Special Publication of the IEEE Power

System Relaying Committee

Copyright IEEE 2011

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Developed by a working group of the

Power System Relay Committee (PSRC)

First published in 1995 widely presented

within the industry, including a presentation
at the 2003 PPIC Conference

Updated, published, and presented for the

first time at the 2011 57th IEEE Pulp and
Paper Industry Conference

Michael Thompson, Chair

Christopher Ruckman, Vice Chair
Hasnain Ashrafi
Gabirel Benmouyal
Zeeky Bukhala
Stephen P. Conrad
Everett Fennell
Dale Finney
Dale Fredrickson
Jonathan D. Gardell
Juan Gers
Randy Hamilton
Wayne Hartmann
Gerald Johnson
Patrick M. Kerrigan
Sungsoo Kim
Prem Kumar

Hugo Monterrubio
Charles Mozina
Mukesh Nagpal
Brent Oxandale
Russell W. Patterson
Mike Reichard
Mohindar Sachdev
Kevin Stephan
Sudhir Thakur
Demetrios Tziouvaras
Joe Uchiyama
Quintin Verzosa, Jr.
Thomas Wiedman
Michael Wright
John Wang
Murty V. V. S. Yalla

Michael J. Thompson received his BS, magna cum laude, from

Bradley University in 1981 and an MBA from Eastern Illinois University in 1991. He
has broad experience in the field of power system operations and protection. Upon
graduating, he served nearly 15 years at Central Illinois Public Service (now
AMEREN), where he worked in distribution and substation field engineering before
taking over responsibility for system protection engineering. Prior to joining
Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. in 2001, he was involved in the
development of several numerical protective relays while working at Basler Electric.
He is presently a Principal Engineer in SELs Engineering Services Division; a
senior member of the IEEE; a main committee member of the IEEE PES Power
System Relaying Committee; and a registered professional engineer. Michael was a
contributor to the reference book, Modern Solutions for the Protection Control and
Monitoring of Electric Power Systems, has published numerous technical papers,
and has a number of patents associated with power system protection and control.

Charles (Chuck) Mozina received a B.S. degree in electrical engineering

from Purdue University, West Lafayette, in 1965. He is a Consultant, for Beckwith
Electric Co. Inc., specializing in power plant and generator protection. His consulting
practice involves projects relating to protective relaying applications, protection
system design and coordination. Chuck is an active 25-year member of the IEEE
PES Power System Relay Committee and was the past chairman of the Rotating
Machinery Subcommittee. He is active in the IEEE IAS I&CPS, PCIC and PPIC
Committees, which address industrial protection systems. He is the past U.S.
representative to CIGRE Study Committee 34 (now B-5) on System Protection. He
has over 25 years of experience as a protective engineer at Centerior Energy (now
part of FirstEnergy), a major utility in Ohio, where he was Manager of System
Protection. For 10 years, he was employed by Beckwith Electric as the Manager of
Application Engineering for Protection Systems. He is now a consultant for that
company. He is a registered Professional Engineer in the state of Ohio and a Liife
Fellow of the IEEE.
6

Fundamentals

Multifunction Generator Protection Systems

Stator Phase Fault Protection

Stator Ground Fault Protection

Field Fault Protection

System Backup Protection

Generator Breaker Failure

Abnormal Frequency Protection

Overexcitation and Overvoltage Protection

Underexcitation / Loss-of-Excitation Protection

Current Unbalance (Negative-Sequence) Protection

Loss of Prime Mover (Antimotoring) Protection

Out-of-Step Protection

Voltage Transformer Signal Loss

Inadvertent Energization Protection

Other Protective Considerations

Tripping Modes

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Basic design and operation of

synchronous generators

Power system connections

Behavior under short-circuit conditions

Generator grounding

Generator stability

IEEE guidelines

Device numbers

Reactive Power
Into System
+
MVAR
Overexcited

Rotor
Winding
Limited

MW
System

MVAR
Normal Overexcited
Operation

Overexcitation
Limiter (OEL)

Stator
Winding
Limited
+ MW Real Power
Into System

Underexcitation
Limiter (UEL)
Underexcited

MVAR
Reactive Power
Into Generator

MW

Underexcited
Operation

G
Stator End
Iron Limited

Steady-State
Stability Limit

System
MVAR

kV 2 RC
MVA =

Z RV
kV 2 RC
Z=

MVA R V

Angle
Angle

Current

Current

Current

Accumulation of Damage Over Time

wattseconds

8000
wattseconds

6000
4000

Total
Generator

2000
0
0.01

System
0.1
1
time, seconds

10

Most damage occurs in period after the generator breaker opens

Types of Instability

Steady-State

Transient

Dynamic

Pmax =

Pe =

Eg Es
X

sin g s

Power Flow
L1
L2
L3

Egg

Power
POWER
System

SYSTEM

L4

Ess

Eg Es
X

Generator

GSU

G
Xd
V

XS
Where:
XT
Xe = XT + XS

Per-Unit MVAR

V2
2

1
1

X
X
d
e

System
Reactance

X
Xe

V2
2

1
1
+

X
X
d
e

Xd Xe
2

Xd + Xe
2

Per-Unit MW

MW-MVAR Per-Unit Plot

R-X Diagram Plot

Ess

Power System

Three-Phase
Short Circuit

Substation
1

GSU
78 = Out-of-Step Protection
Es = System Voltage
Eg = Generator Voltage
s = System Voltage Phase Angle
g = Generator Voltage Phase Angle

78
G

Egg

Pmax =

Maximum
Power
Transfer

Eg Es
X

All Lines in Service

Breakers 1 and 2
Tripped

A2
PM = Pe

Pe =
A1
C
0

90
g s

180

Eg Es
X

sin g s

Occurs when fast-acting AVR control

amplifies rather than damps small MW
oscillations

Most likely to occur when generators

are remote from load centers

Power system stabilizer (PSS) damps

oscillations required in Western
United States

Latest developments reflected in

Std. 242, IAS Buff Book

C37.102, IEEE Guide for Generator Protection

C37.101, IEEE Guide for AC Generator

Ground Protection

C37.106, IEEE Guide for Abnormal Frequency

Protection for Power Generating Plants
Created / maintained by the IEEE PSRC & IAS
updated every 5 years

C37.102-2006
updated version now
available includes
significant changes
and additions

Device Number

Function

Tutorial Chapter

11

Multifunction Protection System

5.2

21

Distance Relay Backup for System and

Generator Zone Phase Faults

2.4

24

Volts / Hertz Protection for Generator

Overexcitation

3.2

27TN

100 Percent Stator Ground Fault Protection

2.2

32

Reverse Power Relay Antimotoring

Protection

3.5

40

Loss-of-Field Protection

3.3

46

Negative-Sequence Current Unbalance

Protection for Generators

3.4

49

Stator Thermal Protection

51G

Time-Overcurrent Ground Relay

2.2

51TG 1&2

Backup for Ground Faults

Device Number

Function

Tutorial Chapter

51V

Voltage-Controlled or Voltage-Restrained
Time-Overcurrent Relay Backup for
System and Generator Phase Faults

2.4

59

Overvoltage Protection

3.2

59G

Overvoltage Relay Stator Ground Fault

Protection for Generators

2.2

60

Voltage Balance Relay Detection of Blown

Voltage Transformer Fuses

3.7

63

Transformer Fault Pressure Relay

62B

Breaker Failure Timer

2.5

64F

Field Ground Fault Protection

2.3

71

Transformer Oil or Gas Level

78

Loss-of-Synchronism Protection

3.6

Device Number

Function

Tutorial Chapter

81

Frequency Relay Both Underfrequency

and Overfrequency Protection

3.1

86

Hand-Reset Lockout Auxiliary Relay

5.1

87G

Differential Relay Primary Phase Fault

Protection for Generators

2.1

87N

Stator Ground Fault Differential Protection

2.2

87T

Differential Relay Primary Protection for

Transformers

87U

Differential Relay Overall Generator and

Transformer Protection

2.2

Transformer Fault Pressure

63
Oil Low
71

87T

51
TG1

Unit
Transformer

51 Transformer Neutral
TG2
Overcurrent

87O
Unit
Differential

50
51

Second
V/Hz

24
2

UAT Backup

UAT Oil Low

71

Voltage
Balance

60

UAT Fault
Pressure

63
UAT

Overvoltage 59
50/
27
Inadv. Energ.
(Note 4)

81

UAT Neutral
Overcurrent

51
Unit Auxiliary
Bus Phase Time
Overcurrent

78
Loss of
Synchronism
24
1

V/Hz

87T

UAT
Differential

40

Loss of
Field

Auxiliary VTs

32

Field
Breaker

51 51
TG1 TG2

Frequency

Reverse
Power

49

41
Stat.
Temp
64F

53

87G

Generator
Differential

Field (Note 1)
Ground
21/
51V

46
Negative
Sequence

59G

50/
51G

Generator
Neutral
Overvoltage

Generator
Neutral
Overcurrent

System
Backup
(Note 2)

27
TN

100 Percent
Stator Ground
(Note 3)

Notes:
1. Dotted devices optional.
2. Device 21 requires external timer. See Chapter 2.4.
3. See Chapter 2.2 regarding 100 percent ground protection.
4. Device 50 requires external timer. See Chapter 4.1.

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Generator protective relaying technology

has evolved from discrete electromechanical
and static relays to digital multifunction
protection systems

With availability, additional performance,

economic advantages, and reliability of
digital multifunction protection systems, this
advanced technology is incorporated into
most new protection schemes

In most cases, new generators are

protected with one of the following:

Dual MGPSs

Single MGPS, possibly backed up by

single-function relays

Inputs

Outputs
ROM
RAM

Voltage Inputs

EEPROM
Current Inputs

Data
Acquisition
System

User Interface
Microprocessor

Other Analog
Inputs

Targets
Digital
Outputs

Digital Inputs
One or More
Power Supplies

Communications

High-Voltage System Bus

52

Generator Transformer
87AT

87T

Auxiliary Bus
52

87O
11G
MGPS #1
Relaying Functions
24
27/59
32-1
32-2
40
46
49
50
51V or 21
50/51G
59G
60
78
81
87G
27TH or 59THD or 64S

Field

11G
MGPS #2
Relaying Functions
24
27/59
32-1
32-2
40
46
49
50
51V or 21
50/51G
59G
60
64F
81
87G
27TH or 59THD or 64S

Note: Only use functions as appropriate.

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Saturation

Stator differential protection does not

detect turn-to-turn faults

Current can be 6 to 7 times nominal

and can damage stator

Use turn-to-turn protection schemes to

detect and avoid damage

Imperfection in generator construction

Temperature variations

Winding connections

External faults

Terminal voltage and load variations

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

The Method of Generator Neutral

Grounding Determines its Performance
During Ground Faults
Solidly Grounded
Low Impedance
High Impedance
Hybrid Grounding
Ungrounded

Multiple Bus (No/Low Z/High Z)

BUS

Directly connected to bus

Likely in industrial, commercial,

and isolated systems

May have problems with
circulating 3rd harmonic
Use of single grounded machine
can help

Adds complexity to discriminate

ground fault source if ground

resistance is high (less than 25A)

Same type of grounding used on 1 or mutiple generators

Low Resistance
Grounding
Systems

45MVA Generator

2000/5

2000/5 CTs
80%

2000/5

87

87 Set at 0.2A Pickup

20% of Winding Not
Protected

400 A

62

Percentage of Stator Winding

Unprotected

87G Generator Differential

87GD Generator Ground Differential
51N Neutral Overcurrent

IA
IB

Residual current
calculated from
individual phase
currents. Paralleled
CTs shown to
illustrate principle.

90

IC
IG

IG

3I O

3 I0

180

-3Io x IG cos (180) = 3IoIG

IG
270

IA
IB

Residual current
calculated from
individual phase
currents. Paralleled
CTs shown to
illustrate principle.

90

IC
IG

IG

3I 0

180

-3Io x IG cos (0) = -3IoIG

IG
3I O 270

59N, 3V0 overvoltage, covers 95% of winding

Tuned to the fundamental frequency
Must work properly from 10 to 80 Hz during startup.

3rd Harmonic methods cover remaining 5% of

winding near neutral
27TN, 3rd harmonic undervoltage
59D, Ratio of 3rd harmonic voltage at terminal and

neutral ends of winding

64S, Subharmonic voltage injection, covers

100% of winding

High-impedance ground limits

ground fault current (limits
damage on internal winding to
ground fault)
Conventional neutral or zerosequence overvoltage relay
(59G) provides coverage for the
ground faults involving up to
90%95% of the winding from
phase terminal
R

59G

51G connected in the primary

or secondary neutral circuit can
be used as a backup to 59G

Last 5%10% near neutral

not covered by neutral
overvoltage relay (59G)
because a ground fault in this
winding region bypasses
grounding transformer or
resistor (R) or 59G, solidly
grounding the machine

59G

XHL

59G

Sensitively set 59G relay to

detect ground faults (up to
95% of the winding) can also
pick up for faults on the HV
side of GSU or in the VT
secondary circuit

Io

Co

CHL

Z0

VR := V0

Z
+
X
HL
0

Zero-Sequence
Network

XHL
R
3Io

VR

3R

Xo

V0

Third-harmonic voltage develops in

stator due to inherent presence of
third harmonic flux in the rotor field

Rotor MMF

I3h A, B, C

Co

Generator winding and terminal

capacitances provide path for
the third-harmonic stator current
via grounding resistor
R
3I3h

Machine construction the pitch

of the stator

Levels of excitation (MVAR) and

machine output (MW)

Terminal capacitance

+V3RD

Normal Operation
Neutral
No Load

Full Load
No Load
Terminal

Full Load

+V3RD
Full Load
No Load

Neutral

Terminal
Fault at Terminal
Neutral
No Load

Terminal

Full Load
V3RD

Can vary with loading

Detects ground faults
near neutral

V3RD
Fault at Neutral

Present in terminal and

neutral ends

Note: If third harmonic goes away

across neutral resistor, conclude a
ground fault near neutral

I3h

C0

Under normal conditions,

27N3 is picked up because of
the third-harmonic voltage
drop across neutral resistor

3I3h

59G

27N3

I3h

C0

3I3h

59G

27N3

For a fault close to neutral of

the stator winding, 27N3 drops
out because the fault bypasses
the neutral resistor
A supervisory overvoltage
(59C) relay located at the
generator terminal blocks
27N3 operation during startup
or shutdown to avoid
misoperation

100%

59G

~95% of winding from

terminal by 59G
~15%30% of winding
from neutral by 27N3

27N3
5%
0%

59G

27N3

Compares third-harmonic
voltage magnitude at the
generator neutral to that
at the generator terminals
Ferroresonance
damping resistor
59D

59G

100%

~95% of winding from

terminal by 59G

59G

~15%30% of winding
from neutral and
terminal by 59D

59D
59D

5%
0%

59G

59D

Does not rely on third-harmonic signature

of generator

Provides full coverage protection

Provides online and offline protection

prevents serious damage upon application
of excitation

Is frequency independent

Injection Signal
20 Hz
Generator

Pickup
Setting

64S

Measurement Signal
20 Hz Filter

Measurement
Value

For stator ground fault,

20 Hz increases and
relay (64S) operates

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Hazards of field faults

Field ground protection

Tripping considerations

Field ground relay selection and settings

Field overcurrent

Field

Field
Breaker

Exciter

64F
DC

Voltage
Relay
Grounding
Brush

Ground #1
Ground #2

Shorts out part of field winding expect unit vibrations,

possible damage

Causes local rotor current expect rotor heating, distorted

rotor, vibration

Causes arc damage at fault points

Field

Field
Breaker

Exciter

64F
DC

Use on generators
with brushes

Has variable
detection sensitivity

Voltage
Relay
Grounding
Brush

Field Breaker
Control

Positive
Varistor

R2
Generator

Generator
Field

+ Exciter
64F

Test
Pushbutton
(optional)

Field Breaker
Control

Voltage
Relay

R2

Negative

Field
+

Exciter
Field
Breaker

Brush
CR

C2

C1
AC
R

64F

Immediate tripping is recommended on

first ground

However, most installations alarm and

shutdown the machine in orderly manner if
ground alarm persists

Relays should also be provided with time

delays to override transients

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

System backup protection for

generators consists of time-delayed
protection for phase-to-ground and
multiphase fault conditions

Backup generator protection

schemes protect against failure of
system protection and subsequent
long-clearing system faults

Relay settings for backup relaying

must be sensitive to detect low fault
current conditions

Settings must balance opposing

sensitivity requirements to detect
distant faults and security to prevent
unnecessary generator tripping

Note locations of current and

voltage transformers.

Use either distance or voltagerestrained overcurrent relay to

detect system multiphase faults.

Use a time-inverse transformer

neutral connected overcurrent
relay for system ground faults.

98

Choose protection based on line relay

type
If distance type, back up with distance
If time-overcurrent type, back up with V-R or

V-C overcurrent

Time coordinate with system relays

including breaker failure relaying

Current Level

Voltage element supervises (torque controls) a

sensitive, low pickup time-overcurrent element

Under fault conditions, voltage drops below set

level dropping out voltage element and
permitting overcurrent element to operate

Current Pickup Level

V-R overcurrent consists of an overcurrent element

whose pickup level varies as a function of voltage
applied to relay

Normally, generator terminal voltage is above

voltage setting, VS1, and current pickup setting is IS

Current Pickup Level

When close-in fault occurs, voltage can drop below

voltage setting, VS2, and current pickup level is
reduced by factor k to kIS

For voltages between VS1 and VS2, pickup level

varies proportionately between IS and kIS

Set pickup below generator fault current

using synchronous reactance
V-C pickup will likely be below rated current
V-R pickup must be above rated current

Calculate 51V voltage element setting to

avoid 51V relay misoperation under
extreme emergency conditions (with
lowest expected system voltage)

To allow for selectivity, time-delay settings

must be coordinated with transmission
system primary and backup protection,
including breaker failure time

Coordination is usually calculated with

zero voltage restraint

Use three V-C or V-R time-overcurrent relays for

complete multiphase fault coverage

Note that generator fault current may decay

rapidly when low voltage is at generator
terminals overcurrent phase fault backup may
not operate for system faults

Check setting with fault current decrement curve

for particular generator and excitation system

Setting detects line fault when protection

equipment fails

Relay impedance reach and time delay must be

coordinated with system primary and backup
protection, including breaker failure time

Setting must remain conservatively above

machine rating to prevent inadvertent trips on
generator swings and severe voltage disturbances

F5

FLT

F4

F1

F3

F2

The impedance relay

for each generator
requires sensitive
settings to detect
faults at the ends of
long lines in the
presence of other
sources.

Sensitive settings may cause backup relays

to unnecessarily trip generator under some
loading conditions or for minor, stable swings

With this system configuration, it is generally

possible to set backup relays to detect only
close-in faults

Redundant line relaying and breaker failure

relaying are necessary for line, bus, and
transformer protection

Set impedance relay to smallest of the

three following criteria:

120% of longest line (with infeed) if unit is connected to

breaker-and-a-half bus, calculate percent using adjacent
line length

50%66.7% of load impedance (200%150% of generator

capability curve) at machine-rated power factor

80%90% of load impedance (125%111% of generator

capability curve) at relay maximum torque angle (MTA)

GCC
Zone 1
Zone 2
System

jX
30.0
Longest Line
(With Infeed)
75.5 Ohms

25.0

20.0

Zone 2 reach will not provide adequate phase

fault system backup protection as it would
require an extremely large setting. The only
way to ensure adequate protection to avoid
sustained currents to the fault is to provide
redundant transmission system protection.

Zone 2
15.0

10.0

50-67% of GCC
@ RPFA

Shortest Line
(No Infeed)

RPFA

Zone
1
5.0

Transformer
High Side
5.0

GCC

MTA

5.0

10.0

Zone 2 limited to 67% of

generator capability curve
at rated power factor.

5.0

10.0

15.0

R
20.0

Zone 1 set to cover 120%

of GSU impedance.

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Provides for tripping of backup breakers when

the generator breaker does not open after trip
initiation upon detection of

Fault

Abnormal
condition

Open circuit to trip coil

Mechanism fails to open breaker
Breaker opens but breaker contacts fail to
interrupt fault
Tripping of circuit breaker left open after
maintenance

Generator trips may not always be from

high-current events (faults)
Overexcitation
Overvoltage
Sequential tripping

Need to include breaker auxiliary contact

status in addition to current detection
BF protection should be fast enough to
maintain stability but not so fast as to
compromise tripping security

Breaker flashover is a type of breaker

failure
Breaker flashover is most likely to occur
just prior to synchronizing or just after
generator is removed from service

Three-phase simultaneous flashovers are

rare, thus most protection schemes are
designed to detect the flashover of one
or two poles

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Underfrequency occurs as the result of

sudden reduction in input power through
loss of generators or key intertie
importing power

Overfrequency occurs as the result of

sudden loss of load or key intertie
exporting power

Regional reliability councils will typically

provide settings for underfrequency load
shedding and generator tripping

Load shedding schemes must coordinate

and meet regional criteria

Generator tripping criteria must

accommodate any frequency excursion
during any islanding scenario

60

Frequency (Hz)

59

58

57
Generator tripping permitted on
or below curve without requiring
additional equivalent automatic
load shedding.

56

55
0.1

3.3
Time (s)

10

100

300

V%

106

Operation outside shaded area is

limited in extent, duration, and
frequency of occurrence
Severe restrictions
could be imposed on
the generator itself

94

96

104

102

98

100

104

102

f%

98

96

Possibility of frequency
operational limits exists for the generator
in the form of time-frequency characteristics
94

Copyright 2005 IEC,

Geneva Switzerland

Protection of the long tuned blading in the

low-pressure turbine element for steam units

Possibility of cumulative blading fatigue and

blading failure

Similar limitations for combustion and

combined-cycle turbines

Virtually no frequency limitations for hydro

generating units

Example of fictitious steam turbine

operational limits shown in the plot
62

61

Restricted Time
Operating Frequency Limits

60

Continuous Operation

Prohibited
Operation

59
Restricted Time
Operating Frequency Limits
58
57
56
0.001

Prohibited
Operation
0.005
0.01

0.05

0.50
0.10
1.0
Time (Minutes)

5.0

10.0

50.0

100.0

Obtain turbine capability 63

62
from manufacturer
61

Verify if IEC 60034-3:

2007 is applicable

60

Have manufacturer
approve protection
scheme

57

Continuous Operating Region

59
58
10-Minute
Maximum

56
55
54
1

10
100
1000
Total Accumulated Time Limit (Minutes)

Limits similar to steam turbine

Example of frequency limits in the plot

Frequency (Hz)

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

V/Hz application can result in:

Heating of stator core iron
Stray flux increasing beyond design limits causing

additional heating

Overvoltage application:
Stresses stator insulation and connected components
Cannot be reliably detected using V/Hz alone

Offline generator voltage regulator problems

Operating error during unit synchronizing
Control failure
VT fuse loss in voltage regulator (AVR)

System problems
Unit load rejection: full load, partial rejection
Power system islanding during major disturbances

Generators: 1.05 pu (generator base)

Transformers:
1.05 pu at rated load at 0.8 PF
1.1 pu at no load

V%
106

104

102
94

96

98

100

98

96

94
Copyright 2005 IEC, Geneva, Switzerland

102

104 f%

130
125
120
115
110
105
100
0.1

10

100

140

130

120
Individual manufacturers
should be consulted for limits
of a specific transformer.
110
0.01

0.1

1
Time (minutes)

10

100

V/Hz (%)

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Limiting factors are rotor

and stator thermal limits
Underexcited limiting factor
is stator end iron heat
Excitation control setting
control is coordinated with
steady-state stability limit
(SSSL)
Minimum excitation limiter
(MEL) prevents exciter
from reducing the field
below SSSL

Reactive Power
Into System

Rotor
Winding
Limited

+
MVAR

MW
G

System
MVAR

Overexcited

Stator
Winding
Limited
+ MW

Real Power
Into System

MEL
Underexcited

MVAR
Reactive Power
Into Generator

MW
SSSL
Stator End
Iron Limited

System

G
MVAR

Field open circuit

Field short circuit (flashover across slip rings)

Accidental tripping of field breaker

Voltage regulator control system failure

LOF to main exciter

Loss of ac supply to excitation system

Impedance variation with

the machine operating at
or near full load locus
follows path from C to D
Machine that initially
operates at 30% load and
underexcited. Impedance
locus follows path from E
to F to G and oscillates in
region between F and G
Generally for any loading,
impedance terminates on
or varies from D to L

Two modern offset mho

relays can be used

+X

0.5
R

+R
Diameter = 1.0 pu
Offset =

Relay with 1.0 pu impedance

diameter detects LOF
condition from full load to
about 30% load
First relay is set with short
time delay; 0.1-second delay
suggested for security
against misoperation during
transients

Xd
2

2
Diameter = Xd
1

Second relay is set with time

delay; 0.5 to 0.6 seconds
provides protection for LOE
condition up to no load

0.5

Two offset mho relays

provide LOE protection for
any loading level

Both relays are set with

offset of Xd/2

+X

+R
Diameter = 1.0 pu
Offset =

Xd
2

2
Diameter = Xd
1

Experience has shown that these settings are secure over

a wide range of system conditions. However, transient
stability analysis should be performed to verify this.

MEL and LOF characteristic

are coordinated so they do
not overlap
MEL prevents leading var
excursions into the LOF
characteristic to avoid relay
misoperation for system
transients
Negative-offset mho element
characteristic leaves
underprotected area relative to
SSSL and stator end iron limit
curve of the machine capability

0.8

Generator
Capability

0.4

LOF MEL
Relay
SSSL

0.4

0.8

P
0

0.8

0.4

pu (MW)

1.2

Generator

GSU

G
Xd

Per Unit
Mvar

XT

System
Reactance
XS
Where
Xe=XT + XS
X
Xe

V2
2

1
Xe

1
Xd

V2
2

1_ + 1
Xe
Xd

Xd - Xe
2

R
Xd + Xe
2

Per Unit MW

MW - Mvar PER UNIT PLOT

R-X DIAGRAM PLOT

This scheme combines

positive-offset mho relay,
directional relay, and
undervoltage relay applied
at generator terminals and
set to look into machine 1.1 (X )

Z2 Setting

XS

Z1 Setting
R
Xd
Offset =
2

Machine
Capability

Directional unit supervises

mho unit because positiveoffset allows it to operate
for faults external to
generator terminals

MEL

SSSL

Improves coverage

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

System Asymmetries

Open system circuits

Downed conductors
Stuck breaker poles or open switches

Unbalanced loads
Untransposed transmission lines
Single-phase GSU with unequal impedances

Unbalanced system faults

Strongest I2 source is generator phase-tophase fault

Generators connected with delta-wye

GSU transformer
System ground faults appear as phase-to-

phase faults to the generator

Generator ground faults typically do not create

as much I2

I2 in the stator creates a

magnetic field component
that rotates in opposite
direction of rotor and power
system (positive-sequence)
field component

As a result, double-frequency current is

induced in rotor

At twice fundamental frequency, skin

effect promotes current in rotor surface
areas and, to a smaller degree, in the
field winding

Beyond a point, the induced surface

currents can cause heating of metal
wedges that hold field windings and / or
retaining rings on rotor ends, causing them
to anneal, expand, and loosen with
catastrophic results

For salient-pole machines,

double-frequency currents
concentrate at pole faces
and teeth

Much current appears in

the pole-face amortisseur
windings

Continuous Unbalance Current Capability

Generator Type

Permissible I2 Stator
Rating Percent

Salient Pole
Connected Amortisseur Windings

10

Nonconnected Amortisseur Windings

Cylindrical Rotor
Indirectly Cooled

10

Directly Cooled
To 350 MVA

3511250 MVA

8 [(MVA-350)/300)]

12511600 MVA

Short-Time Unbalance Current Capability

Generator Type

K Permissible
I22 t (I2 in pu)

Salient Pole

40

Synchronous Condenser

30

Cylindrical Rotor
Indirectly Cooled

30

Directly Cooled
0800 MVA
8011600 MVA

10
See Graph (next slide)

I22 t Capability

I22 t = 10

I22 t = 10 [(0.00625)(MVA 800)]

Values shown in Tables I and II of this

chapter are for machines manufactured to
IEEE C50 standards since 2005

Equipment nameplate data and / or the

manufacturer may be consulted to verify
machine capabilities

Has limited I2 sensitivity of about 60% of

generator full-load rating
Generally insensitive to load unbalances or

open conductors
Limited protection as damaging heat can

occur even at low levels of I2

Allows backup protection for unbalanced

faults (high levels of I2)

Allows relay characteristics that can

match generator I2 capabilities

Allows I2 pickup settings down to 0.03 pu

Can be set to alarm at lower than

generator limits, allowing plant operator
to attempt to reduce I2 before trip occurs

Time (seconds)

1 103

100

K Setting
Adjustable Over
Range 240

10

40
Minimum
Pickup
0.04 pu

10
5
2

0.1
0.01

0.1
1
Negative-Sequence Current (per unit)

10

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Generator Type

Potential Damage

Diesel

Risk of Explosion

Gas Turbine

Gear Damage

Hydro

Blade Cavitation

Steam

Overheating

Generator Type

Typical Motoring Power

Diesel

5% - 25%

Gas Turbine

> 50%

Hydro

0.2 - 2%

Steam

0.5% - 3%

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

The 78 protection scheme protects the

generator from OOS or pole-slip conditions

Common relay schemes for detecting

generator OOS events include:
Single blinder
Double blinder
Concentric circle

When a Generator Goes Out-of-Step (Synchronism)

with the Power System, High Levels of Transient
Shaft Torque are Developed.

If the Slip Frequency Approaches Natural Shaft

Frequency, Torque Produced can Break the Shaft.

High Stator Core End Iron Flux can Overheat and

Damage the Generator Stator Core.

GSU Subjected to High Transient Currents and

Mechanical Stresses.
171

172

One pair of blinders

(vertical lines)

Supervisory offset
mho

Mho limits reach of

scheme to swings
near the generator

Double
Lens
Scheme

Double
Blinder
Scheme

The most popular OOS

protection is the single
blinder scheme

Pickup area is restricted

to shaded area defined
by inner region of mho
circle and area between
Blinders A and B

Z3(t3)
Z0(t0)
Z2(t2)
Z1(t1)

Positive-sequence impedance must

originate outside either Blinder A or
Blinder B

It should swing through the pickup

area and progress to the opposing
blinder

Swing time should be greater than

time-delay setting

Angle (degrees)

Rotor Angle Generator G_1

Case 1 (tc = 90 ms), with controls

Case 2 (tc = 180 ms), with controls

Case 3 (tc = 190 ms), with controls

Case 1 (tc = 90 ms), without controls

Case 2 (tc = 180 ms), without controls
Case 3 (tc = 190 ms), without controls

Time (seconds)

R-X diagrams show trajectory followed by

impedance seen by relay during disturbance

When an oscillation in the generator is

stable, the point of impedance does not
cross the line of the system

When an OOS condition occurs, the point of

impedance crosses the line of the system
impedance each time the slip is completed

R-X Diagram for Case 1

X (ohm)

X (ohm)

R (ohm)

Case 1
Tc = 0.09 ms

R (ohm)

R (ohm)

Case 2
Tc = 0.18 ms

Case 3
Tc = 0.19 ms

Apply OOS if swing impedance passes

through GSU or generator

This zone is protected by differential relays

that do not respond to power swings

Consider application of OOS if swing

passes outside GSU but line protection is
blocked or does not respond to swings

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Common causes
Wiring failure
Open in VT draw-out assembly
Blown fuse due to short-circuit
Fuse left out after maintenance

Affected functions
21, 27, 32, 40, 50/27, 51V, 67N, 78, 81
Automatic voltage regulator (AVR runaway)

When fuse blows, unbalanced voltages created

Two sets of VTs required

Loss of One or Two Phases

Negative-sequence voltage

& no negative-sequence
current = fuse loss
Negative-sequence voltage

& negative-sequence current

= fault

Three-Phase Loss
Low three-phase voltages

& low three-phase current

& positive-sequence
current = fuse loss
Low three-phase voltages

& high three-phase

currents = fault

Wye-wye grounded VTs on ungrounded system

Mitigation
Line-to-line rated VTs
Broken-delta VTs
VT loading resistor

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Operating errors

Breaker head
flashovers

Control circuit
malfunctions

Combination
of above

Typically, normal generator relaying is not

adequate to detect inadvertent energizing

Generator behaves as induction motor

Flux induced into generator rotor causing

rapid rotor heating

Rotor current is forced into negativesequence path in rotor body

Unit
Step-Up
Transformer

Equivalent
High-Voltage
System

X1T

X1S

X1S = system positive-sequence

reactance
X1T = transformer positive-sequence
reactance
X2G = generator negative-sequence
reactance

Gen.

Gen.

X2G

R2G

EG

ET

ES
Equivalent
System
Voltage

EG = generator terminal voltage

ES = system voltage
ET = transformer high-side voltage
I = current
R2G = generator negative-sequence
resistance

Undervoltage (27) supervises low-set, instant overcurrent (50)

recommended 27 setting is 50% or lower of normal voltage

Pickup timer ensures generator is dead for fixed

time to ride through three-phase system faults

Dropout timer ensures that overcurrent element

gets a chance to trip if voltage is higher than
27 setting during event

Generator
Phase
Voltage
Fault Inception

Breaker Opens
Generator
Phase
Currents

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

OF SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS

Copyright IEEE 2011

Large gas turbines are started as a motor using

static frequency converter

V/Hz is maintained constant until rated voltage is

reached, after which rated voltage is maintained

Extended operation occurs at low speeds while

purging and firing cycles are completed

Generator must be protected during low-frequency

operation

Some protection such as phase overcurrent and

phase unbalance is provided by converter controls

To be effective, multifunction generator relays

must maintain protection down to low frequencies

At lower frequencies, protective functions may

deviate from normal specifications

In some cases, protective functions may have to

be disabled during starting because of possible
false operation

Fault-to-ground on dc link cannot

be detected by converter controls

Fault causes dc current to flow

through any wye-connected VTs
and generator ground

DC current saturates magnetic elements (VTs and

distribution transformer in generator neutral)

Damage can occur if fault is not cleared PT can

be damaged in approximately 50 ms

Two strategies to address this fault include

Measure dc current in generator neutral (e.g., with

transducer) and use dc relay and turn converter off

before damage occurs
Eliminate any ground path through magnetic elements

during starting (use delta-connected VTs and disconnect

generator neutral while starting)

To avoid damage to generator or GSU unit, synchronizing

across breaker should be done within tight limits

Typical recommendations are

Electrical degrees 10
Voltage 0 to +5 percent

Frequency difference < 0.067 Hz

Synchronizing equipment or supervising relays should take

into account breaker closing time and relative slip, closing
breaker in advance so that angle between generator and
system at closing is as close to zero as possible

Generators may be operated at lower

frequency during startup and shutdown

Electromechanical relays can become

very insensitive at off nominal frequencies

Plunger-type overcurrent relays have flat

characteristics down to low frequencies
and are used to provide supplementary
protection during start up and shutdown
these relays cannot be energized
continuously and have to be disconnected
during normal operation
Microprocessor-based relays can provide
protection down to lower frequencies and
generally do not require supplementary
protection

Pickup in Multiples of 60 Hz Pickup

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

(D)
4

(B)
(C)

(A)

(E)

(A)
0

10

(F)
20

30

40
50
Frequency in Hz

60

70

(A)

Plunger-Type Current Relay

(B)

Induction Overcurrent Relay

(C)

Generator Differential Relay

(D)
(E)

Generator Ground Relay

Harmonic Restraint Transformer Differential Relay

(F)

Plunger-Type Voltage Relay

80

IEEE TUTORIAL ON THE PROTECTION

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Copyright IEEE 2011

Generator protection
functions with same
trip / shutdown modes
are grouped together

Operated by protective functions, auxiliary

lockout relays, 86G (usually hand-reset),
perform most tripping

Where possible, primary and backup

relays trip via separate paths / lockouts

Includes tripping of all

electrical and mechanical
power sources

Provides fastest way to

isolate generator

Does not shut down

prime mover

Used when abnormality

can be corrected quickly
allowing fast reconnection

Only trips
generator breaker(s)

Used when
disturbance is on
system and it is
desired to have
generator run its own
auxiliaries

Used to prevent overspeed when delayed

tripping of breakers is not detrimental
following a prime mover trip, planned or
unplanned, breakers are tripped after
reverse or low (hydro) power is detected

Not used for clearing faults

Much tripping philosophy depends on

ability of generating unit to continue
operating after disconnection from system
(full load rejection)

If unit cannot support its own auxiliaries,

then a tripping mode that transfers
auxiliaries should be incorporated

Table II provides suggested steam unit trip

logic by IEEE protective function numbers

Some functions are alarmed only

In general, G means generator and N

means neutral or ground

21 or 51V
24
32
40
46
50/27
50/51G
51TG2
50/51 UAT
59

59G
63
63UAT
67N
78
87G
87GN
87T
87T UAT
87O

51TG1 and 81 are

examples of functions
set to trip in unit
separation mode

Table III provides typical tripping for

hydroelectric units

Trip requirements are similar to thermal

generators but may need slightly
different slip / shutdown operations
Slower rotation devices
Different mechanical control devices

A generator disconnect
switch is often used
when tie to transmission
system is dual-breaker
arrangement

Sometimes generator protective

functions are enabled / disabled by
utilizing auxiliary switch contacts based
on position of disconnect switch

Be cautious about bad or incorrect

disconnect position status leaving
generator unprotected