CANON 11 (REMAINING)

CASES:
JIMMY T. GO and ATTY. GREGORIO D. CAEDA
JR., complainants, vs. JUDGE ZEUS C. ABROGAR,
Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 150, Makati
City,respondent.
FACTS: Petitioners, Jimmy Go and Atty. Gregorio
Caneda alleged Judge Zeus C Abrgogar for Gross
Ignorance of the Law because of the decision he rendered
in a civil case (No. 98-791) where Jimmy Go together
with Alberto Looyuko were one of the defendants, and
also for the judges order dismissing their appeal from the
decision of the said civil case. They allege that
respondent Judge did not possess the authority to do so
nor rule that the judgment was ripe for execution, the
same being reserved in the Court of Appeals. The
petitioners also asserted that the judgment against Go was
not yet final and executory in view of the filing of a
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
assailing the dismissal of their appeal. In support of their
claim, they cite the principle ofjudicial courtesy.
In the respondent Judges defense, his writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 98-791 was directed only
against defendant Alberto T. Looyuko who had
withdrawn his notice of appeal and conveyed his
acquiescence to the execution of the Decision against his
properties involved in the said civil case. Judge Abrogar
claims that the reference of the writ todefendants was a
mere clerical mistake, as it should have read defendant,
that was not corrected when the writ was issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted with
Gross Ignorance of Law.
RULING: NO. Obviously, on the basis of the foregoing
case scrutiny, there is no basis to hold respondent
Judge liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law. The
allegations of complainants and the proffered evidence
thereof do not prove the elements of this administrative
offense, i.e., that the subject order or actuation of the
judge in the performance of his official duties must
not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence
but more importantly must be attended by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or corruption. It may even be said
confidently that respondent Judge did not deviate from
established rules on the execution of judgments.
Moreover, the court finds that the fault is at the
complainants own doing. Irresponsibly, they set the
hearing thereof a period of fourteen (14) days from the
date of its filing, and thereafter postponed their own
setting to a date seven (7) days later. Eventually, after
their self-induced delay of twenty-one (21) days,
complainants moved for the cancellation of the scheduled
hearing upon a measly one (1) days notice. For a
supposedly pressing and imperative motion, the hearings
set by complainants do not indicate a bona fide intention
to correct an earnest injustice as the dates were

calendared simply far apart until finally the hearing of

their motion was called off unceremoniously.
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint against JUDGE
ZEUS C. ABROGAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150, is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case. The rule allows such criticism so
long as it is supported by the record or it is material to
the case.
A lawyers right to criticize the acts of courts and
judges in a proper and respectful way and through
legitimate channels is well recognized. The cardinal
condition of all such criticism is that it shall be bona fide,
and shall not spill over the wall of decency and propriety.
(Agpalo)

The court will not hesitate to sanction persons who

recklessly and nonchalantly impute ill motives that
are nothing but unfounded speculations. Any
serious accusation against a judicial officer that is
utterly baseless, unsubstantiated and unjustified
shall not be countenanced.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge,
Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique,
petitioner, vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA,
respondents
FACTS: Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding
Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated
September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to
refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2)
the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing
petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other
controverting evidences. Together with the complainant
judges petition for review are the preliminary
mandatory injunction with regard to whether the
office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal
complaint for the alleged falsification by Judge
Maceda of his certificate of service submitted to the
Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a
referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman
has the power to administer criminal complaint or cases
against a judge.
RULING: A judge who falsifies his certificate of
service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and inefficiency (Sec. 1, Rule 140, Rules of
Court) and criminally liable to the State under the
Revised Penal Code for his felonious conduct. The
Ombudsman could therefore entertain the criminal
complaint. However, where a criminal complaint
against a judge or other court employees arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must
defer action on said complaint and refer the same to

the Supreme Court for determination whether said

judges or court employees acted within the scope of
their administrative duties. Otherwise, in the absence of
any administrative action taken against Maceda, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Courts power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances
against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

ARMANDO ANG, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE JOSE

P. CASTRO, Regional Trial Judge, Branch LXXXIV
and HON, JUDGE JOSE P. ARRO, Branch CIII, both
of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, and ASSISTANT
FISCAL NARCISO T. ATIENZA of Quezon City,
respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner, Armando Ang seeks to set aside the
order, dated February 9, 1984 of respondent Judge Jose P.
Castro of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXXIV in
Quezon City, denying his appeal from an order holding
him in contempt of court. Petitioner also asks the Court
(1) to order respondent Judge Castro to forward the
records of Civil Case No. Q-35466 to the Intermediate
Appellate Court; (2) to enjoin him from enforcing his
order for the arrest of petitioner; (3) to restrain
respondent Assistant Fiscal Narciso T. Atienza of Quezon
City from conducting preliminary investigation on the
libel charge filed against him by respondent judge;
and, (4) to prohibit respondent Judge Jose P. Arro of the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch CIII, Quezon City
from proceeding and/or conducting a hearing on the
criminal complaint for libel against petitioner in Criminal
Case charged against him (Armando Ang).
In the respondent judges (Hon. Castro) statement,
Armando Ang shall be charged with libel because the
letter he sent in the Office of the Presidential Assistant on
Legal Affairs stating that the respondent judge acted with
ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence,
incompetence, manifest partiality, grave abuse of
discretion, grave misconduct, rendering unjust decision in
a Civil Case under Section 3, Rule 71 of the New Rules
of Court constitutes indirect contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners act constitutes
libel or indirect contempt against the court/ judge
RULING: NO. The Rules of Court cannot be any
clearer. The use of disrespectful of contemptuous
language against a particular judge in pleadings
presented in another court or proceeding is indirect,
not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge
as to interrupt the administration of justice. Stated
differently, if the pleading containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the
same court or judge in which the proceedings are
pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent
to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so

near a court or judge as to interrupt the

administration of justice. Considering the aforecited
provisions, petitioner's conduct if at all, constitutes
indirect contempt and if found guilty, he may appeal
pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
"SEC. 10. Review of judgment or order by Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court; bond for stay. - The
judgment or order of a Court of First Instance made in
a case of contempt punished after written charge and
hearing may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, but execution of the judgment or order
shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the
person in contempt, in an amount fixed by the Court of
First Instance, conditioned that if the appeal be
decided against him he will abide by and perform the
judgment or order. The appeal may be taken as in
criminal cases."
The letter of the petitioner complaining against
respondent judge's ignorance of the law, gross
inexcusable negligence, incompetence, disregard for the
Supreme Court administrative order, grave misconduct,
rendering an unjust decision and dereliction of duty was
done in good faith, as manifested in the case of
Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, "a communication
made in good faith upon any subject matter in which
the party making the communication has an interest or
concerning which he has a duty is privileged if made to
a person having a corresponding interest of duty,
although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter
which without the privilege would be libelous and
actionable; . . . that parties, counsel and witnesses are
exempted from liability in libel or slander for words
otherwise defamatory published in the course of
judicial proceedings, provided the statements are
pertinent or relevant to the case."
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances
against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

Rule 11.04. A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives

not supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case.
NOTES
(Agpalo) The rule allows such criticism so long as it is
supported by the record or it is material to the case. A
lawyers right to criticize the acts of courts and judges in a
proper and respectful way and through legitimate channels is

well recognized. What a lawyer can ordinarily say against a

concluded litigation and the manner the judge handed down
the decision therein may not generally be said to a pending
action. Once litigation is concluded the judge who decided it is
subject to the same criticism as any other public official
because then his ruling becomes public property and is thrown
open to public scrutiny. The cardinal condition of all such
criticism is that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the wall of decency and propriety.

CANON 12 CASES:
ANTONIO VILLASIS, MATERNIDAD V.
VILLASIS and SANTIAGO ORENDAIN,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, ELEUTERIO VILLASIS and LAURA S.

VILLASIS, respondents.
FACTS: The Court dismissed the petition and affirmed
the appellate court's dismissal of petitioners-appellants'
appeal for failure to file appellants' brief finds that
petitioners have shown no valid and justifiable reason for
their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only
themselves to blame for their counsel's (Atty. Tayco) utter
inaction and gross indifference and neglect in not having
filed their brief for a year since receipt of due notice to
file the same. Petitioners' counsel before Atty Tayco was
Atty. Valente who filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
due to his having been employed as technical assistant in
the Supreme Court, with a prayer that appellants' newly
engaged counsel be given sufficient time to file their
brief. Said new counsel, Atty. Esdras F. Tayco, filed on
August 18, 1970 his appearance with the appellate court.
New counsel Tayco's claim in his motion for
reconsideration that he had not received the notice to file
brief borders on the frivolous. Such notice to file brief
had been received by his predecessor-counsel Atty.
Valente and is binding on him as the successor. A new
counsel who accepts a case in midstream is presumed and
obliged to acquaint himself with all the antecedent
processes and proceedings that have transpired in the
record prior to his takeover. It is noteworthy that Atty.
Tayco makes no claim that he was unaware that notice to
file brief had been duly served on Atty. Valente and that
the period would expire on August 10, 1970 and that Atty.
Valente had asked in his two withdrawal motions that he
(Tayco) as new counsel be granted "sufficient time" to
file the brief.
The appellate court consequently required both counsels
of appellants, Atty. Valente (whose withdrawal it held in
abeyance until he filed a proper motion in verified form
with the signed conformity of the clients as per its
resolution of August 18, 1970) and Atty. Tayco to
comment on the dismissal motion. Withdrawing counsel
Valente filed his manifestation alleging inter alia that he
had not received a copy of the dismissal motion and
could not therefore comment thereon and submitting
therewith the signed conformity of his clients to his
withdrawal and reiterating his prayer for the court to
grant his withdrawal and to grant appellants sufficient
time to file their brief. New counsel Tayco filed no
comment whatsoever.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court committed an error in
dismissing the petition/appeal of the petitioner-appellant.
RULING: The appellate court committed no error
therefore in dismissing the appeal. Petitioners-appellants
have shown no valid and justifiable reason for their
inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only
themselves to blame for their counsel's utter inaction and
gross indifference and neglect in not having filed their
brief for a year since receipt of due notice to file the
same. They could not even claim ignorance of the

appellate court's notice to file brief since it had required

withdrawing counsel Valente to secure their written
conformity before granting his withdrawal as counsel,
and certainly they must have ascertained from him as
well as new counsel the status of their appeal which
accounts for Atty. Valente's repeated prayers in his two
motions for withdrawal for the granting of sufficient
time for new counsel to file the brief. They had almost a
year thereafter to make sure that their new counsel did
attend to their appeal and did file the brief. Where a
lawyers motion for extension of time to file a pleading,
memorandum or brief has remained unacted by the
court, the least that is expected of him is to file it within
the period asked for.
Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial
unless he has adequately prepared himself on
the law and the facts of his case, the evidence
he will adduce.

RULE 12.03
NOT TO DELAY CASE: A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting to the same or offering an explanation for
his failure to do so.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition at bar is dismissed with
costs against petitioners.
FRANCISCO A. ACHACOSO, in his own behalf
and in behalf of Capital Insurance & Surety Co.,
Inc., petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, COTRAM, S.A., CAPITAL LIFE
ASSURANCE CORP., and JOAQUIN G.
GARRIDO, respondents.
FACTS: The court reprimanded Atty. Rodrigo Nera for
repeatedly filing extensions of time to file pleadings
and thereafter simply let the period lapse without
submitting the pleading to even an explanation or
manifestation of their failure to do so. His explanations
in the extensions of time were: (1) Dated Feb12 (Feb
27)- March 14: in order that this Honorable Court
may be fully and completely informed of the nature
of the controversy which gave rise to the instant
petition; (2) Dated Mar14 (Mar20)- Mar 29: due to the
pressure of urgent professional work and daily trial
engagements of the undersigned counsel during the
original period granted, he has not had sufficient
material time to complete the preparation of
petitioner's reply and; (3) Dated Mar 29 (Apr6) April
13- due to the pressure of urgent professional work
and daily trial engagements of the undersigned
counsel during the original period granted, he has
not had sufficient material time to complete the
preparation of petitioner's reply. The undersigned
counsel humbly apologizes that in view of his
crowded schedule, he has been constrained to ask
for this extension, but respectfully assures the
Honorable Court that this will be the last one
requested.
Atty Neras defensively stated that he failed to
submit the required pleadings because of the

petitioners failure to communicate with him and their

financial position. He also pleads that it is not their
intention to delay the administration of justice and much
less trifle with the resolutions and orders of this
Honorable Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a disciplinary action should be
taken against the counsel/ Atty. Rodrgio M. Nera
RULING: YES. The court finds the explanation of the
counsel far from satisfactory. If indeed he was not in a
financial position to advance the necessary expenses for
preparing and submitting the reply, then he could have
filed timely the necessary manifestation that he was
foregoing the filing of such reply on petitioner's behalf.
His inaction unduly delayed the Court's prompt disposition
of the case after the filing by respondents of their
comments on the petition showing its lack of merit. The
Court would have then so disposed of the petition had it
not been for petitioner's plea to be given time and
opportunity to file a reply to the comments in order to
fully apprise the Court of the nature of the controversy,
which plea the Court granted in reliance on his good faith.
Yet after having obtained three extensions of time for the
filing of the reply, counsel simply failed neither to file any
reply nor to give the Court the courtesy of any explanation
or manifestation for his failure to do so.
In view of the counsels readily perceived explanation that
his conduct comes close to delaying the administration of
justice and trifling with the Court's processes, it does not
reflect well on counsel's conduct as an officer of the Court
that after assuring the Court that the third extension
requested by him "in view of his crowded schedule" and
"of urgent professional work and daily trial engagements"
would be the last within which period he would at last file
the awaited reply, for him thereafter to let the period
simply lapse without any explanation whatsoever, and
worse, to wait to be found out, and have the Court require
him to explain.
RULE 12.03
NOT TO DELAY CASE: A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting to the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
MANILA PEST CONTROL, INC., petitioner, vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(WCC), ATANACIO A. MARDO, as Chief Hearing
Officer of Regional Office 4 of the Department of
Labor, CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA and MARIO
ABITRIA, respondents
FACTS: Mario Abitria, an employee of Manila Pest
Control suffered from tuberculosis found to have been
contracted from his work. He was granted disability
benefits by the Court but Manila Pest Control alleged
infringement of due process as it was not served the
decision by the court thru its counsel. It claimed that a writ
of execution should not have been ordered since it did not

receive a copy of the decision. The decision was sent to

Atty. Manuel Camacho, who was without any
connection to the case, and not to its counsel Atty.
Corpuz. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the
Workmens Compensation Commision (WCC) which
explained that when it delivered the decision to Atty.
Manuel Corpuz, he refused to receive the decision
alleging that he was no longer handling the case. He
instead instructed WCC to deliver said decision to Atty.
Camacho, who according to him was now handling the
case. In view of said instruction, the employee of WCC
handed the copy of the decision to the receiving clerk in
the Office of Atty. Camacho. The Court imposed treble
costs against petitioner to be paid by Atty. Corpuz.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Corpuz acted with great
misuse of court process.
RULING: YES. It is sad to note that Atty. Corpuz is
now impugning the delivery of the decision to Atty.
Camacho when in fact the delivery of said decision was
made per his instruction to the employee of WCC. This
would not be the first time where out of excess of zeal
and out of desire to rely on every conceivable defense
that could delay if not defeat the satisfaction incumbent
on ones client, counsel would attempt to put the most
favorable light on a course of conduct which certainly
cannot be given the stamp of approval. Not that it would
clear counsel of any further responsibility. His conduct
leaves much to be desired. The effort to evade liability
by petitioner by invoking due process guaranty must not
be rewarded with success. An effort was made to serve
petitioner with a copy of the decision; that such effort
failed was attributable to the conduct of its own counsel.
It is not enough that petitioner be required to pay the
sum due to Abitria. The unseemly conduct of petitioners
counsel calls for words of reproof. It is one thing to exert
to the utmost ones ability to protect the interest of ones
client. It is quite another thing to take advantage any
unforeseen turn of events, if not to create one, to delay if
not to defeat the recovery of what is justly due and
demandable, especially so when the obligee is a poverty
stricken man suffering from a dreaded disease. The
ancient and learned profession of the law stresses the
fairness and honor; that must be ever kept in mind by
everyone who is enrolled in its ranks and who expects to
remain a member of a good standing.
It is one thing to exert to the utmost ones ability to
protect the interest of ones client. It is quite another
thing to delay if not defeat the recovery of what is
justly due and demandable due to the misleading acts
of a
lawyer. (Manila Pest Control v. WCC, 25 SCRA 700
(1968))

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and

prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied. With
treble costs against petitioner to be paid by his counsel,
Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz.

RULE 12.04 :COURT PROCESS: A lawyer shall not

unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment
or misuse court processes.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
LEONCIO BALLENA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: In the case at bar the record shows beyond
any question of a doubt that the witness Barruga, after
being duly sworn, did knowingly and willfully testify
falsely in a criminal case before a duly constituted
tribunal; that this witness so testified at the instigation
of the defendant Leoncio Ballena; and that the
defendant knew that the testimony given by the
witness Barruga was false. The witness so informed
the defendant. Notwithstanding this information, the
defendant strongly insisted that by the witness Barruga
testifying that the fiscal committed those acts would be
the only was to save her daughter from imprisonment.
The defendant not only knowingly and willfully
induced this witness to swear falsely, but he did so
maliciously, as it appears from the record that he was
an enemy of the fiscal at that time, the fiscal having
prosecuted him previous to this trial. So the only
question to be determined is, as we have said, Was the
testimony of Barruga material to the issues involved in
that criminal case against her daughter for perjury?
Materiality is an essential element in the crime of
perjury. (U. S. vs. Estraa, 16 Phil. Rep., 520.) It,
therefore, necessarily follows that materiality is
likewise an indispensable requisite in the crime of
subornation of perjury, as the latter is derived from the
former.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant committed a crime
of perjury
RULING: YES. Subornation of perjury is committed by a
person who knowingly and willfully procures another to swear
falsely and the witness subornated does testify under
circumstances rendering him guilty of perjury.
Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to
misrepresent himself or to impersonate another.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 184, Revised Penal Code
The lawyer who presented a witness knowing
him to be a false witness is criminally liable for
Offering False Testimony In Evidence. The
lawyer is both criminally and administratively
liable.

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiffappellant, vs. UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee.

FACTS: Pursuant to a judgment of the Court of First
Instance the mortgaged lands of Uy Teng Piao were
sold. Philippine National Bank obtained a waiver of
the right to redemption. Uy Teng Piao alleged that the
waiver was given with the agreement that the bank
would not collect from him the balance of judgment.
One of the attorneys for the bank during trial testified
that the defendant renounced his right to redeem the

parcel of land because a friend of the defendant was

interested in buying it.
ISSSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the banks
attorney as a witness is valid.
RULING: With respect to the testimony of the
banks attorney, we should like to observe that
although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a
witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause,
the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as
witness unless it is necessary and that they should
withdraw from the active management of the case.
Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics provides that
when a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as
to merely formal matters. Such as the attestation or
custody of an instrument and the like, he should
leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except
when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer
should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his
client.
Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his
client; except:
a. on formal matters, such as mailing, authentication or
custody of an instrument, and the like; or
b. on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is
essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must,
during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel.

CANON 13 CASES:
DOMINGO V. AUSTRIA, petitioner, vs. HON.
ANTONIO C. MASAQUEL, in his capacity as
the Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, respondent
FACTS: Petitioner, Domingo Austria filed an instant
petition for certiorari for having been punished
summarily for direct contempt of court because he
prayed for the disqualification of judge Masaquel for
two (2) main reasons, specifically: (1) The lawyer of
the other party was the judges former assistant and
(2) the defendant Pedro Bravo himself that he is
boasting in San Carlos that because he has a new
lawyer, that surely he is going to win this case. The
petitioner stated that he had not committed an act of
contempt against the court and the respondent judge
had acted win excess of his jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion when he declared the
petitioner in direct contempt of court and imposed on
him the fine of Php 50.00 as penalty.
The respondent judge, on the other hand said that the
actuation of the petitioner, in the premises, is
offensive, insulting, and a reflection on his integrity
and honesty and it shows lack of respect to the court.
He considered that the petitioner was not justified
and had no reason to entertain doubts in his fairness
and integrity simply because the defendant's counsel
was his former associate. And that the act of the

petitioners counsel/attorney (Atty. Macraeg) in

approaching him in his chambers is prohibited.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner acted in direct
contempt against the court and the respondent judge
RULING: NO. The court considered the view that
when the petitioner requested respondent Judge to
inhibit himself from further trying the case upon the
ground that the counsel for the opposite party was the
former associate of the respondent Judge, petitioner
did so because he was impelled by a justifiable
apprehension which can occur in the mind of a litigant
who sees what seems to be an advantage on the part of
his adversary; and that the petitioner made his request
in a manner that was not disrespectful, much less
insulting or offensive to the respondent Judge or to the
court.
Moreover, the petitioner did not take an arrogant
attitude toward respondent Judge. What he did was to
request his lawyer, Atty. Macaraeg, to approach
respondent Judge in his chamber and suggest to him to
refrain from hearing the case on the new trial,
precisely in order that respondent Judge might not be
embarrassed or exposed to public odium. There is
nothing in the record which shows that when
respondent Judge refused to disqualify himself, the
petitioner insisted in asking for his disqualification. If
the request of petitioner for respondent Judge to
disqualify himself came to the knowledge of the
public it was because respondent Judge himself
brought up the matter in open court.
It is, however, improper for a litigant or counsel to see
a judge in chambers and talk to him about a matter
related to the case pending in the court of said judge.
Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated
February 10, 1964, in Civil Case No. 13259 of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring
petitioner in direct contempt of court and ordering
him to pay a fine of P50.00, is hereby annulled and
set aside; and it is ordered that the sum of P50.00, paid
under protest by petitioner as a fine, be refunded to
him. No costs. It is so ordered.
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extendextraordinary
attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for
cultivating familiarity with Judges.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally
should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect
without which the administration of justice must falter or fail." The
power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its
nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of
justice.

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs.

HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION
OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.

FACTS: Two unions (Union of Filipro Employees

and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia) with
pending cases before the Supreme Court had
intermittent pickets (guards/wardens) in front of the
Padre Faura gate of the SC building, obstructing
access to and egress from the Courts premises. They
also constructed provisional shelters, set up a
kitchen, littered the area causing it to be unhygienic
and unsanitized, waved their red streamers and
placards with slogans, and harangued the court with
the use of loudspeakers. Two justices (Judge Pedro
L. Yap and Judge Marcelo Fernan) called the
leaders of the unions and their counsel to inform
them that the pickets constitute direct contempt
of court, and that their petitions could not be heard
until the pickets stop. Atty Espinas, the counsel for
the unions, apologized and assured that the acts
would not be repeated. The Supreme Court
dismissed the contempt charges against Atty.
Espinas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the direct contempt charges
against Atty Espinas shall be dismissed.
RULING: YES. However, grievances must be
ventilated through proper channels (appropriate
petitions, motions or other pleadings) in keeping
with the respect due to the Courts as impartial
administrators of justice entitled to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free
from outside interference obstructive of its functions
and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice. The acts of the respondents are not only
affront to the dignity of this Court, but equally a
violation of the right of the adverse parties and the
citizenry at large. The individuals cited are not
knowledgeable in the intricacies of substantive
and adjective laws, but the duty of advising them
rests primarily on their counsel of record. For
though the rights of free speech and of assembly are
constitutionally protected, an attempt to pressure or
influence courts of justice is no longer within the
ambit of constitutional protection.
WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against
herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth,
no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or
influence courts of justice into acting one way or the
other on pending cases shall be allowed in the
vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all
courts.
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extendextraordinary
attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for
cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Nestle Phil. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 542 (1987) Courts
and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should
be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts
should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and
that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.. The court
will not hesitate in the future to apply the full force of the

law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure

the court into acting one way or the other in any case
pending before it. Grievances should be aired along proper
channels.

IN RE: PUBLISHED ALLEGED THREATS

AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN THE
PLUNDER LAW CASE HURLED BY ATTY.
LEONARD DE VERA
FACTS: Atty. De Vera made some remarks to the
Philippine Daily Inquirer regarding a pending case
involving the constitutionality of the Plunder Law. In
one statement, he asked the SC to dispel rumors that
it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estradas
lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional
and that his group was greatly disturbed by the
rumors. In another statement, he said that a decision
in favor of the laws unconstitutionality would trigger
mass actions and the people would not just swallow
any SC decision that is basically wrong. Atty. De Vera
admitted to making the statements but that these were
factually accurate and that these are within his right to
freedom of speech. Also, his second statement is
allegedly historically correct (Marcos and Erap times)
but that both statements are not to degrade the court,
to destroy public confidence and to bring it into
disrepute. The SC found that de Veras acts constitute
indirect contempt and fined him P20, 000.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER Monday, November 19, 2001:
Atty. Leonard De Vera also argued that he was
merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to
freedom of speech when he said that a decision by the Court
declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional would trigger
mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to
People Power II. While Atty. Leonard De Vera admitted to
having uttered the aforecited statements, respondent denied
having made the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public
confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Leonard De Vera is

liable for indirect contempt of court for uttering
statements aimed to influence and threat the Court in
deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law
RULING: Yes. Freedom of speech is not absolute,
and must be balanced with the requirements of
equally important public interests, such as the
maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. De Vera
is in abuse of his right. Unwarranted attacks on the
dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free
speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to
impair the independence and efficiency of courts or
public respect and confidence thereof. His statements
are not fair criticisms of any decision of the Court,
but are threats made against it to force the Court to
decide the issue in a particular manner, or risk earning
the ire of the public. It tends to promote distrust an
undermines public confidence in the judiciary, by
creating the impression that the Court cannot be

trusted to resolve cases impartially, uninfluenced by

public clamor and other extraneous influences.
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner, vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
FACTS: The Supreme Court publicly reprimanded
Pasay City Fiscal Fransisco Salva for conducting a
reinvestigation of the Manuel Monroy murder not in
his office, but in the Municipal Courts session hall,
to accommodate the big crowd wanting to witness
the proceeding. Members of the press were present,
and were even allowed to ask questions. Salva was
willing to adopt the press questions as the
committees.
ISSUE: Whether or not
RULING: Anent the investigation, the court was
greatly disappointed and annoyed by the publicity
and sensationalism. He committed a grievous error
and poor judgment for which the court failed to find
any satisfactory explanation. His actuations went
beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and good
taste. When such publicity and sensationalism is
allowed, the whole thing becomes inexcusable even
abhorrent, and in the interest of justice, is
constrained to put an end to it. It is bad enough to
have such undue publicity when a criminal case is
being investigated by the authorities, even when it
is being tried in court; but when said publicity is
encouraged when the case is on appeal and is
pending consideration by this court, the whole
thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari
and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part.
Considering the conclusion arrived at by us,
respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly
reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and
wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given
to and allowed in connection with his investigation,
which we consider and find to be contempt of court;
and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of
the same would meet with a more severe
disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements
in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party.

RE: REQUEST RADIO TV COVERAGE,

A.M. NO, 01-4-03 S.C. JUNE 29, 2001
FACTS: The petitioner, in essence, sought to
reverse the 1991 Supreme Court resolution denying
the live coverage of a libel case filed by then
President Aquino. In this case, petitioners requested
the Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial before the Sandiganbayan of
criminal charges against Pres. Estrada. In the 1991
case, the court totally prohibited live radio and TV
coverage because of the prejudice it poses to the

defendants right to due process and to the fair and

orderly administration of justice. The Court also held
that the right of the people to information may be
served by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial
means. The radio and TV coverage allowed was
limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers,
the parties and their counsel taken prior to the
commencement of official proceedings. No video
shots or photographs were permitted during the trial
proper. The Supreme Court denied the petition.
ISSUE:
RULING: This resolution of this case involves the
weighing out of the freedom of the press and the right
of the people to information on one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused on the other, along
with the constitutional power of the court to control
its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.
Jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused
must be preferred. Television can work profound
changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on.
However, the actual effect of media cannot be
quantified. The effect of television may escape the
ordinary means of proof, but is not far-fetched. The
court also pointed out that a public trial is not
synonymous to a publicized trial. Although the court
recognizes the constitutionally protected freedom of
the press and the right to public information, within
the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still
the paramount right of the accused to due process.
In Estes v. Texas, it was held that the likely prejudices
of a live coverage of a trial are: (1) When the judge
allows the trial to be televised, the case automatically
assumes an important status in the community such
that everybody becomes interested. (2) The quality of
the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired.
(3) There are additional responsibilities that the
presence of television places upon the judge. (4) The
presence of television may prove to be a form of
mental sometimes physicalharassment on the
part of the defendant. (much like being in a police
lineup). The court is not unmindful of recent
technological advances but to chance with the life or
liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply
them, even in the presence of safety precautions, is a
price too high to pay.
Trial should not to be televised. The right of accused, who
is in danger of losing his life and liberty, to a fair trial,
outweighs right of public to information. Media exposure
may unduly interfere with the disposition of the trial.
RULE: 13.02 NO PUBLIC STATEMENT TO MEDIA
A lawyer shall not make public statements in media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion
for or against a party.

KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accusedpetitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San
Carlos City Court), Negros Occidental,
respondents.

FACTS: Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, the

petitioners counsel is charged with the contempt of
court and improper conduct as a member of the bar
and an officer of the Court for after having a copy
of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, he filed it
in the Office of the President of the Philippines.
Whereby, Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his
lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all
the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with
"biases and or ignorance of the law or knowingly
rendering unjust judgments or resolution." The
complaint was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the
complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B.
Maglasang, allegedly the father of accusedcomplainant Khalyxto.
By reason of the strong and intemperate language of
the complaint and its improper filing with the
Office of the President, which, as he should know
as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline,
much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme
Court, Atty. Castellano was required to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt or
administratively dealt with for improper conduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of complaint
against the justices in the Office of the President is
improper.
RULING: YES. In filing a "complaint" against the
justices of the Court's Second Division with the
Office of the President, even the most basic tenet of
our government system-the separation of powers
between the judiciary, the executive, and the
legislative branches-has been lost on Atty.
Castellano. Related rule: Rule 11.05. A lawyer shall
submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite
interference by another branch or agency of the
government in the normal course of judicial proceedings.

CANON 14 CASES:
OLEGARIA BLANZA and MARIA PASION,
complainants, vs. ATTY. AGUSTIN
ARCANGEL, respondent..
FACTS: Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria
Pasion ask the Court to take disciplinary action
against respondent Atty. Agustin Arcangel for
professional non-feasance. They complain that way
back in April, 1955, respondent volunteered to help
them in their respective pension claims in
connection with the deaths of their husbands, both
P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over
to him the pertinent documents and also affixed
their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently,
they noticed that since then, respondent had lost
interest in the progress of their claims and when
they finally asked for the return of their papers six
years later, respondent refused to surrender them.

Respondent answered these accusations before Fiscal

Raa to whom this case was referred by the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and
recommendation. He admitted having received the
documents from complainants but explained that it
was for photostating purposes only. His failure to
immediately return them, he said, was due to
complainants' refusal to hand him the money to pay
for the photostating costs which prevented him from
withdrawing said documents from the photostat
service. Anyway, he had already advanced the
expenses himself and turned over the documents, to
their respective photostats and the photostat service
receipt to the fiscal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the actions of Atty Arcangel
constitutes disciplinary actions by the court
RULING: NO. However, he should be reminded of
what high standards of his chosen profession require
of him. Finding respondent's explanation satisfactory
and considering that he charged complainants nothing
for his services, Fiscal Raa recommended the
former's exoneration, on at most, that he be
reprimanded only. The Solicitor General, however,
feels that respondent deserves at least a severe
reprimand considering (1) his failure to attend to the
complainants' pension claims for six years: (2) his
failure to immediately return the documents despite
repeated demands upon him, and (3) his failure to
return to complainant Pasion, allegedly, all of her
documents.
Moreover, as a lawyer who volunteered his services
to a client, and therefore not entitled to attorneys
fees, nevertheless, he is bound to attend to a clients
case with all due diligence and zeal.
By volunteering his services, he has established a clientlawyer relationship. (Blanza v. Arcangel, 21 SCRA 1
(1967))
If the counsel does refuse (see above justifications),
Rule 2.02 governs, which says:
In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case,
he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person
concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the
latter's rights.
Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person
unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same
standard of conduct governing his relations with paying
clients.