Robert Golden

CRISIS IN YEMEN
Weighing Political versus Military Responses

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Introduction
The Middle East is host to some of the most
pressing humanitarian crises in the world.
Whether the topic is the battle for an
independent Palestine or the conquests of the
Islamic State, Americans regularly see
images from the Middle East plastered on
newspapers and airing on cable news. Lately,
the collapse of the government in Yemen has
been gaining international attention. Since
the previous president Ali Abdullah Saleh
left office, the damage incurred by his corrupt
government is still visible today.
Upon his departure in 2011, Saleh left behind
a government that had neither the support of
the people nor the ability to effectively
govern (Carlstrom). In recent months, the
international community has witnessed
increasingly violent reports coming out of
Yemen, due to a string of mosque bombings
by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(Almasari), as well as Saudi Arabia
beginning an air and ground campaign along
the border in an effort to ensure security of
that area (Al-Haj). Given the absence of an
effective government, such reports seem
inevitable. Nevertheless, there is increasing
concern that Yemen will become prime real
estate for terrorist organizations to conduct
planning and training for future attacks
against the United States, its allies, and its
interests. Considering previous interventions
and the political climate of the Middle East,
this paper will provide a brief overview of
Yemens instability, explain why an
American military intervention would be
inappropriate, while promoting aid for
political and economic reforms.
Background of Instability
Since its formation in 1990, Yemen has had
an often tumultuous history. In 1990, it
formed from two states: the Arab Republic
of Yemen to the north and the Democratic
Peoples Republic of Yemen to the south

(Clark 130). These nations had conflicting

political ideologies during their
independence, which presented a challenge
following unification. After only four years
of being a unified country, citizens who had
once been a part of the Democratic Peoples
Republic of Yemen felt as though they were
being mistreated as they were not
represented well in the upper echelons of the
government or the military (Barron 13).
Additionally, northern Yemen is
pockmarked with numerous tribes, many of
which were alienated from Saleh in the
years leading up to the civil war (Sharp 1).
In particular, the tribal leaders felt offended
by Salehs government excluding them from
the profits reaped from oil drilling, much of
which occurred on tribal lands (Clark 131,
132). By making his government hostile to a
powerful ethnic component of the nation,
Salehs policies and handling of the
government contributed to a destructive civil
war which reached flashpoint in 1994.
From May to July, seven thousand Yemenis
were killed (CIA World Factbook), yet the
possibility of old wounds from this conflict is
not the only issue of concern. During the war,
Saleh did not prevent the inflow of Islamic
radicals into the nation; in fact, these fighters
were invited by the government. Over the
span of two months, veterans of the Afghan
mujahedeen and groups born out of the
principles of Islamism entered the country.
Saleh sought to use these individuals as a way
to counteract the influence that the Marxist
southern Yemenis could exert (Clark 144).
However, instead of cementing his rule,
research suggests that the influx of extremists
during the war has contributed to the issues
that Yemenis and the rest of the world are
facing today. The issues posed by influx of
Sunni extremists is aggravated by issues with
the Houthi tribe to the north, which practices
Shia Islam and has political views in
opposition to the Yemeni government
(Barron 12).

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In addition to Salehs history of sponsoring
terrorist groups in portions of Yemen, other
nations have begun acting doing the same.
Iran, which is Shiite like the rebels, has
supported Houthi tribe for several years
(Sharp 7). The support of the Houthi rebels is
viewed as an effort to undermine the support
offered by Saudi Arabia, a Sunni state, and
allies like the United States. Ultimately, this
tactic used to limit the influence of other
nations in the region serves to further
destabilize Yemen and push back the date at
which the international community can help
correct some of the issues afflicting Yemen
(Boyle). However, Iranian support of rebels
may push some countries, like Saudi Arabia,
to use its military assets to ensure security in
their sphere of influence.
The Matter of Military Intervention
A key part of the American Global War on
Terror Strategy is supporting our allies, such
as Saudi Arabia, but it does not necessarily
mean following them into battle. The United
States has a history of some involvement in
Yemen following the September 11th terrorist
attacks (Barron 13). The Yemeni military has
been provided with American advisors for
counter-terrorism tactics and training, as well
as the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to
engage suspected terrorists over the past
decade (Sharp 5). Recent developments
include the recall of the advisors as their
safety could not be ensured (Lackey), while
the number of sorties that unmanned aerial
vehicles are flying has increased since the
beginning of Saudi involvement (Sharp 6).
However, American combat troops may be
unnecessary as the involvement of Saudi
troops should prove to be more effective,
particularly in addressing some of the ethnic
1

The hostilities between Sunnism and Shiism is

derived from a dispute as to who was fit to lead the
Muslim nation after the death of the prophet
Muhammad. Sunnis supported Abu Bakr, whereas
Shiites believed Ali to be the proper successor.

This depicts the dispersal of tribes in Yemen. The politically

dominant Zaydis are in the Hashid region near Sanaa (Central
Intelligence Agency).

components of the conflict. Such a possibility

is largely due to the greater history that
Yemen has in collaborating with Saudi
Arabia on both security and foreign aid
matters (Sharp 7). The United States primary
interest in the Middle East is targeting and
destroying elements of radical organizations
like Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and
Islamic State affiliates, both of which are
present in the current Yemen conflict and
wish to see Americans removed from
historically Muslim lands. However, these
groups are opposed by Iran and the Houthis
as they are Sunni, a rival sect to the Shiites,
which means that any form of collaboration
would be highly unlikely (Sharp 8).1 By not
becoming involved in Yemeni conflict any
more than we already have been, the United
States avoids placing servicemen and women
in harms way. Unfortunately, the absence of
Sunnis have historically held more power in Muslim
nations. Additionally, Shiites have ayatollahs who
function in a manner similar to a Catholic pope (The
Economist).

CRISIS IN YEMEN: WEIGHING MILITARY VS. POLITICAL RESPONSES

3
American forces ultimately prolongs the
conflict, as the United States cannot bring its
technological edge to bear.
Escalated involvement could bring a degree
of control to the situation, though foreign
interventions in ethnically-driven conflicts
have historically been failures. Paying
particular attention to the sectarian violence
that plagued Iraq after the 2003 invasion, it is
also important to recognize the impact of
post-9/11 policies in the Middle East. Many
of
the
counter-terrorism
policies
implemented by the United States have not
had the desired effect and have served to
destabilize the region further (Sky 24). As a
whole, outside interventions generally run
affront of the concept of national sovereignty,
effectively shelving the American military as
a suitable option (Handelman 153).
Therefore, solutions that rely on political
processes, such as foreign aid and overseas
development organizations may be able to
help create more reliable results, but would
only be able to do so after the embers of
conflict die down.
The Potential of Reforms
Where an armed, militarized incursion offers
short-term security for Americans and Arabs
alike, there still exists a threat of long-term
instability. Considering the threat of another
quagmire in the Middle East, pursuing
approaches that seek to establish a functional
government and increase Yemens economic
capacity by providing basic needs to the
public are integral to stabilizing the nation.
Without a solid foundation, the Yemenis will
not be able to make adequate use of future
foreign aid offers (Mosley 240) and run the
risk of being doomed to additional decades of
continuous corruption and poverty. Among
the many ways to help stimulate stability are
to implement economic mobilization and
institutional reforms, the latter of which is
particularly important as it could play a

significant role in reducing Yemens

infamous government corruption.
A Sustainable Economy
Currently, Yemen is a profoundly
unproductive state. In 2001, Yemen produced
its peak amount of oil and has not been able
to arrest the rate at which production has
plummeted. For Yemen, which receives
seventy percent of its revenue through
petroleum exports, peak oil has had a
dramatic effect (Steil 64). Compounded with
wasteful subsidization of the oil industry, oil
smuggling has been a popular avenue for
politicians to receive money on the side
(Sharp 6). As such, diversification of
Yemens economy is imperative. While the
service sector will require time to build up a
pool of sufficiently skilled workers, industry
is a suitable field should foreign firms look to
Yemen as a source of labor. However,
agriculture is an area that, while not currently
expandable, is capable of being improved
(Schmitz). Correcting certain agricultural
practices could improve Yemens stability by
diversifying their economy while increasing
food security. In the course of building up
Yemens agricultural resources, it would
place emphasis on the modification of
existing practices.
Currently, crops and farming practices are
unsustainable, both environmentally and
economically. In particular, Yemen is
experiencing a water shortage. As reports
suggest that the capital city of Sanaa may run
out of water within the next twenty years,
wise use of the countrys water resources is
imperative. Changes in irrigation can aid in
relieving the demand for water in the
agricultural sector, as much work has gone
into distributing water more effectively.
One roadblock to effective agricultural
employment of water is by reducing the
amount of khat produced, an herbal stimulant
with a pervasive cultural role. While the

CRISIS IN YEMEN: WEIGHING MILITARY VS. POLITICAL RESPONSES

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plant is chewed in a business setting,
cultivation consumes half of all water used in
agriculture and a tenth of all fertile land
(Schmitz). As a result, khat perpetuates the
state of food insecurity. Approximately
ninety percent of staple crops, such as wheat
and rice, are imported into Yemen (Steil 66).
Should the nation be cut off from food
sources due to border closures or ships failing
to dock at harbors, thousands of Yemenis will
starve. Compound a dearth of labor with the
pre-existing demand for a stable supply of
foodstuffs and the course of action could
have valuable payoffs in the long-run.

1 This infographic provides information on water usage in

Yemeni agriculture (McEwan).
2

A consociationalist government is designed to

ensure the representation of multiple ethnic groups.
In theory, a structure in which certain seats in
legislature and specific cabinet-level positions are
reserved for a particular ethnic group can serve as a

However, agriculture will not be able to

invigorate the economy unless there is some
degree of effective leadership in the realm of
the government.
Government Restructuring
The current structure of the government of
Yemen is grossly ineffective. While it is
structured as a federal republic (Michigan
State University), there are some
considerations that make a federal system
somewhat inappropriate. Mistrust in the
government is fomented due to the
inadequate representation afforded to
southern Yemenis, who have been
disenfranchised even after the civil war, as
well as tribes that cannot compete with the
politically-savvy Zaydis (Sharp 2). A
common issue with the Yemeni politicians
who win their seat by tribal connections is
that they are often incompetent and easily
corruptible.
Considering the relative
inequality that exists between the Zaydis and
other tribes, an alternative to the federal
system is necessary.
The best alternative to a federal system while
maintaining democratic values is a
consociationalist2 system (Handelman 149).
Such a form of government does require the
capability of executing a census in an honest
and expeditious manner in order to ensure
that the various ethnic groups are being
properly represented. A country in which a
consociationalist structure experienced
difficulty was the nation of Lebanon. After
more than thirty years of successful
governance under a consociationalist
structure, civil war erupted. The impetus for
the war was due to the Maronite Christian
minority occupying positions of power while
the majority of Muslims were effectively shut
sort of checks-and-balances system. Such an
organization denies a single group from hegemonic
control over the entire government (Handelman 149)

CRISIS IN YEMEN: WEIGHING MILITARY VS. POLITICAL RESPONSES

5
out of expressing their concerns in
government. However, an adaptation of the
pre-existing government structure was
adopted following the cessation of hostilities
(Handelman 151).
With the prior example of Lebanon in mind,
should Yemen adopt a consociationalist form
of government, an impartial agency of the
government will have to be formed in order
ensure that the legislative body is receiving
adequate information to judge what seats of
government go to which ethnic groups. By
doing so, the Yemeni government will be
much more effective and transparent as tribal
preference will be able to be seen in active
legislative bodies as opposed to behind
closed doors.
Conclusion
Due to the complex cultural and political
environment of the Middle East, the United
States would benefit greatly by choosing to
achieve the goals of promoting democracy
and defeating extremist groups in Yemen by
non-military means. Such a recommendation
comes after the analysis of the complex
cultural and political nature of the Middle
East. Fortunately, such goals can be
accomplished by supporting regional

partners, such as Saudi Arabia, in their efforts

to ensure security in the region. Once the
armed struggles in Yemen have subsided, the
United States should provide both monetary
aid and professionals to help revitalize their
country by implementing reforms and
possibly restructuring the government.
Economic reforms would serve to help make
the economy more sustainable in both a
financial and environmental sense. Yemen
would move away from an economy based on
oil, while adopting policies that would make
the area inviting to foreign firms.
Additionally, the agricultural sector would
move away from intensive farming of khat
and adopt eco-friendly irrigation practices.
Doing so would provide more land available
to cultivate foodstuffs, as well as reduce the
total amount of water consumed through
agricultural applications. In reference to the
Yemeni government, the federal system that
they currently have is marked by an ethnic
majority in which corruption and
incompetence runs rampant. By switching to
a consociationalist structure, all ethnic
groups would be represented while
representing the concerns of each tribe. By
offering Yemenis these suggestions, their
future could be improved greatly, and allow
them to compete on a global level.

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Works Cited
Al-Haj, Ahmed, and Hamza Hendawi. "Turmoil in Yemen Grows as Saudi Arabia Leads
Airstrikes against Shiite Rebels." U.S. News and World Report. U.S. News and World
Report LP, 26 Mar. 2015. Web. 1 Apr. 2015.
<http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/03/26/saudi-airstrikes-targetingrebel-military-bases-in-yemen>. Provides news story announcing the Saudi intervention
against Shiite rebels (the Houthi) in Yemen.
Almasari, Hakim, and Jason Hanna. "Yemen: Bombs Kill 137 at Mosques; ISIS Purportedly
Lays Claim." CNN.com. Cable News Network, Turner Broadcasting System, 20 Mar.
2015. Web. 1 Apr. 2015.
<http://www.noodletools.com/noodlebib/cite.php?ADD=Web%20Site>. Provides news
coverage of the Yemen mosque bombings reportedly carried out by ISIL.
B., S. "The Economist Explains: What Is the Difference between Sunni and Shia Muslims?" The
Economist. Economist Newspaper, 28 May 2013. Web. 8 Apr. 2015.
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-19>.
This webpage provides a historical explanation for the schism between the Sunnis and the
Shiites. Additionally, it also highlights some theological differences.
Barron, Owen. "Things Fall Apart: Violence and Poverty in Yemen." Harvard International
Review 30.2 (2008): 12-13. JSTOR. Web. 29 Mar. 2015.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/42763186>. This article provides a basic understanding of
the Houthi's goals for their rebellion and also discusses some of the economic and
ecological hardships that the nation of Yemen will face in the coming years.
Boyle, Christina. "Ousted Yemeni President Calls on His People to Stage Peaceful Protests." Los
Angeles Times 28 Mar. 2015: n. pag. Los Angeles Times. Web. 28 Mar. 2015.
<http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-egypt-president-backs-joint-arabmilitary-force-20150328-story.html>. Yemeni President Abdel Rabbo Mansour Hadi
mentions the strain between Sunni and Shiite factions in Yemen. He also chastises Iran
for what he perceived as support of the Houthi rebels.
Carlstrom, Greg. "Profile: Ali Abdullah Saleh." Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera Media Network, 23 Nov.
2011. Web. 29 Mar. 2015.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/yemen/2011/02/201122812118938648.html
>. Provides a basic biography of Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was the President of Yemen
until being removed from office in 2011.
Central Intelligence Agency. "Distribution of Ethnoreligious Groups and Key Tribal Areas."
Map. Perry-Castaeda Library Map Collection - University of Texas Libraries. U of
Texas at Austin, 31 Mar. 2015. Web. 1 Apr. 2015.
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/yemen.html>. This map aids in communicating the
areas that certain Yemeni tribes control, and permits a better understanding of the
situation.
- - -. "The World Factbook: Yemen." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency,
23 June 2014. Web. 29 Mar. 2015. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ym.html>. Provides a basic profile of the nation of Yemen.
Clark, Victoria. Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes. New Haven: Yale UP, 2010. JSTOR.
Web. 30 Mar. 2015. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1npmmh.1>. Provides valuable

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7
information regarding the history of Yemen, and what contributed to the 1994 Civil War
between the northern and southern portions of the country.
Handelman, Howard. "5 The Politics of Cultural Pluralism and Ethnic Conflict." The Challenge
of Third World Development. By Pearson Education. Custom for Penn State University
ed. Boston: Pearson Education, 2011. 124-62. Print. Details possible solutions for states
in which ethnic conflict might be occurring. Among these solutions are foreign military
intervention, government restructuring, exhaustion of the warring factions, and secession.
Lackey, Katherine. "U.S. Forces Evacuate Yemen Air Base." USA Today. N.p., 22 Mar. 2015.
Web. 1 Apr. 2015. <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/21/yemen-usmilitary/25138325/>. Provides news coverage of the U.S. evacuation of Yemen.
McEwan, Dan. "Water in Yemen, an Infographic." Infographic. Middle East Institute. Middle
East Institute, 18 Apr. 2012. Web. 8 Apr. 2015.
<http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/infographics/2012-4-18-yemen.png>. This
infographic serves to illustrate the distribution of water throughout various applications in
Yemen.
Michigan State University. "Yemen: Government." GlobalEDGE. Michigan State University Broad College of Business, 2015. Web. 1 Apr. 2015.
<http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/yemen/government>. Provides information on the
government of Yemen.
Mosley, Paul. Foreign Aid: Its Defense and Reform. Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 1987. JSTOR.
Web. 29 Mar. 2015. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt130j0t0.1>. This book provides
valuable insight on the possible consequences of providing foreign aid. Mosley provides
evidence as to both positive and negative effects that could stabilize Yemen, or increase
conflict.
Schmitz, Charles. "Crisis in the Yemeni Economy: A Troubled Transition to Post-Hydrocarbon
Growth." Middle East Institute. N.p., 13 Jan. 2012. Web. 1 Apr. 2015.
<http://www.mei.edu/content/crisis-yemeni-economy-troubled-transition-posthydrocarbon-growth>. Provides information regarding the necessity for providing a more
diversified economy that relies less on oil. This article also touches on the need for more
sustainable agriculture.
Sharp, Jeremy M. Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations. Washington: Congressional Research
Service, 2014. ProQuest Congressional. Web. 29 Mar. 2015.
<HTTP://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t21.d22.crs-2014-fdt0081?accountid=13158>. Provides background to United States relations with Yemen, as
well sa a detailed listing of what foreign aid has been offered to the nation over the past
five years.
Sky, Emma. "Arab Spring... American Fall?: Learning the Right Lessons from Iraq and
Afghanistan." Harvard International Review 33.2 (2011): 23-27. JSTOR. Web. 28 Mar.
2015. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42763470>. Sky notes that American foreign policy is
often overmilitarized and that this is one of many factors that contributes to the
destabilization of the Middle East.
Steil, Jennifer. "Yemen: Descending into Despair." World Policy Journal 28.3 (2011): n. pag.
JSTOR. Web. 25 Mar. 2015.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/41479288?seq=7#page_scan_tab_contents>. Provides
context on the role of the Arab Spring in leading to the recent coup.

CRISIS IN YEMEN: WEIGHING MILITARY VS. POLITICAL RESPONSES