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A Brief and Incomplete History
A Brief and Incomplete History
History of the
Philosophy of Science
Aristotle
(384-322 BCE)
Inductive-Deductive Model:
General Principles
(1) Induction
Deduction (2)
Observed Phenomena
From observations one proceeds by inductive inference (1) to
General Principles which explain the observations in virtue of
the fact that those same observations can be deduced (2)
from the principles
Pythagoreanism
Pythagoreans revered numbers and mathematical
relations to the point of mysticism
The real is the mathematical patterns and harmonies
discoverable in nature
Describe the mathematical structure of a phenomena and
you have knowledge of its essence
This contrasts with Aristotelianism in that it focuses on the
formal cause to the exclusion of the others, it especially
neglects final causes
Our current mathematical physics is, indeed, quite
Pythagorean
Pythagoreanism resembles Platonism in that it gives pride
of place to abstract entities (numbers) and their relations,
but it does not have much to say about moral Forms
PythagoreanismProblems
Given their knowledge of the Pythagorean Theorem, and
the fact that they conceived of all numbers as ratios,
certain quantities were thought to be mysterious and
incommensurable (immeasurable or unable to be compared
with known quantities, what we would call the irrational
numbers), e.g.,
Heliocentric
Circles
Moving
Eccentric
Epicycle/Deferent
eccentric
P
E
deferent
These models also account for variations in speed and distance relative to E. Further epicycles, eccentrics,
deferents, and equants can be added for greater precision. Of course, none of these is correct
Saving Appearances
Especially in astronomy, a tradition evolved of
not claiming reality for the mathematical models
the task for the astronomer is not to
hypothesize about the unobservable nature of
things, but to provide convenient and
observationally adequate models
This is a form of anti-realism
Relates to the observation/theory distinction
Saving Appearances
and Oneself
The famous heliocentrists, Copernicus (14731543), Galileo (1564-1642), and Kepler (15711630), each had Pythagorean commitments
each held to the reality of his model, and
each was strongly motivated, not just by data and
observation, but also by strong mathematical
aesthetics, a desire to find certain kinds of harmonies
in nature
Copernicus
Galileo
Atomism
A further metaphysical/explanatory picture that can be
contrasted to Pythagoreanism and Aristotelianism is
Atomism
Proponents included Leucippus (490-430 BCE) and
Democritus (460-360 BCE)
The general approach was to explain observed qualitative
and quantitative changes by reference to quantitative
changes at a more elementary level of organization
This, too, neglects the Final Cause, and is thoroughly
materialistic, thus it is antithetical both to Aristotelianism
and to Platonism/Pythagoreanism
One difficulty is to avoid simply attributing to the atoms the
very property to be explained at the macro level. Doing so
would create a circular explanation, which is to say, no
explanation at all (e.g., day-old coffee is bitter because it
has acquired large numbers of bitter atoms)
This raises the issue of the nature and quality of scientific
explanation as well as the observation/theory distinction
Robert Grosseteste
(c. 1168-1253)
William of
Ockham
(1280-1349)
Method of Agreement
Case
Circumstances
Effect
ABCD
ACE
ABEF
ACD
Conclusion
Method of Difference
Case
Circumstances
Effect
ABC
BC
Conclusion
A can be the cause of e
These two methods are often called the (first two) of Mills Methods , after
J.S. Mill (1806-73) , whose arguments in favor of inductivism were widely
influential.
Ockhams Razor
William of OckhamOckhams Razor
A demand for simplicity, stated in various forms:
Assume nature takes the simplest path available
assume the minimum number of (types of) objects necessary to the
theory/explanation
do not unnecessarily complicate theory
eliminate superfluous concepts.
Note that Ockhams caution in stating his razor, as well as the cautious form of the
conclusions in the two inductive methods above, point out a growing recognition of
the fallibility of inductive inference, as well as a reconsideration of Aristotles
requirement that the First (General) Principles be self-evident. For some thinkers
self-evidence may still have been a goal, but many began to recognize (in theory if
not in practice) that one had to be more cautious about the strength of ones
inductively generated conclusions.
Aristotle, Scotus, and others had assumed that certain first principles of the special
sciences could be known to be necessary, hence what counted as self-contradictory
extended beyond just what could be reduced to a logical contradiction
Nicolas of Autrecourt (c. 1300-1350+) had a much stricter notion of necessary truth,
restricting it to claims whose denials are logical contradictions
Much like David Hume (1711-1776) four centuries later, Nicolas concluded that we can have no
certain knowledge of causal relations (Hume also draws stronger conclusions)
Much unlike Hume, Nicolas used his critique to encourage faith in a Christian God
Matters of Fact
Neither a MOF nor its denial is logically contradictory,
so each is possible
Based in knowledge of cause and effect, which is not
certain In fact,
Immanuel Kant
Transcendental Idealism
from a point of view which attempts to transcend our forms of
cognition, we recognize how much our mind and its structure
contributes to our knowledge of the world
Empirical Realism
from a point of view which does not attempt the impossible
transcendence, the structures imparted by the Forms, Categories,
and Principles are fully real, and necessary truths regarding such
things as causal relations and matter can be known
Some problems with this ingenious and seductive picture:
What justifies saying this is what any theory or cognition must
presuppose? How can we be sure weve correctly identified the most
basic forms, categories, and principles? Must they be unique? Kant
thought he had identified unique basic forms, but some of what he
took as basic to science has since been changed and rejected by
science
How can one coherently speak of the transcendental unreality of forms
and categories, while maintaining that transcendence is impossible,
and that the transcendental (noumenal) world is unknowable?
Mills Methods
Method of Agreement*
Method of Difference*
Circumstances
Effect
An BC
an b
A0 BC
a0 b
A1/n BC
a1/n b
Conclusion
(occurrence of a is varying proportionally
to occurrence of A)
So either A causes a, or A and a have a
common third cause
Method of Residues
Case
Circumstances
Effect
ABC
Conclusion
abc
A is the cause of a
Hypothetico-Deductivism
William Whewell (1794-1866) and
W.S. Jevons (1832-82) rejected Inductivism
Rather than justified on the basis of
inductions, a hypothesis is justified when it
Is consistent with other established
hypotheses, and
The consequences deducible from the
hypothesis agree with observations
Whewell
Jevons
Justification
Success of deduced predictions (thus a form of hypotheticodeductivism), especially
Problem(s) of Induction
Two Issues:
The Descriptive Issue: we arrive at beliefs regarding unobserved
matters of fact (future particulars, eternal generalizations)How do we
do that?
The Normative Issue: do we arrive at such beliefs the way in which
we ought to arrive at them? I.e., are we justified in our practice? If not
is there any practice we could adopt which is justified?
Underdetermination
The Underdetermination of Theory by Evidence
Given any amount of observational evidence, there will be more
than one (indeed infinitely many) theories compatible with that
evidence
A unique theory is never dictated by the evidence, not even if we
had all possible evidence
This raises the question of how and if we can
rationally decide between theories
WRONG and often WRONGLY ATTRIBUTED TO W.V. Quine version:
a theory can be preserved in the face of any contrary evidence
(what Quine says, in case youre interested, is that a hypothesis
or statement can be preserved as long as others are given up, but
this is a CHANGE IN THEORY, some hypotheses are preserved,
others not)
This correct understanding of Quine implies that
There are no crucial experiments to rule out a hypothesis
There are (near) crucial experiments to rule out whole theories
Observation/Theory
Distinction
Intuitively, there seems to be a distinction between that which we
can observethe observational; and that which we cannot
observethe theoretical
Observable: people, stars, trees, rocks, grains of sand, a patch of red
Theoretical: electrons, quarks, viruses, dark matter, the big bang,
trees, people
next slide
Social Forces
How and to what extent do religious, cultural,
political, gender, racial biases and interests affect
scientific theorizing?
Can they be avoided? Ought they to be avoided?
This has implications for the issue of the
rationality of theory acceptance and change
If theory acceptance and change are not
rationally constrained there seems to be plenty of
room for non-rational social forces to be in play
Moreover, the apparent lack of rational constraint
and the role of social forces raises the
demarcation issue
Demarcation
How, if at all, is science different from other
organized bodies of beliefs (religion, metaphysics,
political structures, cultural tradition)?
How can a difference be marked out?
Can good science be distinguished from bad
science? Is pseudoscience a third thing, or just
really bad bad science?
Does/should science have a privileged
epistemological standing in relation to these
others?
This all relevant to revolutions and rationality, and
social forces
Realism/Anti-realism
Given the various epistemological difficulties
(underdetermination, problem of induction,
rationality, social forces), and the lack of a
consensus on these issues, why should we think
that our theories are actually describing reality?
The apparently large gap between observational
and theoretical knowledge inspires worry about
realism
Metaphysical difficulties come into play here as
wellwe do not have good understandings of the
nature of laws and causation, explanation, so how
can we claim that we are discovering the nature
of the universe?
Explanation
Science is supposed to explain things to
us
But what does it mean to have a scientific
explanation?
Does mere derivability of a description
from more general truths constitute an
explanation?
What sort of explanations can science
provide?
How can we tell good from bad
explanations?
Analyticity
This is contrasted with synthetic statements whose truth (or falsehood) is a matter of
something beyond the meanings or concepts involved (the world, matters of fact)
Locke and Kant were the first to make use of this distinction, it played a prominent role
for the logical positivists (as well soon see), Quine repudiated it
Analyticity provides a way (though not the only way) of explaining how at least some
truths are
Necessarily true
Accepted or rejected on purely pragmatic considerations and thus lack metaphysical import
it all depends on who is making the distinction and to what use they are putting it