene that we fail co predict the absolute effectiveness of a given cause; rather, itis because there is between cause and effect an entirely probable intervention of events which are notin any way at al connected to the causal datum In particular, we shal never have the right to give ourselves the interval. In scienee, we ean consteucr certain phenomena, we can protect the interval from certain disturb- ances, but we cannot ger rid of every intervention of unforeseen phenomena inthe iaterval between cause and eect. We are well aware, up to this point, of the close connection | hetvion Dupréel’s ideas and those af Cournot.* Bur in Dupréel there is an added nuance which is decisive. Hecey what deter mines chance is not, as in Cournot, the accidental crossing of two causal lines which each have rigocous continuity. Indeed, ‘hanes conceived according to Cournor’s intuition would not is 98 “The Dialectic of Duration any way be opea to probability information; it would be pute atident, Dupeel’s theory sheds light which helps us te itulersund that the probable already stems from any causal chain taken in isolation: ‘Courat’s way’ of sexing is 00 dependent on tation ang rand al goes the impreaion that chance or the fortuitous is Mee slonts atacident, an that a the exception tothe rule dere ret ences of facts that are possible withodt i intervening, and sae ompete without. The fortuitoos fac is for him eetotuned by tw elements of another nature, by facts that are sere and by tice encounter. This is se preconception we mu east fonuitus is nota parasite of causality, its by eights a the very txtare of reality Seek all kaovem reality knowin inthe form of 2 seis of connect br concomitant event, that are peeved as cept Seenc ots came onder and betwcen which thee is am interval thats vars taken up by events of some kd or other, events te only sea cha the eas ofthe onda serie, we i no way reac seetay buconlyan abstract schema, since it is bad metaphysics 0 Teuate oad Bos brdge, as canal im ell woul be, which pul ain the end ofthese lsely together by missing ow the Mecmal of ane or apace dha is always there between the. fF" ‘contrary we say we can reach and define the pare interval thet egaay stand of reality beyond any ocdinal series im which is framed on with hich it contrasts, chen this would mean We were lung shadows: we cannot grasp bold of the indetesminate as Sch (La Case et Fonte, 23) Thus, Dupréel has no trouble proving that his argument takes proper account of al reality, that i to say of a one and Hesamne dime, cause and obstacle, fact and possibility, what happens and what could happen. If we onl stress the necessity veeaases and mentally get tid of accidents chat really do hamper he development of this necessity, then we are indeed going it forscholastiiem and realising an abstraction. Tf we rake 2 cause that in as effective as we could wish, there will always in the ‘fevelopment ofits effectiveness be free scope for possibilities of false or deviaions. We must take account of these possibilities ilove they are encountered, in the forms in which they are eee meered, aud inthe intervals in which they intervene so 850 rust take account of chem in the description of reason eee hin ini cl ane hou go sie the endl prob. py oil roby isc andthe thing ing are les ive in neces ha in a cineca can be expressed inthe form of laws which are apparently neces- ty aor denn (nthe annal probabil faces the iting budesoomstiags clearly seen, ordinal probability is clarified to some degree by the 300 “The Dialectic of Duration sconger than justany chance whatsoover, anda stronger ordinal Frobabiie i already an end. The evo eoneepes end and ordinal Probability are clover vo one another than cause and qnanified vrelabity are. With this new concept, many contests betwen Pralam and mechanisy grow blurred. Followers of Duprée!s Yfulonophy find i gives them schemas that are suficienty rreitle for them do understand the connections a the different sent f emergence. We shall now pose the problem in a shightly tifferent way by studying temporal superimposition eM. Dupe, Tid Mommrion sodtbogere (Reuse, 19st Basel Se EE chap ae fom ths book: he ant 308 PE 1 TEESE appears eo be ome of Boca’ neoerimss "ea Red Ae tyndans emg sow, Maca’ word ent Be A ea nich been (radar, «slowing of te on wainepae cradypesy a lowing fe digrtin Tee ei Fintraleon ordre rai rma 193 Meat Cada, Rechecie pfoeophaos, «(3934-5) Dacelnds LaF Same scr appated inthe ae vole ofthis our a cers was ounce i Pais 193%, and 4 8 Aer evans in posopy, ing petra eames eee Toone wake o Huse Pah ses of 929 2 Te eda treme 93, Bahl coud a and thee at ser relents in hs tooo to res Si ena ee floc example chap 6a 54 a a eee apps sahematician sc ghiloropber of Dacha ef in Cau [1803-771 who best knw fr bs ce a inapmaton of he cael of probs Chapter Six Temporal superimpositions 1 ie study the uestet of musi and pty fom he tnd pos of toe ne all se > rsogne erally ad tety iil eden lip cpt eat if we make o purely temporal study of phenomenology we shall sare wy cooler sew groups of stant, eral ape i Meee, easel eecnitteal ps ae bay wma now lave sewed to pjetios tat re ont Sie sins cnt are tanger yy ak portlarcmperinetl tne. Wh ely ase npr Socio Po cua, ceo teal me eat oe Scroond ve nd cms cece eo seq bet tat do hot however Key drtions Whisk ne ‘Sloe urn swe Even so the concep ef Saran ten ears ere coy rsa ob Al moremen The same nt tv in quan psc Hee she ascent col vias Onion es ns ee ee ee A ce pliner eco naming sun hry ufo he fact ewe exlaing change ust wun of dhngein pow oitkabou pu change we ceca Seem pss" a dad tame ¢ umes cage canheer be Coe Be tele be peumel tha the devlopmet shanti roa The Dialectic of Duration Temporal superimpositions 103 n ‘Were we to venture to relate our own views to a major theory, i is hece that we should recall » number of Hegel's themes, Our vvish having been to wrive as a teacher, teaching how co make a first attempt at sketching temporal waves, we did aot want £0 scart with metaphysics as difficule as Hegel's. We also feared that ‘ve would be accused of tending towards logicism and of having. a dialectic that was more logieal than temporal. And yet how inappropriate such an accusation is when we turn ro Hegelian ‘method! This is what Koyré has recently shown in a short article that is as good as a whole book. The concrete character of Hegelian idealism has never in fact been so well and so quickly ‘established: ‘Wha eget secks wo give us. by no means an analysis of the ‘doa of ee. Quite the opposite, itis the fdoa of ime ~an abstract, Empey iden ~ that Hegel undertakes to destoy by shosting and ‘escribing tous ow cme i comstted in the living reality of the ‘tind, Us this the destruction of time? Isis contruction? Both these terms are inappreprint, Ire nots matter of destroying, even Sialecteally, of of constructing eve a matter of ringing ove and ‘discovering and. not postulating hypothetically ~ in and for conssioasnes tel, the moments, stages, and mental acs in and through which the concept of time x constituted both in and for the mind (Hegel lena’ p. 444) Koyré goes on to show the actual, active character of Hegelian dialectics. The latte are not logical terms limiting one another and offering us, as from the outside, the contradiction of theie aims. It is indeed the mind that grasps itself in the two associated dialectical actions. This being 90, we can understand that it erying to move up co pure mental time we reach the regions of both inner contradiction and the contraction of being tnd nothingness, As the soul thinks of iself, it makes itself dope the attitude of refusal since it rejects objective kinds of thoughts it therefore goes back to nothingness within itself, returning to that fondamental disquict of the mind which Hegel has so clearly described. A forther lesson of Hegelian metaphysics is that in giving ourselves being by refusing being, our restoration is assuced, together with the automatie recovery of minimum 04 ‘The Dialectic of Duration repose. Lastly, the whole problem of the aggregation of slsporsel and disparate mental acts is posed in Koyre's striking conclusion here. In describing ‘the constitution of ime or more accurately the selF-eonstitution of the concept of time, Hegel does not envisage: an analysis ofthe idea of ime, an abstract ea ofan strat time, of the time we find in phys, Newnan time, Kanan sn, the stritylinen time of forme and of watches, Something le in ‘question here Time iell question, slong withthe mental fealty f time. This time doesnot flowing uniform way, nor it hhomogencans medium through which we would ourselves flow isucther the munbec of movement or the order of phenomena. I ‘sencichmen if, and victory Tei el! mind and oncepe Here we glimpse the superimposition of concept and life of thought and tinie. Were we able ro make beautiful temporal figares from or psychic aetvity, i we could in other words really consolidate the emporal structures of the mind, there is sno doubt that we would ease that Hegelian disque born at the level of mental time with the awareness of how dificult ics so remain at this level. This disquiet does nor have its roots in life, for submission to life at slower leel, tothe flimsy continuities of instiness, would ar once erase ir and would give us that lower form of repose in which we cannot cemain when once we have Iefti, Ie indeed the prerogative of thought to ease this disquiet and grant us tre repose. Our sense of a duty to seek the higher, rare and pare shythms of mental life is therefore einforeed. far We shall thesefore try to explore superimposed times psycho logically. Simply because they donot have che same principles of sequence, thought time and lived cime cannot be postulated as being naturally synchronous. Theres a kind of vertical relativity that gives pluralism to mental coincidences and that is different from the physical relativiey which develops at the level whese there is the passage of things. It is very haed to define this cohesion of chineidences hut a number of psychologists do have some inkling of it. Thus, Alexandre Mare writes that: Temporal superimpositions ner Pragati a apt wo pri the pracy of ation win cat kc scone cy we el Sti amounts tothe ae thing edie the pene ie alone. From this pnt of view, no ese dsc ca te Snel bever mats at ins’ Now, wast ft ‘sin animal ‘acti ts posits detest ali o mate rats an co oppoe ina word ha eat Simension™ nich isso te dine of he ine he Soper 8 bth te pry rial nd he indie Gul fhe eal pen een te nase nah This Hine running perpen to the emporl ais fife alone ‘scape, fo expand and depen which have vette led othe Preset instant beng ikned oan etry. ‘Work by Sra and Gehste to which Minkowski has so tievly dev seen cleat show ean omegueces of this temporal superimposition. Basing hima. on Howin wal’ dissin beeen immanent tte and tame te, or mare simply heewees the ine ofthe self andthe ane ofthe word, Minkowski exablshes the daly a equencraa well the ery arial relations of dependence going lm oe eso the oer, Even in noc i thr mayb cond eve thm, Somethin ofthe sal scm lave han the tie othe wei tl we hao ‘pri chin pang est eee fll jo omens onthe conay te ine sf chee ran meu hh ft worn nals nee ‘Ste are gloom sardenarnas kes al Were we 0 see hb as bi rie ana of he ting of langue shae makes us “ind ane soo longs we would no Rave fly supe Minkowski ition. We ae not nat deg wh an ton hee but with a pochlocal fealty evden the analysis of pathologal cats Thum some wuts of ee retous depron the coma Bete the wo snodes of rime scones strkng lr, immanent rime sems to go markedly more slowty a eveg 0 top, and this meaifstion of temporal sactce comes to he 106 The Dialectic of Duration inserted between on the one band the underlying biological disturbance and on the ther the eurent clinical symptoms i Strauss view, tis mosiication the diect consequence OF the biological disturbance, which eee consists of an inhibition. Iescems that in some way, such patients are disconnecting, They make a perpendicular escape from the duration of the world. In forder to set immanent tne in motion, particular rhythms of ‘ansitive time are then needed. The ease of a woman patient of Strauss s very instructive in this respect, for she ‘only felt time move forward when she was doing hee khtting™. Vv Let us now offer an example of superimposed time taken from ‘our own experienc; it comes from a dream in whose stcucture ‘we can distinguish between the different kinds of superimposed ‘ume and the parts they each play. Thad houpht a house, and I fell asleep one night thinking. of some of the things still 0 be done. In my dream, my continuing worries meant that I met the ‘owner of my old home. took the chance thecefore of telling him bout my new acquisition. I spoke kindly as [was about to give him a piece of had news; could anyone fail vo repr the loss ofa philosophier-tenan, one who is ever content and uncomplaining, ‘who combines all the integrity of a moral principle with a hermits frugality! Then slow, and with a skill that revealed the striking continuity of capitalist cite within ms, of which I was entirely unaware, [suggested to my landlord all the many ways in which we might mutually agree ro end the contract binding tus. Fspoke at some lengrh, with sweet words of courtesy and persuasion, My little speech was well organised the face that my aim was clear meant that my arguments were produced at texactly the right moment. Suddenly, I looked at the person 10 svhom [ was speaking; he was now listening to me very calms, and he was not my landlord. He had certainly been my landlord to begin with, this realised theovgh some strange kind of recurrence; he had then been my landlord in his younger days, and afterwards had turned into someone progressively more different until I suddenly eealised thar I was telling all this toa Temporal superimpositions 307 complete strange. Thi pie of bungling on my part annoyed tres much that ew nto epee ove this Be ence of ty absemmindedacm and ofthe temporal dsords tat Thad Allowed to ocr within me ae 2 rest of my having oper imposed tine’ Twas awoken by the anger hat 50 of, noe dreams, dupes and shes time Do we need any free proof that verkl tie and visual tine ae infact only spermponed and tht ino deca, they are independem of exch ther? Vsual tine pase mote sviy, and iis foe this reason that hey allow of stop, Had Seenablenot only oe myc fn ancl wore ta speedup what I wos seping would have rated com plete synchronism with what was happening vnaly Dest ie indeed extremely changeable horeomaly, that ito ay slog plane ofthe rma cveryday incidents of, yerenen ‘2smy dream would alent have tained is eral Conran, that to say the form of normal everyday coinldenge In ay convesaion wih the sarge who tok my inns place ‘rou have chosen words which were appropriate. would not have continued with my sory: I woul have modifi my com, fence the moment my confide bean to chang, Te we agree to analyse complex dreams from the standpoint of thse diferencs interpol rte, shal Se tht Nee ich to be pained from the conept of superimpose sine Many dreams will eem incoherent simply natae there ft sen, scant las of coordination ween the ferent times tht we are experiencia Ir would apes tha sehen we sleep, our diferent mere cents purse tel own feronomous development and that they ae i ef ne detscrors each with fo independent shyt, Let 5 passing tha these lated detectors ae parca en temporal pastes. Indes een inthe peace repose Beings have the feting tha ars of my ban ar eraeling a8 the calls Were exploding or sme Kind of partial death were rehearsing its dates we consider time nthe conte of calllar acy, we most ce that scone tothe time of toth o an amc, ny coincidence her being exept When likes Behe he whole of our brain comes toil te 108 The Dialectic of Duration statistical time chat restores both regularcy. and slowness. ‘Moreover in waking life reality offers grounds for agreement. Reality makes what we see wait for what we say, and asa result of this we have objectively coherent thought, a simple super: imposition of two terms which mutually confirm one another and usually suffice o give an impression of objectivity, We then say what we see; we think wha we say time is tealy vertical and yeti also flows along its horizontal course, beasing with i the different forms of our psychic duration, all according to the same rhythm. Dreaming is the very reverse of this, for it dlisengages these diferent kinds of superimpased eime - We have probably now adduced sufficient evidence, evidence drawn moteover from sufficiently heterogeneous sources, © hhave some kind of certainty chac with this temporal superimpo. sition, we are touching wpon a natural problem. Let us suggest shen how we personally would wish to direct research in order to solve this particular problem, ‘The cemporal axis that lies perpendicular to cranstive tie, othe time ofthe world and of matter, isan axis along which the sell can develop a formal activity. Ieean be explored if we froe ourselves from the matter that atskes up the self and from the sells historical experience, in order to consolidate and sustain aspects of she self which are progressively more formal, and Which are indeed the uly philosophical expeciences of tha sl The most general and the most metaphysical method of approach would be build up tiers of different kinds of cogito We shall rerurn later 1o particular examples of ehis that are closer to everyday psychology. Let us now turn without further elay 10 chis actempt 10 create a compound metaphysics, compound idealism, which will put in the place of I think, therefore Ime the affirmation that I think that I think, therefore am, We can see even now that existence as itis averred by the cogito coguters will be much more formal than existence as iis implied by thought alone; if eventually we can manage to revel What we really are when we first establish ourselves in the 1 Temporal superimpositions 109 think that I think, we shall be less inclined to say that we are ‘a thing which doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denic, wills, refuses, which also imagines and fecls.* We shall thus avoid sectling into a phenomenal existence which needs permanence in order to be conliemed. The Cartesian og slscursive for it is entirely horizontal, and his fact has been ‘made abundantly clear by Teissier du Cros in an article that we ‘consider to be quite unusually profound. He argues that: 0 is necessarily between the Fad thea, there isthe relation of afiemation and confirmation, Where the self is concerned, the judgement of fnistence is, the end 2 repetition: if we take ber a them from the Same standpoint that of reaies, and compare the spect ‘experince of the self withthe specific experience nf this wl besa tobe the stme thing a this” i however we can cise ro the I think that F think, we shall already be foe of phenomenological descrpiion. I, consinaing lice further, we reach the F1hink that I think that dhinks which will be denoted by (cogito), then separate, consccutive exist. «ences will appear in all thei formalising power. We have now embarked upon a noumenological description which, with a ltce practice wil be shown ro e exactly summable in the present instant and which, by vietue of chese formal coincidences offers 1 the very first adumbration of vertical time What we are doing here is nor in fact thinking ourselves thinking someching, but rather thinking ourselves as someone ‘who is thinking. Indeed, with this formalising actvie, we worch the person being born. This formal personalisation takes place along an axis whose direction is entcely opposite to substantial personality, the personality that i supposedly original and deep, although in reality it is encumbered and weighed dawn by passion and instinct and imprisoned by transicive time. Along the vertical axis we are suggesting, being is made mind in accordance with the degree of its awareness of this formal activiey, of the power of the cogita itis using, and also of the highest exponent of the compound cogita to which it can go in its atempted liberation. Were we to overcome the difficulties surrounding the frst severance, and then reach for example (cogito! or (cogito}t, we should immediately recognise the great ne The Dialectic of Duration value of this strictly tautological psychology in which being is really and tuly self-concerned, that isto say the value of repose. Here, thought would rest upon itself alone, I think the I think would become the I shink the I, this being synonymous with 1 am the I. This tautology isa guarantee of inscantaneiy. Tell however be asked in what way this sequence of forms cquire a specific remporal characte. It can do so because i is becoming, This becoming is doubtless peripheral to the hhecoming of things ond independent of material becoming. Clearly then, this formal hecoming rises above and overhangs the present instants latent in every instant that we lives ie ean shoot up like a rocket, high above the world and mature, high above ordinary psychic life. This latency is an ordered succes. sion. Any alteration in the order of the various tiers is incon ceivable, Ii we can be sure, a dimension of the mind. Someone is bound ro ask whether this dimension i infinite. ‘To draw such a conclusion would be to yield far too quickly 0 the seductions of logic and grammar. We therefore refuse to go oon lining up our subjunctive indefinitely. In particular, we refuse to imitate those writers who alk so vaguely about know ledge of knowledge. precisely because the subjective factor of formalisation is mot always clearly implicit in Anowledge of knowledge... in (knowledge)*. We ourselves have found. it exceedingly difficult, psychologically speaking, to. attain 10 [cogitoy*. We believe chat the true region of formal repose in which we woul! gladly remain is that of (cogito)”. From the researches into compound psychology which we shall be out Lining ater on, we shal se thatthe power of three corresponds to. state that i sufliciently now for us to have to exert ourselves considerably and for a long time there hefore we ean go beyond it and proceed with our construction. (Cogito) isthe frst really tunballasted stare in which consciousness of formal life brings ws a special kind of happiness ‘These different temporal levels can, in our view, be rather schematically and crudely characterised by a numberof different mental causalities. Thus, we consider that if cogito} is implied by efficient causes, then (cogito)* cam be ascribed to Final causes, since if we ace with an end in view, then we are acting with a ‘Temporat superimpositions ut thought in view while being ac the same time conscious that we see thinking that thovght, Only with (cogita)” will focmal ‘causality appear inal its purity. This division into things, ends, and forms will of course seem antificial to any linear psychology that seks to place all entities on the same level, making them prt ofa single reality, beyond which there can only be dreams and illusions. Yer the discursive, hierarchical idealism for which ‘we are arguing is not limited to this one realist point of view." I we take Schopenhaver’s fundamental axiom as our starting point and say thatthe world is my repeesemtation, then i seems aceeprable 10 attribute ends to the representation of represen ‘ation while forms that are constitvted in those mental activites which imply both things and ends must be actributed to the representation of the representation of representation. Psychologically speaking, if we follow the axis of liberation and free ourselves of all things material, we shall then no longer etermine our own being by refercing to things of even to thoughts, but rather by reference tothe form of a chought. The life ofthe mind will become pure aesthetics Finally, the time of the person, vertical time, is plainly discontinuous. Were we to attempr to describe the passage from tone power of the cog to the next a8 a continuous process, we should realise that we were placing it along the familiar axis of time, and by this we mean vulgar time. This would lead to a complete misunderstanding of temporal superimposition. We \Would be starting from the mistaken belie tat all psychological analysis is necessarily temporal, in other words that all psychological description is historical, and that it is because we are following the hands of the clock that we can successively think, then shiek shat we think, and then abink that we shink that tve think, We would be disregarding the principle of the fundamental instantanity ofall well-ordered foemalisaions. If wwe rake psychological coincidences not simply in the instant but also in their hierarchical form, we shall receive far mote from them than potential linear development, We remain enticely convinced that the mind thrusts far heyond the line of life Let us live temporally atthe power of three atthe level of

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