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In "Schizophrenics, Cyborgs and the Pitfalls of Posthumanism,"
Angela Woods invites us to revisit two canonical analyses of the
postmodern: Fredric Jameson's "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic
of Late Capitalism" and Donna Haraway's "A Manifesto for Cyborgs:
Science, Technology and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s." Jameson
and Haraway introduced to contemporary cultural criticism two
posthumanist icons: the schizophrenic, a pathologized victim of
postmodernity, and the cyborg, a vision of strategic posthuman
subjectivity. In her timely and critical analysis of these articles,
Woods challenges the established notion of an oppositional
relationship between the schizophrenic and the cyborg. She turns to
the "schizo-cyborgs" of cultural theory, psychiatry and
psychoanalysis as evidence of the intimacy between the schizophrenic
and the cyborg, an intimacy which deeply problematizes the
uncritical celebration of Utopian cyborg subjectivity and raises
significant questions about the capacity of either figure to account
for posthuman embodiment.
Schizophrenics, Cyborgs and the Pitfalls of Posthumanism
Angela Woods
<1> The subject -- its construction and deconstruction, its importance to a
radical politics, and its fate in postmodernity -- is an ongoing, central
focus of contemporary critical theory. Unable to withstand the stringent
critiques of feminist and postcolonial theorists, the universal subject of
liberal humanism has, along with its Cartesian metaphysics, been catapulted
into crisis. Postmodernity is now widely credited with imploding, or at least
destabilizing, the binary oppositions that underpinned the intelligibility,
autonomy and integrity of this so-called "master subject of modernism" [1].
Distinctions between culture and nature, cerebral and corporeal, human and
machine, masculine and feminine, and reason and unreason are no longer
perceived to provide an unproblematic foundation for identity or emancipatory
politics. The mid 1980s saw the publication of two canonical
Marxist/Socialist analyses of the postmodern which continue to influence
debates about new forms of subjectivity peculiar to the late twentieth
century. In "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" [2],
Fredric Jameson deployed the term 'schizophrenia" to describe specific
experiences of time and language in the postmodern dissolution of
subjectivity. Donna Haraway, in "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology
and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s" [3], reconfigured the radically
fragmented subject as a cyborg or cybernetic organism, a futuristic vision of
posthuman hybridity. Since their debut in the Anglo-American academy, the
schizophrenic has functioned to pathologize the decentred subject and the
cyborg to denote a new strategic subjectivity, but should we be satisfied
that these roles are as stable and as oppositional as they first appear? More
importantly, should we be satisfied that these templates for contemporary
subjectivity mark a significant departure from the conceptual framework of
liberal humanism, and offer insight into the embodied experience of
postmodernity?
<2> Twenty years later, there are compelling reasons for revisiting Jameson
and Haraway's articles. Foremost among these is simply that despite being

widely anthologized, Jameson and Haraway have not been construed as

interlocutors, and their well-circulated concepts of the schizophrenic and
the cyborg are seldom, if ever, critically compared. Considering the
political affinities and structural similarities of their projects, this is
somewhat surprising. Writing at the height of the Cold War and the dawn of
the digital revolution [4], Jameson and Haraway both provide compelling
arguments for approaching postmodernity as an economically and
technologically distinct historical period. Furthermore, for each theorist,
coding or mapping the information age of multinational capitalism effectively
requires an interdisciplinary approach [5] and a renewed commitment to
analysing postmodernity as a dominant, global phenomenon. Reconceptualizing
subjectivity is central to both their navigational projects, but from the
outset it should be clear that while Jameson confines himself to diagnosing
the "decentred subject" as the schizophrenic casualty of postmodernity,
Haraway's aim is to sketch an ironic Utopian vision of a new late twentiethcentury subject.
<3> This article confronts the conceptual boundary separating the
schizophrenic and cyborg by first analysing the way in which "Cultural Logic"
and "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" describe, situate and code these figures as
responses to a perceived crisis of humanist subjectivity. Few critics have
paused to examine the complexity of these subjective maps, and fewer still
their interrelationship. Here, I offer a critical comparison of the
schizophrenic and the cyborg and a critique of the widespread framing of
these exemplary postmodern subjects as polar opposites. If taken at face
value, the schizophrenic and the cyborg appear diametrically opposed, so much
so as to signal a new constellation of binary oppositions: fragmentation and
synthesis; isolation and collectivity; disembodied (non)subject and
cybernetic organism; political dysfunctionality and oppositional agency.
However, by pressing beyond Jameson and Haraway's claims and examining other
theoretical fusions of the schizophrenic and cyborg, I will argue that the
intimacy of their relationship complicates such neat binary coding. If
schizophrenia can be seen as a distinctively cyborgian fear of subjective
fragmentation, and the cyborg a schizophrenic delusion of unity, is any
simple delineation between them possible? In collapsing the boundaries that
have rendered lived experience intelligible, both these offspring of late
capitalism risk becoming universal categories that cannot account for
material differences of any kind. My suggestion, ultimately, is that the
schizophrenic and cyborg are significant to critical theorists today not
as models for postmodern or posthumanist subjectivity -- one symptomatic and
the other strategic. Rather, as I will demonstrate, instead of resolving the
question of how we might most usefully conceive of postmodern subjectivity,
they serve as strategic reminders that questions of collectivity,
communication, and embodiment are fundamental to its ongoing analysis.
<4> Fredric Jameson has been hailed as "America's leading Marxist critic and
as theorist supreme of the postmodern" [6]. "Postmodernism, or The Cultural
Logic of Late Capitalism," his major statement on the postmodern [7], is said
to be the most quoted and discussed article of the 1980s [8]. For Jameson,
postmodernism signals, above all, a loss of depth. The waning of affect, the
eclipse of parody by pastiche, the loss of the historical referent, the
flattening of space into surfaces, the abandonment of theoretical depth
models, and the schizophrenic aesthetic are all symptomatic of "a new kind of
superficiality" that Jameson argues is the 'supreme formal feature" of the
postmodern [9]. Only when postmodernism is interpreted as an integrated
expression of historically specific economic conditions can the logic of this

aesthetic inventory be "properly" gauged: it must be understood, according to

Jameson, as "the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave
of American military and economic domination throughout the world" [10].
Jameson defends [11] his reading of postmodernism as cultural hegemony as a
strategic one, arguing that we must approach it as "a new systemic cultural
normin order to reflect more adequately on the most effective forms of any
radical politics today" [12]. His commitment to totalizing analysis derives
from a classical Marxism "decidedly unpopular with the contemporary left"
[13] because it ignores gender, race, and ethnicity -- in short,
heterogeneity and hierarchy. Indeed, although Jameson later concedes that
postmodernism serves the interests of a white, male-dominated elite, he all
but dismisses what he calls non-class micropolitics as a "profoundly
postmodern phenomenon" [14]. Marxism is Jameson's privileged hermeneutic by
virtue of its breadth and its resolute exteriority to postmodernism.
<5> Jameson identifies the decentred subject as the causal link between late
capitalism and the postmodern aesthetic. Despite being initially suspicious
of the all-too fashionable "death" of the subject [15], Jameson's entire
thesis depends upon the assumption that the subject is no longer bounded,
centred or possessed of psychic depth. Exactly which economic, technological
or political manifestations of late capitalism are implicated in the
postmodern shift from an alienated to a fragmented subject remains unclear
[16], but through it, time, language and subjectivity are thrown into crisis.
Jameson's sudden introduction of the term schizophrenia to explain these
interrelated crises is therefore potentially misleading, as it creates the
impression that schizophrenia is just a new symptom of the postmodern, as
many critics have concluded. As discussed below, recasting the decentred
subject as schizophrenic enables Jameson to explore specific aspects of the
postmodern dissolution of self, but the reconfiguration also serves a doubly
strategic function. Firstly, it detracts attention from the fact that for
Jameson, the schizophrenic, as the decentred
subject, precipitates postmodernism's major aesthetic trends. Secondly,
despite Jameson's explicit disavowal of any association with the morbid
psychiatric reality of schizophrenia, and his assurances that he is not
offering a "culture-and-personality diagnosis" of contemporary society [17],
the substitution of schizophrenic for decentred subject functions precisely
as a diagnosis, if not a pathologization, of the postmodern self. As several
theorists have noted, it would be disingenuous indeed to imagine that the
term floats free of any clinical connotations of psychic suffering as well as
dysfunction [18].
<6> Postmodern schizophrenia is not to be confused, however, with the highmodernist experiences of "radical isolation and solitude, anomie, private
revolt [and] Van Gogh-type madness" [19], as the decentred subject can no
longer project the drama of inner feeling [20]. For Jameson (loosely
following Lacan) subjectivity is a function of language, where identity is
created and sustained through the temporal organization of linguistic
signifiers. Schizophrenia is the disintegration of this "objective mirage of
signification," such that "when the links of that signifying chain snap, then
we have schizophrenia in the form of a rubble of distinct and unrelated
signifiers" [21]. Again, Jameson seems typically disinterested in causally
linking this 'snap" to a specific aspect of late capitalism, focussing
instead on its consequences. "If we are unable to unify the past, present and
future of the sentence," Jameson argues, "then we are similarly unable to
unify the past, present and future of our own biographical experience or
psychic life" [22]. Identity and intentionality are thus abolished in the

schizophrenic surrender to the mysterious affective charge and dazzling

materiality of the isolated signifier [23]; "action, project, and orientation
collapse in the literal, nauseous, and real present" [24]
<7> Jacqueline Rose asks an extremely pertinent question of Jameson's
totalizing account of postmodern schizophrenic subjectivity:
What dramatization, sanitization, and desexualization follow from this
general inflation of psychic economies across the whole of social space?
Dramatization because it becomes precisely the drama of all modern subjects;
sanitization since, despite the idea of a crisis, the model seems to become
strangely divested of some of the most difficult aspects of the psychic
itself; desexualization perhaps most oddly of allbecause of the glaring
omission of any question of sexual difference [25]
Anthony Elliott goes on to suggest that the question of sexual difference is
simply displaced onto the all-purpose category of fragmentation [26]. Most
troubling, I would argue, is the schizophrenic transcendence or erasure of
the body and its social inscriptions. Despite these serious shortcomings,
which I discuss in more detail later, the idea of a symbiotic relationship
between schizophrenia and postmodernism has strong support in contemporary
literary and cultural theory [27], and some even suggest the connection is
more than allegorical [28]. While Jameson's is by no means the first or the
most psychologically sophisticated analysis of postmodernism and
schizophrenia [29], his boundary-dwelling schizophrenic is a vivid symbol of
the perceived loss of subjective depth in postmodernity. Stranded in the
perpetual present with no border between the self and the stimuli of the
external world [30], the schizophrenic is incapable of achieving critical
distance, representing the "technological sublime," and cognitive mapping -projects of subjective orientation that Jameson argues are essential if we
are to navigate the unrepresentable totality of capital [31]. In summary,
schizophrenia is for Jameson "a challenge to overcome and surmount" [32].
<8> The move from the schizophrenic disintegration of subjective boundaries
to a cyborg identity "predicated on transgressed boundaries" [33] brings us
to the work of Donna Haraway. Haraway is without doubt the most important
theorist of "cyborgology," an interdisciplinary critical field that is as
much an "academic attitude" [34] as a fertile territory where science,
feminism, and cultural studies converge. For Haraway, the cyborg is an
ontological solution to an epistemological problem: a new mode of postmodern
being and a strategic intervention in 1980s feminism. Haraway's founding
premise is that "There is nothing about being "female" that naturally binds
women. There is not even such a state as "being" female, itself a highly
complex category constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses and
other social practices" [35]. By claiming to speak for all women, socialist,
radical, liberal and ecofeminists effect, in Haraway's view, an "unintended
erasure of polyvocal, unassimilable, radical difference" [36]. Victimhood,
innocence, pre-Oedipal desire, and pseudo-divine feminine intuition are, she
argues, neither grounds for insight, nor suitable bases for a responsible
feminist politics [37]. For Haraway, postmodernity's new biotechnologies,
proliferating communication systems, and exploitative "homework economy" are
key markers of the transition from older hierarchical social structures into
'scary new networks" she terms the "informatics of domination" [38]. The
challenge for feminists is to map the informatics of domination without
recourse to metanarratives, 'salvation history" or the phallogocentric master
code [39]. Rejecting the essential innocence of unity, origin and nature,

Haraway calls for a politics that would "embrace partial, contradictory,

permanently unclosed constructions of personal and collective selves and
still be faithful, effective -- and, ironically, socialist feminist" [40].
<9> The cyborg myth attempts to reconcile these contradictory political
imperatives. Heralded as "the postmodern icon" [41], the cyborg is every inch
a late twentieth century being born from the breakdown of three key
boundaries -- those separating human from animal, organism from machine, and
physical from non-physical [42]. Haraway's cyborg is a synthetic figure and a
figure of synthesis, a cybernetic organism that incorporates the "other" into
the "human" and captures the tensions between them. Neither bounded nor
autonomous, it is a function of multiple, intersecting communication
networks. Consequently, Haraway pays little attention to psychic interiority
in her account of cyborg identity, instead privileging bodies, texts, and
labor as its key construction sites. "A cyborg body," she insists, "is not
innocent; it was not born in a garden; it does not seek unitary identity"
[43]. With "an intimate experience of boundaries, their construction and
deconstruction" [44], and a penchant for fusing, coupling and (re)assembling
parts, the cyborg is both a material being in constant flux, and a framework
through which to imagine new collaborative and collective identities.
<10> Unlike Jameson, who situates himself outside postmodernism in order to
diagnose its symptoms, Haraway foregrounds her own situatedness, writing from
"the belly of the monster" [45] with a sense of urgency, frustration and
excitement befitting a manifesto. Haraway's passionate investment in the
cyborg does not, however, make it an unproblematic ontological model. As
Rosemary Hennessy points out, Haraway does not escape feminist standpoint
theory's difficulty in adequately explaining the relationship between the
discursive (the cyborg as a new feminist mode of subjectivity) and the
presumably non-discursive (the changing material reality of women's lives)
[46]. While explicitly rejecting totalizing theory [47], Haraway's postmodern
manifesto paradoxically constructs cyborg identity as a global phenomenon
that is the only viable mode of subjectivity in postmodernity. Her famous
parting shot, "I"d rather be a cyborg than a goddess" [48], has therefore
attracted responses both petulant ("Why not explore the potential of
cybergoddesses?" [49]) pertinent ("Is it better to be a cyborg than a woman?"
[50]) and political ("If I"m a cyborg rather than a goddess will patriarchy
go away?" [51]). Haraway's subsequent description of her 1985 cyborg as "a
girl who's trying not to become Woman, but remain responsible to women of
many colors and positions" [52] encapsulates the feminist impulse of the
manifesto, but is incommensurable with her claim that she sought to dismiss
"the fetishized perfect subject of oppositional history" [53] in favor of a
frequently ambiguous and permanently incomplete cyborg. How the cyborg can
sustain such openness and an allegiance to socialist feminism is a central,
unresolved problem.
<11> What makes Haraway's cyborg so attractive to its supporters is that it
participates in "a decentring of traditional subjectivity" while offering "a
physical and bodily experience ofstrategic subjectivities" [54]. She insists
upon a subject who can be 'something other than a shroud for the day after
the apocalypse" [55]. But while cyborg subjectivity-as-collage is distinctly
un-funereal, is it necessarily revolutionary? Can we, with Chela Sandoval,
confidently claim that it offers hope to "Jameson's lost subject"? [56] The
cyborg certainly appears more savvy than the schizophrenic, but Haraway's
unmistakable Utopianism does not in itself ensure its political efficacy. The
cyborg's extreme dependence on and proximity to postmodern communication

networks renders it particularly susceptible to information overload, and

even subjective disintegration [57]. When the "privileged pathology" of
postmodernity is communications breakdown [58], how can we differentiate
cyborg heteroglossia from the schizophrenic's "rubble of distinct and
unrelated signifiers"? Cyborg integrity and oppositionality, which I am
suggesting is as much about resisting schizophrenic disintegration as it is
about outmanoeuvring the goddess, hinges upon a strategic commitment Haraway
promises but cannot guarantee.
<12> Since their Anglo-American debut in the mid 1980s, the schizophrenic and
the cyborg have been frequently interpreted as victim and visionary of the
postmodern. So well entrenched are the perceived distinctions between them,
it is tempting to suggest that Haraway and Jameson's border-subjects
paradoxically offer us a new binary opposition with which to map contemporary
subjectivity. However, like most boundaries in postmodern theory, this one is
certainly permeable, contested and unstable. To explore in more depth the
intersections (and indeed, intimacy) between the schizophrenic and the
cyborg, I turn first to the 'schizo-cyborgs" of two post-Marxist texts -Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari's Anti-Oedipus [59] and Jean
Baudrillard's The Ecstasy of Communication [60] -- and then to the cyborgian
dimensions of schizophrenic delusions, as articulated within psychiatric and
psychoanalytic discourse.
<13> For Deleuze and Guattari, schizophrenia is a process of ego-loss; a deOedipalization of the subject reconceptualized as an endlessly reassembling
desiring-machine. This schizophrenic process is emancipatory [61], for
Deleuze and Guattari, because it liberates desire that is presumed to be
subversive, revolutionary and true to itself [62]; and dismantles the
insidious fiction of autonomous, bounded selfhood. Jameson's schizophrenic
owes much to Deleuze and Guattari's schizo, but his stated affiliation with
their project [63] is fraught, not least because
Deleuze and Guattari's whole view of history as an essentially aleatory,
contingent, and heterogeneous series of intensive states experienced by
partial, nomadic subjects secreted by schizophrenic desiring-production would
seem to be completely incommensurable with Jameson's own conception of a
single great adventure of class struggle [64].
Rather than interpret schizophrenia as a primarily linguistic or psychic
phenomenon, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the materiality of fragmentation.
Like Haraway, they valorize the cyborgian coupling, networking and fusion of
human/nonhuman parts, but explicitly reject the idea of their integrated
assembly. The notion of a single cybernetic organism is rejected in favor of
a body-without-organs, "an imageless, organless body [which is] perpetually
reinserted into the process of production" [65]. Here, Anti-Oedipus, I would
argue, loosely equates the schizophrenic dissolution of subjectivity with the
production of interminably dis/assembling cyborgs: both 'schizo" and cyborg
are effective insofar as they remain partial and deterritorialized.
<14> Jean Baudrillard offers a very different, and markedly more frightening,
view of the cyborgian schizophrenic as a "pure screen," an "immanent surface"
across which communication networks simply flicker [66]. Like Jameson's
schizophrenic, Baudrillard's schizo-cyborg is primarily described in terms of
communicative dysfunction. Bereft of psychic depth and flattened into two
dimensions, any distinction between interior and exterior is abolished, and
along with it any notion of corporeality. This schizophrenic-as-terminal

effectively signals a termination of political subjectivity. Interpenetrated

by the communication apparatuses of a technologically manipulated world,
Baudrillard's schizophrenic is characterized by a terrifying overexposure to
the hyperreal [67]. This is schizophrenia as cyborg reification, where the
self, or any meaningful approximation of it, is utterly subsumed by the vast
digital networks of late capitalism. More disturbing than the idea of an
automaton invaded and controlled by technology, here the schizo-cyborg is
simply its empty reflection.
<15> Schizo-cyborgs are not creatures confined to Marxist and post-Marxist
imaginaries, but have long circulated in the annals of psychiatric and
psychoanalytic accounts of psychosis. Experiencing the self as a machine, in
whole or in part, or as cybernetically connected to external technological
devices, is well documented as a staple schizophrenic delusion. Emil
Kraepelin, the first psychiatrist to identify dementia praecox
(schizophrenia) as a disease entity, remarked on the prevalence of delusions
of technological persecution and bodily mutation [68]; Carl Jung analysed the
role "the telephone" played in commenting on his schizophrenic patient's
other delusions [69]; in 1919, Victor Tausk published his seminal analysis of
the "influencing machine" in schizophrenia [70]; and today's diagnostic
manuals still single out the reassembly of body organs as a typically
"bizarre" delusion [71]. The delusional reconfiguration of bodies or body
parts as independently mechanical and externally operated can be seen as a
means of symbolically arresting the fragmentation or dissolution of self; as
the schizophrenic stabilization of a perceived lack of autonomy and
boundedness. As Avital Ronell suggests, "the schizophrenic gives us exemplary
access to the fundamental shifts in affectivity and corporeal organization
produced and commanded by technology, in part because the schizophrenic
inhabits these other territorialities" [72] While the schizophrenic only
technically becomes cyborg, according to cyborgologists, when delusions are
treated psychopharmacologically [73], from within the depth of a delusion
acutely registered on the body, the schizophrenic can articulate what it
feels like to be a cyborg, to be "produced" if not "commanded by technology."
The schizo-cyborg can suggest possibilities for the romantic revisioning of
subjectivity (Deleuze and Guattari) as well as its expiration (Baudrillard),
but by raising the question of the delusion (as in "real-life" schizophrenia)
it forces us to rethink the dualisms of mind/body and real/unreal in accounts
of schizophrenic and cyborg subjectivity.
<16> As I hope to have demonstrated, the appearance of multiple schizocyborgs suggests a theoretical intimacy between the schizophrenic and cyborg,
rendering them a potentially dysfunctional or ineffectual binary opposition.
Nothing beyond an imputed oppositionality guarantees that the cyborg will
successfully negotiate the multiple networks of the information age, as
schizophrenia's communicative breakdown -- isolation in a chaos of
disassociated signifiers -- haunts Haraway's cyborg as its "privileged
pathology." Equally, the integrity and agency of the cyborg body could be a
delusion of Jameson's depthless and disoriented schizophrenic. Such
confusions arise because Jameson and Haraway relocate the decentred subject
in an unmapped territory, an area beyond the boundaries of gender, race,
sexuality, class and even psychic structure; a conceptual space only
tenuously, if at all, connected to the changed material and economic reality
of postmodernity. The possibility -- or desirability -- of resurrecting
liberal humanism or identity politics in order to map this space is rejected
by both Jameson and Haraway; unlike some cyberfeminists, they refuse to
valorize "the local" as the only contemporary guarantor of self-hood [74]. So

the central question raised, and still unresolved, by the schizophrenic and
cyborg is: how can we imagine posthumanist subjects capable of sustaining
connection across time and in space? Drawing on the work of Elizabeth Grosz
[75] and N Katherine Hayles [76], I argue that the schizophrenic and cyborg
call attention to the importance of the body, or more specifically,
embodiment, as a precondition of orientation and participation in the
communication networks of late capitalism.
<17> Despite acknowledging that culture today is "dominated by space and
spatial logic" [77], Jameson portrays the fragmentation of subjectivity
exclusively as a crisis of the temporal organization of language. For all his
discussion of the quantifiable material markers of this new epoch, the
arguably most basic material reference point -- the body -- is absent. As
exemplary postmodern subject, the schizophrenic does not dismantle the
Cartesian divide between mind and body that characterized its liberal
humanist predecessor; on the contrary, it would appear that schizophrenia
exacerbates the split, throwing the mind into crisis and signalling the
disappearance of the body altogether. Although for Jameson it is class
consciousness, rather than corporeality, which is essential to the cognitive
mapping of the postmodern, he claims that postmodern hyperspace 'stands as
something like an imperative to grow new organs, to expand our sensorium and
our body to some new, as yet unimaginable, perhaps ultimately impossible,
dimensions" [78]. As "current fantasies about the salvational nature of high
technologyentertainedby many intellectualsare essentially of a piece with
more vulgar apologies for postmodernism" [79], Jameson clearly refuses the
proposition that cyborg modification would ensure effective corporeal
reconfiguration. Constrained by a view of the body as "merely physical,"
Jameson refers only to its role in navigating physical space, overlooking its
importance to subjective orientation in history and cultural space. As it is
the disembodied schizophrenic who, for Jameson, is a symbol of temporal,
linguistic and subjective disintegration, he seems implicitly to suggest that
the successful negotiation of postmodernism requires a reconceptualization of
embodiment.
<18> In seeking to move beyond a feminist valorization of nature or the
female body as grounds for insight or resistance, Haraway locates cyborg
corporeality at the intersection of fiction and reality. What is troubling
about Haraway's account of the cyborg body is its singularity: disrupting the
organic wholeness of "traditional bodies," it risks reinscribing their very
real differences as an unending and unrepresentable proliferation of
difference, or subsuming them within a new Platonic ideal. Promising an
ironic ontology liberated from the hierarchical taxonomies of gender and
race, the cyborg simultaneously threatens to liberate us from the materiality
of embodiment, to become, as Haraway herself acknowledges, "the awful
apocalyptic telosof the "West's" escalating dominations of abstract
individuation" [80]. For Hayles, construing the cyborg body as an effect of
communication networks continues, rather than disrupts, the liberal humanist
erasure of embodiment [81]; privileging a normative ideal of "the body" which
ignores its specific and messy instantiation. Grosz further argues that
neutralizing or neutering the specificity of the body reinstates an entire
matrix of binary oppositions in which women are assigned an inferior place
[82]. The urgent task for feminists, she contends, is to provide an account
of "embodied subjectivity" which "refuses reductionism, resists dualism, and
remains suspicious of the holism and unity implied by monism," as there is
"no one mode that is capable of representing the "human" in all its richness
and variability" [83].

<19> In surrendering to the proliferation of difference (represented as

linguistic chaos, or the endless refiguring of the cyborg body) both
schizophrenic and cyborg effectively erase difference, becoming metaphors for
a universal subjectivity. As maps of the postmodern, singular icons for
radical heterogeneity, neither the schizophrenic nor the cyborg can begin to
account for a variety of lived experience in postmodernity, let alone the
inequitable distribution of power and resources among global citizens.
"Cultural Logic" and "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" are principally concerned with
the subjective navigation of the postmodern, but as the schizophrenic and
cyborg are both abstracted from the cultural specificity of embodiment upon
which orientation depends, neither feminist coding nor cognitive mapping is
logically possible, for successful cartography is surely a prerogative of
political, geographical and ideological location. Embodiment is, as Grosz and
Hayles make clear, essential to the remapping of subjectivity beyond the
paradigm of liberal humanism, to the configuration of subjects in an epoch
said to have imploded binary oppositions, but unable to abolish the material
effects of their operation. It would therefore be a mistake to see Haraway's
cyborg exclusively as a postmodern success story, because to be faithful to
socialist feminism (and impervious to technofascism [84]) the cyborg must
constantly return to material realities shaped by class and gender, to the
very bodily boundaries it is deemed to have transgressed. Similarly, by
"inflating" and "dramatising," to use Rose's terms, the collapse of a
particular kind subject as a crisis ofall subjects, Jameson begs the question
of whether those who were historically subordinated within the philosophical
framework of liberal humanism on the basis of their bodies also have a
schizophrenic experience of postmodernity [85]. Although the cyborg seems to
foreclose the possibility of an appeal to different physical realities, in
fact it joins Jameson's schizophrenic in implicitly calling attention to the
importance of the body -- or rather, bodies -- in accounts of contemporary
subjectivity. What both the schizophrenic and the cyborg do within the
broader context of Jameson and Haraway's analyses is signal the urgent need
for subjects to map and code postmodernity not from a disembodied vantage
point, but from a corporeally-informed perspective, one which would see
embodiment as a precondition of viable communication and collectivity.
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---. Subject to Ourselves: Social Theory, Psychoanalysis and Postmodernity.
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---. How Like a Leaf: an interview with Thyrza Nichols Goodeve. New York:
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---. "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist Feminism in
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---. "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege
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Hawthorne, Susan. "Connectivity: Cultural Practices of the Powerful or

Subversion from the Margins?" CyberFeminism: Connectivity, Critique and
Creativity. Eds. Susan Hawthorne and Renate Klein. Melbourne: Spinifex, 1999.
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Literature, and Informatics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
Hennessy, Rosemary. Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse. New
York and London: Routledge, 1993.
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Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.
Jameson, Fredric. "Cognitive Mapping." Marxism and the Interpretation of
Culture. Eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 1988. ---. "Pleasure: a Political Issue (1983)." The
Ideologies of Theory, Essays 1971 - 1986, Volume 2: The Syntax of History.
London: Routledge, 1988. ---. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a
Socially Symbolic Act. London: Methuen, 1981.
---. "Postmodernism and Consumer Society." The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on
Postmodern Culture. Ed. Hal Foster. Port Townsend: Bay Press, 1983. ---.
"Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism." New Left
Review 146.July/August (1984): 53-92.
---. Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. London: Verso,
1991.
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the Postmodern Subject." After the Future: Postmodern Times and Places. Ed.
Gary Shapiro. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.
Jung, Carl. The Psychology of Dementia Praecox. Trans. A A Brill. New York:
Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, 1944.
Kellner, Douglas. "Introduction: Jameson, Marxism, and
Postmodernism." Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique. Ed. Douglas Kellner.
Washington: Maisonneuve Press, 1989.
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Limits of Politics." Bodyspace: Destabilizing Geographies of Gender and
Sexuality. Ed. Nancy Duncan. London and New York: Routledge, 1996. Kirkup,
Gill. "Introduction." The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader. Ed. Gill Kirkup, et al.
London: Routledge, 2000.
Klein, Renate. "The Politics of Cyberfeminism: If I"m a Cyborg rather than a
Goddess will Patriarchy go away?" CyberFeminism: Connectivity, Critique and
Creativity. Eds. Susan Hawthorne and Renate Klein. Melbourne: Spinifex, 1999.
Kovel, Joel. "Schizophrenic Being and Technocratic Society." Pathologies of
the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and
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Kraepelin, Emil. Clinical Psychiatry. 1907. Trans. A R Diefendorf. Vol. 7.

New York: Scholars" Facsimiles & Reprints, 1981.
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of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and Depression. New York and London: New York
University Press, 1987.
Lykke, Nina. "Between Monsters, Goddesses and Cyborgs: Feminist
Confrontations with Science." The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader. Ed. Gill Kirkup,
et al. London: Routledge, 2000.
O"Neill, John. "Religion and Postmodernism: The Durkheimian Bond in Bell and
Jameson." Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique. Ed. Douglas Kellner. Washington:
Maisonneuve Press, 1989.
Penley, Constance, and Andrew Ross. "Cyborgs at Large: Interview with Donna
Haraway." Technoculture. Eds. Constance Penley and Andrew Ross. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1991.
Pfeil, Fred. "'Makin' Flippy-Floppy': Postmodernism and the Baby-Boom
PMC." Another Tale to Tell: Politics and Narrative in Postmodern Culture.
London and New York: Verso, 1990.
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Roberts, Adam. Frederic Jameson. London: Routledge, 2000.
Ronell, Avital. The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric
Speech. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989.
Rose, Jacqueline. "'The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat' or 'A Wife is
Like an Umbrella' -- Fantasies of the Modern and Postmodern." Universal
Abandon: The Politics of Postmodernism. Ed. Andrew Ross. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1988. Sandoval, Chela. "New Sciences: Cyborg
Feminism and the Methodology of the Oppressed." Cybersexualities: A Reader on
Feminist Theory, Cyborgs and Cyberspace. Ed. Jenny Wolmark. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1999.
Sass, Louis A. "The Consciousness Machine: Self and Subjectivity in
Schizophrenia and Modern Culture." The Conceptual Self in Context: Culture,
Experience, Self-understanding. Eds. Ulric Neisser and David A Jopling.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
---. Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature
and Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992.
Sofoulis, Zo. "Cyberquake: Haraway's Manifesto." Prefiguring Cyberculture:
An Intellectual History. Eds. Darren Tofts, Annemarie Jonson and Alessio
Carallaro. Sydney: Power Publications, 2002.
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Tausk, Victor. "On the Origin of the 'Influencing Machine' in Schizophrenia

(1919)." The Psycho-Analytic Reader: An Anthology of Essential Papers with
Critical Introductions. Ed. Robert Fliess. London: The Hogarth Press and the
Institute of Pyscho-Analysis, 1950. 31 - 64.
Wolmark, Jenny. "Introduction and Overview." Cybersexualities: A Reader on
Feminist Theory, Cyborgs and Cyberspace. Ed. Jenny Wolmark. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1999.
Woods, Angela. "Subjectivity 'in crisis': Masculinity and Schizophrenia in
David Fincher's Fight Club." antiTHESIS 13 (2002): 76-95.
Notes
[1] Fredric Jameson, quoted in Anders Stephanson, "Regarding Postmodernism A Conversation with Fredric Jameson," Universal Abandon? The Politics of
Postmodernism, ed. Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1988) 21. [^]
[2] Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late
Capitalism," New Left Review 146 July/August (1984). [^]
[3] Donna Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and
Socialist Feminism in the 1980s," Socialist Review 80 March/April (1985). [^]
[4] It is not unfitting that "A Manifesto for Cyborgs" was the first piece
Haraway wrote on a computer. Donna Haraway, How Like a Leaf: an interview
with Thyrza Nichols Goodeve (New York: Routledge, 2000) 39. [^]
[5] For an extensive discussion of the far-reaching interdisciplinary
influence of "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," see Zo Sofoulis, "Cyberquake:
Haraway's Manifesto," Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History, eds.
Darren Tofts, Annemarie Jonson and Alessio Carallaro (Sydney: Power
Publications, 2002). [^]
[6] Michael Hardt and Kathi Weeks, eds., The Jameson Reader (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2000) 1-2. [^]
[7] The article is an extended version of Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism and
Consumer Society," The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal
Foster (Port Townsend: Bay Press, 1983). It is also reproduced as the first
chapter of Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late
Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991). [^]
[8] Douglas Kellner, "Introduction: Jameson, Marxism, and
Postmodernism," Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique, ed. Douglas Kellner
(Washington: Maisonneuve Press, 1989) 2. [^]
[9] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 60.
[^]
[10] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 57.
[^]

[11] Challenges to Jameson's totalizing analysis have come even from those
most sympathetic to his account of postmodernism. See Fred Pfeil, "'Makin'
Flippy-Floppy': Postmodernism and the Baby-Boom PMC," Another Tale to Tell:
Politics and Narrative in Postmodern Culture (London and New York: Verso,
1990). [^]
[12] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 57.
[^]
[13] Hans Bertens, "Fredric Jameson: Fear and loathing in Los Angeles," The
Idea of the Postmodern: A History (London and New York: Routledge, 1995) 165.
See also Steven and Douglas Kellner Best, "Marxism, Feminism, and Political
Postmodernism," Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations (New York:
Guilford, 1991) 188. [^]
[14] Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 318-9.
[^]
[15] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 63.
[^]
[16] In an earlier essay, Jameson is equally vague on this point: "The
immense culture of the simulacrum whose experience, whether we like it or
not, constitutes a whole series of daily ecstasies and punctual fits
of jouissance or schizophrenic dissolutionsmay appropriately, one would
think, be interpreted as so many unconscious points of contact with that
equally unfigurable and unimaginable thing, the multinational apparatus, the
great suprapersonal system of late capitalist technology." Fredric Jameson,
"Pleasure: a Political Issue (1983)," The Ideologies of Theory, Essays 1971 1986, Volume 2: The Syntax of History (London: Routledge, 1988) 73. [^]
[17] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 71.
[^]
[18] Anthony Elliott, Subject to Ourselves: Social Theory, Psychoanalysis and
Postmodernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) 35. See also James M Glass,
"Postmodernism and the Multiplicity of Self," Shattered Selves: Multiple
Personality in a Postmodern World (Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, 1993) 7. [^]
[19] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 63.
[^]
[20] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 61.
[^]
[21] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 72.
[^]
[22] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 72.
[^]
[23] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 73.
[^]

[24] John O"Neill, "Religion and Postmodernism: The Durkheimian Bond in Bell
and Jameson," Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique, ed. Douglas Kellner
(Washington: Maisonneuve Press, 1989) 148. [^]
[25] Jacqueline Rose, ""The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat" or "A Wife is
Like an Umbrella" -- Fantasies of the Modern and Postmodern," Universal
Abandon: The Politics of Postmodernism, ed. Andrew Ross (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 241. [^]
[26] Anthony Elliott, "The Dislocating World of
Postmodernism," Psychoanalytic Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell,
1994) 161. [^]
[27] See David Michael Levin, ed., Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern
Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and Depression (New York and London: New
York University Press, 1987);John Johnston, "Ideology, Representation,
Schizophrenia: Toward a Theory of the Postmodern Subject," After the Future:
Postmodern Times and Places, ed. Gary Shapiro (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1990); Stephen Frosh, Identity Crisis: Modernity,
Psychoanalysis and the Self (London: Macmillan, 1991);Mark Currie, "Culture
and Schizophrenia," Postmodern Narrative Theory (London: Macmillan, 1998).
[^]
[28] Joel Kovel, 'schizophrenic Being and Technocratic Society," Pathologies
of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and
Depression, ed. David Michael Levin (New York and London: New York University
Press, 1987) 334;Louis A Sass, "The Consciousness Machine: Self and
Subjectivity in Schizophrenia and Modern Culture," The Conceptual Self in
Context: Culture, Experience, Self-understanding, eds. Ulric Neisser and
David A Jopling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 217. [^]
[29] Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus was well known to Jameson, and his
relatively brief account of schizophrenia in no way rivals the complexity of
Sass" work. See Louis A Sass, Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of
Modern Art, Literature and Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1992). [^]
[30] Klaus R. Scherpe, "Dramatization and De-dramatization of 'the End': The
Apocalyptic Consciousness of Modernity and Post-Modernity," trans. Brent O.
Peterson, Cultural Critique 5 (1986): 102. [^]
[31] We are using unfashionable here in the sense used by Geoffrey Bennington
in Interrupting Derrida (New York: Routledge, 2000), 129-a sense to do with
the hope of academic discourse that it will be able "to set the tone again."
[32] Bennington, 133. [^]
[33] See our "extroduction" to Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callus,
eds, Discipline and Practice: The (Ir)Resistibility of Theory (Lewisburg, PA:
Bucknell University Press; forthcoming), and also our "What's Wrong with
Posthumanism?" in Rhizomes 7 (2003). Available online:
http://www.rhizomes.net/issue7/callus.htm [^]
[34] Bennington, 130. [^]

[35] See Jean-Franois Lyotard, "Unbeknownst," in Postmodern Fables, trans.

Georges van der Abbeele (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997),
185-97. [^]
[20] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 61.
[^]
[21] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 72.
[^]
[22] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 72.
[^]
[23] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 73.
[^]
[24] John O"Neill, "Religion and Postmodernism: The Durkheimian Bond in Bell
and Jameson," Postmodernism/Jameson/Critique, ed. Douglas Kellner
(Washington: Maisonneuve Press, 1989) 148. [^]
[25] Jacqueline Rose, ""The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat" or "A Wife is
Like an Umbrella" -- Fantasies of the Modern and Postmodern," Universal
Abandon: The Politics of Postmodernism, ed. Andrew Ross (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 241. [^]
[26] Anthony Elliott, "The Dislocating World of
Postmodernism," Psychoanalytic Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell,
1994) 161. [^]
[27] See David Michael Levin, ed., Pathologies of the Modern Self: Postmodern
Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and Depression (New York and London: New
York University Press, 1987);John Johnston, "Ideology, Representation,
Schizophrenia: Toward a Theory of the Postmodern Subject," After the Future:
Postmodern Times and Places, ed. Gary Shapiro (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1990); Stephen Frosh, Identity Crisis: Modernity,
Psychoanalysis and the Self (London: Macmillan, 1991);Mark Currie, "Culture
and Schizophrenia," Postmodern Narrative Theory (London: Macmillan, 1998).
[^]
[28] Joel Kovel, 'schizophrenic Being and Technocratic Society," Pathologies
of the Modern Self: Postmodern Studies of Narcissism, Schizophrenia and
Depression, ed. David Michael Levin (New York and London: New York University
Press, 1987) 334;Louis A Sass, "The Consciousness Machine: Self and
Subjectivity in Schizophrenia and Modern Culture," The Conceptual Self in
Context: Culture, Experience, Self-understanding, eds. Ulric Neisser and
David A Jopling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 217. [^]
[29] Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus was well known to Jameson, and his
relatively brief account of schizophrenia in no way rivals the complexity of
Sass" work. See Louis A Sass, Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of
Modern Art, Literature and Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1992). [^]

[30] Adam Roberts, Frederic Jameson (London: Routledge, 2000) 123-4. Kathleen
Kirby argues persuasively that as the postmodern subject has "lost its
traditional from of enclosed interiority encapsulated in a boundary,"
schizophrenia can be interpreted as much as a dysfunction of spatial as
temporal existence. Kathleen M Kirby, "Re: Mapping subjectivity: Cartographic
Vision and the Limits of Politics," Bodyspace: Destabilizing Geographies of
Gender and Sexuality, ed. Nancy Duncan (London and New York: Routledge, 1996)
51. [^]
[31] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 7791.See also Fredric Jameson, "Cognitive Mapping," Marxism and the
Interpretation of Culture, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1988) 347-57. [^]
[32] Kellner, "Introduction: Jameson, Marxism, and Postmodernism," 29. [^]
[33] Anne Balsamo, "Reading Cyborgs Writing Feminism," The Gendered Cyborg: A
Reader, ed. Gill Kirkup, et al (London: Routledge, 2000) 155. [^]
[34] Chris Hables Gray, Steven Mentor and Heidi J Figueroa-Sarriera,
"Cyborgology: Constructing the Knowledge of Cybernetic Organisms," The Cyborg
Handbook, ed. Chris Hables Gray (New York: Routledge, 1995) 7-8. See also
Jenny Wolmark, "Introduction and Overview," Cybersexualities: A Reader on
Feminist Theory, Cyborgs and Cyberspace, ed. Jenny Wolmark (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1999) 3-4. [^]
[35] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 72. [^]
[36] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 78. [^]
[37] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 75,96,101. [^]
[38] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 80. [^]
[39] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 95. [^]
[40] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 75. [^]
[41] Balsamo, "Reading Cyborgs Writing Feminism," 149. Emphasis in the
original. [^]
[42] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 68-71. [^]
[43] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 99. [^]
[44] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 100. [^]
[45] Donna Haraway quoted in Constance Penley, and Andrew Ross, "Cyborgs at
Large: Interview with Donna Haraway," Technoculture, eds. Constance Penley
and Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) 6.
Haraway's critique of viewpoints that "deny stakes in location, embodiment,
and partial perspective [in order to] make it possible to see well" is
elucidated in Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in

Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," Simians, Cyborgs, and

Women: The Reinvention of Nature (London: Free Association Books, 1991) 191.
[^]
[46] Rosemary Hennessy, Materialist Feminism and the Politics of
Discourse (New York and London: Routledge, 1993) 67-9, 71-3. [^]
[47] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 100. [^]
[48] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 101. [^]
[49] Nina Lykke, "Between Monsters, Goddesses and Cyborgs: Feminist
Confrontations with Science," The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader, ed. Gill Kirkup,
et al (London: Routledge, 2000) 85. [^]
[50] Gill Kirkup, "Introduction," The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader, ed. Gill
Kirkup, et al (London: Routledge, 2000) 5. [^]
[51] Renate Klein, "The Politics of Cyberfeminism: If I'm a Cyborg rather
than a Goddess will Patriarchy go away?," CyberFeminism: Connectivity,
Critique and Creativity, eds. Susan Hawthorne and Renate Klein (Melbourne:
Spinifex, 1999). [^]
[52] Haraway, quoted in Penley, "Cyborgs at Large," 20. [^]
[53] Donna Haraway, "The actors are Cyborg, Nature is Coyote, and the
Geography is Elsewhere: Postscript to 'Cyborgs at Large,'" Technoculture,
eds. Constance Penley and Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1991) 22. [^]
[54] Chris Hables Gray, and Steven Mentor, "The Cyborg Body Politic and the
New World Order," Prosthetic Territories: Politics and Hypertechnologies,
eds. Gabriel Brahm Jr and Mark Driscoll (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1995) 228-9. [^]
[55] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 75. [^]
[56] Chela Sandoval, "New Sciences: Cyborg Feminism and the Methodology of
the Oppressed," Cybersexualities: A Reader on Feminist Theory, Cyborgs and
Cyberspace, ed. Jenny Wolmark (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999)
249. [^]
[57] Wendy Brown, "Feminist Hesitations, Postmodern Exposures," Prosthetic
Territories: Politics and Hypertechnologies, eds. Gabriel Brahm Jr and Mark
Driscoll (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995) 115. [^]
[58] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 82. [^]
[59] Gilles and Flix Guattari Deleuze, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, trans. R Hurley, M Seem and H R Lane (New York: Viking Press,
1982). [^]

[60] Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication, trans. Bernard and

Caroline Shutze, ed. Sylvre Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e) Columbia
University, 1988). [^]
[61] George Ritzer, Postmodern Social Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997)
125-7. [^]
[62] Elliott, "The Dislocating World of Postmodernism," 148. [^]
[63] Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially
Symbolic Act (London: Methuen, 1981) 22. [^]
[64] Sean Homer, Fredric Jameson: Marxism, Hermeneutics,
Postmodernism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) 79. [^]
[65] Deleuze, Anti-Oedipus 8. [^]
[66] Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication 27. [^]
[67] Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication 27. [^]
[68] Emil Kraepelin, Clinical Psychiatry, trans. A R Diefendorf, vol. 7 (New
York: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1981). [^]
[69] Carl Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, trans. A A Brill (New
York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, 1944). [^]
[70] Victor Tausk, "On the Origin of the 'Influencing Machine' in
Schizophrenia (1919)," The Psycho-Analytic Reader: An Anthology of Essential
Papers with Critical Introductions, ed. Robert Fliess (London: The Hogarth
Press and the Institute of Pyscho-Analysis, 1950). [^]
[71] American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Text Revision, 4th ed. (Washington: American Psychiatric
Association, 2000) 324. [^]
[72] Avital Ronell, The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric
Speech (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989) 109. [^]
[73] Hables Gray, "Cyborgology," 2. [^]
[74] See Susan Hawthorne, "Connectivity: Cultural Practices of the Powerful
or Subversion from the Margins?," CyberFeminism: Connectivity, Critique and
Creativity, eds. Susan Hawthorne and Renate Klein (Melbourne: Spinifex,
1999). [^]
[75] Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (St
Leornards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1994). [^]
[76] N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in
Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1999). [^]

[77] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 71.

[^]
[78] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 80.
[^]
[79] Jameson, "Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," 85.
[^]
[80] Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," 67. [^]
[81] Hayles, How We Became Posthuman 4-5. [^]
[82] Grosz, Volatile Bodies ix. [^]
[83] Grosz, Volatile Bodies 22. [^]
[84] Andrew Ross, quoted in Penley, "Cyborgs at Large," 7. [^]
[85] I have argued elsewhere that the "crisis" figured by Jameson's
schizophrenic might be best conceptualized as one besetting contemporary
white masculinity, in which case his schizophrenic cannot be seen as the
universal and disembodied casualty of the postmodern. See Angela Woods,
"Subjectivity 'in crisis': Masculinity and Schizophrenia in David
Fincher's Fight Club," antiTHESIS 13 (2002). [^]