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Srilanka Economic Brief May 2010 - Aru - 8
Srilanka Economic Brief May 2010 - Aru - 8
SriLankaEconomicUpdate
EconomicPolicyandPovertyTeam
SouthAsiaRegion
TheWorldBank
SriLankaEconomicUpdate1
April2010
This economic update is being prepared almost one year after the civil war ended in Sri Lanka and as a
sense of buoyancy and optimism overrides the perilous macroeconomic situation of 2009. This update
makes three main points:
Despite entering the Global Financial Crisis in a weak macroeconomic situation, the Sri Lankan
economy has recovered rapidly. After contracting2 for two quarters (2008Q4 and 2009Q1), the
economy began growing again in 2009Q2. The rebound was aided by a post-war confidence-bounce,
declining interest rates, expansionary fiscal policy, and large inflows of foreign capital into
government securities as global financial markets thawed. The momentum continued through the
year: In 2009Q4 growth reached 6.2 percent; foreign reserves went to about US$5 billion (sufficient
for six months of imports; inflation was in single-digits, though gradually creeping upward, and the
current account deficit had declined to 0.5 percent of GDP, compared to 9.5 percent in 2008, as
imports declined much faster than exports. Remittances continued to grow briskly, increasing by 14
percent in 2009, compared to 2008.
Near-term growth prospects are strong. 2010 growth is poised to reach the 5-6 percent range as
private investmentswhich dropped 2.1 percent in real terms in 2009will recover, buoyed by low
interest rates. Private consumption is also expected to pick up, especially if inflation can be kept in
check. Reconstruction efforts in the war-torn northand more general economic expansion in that
regionwill also provide stimulus, as will implementation of several large-scale public infrastructure
projects around the country. However, the public sectors impact on growth will be constrained by
the need to reduce the large fiscal deficit, which reached 9.8 percent of GDP in 2009, pushing up the
public debt-to-GDP ratio to over 86 percent. Net exports are expected to be broadly growth-neutral
in 2010, although with a significant down-side risk because exports are expected to recover slowly,
depending on the speed of recovery in the global economy, while imports are likely to grow quite fast
as domestic demand increases.
Medium-term challenges rest on two key issues: enhancement of macroeconomic stability and
acceleration of economic growth. Sri Lanka entered the global financial crisis in a weak
macroeconomic situation with a high fiscal deficit, high debt-to-GDP ratio, and double-digit
inflation. Shoring up the fiscal situation is the most pressing macro-policy agenda item to ensure
economic stability and lay the foundation for future growth. The economic history of Sri Lanka is
replete with examples of crowding out of private investments, inflation spurts and exchange rate
volatility, which are detrimental to growth. A key task of the new government will be to reduce the
fiscal deficit, in particular by reversing the secular trend of a declining revenue-to-GDP ratio, which
dropped to 15.1 percent3 in 2009. The new government has set itself ambitious targets for economic
growth, raising it from the current long-term trend of 5-6 percent to, say, 8 percent. Reaching this
target would require a comprehensive policy response aimed at significantly increasing investments
(by raising domestic savings and/or attracting much higher levels of foreign capital), raising labor
inputs (by a combination of higher labor force participation rates, high employment and
improvements in the skills level of the labor force), and increasing overall productivity growth from
its recent level of around 2 percent per annum to at least 3 percent in the medium term.
Prepared by Claus Astrup, Daminda Fonseka, Francis Rowe, and Kirthisri Wijeweera.
In quarter-to-quarter, seasonally-adjusted terms.
3
Including grants
2
RecentEconomicDevelopments
AVshapedRecoveryfromtheGlobalCrisis
Economic growth rebounded strongly in the second half of 2009, confirming the projected V-shaped
impact of the global financial crisis on the Sri Lankan economy. Seasonally-adjusted GDP contracted in
2008Q4, and again in 2009Q1, before beginning to turn around in 2009Q2. In 2009Q3 the economy
expanded by 3.3 percent (q-o-q, seasonally adjusted), the fastest rate ever recorded since the Department
of Census and Statistics began producing quarterly national accounts, in 2002. Although growth
moderated in 2009Q4, at 1.8 percent, it remained above its historical average, suggesting that short-term
economic momentum remained robust. A variety of leading economic indicators confirm the strong turnaround (see the graphs below), including strong upswings in registration of new motor vehicles (an
indication of improving consumer sentiment), total electricity generation, which is closely correlated with
economic activity, and throughput in Colombo port, suggesting that trade and related services picked up
significantly The recovery was broad-based with most sectors showing accelerating growth rates (see box,
pg 3).
V-shaped recovery
20%
4.0%
QuarterlyGDPgrowth(qoq,seasonallyadjusted)
DomesticContainerThroughputinPorts(TEU,%change,yoy)
15%
3.0%
10%
5%
2.0%
0%
1.0%
-5%
-10%
0.0%
2008Q1
2008Q2
2008Q3
2008Q4
2009Q1
2009Q2
2009Q3
-15%
2009Q4
-20%
1.0%
-25%
2.0%
10%
Newregistrationsofmotorvehicles(%change,yoy)
20%
11/2009
ElectricityGeneration(KwH,%change,yoy)
8%
6%
10%
4%
0%
2%
10%
0%
2%
20%
4%
30%
6%
40%
8%
11/2009
10/2009
9/2009
8/2009
7/2009
6/2009
5/2009
4/2009
3/2009
2/2009
1/2009
12/2008
11/2008
10/2008
9/2008
8/2008
7/2008
6/2008
5/2008
4/2008
3/2008
2/2008
1/2008
12/2009
11/2009
9/2009
10/2009
8/2009
7/2009
6/2009
5/2009
4/2009
3/2009
2/2009
1/2009
12/2008
11/2008
9/2008
10/2008
8/2008
7/2008
6/2008
5/2008
4/2008
3/2008
2/2008
10%
1/2008
50%
12/2009
9/2009
10/2009
8/2009
7/2009
6/2009
5/2009
4/2009
3/2009
2/2009
1/2009
11/2008
12/2008
9/2008
10/2008
8/2008
7/2008
6/2008
5/2008
4/2008
3/2008
3.0%
2/2008
1/2008
-30%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
Agriculture
Industry
Source: DepartmentofCensusandStatistics
2009q4
2009q3
2009q2
2009q1
2008q4
2008q3
2008q2
2008q1
2007q4
2007q3
2007q2
2007q1
-2%
Services
Despite the strong recovery in the second-half of the year, overall growth in 2009 was subdued, as
both domestic and global demand fell. GDP growth in 2009 reached 3.5 percent, from 6.0 percent in
2008 and 6.8 percent in 20074. Growth declined as private demand slowed. Real private consumption
growth slowed to only 0.6 percent in 2009, from 2008, the lowest growth in private consumption in more
than a decade. The slowdown in real private consumption was partly the result of a delayed effect of the
erosion of households purchasing power due to a spike in inflation in 2008. Tighter credit markets also
played a role as many durable consumer goods had hitherto been bought on credit. Private investments
contracted by 2.1 percent as market prospect dimmed and real interest rates remained high. The
contraction in world trade also hit Sri Lanka, which saw total export volumes of goods and services drop
about 12.3 percent in 20095. The total effect of the drop in these demand components on economic
growth was equal to -3.9 percent.
All comparative growth figures in this report are year-on-year comparisons, unless stated otherwise.
It should be noted that the national accounts and the trade statistics show a divergent picture of export trends in 2009. While the
two data sources broadly agree on the order of magnitude of the drop in export values (5.9 percent in the National Accounts, as
opposed to 7.7 percent in the Trade Statistics). But, whereas National Accounts data show a concurrent 7 percent increase in the
export price deflation, bringing the drop in export volumes to 12 percent, trade statistics show that the average export unit price
declined by 12.5 percent in 2009, implying an increase in export volumes of about 5 percent.
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
GDP
Consumption
-- Private
-- Public
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation
-- Private
-- Government
Trade
-- Export of Goods and Services
-- Imports of Goods and Services
5.4
4.7
3.9
9.3
17.8
19.9
3.7
6.2
4.5
3.1
12.0
9.8
0.7
81.9
7.7
7.1
6.5
9.6
12.9
15.4
2.0
6.8
4.5
3.9
7.4
9.1
5.4
27.6
6.0
7.9
7.5
9.8
5.3
3.9
11.1
3.5
4.1
0.6
20.2
1.4
-2.1
14.5
7.7
9.0
6.6
2.7
3.8
6.9
7.3
3.7
0.4
4.0
-12.3
-9.1
6.1
1.2
2.7
-4.0
2.2
3.9
2.3
-1.2
7.9
1.4
1.3
-3.0
3.6
2.3
2.5
-1.6
5.5
2.0
0.1
-1.7
0.0
3.7
-3.9
3.7
20.7
1,062
8.8
-3.1
24.4
1,241
10.4
-2.7
28.3
1,421
11.3
-5.3
32.6
1,629
14.0
-4.2
40.7
2,014
16.3
-9.5
42.0
2,052
5.7
-0.5
1/ Due to rounding, numbers might not add up to total real GDP growth
Expanding public spending and a sharp contraction in imports prevented GDP from contracting.
Real public consumption increased by a whopping 20 percent in 2009, as the government continued the
trend of recent years of adding staff to the public payroll, including the armed forces. Public employment
increased by over 60,000 during 2009. Public consumption also increased, in view of the need for
spending on the large number of internally-displaced persons from the military campaign in the north in
the spring of 2009. The United Nations system alone (mainly UNHCH, WFP and IOM) spent almost
US$200 million (0.5 percent of GDP) on humanitarian assistance in 2009. In addition, public investments
remained strong in 2009, despite the challenging revenue situation. In real terms, public investment is
estimated to have increased by 14.5 percent, in large measure because implementation of donor-funded
projects kept pace. Sustained high public spending added an estimated 3.7percent to growth in 2009, and
was therefore an important factor in preventing the economy from contracting. Of similar magnitude was
the effect of the sharp contraction in imports of goods and services, which declined in real terms by 9.1
percent in 2009. Both imports of consumer goodsintermediate goods and investment goods
contracted. Tighter trade credit as banks were extra cautious is likely to have exacerbated the drop in
imports. The delayed effect of the steep deterioration in the terms of trademaking imported goods
relatively more expensivewould also have dampened imports. Several of the measures implemented
under the 2009 budget, including the increase in the Ports and Airports Development Levy (PAL) and
various product-specific levies (so-called cesses) on selected imported goods, added to the relative price
of imports, providing further impetus to domestic production.
MutedLaborMarketImpact
The labor-market impact of the crisis was
SriLanka:RealWageIndex
cushioned by public-sector hiring and growth in
190.0
the informal sector. After growing 1.9 percent in
180.0
2008 (equivalent to 133,000 jobs), employment
170.0
contracted by 0.7 percent (a drop of 50,000 jobs) in
160.0
2009 as a result of the crisis. This modest drop
150.0
masks, however, a large decline in employment in
140.0
6
the formal private sector , which shed 170,000 jobs,
130.0
equivalent to a decline of 5.6 percent, as firms,
120.0
particularly in export-oriented sectors such as
110.0
garments, rubber manufacturing and the like, cut
100.0
back on staffing. The decline in private formal
1/2005
9/2005
5/2006
1/2007
9/2007
5/2008
1/2009
9/2009
employment was partly compensated by increasing
public employment, which grew by 62,000, or 4.9
percent, and a 2.0 percent increase in informal employment, as job-seekers resorted to own-account
working7. Overall, labor markets remained relatively tight, however, even if the average unemployment
rate (excluding Northern Province) rose marginally to 5.8 percent in 2009, from 5.4 percent in 2008. The
continued tight labor market supported modest real wage growth. Real wages of the private sector8 rose
by 1.6 percent in 2009, following growth of 2.6 percent in 2008 and 4.1 percent in 2007. At 5.7 percent,
real wages in the public sector grew faster than those of the private sector in 2009, but this came on the
back of declining public-sector real wages in 2008, where a modest nominal increase of 7.5 percent was
insufficient to cover inflation (over 20 percent) leading to a real-wage erosion of about 12.5 percent.
Recent Employment trends
Total Employment
Of which
-- Public Sector
-- Private Sector
-- Formal
-- Informal
2007
2008
2009
--------mill. persons -------7,042
7,175
7,125
1,197
5,845
2,958
2,887
1,252
5,923
3,025
2,899
2008
2009
2008
2009
-Percent change p.a.- -- change p.a. (1,000 persons)-1.9
-0.7
133
-50
1,314
5,811
2,855
2,957
4.6
1.3
2.2
0.4
4.9
-1.9
-5.6
2.0
55
78
66
11
62
-112
-170
58
Note: "Formal" employment is defined as the sum of "private sector wage employees" and "Employers", while "informal"
is defined as the sum of "own account workers' and 'unpaid family workers".
The Sri Lankan labor force survey does not enable a very exact definition of formal vs. informal employment, so a somewhat
generalized definition has been used here (see the note in the table above).
7
Although the statistics are poor, overseas employment appears to have continued to function as a safety valve for the domestic
labor market. Available data suggests that about 0.25 million people left for overseas employment during 2009. However, data
for the number of people returning from overseas employment is not available, making it impossible to ascertain the net impact
on domestic labor markets.
8
As measured by the minimum wage rate indices of the formal private sector, in Wages Board Trades.
MillionsofUSD
900
$6,000
800
700
$5,000
USD Mn
600
$4,000
500
400
$3,000
300
$2,000
200
100
$1,000
2009q3
2010m2
2009m12
2009m10
2009m8
2009m6
2009m4
2009m2
2008m12
2008m10
$0
2008m8
2009q1
2008q3
2008q1
2007q3
2007q1
2006q3
2006q1
2005q3
2005q1
2004q3
2004q1
2003q3
2003q1
2002q3
2002q1
The real effective exchange rate (REER) saw a welcome depreciation in 2009, after having
appreciated by about 30 percent in FY2007-08. An appreciating REER can raise concerns about
export-competitiveness. While there seems to have been a trend-decline in Sri Lankas share of world
exports in recent years, that trend was interrupted during the global economic crisis, when global exports
plummeted, allowing Sri Lanka to regain market share. The same pattern is observed in the textile and
garment sector. Recent data (though volatile) indicate that the pre-crisis trend may be resuming, giving
rise to concern about the real exchange rate.
SriLanka:ExportShareinWorldExports
SriLanka:RealEffectiveExchangeRate
0.08
(2000=100)+=appreciation
0.07
150
0.06
140
0.05
130
0.04
120
0.03
110
0.02
100
80
2005M1
ShareofTextilesand
GarmentsinWorldExports
0.01
90
2005M9
2006M5
2007M1
2007M9
2008M5
2009M1
2009M9
THEMACROPOLICYRESPONSE
EasingofMonetaryPolicy
Monetary policy has eased considerably. Prior to the global financial crisis, monetary policy was
gradually tightened in response to a sharp increase in inflation, due largely to the global commodity-price
hike. The policy stance was reversed by the end of 2008; from February 2009 the benchmark repurchase
and reverse-repurchase rates were lowered successively, by 300bp (to 7.5 percent) and 225bp (to 9.75
percent). Moreover, after the second lowering, in late 2008, the statutory reserve requirement (SRR) on
commercial banks was lowered in 2009 by a further 75bp, to 7 percent. No policy rate adjustments were
made in the first quarter of 2010.
Inflation has gradually ticked upward since September 2009. Inflation fell rapidly with the onset of
the GFC from a peak of 28 percent in June 2008 to 0.7 percent in September 2009. However, the gradual
uptick in inflation since September 2009 resulted in year-on-year inflation reaching 6.9 percent in
February 2010 (the highest in 11 months) before moderating somewhat in March, to 6.3 percent. Nearly
two-thirds of the growth in inflation during this period has come from increased food prices, which
account for 47 percent of the consumer price index (CPI). Overall CPI inflation in 2009 recorded 3.4
percent, compared to 22.6 percent in 2008. The impact of demand pressures on rising inflation is apparent
in the gradual increase in core inflation10, which reached 8.0 percent in February 2010. Inflation is
expected to stay relatively low in 2010, due partly to positive base and supply-side effects from increased
agricultural production in the North, which will help contain food prices. However, towards the end of
2010, inflationary pressures will mount, in step with the expected rise in global commodity prices and the
lagged effects of fiscal and monetary stimuli during the crisis. Against this background, it can be expected
that the monetary authorities will initiate measured monetary tightening during 2010.
Inflation, %
18%
25%
16%
14%
20%
12%
15%
10%
10%
8%
5%
6%
Reverse Repo
2010M1
2009M7
2009M1
2008M7
2008M1
2007M7
2007M1
Core CPI
Source:CEICdata
Repo
2006M7
2006M1
2005M7
2005M1
2004M1
15.08.2008
03.09.2008
23.09.2008
13.10.2008
03.11.2008
21.11.2008
11.12.2008
02.01.2009
22.01.2009
12.02.2009
04.03.2009
24.03.2009
16.04.2009
06.05.2009
27.05.2009
15.06.2009
02.07.2009
21.07.2009
10.08.2009
27.08.2009
16.09.2009
06.10.2009
23.10.2009
12.11.2009
02.12.2009
21.12.2009
11.01.2010
02.02.2010
22.02.2010
11.03.2010
31.03.2010
Call rate
2004M7
0%
4%
CPI
10
2010m1
2009m11
2009m9
2009m7
2009m5
2009m3
2009m1
2008m11
2008m9
2008m7
2008m5
2008m3
2008m1
Credit Growth
Monetary expansion is slowly filtering through
100%
to the private sector, but banks are likely to
remain cautious. Total advances to the private
80%
sector grew for two consecutive months, in
60%
November and December 2009, compared to the
40%
same months in 2008, with outstanding facilities
growing by 0.7 percent and 1.0 percent
20%
respectively. For the year as a whole, however,
0%
sluggish credit market conditionsreflecting
both lack of credit demand and banks caution
-20%
(see box)resulted in a decline of 5.7 percent
(yoy) in overall private-sector credit in 2009.
Despite this weakness, total domestic credit
Private Credit
Public Credit
Total Credit
continued to grow in 2009, owing to a substantial
increase in public-sector credit. Total publicsector credit (including lending to public corporations) peaked in July, at about 84 percent higher than that
of the previous year. Since the resumption of foreign inflows into government securities and the issue of
the second sovereign bond in October, outstanding public-sector credit has declined. But, by the end 2009,
it still accounted for a high 40 percent of outstanding domestic credita reflection of persistent deficitfinancing needs.
Banking Sector Developments
Leading up to the global financial crisis, in the preceding three years, the domestic banking sector was riding on a robust
economywith growth averaging 7 percent in FY2005/07 and over 6.5 percent in the first 3-quarters of 2008and an asset price
boom. It was a time noted also for persistent negative real-interest rates, which made an ideal environment for the banks to grow
their balance sheets. Indeed, during this period the banks were growing their lending portfolios much faster than in the previous
years. The compounded annualized growth in the banking sector loans & advances during FY2005/07 amounted to 23.2
percentmore than twice the average during the period 2001-04. However, in 2008, the pace of loan growth moderated to 7
percent as concerns of possible bubble-bursts rose and monetary policy direction turned towards aggressive tightening. In 2009,
in the backdrop of the global crisis, loan growth turned negative and recorded a 4 percent drop. However, the shrinking of
portfolios in 2009 did not have significant impact on banks profitability as they managed to maintain their profitability by
retaining their net-interest margins (NIM) and reaping significant one-off gains from trading government securities in an
environment of falling interest rates. The banking sectors NIM stayed relatively unchanged at 4.5 percent in 2009 while income
from non-lending activities rose 12 percent.
Banking sector assets and profitability
18%
1,800
38%
16%
1,600
36%
1,400
14%
34%
1,200
1,000
30%
800
600
Rs. Mill.
12%
32%
10%
8%
28%
400
6%
200
NOPBT /Equity
Gross NPA
30.09.09*
30.06.09*
31.03.09*
2007
2008*
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
1998
2001
4%
30.09.09*
30.06.09*
31.03.09*
2007
2008*
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
2000
24%
1999
26%
With the bottoming out of interest rates, banks once again would be looking to grow their lending portfolios to generate income.
However, they will face two constraints to growing the lending portfolios: (a) the deteriorated asset quality position warranting
more caution and (b) possible erosion in the capital adequacy position with the shift of portfolios from low-risk assets
(government securities and cash) to riskier assets (loans and advances). The overall gross non-performing asset ratio in the
banking system at the end of 2009 is estimated to have risen to around 8 percent, compared to nearly 6 percent at the start of the
crisis. At the same time, overall provision-cover has declined to around 50 percent of total delinquent assets, compared to nearly
70 percent at the start of the crisis. Growth in lending portfolios would warrant increased level of provisioning (both general
and also possibly specific if asset quality continue to deteriorate), whilst banks would also need to build provision cover back
to pre-crisis levels. Total capital adequacy (CA) of the banking systemincluding tier 1 and tier 2was estimated at a relatively
healthy 14.9 percent by end 2009, marginally up from the 14.4 percent at the end of 2008. However, in the face of increased
balance sheet risk, banks may experience deterioration in their CA position in 2010, unless they raise additional capital.
SharplyWidenedFiscalDeficit
The fiscal deficit slipped considerably from original targets. According to provisional estimates of the
Department of Fiscal Policy in the Ministry of Finance, the 2009 deficit (after grants) reached 9.8 percent
of GDP against a (revised) target of 7.0 percent of GDP (see table). This deviation from target was almost
entirely the result of higher public expenditure, driven primarily by higher interest expenditure, higher
rehabilitation-and-reconstruction expenses following the war, and the acceleration of infrastructure
development projects. The revenue outturn fell short by a marginal 0.2 percent of GDP (Rs23 billion) as
opposed to the revised budget. This is explained mostly by steeper falls in trade-related taxes and income
taxes. The governments original budget for 2009, presented in November 2008, did not fully anticipate
the impact of the global financial crisis, especially in terms of lower tax revenues, and therefore included
a highly ambitious revenue target of 16.4 percent of GDP, while expecting the overall budget deficit to be
limited to 5.9 percent of GDP. However, the revised budget moderated revenue expectations
considerably, while at the same time recognizing additional upward pressure on recurrent expenditures
partly in recognition of fiscal stimulus measures announced at the end of 2008and lower capital
expenditure.
Fiscal Outcomes 2009, percent of GDP
Revenue & Grants
Recurrent Exp.
Capital Exp. & Net Lending
Budget Deficit
Revised Budget11
15.2
16.9
5.3
7.0
Original Budget
17.0
15.8
7.1
5.9
Outcome
15.1
18.2
6.7
9.8
LookingAhead:EnsuringMacroStabilityandAcceleratingGrowth
TheFiscalChallenge
The robust growth outlook provides a good opportunity for much-needed fiscal consolidation.
While high growth in public consumption was important to sustain the economy in 2009, it will be
important to consolidate the fiscal position in 2010. Continued high fiscal deficits would not only increase
concerns about the overall sustainability of the fiscal situation, but would also result in upward pressure
on interest rates, and crowd out private investments. Considering the robust underlying growth
momentum, last years fiscal stimulus can be curtailed without seriously jeopardizing growth prospects.
The current fiscal target under the IMF program is for the fiscal deficit to decline to 6 percent of GDP in
201012, while the Ministry of Finance, in its pre-election budget report, projected a higher fiscal deficit of
7.5 percent, mainly due to a less ambitiousbut probably more realisticassessment of the likely cutback in recurrent expenditures (see table, pg. 11). Expenditure rationalization is challenging, in view of
the limited size of discretionary expenditures: difficult-to-change items like the public wage bill,
pension payments and other transfers and interest expenditures make up the bulk of total recurrent
expenditures.
Percent of GDP
Revenue & grants
Recurrent Expenditure.
Capital Expenditure & Net Lending
Budget Deficit
11
12
However,asmallleewayforreconstructionspendingintheNorthandEastislikelytoincreasethetarget
somewhat.
The interim Vote on Accounts (VOA) budget provided a generous spending envelope for the first
four months of 2010. In November 2009, the governmentin the context of upcoming general elections
and the dissolution of the parliamentproposed an interim budget (or, VOA) to provide for expenditure
in the first four months of 2010. The VOA projected a fiscal deficit, after grants, of 4.5 percent (of fullyear GDP) for the four months, which was around 12 percent higher than actual realization in the
corresponding period of 2009. A formal budget for 2010 is expected to be approved around mid-year
2010, following the completion of the election and formation of a new government.
DecomposingRevenuetoGDPratio
Percentagepointchange
1991
1996
2001
2008
199196 199601 200108
TotalRevenues
20.5
19.0
16.3
14.9
1.4
2.7
1.5
Taxes
18.3
17.0
14.4
13.3
1.4
2.6
1.1
Import
5.3
3.3
1.8
2.2
2.0
1.5
0.4
Domestic
2.8
2.5
1.3
2.3
0.3
1.2
1.0
Excises
3.0
4.7
5.1
2.4
1.7
0.4
2.7
Income
2.8
2.9
3.1
2.3
0.0
0.3
0.8
Other
2.6
2.7
2.4
2.9
0.1
0.3
0.5
Nontax
0.9
0.7
0.6
1.2
0.2
0.1
0.6
Note:TaxonimportsincludesVATonimportedgoodsandservices.
10
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
22%
Reversing the long-term secular decline in the
Total Fiscal Revenue, % of GDP
21%
revenue is a crucial objective. Years prior to the
20%
global economic crisis, revenue was on a
19%
downward trend (see graph, right). During the
18%
1990s, the main reason for the declining revenue17%
to-GDP ratio was a fall in import duties, as the
16%
tariffs were lowered. In recent years, import taxes
15%
have picked up, due partly to a large number of
14%
ad-hoc, product-specific taxes and levies.
13%
Unfortunately, this stabilization has been
12%
compromised by declining VAT revenues, where
an expanding array of exceptions and inadequate
collection efficiency has hollowed out the tax
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka
bases (see table, below). The government has
committed to reform and streamline the tax
system and administration, which would yield higher revenue. To this end it initiated, in the 2009 budget,
a Presidential Tax Commission to review current tax policies and recommend measures to strengthen tax
collection, auditing and enforcement, and a general simplification of the system. The committee delivered
an interim report in November 2009, and the main recommendations are expected to be incorporated into
the 2010 budget. These are expected to focus on broadening and streamlining VAT, clarifying the Board
of Investment tax-exemption system for FDI, and simplify or reform the trade-tax regime and tax
administration system.
Thegrowthchallenge
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
Raising the long-term growth rate in Sri Lanka to 8 percent would require a comprehensive policy
agenda. The government has committed itself to raising the long-term growth rate of the Sri Lankan
economy. A standard growth-accounting framework illustrates how this can be achieved15. Within this
13
11
framework, growth can increase by any combination of: (i) accelerated human capital accumulation,
either through increase labor force participation and employment or improvements in the quality of labor
(more or better schooling); (ii) accelerated physical capital-accumulation through higher investments, or
(iii) higher total-factor-productivity (TFP), which is the catch-all residual for structural improvements
affecting the efficiency of use of human and physical capital. TFP improvements can happen in many
ways (e.g., as a result of efficiency gains at the level of the individual business or factory or, e.g., as a
result of sectoral shifts in the economy, from lower- to higher-productivity sectors, such as from
agriculture to industry or services).
An illustrative scenario is presented in the graphs below. The scenario takes as starting point that
growth will gradually accelerate to 8 percent by 2013broadly in line with the Governments medium
term targets. It then asks, what are the requirements to the three underlying drivers of growth to achieve
this target? It is clear that all factorsthe input of labor, the level of investments, and the rate of overall
productivity growthwould have to increase well beyond the levels of the past year. Specifically, the
labor-force participation rate would have to gradually increase from its current level of around 49 percent,
to 52-53 percentequivalent to 500,000 jobs created in the next decade, over and above the number of
jobs necessary to absorb the underlying population growth. In terms of capital accumulation, an increase
in the ratio of investments-to-GDP from the current level of about 25 percent, to around 30 percent,
would be required. Some of this increase may be financed by foreign direct investment (FDI), but it
would also probably require an increase in national savings. Finally, TFP would have to increase to
around 3 percent per annumabout 1 percentage point higher than its average level during the recent
high-growth period from 2004-08, and well above its historical average since 1980.
What does it take to sustain 8 percent growth?an illustrative montage:
RequiredLaborForceParticipationRate,%
53%
9%
52%
8%
51%
7%
50%
6%
49%
5%
48%
4%
47%
3%
2019
2020
2019
2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2011
2012
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2018
2020
2019
2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2011
2012
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2005
2004
46%
2%
Note: Data for 2006 is interpolated using average of 2005 and 2007
32%
3.0%
30%
2.5%
28%
2.0%
26%
1.5%
1.0%
24%
0.5%
22%
12
2020
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2020
2019
2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2005
2004
0.0%
20%
ProductName
LENDING
75
65
105
18
78
40
AAA
Towers of LearningHigher Education
Connecting People to Prosperity Economic Report
Country Environmental Analysis
Infrastructure Assessment
Health Service Delivery System Report
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CurrentStatus