Legarda v.

CA (1992)
F: Legarda was defendant in a complaint for specific performance. Atty. Coronel, her
counsel, failed to file an answer within the period and Legarda was thus declared in
default. The lower court rendered a decision against Legarda. Coronel failed to pose an
appeal within the period. Thus, the decision became final. The SC suspended Atty. Coronel
for six months.

H: Coronel is guilty of gross negligence for violating Canon 18 and rule 18.03 particularly. By
neglecting to file the answer to the complaint against petitioner, he set off the
events which resulted in the deprivation of petitioners rights over her house and lot. It
should be remembered that the moment the lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants
that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to
exercise due diligence or abandons his clients cause makes him unworthy of the trust
reposed on him by the latter.
LEGARDA v CA

*mahaba, di ko na sinama mga dissenting. Talo naman sila eh

Facts:

New Cathay House, Inc. (Cathay) and Victoria Legarda entered into a lease
agreement for a property in QC owned by Legarda.
For some reason, Legarda refused to sign the contract. Cathay made a deposit and
downpayment of rentals then filed for specific performance.
Legardas counsel, Dean Antonio Coronel, requested a 10-day extension to file an
answer which was granted. But Dean Coronel failed to file an answer within that
period.
Cathay presented evidence ex parte. Cathay won the case (Katay si Legarda). Service
of decision was made on Dean Coronel but he still did not do anything.
The QC property was then levied and auctioned off to pay for the judgment debt.
Cathays manager, Cabrera, was the highest bidder in the auction. Legarda did not
redeem the property within the 1 year period.
Kahit natalo na sila dahil walang ginagawa si Dean (hindi nga niya sinabihan si
Legarda kung ano na nangyari sa kaso nila, na wala na yung lupa), Legarda still did
not lose faith in her counsel.
Dean Coronel then filed a petition for annulment of judgment. Petition was denied. No
motion for reconsideration or appeal was made on the order of denial (ibang klase ka
dean!)
So, Legarda hired a new lawyer. New lawyer asked for annulment of judgment upon
the ground that the old lawyer was negligent in his duties. The petition was granted
and the sale of the QC property to be set aside.
The SC said that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Cathay because of the
reckless, inexcusable and gross negligence of Dean Coronel.

Hence this motion for reconsideration of SC decision.

Issue:

W/N Legarda can be bound by the gross negligence of her counsel

Held:

Yes. Original decision is reinstated (Legarda=loser)

As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend her interests in due course,
she cannot be said to have been denied due process of law.
If indeed Legarda is innocent, then all the more that Cathay is innocent. Between two
innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be
the one to bear the resulting loss.
Legarda misjudged and hired the services of Dean Coronel who in the end sort of
abandoned her case.
Decision was res ipso final due to failure to appeal the decision.

RULE 18.04A.C. No. 8252

July 21, 2009

NATIVIDAD UY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BRAULIO RG TANSINSIN, Respondent.
Complainant engaged the services of respondent to defend him in an ejectment case
wherein he was the defendant. Respondent was able to file on time an Answer to the
complaint, however, when required to file a Position Paper, he failed to file one for and on
behalf of the complainant. Eventually, a decision was rendered by the MeTC against the
complainant. The case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court but the same was dismissed
solely because of the failure of respondent to file a memorandum on appeal. Motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied for having been filed out of time.
Realizing that she lost her case because of the negligence of her counsel, complainant
initiated the disbarment case against respondent, before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD). Complainant averred that she gave her
full trust and confidence to respondent, but the latter failed miserably in his duty as a lawyer
and advocate. She also claimed that respondents failure to file the required position paper
and memorandum on appeal constituted gross incompetence and gross negligence, which
caused grave injury to complainant.9 Lastly, complainant alleged that not only did
respondent fail to file the required pleadings, he also was remiss in informing her of the
status of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent failed to exert his best effort and ability in the prosecution or
defense of his clients cause.

Ruling:
Respondents failure to file the required pleadings and to inform his client about the
developments in her case fall below the standard exacted upon lawyers on dedication and
commitment to their clients cause. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance, and whether he accepts it for a
fee or for free. It must be recalled that the MeTC (in the ejectment case) required the
parties to submit their respective position papers. However, respondent did not bother to do
so, in total disregard of the court order. In addition, respondent failed to file the
memorandum on appeal this time with the RTC where complainants appeal was then
pending. Therefore, dismissing said case on that ground alone.
Further, respondents failure to file the required pleadings is per se a violation of Rule 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent also lacked candor in dealing with his
client, as he omitted to apprise complainant of the status of her ejectment case. It should
be stressed that the lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence. Thus, there is a
need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case.
Atty. Tansinsin was suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.

GARCIA V BALA
FACTS:
Spouses Garcia filed a complaint against Atty. Rolando S. Bala for rendering them the wrong
legal remedy and not returning the sum of money they paid to him. According to the report
of the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Bala is guilty for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Despite due notice, he did not appeared in any of the hearings so the case
was decided on the basis of the complaint of complainants evidence. According to the
investigation, he erroneously filed notice of appeal instead of petition for review and this
constituted lack of professional competency. The report also concluded that he should be
sanctioned for his unjustified refusal and failure to return the money paid by his clients
despite his promise to return so. Finally, they concluded that he should be suspended from
practice of law for period of six months in which the IBP Board of Governors agreed with his
suspension and that he should return the amt paid to him by his clients.
ISSUE:
WON Atty Bala violated Canon 18 of CPR.
HELD:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.02 states that a lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation. Specifically Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of the client, they owe fidelity to the cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. A client is entitled to

the benefit of any and every remedy and defense authorized by law, and is expected to rely
on the lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
Wherefore, he is suspended.

FILINVEST LAND, INC VS CA

FACTS:
Case was filed with the RTC for Recovery of Possession of a parcel of land alleging that it is
the owner thereof as evidenced TCT No S-109458 but which by occupied by the defendant to
house some of its officers, and who, inspire of repeated demands by them, has refused to
vacate the same.
The defendant through Atty Salva, Atty Bautista, Atty Reyes filed a total of six extensions
with the court, total of 88 days because of inability of counsels inability to read the records
of too much work, or heavy pressure of work, illness of the counsel or rather frivolous reason
such as unexpected wedding of one of the counsel. On the sixth time they filed a motion,
the court denied and rendered decision that they are in default.
ISSUE:
WON, lawyers are negligent for such acts?
HELD:
(pls se rule 18.03 UP SOLID)
The private respondent was given extraordinary opportunity to have its day in court when
the lower court had given it a total of eighty-eight (88) days from service of summons to file
its answer to the complaint. The inability of four lawyers to prepare the answer for this long
period of time is not justified.
Failure to bring suit immediately constitutes negligence of attorneys.

JOVEN DE JESUS V PNB

FACTS:
This appeal presents a procedural question on the dismissal of in appeal as perfected out of
time. Specifically, it involves applications of Section 13 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court:
Sec.13 Effect of failure to file notice, bond, or record on appeal on appeal. Where the
notice of appeal, Appeal bond or record on appeal is not filed within the period of time
herein provided, the appeal shall be dismissed.

Defendant bank admitted having filed its notice of appeal, notice on appeal and appeal bond
beyond 30 day period, but contended in its motion that the delay was due to accident,
mistake and/or excusable negligence. In support with their contention, it is alleged that the
registered mail was given by the banks postal mail clerk Eugenio Magpoc to Feliciano
Jimenez Jr registered mail clerk of appellants cashier department. Due to the volume of
work, it was delivered late on its legal department and failed to inform that the letter was
two days ago.
ISSUE:
WON, the appellants counsel is negligent.
HELD:
The lower court did not find excusable negligence with their reason. The appellants counsel
carelessly took for granted that the date of receipt stamped on the letter by the legal
departments legal receiving clerk was the date of receipt from the post office. Counsel for
appellant could have easily found out the letter date that he inquired and the court did not
find any excuse for failure to do so. Such fatal consequence has often resulted as what
happened to appellants right to appeal in the instant case.
Failure to ascertain date of receipt from post office of notice of decision resulting in the nonperfection of the appellants appeal constitutes negligence of attorneys.

Gaerlan vs Bernal

Agravante vs Patriarca
FACTS
In 1960, Juana Patriarca filed an action to quiet title with COFL Camsur. The pretrial was
rescheduled after Aggravante moved for cancellation for illness of attorney and medcert was
attached with the motion. It was denied for lack of notice to adverse party. Pretrial was
pushed through with defendants absent. Aggravante declared to be substituted in her stead.
It was granted. Aggravante filed petition for certiorari with SC.

ISSUE
WON Court acquired jurisdiction over Patriarca.

RULING
Yes. Allegation of aggravante wad demise of Patriarca long before the pretrial setting
prevented the TC from acquiring jurisdiction over her. SC said that jurisdiction over the

person of the plaintiff is acquired by the court by the filing of complaint. Subsequent death
will not affect jurisdiction, all that is entailed is the substitution of the heirs for the deceased
in accordance with Rule 3, Section 17. In any ground to oppose the substitution or that they
had suffered any prejudice of any sort by reason of substitution.

Ventura vs Santos

Alcoriza vs Lumakang
FACTS
Alcoriza, the defendant in a civil case, and his lawyer Lumakang were not present during the
decision despite the fact that they were notified to do so. Lumakang averred that he did not
go to the court because he has waited for Alcoriza, saying he will not attend without him
because it would be lack of preparation on his part as a lawyer. He began suspecting that
Alcoriza has already lost his interest and as a lawyer, he cannot be more interested in his
clients case than the client himself.

ISSUE
WON Atty Lumakang should be given disciplinary action.

RULING
No. Although Atty. Lumakang was not prepared to enter into trial on that day, still he could
do things to protext the interest of his client by appearing for him in the court. However, it is
not considered that this inaction of Atty Lumakang would constitute so serious a ground as
to warrant disciplinary action in view of the lack of interest which his client has shown in the
premises. Lumakang for his failure to appear should be reprimanded for his inaction as it
would tend to diminish trust and confidence which the public is supposed to repose in the
office of a lawyer.

Capulong vs Alino
FACTS
Respondent Manuel Alino, a member of the bar, is charged by his former clients, the spouses
Emilio and Cirila Capulong, with alleged gross negligence tantamount to malpractice and
betrayal of his client trust and confidence after Atty Alino failed to pay docket fee and to
deposit the estimated cost of printing of the record for the appeal they filed on Court of
Appeals after the decision on a civil case that was adverse the complainants. This failure
resulted to the dismissal of the appeal.

The respondents contention was the complainants had authorized him to exercise his
judgment and discretion in determining whether or not he should prosecute the appeal, and
to regard said sum of P298 as compensation of his services in connection with said case,
should he consider it advisable to desist from said appeal and expressed his intention of
introducing additional evidence.

ISSUE
WON the actions of Alino constitute legal malpractice

RULING
Yes. In the view of the allegation in respondents answer, the same designated its Legal
Officer for the reception of said evidence. Yet, after securing four postponements of the date
set by said officer for this purpose, respondent did not introduce any additional evidence in
his favour. Apart from suggesting a misappropriation of funds held by him in trust for his
clients and breach of such trust, the foregoing acts and omissions indicate the high degree
of irresponsibility of respondent herein and his unworthiness to continue as a member of the
legal profession. The respondent was disbarred.

Republic vs Arro

Legarda vs CA

PHHC vs Tiongco
FACTS
Appellants Melchor Tiongco were registered squatters of an area. Long before Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation declared a parcel of land embraced in TCT 1356 of the
Quezon City Register of Deeds. Appellants were already occupying the portion and have
introduced improvements thereon and had declared the property for taxation purposes. In
the census list of the corporation, the appellants were considered a bonafide occupants of
the property and during the same period, they had applied to purchase the property from
the PHHC. They found out later, that the same had already been awarded to Asuncion
Enverga, a relative of congressman, in spite of the fact that she had not occupied the
property at any time, nor introduced any improvements. Immediately upon the discovery of
the award a complaint was lodged by Tiongco and Escasa with the appellee PHHC. After a
preliminary investigation of the complaint, Eugenio Alvarado. Jr., chief of investigation and
research section, PHHC investigating committee, with the recommendation that they have
priority rights to the property, which was given after two investigations. The matter has
been submitted to the Executive Committee to render their judgment.

However, no action has been taken on the report. Four months after the filing of the
complaint, the PHHC instituted an action for Recovery of Possession in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, the appellant interposes the defense of Priority of Right of Purchase
and ability to pay, which was found in the investigation made by the appellee. The case was
set for hearing on February 7, 1961. The appellants counsel, Atty. Bonifacion Tanega failed
to notify the appellants of the scheduled hearing. The case was heard, the plaintiff
introduced evidence showing ownership of the property. The judgment held that the plaintiff
is the owner of the land situated in QC, and that the defendants without the consent and
knowledge of the plaintiff entered and constructed their houses upon then premises,
depriving the plaintiff of the possession of the same parcel of land. Tiongco and Escasa were
ordered to remove their houses and the improvements on them, and pay the plaintiff the
sum of P26 per month from the date of occupation, until premises in question is restored to
the plaintiff, and the P200 in attorneys fees.
Although the above judgment was received by counsel for the appellants, he never informed
the latter about the matter. Neither did he take steps to protect the interests of his clients,
by presenting a motion for reconsideration and/or filing a petition to set aside judgment.
Appellants only came to know that an adverse decision had been promulgated when on May
1961, the Deputy Sheriff of QC, served them a copy of writ of execution ordering them to
vacate the premises and to pay the amounts ordained therein. Appellants lost no time in
contacting their counsel, Atty Tanega, and failing to do so, they engaged the services of Atty.
Ciriaco Sayson, who presented with the lower court a petition for relief from judgment,
accompanied by affidavits of merit. The presiding judge cited Atty Tanega admitted to the
court that he did not inform the appellants of the hearing, as he forgot all about the same;
that he received the decision but did not also inform the appellants about it, because he
forgot all about the case, explaining that he had so many ejectment cases then, that the
orders and decisions in the case just escaped his attention.

ISSUE
WON Atty tanegas conduct constitutes negligence of his duties as a lawyer.

RULING.
There was something fishy and suspicious concerning the actuations of former counsel Atty
Tanega in this cae. He did not give any significance at all, to the processes of the court,
which has proven prejudicial to the rights of his clients. There was nothing which could have
prevented the appellants from attending the trial of the case themselves, or moving for a
reconsideration of the decision or taking the necessary appeal from the judgment, if only
their counsel had informed them of the courts processes. Counsel had simply ignored the
rights of his clients by giving a lame and flimsy explanation that the courts processes just
escaped his attention. He deprived them of their day in court.
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is notice
to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficient effects upon the prompt dispensation of
justice. Its application to a given case, however, should be looked into and adopted,
according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise in the courts desire to make a
shortcut of the proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous collusions to
the detriment of justice. It would then be easy for one lawyer to sell ones rights down the
river, by just alleging that he just forgot every process of the court affecting his clients,

because he was so busy. Under this circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such
irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his clients.
The attention of the trial court is invited to the censurable conduct of Atty Tanega in this
particular case, and to take such action may be warranted in the premises.

Blanza v Arcangel (1967)

F: Due to lack of evidence, the SC dismissed the case against Atty. Arcangel who after
volunteering to help petitioners Blanza and Pasion to claim pension (in connection with the
deaths their PC husbands) failed to inform them of the progress of their case because they
had not paid him for photostating expenses he had incurred.

H: A lawyer has a dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying with
the minimal technicalities of the stature. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence,
especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional services.
Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have
complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their pension claims. Upon their refusal
to co-operate, respondent should have forthwith.

RBCI v FLORIDOA.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010CARPIO,

J.:
FACTS:
Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent.

RBCI allegedthat respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.According to RBCI, respondent and his clients, Nazareno-Relampagos
group, through force andintimidation, forcibly took over the management and the
premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evictedCirilo A. Garay, the bank manager,
destroyed the banks vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank.Respondent
added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI
wasalready dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspend
ed because of theexistence of a prejudicial question. Respondent said that the
disbarment complaint was filed against himin retaliation for the administrative
cases he filed against RBCIs counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol.Moreover,
respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their
allegations.Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were
never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the
documentary exhibits were originals or certified truecopies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated his oath and the CPR Canon 19.
HELD:
The Court held that respondent was guilty as charged and suspended for a year. The
first andforemost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold theConstitution and obey the laws of the land. It is the lawyers
duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from
activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the
legalsystem.Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal within the bounds of thelaw. It is his duty to counsel his clients to use
peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrainfrom doing an intentional
wrong to their adversaries.A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. To that end, his clients success iswholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law
andethics.Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the
lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable
and unethical.

Facts:

Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio appeared as legal counselfor Grace C. Hufana in an illegal

dismissal casebefore the National Labor Relations Commission(NLRC) against
complainant Fernando Martin Pena.Hufana is praying for claim for separation pay,
butPena rejected the claim as baseless.

Thereafter, Aparicio sent Pena a letter

reiteratinghis client's claim for separation pay. Through hisletter, he threatened
complainant that should Penafail to pay the amounts they propose as
settlement,he would file and claim bigger amounts includingmoral damages, as well
as multiple charges such
astax evasion, falsification of documents, andcancellation of business license to ope
rate due toviolations of laws.
Issue:

WON Aparicio violated Canon 19 (and 19.01) of theCPR, enjoining every lawyer to
represent his client withzeal within the bounds of the law?

YES

NB:
Rule 19.01.

A lawyer shall employ

only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain animproper advantage in any case or
proceeding."

WON it is proper to disbar Aparicio?

NO,reprimand onlyHeld:

Under Canon 19, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or
baseless criminalcase or cases against the adversaries of his
clientdesigned to secure leverage to compel theadversaries to yield or withdraw the
ir own casesagainst the lawyer's client.

In the case at bar, the threats are not

onlyunethical for violating Canon 19, but they alsoamount to
blackmail
.
Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation
or exposure or opposition in the public prints,obtaining of value from a person as
a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing
some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice."
The letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even
contains athreat to file retaliatory charges against complainantwhich have nothing
to do with his client's claim for separation pay. Indeed, letters of this nature are
definitely proscribed by the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.

It was not respondent's intention to pointout complainant's violations of the

law as he sogallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even containsan implied promise
to
"keep silent"
about the saidviolations if payment of the claim is made on thedate indicated.

DECISION:
While the writing of the
letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold thatdisbarment is too severe a
penalty to be imposed onrespondent, considering that he wrote the same
outof his overzealousness to protect his client'sinterests. Accordingly, the more
appropriate penaltyis
reprimand.

On the sui generis character of disbarmentproceedings, the Court ratiocinated in

In re Almacen
:Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
sui generis
.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal
,they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but israther an
investigation by the Court into theconduct of one of its officers
. Not being intended toinflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminalprosecution.
Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein
. It may be initiated by theCourt
motu proprio
.

Public interest is its primaryobjective, and the real question for determinationis
whether or not the attorney is still a fit personto be allowed the privileges as such
. Hence, in theexercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merelycalls upon a member of the Bar to account for hisactuations as an
officer of the Court with the
endin view of preserving the purity of the legalprofession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging theprofession of members who by their
misconducthave proved themselves no longer worthy to
beentrusted with the duties and responsibilitiespertaining to the office of an
attorney. In suchposture, there can thus be no occasion to speakof a complainant or
a prosecutor
.
RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the MTC which ordered
respondents client to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case.
respondent as counsel, appealed the decision. CA dismissed Co's appeal from the
decision of the RTC for failure to comply with the proper procedures. Respondent
thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of
the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client.
Held: SUSPENDED for (1) year. Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions
arising from the same cause. Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to
represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule
19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the
case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the
filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole
purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment.
A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for
want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained
by fraud.

Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of
the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping
exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to
another for a more favorable resolution of his case.

Corpuz vs CA
Atty David and Corpuz were good friends. In Corpuzs civil case, David became his
counsel. Prior to rendering of final judgment, Corpuz gave the lawyer a check which
the latter returned. After favorable decision was rendered, Atty. David demanded
attorneys fee which Corpuz refused to deliver alleging that Davids services were
offered gratuitously. The Court decided that Atty. David should be paid attorneys
fees.

H: An attorney-client relationship can be created by implied agreement, as when the

attorney actually rendered legal services for a person who is a close friend. The
obligation of such a person to pay attorneys fees is based on the law of contracts
concept of facio ut des (no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
others.) Absence of an express contract for attorneys fees between respondent
David and petitioner Corpus is no argument against the payment of attorneys fees,
considering their close relationship which signifies mutual trust and confidence
between them.

Albano v. Coloma (1967)

F: Coloma was Albanos counsel during the Japanese occupation. According to
Albano, Coloma failed to expedite hearing and termination of case. Coloma denied
that she did nothing to expedite the hearing and termination of such civil case as
the records would show otherwise. After Albanos won in the case, Coloma
intervened to collect attorneys fee which is computed at 33.3% of what the
Albanos can recover. The Court held that Coloma may recover attorneys fees.

H: Counsel, any counsel, if worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for
his services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains and his skill, acquired at
tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is
entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of
a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the

best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would
not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid.

Case of Traders Royal Bank Employees Union- Independent vs NLRC and Emmanuel
Noel A. Cruz
G.R.No. 120592 14March1997
FACTS OF THE CASE:
That TRB Employees Union, had a retainer agreement with Atty. Cruz, for 3,000.00
in consideration of the law firms undertaking to render the services enumerated in
their contract. During the existence of the agreement the union referred to the
private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and year-end
bonuses against their employer TRB.
The NLRC granted the petition of the union with regard to the demand for bonuses.
After, the S.C. acting upon the challenge of TRBank of the NLRC decision in its
decision on August 30, 1990 modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting the
award of mid- year and year- end bonus differentials while affirming the award of
holiday pay differential.
After TRB voluntarily complied with the decision, the respondent on September 18,
1990 notified the union, TRB management, and the NLRC of his right to exercise and
enforce his attorneys lien over the award of holiday pay differential through a letter
dated October 8, 1990.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Was the lien made by the respondent attorney over the award as attorneys fees
valid?
- Yes, Because the contract between the Union and the attorney stipulates that the
3,000.00 paid as retainer fees is intended merely as a consideration for the law
firms commitment to render the services enumerated on PART A and B of the
retainer agreement.
- The retainer fee paid by the Union is not a payment for the firms execution or
performance of the services listed in the contract, subject to the particular
qualifications.
- Obligations do not emanate only from contracts. One of the sources of extracontractual obligations found in our civil code is the quasi contract premised on the
roman maxim that nemo alterius detrimento locupletari potest
- As early as 1903 the court has allowed the payment of reasonable professional
fees to an interpreter, not withstanding the lack of understanding with his client as
to his remuneration, on the basis a quasi-contract. It is not necessary that the

parties agree on a definite fee for the special services rendered by the firm in order
that the union may be obligated to pay compensation. Equity and fair play dictate
that petitioner should pay the same after it accepted, availed itself of, and benefited
from the firms services.
- The measure of compensation for private respondents services as against his
client should be properly addressed by the rule of quantum meruit is used as the
basis for determining the lawyers professional fees in the absence of a contract.
HELD:
The resolution of the NLRC with regard to the attorneys fees is modified, and Union
is hereby ordered to pay 10,000 for the firms rendered services.
Obligations and Contracts Terms:
General Retaining Fee- is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as
general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise from routinary
business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The reason for the
remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services
for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. It is a compensation for lost
opportunities.

Distinguish from Rule 34 Nocom v. Camerino GR 182984 Feb 10, 2009

F: Camarino were agricultural tenants w/ right to redeem. Allegedly executed an
irrevocable Power of Atty to sell parcels of land. Subsequently annotated to the
TCT,. Camarino wanted to annul such, consent was vitiated because did not know it
was an irrevocable power of attorney. Nocom alleged that it cannot be cancelled
unilaterally, alleged that he paid for it....Camarinos filed motion for summary
judgment stating that sicne Nocom admitted to the existence of the irrevocable
power of attorney...summary judgment proper because only resolve WON it was
coupled w/ interest and WON it is irrevocable. Allege that there is not issue as to the
contents of the irrevocable power of atty
H: facts not subject motion for summary jdugment
2 requisites:
No genuine issue as to material facts
Party moving for summary judgment entitled to judgment by law
Genato v. Silapan 453 Phil. 910 (2003)
Facts:
Atty. Silapan and Genato had an attorney-client relationship. Genato filed charges
against Silapan due to the latters failure to pay amortization fees. Silapan alleged
in his answer that Genato is a businessman in real estate business, who traded and

buys and sells deficiency taxed imported cars, provides shark loan and engages in
other shady deals. He also alleged that Genato has many pending cases and had
attempted to bribe officials to lift the case. The SC held that Silapan had violated
confidentiality of lawyer-client relationship.
Held:
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall bemindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him. The rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose
communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the
latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client
arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is
perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation nor is it affected
by the partys ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any
other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client. It
must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential
communications or information is limited only to communications which are
legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It
does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a
fraud. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he may
commit a crime. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no
professional employment in the strict sense. Nevertheless, respondents
explanation that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in his pleading
fails to satisfy the Court. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights,
as they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use
it against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of
litigation therein and respondents professional competence and legal advice were not being
attacked in said case.

GENATO v. SILAPAN
PUNO, July 14, 2003NATUREComplaint for disbarment
FACTS (Complainants side)-July 1992, respondent allegedly asked the complainant
if he could rent asmall office space in complainantsbuilding in Quezon City for his
law practice. Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty.Benjamin
Dacanay, complainants retained lawyer, who accommodated respondent in the
building and made him handle some of complainants cases.-Respondent borrowed
two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from complainant which he intended to
use as down payment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent issued to
complainant a postdated check in the amount of P176,528.00to answer for the six
(6) months interest on the loan. He likewise mortgaged to complainant his house
and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title claiming that it was the subject
of reconstitution proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds.-The
respondent bought the car but the document of sale was issued in the
complainants name and financed through City Trust Company.-January 1993:
respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero who wanted to
borrow money from complainant. Complainant lent Romero the money and, from

this transaction, respondent earned commission in the amount

of P52,289.90. Complainant used the commission to pay respondents arrears with
the car financing firm.-Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on
the car and the financing firm sent demand letters to complainant. Complainant
tried to encash respondents postdated check with the drawee bank but it was
dishonored as respondents account therein was already closed. Respondent failed
to heed complainants repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed a
criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22and a civil
case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.-In the foreclosure case, there
spondent alleged that the complainant is engaged in buy and sell of deficiency
taxed imported cars,shark loans and shady deals, and has many cases pending in
court, which the complainant denied, adding that the allegations were libelous and
were irrelevant to the foreclosure case. A particular allegation states that in one
case, the complainant would only give the respondent the document of sale of the
car if the latter would bribe the review committee of the DOJ for a case of the
complainant. According to the complainant, the allegation was, aside from being
false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and maliciously designed to defame him,
the respondent was also guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client
relationship and should be held administratively liable.- the complainant then filed
this complaint for disbarment, praying also that an administrative sanction be
meted against respondent for hisissuance of a bouncing check
(respondents side)-It was complainant who offered him an office space in his
building and retained him as counsel as the latter was impressed with the way he
handled a B.P. 22 case filed against complainant.-There was nothing libelous in his
imputations of dishonest business practices to complainant and his revelation of
complainants desire to bribe government officials in relation to his pending criminal
case. He claimed to have made these statements in the course of judicial
proceedings to defend his case and discredit complainants credibility by
establishing his criminal propensity to commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He
argued that he is not guilty of breaking his confidential lawyer-client relationship
with complainant a she made the disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.Respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage infavor of
complainant without consideration and only as a formal requirement so he could
obtain theP200,000.00 loan and for this reason, he did not surrender his title over
the mortgaged property to complainant.-Respondent claimed that he issued the
postdated check, not for account or for value, but only: (a) to serve assome kind of
acknowledgment that he already received in advance a portion of his attorneys
fees from the complainant for the legal services he rendered, and (b) as a form
of assurance that he will not abandon the cases he was handling for complainant.Respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from Romeros loan
which he allegedly helped facilitate, alleging that the amount paid to him was for
attorneys fees. He used this amount to pay his arrears with the car financing firm.
On January 29, 1993, before paying the next amortization on the car, he asked

complainant to execute a deed of sale transferring ownership of the car

to him. Complainant refused and insisted that he would transfer ownership of the
car only after the termination of his criminal case which respondent was handling as
his defense lawyer. Consequently respondent stopped paying the amortization on
the car. Respondent also alleged that he filed a perjury case against complainant
who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel against him.-October 27, 1993: the Court
referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)for
investigation, report and recommendation.-August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors
of the IBP approved the report of the investigating commissioner finding the
respondent guilty as charged and recommending his suspension from the practice
of law for one (1) year.ISSUES1. WON the court has the jurisdiction to sanction
respondent for hisissuance of the bouncing check.2. WON the respondent
committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to complainant illegal
practices and disclosing complainants alleged intention to bribe government
officials in connection with a pending case, and thus would be sanctioned.
HELD1. NO, it is not for the Court to sanction respondent for his issuance of a
bouncing check ,which would be determined bythe trial court.
Ratio
We shall not delve into themerits of the various criminal and civilcases pending
between the parties. Itis for the trial courts handling thesecases to ascertain the
truth or falsityof the allegations made therein.2. YES, respondents allegations
anddisclosures in the foreclosure caseamount to a breach of fidelitysufficient to
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him.
Ratio
A lawyer must conduct himself,especially in his dealings with hisclients, with
integrity in a manner thatis beyond reproach. His relationshipwith his clients should
becharacterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.
Reasoning
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility providesthat a lawyer owes
fidelity to thecause of his client and shall bemindful of the trust and
confidencereposed on him. The long-establishedrule is that an attorney is
notpermitted to disclose communicationsmade to him in his professionalcharacter
by a client, unless the latterconsents.-The obligation to preserve theconfidences and
secrets of a clientarises at the inception of theirrelationship. The protection given
tothe client is perpetual and does notcease with the termination of thelitigation, nor
is it affected by thepartys ceasing to employ theattorney and retaining another, or
byany other change of relation betweenthem. It even survives the death of the
client.-However, the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or
information islimited only to communications whichare legitimately and properly

withinthe scope of a lawful employment of alawyer.It does not extend to thosemade

in contemplation of a crime orperpetration of a fraud. If the unlawfulpurpose is
avowed, as in this case, thecomplainants alleged intention tobribe government
officials in relationto his case, the communication is notcovered by the privilege as
the clientdoes not consult the lawyerprofessionally. It is not within theprofession of a
lawyer to advise aclient as to how he may commit acrime as a lawyer is not a gun
forhire. Thus, the attorney-clientprivilege does not attach, there beingno
professional employment in thestrict sense.-The disclosures were notindispensable
to protect his rights asthey were not pertinent to theforeclosure case. It
was improper forthe respondent to use it against thecomplainant in the foreclosure
case asit was not the subject matter of litigation therein and
respondentsprofessional competence and legaladvice were not being attacked in
saidcase.
Disposition
IN VIEW WHEREOF,respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan isordered suspended from the
practiceof law for a period of six (6) monthseffective upon receipt of
thisDecision. Let a copy of this Decisionbe furnished the Office of the BarConfidant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The CourtAdministrator is directed to
circulatethis order of suspension to all courtsin the country.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949

BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB
ASSAD, respondents.
Petitioner alleged that she and the counsel for the defendant had an attorney-client
relationship with her when, before the trial of the case, she went to defendants
counsel, gave him the papers of the case and other information relevant thereto,
although she was not able to pay him legal fees. That respondents law firm mailed
to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the merits of her case; that
this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at his office; that
Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's
professional services. Atty. Francisco appeared as counsel for defendant and
plaintiff did not object to it until (4) months after. Then, plaintiff moved to dismiss
the case between her and defendant.
Issue: Was there an attorney-client relationship between plaintiff and Atty.
Francisco?
Held: YES. In order to constitute the relation a professional one and not merely one

of principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a
legal point, to prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare and
draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like.
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary
that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about
which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must
be regarded as established.
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a
lawyer or counselor-when he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his
case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
client's pleadings, or advocating his client's cause in open court. An acceptance of
the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his
client in pursuance of a request by the latter.
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney
Agrava and that, this being so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by
the plaintiff, would not vary the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's
statement that other papers, personal and private in character, were turned in by
her. Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that the mere relation of
attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite
party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received
by him from his first client.
An attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel
against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his
former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's
disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment
"A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and
secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to
remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the
opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and
the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the
contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its
payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the
services which he has retained him to perform."

Felicisimo Montano vs IBP

PONENTE: Kapunan
FACTS: Atty. Dealca, counsel for Felicisimo Montano withdrew his services for his
client upon
the latter's failure to comply with their retainer agreement.
HELD: We find Atty Dealcas conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal
profession. UnderCanon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall
withdraw his services onlyfor good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances. Although he may withdraw hisservices when client deliberately fails
to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstancesof the present case, Atty.
Dealcas withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberatelyfail to pay
him the attys fees. Rule 20.4 of Canon 290, mandates that a lawyer shall
avoidcontroversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to
judicial action only toprevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a
sum owed to him by complainant (P 3,500.00), respondent lawyer failed to act in
accordance with the demands of the Code. But,only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyeras an officer of the
court and member of the bar will mdisbarment be imposed a s penalty.

FELICISIMO M. MONTANO, complainant, vs. INTEGRATED BAR of the PHILIPPINES

AND Atty. JUAN S. DEALCA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a verified complaint filed before this Court on March 9, 1994, complainant
Felicisimo M. Montano charged Atty. Juan Dealca with misconduct and prays that he
be sternly dealt wit administratively. The complaint[1][1] is summarized as
follows:
1. On November 14, 1992, the complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca
as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending
before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 37467 wherein the
complainant was the plaintiff-appellant.
2. The parties agreed upon attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000.00, fifty
percent (50%) of which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining
balance upon the termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent
the amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the attorneys fee.
3. Thereafter, even before the respondent counsel had prepared the appellants
brief and contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after
the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from
complainant. Complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.00.
4. Prior to the filing of the appellants brief, respondent counsel again demand

payment of the remaining balance of 3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do

so, respondent lawyer withdrew his appearance as complainants counsel without
his prior knowledge and/or conformity. Returning the case folder to the complainant,
respondent counsel attached a Note dated February 28, 1993,[1][2] stating:
28 February 1994
Pepe and Del Montano,
For breaking your promise, since you do not want to fulfill your end of the bargain,
heres your reward:
Henceforth, you lawyer for yourselves. Here are your papers.
Johnny
Complainant claimed that such conduct by respondent counsel exceeded the ethical
standards of the law profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt with
administratively. Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of the
maximum penalty of disbarment.
After respondent counsel filed his comment on the complaint, the Court in the
Resolution of August 1, 1994, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional
conduct and recommended that he be severely reprimanded. However, in a
Resolution[1][3] by the IBP Board of Governors on July 26, 1997, it was resolved that
the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner meted to respondent
by amended to three (3) months suspension from the practice of law for having
been found guilty of misconduct, which eroded the public confidence regarding his
duty as a lawyer.
Respondent counsel sought reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution of the
IBP, alleging that the latter misapprehended the facts and that, in any case, he did
not deserve the penalty imposed. The true facts, according to him, are the
following:
1. Complainant is being represented by Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in his case on
appeal;
2. Due to the ailment of Atty. Geronas daughter, he could not prepare and submit
complainants appellants brief on time;
3. Complainant went to the respondent to do just that, i.e., prepare and submit his
appellants brief on time at the agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and 50% upon
its completion;
4. Working overtime, respondent was able to finish the appellants brief ahead of its
deadline, so he advised the complainant about its completion with the request that
the remaining balance of P7,500.00 be paid. Complainant paid P4,000.00 only,
promising to pay the P3,500.00 tomorrow or on later particular date. Please
take note that, at this juncture, there was already a breach of the agreement on
complainants part.
5. When that tomorrow or on a later particular date came, respondent, thru a
messenger, requested the complainant to pay the P3,500.00 as promised but word
was sent that he will again pay tomorrow or on later date. This promise-non-

payment cycle went on repeatedly until the last day of the filing of the brief. Please
take note again that it was not the respondent but the complainant who sets the
date when he will pay, yet fails to pay as promised;
6. Even without being paid completely, respondent, of his own free will and accord,
filed complainants brief on time;
7. After the brief was filed, respondent tried to collect from the complainant the
remaining balance of P3,500.00, but the latter made himself scarce. As the records
would show, such P3,500.00 remains unpaid until now;
8. Sensing that something was amiss, respondent sent the February 28, 1993 note
and case folder to the complainant, hoping that the latter would see personally the
former about it to settle the matter between them;
9. However, instead of seeing the respondent, complainant filed this case;
10. Respondent was constrained to file his withdrawal with the Court of Appeals
because of this case to avoid further misunderstanding since he was the one who
signed the appellants brief although Atty. Gerona was his counsel of record. Such
withdrawal was accordingly granted by the appellate court;
xxx xxx xxx.[1][4]
Respondent counsel further averred that complainants refusal to pay the agreed
lawyers fees, measly as it was, was deliberate and in bad faith; hence, his
withdrawal as counsel was just, ethical and proper. Respondent counsel concluded
that not only was the penalty of suspension harsh for his act of merely trying to
collect payment for his services rendered, but it indirectly would punish his family
since he was the sole breadwinner with children in school and his wife terminally ill
with cancer.
In its Resolution No. XIII-97-129 dated October 25, 1997, the IBP denied Atty.
Dealcas motion for reconsideration, to wit:
xxx
RESOLVED TO DENY Atty. Dealcas Motion For Reconsideration of the Boards
Decision in the above-entitled case there being no substantive reason to reverse the
finding therein. Moreover, the motion is improperly laid the remedy of the
respondent is to file the appropriate pleading with the Supreme Court within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of notice of said Decision pursuant to Sec. 12 [c] of Rule 139B.[1][5]
On December 10, 1997, this Court noted the following pleadings filed in the present
complaint,
(a) notice and a copy of Resolution No. XII-97-154 dated July 26, 1997 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines amending the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of reprimand to three (3) months suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for having been found guilty of misconduct which eroded the public
confidence regarding his duty as a lawyer;
(b) complainants motion for praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of
disbarment;
(c) motion dated September 15, 1997 of respondent for reconsideration of the
aforesaid resolution of July 26, 1997;

(d) comment/opposition of respondent praying that the motion for the imposition of
the maximum penalty be denied;
(e) comment of complainant praying that the penalty of three (3) months
suspension for the practice of law as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. XII-97-154 be raised to a heavier penalty;
(f) comment/manifestation/opposition of complainant praying that the respondent
be disbarred; and
(g) rejoinder of respondent praying that this case be dismissed for being baseless.
[1][6]
and referred the same to the IBP for evaluation and report.
In compliance therewith, on March 28, 1998, the IBP issued Resolution No. XIII-98-42
referring the above-entitled case to Commissioner Vibar for evaluation, report and
recommendation in view of the Motion for Reconsideration granted by the Supreme
Court.
The Investigating Commissioner, after referring the case, recommended that his
original recommendation of the imposition of the penalty of reprimand be
maintained, noting that respondent counsel had served the IBP well as President of
the Sorsogon Chapter.[1][7] Accordingly, on February 23, 1999, the IBP Board of
Governors, issued the following resolution:
RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-48
xxx
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration be granted and that the
penalty of REPRIMAND earlier recommended by the Investigating Commissioner be
imposed on Atty. Juan S. Dealca.[1][8]
Complainant asked the IBP to reconsider the foregoing resolution but the motion
was denied.[1][9]
On April 10, 2000, complainant filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari in connection with Administrative Case No. 4215 against the IBP and
respondent counsel averring that the IBP Board of Governors committed grave
abuse of discretion when it overturned its earlier resolution and granted respondent
counsels motion for reconsideration on February 23, 1999. He claimed that the
earlier resolution denying the motion for reconsideration issued on October 25,
1997 had already become final and executory; hence, any further action or motion
subsequent to such final and executory judgment shall be null and void.
When the Court issued the resolution of December 10, 1997 treating the several
pleadings filed in the present complaint, it should be noted that the IBP resolution
denying respondents motion for reconsideration (Resolution No. XIII-97-129) dated
October 25, 1997, for some reason, had not yet reached this Court. As of that date,
the only IBP resolution attached to the records of the case was Resolution No. XII97-54 amending the administrative sanction from reprimand to three months

suspension. Hence, at the time the pleadings were referred back to the IBP in the
same resolution, the Court was not aware that the IBP had already disposed of the
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent counsel.
Thus, when the IBP was informed of the said Court resolution, it construed the same
as granting Atty. Dealcas motion for reconsideration and as an order for IBP to
conduct a re-evaluation of the case. The IBP assumed that its resolution of October
25, 1997 was already considered by this Court when it referred the case back to the
IBP. It failed to notice that its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was
not among those pleadings and resolution referred back to it.
Hence, on the strength of this Courts resolution which it had inadvertently
misconstrued, the IBP conducted a re-evaluation of the case and came up with the
assailed resolution now sought to be reversed. The Court holds that the error is not
attributable to the IBP. It is regrettable that the procedural infirmity alleged by
complainant actually arose from a mere oversight which was attributable to neither
party.
Going into the merits, we affirm the findings made by the IBP that complainant
engaged the services of respondent lawyer only for the preparation and submission
of the appellants brief and the attorneys fees was payable upon the completion
and submission of the appellants brief and not upon the termination of the case.
There is sufficient evidence which indicates complainants willingness to pay the
attorneys fees. As agreed upon, complainant paid half of the fees in the amount of
P7,500.00 upon acceptance of the case. And while the remaining balance was not
yet due as it was agreed to be paid only upon the completion and submission of the
brief, complainant nonetheless delivered to respondent lawyer P4,000.00 as the
latter demanded. This, notwithstanding, Atty. Dealca withdrew his appearance
simply because of complainants failure to pay the remaining balance of P3,500.00,
which does not appear to be deliberate. The situation was aggravated by
respondent counsels note to complainant withdrawing as counsel which was
couched in impolite and insulting language.[1][10]
Given the above circumstances, was Atty. Dealcas conduct just and proper?
We find Atty. Dealcas conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession.
Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyer shall withdraw his
services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the
fees for the services,[1][11] under the circumstances of the present case, Atty.
Dealcas withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay
him the attorneys fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his
obligation. Respondents contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of
the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. Rule 20.4 of
Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning
his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant,
respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code.
The Court, however, does not agree with complainants contention that the

maximum penalty of disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer. The

power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.
It should never be decreed where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension,
would accomplish the end desired.[1][12] In the present case, reprimand is deemed
sufficient.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca is
REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
OBANDO V. FIGUERAS
18 Jan. 2000
Facts
:In a civil case, D filed a motion to dismiss and this was granted. P claimed that
themotion to dismiss is invalid since at the time of filing, Atty. Y no longer
represented D.
Issue
:Whether or not Atty. Y ceased to be Ds counsel
Held
:No. Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of counsel
inaccordance with Sec. 26, Rule 138. Counsel may be validly substituted only if the
followingrequisites are complied with: (1) new counsel files a written application for
substitution; (2) theclients written consent is obtained; and (3) the written consent
of the lawyer to be substituted issecured, if it can still be; if the written consent can
no longer be obtained, then the applicationfor substitution must carry proof that
notice of the motion has been served on the attorney to besubstituted in the
manner required by the rules.
OBANDO V. FIGUERAS
18 Jan. 2000
Facts
:In a civil case, D filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that P lost his capacity to
sueduring the pendency of the case. P assailed the motion, saying that it was too
late since P hadalready finished presenting his evidence.
Issue

:Whether the motion to dismiss should be granted

Held
:Yes. The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances of the
case.Sec. 1 of Rule 16 requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed
within thereglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. But the court allows
a defendant to file amotion to dismiss on the ff. grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2)
litis pendentia; (3) lack of causeof action; and (4) discovery during trial of evidence
that would constitute a ground for dismissal.