14. A.M. No. RTJ-15-2408 (Formerly OCA IPI No.

13-4134-RTJ), March 02, 2016

FLORANTE A. MIANO, Complainant, v. MA. ELLEN M. AGUILAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a Verified Complaint1 dated September 10, 2013 filed by complainant Atty.
Florante A. Miano (complainant) before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Ma. Ellen M.
Aguilar (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch 70 (RTC-
Burgos), with ignorance of the rules on inhibition and gross inefficiency relative to several pending cases in her sala.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that he filed motions for inhibition in several cases raffled to the sala of respondent, specifically
Civil Case No. 173-B,2 entitled "Florante A. Miano and Bernadette Atienza v. Romeo Migano" (Migano case), and
Criminal Case No. B-685,3 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Nelson Mores y Madarang" (Madarang case), which
respondent granted.4 In the Migano case, complainant alleged5 as grounds for respondent's inhibition his being a
"personal friend" of the latter, as in fact complainant - whom respondent called "Florams," a nickname only used by
close and intimate friends - would often have dinners and/or lunches together with a common friend at respondent's
house in Quezon City. Moreover, prior to respondent's appointment to the judiciary, one of her colleagues at the City
Legal Office of Olongapo City, a certain Leonardo M. Miano, is a first cousin of complainant.6 The OCA was furnished
a copy of the Order of Inhibition dated September 11, 2007.7

Subsequently, however, respondent issued an Order8 dated October 11, 2007 (October 11, 2007 Order) in the
Migano case directing that the proceedings therein be held in abeyance "until such time that a new Presiding Judge
will be appointed by the Court Administrator to hear and decide this case."9 Complainant asserted that this constitutes
ignorance of the rules on inhibition on the part of respondent because according to Administrative Matter (A.M.) No.
03-8-02-SC,10 where the judge in a single-branch RTC, such as RTC-Burgos where respondent presides, is
disqualified or voluntarily inhibits from hearing a case, the Order of Inhibition shall be transmitted to the pairing judge
who shall then hear and decide the case.11 Likewise, complainant contended that due to the issuance of the October
11, 2007 Order, the proceedings in the Migano case did not move from the time respondent inhibited therefrom in
2007 up to the filing of the present administrative complaint.12

Further, complainant accused respondent of gross inefficiency, citing various instances where the latter failed to
resolve motions for inhibition within the 90-day period prescribed by law. Finally, he averred that respondent -
surprisingly - denied his motions for inhibition in cases where the opposing counsel is a certain Atty. Sancho Abasta,
Jr. (Atty. Abasta), who hails from the same province as her. In this regard, complainant claimed that respondent
showed bias as she would usually grant motions for inhibition that he files before her court, except for the said cases
handled by Atty. Abasta.13

In her comment,14 respondent countered that: (a) she is aware of the rules on inhibition set forth in A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC and that the October 11, 2007 Order in the Migano case was only intended to inform the OCA of her inhibition
therefrom; (b) her Branch Clerk of Court failed to transmit the records of the said case to the Executive Judge of the
multi-sala court of RTC-Alaminos City, Pangasinan (RTC-Alaminos City), resulting in the delay in the proceedings
therein; (c) her failure to resolve the motions filed by complainant within the 90-day period was due to heavy workload,
especially considering that, aside from being the presiding judge of RTC-Burgos, she was also serving as acting
presiding judge in RTC-Alaminos City, Branch 54 in behalf of Judge Benjamin Abella who already retired from service;
and (d) complainant's motions for inhibition in cases where the opposing counsel is Atty. Abasta were pro forma, for
which reason she denied the same, and the mere fact that she and Atty. Abasta hail from the same province is not
enough justification for her inhibition.15

The OCA's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation16 dated August 20, 2014, the OCA found respondent guilty of Gross Ignorance of
the Law/Procedure, Undue Delay in Issuing Orders in Several Cases, and Undue Delay in Transmitting the Records of
a Case. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that she be meted the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of
all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.17

The OCA found that respondent was indeed ignorant of the rules on inhibition, especially Section 8, Chapter V of A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC which provides that the Order of Inhibition should be transmitted to the pairing judge who shall be the
one to hear and decide the case. Her ignorance of such rules was highlighted when she violated the same by issuing
the October 11, 2007 Order in the Migano case which was not solely intended to inform the OCA of her inhibition
therefrom, but also "to hold the case in abeyance until such time that a new Presiding Judge will be appointed by the
Court Administrator."18 Worse, she caused undue delay in transmitting the records of the said case to the appropriate
pairing court as such transmittal was effected only six (6) years after her inhibition therefrom.19
Anent the issue of respondent's failure to resolve motions for inhibition within the prescribed period, the OCA found
that while her caseload was indeed heavy during the time she failed to resolve said motions, she made no effort to
seek for an extension of time to resolve them. In this relation, the OCA pointed out that in such instances, all that
respondent needed to do was to request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases and the Court would
have granted such request, but she failed to do so.20

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not grounds exist to dismiss respondent from service, as
recommended by the OCA.

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs with the OCA in finding respondent guilty of Undue Delay in Issuing Orders in Several Cases and
Undue Delay in Transmitting the Records of a Case, but differs from its finding that respondent should likewise be
held guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law/Procedure.

To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges should be
embodiments of competence, integrity and independence. Judges are also expected to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules and to apply them properly in all good faith. They are likewise
expected to demonstrate mastery of the principles of law, keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence, and discharge
their duties in accordance therewith.21

Corollary thereto, the Court has ruled that when a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes
the public's confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. However, gross ignorance
of the law is more than an erroneous application of legal provisions.22 Not every error or mistake that a judge commits
in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate
intent to do an injustice.23 To constitute gross ignorance of the law and for administrative liability to attach, it is not
enough that the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing
law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption or had
committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.24

Section 8, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states in part:

Section 8. Raffle and re-assignment of cases in ordinary courts where judge is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits
himself/herself from hearing case. - x x x.

xxxx

(c) Where the judge in a single-branch RTC is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself/herself, the Order of Inhibition
shall be transmitted to the pairing judge who shall then hear and decide the case. The determination of the pairing
judge shall be in accordance with Annex "A" hereof.

xxxx
In this case, respondent maintains that she is aware of the foregoing rules on inhibition. Nonetheless, she still issued
the October 11, 2007 Order and directed that the proceedings in the Migano case be held in abeyance until such time
that a new judge shall have been appointed by the Court Administrator, and failed to directly and immediately transmit
the records of the case to the pairing judge in RTC-Alaminos City for further proceedings. Unfortunately, the
transmittal was made only on July 25, 2013, and the case did not progress during the six-year interim period. As a
result, the Migano case was left pending in her court for a long period of time.

Under the foregoing circumstances, therefore, respondent was clearly remiss in her duty of familiarizing herself with
the rules on inhibition set forth in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC. However, the Court finds that such error cannot be
categorized as gross ignorance of the law and/or procedure as records are devoid of evidence to show that
respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty, or egregious error in issuing the October 11,
2007 Order.

Respondent had already clarified that she issued the said Order merely to inform the OCA of her inhibition from the
subject case, and while it is true that there was no necessity therefor, respondent's act in itself is not indicative of bad
faith. Moreover, she explained that she had instructed her Branch Clerk to transmit the records of the Migano case to
the pairing judge in RTC-Alaminos City, only to discover later on that the transmittal letter was not properly attached to
the records, resulting in the delay in its transmittal. Hence, while it may be inferred under the circumstances that
respondent was careless and did not exercise diligence in ensuring that the records of the Migano case were
immediately transmitted to the pairing judge of RTC-Alaminos City for proper disposition, records are bereft of
evidence to show that the resulting delay was deliberately or maliciously caused as to amount to bad faith. Instead,
what is evident in this case is that the delay was caused by inadvertence and negligence.
As such, while it may be considered an unfortunate error on respondent's part to hold in abeyance the proceedings in
the Migano case and to fail to promptly transmit the records thereof to the pairing judge in RTC-Alaminos City, such
error does not appear to have been tainted with or impelled by bad faith. Bad faith cannot be presumed25 and the
Court cannot conclude that bad faith attended respondent's acts when none has been shown in this case.
Consequently, respondent need not be subjected to administrative sanction in this respect.26

With regard, however, to the delay in the resolution of pending motions for inhibition within the prescribed period,
records are bereft of evidence to show that respondent filed any request for an extension of time within which to
resolve them, which the Court could have granted. As such, even if the Court were to accept her excuse that her
combined caseload in RTC-Alaminos City, as well as in RTC-Burgos, the courts where she was concurrently
presiding, was indeed heavy, she could have requested an extension of time within which to decide and dispose of
pending cases and justified the same. The Court is not unmindful of the circumstances that may delay the speedy
disposition of cases assigned to judges, thus, the Court allows extensions of time within which pending cases may be
disposed of, upon a seasonable filing of a request therefor and sufficient justification.27 For failing to do so,
respondent cannot evade administrative liability.

The rules and jurisprudence are clear on the matter of delay. Failure to decide cases and other matters within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the
erring magistrate.28 Judges must decide cases and resolve matters with dispatch because any delay in the
administration of justice deprives litigants of their right to a speedy disposition of their case and undermines the
people's faith in the judiciary. Indeed, justice delayed is justice denied.29

In light of all the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent is administratively liable for Undue Delay in Issuing Orders
in Several Cases and Undue Delay in Transmitting the Records of a Case, which are classified as less serious
charges under Section 9,30 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court that merit the penalty of (a) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.31 Considering the circumstances of this case and the fact that this is not
the first time that respondent has been held administratively liable,32 the Court finds it appropriate to impose the
penalty of suspension for a period of three (3) months against respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch 70, GUILTY of Undue Delay in Issuing Orders in Several Cases and Undue Delay in
Transmitting the Records of a Case, and is hereby SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for a
period of three (3) months, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 15. & 16. G.R. No. 179914 June 16, 2014
SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law by heart and to have the basic rules of procedure at
the palm of his hands.1
Before us are two consolidated cases: (1) a Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the June 13, 2007 Decision3 and the August 8, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00477-MIN; and (2) an Administrative Complaint5 against Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. (Judge Venadas, Sr.) of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, for Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave
Misconduct.
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon (spouses Sombilon) were the previous owners of a 601-square meter
property, with two buildings constructed on it, in South Poblacion, Maramag, Bukidnon. 6 The said property, which they
mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for their loan, was foreclosed and sold at public auction
on July 15, 1998, where PNB emerged as the winning bidder in the amount of ₱2,355,000.00.7Consequently, on
August 20, 1998, a Certificate of Sale was issued in PNB’s name, which was duly registered with the Registry of
Deeds for Bukidnon on August 25, 1999.8 The one-year redemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed to
redeem the property.9
In 2005, spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand T. Garay (Atty. Garay), a Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO) lawyer, who was once appointed by the court as counsel de officio for Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and
who happens to be the owner of a lot adjacent to the property.10 Spouses Sombilon told Atty. Garay that they wanted
to reacquire11 the property from PNB, but had no money to repurchase it. 12 Thus, they were hoping that he would
agree to advance the money and, in exchange, they promised to sell him the 331-square meter portion of the
property, where one of the buildings is located, for ₱5 million.13
On February 9, 2005, Atty. Garay together with spouses Sombilon went to PNB to inquire about the status of the
property.14 They were informed by the bank that the property could be purchased at the fair market value of
₱2,938,000.00.15 The following day, Atty. Garay went to the bank alone and offered to buy the property by making a
down payment of ₱587,600.0016 or 20% of the purchase price.17
On February 14, 2005, upon learning that Atty. Garay intended to purchase the entire property for himself, spouses
Sombilon offered to buy back the property from PNB.18 The bank advised them to make a 10% down payment of the
bank’s total claim 19 to formalize their offer.20
On February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in favor of PNB. 21
On April 14, 2005, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 94384 was issued in the name of PNB. 22
On the same date, PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Garay23 since spouses Sombilon failed to
make the required down payment.24

G.R. No. 179914

On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession25 before the RTC of Malaybalay
City, Bukidnon. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 375-05 and raffled to Branch 8, presided over by
Judge Venadas, Sr.
On June 10, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order 26 granting the Petition and, on June27, 2005, he issued a Writ
of Possession27 in favor of PNB.28
On June 22, 2005, PNB informed spouses Sombilon that Atty. Garay’s offer to purchase the property had been
approved due to their failure to pay the full down payment.29
On July 10, 2005, spouses Sombilon moved for a reconsideration 30 of the issuance of the Writ of Possession arguing
that Atty. Garay,31 who was the former counsel of Hilly, was barred from purchasing the property pursuant to
paragraph 5,32 Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 14, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order 33 holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession, a portion of which reads:
Although, ordinarily a writ of possession is issued by the court because it is a mandatory and ministerial duty under
Act 3135, x x x there is x x x an exception to this rule that if the implementation and enforcement of the writ of
possession would work [great] injustice to the registered owner because the petitioner PNB or in this case Atty. Garay
counsel for the Sombilon[s] is not entitled thereto. There is much to be said about the conduct of Atty. Garay in
manipulating that the property in question was finally bought by him from the PNB not to mention the possible violation
of the [canon] of legal and judicial ethics. However, the court cannot ignore the version of Mrs. Sombilon. The court
will give Atty. Garay [the opportunity] to rebut the evidence presented by spouses Sombilon and he is directed to
appear on August 2, 2005, at 8:30 in the morning. And if this case cannot be accommodated in the morning[,] it will
proceed in the afternoon.
Send proper notice to Atty. Rey Ferdinand Garay for him to appear on said date.
In the meantime, the full implementation x x x of the Writ of Possession is hereby held in abeyance. Sheriff Claudio C.
Bugahod is hereby directed to return all items to the house of Spouses Sombilon and to restore them in full
possession of the property, if already implemented and enforced.
SO ORDERED.34
Aggrieved, Atty. Garay and PNB elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction35 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Initially, on August 2, 2005, the CA dismissed36 the Petition for Certiorari for several procedural defects.37 However, on
reconsideration,38 the CA reinstated the Petition.39
On July 25, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution40 granting the PNB and Atty. Garay’s application for a TRO. Thus:
Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued upon the posting of a Five Thousand Peso
(₱5,000.00) bond within five (5) days from receipt hereof ordering, [petitioners] to:
1. Cease and desist from doing any act which is destructive of, or involves danger to, or alters the nature and
condition of the property;
2. Cease and desist from collecting rent or income [for the use of] the said property;
3. To deposit any rent or income arising from the said property which they may have already received to the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of the Tenth Judicial Region, Malaybalay City; and
Furthermore, all tenants are hereby ordered to deposit any rentals arising from the disputed property to the said Clerk
of Court.
SO ORDERED.41
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 13, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision42 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA found grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession.43The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the assailed July 14, 2005 Order of the court a
quo is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.44
Spouses Sombilon moved for reconsideration45 but the CA denied the same in its August 8, 2007 Resolution.46
Hence, spouses Sombilon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari contending that:
THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITIONFOR
CERTIORARI OF [ATTY. GARAY AND PNB] AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNT[ING] TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION COMMITTED BYTHE [RTC], BRANCH [8],
MALAYBALAY CITY, WHICH IS CONTRARY [TO] LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT.47
Spouses Sombilon’s Arguments
Spouses Sombilon insist that the CA should have dismissed the Petition for Certioraridue to the failure of PNB and
Atty. Garay to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order. 48
They also allege that PNB and Atty. Garay engaged in forum-shopping when they filed a Motion to Recall Order with
the RTC, in addition to the Petition for Certiorari they earlier filed with the CA.49
As to the assailed Order, they contend that Judge Venadas, Sr. did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession because PNB no longer has the legal personality to apply for
a Writ of Possession considering that the subject property had already been sold to Atty. Garay, 50 who they claim is
also not entitled to the Writ of Possession as he is disqualified from purchasing the subject property pursuant to
paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code.51
Atty. Garay’s and PNB’s Arguments
Atty. Garay, on the other hand, argues that the CA did not err in granting the Petition for Certiorari as Judge Venadas,
Sr. acted with grave abuse of discretion when he recalled the Writ of Possession without notice to him and PNB. 52 He
also emphasizes that it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession after the redemption period has
lapsed.53
PNB, for its part, asserts that as the registered owner of the subject property, it is entitled to the Writ of
Possession.54 Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession, which he had earlier issued.55
PNB further avers that it is not privy to the arrangement or relationship between Atty. Garay and spouses
Sombilon.56 In any case, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code does not apply to the instant
case as Atty. Garay purchased the subject property from PNB and not from spouses Sombilon. 57
Anent its failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition for Certiorari, PNB explains that in this
case the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration may be dispensed with as the issue involved is purely one of law, which
is an exception under prevailing jurisprudence.58
Besides, there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available at the time considering that Judge Venadas, Sr.
issued the assailed Order, holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession, without affording PNB
the opportunity to be heard.59
Lastly, PNB denies that it committed forum-shopping claiming that it did not institute another action simultaneously
with the Petition for Certiorari it filed with the CA.60
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
Meanwhile, on November15, 2005, Atty. Garay filed a Verified Complaint61 against Judge Venadas, Sr., charging him
with Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct when he proceeded with the hearing of spouses Sombilon’s
motion for reconsideration of the Order granting the issuance of the Writ of Possession despite lack of notice to PNB
and for holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he issued in Special Civil Case No. 375-05.
Atty. Garay’s Arguments
Atty. Garay claims that Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the Writ of
Possession he earlier issued62 and for ignoring Sections 4,63 5,64 and 665 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as he
proceeded to hear the motion despite lack of notice to PNB.66
Judge Venadas, Sr.’s Arguments
In his defense, Judge Venadas, Sr. denies the charges against him arguing that he did not annul the Writ of
Possession but merely stayed its execution and implementation to prevent any injustice. 67 He insists there was no
violation of due process because he immediately scheduled a hearing for PNB to present its evidence. 68
Report and Recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
The OCA, in its Report,69 found Judge Venadas, Sr. administratively liable for grave abuse of authority bordering on
gross ignorance of procedure.70 Although the OCA did not touch on the issue of whether Judge Venadas, Sr. should
be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession as it was still
pending with the CA at that time, it nevertheless found Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4,
5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when he acted on the defective motion filed by spouses Sombilon. 71 It also
pointed out that PNB and Atty. Garay were deprived of their rights to due process as no proper notice was sent to
them.72 Thus, the OCA recommended that:
a) the instant administrative complaint be DOCKETED as a regular administrative complaint;
b) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas,Sr. be found guilty of gross ignorance of procedure; and
c) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. be ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱20,000.00) with a WARNING that a similar transgression x x x will be dealt with more severely. 73
On November 26, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000 with G.R. No. 179914.74
Issues
Stripped of the non-essentials, the issues boil down to: (1) whether Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession; and (2) whether he should be
administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession and for disregarding
Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling

G.R. No. 179914

The issuance of a writ of possession is
ministerial upon the court.
A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with the Register of Deeds within which to
redeem his property.75 During the one-year redemption period, the purchaser may possess the property by filing a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the court, upon the posting of a bond. 76 But after the one-year
period, the purchaser has a right to consolidate the title and to possess the property, without need of a bond. 77 And
once title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial
on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is left to the court.78 Questions regarding the regularity and validity of the
mortgage or the foreclosure sale may not be raised as a ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the
writ of possession as these must be raised in a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure
sale.79 The pendency of such action is also not a ground to stay the issuance of a writ of possession.80
In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of
Possession.1âwphi1In fact, the title over the subject property had already been consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it
was ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr. to issue the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of the
subject property.
Though there are instances when the issuance of the Writ of Possession may be deferred, 81 we find none of these
recognized exceptions present in the instant case. Spouses Sombilon claim that the sale between PNB and Atty.
Garay was invalid as it was done in violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. However, the alleged
invalidity of the sale is not a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of Possession as this does not affect
PNB’s right to possess the subject property. Thus, there was no reason for Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in abeyance
the implementation of the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Order holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession because PNB, as the registered owner, is
entitled to the possession of the subject property as a matter of right.
Regarding the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to move for a reconsideration of the assailed Order prior to the
availment of a special civil action for certiorari, we agree with PNB that the filing of a motion for reconsideration may
be dispensed with where the decision is a patent nullity or where there is violation of due process,82 such as in the
instant case.
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in granting the Petition for Certiorari.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
As to the Administrative Complaint filed against Judge Venadas, Sr., we agree with the findings and recommendations
of the OCA.
Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day notice rule and the required proof of service
embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, thereby rendering the motion fatally defective.
Despite this, Judge Venadas, Sr. still took cognizance of the motion filed by spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and
Atty. Garay of their right to due process.
To exculpate himself from the charges against him, Judge Venadas, Sr. claims that the motion was personally served
on PNB and its counsel on July 12, 2005 but they refused to receive the same. However, as aptly pointed out by the
OCA, no affidavit was submitted to substantiate such allegation. Thus, we agree with the Court Administrator that
Judge Venadas, Sr. is guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure for blatantly
disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and law is gross ignorance of the
law,83which is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC, punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension for more than three months but not exceeding
six months, or a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.84
Thus, in view of his blatant disregard of the rules and his grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order, and
considering that this is his first offense, we find Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on
gross ignorance of the law and is hereby fined the amount of ₱20,000.00. Incidentally, in the April 18, 2007 Resolution
in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.,85 the Court approved the application of Judge Venadas, Sr. for disability retirement but
withheld the amount of ₱100,000.00 pending the final resolution of this case. In view thereof, the fine of ₱20,000.00
herein imposed on Judge Venadas, Sr. is to be deducted from the withheld amount of ₱100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 179914, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The June 13, 2007 Decision and the August 8,
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay
City, Bukidnon, Branch 8, is hereby found guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law
and is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) to be deducted from the withheld
amount of ₱100,000.00 from his retirement benefits pursuant to the April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.
SO ORDERED.
 18. October 9, 2017
A.M. No. rtj-17-2507
Re: Anonymous Complaints against Hon. Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong, former Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 59, Lucena City, Quezon Province.,
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On April 16, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received two letters-complaints, one from an
anonymous sender1 (first letter-complaint) and the other under the pseudonym "Shirley Gomez"2 (second letter-
complaint), both narrating the difficulties encountered by the employees of, and litigants appearing before, the
Regional Trial Court (HTC) of Lucena City, Branch 59 concerning then Presiding Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong
(Judge Bandong).
legal researcher to resolve the cases; (2) she would not acquaint herself with the case status and would instead ask
counsels about the same; (3) she would admit in open court that she could not resolve the case for failing to
understand it; she would instead force her staff to n1ediaie cases; (4) she would spend most of her time watching
television inside her chambers; in fact, she would call for a recess in order to watch her favorite telenovelas; and, (5)
Judge Bandong would unreasonably demand that all checks covering her salaries and allowances be immediately
delivered to her upon release.
Further, Judge Bandong would 1mduly favor Criminal Case Clerk-inCharge Eduardo Febrer (Febrer) thereby affecting
the office dynamics negatively. Febrer, for his part, would always stay out of the office and delegate his tasks to his
co-workers, on top of their respective assignments. Febrer would also look for records or process bail bonds only
when given money by bonding companies or litigants. While obvious to all, Judge Bandong seemed not to mind
Febrer's ways.
The second letter-complaint was of similar import. It claimed that Judge Bandong was not keen on studying cases,
and would instead direct her staff, except the utility worker, to talk to the parties to settle the case at the outset. If the
parties disagreed, Judge Bandong would repeatedly postpone the hearing until such time that the parties would just
opt to settle. In one instance, Judge Bandong even pursued the settlement of a rape case notwithstanding that it was
already submitted for decision prior to her assumption as Presiding Judge of the branch. She ordered the accused to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, and when the Public Attorney's Office lawyer refused to assist the accused, Judge
Bandong appointed another lawyer to the prejudice of the private complainant whose efforts to obtain justice was put
to naught.
Also, Judge Bandong would refrain from reading voluminous case records and would instead order her staff: usually
the stenographers and clerks, to make a digest or orally narrate to her the circumstances of the case. Because of this,
the stenographers could not attend to the transcription of stenographic notes, causing them to pile up.
In addition, the second letter-complaint mentioned that Judge Bandong was especially fond of Febrer, whose wite
would also frequent the office and bring food for Judge Bandong. Because of these, Judge Bandong tolerated
Febrer's act of receiving money from litigants.
On April 18, 2013, the OCA received another anonymous lettercomplaint, 3 this time against Febrer and the Court
Interpreter of the same branch, Francisco Mendioro (Mendioro). It similarly alleged that Judge Bandong would assign
Febrer's duties to other staffrnembers, leaving the latter with nothing to do. It also mentioned Febrer's scheme of
demanding money from litigants before attending to follow-ups of cases. The letter-complaint likewise pointed to
Mendioro as the person responsible for the missing records that would re-surface a few days later, a scheme on the
part of Mendioro to make money.
Acting thereon, the OCA indorsed the two letters-complaints against Judge Bandong and the letter-complaint against
Febrer and Mendioro to the Executive Judge of RTC Lucena City for discreet investigation and report.4
Meanwhile, on November 20, 2013, the Court in A.M. No. 14889-Ret. approved the application of Judge Bandong for
optional retirement effective at the close of office hours of September 30, 2013.5 However, her retirement benefits,
except for the money value of her accrued leave credits, were ordered withheld pending resolution of the two
aforementioned letters-complaints against her and of two other administrative complaints, to wit: (1) OCA IPI No. 12-
3944-RTJ entitled "Liberty R. Beltran v. Presiding Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong';6and (2) OCA IPI No. 12-
3963-RTJ entitled "Yolanda G. Maniwang v. Presiding Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong."7
On February 26, 2014, the OCA received the separate reports 8 of then RTC Lucena City Executive Judge Eloida R.
De Leon-Diaz (EJ De Leon-Diaz) on the discreet investigations she conducted. While EJ De Leon-Diaz recommended
the dismissal of the charges against Febrer and Mendioro for want of concrete evidence, she opined otherwise with
respect to Judge Bandong.
EJ De Leon-Diaz revealed that even before the discreet investigation was made, the staff members of Judge Bandong
already requested detail to other branches on account of the difficulties they experienced in dealing with the latter.
Instead of acceding, EJ De Leon-Diaz advised Judge Bandong to settle the issues between her and her staff. Judge
Bandong refused to heed EJ De Leon-Diaz' advice and even scolded her staff for discussing their problems with the
Executive Judge. She allegedly told her staff not to listen to EJ De Leon-Diaz since it was her (Judge Bandong), as
the Presiding Judge of Branch 59, who has the final say on matters concerning the branch. Because of the above-
mentioned incident, EJ De Leon-Diaz claimed that she continued to monitor the activities in Branch 59.
EJ De Leon-Diaz further stated that when Judge Bandong assumed office as Presiding Judge of Branch 59, there
were complaints from prosecutors, lawyers, and litigants regarding her failure to conduct formal hearings in her court;
compelling parties to conciliate even in criminal cases; and admitting that she does not know how to conduct hearings
and write decisions and resolutions. Because of these, Judge Bandong had become the laughing stock of lawyers
appearing before the RTC Lucena City.
EJ De Leon-Diaz also confirmed the allegation that Judge Bandong pursued the settlement of a rape case even if the
same was already submitted for decision. The said incident, according to the Executive Judge, even caused the
prosecutor assigned at Judge Bandong's sala to request detail to another station due to her disappointment with the
latter's actuation.
Moreover, EJ De Leon-Diaz recounted that while conducting an observation of the courts in RTC Lucena City, she
noticed that nO' hearing was being conducted in the sala of Judge Bandong. When she went inside, she found Judge
Bandong in her chambers watching television with feet on the table. Judge Bandong even invited EJ De Leon-Diaz to
join her in watching but the latter declined and advised her to just tum off the television and attend to her cases
instead. Later, the staff of Judge Bandong told EJ De Leon-Diaz that they were scolded by their boss for their failure to
warn her of the Executive Judge's arrival. They also told her that the money used to buy the television set of Judge
Bandong came from their own contributions.
EJ De Leon-Diaz likewise confirmed the following charges: (1) Judge Bandong would assign duties not commensurate
to the plantilla positions of her staff, i.e., the Process Server was assigned duties of a Clerk; the Utility Worker was
assigned duties of a Process Server; and the Stenographers were required to summarize cases; (2) it was the Legal
Researcher who would resolve cases; (3) Judge Bandong would unreasonably demand priority in the delivery of
money and checks no matter how small the amount; and, (4) Judge Bandong would exhibit eccentricities and attitude
problems. She disallowed her staff from talking to other court personnel and instructed them to prevent the entry of
other persons inside their office; she also at one time padlocked their office and brought the keys with her to Infanta,
Quezon, forcing her staff to engage a locksmith so they could enter their office.
In view of the above, EJ De Leon-Diaz recommended that administrative charges for gross ignorance of the law,
incompetence, and conduct unbecoming of a member of the bench be filed against Judge Bandong.
In the Resolution9 dated October 15, 2014, the Court, per recommendation of the OCA,10 resolved as follows:
1. CONSIDER the two (2) anonymous complaints filed on 1April2013 and 16 April 2013 against Presiding Judge
Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong, RTC, Br. 59, Lucena City, Quezon Province, and the Reports both dated 15 August
2013 of Executive Judge Eloida R De Leon-Diaz on her discreet investigation on the anonymous complaints as an
ADMINISTRA TNE COMPLAINT against former Presiding Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong;
2. DIRECT the Division Clerk of Court to FURNISH former Judge Bandong with copies of the two (2) anonymous
complaints and the Reports both dated 15 August 2013 of Executive Judge Eloida R De Leon-Diaz;
3. REQUIRE Judge Bandong to COMMENT on the charges against her within a period often (10) days from notice;
4. DISMISS the charges against Clerk III Eduardo Febrer and Court Interpreter Francisco Mendioro, both of the RTC,
Br. 59, Lucena City, Quezon Province for lack of merit; and
5. DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to CONDUCT a JUDICIAL AUDIT in the RTC, Br. 59, Lucena City,
Quezon Province.
xxxx11
In her Compliance12 dated February 18, 2015, Judge Bandong vehemently denied the charges against
her.1âwphi1 She instead imputed "sinister delight and malevolent glee" upon EJ De Leon-Diaz in drafting the
investigation report and even insinuated that EJ De Leon-Diaz could be responsible for the two anonymous letter-
complaints.13
Relevant portions of Judge Bandong's comment to the charges against her are as follows:
That 'the entire staff of Branch 59 has come to her (EJ. De Leon-Diaz) personally to communicate their grievances
against Judge Bandong and request that they be detailed to the other branches or offices of the court, leaving no
support staff in Branch 59' is too absurd and far-fetched to be worthy of belief. First, while there may be at least a
couple of 'bad eggs' in the staff of Branch 59, the rest are practical and sensible enough to recognize the irrationality
of leaving the branch without a single member of its staff. Second, it is no secret that EJ De Leon-Diaz is generally
known, at least within the courthouse in Lucena City and local legal circles, to be unapproachable to most, to the point
of being fearsome.
xxxx
As to EJ. De Leon-Diaz' claim that she received complaints that respondent 'does not conduct any formal hearings in
her court', the records will show otherwise. Information, though unconfirmed, has reached [the] respondent that EJ. De
Leon-Diaz has been spreading rumors to that effect, all the way up to the Supreme Court. And because EJ. De Leon-
Diaz is an absentee judge, being always out of the courthouse, she has never seen how respondent has been
working, sometimes staying in court up to 8:00 o'clock at night, to meet her self-imposed deadlines for court work.
There is simply no truth to EJ. De Leon-Diaz' finding that respondent's 'former prosecutor asked to be detailed in
Laguna because she refused to conciliate criminal cases.' The truth is that former Prosecutor Alelie B. Garcia was
already detailed in Laguna as early as April 2011 x x x concurrently serving as prosecutor for Branch 59, and acted in
both capacities until her appointment as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court at Polillo Island on 09 September
2013.
EJ. De Leon-Diaz' story about finding respondent 'inside her chamber x x x, feet raised and very relaxed in watching
her favorite telenovela' is a complete fabrication, a deliberate falsehood and a vicious lie. It must be stressed here that
respondent previously underwent surgery on account of a complete fracture of her leg bone, and can neither walk long
distances nor prop up her legs without experiencing disabling pain. Consequently[,] respondent would never raise her
feet on a table, particularly one as high as that in her chambers at Branch 59, unless it was absolutely necessary. EJ.
De Leon-Diaz seems to have forgotten that respondent walks with a limp, or it may have entirely escaped her notice.
At any rate, it runs against respondent's moral fiber to watch a television show in lieu of hearing cases during the
business hours of the court.
xxxx
About the television set: while other courts/branches have refrigerators, water dispensers and other electrical
appliances, Branch 59 procured only a television set for use during lunch break which almost all members of the staff
spent in court, to keep abreast of goings-on in the country and elsewhere as well as for entertainment. Worth some
Php 6,000.00, respondent paid the Phpl,500.00 down payment while the balance was paid via contributions from the
court employees. Respondent also shouldered the expenses for the installation of a cable TV service and the monthly
subscription fees therefor while she was still presiding over Branch 59. The TV set is, as far as respondent knows, still
in [the] court.
xxxx
It is not 'the Legal Researcher who resolves whatever is pending for the (respondent's) consideration'. That is the duty
of respondent, which duty she discharges and fulfills by writing the drafts of her own decisions, orders and other
issuances, then affixing her signature to the finalized form thereof The Legal Researcher, Shiela Amandy, is asked to
check the citations of law and precedent, if any, that these drafts may contain, and proceed with the reduction of the
drafts into typewritten or printed form for respondent's signature. Every decision or resolution respondent made and
signed was the product of her study of the facts alleged, the evidence adduced, and the law and jurisprudence
applicable to the case. Aware that such decisions/resolutions are subject to challenge by the parties, respondent takes
care to carefully apply the law and precedent to the facts as shown by the evidence.
xxxx
Respondent did not and does not play favorites. An examination of her work in all the courts she served will show that
she is a fair, just and humane judge and leader, who does not tolerate idleness and wrongdoing. She adheres to the
principle that every member of the court staff represents a spoke in the wheel of justice. For the wheel to keep turning,
each spoke must give its best and contribute its strength to the whole.
Branch 59's caseload consists of approximately eighty percent (80%) criminal cases and twenty percent (20%) civil
and other cases. In view of the number of cases, the workload relative to criminal cases could not be accomplished
singlehandedly by Criminal Docket Clerk Eduardo Febrer so that he was assisted by a provincial employee who was,
however, appointed Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court at Lucban, Quezon, in March 2013. Process Server
Eric Atienza was assigned to perform duties related to his position and functions, specifically the service of notices,
orders, subpoenae, etc. by registered mail. Prior to March 2013 Atienza' s workload was very light - he had much time
on his hands that he could afford to attend to his bar/restaurant and construction contracting businesses as well as his
functions as President of the Process Servers Association of the Philippines during office hours. When Atienza was
given his new assignment of mailing notices, he became scarce, frequently absenting himself and when present
refusing to work at the office, forcing his co-employees Sheriff Grace Armarnento, Clerk III Madeleine Gaviola and
OIC Branch Clerk of Court Teodora Parfan to fill in for him. On hindsight, respondent should have filed a case or
cases against Atienza.
xxxx
There is no truth whatsoever to EJ. De Leon-Diaz' report that respondent 'closed the entire office because she wanted
her staff in San Pablo City as she was sick.' Respondent prefers to rest in private when she is under the weather or
otherwise feels unwell, which preference is known to her staff in Branch 59 and the other courts she had served, to
friends and relations.
The story laying responsibility, nay, culpability, upon respondent for the keys that went missing sometime in June
2013 while she was on official travel to Infanta, Quezon, is only for the gullible. Even EJ. De Leon-Diaz[, is] or should
be aware that respondent is not the custodian of the keys to the offices of Branch 59, so that blaming respondent for
their loss stretches logic and reason, and is certainly unjustified and unreasonable.
On Demands for Priority in the Delivery of Checks and Moneys
There is a payroll for the eight (8) judges presiding over the different branches of the Regional Trial Court in Lucena
City, which is prepared ahead of and apart from the payroll for the other court employees. As a natural consequence,
respondent received her paychecks ahead of her staff, but she never demanded that the same be given ahead of the
other judges.
EJ De Leon-Diaz' confirmation of the claim that respondent wants to be prioritized in the delivery of her checks
appears to be a ploy on her part to cover or camouflage her own shortcomings regarding her pay. Unconfirmed
reports have it that the EJ has a lot of loans. But it is a fact that there is a pending matter between Nedy Taringan and
Lorelei Caranto, both employees of Branch 54. It is also a fact that the EJ has not investigated this matter until the
present. Then there is talk that the EJ could not proceed with the investigation because she is in deep monetary debt
to both employees.
At any rate, whether or not the reports are true, the issue on priority in check delivery is too petty to deserve any
consideration. x x x14
In its Memorandum15 dated August 19, 2015, the OCA informed the Court that in compliance with the Resolution
dated October 15, 2014, it dispatched a team to RTC-Lucena City, Branch 59 to conduct a judicial audit. In the course
thereof, the OCA likewise conducted a parallel investigation in connection with the complaints against Judge Bandong
which yielded the following:
x x x Four (4) of the court personnel, namely, OIC-Legal Researcher Shiela May Amandy, Court Interpreter Francisco
Mendioro, Clerk III Eduardo Febrer, and Process Server Eric Atienza gave their respective sworn statements. OIC-
Legal Researcher Amandy narrated her initial non-designation by respondent Judge Bandong as OIC. Moreover, she
confirmed the allegation that respondent Judge Bandong belatedly conducted court hearings due to her habit of
watching Korean telenovelas and how she instructed her staff to give her a detailed update on the scenes she missed
whenever she was constrained to conduct hearings. OIC Legal Researcher Amandy stressed that respondent Judge
Bandong practically delegated to her the duty of preparing court decisions without any significant output from the
latter.
Court Interpreter Mendioro confirmed respondent Judge Bandong's obsession to watch Korean telenovelas and
revealed the latter's peculiar manner of dressing up [in] public by wearing dusters, slippers, and other household
clothes. He expressed incredulity over respondent Judge Bandong's propensity to delegate cases (including appealed
ones) for mediation even to the lowerranked employees such as the process server. On the other hand, Clerk III
Febrer denied being the pet employee of respondent Judge Bandong as he also received some dressing-down from
the latter. He also denied loafing around or looking for records only when there was money involved. He, however,
validated respondent Judge Bandong's declaration that Process Server Atienza's frequent loitering prompted the
magistrate to delegate to the latter the duty of releasing orders and notices.
For his part, Process Server Atienza confirmed all the allegations against respondent Judge Bandong and Clerk III
Febrer, withoutc,J howevef[,J giving specifics. He asserted that he was overloaded with tasks which are not part of his
job description, including the mediation of cases, to the detriment of his own workload.x x x 16
Interestingly, Process Server Atienza (Atienza) also stated that there were allegations that their former OIC,
Stenographer Teodora Parfan (Parfan), was asking money in exchange of favorable orders or decisions. In fact,
Atienza, for several times, saw litigants giving money to Parfan in their branch session hall. Later, the OCA
investigating team came across a piece of paper which appeared to be a handwritten receipt issued and signed by
Parfan on November 27, 2014 indicating as follows: "Received the amount of ₱ 5,000.00 from Rowel Abella as partial
settlement of case." Apparently, the said receipt pertained to Criminal Case No. 2005-1127, a case for: frustrated
homicide. The investigating team then tracked down the accused therein, Rowell Abella (Abella), and private
complainant's father, Ruben de Ocampo (de Ocampo). They both confirmed that after a scheduled hearing, Judge
Bandong referred the parties to Parfan for mediation.17
Considering the foregoing, the OCA evaluated the complaints as follows:
In the instant matter, respondent Judge Bandong is confronted with a considerable number of charges. After a careful
evaluation of the charges, this Office is convinced that most of them failed to surpass and transcend the required
substantial evidence to prove her culpability on said allegations, either because the charges against her were
uncorroborated and inadequate, or because they were merely derived from second-hand information, or because they
were just too inconsequential to merit the Court's attention, viz.:
a. Her alleged predisposition to keep favorite employees;
b. Her alleged public admission of ineptitude when conducting trials and hearings and/or propensity to compel litigants
and lawyers to conciliate;
c. Her alleged failure to conduct trials and hearings;
d. Her alleged undue insistence for an immediate dispatch of her checks;
e. Her alleged proclivity to delegate her decision-making duty to her court personnel; and,
f. Her alleged eccentricities and/or peculiar directives to her personnel.
Some of the above allegations might have been considered as serious enough to have merited a deeper scrutiny had
they been supported by additional evidence. Unfortunately, mere allegation without any proof of the supposed
improprieties committed by respondent Judge Bandong in the anonymous letters and the report submitted by
Executive Judge De Leon-Diaz is evidently not sufficient to make her accountable for such misfeasance.
Still, this Office believes that substantial evidence exists against respondent Judge Bandong on the following charges:
a. Her habit of watching TV programs during court trials and hearings;
b. Her predeliction to delegate mediation of cases to court personnel; and,
c. Her designation of Process Server Atienza to perform the functions and duties appertaining to Clerk III Febrer.18
As to Judge Bandong's habit of watching telenovelas during office hours, the OCA noted that (1) EJ De Leon-Diaz had
a first-hand information on this as she herself witnessed it; and (2) the same was confirmed by Judge Bandong's staff,
namely, Atienza, Amandy, Febrer and Mendioro in their respective sworn statements. For this, the OCA found Judge
Bandong to have exhibited conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon
6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which mandate a judge's strict devotion to judicial duties.
With respect to Judge Bandong's practice of delegating to her court staff the mediation of cases, this was confirmed
by the sworn statements of Abella and de Ocampo which revealed that per instruction of Judge Bandong,
Stenographer Parfan caused the parties in Criminal Case No. 2005-1127 to enter into monetary settlement in order to
terminate the case. Per A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated October 16, 2001, cases where amicable settlement is
possible should be referred to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) which shall assist the parties in selecting a duly
accredited mediator. Judge Bandong therefore erred in not referring mediatable cases to the PMC and in letting her
staff, who were not accredited mediators, handle the mediation of cases. This, according to the OCA, constituted
grave misconduct.
Anent Judge Bandong's designation of (Process Server) Atienza to perform the duties and functions pertaining to
(Clerk III) Febrer, the OCA stressed that under Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, court
personnel shall not be required to perform any work or duty outside the scope of their assigned job description. Here,
the OCA noted the significant difference between the duties of a Clerk III, which are basically clerical in nature and
require one to be always in the office, and the duties of a Process Server, which require the latter in the field to
personally serve and/or mail court processes. The OCA opined that it is incongruent to assign a Process Server with
duties pertaining to a Clerk since the same would tie down the former to the office to the detriment of his own work,
which as mentioned, requires him to be out of the office most of the time. While Judge Bandong might have had the
best intention in wanting to lighten the workload of Febrer, her assignment to Atienza of the duties pertaining to
Febrer, however, adversely affected another important aspect of court management, that is, the prompt service of
court processes. This, according to OCA, was counter-productive and did not serve the ends of justice. Hence, it
found Judge Bandong to have violated Supreme Court circulars, rules and directives.
The OCA summed up its report as follows:
Recapitulating the three (3) charges discussed above, this Office believes that respondent Judge Bandong is liable for
(1) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service (for watching TV during court trials and hearings), (2) gross
misconduct (for erroneously referring cases for mediation), and (3) violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and
circulars (for wrongful delegation of duties to court personnel). Under Section 50, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), if the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges or
counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be
considered as aggravating circumstances. In the instant case, the charge of gross misconduct is the most serious
charge, making the charges of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Supreme Court
rules, directives and circulars as aggravating circumstances. Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross
misconduct is punishable by dismissal from the service.
Considering, however, that respondent Judge Bandong has already retired from the service, this Office finds wisdom
in applying the principle laid down in Santiago B. Burgos vs. Clerk of Court II Vicky A. Baes. In lieu of dismissal that
the offense carries but which can no longer be effectively imposed because of respondent Judge Bandong's
retirement, this Office recommends the forfeiture of whatever benefits still due her from the government, except for the
accrued leave credits, if any, that she had earned. It is also recommended that she be barred from reemployment in
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
xxxx
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office respectfully recommends that:
(a) the instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
(b) retired Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong, formerly of Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Quezon be
found LIABLE for Gross Misconduct;
(c) considering that dismissal from the service can no longer be effectively imposed on respondent Judge Bandong in
view of her optional retirement effective 30 September 2013, that whatever benefits still due her from the government,
except for accrued leave credits, if any, be FORFEITED and that she be BARRED from re-employment in any branch
or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
xxxx19
The Court's Ruling
The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
Among the many charges against Judge Bandong, the OCA aptly found that only the following were supported by
substantial evidence: (1) Judge Bandong's habit of watching television during office hours; (2) her predeliction to
delegate mediation of cases to court personnel; and (3) her delegation to Process Server Atienza the performance of
the functions and duties pertaining to Clerk III Febrer. "In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is
that of substantial evidence."20 "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the
[respondent] is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming." 21Here,
the other charges against Judge Bandong remain to be mere allegations and therefore did not meet the mandated
quantum of evidence. Rightly so, Judge Bandong "should not be held responsible for. allegations which were not
proven."22 However and as stated, it is otherwise with respect to the three charges specifically mentioned as will be
discussed below.
Judge Bandong's habit of watching television programs during office hours
As noted by the OCA, Judge Bandong's habit of watching telenovelas during office hours was personally witnessed by
EJ De Leon-Diaz. Aside from this, the staff of Branch 59 in their respective sworn statements 23 uniformly attested that
Judge Bandong would watch Korean telenovelas during office hours thereby causing delay in the conduct of hearings.
Lawyers and litigants were made to wait until she had finished watching. Indeed, the report of EJ De LeonDiaz
regarding this matter and the consistent statements of the staff of Branch 59 already constituted substantial evidence.
On the other hand, Judge Bandong did not categorically deny the charge and merely stated that "it runs against [her]
moral fiber to watch a television show in lieu of hearing cases during the business hours of the court."24
Thus, the Court agrees with the OCA that Judge Bandong violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provide, viz.:
CANON 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.
SECTION 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.
SECTION 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the performance of
judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial
office or the court's operations.
The Court has stressed time and again that "decision-making is the primordial x x x duty of a member of the
[bench]."25 ''No other [task] can be more important than decision-making x x x."26 In the case of trial courts, the
conduct of hearings is unquestionably an important component of their decision-making process and, conversely, all
other official tasks must give way thereto.27 Hence, for a judge to allow an activity, and an unofficial one at that, to take
precedence over the conduct of hearings is totally unacceptable. It is a patent derogation of Sections 1 and 2 of
Canon 6 and a blatant disregard of the professional yardstick that "all judicial [officials and] employees must devote
their official time to government service.28
Additionally, Judge Bandong's habit of watching television during office hours violates Section 7 of the same Canon 6
which requires Judges "not to engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties."
Watching telenovelas surely dissipates away Judge Bandong's precious time in the office, which, needless to say, has
an adverse effect on the prompt administration of justice.29 Such activity is by all means counter-productive to the due
performance of judicial duties.
For the afore-stated violations, the Court finds Judge Bandong guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. "Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of [the] service x x x pertains to any conduct that is detrimental or
derogatory or naturally or probably bringing about a wrong result; it refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of
public accountability and diminish - or tend to diminish - the people's faith in the Judiciary."30 As correctly stated by
OCA, Judge Bandong's "audacity to delay - and even interrupt - court trials and hearings just to satisfy her obsession
for soap operas [is w ]ithout a doubt [a] reprehensible conduct [which] lowers the people's respect for the judiciary." 31
Judge Bandong's predeliction to delegate mediation of cases to court personnel
Both the affidavits of De Ocampo and Abella confirmed that it was (Stenographer) Parfan who mediated between
them in Criminal Case No. 2005- 1127. This was supported by the handwritten receipt signed by Parfan (which the
OCA investigating team came across in the course of its investigation) purportedly showing partial payment of the
settlement amount in the said criminal case. Abella also categorically stated that it was Judge Bandong who referred
them to Parfan. To the Court, these are substantial evidence to support the subject charge against Judge Bandong.
Notably, Judge Bandong was silent about the matter. She totally failed to deny or proffer any explanation for the
same.
To decongest court dockets and enhance access to justice, the Court through A.M. No. 01-10-05-SC-PHILJA
approved the institutionalization of mediation in the Philippines through court-annexed mediation. Along with this,
structures and guidelines for the implementation of court-annexed mediation were put in place. Trial courts, therefore,
cannot just indiscriminately refer for mediation any case to just anybody. For one, there are cases which shall 32 and
shall not33 be referred to court-annexed mediation. For another, mediatable cases where amicable settlement is
possible must be referred by the trial courts to the PMC, who in turn, shall assist the parties in selecting a mutually
acceptable mediator from its list of duly accredited mediators. Here, Criminal Case No. 2005-1127 involving frustrated
homicide is apparently not a mediatable case. Clearly on this score alone, Judge Bandong had already violated A.M.
No. 01-10-05-SCPHILJA. Worse, Judge Bandong entrusted the settlement of the case to Parfan, a Court
Stenographer, who obviously was not a qualified, trained, or an accredited mediator. It must be emphasized that while
courts and their personnel are enjoined to assist in the successful implementation of mediation, A.M. No. 01-10- 05-
SC-PHILJA does not authorize them to conduct the mediation themselves. Mediation of cases can only be done by
individuals who possess the basic qualifications for the position, have undergone relevant trainings, seminars-
workshops, and internship programs and were duly accredited by the court as mediators. These are to ensure that the
mediators have the ability to discharge their responsibility of seeing to it that the parties to a case consider and
understand the terms of a settlement agreement. Unlike therefore when the mediation is facilitated by an accredited
mediator, there is great danger that legal rights or obligations of parties may be adversely affected by an improper
settlement if mediation is handled by an ordinary court employee.
The above important points could not have been unwittingly missed out by Judge Bandong. As opined by the OCA,
Judge Bandong could not feign ignorance of A.M. No. 01-10-05-SC-PHILJA since the Philippine Judicial Academy
frequently conducts "conventions and seminars for judges and clerks of court nationwide regarding the implementation
of court-annexed mediations and judicial dispute resolutions."34 To the mind of the Court, Judge Bandong knowingly
made the wrongful referral because her indolence got the better of her. Indeed, this wanton disregard and mockery of
the proper procedure in mediation of cases, as correctly held by the OCA, was tantamount to misconduct.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction
of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior. The misconduct is grave if it involves any
of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must
be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.35
Here, the misconduct committed by Judge Bandong was grave since the circumstances obtaining established her
flagrant disregard of the rules on referral of cases for mediation. Judge Bandong committed a patent deviation from
the rules when she wrongfully referred a non-mediatable case to her staff, a court stenographer, who was not an
accredited mediator. This was despite the expectation that as a member of the bench, she not only knows the rules
and regulations promulgated by this Court but also faithfully complies with it. Indeed, Judge Bandong is guilty of grave
misconduct.
Judge Bandong's delegation of the functions and duties of Clerk III Fehrer to Process Server Atienza
The separate sworn statements36 of Atienza and Febrer confirmed the fact that the former was assigned the duties
and functions of the latter as Clerk III. Judge Bandong, on the other hand, did not directly confront the subject charge
and simply stated that: (1) the number of workload relative to criminal cases could not be accomplished
singlehandedly by Febrer as the Clerk-in-Charge of criminal cases; and, (2) that prior to March 2013, Atienza's
workload was very light, allowing him to attend to his other businesses as well as to his functions as President of the
Process Servers Association of the Philippines during office hours.37 The consistent statements of the two personnel
involved in this charge vis-a-vis Judge Bandong's ambivalent explanation on the matter lead this Court to sustain the
charge.
In Executive Judge Apita v. Estanislao, 38 the Court had the occasion to explain that:
While the [2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court which defines the general functions of all court personnel in the
judiciary] provides that court personnel may perform other duties the presiding judge may assign from time to time,
said additional duties must be directly related to, and must not significantly vary from, the court personnel's job
description. x x x
Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel expressly states that court personnel shall not be
required to perform any work outside the scope of their job description, thus:
Sec. 7. Court personnel shall not be required to perform any work or duty outside the scope of their assigned job
description.39
The rationale for this is as follows:
This rule is rooted in the time-honored constitutional principle that public office is a public trust. Hence, all public
officers and employees, including court personnel in the judiciary, must serve the public with utmost responsibility and
efficiency. Exhorting court personnel to exhibit the highest sense of dedication to their assigned duty necessarily
precludes requiring them to perform any work outside the scope of their assigned job description, save for duties that
are identical with or are subsumed under their present functions. 40
Clearly here, Judge Bandong violated Supreme Court circulars, rules and directives when she delegated to Atienza
the duties of Febrer as Clerk III. As explained by the OCA, the duties of a Clerk III are not directly related to and
significantly vary from those of a Process Server, viz.:
The duties of a Clerk III differ significantly from those of a Process Server. A Clerk Ill's job is basically clerical in nature
and requires him to be always in the office to assist the clerk of court in maintaining the integrity of the docket books of
the court. A Process Server, on the other hand, has the primary duty of serving court processes such as subpoenas,
summons, court orders and notices, thus, necessitating him to be mostly out of the office and in the field personally
serving and/or mailing court processes. Hence, it would be incongruent to assign a Process Server with duties
pertaining to that of a Clerk III since it would tie him down in the office to the detriment of his own work
accomplishment. Evidently, a Clerk III's duties are not directly related to, and significantly vary from, the functions of a
Process Server. Such arrangement diminishes the court personnel's professional responsibility and peak efficacy in
the performance of their respective roles in the administration of justice. 41
Penalty
Under Sec. 46(B), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), the offense
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal from the service for the second offense.
The penalty for grave or gross misconduct under Sec. 11 in relation to Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court is any of
the following: "(1)dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding (6) months; or (3) a
fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00."
With respect to violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, the same is sanctioned by any of the
following under Sec. 11 in relation to Sec. 9 of the same Rule 140: "(1) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (2) a fine of more than ₱l0,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱20,000.00."
Under Sec. 50, Rule 10 of the RRACCS, if the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the
penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as
aggravating circumstances. Here, the most serious charge against Judge Bandong is grave or gross misconduct. As
mentioned above, any of the three sanctions therefor provided under Sec. 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court may be
imposed for the said charge. Considering Judge Bandong's service to the government spanning 46 years 42 and also
the fact that she has not yet been previously penalized for an administrative offense, the Court deems it proper to
impose upon her the penalty of fine in the amount of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from her retirement benefits. It may
be recalled, however, that the Court, in its Resolution of November 20, 2013, ordered the withholding of Judge
Bandong's retirement benefits pending the outcome of this case and of the then two other pending administrative
cases against her, to wit OCA IPI No. 12-3944-RTJ and OCA IPI No. 12-3963-RTJ. In view of this decision and also of
the January 29, 2014 Resolution in OCA IPI No. 12-3944-RTJ (dismissing the complaint against Judge Bandong for
involving issues that are judicial in nature and for lack of merit) and the July 6, 2015 Resolution in OCA IPI No. 12-
3963-RTJ (merely admonishing Judge Bandong and directing her to refrain from further acts of impropriety), it is
proper that Judge Bandong's retirement pay and other benefits be now ordered released after deducting the fine
herein imposed, subject to the usual clearance requirements, unless withheld for some other lawful cause.
As a final note, it bears to emphasize that a judge's "high and exalted position in the Judiciary requires [her] to
observe exacting standards of x x x decency and competence. As the visible representation of the law and given [her]
task of dispensing justice, a judge should conduct [herself] at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and
confidence of the people."43
WHEREFORE, the instant complaints are RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter. Retired Judge Dinah
Evangeline B. Bandong, formerly of Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Quezon is hereby found GUILTYof
Gross Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and Violation of Supreme Court Rules,
Directives and Circulars for which she is imposed a FINE of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from whatever retirement pay
and other benefits which may be due her. The Financial Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator is
directed to release Judge Bandong's retirement pay and other benefits after deducting the fine herein imposed, unless
withheld for some other lawful purpose.
SO ORDERED.
 19. APRIL 16, 2018
A.M. No. mtj-18-1911
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant
vs
WALTER INOCENCIO V. ARREZA, Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Pitogo, Quezon, Respondent
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
From September 19, 2016 to October 1, 2016, a judicial audit was conducted in Branches 61 and 62, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Gumaca, Quezon, and all the Municipal Trial Courts (MTC)/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC) under
the said RTC's jurisdiction. The results thereof,1 particularly with respect to the MTC, Pitogo, Quezon presided by
Judge Walter Inocencio V. Arreza (Judge Arreza), showed, that out of the 35 pending cases, there were numerous
undecided cases which had been overdue for several years.2
In view of this, Deputy Court Administrator Raul B. Villanueva (DCA Villanueva) issued a Memorandum 3 dated
October 28, 2016 to Judge Arreza which stated in part, viz.:
xxxx
MTC Pitogo, Quezon, has six (6) court personnel headed by the Clerk of Court II, Ms. Mederlyn F. Orfanel. We note
that the positions of Court Stenographer 1 and Clerk II are vacant. The court's latest monthly reports of cases for the
last six (6) months show the clearance and disposition rates and average inflow and outflow of cases as follows:
Pending Inflow Outflow Pending Clearance Disposition
Beginning Cases Rate Rate
(Outflow÷ [Outflow÷
Inflow) (Beg+Inflow)]
Mar-16 45 1 4 42 183.33% 21.57%
Apr-16 42 0 1 41
May-16 41 0 2 39
Jun-16 39 4 2 41
Jul-16 41 0 0 41
Aug-16 41 1 2 40
Average 1 2
While the clearance rate may appear high at 183.33%, the disposition rate is quite low at 21.57%. The data also
shows that the high clearance rate is only due to the fact that very few cases are being filed in court, or an average of
1 case per month. The disposal of the court leaves much to be desired. It was able to dispose of only 2 cases per
month, on the average.
The audit team examined a total of 35 pending cases (cutoff is 31 August 2016). Of these cases, 23 were already
submitted for decision; all are already overdue for several months and even years, with the exception of 1 case. Thus,
if we remove the 23 cases submitted for decision from the 35 pending cases, [Judge Arreza was) left with only 12
cases in active trial. With only 12 cases to handle, Judge Arreza clearly had more than enough time to render
decisions. Further, we see no reason why there could still be any protracted proceedings. But surprisingly, there
were 7 cases that have been pending trial for over 3 years. In fact, the oldest case has been pending trial for almost 9
years x x x.
In view of the above observations, Judge Arreza should be made to explain why no administrative sanction should be
imposed against him for gross inefficiency and undue delay in deciding cases. 4
Thus, Judge Arreza was ordered to:
xxxx
a. IMMEDIATELY DECIDE the [twenty-three (23), cases submitted for decision x x x which are overdue;
b. TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on the one (1) case with no further action/setting for a considerable length of time x
x x;"5
c. EXPEDITE the disposition of the seven (7) cases aged three (3) years and above and SUBMIT a status report
thereon as of 30 June 2017 on or before 5 July 2017;6 and
d. SUBMIT copies of the pertinent decisions and orders, as proof of the action taken on Item Nos. 1(a) and 1(b)
above, on or before 30 December 2016, together with a written explanation why no administrative sanction should be
imposed against [Judge Arreza for] gross inefficiency and undue delay in deciding cases.
xxxx
For strict compliance.7
In the Compliance8 dated December 27, 2016, a table was presented indicating that: (1) all of the 23 cases submitted
for decision had already been resolved/decided; (2) the one case with no further action/setting for a considerable
length of time had already been acted upon;9 and (3) two of the seven pending cases aged three years and above had
already been resolved while the remaining five were undergoing hearings. Judge Arreza likewise submitted his written
explanation10 dated December 29, 2016 wherein he admitted his inefficiency. He, however, begged for understanding
and narrated the circumstances which he claimed led to his failure to act on and decide cases. According to him, he
and his wife were having marital problems in 2008 or just a year after his appointment as Judge. Things became
worse in March 2010 when his wife finally left him and their children. In December 2012, he suffered a stroke, was
hospitalized for two weeks, and almost became paralyzed. He has since then started taking maintenance medicine
and was lucky enough to have now recovered. All these, according to Judge Arreza, took a toll in his performance as
a judge. Be that as it may, he now undertakes to perform all his tasks, duties and responsibilities in line with the
Court's mission and vision.
In the latest update11 dated July 3, 2017, Judge Arreza reported the status/specific actions taken on the remaining five
cases aged over three years and beyond which as of the said date were still in active trial.
Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
In its Memorandum12 of July 20, 2017, the OCA made the following observations:
Judge Arreza's explanation that he experienced marital problems and suffered a stroke in 2012 cannot justify the
delay.1avvphi1 While we commiserate with him for having been abandoned by his wife and having to take care of
their children on his own, such is not a valid ground to excuse his failure to discharge his duties. We note that his
stroke happened years ago in 2012. How he allowed his court to incur the 23 overdue cases for too long a time
despite only around 12 active cases to hear at a once a month hearing schedule, is abhorrent. More than half of said
cases were in fact submitted for decision even prior to his stroke. We note further that after said cases were
discovered during the audit, he was able to dispose of all of them within a three (3) month period without a hitch. This
only shows that he had the capability but chose not to act on said cases.
This Court has consistently impressed upon the members of the Bench the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously, on the time-honored principle that justice delayed is justice denied.
As frontline officials of the Judiciary, trial court judges should at all times act with dedication, efficiency, and a high
sense of duty and responsibility as the delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith
and confidence in the judicial system.
This is embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that a judge shall dispose of the
court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods, and in Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides that judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.
No less that the Constitution requires that cases at the trial court level be resolved within three (3) months from the
date they are submitted for decision, that is, upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
Rules of Court or by the court itself. This three (3)-month or ninety (90)-day period is mandatory and failure to comply
can subject the judge to disciplinary action.13
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Arreza be held liable for gross inefficiency and undue delay in
deciding cases and fined in the amount of ₱40,000.00, with stern warning, it being his first offense.
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts the findings of the OCA with modification as regards the recommended penalty.
The Court's policy on prompt resolution of disputes cannot be overemphasized. 14 In Guerrero v. Judge Deray,15 it
stated:
As has been often said, delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people's faith in the judiciary. Hence, judges
are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions on them. Appellate magistrates and judges alike, being paradigms of justice,
have been exhorted time and again to dispose of the court's business promptly and to decide cases within the
required periods. Delay not only results in undermining the people's faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt
hearing of their supplications is anticipated and expected; it also reinforces in the mind of the litigants the impression
that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly.
Here, Judge Arreza himself admitted his inefficiency. While he attributed this to domestic and health issues, suffice it
to say that said reasons, even if found acceptable, cannot excuse him but, at most, can only mitigate his liability.
Unfortunately for him, the Court shares the OCA's observation that the problems alluded to by Judge Arreza
happened years before the judicial audit was conducted in 2016. If he was really inclined to dispose of the backlog
caused by his domestic and health problems, he should have immediately done so. Note that his separation from his
wife happened way back in 2010 and his stroke in 2012. To the mind of the Court, Judge Arreza had more than
enough time to catch up before the conduct of the judicial audit in 2016 especially considering that his sala has a
manageable case load due to the low average of case inflow which was only one case a month. Moreover, the Court
notes that, with respect to the cases already submitted for decision but not decided within the prescribed period,
Judge Arreza failed to ask for extension to decide the same. It has been previously held that "[i]n case of poor health,
the Judge concerned needs only to ask this Court for an extension of time to decide cases, as soon as it becomes
clear to him that there would be delay in the disposition of his cases."16 To stress, Judge Arreza never bothered to ask
the Court for an extension after he suffered a stroke. In fact, even before his stroke, there were already cases which
were overdue for decision for which no motions for extension were made. Anent the cases with protracted
proceedings, the Court shares the observation of the OCA that there was no reason for them to undergo a long-
drawn-out trial considering that there were only 12 cases supposedly in active trial.
Given the foregoing, it is not difficult to see that the delay in Judge Arreza's disposition of cases was the product of his
apathy. This becomes even more apparent in light of the fact that Judge Arreza was able to dispose of all the 23
cases overdue for decision within three (3) months and act on the other cases after his attention was called by the
OCA. Indeed, and as correctly observed by the OCA, Judge Arreza has the capability but simply chose not to act on
the subject cases.17
Again, it bears to stress that "[a] judge's foremost consideration is the administration of justice."18 Judges must "decide
cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge
should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions
for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards
and brings it into disrepute."19
As "delay in the disposition of cases is tantamount to gross inefficiency on the part of a judge", 20 the OCA correctly
found Judge Arreza guilty of gross inefficiency for his undue delay in rendering decisions and failure to act on cases
with dispatch. Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the same is punishable by (1) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (2) a fine of more than
₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00. Considering that this is Judge Arreza's first offense, the imposition of fine
in the amount of ₱15,000.00 is in order.
WHEREFORE, Judge Walter Inocencio V. Arreza is hereby found GUILTY of Gross Inefficiency for his undue delay in
rendering decisions and failure to act on cases with dispatch. He is ordered to pay a FINE of ₱15,000.00
and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act or omission will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 20. EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-2224-MTJ), April 03, 2018
ROSILANDA M. KEUPPERS, Complainant, v. JUDGE VIRGILIO G. MURCIA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN
CITIES, BRANCH 2, ISLAND GARDEN CITY OF SAMAL, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction violates Article 7 of the Family
Code, and is guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He should be
properly sanctioned.
The Case

This administrative matter commenced from the 1st Indorsement dated November 4, 2009,1 whereby the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao endorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action the
complete records of the case initiated by affidavit-complaint by complainant Rosilanda Maningo Keuppers against
respondent Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, in the Island
Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte. She thereby charged respondent Judge with estafa; violation of Republic Act
No. 6713; and grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.2

The complainant averred in her affidavit-complaint executed on June 6, 20083 that on May 12, 2008, she and her
husband, Peter Keuppers, went to the Local Civil Registrar's Office (LCRO) of Davao City to apply for a marriage
license because they wanted to get married before Peter's departure on May 22, 2008 so that he could bring the
marriage certificate with him back to Germany; that Julie Gasatan, an employee of the LCRO, explained the process
for securing the license, and apprised them that it would be virtually impossible to solemnize their marriage before
May 22, 2008 because of the requirement for the mandatory 10-day posting of the application for the marriage license;
that Gasatan then handed a note with the advice for the couple to proceed to the office of DLS Travel and Tours
Corporation (DLS Travel and Tours) in Sandawa, Matina, Davao City to look for a person who might be able to help
the couple; that in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours, Lorna Siega, the owner, told the couple that the marriage
processing fees charged by her office would be higher than the P600.00 fee collected in the City Hall in Davao City;
that Siega assured that the couple would immediately get the original as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO)
copies of the marriage certificate; that Siega then required the couple to fill up forms but instructed the couple to leave
the spaces provided for the address and other information blank; that the couple paid P15,750.00 to Siega purportedly
to cover the fees of the solemnizing Judge, the certification fee, the security fee, the City Hall fee, the service fee and
the passport fee; and that Siega later on confirmed to the couple the date, time and place of the solemnization of the
marriage.

According to the complainant, respondent Judge solemnized the marriage on May 19, 2008 in the premises of the
DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; that the staff of the DLS Travel and Tours later on handed to the couple the copy
of the marriage certificate for their signatures; that on the following day, May 20, 2008, the couple returned to the DLS
Travel and Tours to pick up the documents as promised by Siega; that the couple was surprised to find erroneous
entries in the marriage certificate as well as on the application for marriage license, specifically: (a) the certificate
stating "Office of the MTCC Judge, Island Garden City of Samal" as the place of the solmenization of the marriage
although the marriage had been solemnized in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; (b) the statement
in the application for marriage license that she and her husband had applied for the marriage license in Sta. Cruz,
Davao City on May 8, 2008 although they had accomplished their application on May 12, 2008 in the office of the DLS
Travel and Tours; and (c) the statement in their application for marriage license on having appeared before Mario
Tizon, the Civil Registrar of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, which was untrue.

In his comment dated February 2, 2010,4 the respondent professed no knowledge of how the complainant had
processed and secured the documents pertinent to her marriage; denied personally knowing her and the persons she
had supposedly approached to help her fast-track the marriage; insisted that he had met her only at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage, and that the solemnization of the marriage had been assigned to him; asserted that the
documents necessary for a valid marriage were already duly prepared; and claimed that he was entitled to the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties considering that the documents submitted by her had been
issued by the appropriate government agencies. He contended that he should not be blamed for the erroneous entries
in her certificate of marriage because the same had been merely copied from her marriage license and from the other
documents submitted therewith, and also because he had not been the person who had prepared the certificate; and
that he had only performed the ministerial duty of solemnizing the marriage based on the proper documents submitted
to him, with the real parties involved having personally signed the certificate of marriage before him.

The respondent also denied receiving any amount for solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband;
and pointed out that he had not been aware as the solemnizing officer if any of the documents submitted by her was
spurious. He recalled that she had freely and voluntarily signed the certificate of marriage; and that it was the same
document that had been filed in the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Davao City. He declared that the marriage
certificate itself stated the place of the solemnization of the marriage; and that he did not alter, modify or amend the
entries therein.
Report & Recommendation
of the Investigating Justice

Upon the recommendation of the OCA,5 the Court referred the complaint to the Court of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro
City for investigation, report and recommendation. The complaint, originally assigned to Associate Justice Pamela Ann
Abella Maxino for such purposes, was re-assigned to Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy in view of the transfer
of Associate Justice Maxino to the Cebu Station of the Court of Appeals.

On August 10, 2012, Investigating Justice Sempio Diy submitted her report and recommendation as the Investigating
Justice,6 whereby she concluded and recommended as follows:
The undersigned Investigating Officer, in the course of the investigation, has been hurled with overwhelming evidence
that the marriage between complainant and Peter Keuppers was held only in the premises of DLS Travel and Tours
Corporation, Sandawa Road, Matina, Davao City, and was solemnized by respondent. Several witnesses for
complainant affirmed the same. More importantly, this Office has conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of
DLS Travel and Tours. During said inspection, it was confirmed that the premises shown in Exhibits "G", "G-1", "G-2",
"G-3", "G-4", and "G-5" where respondent is seen solemnizing a wedding, is the same place subject of the ocular
inspection. Hence, the DLS Travel and Tours building is, in fact, the actual venue of complainant's wedding.

It is also of equal importance to note that respondent admitted that he indeed solemnized the subject marriage outside
of his jurisdiction. In fact, in his testimony, respondent stated:
A: Rosilanda Maningo was really begging that the marriage be performed since that was the very day of the marriage
as the German fiance will be leaving soon. Because of pity, I accommodated the parties. I risked your honor because I
didn't want that the marriage be postponed as it was for the best interest of the couple because according to
Rosilanda Maningo that was the only day, the German fiance was leaving for Germany. So, I decided to solemnize
the marriage in the office of DLS Travel and Tours.
(Emphasis supplied)

The fact that respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction is further bolstered by his own admission
that he solemnized the marriage of complainant and Peter Keuppers at DLS Travels and Tours and not in his territorial
jurisdiction in the Island Garden City of Samal.

Indeed, respondent knows the possible consequence of the aforementioned act when he said:
A: I was thinking your honor that there was a sanction but because of my honest intention to help the parties because
they were already begging that the solemnization be performed [sic]. I was honest with my intention and my
conscience was clear.

However, this Office is also duty bound to specify that respondent had no hand in the preparation and processing of
the documents pertaining to the subject wedding. The witness for complainant, Lorna Siega, stated:
Q: Madam, you mentioned a while ago that your establishment was the one who processed the documents for
Rosilanda Maningo Kuppers and Peter Keuppers to get married, you confirm that?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Who prepared the certificate of marriage?

A: Orlan.

Q: How about the marriage contract?

A: My employee.

-xxx- -xxx- -xxx-

Q: Who supplied the entries in the marriage contract?

A: Based on the marriage license.

-xxx- -xxx- -xxx-

Q: So, in relation to this case the once [sic] involving Peter Keuppers, I have here the copy of the marriage contract,
have you seen this document, if any?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: You would confirm that the place of marriage typed there is the office of the MTCC Judge, Branch 2, Island Garden
City of Samal?
A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And your office supplied the information in the upper portion in the certificate of marriage which is Davao del Norte,
Island Garden City of Samal?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Be that as it may, this Office is of the opinion that notwithstanding that respondent had no hand in the preparation and
processing of the subject marriage, he indeed solemnized a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction, subject to
sanctions that the Office of the Court Administrator may impose.

The above-quoted Article 8 of the Family Code clearly states that a marriage can be held outside the judge's
chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance
with Article 29; or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.

Inasmuch as respondent's jurisdiction covers only the Island Garden City of Samal, he was not clothed with authority
to solemnize a marriage in Davao City.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant or her fiance Peter Keuppers was at the point of death or in a
remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to respondent that the
marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or a place other than his sala. What in fact appears on record that
respondent took pity on the couple and risked sanctions to attend to the urgency of solemnizing the marriage of
complainant and Peter Keuppers.

In Beso vs. Daguman, the Supreme Court held:

A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it and render justice
at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he
must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office[,]
should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.

The undersigned Investigating Officer believes that taking pity on the Keuppers couple is not enough reason for
respondent to risk possible sanctions that may be imposed upon him for not observing the applicable laws under the
circumstances. It is his sworn duty to conscientiously uphold the law at all times despite the inconvenience that it may
cause to others.

Significantly, Canon 6, Section 7 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates:
-xxx- Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties.

It is likewise worth mentioning that respondent cannot be charged with ignorance of the law considering that he knew
the consequences of his actions and he also cannot be seen as a judge that demonstrates a lack of understanding of
the basic principles of civil law. Lastly, it also does not appear from the records that he has been previously charged
with any offense or that there is/are any pending administrative case/s against him.

RECOMMENDATION:

The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed respondent is guilty of solemnizing a marriage outside of his
territorial jurisdiction under circumstances not falling under any of the exceptions as provided for in Article 8 of the
Family Code. Considering, however, the factual milieu of the instant case and the peculiar circumstances attendant
thereto, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be meted a fine of P5,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or a similar offense in the future will be dealt with severely.

Issue
Was respondent Judge liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service?
Ruling of the Court

We hold and find respondent Judge guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service for solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband outside his territorial jurisdiction, and in the
office premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City.

Such place of solemnization was a blatant violation of Article 7 of the Family Code, which pertinently provides:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
x x x xFurthermore, in solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband in the office premises of the DLS
Tour and Travel in Davao City despite the foregoing provision of the Family Code, respondent Judge flagrantly
violated the spirit of the law. Article 8 of the Family Code disallows solemnizing the marriage in a venue other than the
judge's courtroom or chambers, viz.:
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church,
chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere,
except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)
Respondent Judge's explanation of having done so only out of pity for the complainant after she had supposedly
claimed that her German fiancé was soon returning to Germany and wanted to bring with him the certified copy of the
marriage certificate did not diminish his liability, but instead highlighted his dismissive and cavalier attitude towards
express statutory requirements instituted to secure the solemnization of marriages from abuse. By agreeing to
solemnize the marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction and at a place that had nothing to do with the performance
of his duties as a Municipal Trial Judge, he demeaned and cheapened the inviolable social institution of marriage.
Article 8 of the Family Code contains the limiting phrase and not elsewhere, which emphasizes that the place of the
solemnization of the marriage by a judge like him should only be in his office or courtroom. Indeed, the limiting phrase
highlighted the nature and status of the marriage of the complainant and her husband as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman," and as "the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." 7The only
exceptions to the limitation are when the marriage was to be contracted on the point of death of one or both of the
complainant and her husband, or in a remote place in accordance with Article 29 of the Family Code,8 or where both
of the complainant and her husband had requested him as the solemnizing officer in writing to solemnize the marriage
at a house or place designated by them in their sworn statement to that effect.

Respondent Judge's offense was not his first act of gross misconduct concerning the discharge of the office of
solemnizing marriages. He had been charged on February 28, 2008 in A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223 entitled Palma v. Judge
George E. Omelio, Regional Trial Court, Br. 14, Davao City (then of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 4, Davao City),
Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 2, et al. with having affixed his signature as the
solemnizing officer on the marriage contract without having actually solemnized the marriage. The charge was in
violation of Administrative Order No. 125-2007 dated August 8, 2007 (Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by
the Members of the Judiciary). The Court declared him guilty of gross misconduct, and fined him in the amount of
P40,000.00.9 The present offense was committed on May 19, 2008.

Misconduct consists in the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, or, more particularly, in an
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. It implies wrongful intention, and must not be a mere error
of judgment. Respondent Judge was guilty of grave, not simple, misconduct because he had at the very least the
wilful intent to violate the Family Code on the venue of a marriage solemnized by a judge, and to flagrantly disregard
the relevant rules for such solemnization set forth in the law. The office of solemnizing marriages should not be treated
as a casual or trivial matter, or as a business activity. For sure, his act, although not criminal, constituted grave
misconduct considering that crimes involving moral turpitude are treated as separate grounds for dismissal under
the Administrative Code.10 It is relevant to observe, moreover, that his acts of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service seriously undermined the faith and confidence of the people in the
Judiciary.

The Investigating Justice recommended the imposition on respondent Judge of the measly fine of P5,000.00 with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense in the future would be dealt with severely. The
recommendation did not take into account that the present charge was the second offense respondent Judge
committed in relation to his office of solemnizing marriages. Given that the charge was committed with a wilful intent to
violate the letter and the spirit of Article 7 and Article 8 of the Family Code, and to flagrantly disregard the relevant
rules for the solemnization of marriages set by the Family Code, the proper penalty was dismissal from the service.

Yet, dismissal from the service can no longer be imposed in view of the intervening retirement from the service of
respondent Judge. Instead, the Court forfeits all his retirement benefits except his accrued leaves.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent JUDGE VIRGILIO G. MURCIA, the former Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, in the Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del
Norte GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
SERVICE; and, ACCORDINGLY, DECLARES as forfeited all his retirement benefits, except his accrued leaves, with
prejudice to his appointment in the government service.

SO ORDERED.
 “GROUNDS”
21.A.M. No. RTJ-13-2360 November 19, 2014
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-3010-RTJ)
DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALOMPON, LEYTE, BRANCH 17, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case stems from an Amended Administrative Complaint 1 dated October 6, 2008 filed by
Dorothy Fe MahArevalo (complainant), Court Stenographer of the Regional Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17
(RTC), before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), against Judge Celso L. Mantua (respondent) of the same
court, accusing him of Disgraceful/Immoral Conduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Violation
of Republic Act No. 3019,2 Gross Violation of the Judicial Code of Conduct, Abuse of Authority, and Gross Ignorance
of the Law.
The Facts
In the said complaint, it was alleged that respondent: (a) used the Hall of Justice, particularly his chamber, as his
residence; (b) openly brought his mistress in court as observed by all of his staff, especially by a former Utility Worker
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of the same station, Dyndee Nuñez (Nuñez); (c) used the court process server,
Benjamin Pepito (Pepito), as his personal driver; (d) delegated his work load tohis legal researcher, Atty. Elmer Mape
(Atty. Mape), because he could no longer attend to the same due to his many vices; (e) committed gross ignorance of
the law when, in one criminal case that he handled, he proceeded to trial and allowed the private complainant to testify
in open court even if the accused was not assisted by counsel, and furthermore, extorted money from the accused in
the amount of ₱200,000.00; (f) asked for gasoline, personal allowance, and other benefits from the local government;
and (g) failed to decide cases within the prescribed 90-day period because he was waiting for litigants to offer him
monetary consideration.3
In response to the OCA’s 1st Indorsement4 dated February 13, 2009 directing him to comment on the complaint,
respondent submitted an undated comment5 denying all accusations against him. In particular, respondent maintained
that he: (a) could not be residing at the Hall of Justice as he was already renting a vacant house near the same during
his tenure as judge of the RTC; (b) had no mistress, explaining that the woman that often goes inside his office was
his caterer who brought him food; (c) merely requested to hitchhike with Pepito from Palompon to Ormoc City and
viceversa on Mondays and Fridays since the latter synchronized his process serving to litigants and lawyers of Ormoc
City on such days; (d) personally prepared his decisions as Atty. Mape only assisted him with legal research; (e)
indeed allowed trial to proceed without the accused being assisted by counsel in that criminal case pointed out by the
complainant, but only because the accused violated the three (3)-day rule of filing postponements and failed to inform
the adverse party of such intention, and that he never extorted money from the accused; and (f) never asked for
gasoline allowance, but nevertheless affirmed that he, like all other local officials, received allowances from the local
government. Further, respondent averred that as of January 9, 2009, he had already been separated from service due
to compulsory retirement.6
The OCA and CA Proceedings
Pursuant to the OCA’s Memorandum 7 dated September 8, 2009, the administrative case was referred to an Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report, and recommendation.8
In an undated Report9 received by the OCA on July 6, 2010, the Investigating Justice found respondent guilty of
violating Canon 2 and Rule 2.0110 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and accordingly, recommended that he be fined in
the amount of 25,000.00. Giving credence to complainant’s consistent and spontaneous answers as well as her
demeanor in the witness stand during her testimony, the Investigating Justice concluded that respondent indeed made
his chamber in the Hall of Justice as his residence,11 a prohibited act under SC Administrative Circular No. 3-9212 and
A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.13 Similarly, the Investigating Justice also believed Nuñez’s testimony that respondent indeed
brought his mistress and slept with her inside his chamber, finding no reason for Nuñez to fabricate a story. 14
The Investigating Justice, however, exonerated respondent from the other charges for failure of the complainant to
substantiate the same.15
In view of the foregoing, the Investigating Justice noted that respondent’s acts would have warranted the latter’s
suspension and even dismissal from service, if not for his compulsory retirement on January 9, 2009. In lieu thereof,
respondent was instead meted a fine in the aforesaid amount.16
Pursuant to such report, the OCA issued a Memorandum 17 dated August 5, 2013 finding respondent guilty of
Immorality and violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92,and accordingly increased the recommended fine to
40,000.00, which amount shall be deducted from the retirement benefits due him. Similar tothe Investigating Justice,
the OCA found respondent to have violated Administrative Circular No. 3-92 and A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC when heused
his chambers in the Hall of Justice as his residence.18 The OCA likewise found respondent guilty of Immorality for
bringing his mistress to his chambers and using the same as their "love nest."19
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for Immorality and
violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 inrelation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the findings of the Investigating Justice and the OCA.
SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of Justice may only be used for functions related to
the administration of justice and for no other purpose: SC ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 3-92, AUGUST 31,
1992
TO: ALL JUDGES AND COURT PERSONNEL
SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL
PURPOSES
All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used only for purposes directly
related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, least of all
as residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or profession.
Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nelly Kelly Austria v. Judge Singuat Guerra), a case involving
unauthorized and improper use of the court’s premises for dwelling purposes by respondent and his family, in which
the Court, by Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found respondent Judge guilty of irresponsible and improper
conduct prejudicial to the efficient administration of justice and best interest of the service and imposed on him the
penalty of SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that such use of the court’s premises inevitably degrades the
honor and dignity of the court in addition to exposing judicial records to danger of loss or damage.
FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
Similar thereto, Section 3, PartI of A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC also provides for similar restrictions regarding the use of the
Halls of Justice, to wit:
PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
xxxx
Sec. 3. USE OF [Halls of Justice] HOJ.
Sec. 3.1. The HOJ shall be for the exclusive use of Judges, Prosecutors, Public Attorneys, Probation and
ParoleOfficers and, in the proper cases, the Registries of Deeds, including their support personnel.
Sec. 3.2. The HOJ shall be used only for court and office purposes and shall not be used for residential, i.e., dwelling
or sleeping, or commercial purposes.
Sec. 3.3. Cooking, except for boiling water for coffee or similar beverage, shall not be allowed in the HOJ. 20(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In this case, complainant’s evidence had sufficiently established that respondent used his chambers in the Hall of
Justice as his residential and dwelling place. As correctly pointed out by both the Investigating Justice and the OCA,
respondent’s defense that he rented a house did not negate the possibility that he used the Hall of Justice as his
residence, since it is possible that a person could be renting one place while actually and physically residing in
another.
Further, the Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of Immorality.1âwphi1 Immorality has
been defined "to include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of
corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order
and public welfare.’"21 It is a serious charge which may be punishable by any of the following: (a) dismissal from
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; (b) suspension from office withoutsalary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six
(6) months; or (c) a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.22
In the case at bar, it was adequatelyproven that respondent engaged in an extramarital affair with his mistress. The
respective testimonies of complainant and Nuñez clearly demonstrated how respondent paraded his mistress in full
view of his colleagues, court personnel, and even the general public by bringing her to fiestas and other public places,
without any regard to consequences that may arise as a result thereof.Worse, respondent even had the audacity to
use his chambers as a haven for their morally depraved acts. In doing so, respondent failed to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency which every memberof the judiciary is expected to observe.23 There is no doubt
that engaging in an extra marital affair is not only a violation of the moral standards expected of the members and
employees of the judiciary but is alsoa desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which the Court abhors
and is, thus, punishable.24
Finally, the Court agrees with the recommendation of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA that since
respondent can no longer be dismissed or suspended from office on account of his compulsory retirement on January
9, 2009, he should be fined instead.25 In this light, the Court deems that given the circumstances herein discussed, it
is proper to impose upon respondent the penalty of finein the amount of ₱40,000.00.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Celso L. Mantua of the Regional Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17 is
found GUILTY of Immorality and violation of Administrative Circular No. 3-92 in relation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.
Accordingly, he is hereby meted the penalty of a FINE in the amount of ₱40,000.00, which amount shall be deducted
from the retirement benefits due him.
SO ORDERED.
 22. A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405 January 12, 2015
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ]
ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, JULIETA D. TOLEDO, JOSEPH
Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E. LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L. NOGUERA, FIDEL S. SARMIENTO, SR.,
DAN T. TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M. COLONIA, ERIC S. PASTRANA, and MARIVEL B.
ISON Complainants,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., Branch 45, Regional Trial Court, San Jose Occidental
Mindoro,Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
This is an administrative Complaint1 for gross and serious violations of the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct &
Judicial Ethics and Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, against Judge Jose S. Jacinto Jr. (respondent) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. Complainants Antonio Ascafio, Jr., Consolacion D. Dantes, Basilisa A. Obalo, Julieta D. Toledo,
Joseph Z. Maac, Fidel S. Sarmiento, Sr., Dan T. Taunan, Amalia G. Santos, Emiliano E. Lumboy, Tita F. Bernardo,
Igmedio L. Noguera, Avelina Colonia, Eric S. Pastrana, and Marivel B. Ison (collectively, complainants) were allegedly
section leaders of the lessees of market stalls in the public market ofOccidental Mindoro. The Mayor of the
Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (the Municipality), Jose T. Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa or the Mayor)
allegedly wanted to demolish the public market, so that the Municipality can use the space to erect the new "San Jose
Commercial Complex."2 Thus, on 26 June 2012, complainants filed a Petition for Prohibition With Urgent Application
for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) against the
Municipality and Mayor Villarosa. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. R-1731 and was raffled to
respondent’s sala.
Respondent issued a TRO, which had a 72-hour validity, on 27 June 2012. Hearings for the determination of the
propriety of extending the TRO or issuing the WPI against the Municipality were scheduled on 2 and 3 July 2012.
Mayor Villarosa waived his right to present his evidence and submitted the case for resolution.3
While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none of whom were parties to the case, were all allowed inside the
courtroom during the 2 July 2012 hearing,4 only 12 out of the more than 500 members accompanying complainants on
that day were allowed to enter.5 Worse, upon the motion of the Mayor, all the complainants were escorted out of the
courtroom except for Julieta D. Toledo, who was scheduled to giveher testimony that day. 6
Complainants claimed that the questions propounded by respondent to their witnesses "were all geared towards
establishing" that they should have no right to oppose the Mayor’s plan, as "this will be good for all and the progress
and development of the municipality."7
After the hearing, respondent issuedan open-court Order stating that "the Court is not inclined to extend for seventeen
(17) days the said TRO."8
At the next hearing held on 3 July2012, Mayor Villarosa stepped out of the courtroom to take a call. He exited through
the door used by the judge and the employees of the court.9 According to complainants, the Mayor did not speak to
anyone, not even his lawyer, before leaving the courtroom. Thus, it came as a surprise to everyone when respondent
suddenly explained that the Mayor had to excuse himself for an important appointment. 10
Respondent eventually issued an Order lifting the TRO.11
Petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on 2 and 3 July 2012, respondent "argued, berated, accused,
scolded, confused and admonished petitioners without basis or justification." 12 They further claimed that respondent
judge asked complainants "confusing and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging to
the cause of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their adversary."13
Complainants alleged that it is common knowledge to the entire community of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, that
respondent is beholden to Mayor Villarosa and is identified with the causes, friends, and allies of the latter.14 They also
alleged that all cases in the RTC before respondent involving Mayor Villarosa or his relatives, political allies,
supporters, and close friends were decided in favor of the Mayor or his relatives and supporters. 15 Thus, complainants
filed the instant complaint charging respondent with serious violations of the canons of the Codes of Judicial Conduct
and Judicial Ethics and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Respondent denied the foregoing accusations and cited several cases in which he issued an order/ruling against
Mayor Villarosaand the latter’s supposed supporters.16
In a Resolution17 dated 25 November 2013, this Court referred the Complaint to the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals, Manila (CA) "for raffle among the Justices thereat, for investigation, report and recommendation." The case
was raffled to CA Justice Pedro B. Corales on 24 February 2014. This Court received his Report and
Recommendation (Report)18 on 9 June 2014.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of Justice Corales.
Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that respondent acted with bias and partiality. Mere suspicion that a
judge is partial is not enough.19 Clear and convincing evidence is necessary to prove a charge of bias and
partiality.20 The circumstances detailed by petitioners failed to prove that respondent exhibited "manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence" in the discharge of his judicial functions, as required by Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019, when he issued the Order lifting the TRO.
This Court cannot accept the contention that respondent’s bias and partiality can be gleaned from the mere fact that
he did not allow the "more than 500 members" who accompanied petitioners during the hearing to enter the
courtroom. As indicated in the report, due to the standard sizes of our courtrooms, it is highly improbable that this
huge group could have been accommodated inside.21 With respect to the exclusion of the other witnesses while
Julieta Toledo was giving her testimony, this is sanctioned by Section 15, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 22
We now go to the claim of petitioners that respondent berated, scolded, confused and admonished their witnesses
without basis or justification. According to the investigating justice, respondent failed to submit the transcript of notes
for the 3 July 2012 hearing without plausible reason.23 As regards what transpired in the 2 July 2012 hearing, the
investigating justice found that apart from raising his voice when addressing Toledo and making "abrasive and
unnecessary statements to her,"24 respondent also made the following"insulting, sometimes needlessly lengthy
statements"25 in open court:
1. Respondent declared that he no longer wanted to go to the market, because he might be mistreated by
petitioners.26
2. He told petitioners: "Mga taga-palengke na nagkakaso sa akin xxx pero ‘di naman nila alam ang kanilang
ginagawa."27
3. He told Toledo while the latter was testifying: "[B]asta na lang kayo pirma pirma na gawa naman ng abogado
niyo."28
4. He asked Toledo: "You mentioned about that ‘walang pwesto na nakikipwesto sa inyo,’ is that not a violation to your
lease contract that you are allowing somebody to occupy your portion so that they can also engage in business? Is
this not an additional earning on your part and you are violating your lease contract? Is that not depriving the coffer of
the Municipal Government?"29 The investigating justice found that the foregoing statements "definitely imperiled the
respect and deference"30 rightly due to respondent’s position.
We agree.
As stated in the report, respondent raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to petitioners’
witness.31 Respondent failed to conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, 32 which reads:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified
and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction
or control.
A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court, 33 viz:
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and
restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken,
with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech
increases his persuasiveness.34
This Court likewise finds that respondent violated Section 1 of Canon 2 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which read:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it isperceived to be so inview of a
reasonable observer.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.1âwphi1 The above
provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety, but even acts that have the appearance
of impropriety.35 This is because appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial functions. A judge
— like Ceasar's wife — must not only be pure and faithful, but must also be above suspicion. 36
In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court’s permission to leave while the trial
was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the former’s advocate. He did so by declaring in open court that the
abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the latter had an important appointment to attend. Respondent does
not deny this in his Comment.37 It was the Mayor’s lawyer, and not respondent judge, who had the duty of explaining
why the mayor left the courtroom without asking for the court’s permission.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may
erode the people's faith in the Judiciary.38 Members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their
conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties, as well as in
their personal behavior and everyday life.39
The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a judge.1âwphi1 He gave
petitioners reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality. Petitioners cannot be blamed for thinking that respondent
must have directly communicated with Mayor Villarosa. Otherwise, he would not have been able to explain that the
Mayor could no longer return to attend the hearing after leaving, when not even the latter’s own lawyers knew that.
Thus, respondent is also guilty of violating Section 2 of Canon 3, which reads:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal p rofession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
It is clear from all the foregoing that respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge.
We note that in a previous case, Taran v. Jacinto, Jr.,40 this Court has already found Respondent Judge Jacinto liable
for his failure to supervise his personnel closely and for issuing orders relayed over the phone. Judge Jacinto was
found guilty of violating Supreme Court Circular No. 26-97 by failing to compel his Clerk of Court to issue official
receipts for all monies received by the latter. In the foregoing case, respondent judge was fined in the sum of ₱11,000
and was warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Under Section 10 in
relation to Section 11(C), paragraph 1 of Rule 14041 of the Rules of Court, as amended, "unbecoming conduct" is
classified as a light charge, punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a fine of not less than ₱1,000, but not
exceeding ₱10,000; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4) admonition with warning. 42
Considering that this is respondent judge's second infraction already, the Court finds that the penalties of a fine in the
amount of Pl 0,000 and admonition with warning, as recommended by the investigating justice, are proper under the
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. guilty of unbecoming conduct and is hereby
FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000) and REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 23. SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 04, 2015

JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

For consideration is the Report and Recommendation1 of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice Diy), Court of
Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to its January 14, 2013 Resolution,2 referring the complaint filed
by Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Facts

In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a
student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the
Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge
Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge
Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant
of the law.

Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times. In one
session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of
Judge Tormis, stating that he was a “court-noted addict.”4 She was absent from class at that time, but one of her
classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid
humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in
Tacloban City.

Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled “Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis”5(Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was
suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary
release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the
one who reviewed the findings conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe
reprimand.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by her mother. She
averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, “People of the Philippines v. Lita
Guioguio,” docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R,6 then pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio
case).

Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.

Comment of Judge Paredes

In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated that Judge
Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he
recommended sanctions against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he
discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor
her sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis’
dignity and credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all the judges and
should be discussed so that other judges, court employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds;
that the marriage scams were also discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where remedial law and
legal ethics were taught; that he talked about past and resolved cases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge
Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because these
cases were known to the legal community and some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) and other legal publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis,
he told her to mend her ways, but she resented his advice.

Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or dispute his discussions
in class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also brought to the attention of
the Dean of Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a son
named Francis who was a drug addict and that drug dependents had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested
that Francis should be removed from the judiciary.

He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a result of the influence of Judge
Tormis. She is not an influential person and it is the Supreme Court who determines the persons to be appointed as
court employees. Judge Tormis, however, allowed her drug dependent son to apply for a position in the judiciary.

Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally accepted a cash bail bond
of P6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio on March 13, 2011. He claimed though that the approval of
the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges
to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes
explained that he merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a temporary receipt and on the
following business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of
Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his
fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the afternoon of March 21, 2011.

Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge Tormis could not be
the subject of an administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance of his judicial duties.

Reply of the Complainant

In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had nothing to do with the filing of the
present complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City to continue her law studies elsewhere because
she could no longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about by Judge Paredes’
frequent discussions in class of her mother’s administrative cases; that her mother was indeed one of the judges
implicated in the marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes discussed the matter in his classes, the case of her
mother was not yet resolved by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge Paredes was
aware that administrative cases were confidential in nature.

Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded her brother, Francis,
as a “drug addict.”

Rejoinder of Judge Paredes

In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not premature to discuss the
marriage scams in class because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also written in
many legal publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of Justice of Cebu City.

In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that the conflicting
allegations by the parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on the evidence on record then.
Considering the gravity and the sensitive nature of the charges, a full-blown investigation should be conducted by the
CA.

On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the administrative complaint to
the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days
from receipt of the records.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice Diy. Thereafter, the
appropriate notices were issued and the confidential hearings were conducted. Afterwards, Justice Diy received the
respective memoranda of the parties.

In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes’ act of discussing Judge Tormis’ cases in class where she
was present was an open display of insensitivity, impropriety and lack of delicadeza bordering on oppressive and
abusive conduct, which fell short of the exacting standards of behavior demanded of magistrates. She asserted that
the defense of Judge Paredes that he could not be made administratively liable as the act was not made in the
performance of his official duties did not hold water because a judge should be the embodiment of what was just and
fair not only in the performance of his official duties but also in his everyday life.

Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when he discussed the marriage scam involving Judge
Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case was still being investigated; that the administrative case relative to the
marriage scam was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes was not the Executive Judge of the MTCC
when he received the cash bail bond in the Guiguio case; that he could not prove that the executive judge of the
MTCC was unavailable before accepting the cash bail bond; and that the assertion of Judge Paredes of his being an
anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence did
not exculpate him from committing the acts complained of.
In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations contained in his previous pleadings. He
added that the marriage scams scandalized the Judiciary and became public knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of
the OCA held a press conference on the matter; that, hence, every citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that
in the hierarchy of rights, freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that Judge Tormis never intervened in the
present case; that if he indeed made derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis, she should have filed a criminal
action for oral defamation; and that calling for the ouster of drug addicts could not be considered an abuse, but was
meant for the protection of the Judiciary.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. She
opined that his use of intemperate language during class discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class,
tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly
insensitive and inexcusable.

Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the administrative case of Judge Tormis
in class was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary15 which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of propriety at all times. She quoted with
emphasis Section 6 which stated that “Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to
preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary.”16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’ position that he could not be held administratively liable for his comments
against Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was not in the exercise of his judicial functions.
Jurisprudence,17 as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct, required that he conduct himself beyond reproach, not
only in the discharge of his judicial functions, but also in his other professional endeavors and everyday activities.

Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when the latter discussed the
marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still being investigated. She cited, as basis
for Judge Paredes’ liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case, Justice Diy absolved him of
any liability as the charge of grave misconduct was not supported by sufficient evidence. She accepted Judge
Paredes’ explanation that he merely followed the procedure laid down in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC when he approved the bail bond.

Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not
exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first offense and considering the factual milieu and the peculiar circumstances
attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out with the penalty of REPRIMAND
with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.18

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the penalty.

Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements
of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an
element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses
his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
others.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his
official duties.20 Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made
by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as “misconduct.” They are simply not related to
the discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much
less for grave misconduct.

Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that
might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process.
Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
(Emphasis supplied)

The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.21 The rationale for the rule
was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,22 where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of
civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from
every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination
of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation
relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court
only on April 2, 2013.24 In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue
influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved,
was in contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated
Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing the marriage
scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of
the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes
unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the
said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on the issue.
There was no need for Judge Paredes to “rub salt to the wound,”25 as Justice Diy put it.

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge Tormis as a
corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by
Justice Dy.

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify propriety at all
times. Canon 4 instructs:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 4

PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

xxx

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety
and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other
words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a
sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is
required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the Code and to use
temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming
of a judge.

When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal circumstances, as
properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly
indicated his intention to taint their reputations.

The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge Paredes who merely
justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is
not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise
of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedom of
expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary of which he is a part. He should have
avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have been more circumspect in his
language. Being a judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily,
Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.

The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held administratively liable for his negative
portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical
conduct expected of him as a judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and
private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code mandates:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 2

INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
(Emphases supplied)

Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should not be tolerated for he
is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct
of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also
to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should
freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He
should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy correctly found that it cannot be
regarded as grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in the position of Judge Paredes that the approval, as well as
the receipt, of the cash bail bond, was in accordance with the rules. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes committed grave misconduct when
he personally received cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes justified his action by stating
that he was merely following the procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes
executive judges to act on petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays,
and special days. Said rule also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall
acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering that Judge
Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot be held administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail
bond in the Guioguio case.

Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case is
pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court
or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest.
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are authorized to exercise
other powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the performance of their functions in relation to
court administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions as
an Executive Judge since he was the only judge available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguio’s
payment for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assigned to the court where the Guioguio
case was then pending and the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail bond.
Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice was for one judge to be present on Saturdays.
However, there was no judge assigned for duty during Sundays.

Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any irregularity reflected in the
issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by sufficient evidence.28

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and
penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the circumstances is
admonition.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and ADMONISHES him therefor.

SO ORDERED.
 24. June 6, 2017

A.M. No. mtj-16-1870

RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER COMPLAINT, Complainant

vs.
JUDGE DIVINA T. SAMSON, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Mabini-Pantukan, Compostela Valley, and UTILITY
WORKER FRANCISCO M. ROQUE, JR., Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Mabini-Pantukan, Compostela Valley,
Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Divina T. Samson of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Mabini-Pantukan, Compostela Valley for misconduct and against respondent Francisco M. Roque, Jr., a
utility worker in the court of respondent Judge Samson, for dishonesty and falsification.

The facts are as follows:

On July 11, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous letter-complaint1 charging
respondent Judge Divina T. Samson with misconduct for hiring co-respondent Francisco M. Roque, Jr. as Utility
Worker I in her court despite knowing that respondent Roque was convicted in Criminal Case No. 133882 for illegal
possession of explosives, as she was the public prosecutor who handled the case, and for knowingly abetting the
concealment of such fact, which led to Roque's appointment in the Judiciary. The complaint also charged respondent
Roque with dishonesty and falsification for the untruthful entries he made in his Personal Data Sheet, particularly that
he had not been formally charged and convicted of an offense.

Respondent Roque was convicted of the crime of illegal possession of explosives3 in Criminal Case No. 13388 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofTagum City, Branch 1, Davao del Norte in an Order issued on June 1, 2005. Respondent
Roque was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three years,
six months and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum, including all the accessory penalties provided by
law. Respondent Roque immediately applied for probation, which was granted by the RTC of Tagum City, Branch 1 in
an Order dated July 25, 2005. Upon the motion of Lily Anne B. Cabonce, Probation and Parole Officer II of Davao
City, respondent Roque was discharged from his probation by Executive Judge Isaac G. Robillo, Jr. of the RTC of
Davao on July 18, 2008.

Respondent Roque applied for the position of Utility Worker I in the court of respondent Judge Samson. Despite
having been convicted of the crime of illegal possession of explosives, in his Personal Data Sheet dated June 12,
2008, Roque answered "No" to these questions:

37.a. Have you ever been formally charged?

38. Have you ever been convicted of any crime or violation of any law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court or
tribunal?

Respondent Judge Samson, who knew of respondent Roque's conviction of the crime of illegal possession of
explosives, as she was the public prosecutor who handled his case, favorably recommended respondent Roque for
the position of Utility Worker I in her court even if she knew that he was not yet discharged from probation at that time.
Respondent Roque was appointed to the position on October 17, 2008 and started working as Utility Worker on the
said date.

The complainant alleged that the position of Clerk II in the trial court remains vacant despite the availability of several
qualified applicants for the reason that respondent Judge Samson is reserving it for someone else, presumably
respondent Roque. Moreover, an employee named Janet G. dela Cruz allegedly continues to hold the position of
Court Stenographer I despite her incompetence and lack of knowledge about the job.

Further, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge Samson has been tolerating the daily presence in her sala of
her 62-year-old sister Rachel Tabanyag-Verzola, who wears the court uniform although she is not a court employee.
Complainant said that Verzola is like a fixer/swindler and she entertains litigants, including those who wish to be wed
by respondent Judge Samson.

In her Comment,4 respondent Judge Samson admitted that she knew that respondent Roque was convicted of the
crime of illegal possession of explosives. However, she countered that the hiring of respondent Roque as Utility
Worker I was not irregular, but proper, because he was already discharged after having served his probation. She
inquired from Edgar Perez and Florida Ayaso, both from the Probation and Parole Office of Davao del Norte, as to the
propriety of respondent Roque's application and, likewise, sought the recommendation of then Executive Judge
Hilarion Clapiz, Jr. on the matter. They all assured her that a final discharge of a probation restores all civil rights lost
or suspended as a result of the conviction.

Respondent Judge Samson dismissed as preposterous the insinuation that she was reserving the position of Clerk II
for respondent Roque, since he is only a high school graduate and not qualified for the position requiring civil service
eligibility and two years of college education.

Respondent Judge Samson did not address the allegation that she had been tolerating the presence in her sala of her
older sister Rachel Verzola, who allegedly wears the official uniform even if she is not a court employee. However, she
dismissed the charge that Verzola was a fixer/swindler as malicious. She challenged the complainant to come up with
evidence of fixing or swindling and file the charge in court, and she will step down from her position if the charge is
proved. She suspected that the anonymous complainant was Nelda Britanico, a court stenographer in her sala, who
allegedly has a penchant for filing anonymous complaints to conceal her inefficiency and incompetency at work.

Respondent Judge Samson prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

In his Affidavit5 dated October 23, 2013, respondent Roque admitted that he was convicted in Criminal Case No.
13388. He said that he was a probationer from June 2005 to July 2008. He was discharged from probation on July 18,
2008 by virtue of an Order issued on the same date by then Executive Judge Isaac G. Robillo, Jr. of the RTC of
Davao City.

Respondent Roque stated that during his probation, he attended several seminars and open forum where he asked
Probation Officer Lily Anne Cabonce if probationers could be employed or travel abroad after having been discharged
by the court. Cabonce replied in the affirmative and assured him that his discharge from probation would restore his
civil rights and his probation record would be considered confidential and would not be opened to the public except
upon court order.

Respondent Roque said that he learned about the vacant position of Utility Worker I at the MCTC of Mabini-Pantukan,
Compostela Valley, so he applied for the said position in order to support himself and his son. When he applied for the
position, respondent Judge Samson told him that she would refer his case first to the Provincial Probation Officer
Edgar Perez. Respondent Roque averred that his application was made in good faith and based on the assurance of
his probation officer and the favorable result of the referral of his application by respondent Judge Samson to the
Probation Office. Further, respondent Roque said that when he applied for clearance from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), his conviction and probation were not indicated in his NBI clearance.

This administrative case raises these issues:

(1) Whether or not respondent Roque is liable for dishonesty and falsification for failing to disclose in his Personal
Data Sheet that he was charged of a criminal offense and convicted of the crime charged.

(2) Whether or not respondent Judge Samson is liable for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for her complicity
in the appointment of respondent Roque to the judiciary despite knowing that he was not yet discharged from
probation when he applied for the position of Utility Worker I in her court.

On February 15, 2016, the OCA submitted a Report6 and recommended that this complaint be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter. It found respondent Roque guilty of dishonesty and falsification of his Personal Data
Sheet and recommended his dismissal from the government service, while it found respondent Judge Samson guilty
of misconduct and recommended that she be fined in the amount of ₱20,000.00. Moreover, the OCA found that the
other allegations against respondent Judge Samson on appointing an underqualified employee, Janet de la Cruz, and
allowing her sister Rachel Versola to be a fixer in her court to be unsubstantiated with substantial evidence.

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, but modifies the recommended penalties to be imposed.

In regard to respondent Roque, Executive Judge Isaac G. Robillo, Jr. of the RTC of Davao City issued an Order
discharging him from probation on July 18, 2008. However, the records show that respondent Roque applied for the
position of Utility Worker I in June and accomplished his Personal Data Sheet on June 12, 2008 before he was
discharged from probation. It is clear that when respondent Roque applied for the position of Utility Worker I, he was
still a probationer.

However, the fact that respondent Roque was still a probationer when he applied for the position of Utility Worker and
accomplished his Personal Data Sheet did not disqualify him from applying for the position. In Moreno v. Commission
on Elections, 7 the Court clarified that the grant of probation suspends the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. It held:
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather,
in effect, a .suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the
imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office
and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from
continuing with her teaching profession.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno
were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public
office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.

Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged.
Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence.
During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is
merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.8

From the foregoing jurisprudence, it is clear that when respondent Roque was granted probation, not only was the
imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment suspended, but the accessory penalty of suspension from the right
to follow a profession or calling was also suspended. Hence, respondent Roque retained the right to seek employment
and was, therefore, not disqualified to apply for the position of utility worker in the court when he was still a
probationer. However, respondent Roque had the obligation to disclose the fact that he had been formally charged
and convicted of an offense in his Personal Data Sheet and cannot justify his non-disclosure of such fact by invoking
the confidentiality of his records under the Probation Law.

Under Section 179 of the Probation Law, the confidentiality of records of a probationer refers to the investigation
report and supervision history of a probationer taken under the said law, which records shall not be disclosed to
anyone other than the Probation Administration or the court concerned. However, the Probation Administration and
the court concerned have the discretion to allow disclosure of the confidential records to specific persons and the
government office/agency stated in the Probation Law. The confidentiality of the said records is different from
respondent Roque's obligation to answer truthfully the questions in his Personal Data Sheet, as the accomplishment
of the Personal Data Sheet is a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with
employment in the government.10 The Personal Data Sheet is the repository of all information about any government
employee and official regarding his personal background, qualification, and eligibility. 11 Respondent Roque,
therefore, had the obligation to reveal the fact that he had been formally charged and convicted of a criminal offense
to enable the Selection and Promotion Board for Lower Courts to correctly determine his qualification for the position
applied for. The Office of the Court Administrator aptly stated that by respondent Roque's false statement in his
Personal Data Sheet making it appear that he had a spotless record, he gained unwarranted advantage over other
qualified individuals, especially that he was also recommended by respondent Judge Samson for the position.

The falsification in respondent Roque's Personal Data Sheet is a dishonest act related to his employment. Dishonesty
is the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive or
betray and an intention to violate the truth. 12

CSC Resolution No. 06-0538 provides the rules on classifying the offense of Dishonesty and the proper penalty to be
imposed based on the factual circumstances of the case. The pertinent provisions of Resolution No. 060538 are as
follows:

Section 2. Classification of Dishonesty-The classification of the offense of Dishonesty and their correspondent
penalties are as follows:

a. Serious Dishonesty punishable by dismissal from the service.

b. Less Serious Dishonesty punishable by suspension from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first
offense and dismissal from the service for the second offense.

c. Simple Dishonesty punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first
offense; six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year suspension for the second offense; and dismissal from the
ser1ice for the third offense.

Section 3. Serious Dishonesty -- The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the commission
of the dishonest act would constitute the offense of Serious Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act caused serious damage and grave prejudice to the Government;

b. The respondent gravely abused his authority in order to commit the dishonest act;

c. Where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest act directly involves property, accountable forms or
money for which he is directly accountable and the respondent shows an intent to commit material gain, graft and
corruption;

d. The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of the respondent;

e. The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official documents in the commission of the dishonest act
related to his/her employment;

f. The dishonest act was committed several times or in various occasions;

g. The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as, but not
limited to impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets;

h. Other analogous circumstances.

The falsification in respondent Roque's Personal Data Sheet is a dishonest act related to his employment. Dishonesty
is the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive or
betray and an intention to violate the truth.

As the Court has stated in the recent case of Alfornon v. Delos Santos, 13 we do not automatically dismiss dishonest
government employees; rather, their penalty would depend on the gravity of their dishonesty. Rule IV, Section 53 of
the Civil Service Rules provides mitigating circumstances, among others, that may be allowed to modify the penalty,
such as length of service in the government, good faith, and other analogous circumstances.14 Jurisprudence is
replete with cases where we lowered the penalty of dismissal to suspension taking into account the presence of
mitigating circumstances.15 Office of the Court Administrator v. Aguilar16 enumerated cases 17 wherein the Court
reduced the administrative penalties imposed for equitable and humanitarian reasons.

In Alfornon v. Delos Santos, 18 the petitioner therein, when she became a permanent employee as Administrative
Aide IV in the Municipality of Argao, Cebu, answered "No" to the question in her PDS about whether she had ever
been formally charged despite the fact that she was previously charged with the crime of estafa in the RTC ofLapu-
Lapu City, Cebu before she was employed in the government. The Court held that while the falsification in Alfomon's
PDS can be considered as a dishonest act related to her employment, it found that suspension was the more
proportionate penalty for her dishonesty. The Court considered Alfomon's continued service to the Municipality of
Argao, Cebu since 2003, among others, in holding that she only deserved to be suspended for six 6 months, as her
outright dismissal from the service would be too harsh.

In In the Matter of: Anonymous Complaint for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Perjury Committed by Judge Jaime
E. Contreras (Jn His Capacity as then 4th Provincial Prosecutor of Libmanan, Ca-marines Sur), 19 respondent judge,
in his application for a position in the Judiciary, failed to disclose in his Personal Data Sheet that a previous
administrative case was filed against him when he was the 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Libmanan,
Camarines Sur. The Court found him guilty of dishonesty and penalized him with suspension from the service for one
year without pay, taking into account that he had been in the government service for more than 30 years and it was
his first offense as a member of the bench.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Flores,20 the respondent therein, who was a Court Legal Researcher II in the
RTC of Quezon City, was charged with dishonesty for failure to disclose in her Personal Data Sheet her suspension
and dismissal from her previous employment. The Court imposed the penalty of suspension for six months without
pay, considering that respondent had been in the government service for 14 years and it was her first offense during
her employment in the Judiciary.

In Advincula v. Dicen, 21 the petitioner therein, who was the Provincial Agriculturist in Samar, declared in his Personal
Data Sheet that there were no pending administrative and criminal cases against him and that he had not been
convicted of any administrative offense, although there were pending criminal and administrative cases against him,
and he had already been convicted of the administrative offense of simple misconduct. The Court affirmed the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas that
petitioner was guilty of misconduct and penalized with suspension from office for six months without pay.

In Yalung v. Pascua,22 respondent judge, in his application for promotion, misrepresented in his PDS that he had
never been charged with violating any law, decree, ordinance or regulation despite the fact that two administrative
cases and one criminal case had been filed against him, although these cases were later dismissed. The Court
penalized him with suspension ·for six months, taking into consideration that he had been in the government service
for 26 years and that he had no prior administrative record as the cases against him were eventually dismissed.

In the instant case of respondent Roque, the penalty of suspension for six months without pay is proper, considering
that he was already discharged from probation on July 18, 2008 when he was appointed to the position of Utility
Worker I on October 17, 2008, or he was appointed to the position almost three months after his discharge from
probation, and he has been in the government service for almost nine years as a reformed member of society. We
take the benevolent stance to give him a chance to serve in the government, as this is his first offense as an employee
in the Judiciary.

As regards respondent Judge Samson, she contends that respondent Roque applied for the position of Utility Worker
in her court after his discharge from probation, but the records show that respondent Roque accomplished his
Personal Data Sheet on June 12, 2008 or more than a month before he was discharged from probation on July 18,
2008. When respondent Roque applied for the position of Utility Worker I in her court, respondent Judge Samson
knew that he was not yet discharged from probation and yet she recommended respondent Roque for the position in a
recommendation letter dated June 3, 2008, which forms part of the employment record of respondent Roque in the
Court. As the Presiding Judge of the Court, respondent Judge Samson should have been circumspect and waited for
the final discharge of respondent Roque before she entertained his application and gave him her favorable
recommendation, as it is only upon the final discharge of respondent Roque from probation that his case is deemed
terminated and all his civil rights lost or suspended are restored. 23 Her act violates Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, thus:

CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD A VOID IMPROPRIETY AND APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL

ACTIVITIES

Rule 2.01 --A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.

xxxx

Rule 2.03 - A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Conduct is a serious
charge which may be sanctioned by: (1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporations; Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six
(6) months; or (3) a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Divina T. Samson guilty of gross misconduct and imposes on her a
fine in the amount of Twentyfive Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00), while the Court finds respondent Francisco M.
Roque, Jr. guilty of Serious Dishonesty and imposes on him the penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay,
with a stem warning that the commission of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED
 25. September 5, 2017

A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC

Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon
City.,

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This administrative matter refers to the report on the preliminary results of the spot audit conducted by the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City.

The Factual Antecedents

On April 26, 2016, the OCA sent a team to conduct a spot audit of search warrant applications raffled to Branch 170,
due to persistent reports pertaining to the alleged irregular issuance of search warants by Presiding Judge Zaldy B.
Docena (Judge Docena).

The Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit

On May 26, 2016, the OCA submitted to the Court its Report1 dated May 23, 2016 on the preliminary results of the
spot audit. In the Report, the OCA made the following observations:

First, a total of 938 applications for search warrants were filed before the RTC of Malabon City from January 2015 up
to April 13, 2016. These applications were distributed among the following judges: Judge Docena, Branch 170, with
761 applications; then Executive Judge Celso Raymundo L. Magsino, Jr. (Judge Magsino), Branch 74, with 175
applications; and Judge Jimmy Edmund G. Batara (Judge Batara), Branch 172, with two applications.2

Second. the RTC of ivfalabon City exceeded the number of search warrants issued by the RTC of Manila (with 56
branches) and the RTC of Quezon City (with 48 branches), notwithstanding the fact that the latter courts are allowed
to issue search warrants which are enforceable nationwide.3

The data provided by the Statistical Reports Division of the Court Management Office show the number of search
warrants issued by selected RTCs in the National Capital Judicial Region from January 2015 up to March 2016:4

ISSUING COURT NUMBER OF SEARCH

WARRANTS ISSUED
RTC of Malabon City 763
RTC of Manila 675
RTC of Makati City 75
RTC of Quezon City 68
RTC of Pasig City 9
Third, out of the 761 applications assigend to Branch 170, Judge Docena issued 113 search warrants which are
enforceable outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City, viz:5

PLACE WHERE SEARCH WARRANTS WERE ENFORCED JUDICIAL REGION SEARCH WARRANTS
ISSUED
Manila National Capital Judicial Region
46

Makati City National Capital Judicial Region 16

Pasig City National Capital Judicial Region 14
Quezon City National Capital Judicial Region 8
Taguig City National Capital Judicial Region 7
Mandaluyong City National Capital Judicial Region 6
Pasay City National Capital Judicial Region 4
Caloocan City National Capital Judicial Region 3
Valenzuela City National Capital Judicial Region 2
Parañaque City National Capital Judicial Region 2
Muntinlupa City National Capital Judicial Region 1
Laguna 4th Judicial Region 1
TOTAL 113
The OCA found this to be in violation of Section 2(a) of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides that an
application for a search warrant shall be filed with "[a]ny court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed."6

Fourth, Judge Docena issued 418 search warrants which are also enforceable outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
RTC of Malabon City, but this time the applicants specifically invoked Section 2(b) of Rule 126 which allows, for
compelling reasons, the filing of the application with any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed or where the warrant shall be enforced.7

The OCA, however, pointed out that said search warrant applications merely cited the bare allegations of possible
leakage of information and/or that the person subject of the application is influential in the area, or has friends working
in the local government offices and the courts.8

Fifth, Branch 170 has admitted returns on search warrants where the seizing officer did not proceed with the operation
because of new developments and/or information that the subject has already moved out, when the proper procedure
is for the applicant to file a motion to set aside the search warrant.9

There are also several cases where the returns have yet to be submitted to the court despite the lapse of the 10-day
period within which to do so. The OCA considered this to be a failure on the part of Branch 170 "to ascertain if the
return has been made, and if none, [to] summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to
explain why no return was made."10

And sixth, the OCA noted that Branch 170:

a) x x x issues search warrants even [though] the application is not accompanied with pertinent papers to establish
that the applicant [had] conducted a surveillance prior to the filing of said application x x x;

b) x x x issues search warrants even when the authority of the head of the agency to file the application is a mere
photocopy;

c) [admits] mere photocopies of the inventory of the seized items and inventories that are not under oath; and,

d) x x x always grants custody of the seized items to the applicant and/or his agency for forensic examination or due to
lack of space in the court premises.11

Upon the OCA's recommendation, the Court issued a Resolution12 dated May 31, 2016 placing Judge Docena under
immediate preventive suspension for a period of six months. Thus:

x x x The Court resolved, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), to:

(a) PREVENTIVELY SUSPEND, effective immediately, effective immediately, Judge Zaldy B. Docena, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 170, Malabon City, for six (6) months pending the completion of a more comprehensive and
detailed investigation on the issuance of search warrants;

(b) RELIEVE Judge Celso Raymundo L. Magsino, Jr., Branch 74, same court, from his duties as Executive Judge of
RTC, Malabon City, and INCLUDE him IN THE INVESTIGATION in view of the apparent irregularity in the raffle of
applications for search warrants;

(c) DESIGNATE Judge Jimmy Edmund G. Batara, Branch 72, same court, and Judge Emmanuel D. Laurea, Branch
169, same court, as Executive Judge and Vice-Executive Judge, respectively, of RTC, Malabon City; and

(d) DIRECT the OCA to IMMEDIATELY SEAL/SECURE all records/folders pertaining to applications for search
warrant received by Judge Docena.

Let this resolutiion be personally and immediately served on the parties concerned. x x x13

In compliance with the May 31, 2016 Resolution of the Court, the OCA's Audit Team conducted an investigation on
the raffle of applications for and issuance of search warrants in the R TC of Malabon City. The investigation was
thereafter concluded on June 17, 2016.

The Result of the Investigation

In a Memorandum14 dated August 4, 2016, the Audit Team submitted the result of the investigation to Court
Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez.

On the Distribution/Raffle of Search Warrant Applications

The Audit Team noted that only two out of the five branches15 in the RTC of Malabon City, specifically, Branches 74
and 170, took cognizance of search warrant applications, as Branches 72 (Drugs Court), 73 (Family Court), and 169
(Family Court and Agrarian Court) which exclusively handle drugs and family court cases, respectively, are not
included in the raffle of said applications.16

The distribution of applications for search warrants in the RTC of Malabon City from January 2015 up to May 10, 2016
is as follows:17

BRANCH/JUDGE APPLICATIONS RECEIVED

Branch 170 (Judge Docena) 795
Branch 74 (Judge Magsino)
- Involving ordinary criminal cases (received by raffle)
- Involving special criminal cases (received in his s,apacity as Executive Judge)
185
(152)

(33)

Branch 72 (Judge Batara) 4

- Involving special criminal cases (received in his capacity as the Vice Executive Judge) 4
TOTAL 984
According to Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon (Atty. Dizon), Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), this
distribution system is in accordance with their internal policies on the raffle of cases.18 The pertinent portions of said
internal policies are quoted as follows:

INTERNAL OFFICE MEMO

TO: CLERK IN CHARGE OF RAFFLE (Millet/Pam, Mark, Paul)

RE: SW/TRO/TPO
DATE: MAY 2014

Per executive session with the Executive Judge, the following are the innovations with respect to raflling:

xxx

3. Raffle of TRO/TPO/SW shall be special and shall reqmre notices/Returns/complete documentation and presence of
witness/applicant in case of SW;

4. Due to its confidentiality, only the Clerk of Court and the Clerk In Charge sha11 receive any application for SW.
Raffle of this nature shall be held at the chambers/office of the EJNice EJ and only the ordinary courts (170 and 74)
are eligible for raffle unless the nature subject of application falls exclusively under the powers of EJ or in his absence,
the Vice EJ;

5. Ratio of cases between the EJ and Branch 170 shall be in accordance with the Guidelines on the Selection and
Designation of EJs (A.M. 03-8- 02-SC) which is 2 :3;

6. SW shall be raffled on 1:2 daily basis and counted per applicant. Since Br. 74 is also the EJ, then, SW shall be
raffled exclusively to the remaining ordinary court when the EJ is on official leave, official business, official meeting.

xxx

(Sgd.)
ATTY. ESMERALDA G. DIZON
Clerk of Court VI19

After a thorough examination of the records of the OCC, the Audit Team concluded that the RTC ofMalabon City failed
to observe the existing rules in the distribution of search warrant applications involving ordinary criminal cases as
provided in Chapter V of the Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive Judges.20

The Audit Team cited three instances where the raffle of search warrant applications was clearly inequitable:

a) in January 2016, Branch 170 received all 16 search warrant applications filed in the RTC ofMalabon City;21

b) in February 2016, 44 search warrant applications were assigned to Branch 170, while only five ordinary criminal
cases were given to Branch 74·22 and ' '
c) in March 2016, 87 search warrant applications went to Branch 170, while only three ordinary criminal cases were
raffled to Branch 74.23

In addition, the Audit Team also made the following observations:

First, the application docketed as SW16-183 was raffled to Branch 170, when it should have been directly assigned to
the Executive Judge as it involved violations of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, and Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, or the law on the illegal possession of firearms.24

Second, it could not be ascertained whether a special raffle for applications for search warrant was actually conducted
in the RTC of Malabon City because the OCC did not prepare the minutes of the raffle.25

Third, there are discrepancies between the date of receipt of some search. warrant applications appearing in the
OCC's logbook and the date stamped on the face of said applications as received by Branch 170.26

For instance, SW15-120-MN appears to have been received by the OCC on May 6, 2015 at 9:00 a.m. and thereafter
raffled to Branch 170 on the same ,day, based on the date stamped on the face of the application.27 However,1 the
case was recorded in the OCC's logbook only on May 7, 2015.28 The corresponding search warrant was also issued
on May 7, 2015.29

The same observation is true for the following applications: SW15- 427 to SW15-432 - logged as filed with the OCC
on September 9, 2015,30 but the applications were all stamped received on September 8, 2015 at 10:30 a.m.;31and
SW15-592 to SW15-596 - logged as filed with the OCC on November 27, 2015,32 but the applications were stamped
received on November 26, 2015, at 1 :00 p.m.33

And fourth, there are cases where the caption of search warrant applications already indicates that it is being filed with
Branch 170, and typewritten at the bottom of the applications is the name of Judge Docena to whom the application
would be subscribed and sworn to.34

On the Issuance of Search Warrants by Branch 170

The Audit Team noted that Judge Docena granted all 790 search warrant applications raffled to Branch 170 from
January 2015 up to May 10, 2016, and 19235 of which are John/Jane Doe search warrants. Out of the 790 search
warrants issued, 442 or 55.95% thereof have yielded negative results, remained unserved, or were otherwise never
returned to the court.36

The Audit Team also found that Judge Docena granted 758 search warrant applications even though the places of
commission of the crimes involved therein were outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City. Out of
758 applications,37 130 had completely failed to cite compelling reasons to warrant their filing in the RTC of Malabon
City.38 Thus:

PLACES WHERE SEARCH WARRANTS ENFORCEBLE NO COMPELLING REASON WITH

COMPELLING REASON TOTAL
Laguna 1 - 1
Caloocan City 7 8 15
Las Piñas City - 6 6
Makati City 18 170 188
Mandaluyong City 6 13 19
Manila 54 116 170
Muntinlupa City 1 15 16
Parañaque City 2 65 67
Pasay City 6 75 81
Pasig City 15 68 83
Quezon City 11 50 61
Taguig City 7 33 40
Valenzuela City 2 9 11
TOTAL 130 62839 758
The Audit Team likewise observed that there are instances where the compelling reasons cited by the applicant
appear to be without merit, and Judge Docena failed to ask the required probing and exhaustive inquiry on the
veracity of the compelling reason invoked.40

In addition to its preliminary findings, the Audit Team pointed out the following irregularities pertaining to Judge
Docena's issuance of search warrants:

a) There are search warrants that were issued ahead of the date of filing of the application.41
b) Judge Docena is the signatory of the jurat of all the applications for search warrants before Branch 170. In some
cases, the signature appearing thereon is not his customary signature.42

c) There are some applications that are not under oath although the affidavits were signed by Judge Docena.43

d) Page 3 of the application in SWl 5-588 is missing, but Judge Docena signed on another page containing the sketch
of the place to be searched.44

e) Judge Docena signed the jurat of some affidavits of witnesses, despite the lack of signature of the affiant.45

f) Some affidavits of witnesses are replicated, where only the dates and the addresses relating to the supposed
surveillance are changed.46

g) Judge Docena has admitted as proof of surveillance the attachment of a map and pictures of the door of the unit to
be searched, as well as the screen of a computer.47

The Audit Team also noted several lapses in the management of case records in Branch 170:

a) Case records have no minutes of the proceedings.48

b) There were two sets of stenographic notes found in 16 search warrant applications.49

c) In most applications, there are no searching questions and answers in writing and under oath, in violation of Section
5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.50

d) The search warrant case folders of Branch 170 are not paginated.51

e) In cases where an applicant filed several search warrant applications, some of the documents attached are not
original copies.52

f) Case folders are not properly stitched, and some folders loose pages. Other folders, too, are merely attached using
fasteners.53

g) Stenographic notes are not attached to the records.54

h) Transcripts of stenographic notes are similarly not attached to the records.55

i) Branch 170 does not maintain a logbook where entries shall be made within 24 hours after the issuance of the
search warrant.56

Issuance of Search Warrants by Branch 74

The Audit Team noted that Judge Magsino also granted a considerable number of search warrant applications from
January 2015 up to May 10, 2016, where the offenses involved were committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
RTC ofMalabon City.57 Thus:58

PLACES WHERE SEARCH WARRANTS ENFORCEBLE NO COMPELLING REASON WITH

COMPELLING REASON TOTAL
Rizal 1 - 1
Caloocan City 1 1 2
Makati City - 35 35
Mandaluyong City 13 2 15
Manila 1 18 19
Marikina City - 2 2
Muntinlupa City - 2 2
Parañaque City 7 10 17
Pasay City - 16 16
Pasig City 4 10 14
Quezon City 3 3 6
Taguig City 3 7 10
TOTAL 33 106 139
Nevertheless, the Audit Team found no patent irregularities in Judge Magsino's issuance of search warrants assigned
to Branch 74,59 considering that:
1. There is no instance where the date of receipt by the OCC and the date ofraftle of the search warrant application to
Branch 74, as stamp the face of the application, are ahead of the date recorded in the logbook of the OCC.60

2. There is also no instance where the date of the search warrant issued is ahead of the date of filing of the application
in court.61

3. The minutes of the proceedings are attached to the case records, but the contents are not complete.62

4. Aside from the issuance of search warrants, Judge Magsino also issues an order stating, among others, that the
court conducted a hearing and examined the applicant and his witness/informant.63

5. The stenographic notes are all attached to the records, although some have yet to be transcribed.64

6. Branch 74 observes the guidelines on the custody of computer data under Sections 15 and 16, Chapter IV of
Republic Act No. 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act. 65

For these reasons, the Audit Team no longer discussed the details of the rest of the acts and omissions of Branch 74.

In its 1st Indorsement66 dated September 27, 2016, the OCA directed Judge Docena and Judge Magsino, as well as
the concerned court personnel, to submit their comments on the final report of the Audit Team.

Judge Docena's Comment

In his Comment67 dated October 28, 2016, Judge Docena submits that he granted the search warrant applications
before him "in the good faith belief that there was probable cause for their issuance and in compliance with law and
procedure."68

Judge Docena clarifies that he had no control over which search warrant applications will be filed in the RTC of
Malabon City, much less those that will be raffled to Branch 170.69 Neither does he or the court personnel under him
have any hand in the implementation of the search warrants issued by him or the outcome or results thereof. 70

Judge Docena likewise contends that there is nothing irregular in his issuance of 192 John/Jane Doe search warrants,
considering that the crimes involved therein are mostly violations of the Cybercrime Prevention Act and the £-
Commerce Act, where there is indeed difficulty in obtaining the identities of the alleged perpetrators. 71

As for his issuance of search warrants involving crimes committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of
Malabon City, Judge Docena denies having violated Section 2(a) of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and Section 12,
Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02, given that the issuance of search warrants is inherent in all courts and venue in search
warrant applications is merely procedural and not jurisdictional. 72

Judge Docena further argues that he "cannot consider the issues of absence of compelling reasons in the [search
warrant] application[s], and improper venue mo tu proprio to deny [said] applications outright," as "these have to be
raised by the respondent/accused in a motion to quash."73 And as for those respondents in the search warrants who
did not question the venue of the pertinent search warrant applications, they should be deemed to have waived said
defense and considered to have acquiesced to the venue of said applications.74

In addition, Judge Docena maintains that "he granted the search warrant applications in the good faith belief that there
is merit to the compelling reasons provided by the applicants." He insists that "this determination should be respected
unless it is shown that [he] is guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction."75

Judge Docena also explains that "the rule requiring judges to conduct a probing and exhaustive inquiry is applicable
only to the determination of probable cause" and not to the compelling reasons cited by an applicant in a search
warrant application, 76 as the existence of compelling reasons does not relate to the existence of probable cause
which is the basis for the issuance of the search warrant. 77

While Judge Docena admits that there are search warrants that appear to have been issued ahead of the date of filing
of their respective applications, he argues that the incorrect dates on said warrants are typographical errors which are
attributable to honest mistake and inadvertence.78 He claims that Branch 170 uses previous documents as templates
in order to save time and effort,79 and he surmises that the dates in the orders pertaining to some search warrant
applications were unfortunately not properly edited to reflect the correct date. 80

Finally, Judge Docena begs the Court for understanding and leniency for his failure to properly monitor the submission
of returns of the search warrants he issued and to summon those applicants who have yet to file their respective
returns, given the extraordinarily high number of search warrants raffled to Branch 170. 81

Recommendations of the OCA

In a Memorandum82 dated February 20, 2017, the OCA made the following recommendations:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:

1. Hon. CELSO R. L. MAGSINO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 74, Malabon City, and then Executive Judge,
RTC, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of (a) violation of Supreme Court rules and circulars concerning the raffle of
search warrant applications, and Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and Section 12, Chapter V of the
Guidelines in the Selection and Designation of 1'.,xecutive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties
on the issuance of search warrants, and Section 12(b ), Rule 126, Rules of Court on, among others, the filing of the
returns; and (b) inefficiency in the performance of his duties as Presiding Judge of Branch 74, same court, and FINED
in the amount of ₱20,000.00;

2. Atty. ESMERALDA G. DIZON, Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of
simple neglect of duty and SUSPENDED from the service for six (6) months, effective immediately;

3. Hon. ZALDY B. DOCENA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 170, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of gross ignorance
of the law, gross negligence, and gross misconduct and DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from re-employment in any government
institution;

4. Atty. JESUS S. HERNANDEZ, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 170, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of simple
neglect of duty and SUSPENDED from the service for six (6) months, effective immediately;

5. MS. OLIVIA M. LABAGNAO, MS. DEBHEM E. FARDO, MS. ROSARIO [M. SAN PEDRO], and MS. GIGI M.
MENDOZA, Court Stenographers, and MS. ZENAIDA Z. SALONGA, Clerk-in-Charge, all of RTC, Branch 170,
Malabon City, be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and ADMONISHED to be more diligent and circumspect in
the performance of their duties; and

6. Atty. EVELYN M. LOZANO-AGUILAR, Branch Clerk of Court, MA. ALICIA C. MALUBAY, Court Interpreter, and
DALISAY C. CASUGA, MYRA D. SANTOS, SHERREE ANN R. RUZGAL, MA. THERESA P. REYES, Court
Stenographers, all of RTC, Branch 74, Malabon City, be REMINDED to henceforth strictly comply with existing court
issuances on search warrants without necessarily giving up their endeavor to preserve the confidentiality of the
information in the records.

Considering the herein recommendation of the OCA that Judge Docena be dismissed from the service, and
considering further that the preventive suspension of Judge Docena will in the meantime expire on 1 March 2017, it is
likewise hereby recommended that the PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of Judge Docena expiring on 1 March 2017 BE
INDEFINITELY EXTENDED until such time the Court has resolved this administrative matter.

In a Resolution83 dated February 28, 2017, the Court extended the preventive suspension of Judge Docena for
another three (3) months reckoned from March 1, 2017. Finally, on June 20, 2017, the Court resolved to extend Judge
Docena's suspension until such time that this administrative matter would have been resolved.84

The Court's Ruling

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides for the proper venue where applications for search warrant should
be filed:

SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be filed
with the following:

(a) Any court within whose jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending.85

It is settled that the inclusion of a statement of compelling reasons in a search warrant application that is filed in a
court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of the alleged crime is a mandatory
requirement, and the absence of such statement renders the application defective.86
The absence of a statement of compelling reasons, however, is not a ground for the outright denial of a search
warrant application, since it is not one of the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant. Section 4 of Rule 126 is
clear on this point:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.87

In other words, the statement of compelling reasons is only a mandatory requirement in so far as the proper venue for
the filing of search warrant application is concerned. It cannot be viewed as an additional requisite for the issuance of
a search warrant.

It is also important to stress that an application for a search warrant merely constitutes a criminal process and is not in
itself a criminal action.88 The rule, therefore, that venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases does not apply thereto.89
Simply stated, venue is only procedural, and not jurisdictional, in applications for the issuance of a search warrant.

In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Romars International Gases Corporation,90 the Court ruled that the issue
on the absence of a statement of compelling reasons in an application for a search warrant does not involve a
question of jurisdiction over the subject matter, as the power to issue search warrants is inherent in all courts.91 Thus,
the trial court may only take cognizance of such issue if it is raised in a timely motion to quash the search warrant.
Otherwise, the objection shall be deemed waived, pursuant to the Omnibus Motion Rule.92

Consequently, the Court in Pilipinas Shell upheld the validity of the questioned search warrants despite the lack of a
statement of compelling reasons in their respective applications,93 as the objection was not properly raised in a
motion to quash.94

Note, too, that the determination of the existence of compelling reasons under Section 2(b) of Rule 126 is a matter
squarely addressed to the sound discretion of the court where such application is filed, subject to review by an
appellate court in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.95

Clearly, this administrative proceeding is not the proper forum to review the search warrants issued by Judge Docena
and Judge Magsino in order to determine whether the compelling reasons cited in their respective applications are
indeed meritorious.

Given these circumstances, we cannot agree with the OCA's findings that Judge Docena and Judge Magsino violated
Section 2 of Rule 126 by simply issuing search warrants involving crimes committed outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the RTC of Malabon City where: a) there is no compelling reason to take cognizance of the applications; and b) the
compelling reasons alleged in the applications appear to be unmeritorious.96

It is obvious that Judge Docena and Judge Magsino simply exercised the trial court's ancillary jurisdiction over a
special criminal process97 when they took cognizance of the applications and issued said search warrants. And as
previously discussed, the propriety of the issuance of these warrants is a matter that should have been raised in a
motion to quash or in a certiorari petition, if there are allegations of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the issuing
judge.

The Administrative Liabilities

To hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in
the exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that his acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice.98 Absent such proof, the judge is
fresumed to have acted in good faith in exercising his judicial functions.99

In this case, the OCA found Judge Docena's issuance of the subject search warrants to have been motivated by bad
faith, 100 as evidenced by the following attendant circumstances:

First, the high incidence of search warrant operations that yielded negative results, remained unserved, or otherwise
were never returned to the court;101

Second, Judge Docena appears to have thrown leading questions during the examination of the applicant and the
witness in SW16-257 and SW14-134;102

Third, four search warrants issued by Judge Docena, i.e. Search Warrant Nos. 13-160-MN, 13-161-MN, MN-13-162,
and MN-13-163, have been nullified by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132860 for insufficiency of the
compelling reasons alleged in the search warrant applications;103
And fourth, there were search warrants that appear to have been issued ahead of the dates of filing of their respective
applications; search warrants that were released to the witness instead of the applicant; and search warrants which
were issued on the date of filing of the application, but appear to have been received by the applicant a day in
advance.104

We are not convinced. These circumstances alone are clearly insufficient to overturn the presumption that Judge
Docena acted in good faith in issuing the subject search warrants.

For one thing, it is unfair to hold the low rate of success of search warrant operations against Judge Docena, given
that the courts have absolutely no participation in the implementation of the search warrants that they issue.1âwphi1

For another, it is a grave error to consider the CA's nullification of four search warrants issued by Judge Docena as an
indication that all warrants issued by him suffer from the same infirmity. After all, not every mistake or error of
judgment of a judge in the performance of his official duties makes him liable therefor. 105

Nevertheless, we find sufficient evidence to hold Judge Docena administratively liable for gross neglect of duty for the
serious mismanagement of search warrant applications in Branch 170.

Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. -

a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true
inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made,
and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was
made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether Section 11 of this Rule has been complied with
and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has
been complied with.

c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who
shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.106

The records show that Judge Docena has failed to properly monitor the submission of returns as required under
Section l 2(b) and (c) of Rule 126, considering that:

1. the returns on 172 search warrants107 have yet to be submitted, and Judge Docena failed to summon each of the
39 applicants thereof to court to explain why no return was made.108

2. 350 returns109 were filed by applicants well beyond the 10-day period to do so, with the delay ranging from 11 days
up to six months and five days (in SW 15-477).110

3. 43 returns111 were not immediately acted upon, with the delay ranging from one month and 22 days up to five
months and 12 days (in SW 15-435).112

4. 29 returns 113 have yet to be acted upon.

Judge Docena likewise committed several lapses in ascertammg whether Section 12(a) of Rule 126 was complied
with by the applicants in: a) SW 15-503-MN, where mere photocopies of the inventory of the seized items were
submitted;114 b) in SW 16-286-MN, where the inventories are not under oath and the signatures of the witnesses are
unidentifiable because their printed names are not indicated in the inventory; 115 and c) in SW 16- 273-MN, where
only one witness signed the inventory sheet.116

We also find that Judge Docena failed to comply with his administrative responsibilities under Rules 3.08 and 3.09 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct which provide:

RULE 3.08 - A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in
court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.

RULE 3.09 - A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.117

as it appears that the concerned court personnel in Branch 170, namely Atty. Jesus S. Hernandez (Atty. Hernandez),
the Branch Clerk of Court, Ms. Zenaida Z. Salonga, the Clerk-in-Charge, together with Ms. Olivia M. Labagnao, Ms.
Rosario M. San Pedro, Ms. Debhem N. Fajardo, and Ms. Gigi M. Mendoza, all court stenographers, too, are all guilty
of simple neglect of duty for failure to diligently perform their respective administrative duties.

Atty. Hernandez, as the administrative officer in Branch 170, fell short of the diligence and care required of him in the
following instances:

a. Case records have no minutes of the proceedings.118

b. Some search warrants are incorrectly dated, thus making it appear that they were issued ahead of the date of filing
of their respective applications.119

c. Some search warrants were handed over to the witnesses instead of the applicants.120

d. There is no date and time of receipt of the case folder by Branch 170 on the face of the search warrant
applications.121 e. The search warrant case folders in Branch 170 are not paginated.122

f. In several applications, some documents attached thereto are not original copies.123

g. Case folders are not property stitched, and some folders have loose pages. Other folders, too, are merely attached
using fasteners.124

The court stenographers were likewise remiss in the performance of their duties under Section 17, Rule 136 of the
Rules of Court, given that they failed to produce a total of 34 stenographic notes or seven sets of consolidated notes,
and to properly label their stenographic notes.125 It also appears that they only prepared transcripts of stenographic
notes upon request of the applicants.126

As for the Clerk-in-Charge, she clearly violated Section 12(c) of Rule 126,127 when she unjustifiably failed to maintain
the required log book for search warrant applications in Branch 170.

It is settled that "[a] judge presiding over a branch of a court is, in legal contemplation, the head thereof having
effective control and authority to discipline all employees within the branch."128 Consequently, Judge Docena shares
accountability for the administrative lapses of his staff that contributed to the clearly disorganized and inefficient
dispatch of business in Branch 170.

Finally, we hold Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon administratively liable for simple misconduct, in their capacities as the
Executive Judge and the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Malabon, respectively, for imposing their own internal policies
and practices129 in lieu of the existing rules in the raffle of applications involving ordinary cases covered by Chapter V
of the Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and
Duties (Guidelines).

To be specific, Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon failed to observe the pertinent portion of Section 6 of the Guidelines
which requires the search warrant applications assigned to a branch during the special raffle to be deducted from the
number of cases allotted to on the next scheduled regular raffle. This, however, was not implemented in the RTC of
Malabon City.130

Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon also failed to observe the proper ratio of the raffling of cases prescribed under par. 1,
Chapter V of Administrative Order No. 6 dated June 30, 1975,131 which states:

V. CASELOAD AND HONORARIUM

1. The caseload of the Executive Judge shall be as follows:

xxxx

c. In case of multiple branches (salas) of more than five (5), the distribution of cases shall be in the proportion of one
(1) case for the Executive Judge and two (2) for each of the other judges.132

Their use of an improvised system of counting the applicants (instead of the applications)133 in the special raffle is
simply unacceptable, as the Executive Judge, much less the Clerk of Court, has absolutely no discretion to deviate
from the prescribed ratio for the raffling of cases without prior approval from this Court.

This resulted in an inequitable distribution of search warrant applications between Branches 170 and 74 at a ratio of
almost 6:1, or a six out of seven chance that an application will be raffled to Branch 170, thereby removing the
unpredictability of the raffling process, so much so that some applicants already indicate that their applications are
being filed with Branch 170.134
The Penalties

On the one hand, gross neglect of duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, in so far as other persons may be affected. x x x In
case involving public officials, [there is gross negligence] when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable."135

It is important to stress, however, that the term "gross neglect of duty" does not necessarily include willful neglect or
intentional wrongdoing. It can also arise from situations where "such neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the
frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character" that it ends up endangering or threatening the public
welfare.136In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required
task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference.137
Under Section 46(A), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), gross
neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service (even for the first offense),
while simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense, punishable by suspension without pay for one (1) month and one
(1) day to six (6) months for the first offense.
In this case, we find the gravity of Judge Docena's neglect in the performance of his duties to be so serious in
character that the Court may unquestionably impose against him the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Nevertheless, we take into consideration his length of service of thirty (30) years in various sectors of the government,
with eight (8) years spent rendering service in the Judiciary as a Technical Assistant in the Supreme Court from 1985
to 1987 and as an RTC Judge from 2010 up to present,138 his candid admission of his lapses and his commitment to
undertake stringent steps to address the matters brought to his attention by the OCA139 as mitigating factors that
serve to temper the penalty to be imposed upon him.140 We also note that this is Judge Docena's first time to be
administratively sanctioned by this Court. Thus, instead of imposing the penalty of dismissal, we deem it proper to
impose against Judge Docena the penalty of suspension for two (2) years without pay.
As for Atty. Hernandez, we agree with the OCA's conclusion that he undoubtedly failed to meet the standards required
of him as an effective and competent clerk of court.141 The OCA recommended that Atty. Hernandez be suspended
without pay for six (6) months. 142 We, however, modify this recommendation and reduce the penalty to suspension
without pay for one (1) month and (1) day, considering the fact that this is his first offense,143 and the errors he
committed are purely administrative in nature and are not gross or patent.
We likewise agree with the OCA's finding that Ms. Salonga (the Clerk-in-Charge) and Ms. Labagnao, Ms. Fardo, Ms.
San Pedro, and Ms. Mendoza (the court stenographers) also failed to diligently perform their respective duties.144
Since this, too, is their first offense, we adopt the OCA's recommendation145 and impose the penalty of admonition
that they be more circumspect in the performance of their respective duties.
On the other hand, "[m]isconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by
substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple."146
In this case, there is no substantial evidence to show that Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon's actions involved the
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules to qualify their misconduct as
grave. Absent such malicious intent or bad faith on their part, they may only be held administratively liable for simple
misconduct.Although the penalty for simple misconduct is suspension without pay of one (1) month and one (1) day to
six (6) months,147 the RRACCS allows the payment of a fine in place of suspension if the offense is committed
without abusing the powers of one's position or office.148 Considering that this is also the first offense for both Judge
Magsino and Atty. Dizon, we find the imposition of a fine of ₱20,000.00 to be proper and commensurate for their
transgressions.
Four of the Justices voted for the dismissal of Judge Docena from the service.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. FINDS Hon. Celso R. L. Magsino, Jr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, Malabon City, and then
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Malabon City, GUILTY of simple misconduct, and hereby orders him to pay a
FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely;
2. FINDS Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,. Malabon City,
GUILTY of simple misconduct, and hereby orders her to pay a FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely;
3. FINDS Hon. Zaldy B. Docena, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, GUILTY of gross
neglect of duty, and hereby SUSPENDS him from office for a period of two (2) years without pay, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely;
4. FINDS Atty. Jesus S. Hernandez, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, GUILTY
of simple neglect of duty, and hereby SUSPENDS him from office for a period of one (1) month without pay, with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely;
5. FINDS Ms. Zenaida Z. Salonga, Clerk-in-Charge, and Ms. Olivia M. Labagnao, Ms. Debhem E. Fardo, Ms. Rosario
M. San Pedro, and Ms. Gigi M. Mendoza, Court Stenographers, Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City,
GUILTY of simple neglect of duty, and are ADMONISHED to be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of
their duties.
SO ORDERED.
 26. December 5, 2017
A.M. No. 14-11-350-RTC
RE: JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, CAGAY AN DE ORO CITY,
MISAMIS ORIENTAL
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The present administrative matter arose from the judicial audit conducted on March 12 and 13, 2013, of Branch 20 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, then presided by Judge Bonifacio M.
Macabaya (Judge Macabaya).
In a Memorandum1 dated April 17, 2013, the audit team found that out of the 573 cases examined by it, (1) 69 cases
were submitted for decision but have yet to be decided despite the lapse of the 90-day period [as mandated by par. 1,
Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution]; 2 (2) 33 cases with pending incidents were not yet resolved despite
the lapse of the reglementary period to resolve them; and (3) 155 cases were dormant and unacted upon for a
considerable length of time.
The audit team noted the following irregularities:
1. In Criminal Case No. 2001-888 entitled People [v.] Jabinao, the [RTC] issued an Order dated 22 November 2011
directing the accused to secure another bond within five (5) days from notice, 'it appearing that the bond put up by the
accused had already expired' The Order [goes against] Sec. 2(a) of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides that '(t)he undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain
in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether
the case was originally filed in or appealed to it. '3
2. In Crinlinal Case Nos. 2000-260 and 2000-316, both entitled People [v.] Alba, et al. as well as Criminal Case Nos.
2002-098 and 2002-100, [also] both entitled People [v.] Alba, the [RTC] issued twin Orders, both dated 26 September
2006, directing the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against the accused for his failure to appearr,J and directing the
Branch Clerk of Court 'to receive evidence of the prosecution through ex-parte hearing' - [in violation of] the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure [and by] existing jurisprudence x x x. 4
Moreover, the audit team noted inaccuracies in the RTC's February 2013 report. It failed to include 43 cases already
submitted for decision and 13 cases with unresolved motions, while it prematurely reported six cases 5 as submitted for
decision, although the records did not show that the appellees received the appellants' briefs or memoranda, against
which the prescribed period within which to submit the formers' briefs or memoranda should be reckoned. 6These
omissions and inaccuracies in the report violated paragraph 8 of the Guidelines and Instructions in Administrative
Circular No. 61-2001 dated December 10, 2001, which state that "(i)nfilling up Item No. VI x x x where all the data
needed must be indicated, include all cases with unresolved motions which may determine the disposition of the
cases, e.g., Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence. Patent non-indication of undecided cases or unresolved
motions is tantamount to falsification of official document"
In addition, the audit team discovered that the docket books for civil cases were not updated regularly; the docket
inventory for the period July-December 2012 suffered from a number of defects in form; and, there was no judgment
book, no book of entries of judgment, nor an execution book.7
The audit team furthermore noted the constant presence and active participation of Judge Macabaya's wife during the
entire judicial audit although she was not a court employee. She was observed to be handing over case records to,
and talking with, the court staff. When this matter was brought to the attention of Judge Macabaya, the latter assured
the audit team that he was in full control of the actions of his wife, and even acknowledged ''that she has been a big
help x x x [in] overseeing the administrative functions of his office, [thus allowing] him to focus his attention on his
judicial functions."8
In a Letter9 dated April 4, 2013, Judge Macabaya's Clerk of Court V Atty. Taumaturgo U. Macabinlar (Atty. Macabinlar)
submitted a copy of an Action Plan10 for the Period April 2013 to April 2014, bearing the signature of Judge Macabaya
himself The Action Plan was "formulated as a result of (their) discussions with the Supreme Court Audit Team and
(their) brainstorming session with all the Branch 20 staff," and "is intended to make a more lasting plan of action to
prevent recurring audit exceptions."11
The audit team noted that the action plan provided for a single strategy only and an inflexible time frame for the
disposition of three kinds of cases.12 Hence, the audit team recommended that the Action Plan be revised to make it
more specific and more results-oriented for easier measurement of output.
Taking a holistic approach, the audit team made the following recommendations to Judge Macabaya to:
xxxx
1.1 SUBMIT x x x within fifteen (15) days x x x a revised action plan, incorporating therein the strategies, specific
courses of action and the corresponding time frame[ s ], to be measured by specific number of calendar days, for: (a)
the disposition of the cases xxx; (b) the resolution of the incidents or motions x x x; and (c) all the other judicial audit
findings above x x x;
1.2 Immediately TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on the untranscribed stenographic notes taken down by then court
stenographer Oscar P. Rabanes, x x x in Civil Case No. 3672, x x x and SUBMIT to this Office within fifteen (15) days
from receipt hereof a written report thereon;
1.3 SUBMIT x x x within fifteen (15) days x x x a written status report on the untranscribed stenographic notes x x x in
Civil Case No. 6776 and in Criminal Case Nos. 1863 and 3418;
1.4 ENSURE that a request for extension of time to decide a case is filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
before the expiration of the mandated period for decision, x x x;
1.5 TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION immediately in the cases referred to in Item No. I (7) above, and SUBMIT to this
Office within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof a written report thereon, attaching thereto copies of the orders or
decisions, if any, issued in connection therewith;
1.6 CONDUCT PERSONALLY [a] physical inventory of cases at the end of every semester, and CONSIDER the
results of the exercise in the evaluation and assessment of the performance of the court against its existing action
plan, and use the same as a basis for drawing up a new action plan to ensure the sustainability of the remedial
measures earlier adopted;
1.7 ADOPT a firm policy against improvident postponements and ENSURE that cases are heard and disposed of with
deliberate dispatch, x x x;
1.8 COMMENT in writing on the observations raised in Item No. II, Sub item Nos. 1 and 2 above, and SUBMIT the
same to this Office within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof;
1.9 DISCOURAGE and MINIMIZE his wife's presence in his court, and PREVENT her from interfering with the
business of the court with a WARNING that any violation thereof will warrant an administrative action against him; and
1.10 SUBMIT to this Office within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof a written report on the action/s taken on the
immediately preceding directive;
xxxx13
But in a letter14 dated July 22, 2013, Judge Macabaya and his Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Macabinlar, merely
submitted copies of the Decisions and Orders in some of the cases enumerated in the April 17, 2013 Memorandum;
and this was done despite the passage of almost 10 months. Thus, in a letter-directive15 to Judge Macabaya dated
March 14, 2014, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino (DCA Aldecoa-Delorino)
reiterated the recommendations above.
In reply thereto, on May 12, 2014, Judge Macabaya attached another set of copies of orders, resolutions, and
decisions, without any other explanation other than the inadvertent attachment of the letter-directive to the RTC's
October 2013 monthly report.16
Via a Letter17 dated May 19, 2014, one month after the deadline set in the action plan, DCA Aldecoa-Delorino gave an
updated summary on the number of cases that had not yet been decided or resolved, and acted upon. This letter
likewise reiterated the directive for Judge Macabaya to comply with the audit team's Memorandum, particularly item
nos. 2, 3, 8 and 9, with a reminder that "all directives coming from the Court Administrator and his deputies are issued
in the exercise of the Court's administrative supef1lision of trial courts and their personnel, hence, should be respected
These directives are not mere requests but should be complied with promptly and completely. "18 Thus, DCA
AldecoaDelorino directed Judge Macabaya to:
1. EXPLAIN x x x the delay in: (a) deciding the remaining thirty [30] cases x x x; (b) resolving the incidents in the
remaining fifteen (15) cases listed x x x; and (c) taking appropriate actions [on] the remaining fifty-seven [57] dormant
cases x x x; and SUBMIT the same to this Office within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof;
2. SUBMIT x x x within fifteen (15) from receipt hereof a copy of each of the decisions, orders[,] or resolutions, if any,
rendered or issued in the cases referred to above; and
3. SUBMIT x x x within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof a written report on the actions x x x taken on x x x the
directives contained in our Memorandum dated 19 April 2013 .19 In a letter-compliance20 dated June 30, 2014, Judge
Macabaya attached copies of the decisions, resolutions and orders rendered or issued by his court. He then asked for
a 90-day extension to decide or resolve the remaining cases, giving as reason therefor the court's heavy caseload and
claiming that the remaining cases submitted for decision comprised "mainly of those referred to the Branch Clerk of
Court, Atty. Taumaturgo U. Macabinlar[,] for ex-parte hearing xxx."21
Owing to Judge Macabaya's repeated failure to fully comply with the directives of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) for more than one year,22 this Court on December 1, 2014 resolved to:
1. DIRECT Judge x x x Macabaya, xxx to:
a. SHOW CAUSE x x x why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his failure to: (a) decide the
remaining twenty-eight [28] cases due for decision; (b) resolve the incidents in the remaining eleven [11] cases with
incidents for resolution; (c) take appropriate actions [on] the remaining thirty-eight [38] cases found to be donnant at
the time of the judicial audit, all despite the lapse of more than one year since the said judicial audit was conducted;
and (d) comply with the other directives contained in the 19 April 2013 Memorandum of the OCA, x x x;
b. DECIDE with dispatch the remaining twenty-eight (28) cases submitted for decision x x x and SUBMIT x x x copies
of the Decisions within thirty (30) days from notice;
c. RESOLVE with dispatch the incidents in the remaining eleven (11) cases x x x referred to above, and SUBMIT x x x
copies of the corresponding Orders or Resolutions within thirty (30) days from notice;
d. TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS immediately in the thirty-eight (38) remaining dormant cases referred to above,
and SUBMIT x x x copies of the Orders or Decisions, if any, issued in connection therewith; and
e. SUBMIT x x x within fifteen (15) days from notice his compliance with directive Nos. 2, 3, 8, 9[,J and 10 contained in
the 19 April 2013 Memorandum of the OCA, with a STERN WARNING that failure to do so will be dealt with more
severely;
2. RELIEVE Judge Macabaya of his judicial and administrative functions, effective immediately and to continue until
further orders from the Court, EXCEPT to: (a) DECIDE the remaining twenty-eight (28) cases submitted for decision;
(b) RESOLVE the remaining eleven (11) cases with incidents for resolution; and (c) TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS
[on] the remaining thirty-eight (38) dormant cases;
3. WITHHOLD the salaries and other benefits accruing to Judge Macabaya, effective immediately until such time that
the Court shall have ordered the restoration of his judicial and administrative functions;
4. DESIGN A TE Judge Gil G. Bollozos, RTC, Br. 21, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, Acting Presiding Judge
of RTC, Br. 20, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, effective immediately and to continue until further orders from
the Court, x x x and
5. ENTITLE Judge Bollozos to x x x traveling expenses with per diems (if applicable), as well as an additional expense
allowance and judicial incentive allowance, x x x 23 On February 18, 2015, Judge Macabaya filed a Motion for
Reconsideration/Explanation24 claiming that the penalties imposed upon him were unjust because they were solely
based on the Memorandum dated April 17, 2013; that no formal charge had been filed against him, nor had any
investigation been conducted relative to any administrative case filed against him. Simply put, Judge Macabaya
insisted that he was not given his day in court, as he ''was not apprised of any administrative complaint about him."25
Judge Macabaya then filed a Supplemental Explanation to the Motion for Reconsideration 26 reiterating the arguments
he put forward in his MR, and further claiming that some unresolved cases, those filed between 1971 to 2009, had
long been submitted for decision, and were well within the extension of time he had requested in his
compliance.27 Judge Macabaya claimed that the judicial audit mistakenly and inaccurately found that there were only
26 inherited cases when in fact he inherited no more than 361 unresolved cases. 28 Judge Macabaya also argued that
the audit team's recommendation that he be made to resolve one case per day was "preposterous if not downright
impossible."29 Nevertheless, Judge Macabaya hastened to add that he was ready to dispose of the remaining
inherited cases.30
On March 5, 2015, Judge Macabaya filed a Recapitulative Statement with Urgent Reiterative Motion to Lift the
Suspension of Administrative and Judicial Functions and the Release of Salaries, Benefits[,] and Emoluments, 31 to
enable him to "issue orders and help in the restoration and reconstitution of the records of cases scorched by fire." 32
On March 16, 2015, this Court referred Judge Macabaya's (1) motion for reconsideration/explanation dated February
16, 2015; (2) supplemental explanation to the motion for reconsideration dated February 27, 2015, and(3)
recapitulative statement with urgent reiterative motion to lift the suspension of administrative and judicial function and
the release of salaries, benefits and emoluments dated March 4, 2015, to the OCA for evaluation, report, and
recommendation.33
In a Memorandum34 dated May 7, 2015, the OCA recommended that the matter be re-docketed as a regular
administrative complaint; that Judge Macabaya be adjudged guilty of gross misconduct (due to his failure to comply
with the OCA and this Court's directives) and also of gross ignorance of the law or procedure; 35 and that Judge
Macabaya be dismissed "from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except his accrued leave credits,
and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of government, including government owned and controlled
corporations."36
The OCA explained that Judge Macabaya and his court staff never questioned the findings and observations of the
audit team; and that Judge Macabaya even undertook to decide all the cases/incidents listed in the audit findings
within one year from April 2013. The OCA noted that in all five of his letters-compliance with the April 19, 2013
Memorandum of the OCA, Judge Macabaya never took issue with such findings, but instead merely submitted copies
of his Decisions and Orders on the cases submitted for decision in his sala. 37 Needless to say, the derelictions
imputed against Judge Macabaya constituted insubordination, disrespect, and disdain against the authority of this
Court, as these acts stemmed from his deliberate failure to comply with the directives of the OCA - which directives
contained the command to "be complied with promptly and completely."38 The OCA likewise noted the officious
interference of Judge Macabaya's wife in the court's functions - an observation that was never refuted by Judge
Macabaya; this, in turn, further tarnished Judge Macabaya's already compromised integrity. 39
Lastly, the OCA affirmed the findings of the audit team that Judge Macabaya's Order dated November 22, 2011 in
Criminal Case No. 2001-888,40 and his twin Orders dated September 26, 2006 in Criminal Case Nos. 2000-
260,412000-31642 and 2000-098,43 were clearly violative of the Constitution and the law thus rendering Judge
Macabaya guilty of ignorance of the law and procedure.
Issue
Whether Judge Macabaya is guilty of gross misconduct and of gross ignorance of the law, warranting his dismissal
from the service and the forfeiture of his retirement benefits (except accrued leave credits), with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
Our Ruling
We adopt and agree with the OCA' s findings but with modification as regards the recommended penalty.
Judge Macabaya claimed that the audit team made vague and sweeping accusations that were allegedly meant to
mislead and misinform the Court about the status of cases pending before his sala.44 He also insisted that the
administrative charges against him were made without notice and hearing, hence violative of his right to due process.
Judge Macabaya moreover assailed the Report/Memorandum dated April 17, 2013, saying that the 264-working day
period requiring him to decide or resolve 168 cases was unrealistic due to (1) the cases' voluminous records, (2) his
sala's receipt of 761 new cases upon his assumption into office, (3) his appointment as acting presiding judge of the
RTC Branch 9 in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, (4) the assignment to his court of other cases from other courts caused
by the inhibition of other judges, and (5) his busy schedule of hearings.45 Lastly, Judge Macabaya maintained that as
much as he was willing to decide the 12 remaining cases that he had inherited, he was unable to do so because of the
conflagration that gutted the records in the Hall of Justice ofCagayan de Oro. 46
Judge Macabaya' s arguments lack basis.
We find it surprising that throughout the breadth and length of the space and time that were accorded to him as shown
in the OCA's (1) Memorandum dated April 19, 2013, (2) the letter dated March 14, 2014, and (3) the letter dated May
19, 2014, Judge Macabaya never protested against the validity or correctness of the judicial audit's findings.
Interestingly, it was only after this Court resolved on December 1, 2014 to withhold his salaries and benefits that he
started to question the audit findings. However, his assertion that the audit findings were incorrect or baseless, is self-
serving and lacked credence vis-à-vis the clear-cut and well-supported findings of the audit team.
Judge Macabaya' s woeful lamentation that his right to due process had been violated fails to persuade. It is axiomatic
that due process requires nothing else but the opportunity to be heard - by no means does it require a formal, trial-
type hearing. Thus we held in FIO Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:47
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due
process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of
due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Here, Judge Macabaya was given ample opportunities to be heard. Indeed, as early as April 19, 2013, Judge
Macabaya was asked to submit a written explanation to answer the directives issued in the Memorandum dated April
17, 201348 and to comment (in writing) on the observations raised in the judicial audit. 49 In a letter50 dated March 14,
2014, the OCA acknowledged receipt of Judge Macabaya's and his clerk of court's compliance letter dated July 22,
2013, but noted the lack of explanation/full compliance to its directives, as mandated in the OCA's earlier letters. In the
May 19, 2014 OCA letter51 and December 1, 2014 Court Resolution,52 Judge Macabaya was directed anew to explain
the delay in (1) deciding cases, (2) resolving incidents, and (3) taking appropriate action in dormant cases. Yet,
despite such repeated behests and warnings, punctuated by the caveat that "all directives from the Court
Administrator and his deputies are issued in the exercise of the Court's administrative supervision of trial courts and
their personnel, hence, said directives should be respected [and should not be construed] as mere requests [and]
should be complied with promptly and completely,"53 Judge Macabaya only submitted decisions and resolutions on
a piecemeal basis sans explanation for his failure to comply in full. Judge Macabaya ought to be reminded that:
A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be complied with promptly
and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also
disrespect for the Court's lawful order and directive. This contumacious conduct of refusing to abide by the lawful
directives issued by the Court has likewise been considered as an utter lack of in1erest to remain with, if not contempt
of, the system. x x x54
The records disclose that Judge Macabaya utterly failed to decide the cases submitted for decision or resolve pending
incidents within the reglementary period as well as within the time frame that he himself fixed in the initial Action Plan.
As noted during the audit, these cases were already deemed submitted for decision much further beyond the
period55 allowed by the Constitution and by statute. In Re: Judicial Audit of the RTC, Br. 14, Zamboanga City,56 we
cited Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which underscores the need to speedily resolve cases, thus:
The Supreme Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on
the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period
fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their
cases.
The office of the judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of
official duties. Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts
must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for decision or resolution.
Moreover, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to 'dispose of the court's business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.' Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in
order to preserve the integrity, competence, and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of justice
more efficient. Time and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe this duty so as not to negate our efforts
to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts.
Finally, Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics [exhort] judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition
and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts, to wit:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice
denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and
attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to
create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.
Parenthetically, Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1988, requires all magistrates to observe scrupulously
the periods prescribed in Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution and to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory
matters pending before their courts.
We cannot overstress this policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay in case disposition is a major
culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards.
Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reason, constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.
Nor is there merit in Judge Macabaya's claim that at the time his motion for reconsideration was filed, there were only
11 to 12 cases left undecided or unresolved, and that the period to decide or resolve these cases were within the time
extension he prayed for.57 Judge Macabaya ought to know that requests for extension of time are not always granted
as a matter of course and, even if they were, such requests for extension of time in no wise operate to absolve him
from administrative liability. Here, the records showed that Judge Macabaya asked for additional time to resolve the
cases submitted for decision only on June 30, 201458 and on November 24, 201459 - or 61 and 208 days respectively,
past the deadline that Judge Macabaya himself set in the action plan. The audit team even reminded him to submit
the request for extension of time before the mandated period to decide would expire.60 This, he failed to do.
Even so, our independent examination disclosed the following discrepancies between the status of the cases and the
allegations of Judge Macabaya:
1. In Civil Case Nos. 1971-3672 and 1971-3673, Judge Macabaya insisted that the above-mentioned inherited cases
were disposed of on June 24, 2014.61 However, the alleged decision or order disposing of the case has not been
attached on record; the only relevant document related to the instant case being an Order dated March 25, 2014
ordering the parties to appear for a preliminary conference on May 2, 2014.62
2. There was no decision, resolution or order attached in the records in the following cases:
a. Civil Case No. 1990-258 entitled Integrated Rural Bank v. Acenas;63
b. Civil Case No. 1995-403 entitled Minda Development Bank v. Sps. Rabaya;64
c. Civil Case No. 1996-514 entitled PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Sps. Lee;65
d. Civil Case No. 1996-521 entitled BA Savings Bank v. Sps. Yap, et al.;66
e. Civil Case No. 1998-176 entitled Minda Development Bank v. Agcopra;67
f. Civil Case No. 2004-214 entitled Veluz v. Morados;68
g. Civil Case No. 2011-220 entitled Tomarongv. P/Supt. Pimentel;69
h. LRC No. 1999-085, LRC No. 2000-039, and LRC No. 2006-020 all concerning Phividec Industrial Authority as the
applicant;70
i. Criminal Case No. 2004-100 entitled People v. Manlunas; 71
j. Civil Case No. 1992-503 entitled Republic of the Philippines v.Y anez, et al . ,72
k. Civil Case No. 1996-167 entitled Dumdum v. Dumdum;73
l. Civil Case No. 2002-195 entitled Shoreline Environment Association, Inc. v. Reyes, et al.;74
m. Civil Case No. 2002-290 entitled Asset Pool, et al. v. Sps. Forster;75
n. Civil Case No. 2006-123 entitled Sps. Nera v. Tobias;76
o. Civil Case 2011-062 entitled Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. v. Escauso;77
p. Civil Case No. 2011-191 entitled Sps. Encinareal v. Hult, et al.; 78
q. Spec. Proc. Case No. 2010-135 with Santiago C. Sabal as petitioner;79
r. Criminal Case No. 4804 entitled People v. Roque, et al. ;80
s. Criminal Case Nos. 2005-103 to 107 and 2005-156 to 157 all entitled People v. Autor;81
t. Criminal Case Nos. 2005-462 to 463 both entitled People v. Roios;82
u. Criminal Case No. 2010-925 entitled People v. Velez; 83 and,
v. Criminal Case No. 2011-323 entitled People v. Gelam.84
In some of the above-mentioned cases,85 Judge Macabaya claimed that he submitted a decision/order/resolution
concerning the same through an alleged Compliance dated November 24, 2014. However, a perusal of the records
shows that this alleged Compliance was never submitted to this Court.
3. Judge Macabaya claimed that he already resolved Civil Case No. 1998-04 last December 19, 2014 but failed to
attach the same at the earliest possible time. Judge Macabaya submitted a mere photocopy thereof in his
Supplemental to the Reiterative Motion to Release of Salaries, Benefits and Other Emoluments Dated 27 October
2015,86 without any explanation for the belated submission thereof notwithstanding his previous submission of a
Motion for Reconsideration/Explanation87 dated February 16, 2015; Supplemental Explanation to the Motion for
Reconsideration88 dated February 27, 2015; Recapitulative Statement with Urgent Reiterative Motion to Lift the
Suspension of Administrative and Judicial Function[ s] and the Release of Salaries, Benefits and Emoluments89 dated
March 4, 2015, Compliance/Report90 dated September 18, 2015, and Reiterative Motion to Release of Salaries,
Benefits and Emoluments91 dated October 27, 2015.
4. Similar to Civil Case No. 1998-04, Judge Macabaya claimed to have issued a Consolidated Order 92dated
November 20, 2015 dismissing Civil Case No. 2010-103 entitled Sandigan v. Cagayan De Oro Holy Infant School and
Spec. Proc. Case No. 2010-116 in Re: Petition to Approve the Will of Gregoria Veloso but only attached the same to
its Letter of Transmittal of Decided Cases Subject to A.M. No. 14-11-350-RTC in the RTC of Cagayan De Oro City,
Misamis Oriental, Br. 20 with Reiterative Request for Certification (Letter of Transmittal). 93 Although Judge Macabaya
alleged that "he has already submitted them with the Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division as part of his
pleadings and compliance with copies furnished to this Honorable Office,"94 a thorough review of the records reveals
that the said cases were not submitted to this Court prior to said Letter of Transmittal.
5. In Criminal Case No. 2002-394, Judge Macabaya issued an Order95 dated June 28, 2013 recalling the previous
order declaring the case submitted for decision on the ground that the records showed "that the prosecution has not
yet presented their evidence."96 However, the audit team noted that "this case may be considered as inherited since
the hearing in this cases [sic] was entirely heard by the former judge, although the motion for reconsideration of the
Order dated 15 [Sept]. 2003 denying the Formal Offer of Exhibits of the accused was only resolved on 15 Nov.
2011."97 The audit team's observation runs counter to Judge Macabaya's findings that the prosecution has not yet
presented its evidence. To date, no other order has been submitted to this Court regarding the status of the instant
case.
6. In Criminal Case Nos. 2011-772, 2011-909 and 2012-732 Judge Macabaya issued Orders dated June 19,
201398 and July 3, 201399 which deemed the criminal cases submitted for judgment. However, to date, Judge
Macabaya has not submitted to this Court a copy of the said judgment (despite the numerous pleadings he has filed in
the instant administrative case). Judge Macabaya is reminded of this Court's Resolution dated December 1, 2014 ''to
take appropriate action on the remaining dormant cases" such as Criminal Case Nos. 2011-772, 2011-909, and 2012-
732.
Also, despite this Court's directive for Judge Macabaya to decide or resolve the remaining cases/incidents that were
included in the judicial audit, Judge Macabaya failed to comply with the same. Even with Judge Macabaya's own
acquiescence that the remaining cases have to be resolved/acted upon by him, 100 he merely attached orders101 issued
by Acting Presiding Judge Gil G. Bollozos, concerning cases under the former's responsibility in clear defiance of this
Court's mandate, to wit:
1. Civil Case No. 1998-325-R entitled Heirs of Yacapin v. Buhay;102
2. Civil Case No. 2010-022-R entitled Emata, Jr. v. Emano; 103
3. Civil Case No. 2010-282 entitled Maybank Philippines, Inc. v. Naval and John Doe; 104
4. Civil Case Nos. 1984-9853 entitled Padilla v. Development Bank of the Philippines and 1985-10009-R
entitled Development Bank of the Philippines v. Padilla; 105
5. Civil Case No. 1996-766 entitled Nabo v. Lim; 106
6. Civil Case No. 2011-055-R entitled First Standard Finance Corp v. Sps. Pacatan;107
7. Civil Case No. 2011-241-R entitled Soriano v. Onari; 108
8. Civil Case No. 2012-253 entitled Heirs of Longos v. Kahayag Home Settlers Association, Inc.;109
9. LRC Case No. N-2006-005 with Phividec Industrial Authority as applicant;110
Judge Macabaya's negligence does not end here.
For, aside from the delay/sin rendering a Decision or Resolution on cases submitted for decision, the judicial audit
team also found errors or irregularities in several orders issued by Judge Macabaya.
In Criminal Case No. 2001-888, entitled People v. Jabinao, Judge Macabaya issued an Order dated November 22,
2011 directing the accused to secure another bail bond within five days from notice, "it appearing that the bond put up
by the accused had already expired,"111 in clear violation of Section 2(a) Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides:
SECTION 2. Conditions of the Bail; Requirements. -All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in force at all stages of the
case until promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally
filed in or appealed to it;
This Court, in its Resolution112 of July 20, 2004, had already clarified that "[ u ]nless and until the Supreme Court
directs otherwise, the lifetime or duration of the effectivity of any bond issued in criminal and civil action/special
proceedings, or in any proceeding or incident therein shall be from its approval by the court until the action or
proceeding is finally decided, resolved or terminated."113
Then again, in Criminal Case Nos. 2000-260 and 2000-316, both entitled People v. Alba, and in Criminal Case Nos.
2002-098 and 2002-100, also entitled People v. Alba, Judge Macabaya issued twin Orders directing his Branch Clerk
of Court ''to receive evidence of the prosecution through ex-parte hearing."114 Nowhere in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure are Clerks of Court allowed to receive evidence ex-parte in criminal proceedings - unlike in ordinary civil
actions and in special proceedings where the judge may delegate such act to his Clerk of Court. 115These orders
clearly showed gross ignorance of the rules of procedure. Thus, we held in Spouses Lago v. Judge Abul, Jr.: 116
Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of the rules, and that, when committed in good faith,
does not warrant administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable
misjudgment. When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court
proficiency in the law, and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. When a judge displays an utter
lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge is expected to keep
abreast of the developments and amendments thereto, as well as of prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by
a judge can easily be the mainspring of Injustice. (Underscoring supplied)
The audit team also noted that Judge Macabaya's wife meddled or interfered with the court's business.1âwphi1 Judge
Macabaya, however, saw nothing wrong with that, and even claimed that her presence helped him focus more on his
judicial functions. Apparently, Judge Macabaya seems to have missed the point of his being the presiding Judge of his
court; he seems to be unaware that this unwholesome atmosphere can only further aggravate the court's already
fractured integrity and efficiency. It is not too much to say that the court's official business is none of Mrs. Macabaya's
officious business. In Gordon v. Judge Lilagan, 117 we said:
As pointed out by the Investigating Justice in his factual findings, there is enough evidence on record to show that
respondent [judge] permitted [his wife] to have access to court records in order to monitor the dates when cases are
submitted for decision. There is impropriety in this. Records of cases are necessarily confidential, and to preserve
their integrity and confidentiality, access thereto ought to be limited only to the judge, the parties or their counsel and
the appropriate court personnel in charge of the custody thereof Since [the judge's wife] is not a court employee, much
less the employee specifically in charge of the custody of said records, it was improper for respondent to allow her to
have access thereto.
In this regard, the Code of Judicial Conduct states in no uncertain terms that- Rule 3.08. A judge should diligently
discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management and facilitate the
performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
Rule 3.09. A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.
The foregoing rules should be observed by respondent judge with the help of his staff and without the intervention of
his wife who is not a court employee. It needs be stressed in this regard that respondent judge is not wanting in help
from his staff to warrant the assistance of one who, while closely related by affinity to respondent judge, is actually an
outsider in his sala insofar as official business and court functions are concerned.
In sum, Judge Macabaya must be held to account for acts constitutive of serious misconduct and gross ignorance of
the law and/or procedure.
Although this Court has meted out the penalty of dismissal or forfeiture of retirement benefits to judges who were
found guilty of several infractions118 such as in this case, we have nevertheless imposed lighter penalties towards
members of the bench when mitigating circumstances merit the same.
Judge Macabaya has continuously rendered almost 31 years of government service - starting as Trial Attorney II of
the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office on December 2, 1986, as Public Attorney II of the Public Attorney's Office from
January 1, 1990 to March 31, 1997, as a prosecutor on April 1, 1997 up to his appointment to the Judiciary on March
5, 2010.119 In the three decades he has been in public service, this Court has not adjudged him guilty of any infraction
- with four of the six administrative cases filed against him dismissed. 120
Also, this Court notes that in the four years Judge Macabaya was sitting as Presiding Judge of Branch 20, 761 new
cases were raffled to his sala.121 At the same time, he was appointed as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 9 of the
RTC of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon - some 93 kilometers away from his sala - to hear, resolve and dispose of cases in
that branch.122 This is notwithstanding the assignment of other cases from other courts where judges had inhibited
and his continuous hearings in his sala.123
Lastly, this Court notes the fire that engulfed the Cagayan de Oro Hall of Justice last January 30, 2015. 124 Albeit
beyond the prescribed period for Judge Macabaya to act on the cases mentioned in the audit, this may have
contributed to the difficulty in disposing of or resolving the remaining cases under his responsibility.
In light of the above-mentioned circumstances, we believe that a fine equivalent to two (2) months' salary, with a stem
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with severely, is more commensurate.
WHEREFORE, Judge Bonifacio M. Macabaya, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de
Oro City, Misamis Oriental, is hereby found GUILTY of: (1) gross misconduct for his repeated failure to comply with
the directives of the Office of the Court Administrator and this Court; and (2) gross ignorance of the law and
procedure. Nevertheless and in view of the mitigating circumstances mentioned above, the Court hereby imposes
upon him a FINE equivalent to two (2) months' salary, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Judge Macabaya is also ORDERED to:
1. SUBMIT a copy of his Judgment on the following cases within 30 days from receipt of this Decision:
a. Criminal Case No. 2002-394 entitled People v. Baylon;
b. Criminal Case No. 2011-772 entitled People v. Valledor;
c. Criminal Case No. 2011-909 entitled People v. Tan;
d. Criminal Case No. 2012-732 entitled People v. Mendoza; and
e. Civil Case No. 2009-003 entitled Heirs of Ramos v. Heirs of Abejuela, et al.
2. FURNISH a copy of the Decision/Resolution/Order in the following cases:
a. Civil Case No. 1971-3672 entitledPabito v. Nicolas;
b. Civil Case No. 1971-3673 entitled Rustia v. Pabito;
c. Civil Case No. 1990-258 entitled Integrated Rural Bank v. Acenas;
d. Civil Case No. 1995-403 entitled Minda Development Bank v. Sps. Rabaya;
e. Civil Case No. 1996-514 entitled PC! Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Sps. Lee;
f. Civil Case No. 1996-521 entitled BA Savings Bankv. Sps. Yap;
g. Civil Case No. 1998-176 entitled Minda Development Bank v. Agcopra;
h. Civil Case No. 2004-214 entitled Veluz v. Morados;
i. Civil Case No. 2011-220 entitled Tomarong v. P/Supt. Pimentel;
j. LRC No. 1999-085, LRC No. 2000-039, and LRC No. 2006-020 all concerning Phividec Industrial Authority as the
applicant;
k. Criminal Case No. 2004-100 entitled People v. Manlunas;
1. Civil Case No. 1992-503 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Yanez;
m. Civil Case No. 1996-167 entitled Dumdum v. Dumdum;
n. Civil Case No. 2002-195 entitled Shoreline Environment Association, Inc. v. Reyes;
o. Civil Case No. 2002-290 entitled Asset Pool v. Sps. Forster
p. Civil Case No. 2006-123 entitled Sps. Nera v. Tobias;
q. Civil Case No. 2011-062 entitled Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. v. Escauso;
r. Civil Case No. 2011-191 entitled Sps. Encinareal v. Hult;
s. Spec. Proc. Case No. 2010-135 with Santiago C. Sabal as petitioner;
t. Criminal case No. 4804 entitled People v. Roque;
u. Criminal Case Nos. 2005-103 to 107 and 2005-156 to 157 all entitled People v. Autor;
v. Criminal Case Nos. 2005-462 to 463 both entitled People v. Rosios;
w. Criminal Case No. 2010-925 entitled People v. Velez; and
x. Criminal Case No. 2011-323 entitled People v. Gelam.
3. CREATE, MAINTAIN and REGULARLY UPDATE the following books in accordance with Sections 9 and 10 of
Rule 136 of the Rules of Court:
a. Judgment Book;
b. Book of Entries; and
c. Execution Book.
4. UPDATE his court's docket books;
5. UPDATE and make the necessary CORRECTIONS in his court's Docket Inventory Report, particularly:
a. COMPLY with the prescribed form of the Docket Inventory Report;
b. INCLUDE a column for the following details:
i. "Last Trial/Action Taken and Date thereof;"
ii. Names of the judges to whom cases are assigned;
iii. Pre-trial dates for criminal cases;
c. REMOVE the following columns for being unnecessary:
i. "Bonded or Detained;"
ii. "Place of Detention;" and
iii. "Date of Detention."
6. ENSURE the accuracy of monthly reports, in accordance with Paragraph 8 of the Guidelines and Instructions in
Administrative Circular No. 61-2001 dated December 10, 2001;
7. DISALLOW his wife to have access to court records and MINIMIZE her presence in his court to prevent the
impression of interference in the discharge of his judicial and administrative functions.
Failure to comply with any of the directives set herein shall constitute open defiance of this Court's orders and shall be
dealt with accordingly.
Judge Macabaya is DIRECTED to report to this Court the actual date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this
Court to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.
The current Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan De Oro City is mandated
to CONTINUE TRIAL on the following cases WITH DISPATCH while Judge Macabaya is serving his two year period
of suspension:
1. Criminal Case Nos. 2000-260 and 2000-316 both entitled People v. Alba, et al.; and
2. Criminal Case Nos. 2002-098 and 2002-100 both entitled People v. Alba.
The current Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan De Oro City is ordered
to RECALL Judge Macabaya's previous Order dated November 22, 2011 in Criminal Case No. 2001-888
entitled People v. Jabinao as the bail bond put up by the accused in the said case remains valid during the pendency
of the case.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Judge Macabaya and furnished to Branch 20 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan De Oro for its proper compliance.
SO ORDERED.
 27. November 8, 2017

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2478

DOMINADOR I. FERRER, JR., Complainant

vs.
JUDGE ARNIEL A. DATING, Regional Trial Court, Bra.ncb 41, Daet, Camarines Norte, Respondent

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

For resolution is the Administrative Complaint1 dated April 18, 2011 filed by Atty. Dominador I. Ferrer, Jr. against
Judge Arniel A. Dating, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Daet, Camarines Norte, for "abuse of authority, judicial
oppression and unreasonable/malicious acts to delay raffle of cases," relative to Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 77882
(subject case), entitled, "Cesar E. Barcelona and Jose Vargas vs. Atty. Freddie A. Venida and Atty. Dominador Ferrer,
Jr." for Quo Warranto with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunction.3

The subject case, where complainant Atty. Ferrer, Jr. is one of the respondents, was first raffled to respondent Judge
Dating's sala, RTC, Branch 41, Daet, Camarines Norte.4 In an Order5 dated January 14, 2011, Judge Dating granted
petitioners Barcelona and Vargas' prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and set the hearing of the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction on January 24, 2011.6

Aggrieved by the said Order, Atty. Venida and Atty. Ferrer, Jr. filed the following: (a) Motion for
Inhibition/Disqualification dated January 14, 2011; (b) Joint Omnibus Motion dated January 17, 2011; and (c) Second
Amended Joint Omnibus Motion dated January 20, 2011.7

In an Order8 dated January 25, 2011, Judge Dating denied the Motion for Inhibition/Disqualification due to absence of
valid or just cause.9 Moreover, in an Order10 dated January 26, 2011, Judge Dating cited Atty. Ferrer, Jr., Atty.
Venida, and two (2) other lawyers for direct contempt of court, and imposed a fine of Two Thousand Pesos
(₱2,000.00) upon each of them, and then voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the subject case.11

The subject case was re-raffled to the sala of Judge Winston S. Racoma, RTC, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte.12
The respondents in the subject case, through their counsel, filed motions for inhibition which Judge Racoma granted
in an Order13 dated March 9, 2011.14 The case records were then transmitted to the Office of the Executive Judge on
March 15, 2011 for re-raffle.15

As mentioned above, Atty. Ferrer, Jr., filed an Administrative Complaint dated April 18, 2011 against Judge Dating,
then the Executive Judge, alleging that the latter deliberately caused the delay of the re-raffle of the subject case for
more than a month because he was always unavailable, either on a leave of absence or in a seminar.16 Atty. Ferrer,
Jr. alleged that while Judge Dating has the right to attend seminars or take a leave of absence, the same should not
cause unreasonable delay in the re-raffle of the subject case.17

Atty. Ferrer, Jr. also alleged that Judge Dating favored the petitioners in the subject case since the latter immediately
conducted hearings thereon and issued the TRO after only four (4) days from the filing of the subject case.18 Hence,
Atty. Ferrer, Jr. prayed that the appropriate sanction be imposed upon Judge Dating.19

In the 1st Indorsement20 dated May 9, 2011, signed by then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) and Officer-In-Charge
of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Nimfa C. Vilches, and OCA Chief of Legal Office, Wilhelmina D.
Geronga, the said Administrative Complaint was referred to Judge Dating for his comment.

Meanwhile, in a Manifestation on the Continuing Delay and Non-Raffle of the Case of Respondent Honorable Judge
Arniel A. Dating21 dated May 10, 2011, Atty. Ferrer, Jr., reiterated the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, and
added that, as of that date, the subject case had not yet been re-raffled.22

Upon receipt of the above Manifestation, Judge Dating submitted a letter23 dated May 19, 2011 to DCA Vilches
stating that the subject case was included in the raffle on April 28, 2011, but that the Raffle Committee unanimously
decided to return the subject case to Branch 39 since the petitioners (i.e., Barcelona and Vargas) in the subject case
had filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of inhibition issued by Judge Racoma.24

Moreover, in compliance with the above 1st Indorsement, Judge Dating submitted his Comment25 dated June 3, 2011
stating that the case raffle is conducted every Thursday.26 Judge Dating also stated therein that, while the records of
the subject case were received by the Office of the Executive Judge on March 15, 2011 (Tuesday), no raffle was done
on March 17, 2011 (Thursday), since there was no urgent case and the number of cases was not sufficient for a
raffle.27
Judge Dating also alleged that the judges of RTC, Daet, Camarines Norte were scheduled to travel to Manila on that
day, March 17, 2011 to attend the 1st General Assembly of Judges the following day.28 Judge Dating also stated that,
in the morning of March 17, 2011, he even heard cases in Branch 40 (a Family Court), where he was a concurrent
assisting judge, before he left for Manila in the afternoon of that day.29

Judge Dating also explained that he used his forfeitable leave credits on March 21-31, 2011.30 On April 7-9, 2011, he
attended the IBP National Convention in Subic, Zambales and, on April 14-15, 2011, he attended the Land Valuation
and Just Compensation Seminar sponsored by the Philippine Judicial Academy in Tagaytay City.31 He also denied
that the delay was deliberate.32

In a Report33 dated March 4, 2016, the OCA recommended that the Administrative Complaint against Judge Dating
be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, and that he be found guilty of simple neglect of duty and fined in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or any similar
infraction would be dealt with more severely.34

After considering the allegations in the Administrative Complaint and Judge Dating's explanation, the OCA found as
follows:

This Office finds such explanation to be unacceptable. A careful perusal of Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,35
specifically the provisions on the conduct of raffle of cases, would reveal that it was never intended as an
indispensable requirement that a substantial number of cases must have been filed in court before raffle of cases
could be conducted. On the contrary, Section 2 thereof explicitly mandates that "[r]affling of cases shall be regularly
conducted at two o'clock in the afternoon every Monday and/or Thursday as warranted by the number of cases to be
raffled." Clearly, as can be easily inferred from the use of the words "shall" and "regularly," the raffle of cases should
be mandatorily done on a regular basis and, much more, not only once but even twice a week depending on the
number of cases to be raffled. Clearly, if the supposed substantial number of cases to be raffled affects the conduct of
raffle as what respondent Judge Dating is trying to impress upon us, it is more of the fact that the conduct of raffle of
cases in a week could be done twice if necessary, but never to altogether dispense with the raffle.

Respondent Judge Dating averred that there was no urgency to conduct a raffle (as there was no case [presumably
including the Special Civil Action No. 7788] which applied for a TRO, a special raffle, and the like). Again, respondent
Judge Dating missed a substantial point on the matter. Assuming that, save for Special Civil Action No. 7788, there
were no cases scheduled to be raffled on 17 March 2011, respondent Judge Dating was still obligated to cause the re-
raffle of the quo warranto petition for that particular day. As provided under Section 8 of the same guidelines, "[w]here
a judge in a multiple-branch court is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself/herself [as what Judge Racoma did], the
records shall be returned to the Executive Judge and the latter shall cause the inclusion of the said case in the next
regular raffle for re-assignment." The rule is so worded in a mandatory tenor for Executive Judges to require the
inclusion of cases [inhibited by judges] in the next regular raffle for a re-assignment. Unfortunately, respondent Judge
Dating apparently failed to grasp the true intent of that particular guideline.

Respondent Judge Dating rationalized the failure to immediately raffle the quo warranto petition on 17 March 2011 by
pointing out that on that day, the judges would be travelling to attend the 1st General Assembly of Judges in Manila on
18 March 2011. Curiously though, he also averred that he conducted trial in the morning of 17 March 2011 for cases
pending before Branch 40 (a Family Court) where he also serves as the Acting/ Assisting Judge, and left his station
for Manila in the afternoon. While it is commendable for respondent Judge Dating to still perform his duties as a
Presiding Judge by holding trial in the morning, his exemplary action was virtually negated by the fact that he failed to
perform his duties as an Executive Judge. This Office understands that respondent Judge Dating, together with the
other judges of the RTC, Daet, Camarines Norte, would have to leave much earlier than the others due to the
considerable distance of their stations from Manila. Still, this Office believes that respondent Judge Dating [and the
other members of the Raffle Committee as well] could still have set aside even a few minutes of their precious time to
conduct a raffle before leaving their station. Truth be told, the raffling of cases (minus the usual chats and exchange of
pleasantries) could be accomplished in less than an hour, unlike court trials that invariably consume much of the time
of the judges. As Executive Judge, it is the personal duty and responsibility of respondent Judge Dating to exercise
supervision over the raffling of cases. Hence, he should have been prudent enough to find ways to minimize, if not
totally avoid, delays in the raffle of cases.

This ideal condition of avoiding or minimizing delays in the raffle of cases all the more applies to respondent Judge
Dating's situation in light of his admission that it is his "custom" to avail of his forfeitable leaves during the month of
March. While attending seminars and conventions sanctioned by the Court may excuse the non-raffle of cases in
courts on specific dates, the same could not be said when the non-raffle of cases was occasioned by the trial judges'
forfeitable leave of absences. Unlike seminars and conventions which are sponsored and evidently scheduled by the
Court [usually through the PHILJA], availing of forfeitable leaves is a personal act on the part of judges especially on
choosing the dates which they usually prefer. While they are indeed entitled to such leaves, judges should so
schedule the same in the most careful manner so as to prevent a hiatus in court proceedings. Speedy administration
of justice should never play second fiddle to the personal comfort and caprice of those working in the judiciary, judges
and/or personnel alike. In the case at bar, respondent Judge Dating scheduled his forfeitable leaves from 21 March
2011 to 31 March 2011. Knowing fully well that he would not be able to attend to his functions as chairperson of the
Raffle Committee for the raffle dates of 24 March 2011 and 31 March 2011, and aware of the fact of the incoming
seminar and convention that would coincide with the succeeding raffle dates (7 April 2011 and 14 April 2011) as well
as of the observance by the nation of the Holy Week (21 April 2011 being a Maundy Thursday), respondent Judge
Dating should have endeavored to wrap up all his pending work before going on a sabbatical. Unfortunately, instead
of allotting just a few minutes in the afternoon of 17 March 2011 to re-raffle Special Civil Action No. 7788, he opted to
forthwith leave his post to attend the General Assembly of Judges, then proceeded with his "customary" forfeitable
leave of absences during the month of March, then attended the IBP National Convention in Subic, Zambales (7 to 9
of April 2011) and the Just Compensation Seminar sponsored by PHILJA in Tagaytay City, Cavite (14 to 15 April 2011
), and then took a break during the Holy Week, before including on 28 April 2011 the quo warranto petition in the list of
cases to be raffled, only to have it referred back to the court of origin in view of the pending motion for reconsideration
of the inhibition order. What could have been done by respondent Judge Dating in less than an hour was apathetically
delayed for six (6) long weeks.

Apropos his letter dated 17 March 2011 to then DCA Jesus Edwin Villasor and another letter addressed to then DCA
Vilches expressing his supposed dilemma in the conduct of raffle of cases during his forfeitable leaves of absence and
asking if the Vice-Executive Judge could conduct the same during such time, respondent Judge Dating seemed to flip-
flop and contradict himself when he subsequently explained [in the instant matter] that during his absence, the Clerk of
Court and the Vice-Executive Judge are fully knowledgeable of what to do pursuant to existing circulars and
directives. These vacillations do not augur well for respondent Judge Dating for they only serve to highlight either his
inconsistency in making a sound justification for his inefficiency to supervise the conduct of raffle of cases, or his
tendency to put the blame on the other members of the Raffle Committee.

xxxx

For his failure to strictly adhere to the provisions of A.M. No. 03- 8-02-SC, specifically the provisions on the raffle of
cases, this Office finds respondent Judge Dating guilty of simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty signifies a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.1âwphi1 The Court has consistently held that mere
delay in the performance of one's functions is considered as simple neglect of duty. Under Rule IV, Section 52 (B) of
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, it is a less grave offense punishable by suspension
without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. In order, however, not to disrupt the conduct of court
proceedings, the imposition of a fine against respondent Judge Dating is appropriate under the circumstances.36

The Court hereby adopts the above well-reasoned OCA recommendation.

For failure to observe the procedure on the raffle of cases pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Judge Dating is guilty of
simple neglect of duty which is defined as the "failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to
carelessness or indifference."37 Simple neglect of duty is listed as one of the less grave offenses punishable by
suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for
the second offense under Rule IV, Section 52(B)(l) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service.38 In lieu of suspension, the Court agrees with the OCA recommendation for the imposition of a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ami el A. Dating GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and imposes upon him a
FINE in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
any similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 28. EN BANC
[ A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2416-RTJ], November 07, 2017 ]
MARIE ROXANNE G. RECTO, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. HENRY J. TROCINO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 62, BAGO CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint[1] against Judge Henry J. Trocino (Judge Trocino), former Executive
Judge and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Bago City (RTC), filed by Marie Roxanne G. Recto
(Complainant) for bias and partiality, ignorance of the law, grave oppression, and violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct for issuing an ex parte Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in relation to Civil Case No. 1409, a case for Child
Custody under the Family Code.

Antecedents:

The controversy stemmed from a petition[2] for Child Custody with Prayer for Protection Order under A.M. No. 04-10-
11-SC[3] in relation to A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC[4] and damages filed by Magdaleno Peña (Peña) on December 20, 2005
against complainant, entitled Magdaleno M. Peña, for himself and in behalf of his minor son, Julian Henri "Harry" R.
Peña v. Marie Roxanne G. Recto. The petition was raffled to the RTC-Branch 62.

On December 23, 2005, the RTC issued, ex parte, a Temporary Protection Order (TPO),[5] granting, among others,
the temporary custody of their fifteen (15) month-old child, Julian Henri "Harry" R. Peña (Henri), to her former live-in
partner, Magdaleno Peña (Peña). Specifically, the December 23, 2005 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the court hereby directs the Clerk of Court to
issue Summons which shall be served, together with copy of the petition and its annexes thereto, personally to the
respondent.

TEMPORARY CUSTODY OVER JULIAN HENRI "HARRY" R. PEÑA IS HEREBY VESTED UPON THE PETITIONER
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA; AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE PNP-CIDG (NCR) IS ORDERED TO ASSIST THE
SHERIFF OF THIS COURT IN [TAKING CUSTODY] OF JULIAN HENRI "HARRY" R. PEÑA WHEREVER HE MIGHT
BE FOUND WHO SHALL THEREAFTER BE IMMEDIATELY TURNED OVER TO HIS FATHER, THE HEREIN
PETITIONER.

A protection order, which shall be effective for thirty (30) days from service upon respondent Marie Roxanne G. Recto,
is hereby issued as follows:
prohibiting the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of violence
against the offended party;

prohibiting the respondent from harassing, annoying, contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the
offended party, either directly or indirectly;

removing and excluding the offended party from the residence of the respondent or from any other place where said
offended party may be found;

requiring the respondent to stay away from the offended party and any designated family or household member at a
distance of two hundred (200) meters;

requiring the respondent to stay away from the residence, or any specified place frequented regularly by the offended
party and any designated family or household member;

prohibiting the respondent from carrying or possessing any firearms or deadly weapon, and ordering her to
immediately surrender the same to the court for proper disposition; and

directing the respondent to put up a bond of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) to keep the peace and to present
two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that respondent shall not commit any of the acts of violence on the
offended party and/ or the petitioner or violate the protection order.
Lastly, pursuant to Section 16 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC (Rule on Custody of Minors) a HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER
is hereby issued for the purpose of preventing the minor child from being brought out of the country without prior order
from the court, during the pendency of the petition.

Accordingly, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is directed NOT to allow the departure of the minor child from
the Philippines without the court's permission. Likewise, the Department of Foreign Affairs is ordered NOT to issue
any passport to said minor without the prior authority of this court.
For the guidance of said government entities, hereunder are the pertinent information about the subject of the Hold
Departure Order:

xxx

Furnish copies of this order the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within
twenty four (24) hours hereof and through the most expeditious means of transmittal.

Likewise furnish copies hereof the petitioner and counsel.

SO ORDERED.[6]
The Complaint

In vehement protest, complainant filed this administrative complaint against Judge Trocino alleging that he (1)
exhibited bias and gross ignorance of the law; (2) acted with grave oppression; and (3) violated the Code of Judicial
Conduct when he issued the TPO, ex parte, vesting immediate custody of Henri to Peña based on hypothetical
assumptions. Specifically, the complainant alleged as follows:
9. Respondent judge is biased, ignorant of the law, and acted with grave oppression when he issued the TPO based
on a complaint for child custody. Respondent judge, in full disregard of the law and rule of the Supreme Court on
Custody (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC), issued ex-parte the so called "TPO" without giving herein complainant Recto
opportunity to file her answer, enter into Pre-trial, and without social worker's case study report. This conduct of the
respondent judge manifests patent bias in favor of Peña, who is a resident of Negros Occidental. Moreover, Peña is
not the natural guardian of Julian Harry, being an illegitimate child.

10. Respondent judge deliberately did not apply the Rule on Custody but instead erroneously used R.A. 9262 to
support his order giving temporary custody of minor Harry Peña to Magdaleno Peña, to the prejudice of herein
complainant;

11. Respondent Judge inappropriately issued the so called "TPO" considering that the case filed by Magdaleno Peña
is for Child Custody. The Rule on custody should have been observed by the respondent judge and not the Rule on
Anti-Violence against Women and their Children. A TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man because only women and
their children are protected by R.A. 9262. Moreso, respondent's Order giving temporary child custody to Magdaleno
Peña has no legal leg to stand on because in custody cases, only provisional orders for custody is issued after an
Answer is filed and after Pre-trial is conducted and a DSWD Social Worker Case Study Report is filed. Thus, the
Temporary Protection Order used by respondent Judge is not proper and patently illegal and void;

12. Respondent's obvious bias is further shown by the fact that he was aware that a TPO was previously issued
against Magdaleno Peña who is a respondent in a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection Order in the RTC
of Mandaluyong City, yet he issued the so called "TPO" by deliberately mis-applying the provisions of R.A. 9262. The
so called "TPO" of respondent judge was not a product of innocent error in judgment. x x x

13. Likewise, it is gross ignorance of the law on the part of respondent judge in awarding temporary custody of minor
Harry to Magdaleno Peña based on hypothetical assumptions. Respondent judge in justifying his unfounded order
said, and we quote:

xxxx

14. Under Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Court may issue an ex-parte TPO where there is reasonable
ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against women and their children exists or is about to recur.
There is complete absence of allegation to this effect in the petition. Clearly, the basis of the so called "TPO" is
hypothetical and not factual. Thus, respondent issued the so called "TPO" without legal basis;

15. There is no legal basis to award custody of minor Harry (an illegitimate child) to Magdaleno Peña, based on the
Preamble of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in the light of Article 213 of the Philippine Family
Code that clearly state: "No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." Moreover, illegitimate children shall be under the sole parental authority of the
mother (Briones vs. Miguel, 440 SCRA 455);

16. The averments in the Petition for Child Custody are not compelling reasons to immediately award custody of the
minor child to Magdaleno Peña to overcome Article 213 of the Family Code and the ruling in the case of Briones vs.
Miguel. Not to be ignored is Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise. Only the most
compelling reasons, such as the mother's unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of
parental authority and the award of custody to someone else (Briones vs. Miguel, Ibid). It is elementary that basic
Philippine Law has greater weight than any international law;
17. Likewise, Respondent Judge committed grave, whimsical and capricious abuse of discretion in the exercise of his
judicial function in taking cognizance over the petition despite apparent lack of jurisdiction and in issuing the so called
"Temporary Protection Order" against complainant;

18. Magdaleno M. Peña has no standing to institute an action in behalf of complainant's 15 month old child because
being illegitimate, only complainant has parental authority on Julian Henri "Harry" being the natural guardian, and yet
with such knowledge, the respondent judge abused his power with full disregard for the law and the right of
complainant in order to favor Magdaleno Peña;

19. The respondent judge could not have innocently missed the fact that the court had no jurisdiction because
Magdaleno M. Peña in filing for himself has no cause of action against herein complainant (Marie Roxanne G. Recto),
and avail of TPO [under] RA 9262 because the remedies of the law could not be availed of by a man;

20. Likewise clearly alleged in the petition is that Peña is bringing the action for and in behalf of the offended party
JULIAN HENRI (HARRY R. PEÑA) - his minor illegitimate son [with complainant]. As such, it is manifest that the real
petitioner is minor Harry Peña who is a resident of Mandaluyong City. Under Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the
verified petition for Temporary Protection Order may be filed with the Family Court of the place where the offended
party resides. Accordingly, the petition must be filed before the Family Court of Mandaluyong City;

21. Respondent Judge is fully aware of this defect of jurisdiction in the petition considering that the alleged offended
party Julian Henri "Harry" R. Peña is not within his territorial jurisdiction. His awareness of wrong venue is manifested
in his order stating in page 9 paragraph a) that "Harry" lives in Mandaluyong City and not in Negros. We quote the
following:

xxxx

22. Respondent judge blindly issued the so called "TPO" without serious and judicious assessment of the contents of
and averments in the petition filed by Peña. This is an obvious fact because the hypothetical approach in the petition
for custody was based on psychological incapacity for annulment of marriage and not incapacity to rear a child. The
documents speak for themselves;

23. Apparently, respondent has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition before him and to issue the so called
"Temporary Protection Order" yet, he did so. In so doing, respondent judge committed grave abuse of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the so called "TPO" issued is null and void;

24. Respondent blindly assumed jurisdiction because respondent Judge Trocino and petitioner Peña were in
connivance. Complainant has personal knowledge that respondent judge was working under the dictates of Peña. On
several occasions, while complainant and Peña were still live-in partners, she has full personal and direct knowledge
that respondent judge was dictated upon by Peña to decide on cases at the desire of Peña in her presence. Aside
from the personal knowledge of complainant, the close relationship of Judge Trocino and Peña is evident in the case
entitled Eric L. Lee vs. Hon. Henry J. Trocino, et al., under G.R. No. 164648 x x x before the Supreme Court, where
respondent and Judge Trocino and Magdaleno Peña are co-respondents;[7] [Emphases supplied]
Respondent's Position

In his Comment,[8] Judge Trocino denied the allegations and pointed out that the TPO was sanctioned by Sections
11[9] and 15[10] of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC in relation to Section 32[11] thereof as an ancillary remedy incident to the
petition for custody filed by Peña for himself and in behalf of his minor son. Judge Trocino asserted that the ex parte
TPO was issued after a careful evaluation not only of the material allegations in the petition but all other
circumstances relevant to the welfare and best interest of the minor offended party, and that it was issued judiciously
in complete good faith, devoid of any grave, whimsical and capricious abuse of discretion.

Judge Trocino explained that the December 23, 2005 TPO was a temporary order in contemplation of A.M. No. 04-1
0-11-SC and not an order of temporary custody pursuant to A.M. 03-04-04-SC which requires the prior filing of an
answer, pre-trial, and a social worker's study report. Judge Trocino insisted that the TPO was properly issued
considering that Civil Case No. 1409 was a case for child custody with ancillary prayer for the issuance of a protection
order under Section 32 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC and that said provision of the law authorizes an application for
protection order as an incident in criminal or civil actions.

Judge Trocino contended that the issuance of the TPO was not based on hypothetical assumptions but was made
after a thorough evaluation of the allegations set forth in the petition and its supporting documents, and after
assessment, he believed in good faith that the TPO was legal and necessary for the protection of the minor offended
party. Judge Trocino insisted that his act was a bonafide exercise of judicial discretion, the paramount consideration of
which was the interest of the minor child. And even assuming that the TPO was erroneously/improperly issued, the
proper remedy lies with the proper court as the matter was judicial in nature, and not with Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) by means of an administrative complaint.
On the issue of jurisdiction, Judge Trocino asserted that the petition for child custody and damages was within the
competence and jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. Judge Trocino argued that the petition substantially
complied with the requirements on non-forum shopping and that there was nothing in the Verification and Certification
against Non Forum Shopping that would indicate that the parties raised a similar issue or cause of action in another
court, tribunal or agency.

As to the allegation that he worked under the dictates of Peña, Judge Trocino vehemently denied the same and
asserted that he never allowed anyone to either influence or dictate on him in the discharge of his official functions;
and the fact that he and Peña were co-respondents in a particular case filed before the Court was not an indication
that he worked under Peña's whims.

Meanwhile, on January 27, 2006, Judge Trocino voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the petition.[12]

Complainant likewise questioned the December 23, 2005 TPO before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
01394.[13]

Report and Recommendation of the OCA

In a Resolution,[14] dated July 17, 2017, the OCA found no basis to hold Judge Trocino liable for bias and partiality
and grave oppression. It, however, found him liable for gross ignorance of the law for issuing an ex parte TPO
pursuant to A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9262 and recommended that he be fined in the amount of
Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) considering that Judge Trocino compulsorily retired from the service on July 15,
2006 and was previously found administratively liable of undue delay in rendering a decision in A.M. No. RTJ-05-
1936[15] and A.M. No. RTJ-07-2057.[16]

The Ruling of the Court

Upon review of the records, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA that Judge Trocino
acted with gross ignorance of the law when he issued, ex parte, the December 23, 2005 TPO pursuant to A.M. No.
04-1 0-11-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9262, which granted, among others, the temporary custody of the minor child to
Peña and issued a protection order against complainant effective for thirty (30) days. He deliberately ignored the
provisions of the Family Code, A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in relation to Custody of Minors and A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC or the Rule on Violence against Women
and their Children.

Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of the basic rules and settled jurisprudence.[17] A judge owes it to his
office to simply apply the law when the law or a rule is basic[18] and the facts are evident.[19] Not to know it or to act
as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[20]

On Child Custody

Article 176 of the Family Code explicitly confers the sole parental authority of an illegitimate child to the mother. This
preference favoring the mother is reiterated in Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother. Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother's unfitness
to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to
someone else.[21] The mother's fitness is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings
before the trial court.[22]

On Provisional Custody

A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC is instructive. Specifically, Section 13 thereof provides:

Section 13. Provisional order awarding custody. - After an answer has been filed or after expiration of the period to file
it, the court may issue a provisional order awarding custody of the minor. As far as practicable, the following order of
preference shall be observed in the award of custody:

(a) Both parents jointly;

(b) Either parent, taking into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the minor over seven years of
age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit;

(c) The grandparent, or if there are several grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the minor over seven years of
age and of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or disqualified;

(d) The eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified;
(e) The actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless the former is unfit or disqualified; or

(f) Any other person or institution the court may deem suitable to provide proper care and guidance for the minor.
[Emphasis supplied]
Clearly, a court is not authorized to issue a provisional order awarding custody of a minor child until after an answer to
the petition has been filed or when the period to file the same have expired and no such answer was filed in court.

Temporary Protection Order

Judge Trocino's contention that the TPO was a temporary protection order pursuant to A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, and not
an order of temporary custody as contemplated in A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, is not tenable.

Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides:

SEC. 15. Ex parte issuance of temporary protection order. - (a) If the court is satisfied from the verified allegations of
the petition that there is reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against women and their
children exists or is about to recur, the court may issue ex parte a temporary protection order which shall be effective
for thirty days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined.

x x x. [Emphasis supplied]
Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262 further provides:
SEC. 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. - The application for a protection order must be in writing, signed and
verified under oath by the applicant. It may be filed as an independent action or as an incidental relief in any civil or
criminal case the subject matter or issues thereof partakes of a violence as described in this Act. A standard
protection order application form, written in English with translation to the major local languages, shall be made
available to facilitate applications for protection orders, and shall contain, among others, the following information:
(a) names and addresses of petitioner and respondent;

(b) description of relationships between petitioner and respondent;

(c) a statement of the circumstances of the abuse;

(d) description of the reliefs requested by petitioner as specified in Section 8 herein;

(e) request for counsel and reasons for such;

(f) request for waiver of application fees until hearing; and

(g) an attestation that there is no pending application for a protection order in another court.
If the applicant is not the victim, the application must be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting to (a)
the circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the circumstances of consent given by the victim for the
filing of the application. When disclosure of the address of the victim will pose danger to her life, it shall be so stated in
the application. In such a case, the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in the municipality or city over which
court has territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing address for purposes of service processing.

An application for protection order filed with a court shall be considered an application for both a TPO and PPO.
Barangay officials and court personnel shall assist applicants in the preparation of the application. Law enforcement
agents shall also extend assistance in the application for protection orders in cases brought to their
attention.[Emphasis supplied]
A protection order is issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs.[23] It is issued for the purpose of safeguarding the offended
party from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of
the victim to independently regain control over her life.[24] A protection order may be issued ex parte if the court finds
that there is danger of domestic violence to the offended party. This provisionary protection order, however, may be
issued only if the court finds that the life, limb or property of the offended party is in jeopardy and there is reasonable
ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of violence
or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.[25] If after examining the verified petition and its accompanying
affidavits the court is satisfied that there is, indeed, a reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against the offended party exists or is about to recur, it may issue a TPO ex parte.[26]

In the case at bar, a reading of the petition for child custody filed by Peña would show that no specific allegation of
violence or abuse, whether physical, emotional or psychological was committed or was about to be committed against
Henri. Not even the affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition supported his positions. The averments in the
petition that complainant was suffering from personality disorder, that she subjected Henri to psychological violence as
she would always shout at the helpers, and that complainant always leave Henri to the yaya, to name a few, are not
sufficient bases to issue the TPO.
Moreover, a perusal of the Verification with Certification of Non- forum Shopping[27] attached to the petition for child
custody would reveal that a similar case for protection order and child custody, docketed as Civil Case No. MC05-
2779, was filed by complainant against Peña before the RTC- Mandaluyong City. Considering that there was such a
declaration, it behooves upon Judge Trocino to inquire first about the nature and the status of the said pending case
before taking cognizance of the case and eventually issue the TPO.

In fact, the December 23, 2005 TPO was eventually annulled and set aside by the CA in its Decision[28] dated
September 15, 2006. In the same decision, Civil Case No. 1409 was likewise dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
petition for protection order and child custody. The CA held that Judge Trocino gravely abused his discretion when he
issued the December 23, 2005 TPO awarding the custody of parties' common child to Peña. It ruled that since the
RTC-Mandaluyong City had already taken cognizance of the petition for protection order and child custody, it
exercises jurisdiction thereon to the exclusion of all other courts. Hence, the RTC-Mandaluyong City has exclusive
jurisdiction over said petition and no other petition involving the same subject matter may be filed before any other
court. The CA decision was affirmed by the Court in a Resolution,[29] dated June 20, 2007.

The Court has always reminded judges to be extra prudent and circumspect in the performance of their duties. This
exalted position entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the law.[30] Though not every
judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative
sanction, the same, nonetheless, applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment.[31] Where the
procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err thereon
amounts to ignorance of the law.[32] In the case of Bautista v. Causapin Jr.,[33] the Court explained thus:
Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must
know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less. The mistake committed
by respondent Judge is not a mere error of judgment that can be brushed aside for being minor. The disregard of
established rule of law which amounts to gross ignorance of the law makes a judge subject to disciplinary action.[34]
Given the foregoing, Judge Trocino's actions cannot be considered a mere error in judgment that can be easily
ignored. His act of issuing the questioned TPO is not a simple lapse of judgment but a blatant disregard of the basic
rules on child custody and the rule on the issuance of a protection order. As held by the Court in a number of cases, a
patent disregard of the basic legal commands embodied in the law and the rules constitutes gross ignorance of the
law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.[35]

Verily, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.[36] A judge owes it to himself and his office to know by heart the basic legal principles and relevant
doctrines.[37] It is highly imperative that he be conversant with them because when a judge displays an utter lack of
familiarity with the laws and rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts.[38]

Previous Record; Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is a
serious charge, punishable by dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.[39] In the consolidated cases of Department of Justice v. Judge Mislang[40] and Home Development
Mutual Fund v. Judge Mislang,[41] the respondent judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and was
dismissed from the service considering that he was previously found administratively liable in two cases. The Court
held that despite previous warnings that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely, he
still continued to transgress the norm of judicial conduct.

Similarly, the records show that Judge Trocino was previously found administratively liable on two (2) cases for undue
delay in rendering judgments. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1936,[42] Judge Trocino was suspended for three (3) months; while
in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2057,[43] he was fined in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

Doubtless, Judge Trocino's infraction on this instance would have warranted the ultimate penalty of dismissal had he
not compulsory retired from the service effective July 15, 2006.

Consequently, considering the past infractions of Judge Trocino, the Court finds that the OCA's recommended penalty
of fine in the amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) is disproportionate to the present charge which he was
found guilty of.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Ret. Judge Henry J. Trocino, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Bago City,
Negros Occidental, GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law. In lieu of dismissal from the service, the Court imposes
the penalty of FORFEITURE of all his retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.

SO ORDERED.
 29. June 6, 2017

A.M. No. p-06-2279

MAURA JUDAYA and ANA AREVALO, Complainants

vs.
RAMIRO F. BALBONA, Utility Worker I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Respondents

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is an Amended Affidavit1 dated May 29, 2006 filed by complainants Maura Judaya and Ana
Arevalo (complainants) against respondent Ramiro F. Balbona (respondent), Utility Worker I, Office of the Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (R TC), for Grave Misconduct.

The Facts

In the Amended Affidavit, complainants alleged that they are the mother and live-in partner, respectively, of one Arturo
Judaya (Arturo), who was arrested purportedly for the use of illegal drugs. Complainants were then told that
respondent could facilitate Arturo's release in exchange for ₱30,000.00. Thus, at 9:30 in the morning of February 24,
2005, complainants went to the Palace of Justice, Capitol, Cebu City to deliver the said amount to respondent, who
then assured them that he would help secure Arturo's release. Respondent, however, failed to perform his
undertaking; thus the demand to return the money. Out of the ₱30,000.00, respondent only returned ₱2,500.00 to
complainants; hence, the instant complaint.2

In his defense, respondent essentially denied the accusations against him, maintaining that as a mere utility worker,
he could not in any way facilitate the release of a detention prisoner. He likewise denied personally knowing
complainants and receiving money from them. In this relation, respondent pointed out that he is stationed at the Cebu
City Palace of Justice, while the case of Arturo was pending at Branch 55 of the RTC, which was located in Mandaue
City. Finally, respondent asserted that it is contrary to human experience for complainants to simply hand over a large
amount of money to a complete stranger; that complainants' act of doing so for the release of a prisoner was illegal
and showed their lack of moral fitness; and that complainants have no one to blame but themselves for the
consequences of their act.3

In light of the seriousness of the accusations against respondent, the Court, as recommended by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), redocketed the case as a regular administrative matter and referred the same to the
Executive Judge of the RTC for investigation, report, and recommendation.4

In a Report 5 dated December 21, 2015, the Executive Judge recommended respondent's dismissal on the ground of
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming of a Government Employee. It was disclosed that pending the instant
proceedings, respondent stopped reporting for work, had been declared absent without official leave (AWOL), had
resigned since September 20, 2007,6 and eventually, his position was occupied by another person. 7 Despite the
foregoing, the Executive Judge opined that the foregoing did not render the instant case moot and academic.8
Subsequently, it was found that respondent's act of receiving money from complainants on the pretext that the latter
will obtain a favorable ruling constitutes Grave Misconduct for which he should be held administratively liable.9

The OCA's Report and Recommendation

In a Memorandum 10 dated October 19, 2016, the OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of Grave
Misconduct, an offense punishable by dismissal from service under Section 2 (e ), Canon III, of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel. 11 It found substantial evidence showing that respondent indeed solicited and received money
from complainants. However, since such penalty could no longer be imposed on respondent due to his separation
from service during the pendency of the investigation against him, the OCA recommended that he be, instead, meted
the accessory penalties appurtenant to the same, namely: cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits; and perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from taking civil service examinations. 12

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for
Grave Misconduct.

The Court's Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of the OCA. Preliminarily, it is worthy to emphasize that the
precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from service does
not render moot the administrative case against him. The Court's pronouncement in Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr. 13 is
instructive on this matter, to wit:

In [OCA] v. Juan [(478 Phil:" 823, 828-829 [2004])], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a
government employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the
administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing
administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability
to which he or she shall still be answerable.

A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the
petitioner's separation from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions - that of
separation from service - may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be
imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification
to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.

Moreover, this Court views with suspicion the precipitate act of a government employee in effecting his or her
separation from service, soon after an administrative case has been initiated against him or her. An employee's act of
tendering his or her resignation immediately after the discovery of the anomalous transaction is indicative of his or her
guilt as flight in criminal cases. 14 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Here, the Executive Judge of the RTC and the OCA correctly pointed out that respondent's failure to report for work,
which eventually caused him to be declared in AWOL, and his resignation during the pendency of the investigation
against him did not render this administrative case moot and academic, especially so that he is being charged with an
offense punishable by dismissal from service.

In this light, the Court shall now delve into respondent's administrative liability.

"Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer.1âwphi1 To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer's
official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of
the office. In order to differentiate [grave] misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent
to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former." 15

In order to sustain a finding of administrative culpability for such offense, only substantial evidence is required, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 16

A judicious review of the records of this case reveals substantial evidence showing that respondent indeed solicited
and received the amount of ₱30,000.00 from complainants, on the pretext that he will facilitate the release of the
latter's relative who is a detention prisoner. This is a direct violation of Section 2, Canon I and Section 2 (e), Canon III
of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, 17 which respectively read:

CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY

xxxx

Section 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit or implicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.

CANON III
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

xxxx

Section 2. Court personnel shall not:

xxxx

(e) Solicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favor, hospitality or service under circumstances from which it
could reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor is to influence the court personnel in performing official
duties.
In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently held that the acts of soliciting and receiving money from litigants for
personal gain constitute Grave Misconduct, for which the court employee guilty thereof should be held administratively
liable, 18 as in this case.

Anent the proper penalty to be" imposed on respondent, the Court notes that Grave Misconduct is classified as a
grave offense punishable by dismissal from service for the first offense. 19 "Corollary thereto, the penalty of dismissal
from service carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b)
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any; and (c) perpetual disqualification from
re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled
corporation or government financial institution." 20 In this instance, since respondent had earlier resigned, the penalty
of dismissal from service could no longer be imposed. Nevertheless, such penalty should be enforced in its full course
by imposing the aforesaid administrative disabilities upon him.21

As a final note, "[i]t must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people's confidence in it.
The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor
condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish,
the faith of the people in the justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who
undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of
the public."22

WHEREFORE, respondent Ramiro F. Balbona, former Utility Worker I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, is found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and would have been DISMISSED from service, had he not
earlier resigned. Accordingly, his civil service eligibility is hereby CANCELLED, his retirement and other benefits,
except accrued leave credits, are FORFEITED, and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government
financial institution.

SO ORDERED.
 30. June 19, 2017

A.M. No. P-17-3709

JUDGE CELSO O. BAGUIO, Complainant

vs.
JOCELYN P. LACUNA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, GAPAN CITY,
NUEVA ECIJA, Respondent

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative matter stemmed from a letter-complaint 1 filed by Judge Celso O. Baguio (Judge Baguio),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija (RTC), charging respondent Jocelyn
P. Lacuna (respondent), Stenographer III of the same court, with gross incompetence.

In his letter-complaint, Judge Baguio alleged that on January 25, 2013, the RTC had to reset the scheduled initial trial
of Criminal Case No. 14405-10, entitled People of the Philippines v. Jason Ondrade, for failure of respondent to
transcribe and submit the stenographic notes of the pre-trial proceedings held on November 16, 2012. As a result, she
was directed to immediately transcribe the same in an Order 2 dated January 25, 2013, and ordered to submit a
written explanation why she should not be held administratively liable for her failure to perform her job in accordance
with the rules. 3 While respondent apologized for her incompetence in a letter 4 dated January 28, 2013, she
nonetheless claimed that the resetting of the case was not solely due to her failure to perform her task but also in view
of the absence of the witness for the prosecution. Judge Baguio further claimed that despite having been previously
suspended for a similar offense in A.M. No. P-11-2933 (formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2674-P), 5 respondent did not
improve, and that her proficiency as stenographer was doubtful given that she relied solely on tape recordings for the
past fifteen (15) years. He pointed out that the incident complained of was just one of the many similar incidents
involving respondent's dismal failure to perform her tasks, which resulted in the cancellation of hearings and caused
embarrassment to the court. Nevertheless, Judge Baguio remarked that respondent has an almost perfect attendance
and that she behaved well in court although she mostly tended to keep to herself and was always very quiet. 6

In the 1st Indorsement 7 dated March 4, 2013 issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), respondent was
directed to comment on the letter-complaint dated January 28, 2013.

In her Comment 8 dated April 15, 2013, respondent admitted having failed to transcribe the stenographic notes of the
pre-trial held on November 16, 2012. However, she contended that her omission was not due to her gross inefficiency
but rather, due to simple oversight or inadvertence on her part. She explicated that the court regularly scheduled
hearings three (3) times a week, with the bulk of the criminal cases heard every Tuesday and Friday, and that the date
complained of was a Friday, during which there were many criminal cases scheduled for hearing at that time. She
added that there were only three (3) stenographers in Branch 34 and each of them took turns in their duty at least
once a week, transcribing not only stenographic notes of pre-trial and trials, but also encoded orders of the court. She
clarified that her apology should not be viewed as an admission of her incompetence, and further denied that she
solely relied on tape recordings. Likewise, she contended that her regular attendance was a manifestation of her
enthusiasm to not only cope with her work load but also her willingness to improve in the performance of her official
functions. Accordingly, she prayed that the complaint be dismissed or if found guilty, that her penalty be mitigated. 9

On September 11, 2015, the OCA recommended that the administrative complaint be referred to the Executive Judge
of the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija for investigation, report and recommendation.10

In a Report and Recommendation 11 dated March 2, 2017, Executive Judge Ana Marie C. Joson-Viterbo
recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay, having been found
guilty only of simple neglect of duty. 12 The Executive Judge noted that respondent admittedly failed to timely
transcribe half of her stenographic notes within the period prescribed prior to January 25, 2013 (the date of the
incident complained of) but nonetheless completed the same before the next scheduled hearing of the cases, and that
the primary cause for the delay was her slow performance despite her noticeable hard work. Since the investigation
showed that respondent has significantly improved, and in fact, exerted efforts to fulfill her duties within the prescribed
time, the Executive Judge found respondent not to have acted in bad faith and therefore guilty of simple neglect of
duty only. Accordingly, the Executive Judge recommended the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay after
considering her previous infraction for a similar offense, 13 the twenty-one (21) years of public service, and
complainant's admission that her working habits had greatly improved. 14

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for simple neglect of
duty.
The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the Executive Judge's recommendation to be in accord with the law and the facts of the case and
thus, adopts and approves the same except as to the imposable penalty.

The duties of a Stenographer are clearly embodied under Section 17, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 17. Stenographer. - It shall be the duty of the stenographer who has attended a session of a court either in the
morning or in the afternoon, to deliver to the clerk of court, immediately at the close of such morning or afternoon
session, all the notes he has taken, to be attached to the record of the case; and it shall likewise be the duty of the
clerk to demand that the stenographer comply with said duty. The clerk of court shall stamp the date on which such
notes are received by him. When such notes are transcribed the transcript shall be delivered to the clerk, duly initialed
on each page thereof, to be attached to the record of the case. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Under the afore-cited provision, stenographers are enjoined to immediately deliver to the clerk of court all the notes
taken during the session of the court, which are to be attached to the record of the case. In this regard, Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 24-9015 requires stenographers to transcribe their notes and attach the transcripts
to the record of the case within a period of twenty (20) days from the time they were taken, thus:

2. (a) All stenographers are required to transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts to the record of
the case not later than twenty (20) days from the time the notes are taken.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that respondent failed to comply with the twenty (20) day period in the transcription
of the stenographic notes for the Pre-Trial in Criminal Case No. 14405-10, and hence, guilty of violating Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 24-90. 15 The heavy work load proffered by respondent in her attempt to be
exonerated from liability is not an adequate excuse for her to be remiss in the performance of her duties. To allow
otherwise would permit every government employee charged with negligence and dereliction of duty to resort to the
same convenient excuse to evade punishment. 16

It bears stressing that a court stenographer performs a function essential to the prompt and fair administration of
justice. The conduct of every person connected with the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. All public officers are accountable to the people
at all time and must perform their duties and responsibilities with utmost efficiency and competence. 17 As
administration of justice is a sacred task, the Court condemns any omission or act which would erode public faith in
the judiciary. 18 A public office is a public trust, and a court stenographer, without doubt, violates this trust by failing to
fulfill his duties. 19

While respondent admitted to incurring delay in the performance of her duties, records show that she nonetheless
completed the same in time for the calendar of cases. Under the circumstances, her failure to timely transcribe the
stenographic notes was correctly found by the Executive Judge to constitute simple neglect of duty, which is defined
as a disregard of, or a failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee, simple neglect of duty
signifies carelessness or indifference. 20

Section 46 (D) of Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service 21 provides that simple
neglect of duty is categorized as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to
six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense. While the Court is duty
bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are undesirable,
the Court also has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy. 22 Thus, in several
administrative cases, the Court has restrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating facts,
such as, length of service in the judiciary, the acknowledgment of infractions and feelings of remorse, and family
circumstances, among others. 23 In this case, apart from respondent's long service in the government, it has been
observed during the administrative investigation, and as admitted by complainant, that the latter's working habits had
greatly improved and had since complied with her duties. 24

Accordingly, the Court finds the imposable penalty of three (3) months suspension without pay, instead of the six (6)
months penalty recommended by the Executive Judge, to be more fair and reasonable under the circumstances. It is
noteworthy to point out that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by the
employee ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. 25

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Jocelyn P. Lacuna GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. She is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months without pay and STERNLY WARNED to be more circumspect in the
performance of her duties, as a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy
of this Decision be entered in the 201 file of respondent Jocelyn P. Lacuna.

SO ORDERED.
 31. EN BANC
[ A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3987-RTJ), January 10, 2018 ]
PROSECUTOR LEO T. CAHANAP, COMPLAINANT, V. JUDGE LEONOR S. QUIÑONES, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 6, ILIGAN CITY, LANAO DEL NORTE, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:

Complainant Prosecutor Leo T. Cahanap (Complainant) filed the instant administrative complaint on October 30,
2012, charging respondent Judge Leonor S. Quinones (respondent Judge) with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross
Misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for the following alleged acts of respondent Judge:
First, Complainant alleged that in his last two (2) years as a prosecutor in Branch 6, he suffered unbearable and
intolerable oppression in the hands of respondent Judge.[1]

In the case of People v. Inot, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6-15566, respondent Judge got angry and objected to
the leading questions asked during complainant's re-direct examination, notwithstanding the fact that no objections
were raised by the defense counsel.[2]

In the case of People v. Badelles, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06- 15405, respondent Judge issued an order
blaming complainant for the failure of the forensic chemist to bring the chemistry reports for the other accused in the
case because complainant did not sufficiently specify the chemistry reports due to the court.[3] In the same case,
respondent Judge gave complainant a lecture on the proper demeanor and conduct in court while he was making a
formal offer of a testimony, causing extreme embarrassment to complainant.[4]

Complainant asserted that the prosecutors, who previously appeared before respondent Judge, opted to be assigned
to other courts as they too experienced humiliation and harsh treatment from her. Further, respondent Judge's staff
themselves were subjected to respondent Judge's insolent behavior.[5]

Second, Complainant further accused respondent Judge of habitual tardiness which delayed the start of court
sessions, usually at 9:30 or 10:00 in the morning, earning for her sala the monicker "Branch 10."[6]

Third, in the proceedings for the case of People v. Heck (Heck Case), docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 15144, 15149,
15151 and 15153 for Estafa, pending before respondent Judge's sala, respondent Judge, in open court and heard by
the public, asked private complainant, Hanna Mamad, to go to her house because she was interested in buying
jewelry items from her.[7]

Respondent Judge ordered her staff to provide Mamad with directions to her house.[8] Complainant averred that when
he called Mamad on September 13, 2012, Mamad confirmed that respondent Judge bought jewelry from her. Court
personnel have also testified that respondent Judge showed off the jewelry she bought from Mamad.[9]

Fourth, in proceedings in the case of People v. Macapato (Macapato Case), docketed as Criminal Case No. 16089 for
Attempted Murder, respondent Judge issued an Order dated June 18, 2012, directing the release of accused
Dimaampao's vehicle despite the prosecution's written opposition on the ground that the vehicle has yet to be
presented as evidence in court and has yet to be formally offered before the court could acquire jurisdiction.[10]

Respondent Judge immediately set accused's subject motion for the release of accused Dimaampao's vehicle for
hearing a day after it was filed, in violation of the three-day notice rule.[11] The Transcript of Stenographic Notes
(TSN) of the hearing revealed that respondent Judge showed her bias and practically acted as defense counsel,
prompting the prosecution to move for the inhibition of respondent Judge.[12]

Fifth, in the case of People v. Tingcang (Tingcang Case), docketed as Criminal Case No. 6-6115 for Murder,
respondent Judge dismissed the case provisionally without prejudice to its refiling upon the availability of the
prosecution's witnesses on the ground of speedy trial.[13] The prosecution lamented that the delay in the proceedings
was due to the absence of the accused who has been in hiding since 1996.[14]

Sixth, in the case of People v. Casido (Casido Case), docketed as Criminal Case No. 6-16034, respondent Judge
dismissed a complaint for Attempted Murder due to the absence of a fatal wound on the victim, which the prosecution
believed to be misplaced in an information for Attempted Murder.[15]

Seventh and lastly, complainant averred that respondent Judge also mistreated her court staff. On July 29, 2011,
respondent Judge allegedly shouted at a court stenographer, and called her "bogo" which meant dumb.[16]

Respondent Judge berated another stenographer and shouted at the latter ''punyeta ka"[17] and "buwisit ka"[18].

Comment dated January 12, 2013 of respondent Judge

Respondent Judge, in her Comment dated January 12, 2013, denied that she maltreated the prosecutors assigned to
her sala. In support thereof, she submitted the following documents:

1)
Certification[19] dated January 3, 2013 issued by OIC-Provincial Prosecutor Diosdado D. Cabrera, stating that
Prosecutor Macacuna B. Macadatu requested for transfer for security reasons, not due to respondent Judge's
maltreatment;

2)
Letter[20] dated March 22, 2011 to former Secretary Leila M. De Lima by Prosecutor Macacuna B. Macadato,
requesting for transfer of assignment from Iligan City to the Prosecutor's Office in Marawi City, due to a threat to his
life;

3)
Affidavit[21] dated December 18, 2012 executed by Prosecutor Mangontawar M. Gubat, proving that he declined to be
the trial prosecutor in respondent Judge's sala for health reasons, not due to the insolent behavior of respondent
Judge; and

4)
Joint Affidavit[22] dated January 3, 2013 by Public Attorneys Nur Jaypha R. Bacaraman and Rashid A. Macarimbang,
attesting that their re-assignment or subsequent transfer to other branches of the RTC in Iligan City is a matter of
policy in their office, with due consideration to the caseloads of individual lawyers in the district or the balancing of
work assignment, not due to the reported misbehavior of respondent Judge.
Relative to the Heck Case, respondent Judge denied having asked jewelry from Mamad, the private complainant in
the subject case.[23]

Respondent Judge reasoned that she immediately acted on the motion of the defense in the Macapato Case because
an urgent motion is exempted from the three-day notice rule. She maintained that the motion was granted and was
issued in good faith in the performance of judicial functions.[24]

Respondent Judge also insisted that her order of dismissal in the Tingcang Case was issued in good faith in the
performance of her judicial functions.[25]

Respondent Judge admitted her mistake in the Casido Case, averring that the finding of lack of probable cause on the
basis of absence of a 'fatal injury' was an error but an error of judgment made in good faith.[26]

In response to the allegation that she unduly interfered in the court proceedings, respondent Judge explained that she
merely reminded lawyers of the purpose of enforcing the rules and to elicit evidence with sufficient probative value to
help in the search for truth. She maintained that she was just helping the prosecution and/or lawyers to propound
questions to the witnesses whenever she found it necessary to clarify matters.[27]

On her alleged offensive and disrespectful attitude towards her staff, respondent Judge denied being oppressive to
her staff. She claimed that she merely rebuked or admonished them in the exercise of her supervisory authority.[28]

Respondent Judge also admitted arriving late to court but denied that her tardiness was often or habitual. Assuming
arguendo that she was habitually late, she countered that her sixty percent (60%) disposal rate of cases assigned to
her from June 2010 to November 2012 would refute the issue of punctuality hurled against her.[29]

OCA Resolution dated October 9, 2014

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the charges against respondent Judge relative to the
issuance of the (1) Order dated June 18, 2012 in the Macapato Case, (2) Order dated June 18, 2012 in the Tingcang
Case for the dismissal of the case on the ground of violation of the accused's right to speedy trial, and (3) Order
relative to the Casido Case, dismissing the same for lack of probable cause, be dismissed for involving issues judicial
in nature which are beyond the purview of an administrative proceeding.[30]

The OCA reasoned that a party's remedy, if prejudiced by the orders of a judge given in the course of a trial, lies with
the proper reviewing court, not with OCA by means of an administrative complaint.[31] It must be understood that the
statutory mandate of the OCA extends only to the administrative supervision over court officials and personnel and
does not include the authority to interfere with the judicial prerogatives of a judge to try and resolve a case and its
pending incidents. For the OCA to review the merits underlying each decision and order issued by respondent Judge
would result in a re-evaluation of his exercise of his judicial discretion which is definitely beyond the OCA's authority.
These are clearly matters for judicial adjudication.[32] It has been stressed that questions judicial in nature ought to be
threshed out in a judicial proceeding and definitely not in an administrative one.[33]
With respect however to the other charges, pertaining largely to the demeanor of respondent Judge, the OCA found
that the same appear to be serious.[34] However, because of the conflicting versions presented by the parties, there
exist factual issues that cannot be resolved merely on the basis of the records at hand, and can be ventilated only in a
formal investigation where the parties can adduce their respective evidence.[35]

The OCA thus recommended that the remaining charges filed against respondent Judge be referred to the Executive
Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, for raffle among the Justices thereat for investigation, report
and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.[36]

In a Resolution[37] dated February 11, 2015, the Third Division of the Court adopted the recommendations of the
OCA.

Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the OCA's Report dated October 9, 2014, which was denied by the
Court in a Resolution[38] dated July 1, 2015.

Report dated July 13, 2015 of Investigating Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh

Investigating Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh (Investigating Justice) recommended that respondent Judge be held
administratively liable for Oppression with a fine of P40,000.00 and Habitual Tardiness with a fine of P20,000.00.[39]

The Investigating Justice also recommended that respondent Judge be transferred to a different court considering the
irremediably strained relations between respondent Judge and the court staff;[40] and that the names of certain
witnesses be blocked from the decision that the Court will render in this case.[41]

The testimonies of the court staff witnesses and the Branch Clerk of Court uniformly pointed to the habitual tardiness
of respondent Judge in coming to work and holding court hearings, which they consistently testified to as generally
starting between 9:00 and 9:30 in the morning.[42] In the judicial affidavit of complainant, he attested that during his
time as the public prosecutor in respondent Judge's sala, respondent Judge started court hearings at 9:30 a.m.,
instead of 8:30 a.m.[43] The successor of complainant, Assistant City Prosecutor Diaz, also confirmed that respondent
Judge commenced court sessions between 9:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.[44]

The testimonies of court staff witnesses also revealed that respondent Judge does not want to indicate in the Minutes
of the Proceedings the actual time court sessions start. A court staff testified that one of the court's casual employee
was once reprimanded by respondent Judge when she wrote in the Minutes of the Proceedings that the actual time of
arrival of respondent Judge was 9:30 a.m..[45] The Branch Clerk of Court even admitted under oath that the Minutes
of the Hearings and Notices indicate that court hearings start at 8:30a.m. instead of the actual time the hearings
commenced.[46]

Although the Minutes of the Proceedings in her court reflect that respondent Judge start court sessions regularly at
8:30 a.m., the uniform testimonies of the witnesses regarding respondent Judge's habitual tardiness, despite the risk
of being held administratively and criminally liable, constitute substantial evidence to hold respondent Judge liable.[47]

On the charge of Oppression, the Investigating Justice found that respondent Judge failed to show compassion,
patience, courtesy and civility to lawyers who appear before her in contravention of the mandates of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct which sets the high standards of demeanor before all judges must observe.

Respondent Judge displayed antagonistic behavior towards Atty. Basher Macapado, who appeared as defense
counsel in Criminal Case Nos. 15539, 15540 and 15541, during the hearing on May 14, 2012:

COURT:

Atty. Macapado, during the last hearing, it was Atty. Plando who appeared. These were already testified by this
witness. Next time, if you intend to do your cross-examination you better appear so you will not be wasting the court's
time and these were already testified to by the witness. Where is Atty. Plando?

ATTY. MACAPADO:

He is out of town Your Honor. As far as this is concerned Your Honor, this was not testified to by this witness.
COURT: It is your question (Presiding Judge banging the gavel). What is your question before this?

ATTY. MACAPADO:

I am asking about the confirmatory test.

COURT:
That was testified already. Listen! (banging the gavel again and raising her voice).

ATTY. MACAPADO:

That was testified (interrupted)

COURT:

You listen! (banging the gavel again)

ATTY. MACAPADO:

Yes Your Honor, I am listening.

COURT:

I will contempt you. That was already taken during the last hearing when Atty. Plando appeared and this time you
were asking the same question.

ATTY. MACAPADO:

Yes Your Honor because what this witness have testified is about confirmation and this object was not presented to
the court Your Honor.

COURT:

You are out of order Atty. Macapado. Next time before you appear you ask Atty. Plando a copy of the previous
transcript so that there will be no redundancy. Have you read or are you aware?

ATTY. MACAPADO:

Yes Your Honor because the two of us appeared.

COURT:

Are you sure of that?

ATTY. MACAPADO:

Yes Your Honor.

COURT:

But that was already taken during the last hearing.

ATTY. MACAPADO:

I am only asking the witness about this object Your Honor and this was not presented during the last hearing.

COURT:

But you were asking, what IS confirmatory test and that was already taken.

ATTY. MACAPADO:

Yes Your Honor because she mention it now.

COURT:

Proceed now.[48]

Through the filing of a Manifestation, Atty. Macapado apologized to the court for the incident which happened during
the hearing on May 14, 2012 but prayed for respondent Judge to extend a little respect to all lawyers who appear
before her court in the presence of their respective clients and other litigants.[49]
As evidenced by the TSN taken on January 25, 2011, respondent Judge also engaged in an argument in open court
with a certain Atty. Gerardo Padilla who appeared as defendants' counsel in Civil Case No. 06-7010.[50] Atty. Padilla
found the behavior of respondent Judge antagonistic[51] which led to the exchange of words between respondent
Judge and Atty. Padilla who was prompted to utter the words "xxx you can do your worst and I will do my best"[52] to
respondent Judge, maintaining civility towards the court despite the exchange.

Complainant and Assistant City Prosecutor Diaz also experienced the same antagonistic and hostile behavior from
respondent Judge which caused them embarrassment in open court as shown in the TSNs submitted by complainant.
Complainant was scolded by respondent Judge in open court on September 10, 2012 for his failure to properly
address the court.[53] On November 4, 2014, ACP Diaz felt humiliated when respondent Judge admonished her also
in open court because respondent Judge felt displeased with ACP Diaz's reaction and alleged disrespectful behavior
which led ACP Diaz to cry and made her unable to continue with the presentation of her witness.[54]

The Investigating Justice reasoned that if respondent Judge felt that complainant or any other lawyer must be
admonished for his/her behavior or unpreparedness in court, respondent Judge could have called them privately to
approach the bench or even in chambers to scold him/her, but certainly not to embarrass them in front of their clients
and other litigants as the same may also cause shame to the court, if an argument ensues, and will directly affect the
professional and personal lives of all involved. These incidents highlighted respondent Judge's lack of temperance
and self-restraint which taints her impartiality in making decisions in the eyes of the public.[55]

To make matters worse, respondent Judge also exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge when she shouted at a
court staff in her chambers while correcting the court staffs draft orders which she dictated in open court and called
the court staff, "bogo ba nimo" (you are dumb or stupid).[56] Although respondent Judge and the court staff were
alone in the chambers, the court staff felt humiliated as she was berated for fifteen (15) minutes and she cried when
she went to the staff room.[57]

Another court staff also experienced being berated and humiliated by respondent Judge. In correcting the court staffs
eleven (11) draft orders, respondent Judge humiliated her by repeatedly pointing at her mistakes in an elevated voice
in the presence of a friend of respondent Judge, who happened to be a party in a civil case pending before their
court.[58] Nearly in tears, the court staff went out of the chambers and told her co-workers that she would no longer
help in drafting orders in bail bond applications so she could concentrate on her drafts.[59] Respondent Judge found
court staffs reaction to be improper, so respondent Judge followed her to the staff room and continued to scold her in
front of the other staff members, and even called for an emergency staff meeting[60] where respondent Judge even
called the court staff "punyeta ka, buwisit ka" in front of the other staff.[61]

The Investigating Justice emphasized in her Report that judges are expected to observe courtesy and civility at all
times in addressing lawyers, litigants and witnesses appearing in his/her sala[62] considering that judges must act
beyond reproach to maintain the court's integrity and public confidence in the judicial system.[63]

The Investigating Justice also said that respondent judge's belligerent, oppressive and tyrannical behavior towards her
court staff and lack of courtesy, civility and self-restraint towards lawyers and litigants during court hearings cannot be
treated with leniency. The Investigating Justice added that public confidence in the judiciary must be maintained and
the tenets on the first duty of judges to conduct themselves beyond reproach must be safeguarded.[64]

OCA Report dated October 26, 2015

The OCA, in their Report dated October 26, 2015, agreed and adopted the findings of the Investigating Justice.

Apart from Complainant, three (3) court staff testified to the habitual tardiness of respondent Judge who began the
court hearings between 9:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.[65] A former assistant City Prosecutor also confirmed that she
commenced court sessions at the said time.[66] The testimonies of her staff also revealed that she did not want to
indicate in the Minutes of the Proceedings the actual time when court sessions started.[67] It was also revealed that a
casual employee was once reprimanded by respondent Judge when the employee wrote in the Minutes that the actual
time of arrival of respondent Judge was 9:30a.m., as corroborated by the testimony of another court staff.[68]

Respondent Judge unquestionably failed to observe the prescribed official hours as repeatedly enjoined by the
Court.[69] She admitted being late "sometimes" in arriving to the court and beginning the court hearings as rebuffed
by contrary evidence.[70] Facing the risk of being administratively and criminally held liable, respondent Judge's own
branch clerk of court even bravely testified that court sessions commenced between 9:00a.m. and 10:00 a.m.
although the Minutes of the Proceedings reflected the time at 8:30 a.m..[71]

The OCA also found that respondent Judge failed to show compassion, patience, courtesy and civility to lawyers who
appear before her in contravention of the mandates of the Code of Judicial Ethics, which sets the high standards of
demeanor all judges must observe.[72]
The OCA pointed out that one significant aspect that became apparent during the investigation is respondent Judge's
competence in the performance of her duties.[73] True, she was exonerated in the instant complaint because the
issues raised were judicial in nature and in another case for grave abuse of discretion, dishonesty and partiality for
lack of merit.[74] But, as testified to by witnesses, respondent Judge did not personally prepare the court's orders,
resolutions and decisions; she did not know the details of some cases before her; and she does not possess
proficiency in English.[75] Yet, respondent Judge remained intractable and would not own up to her mistakes and
shortcomings.[76]

The OCA held that respondent Judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct for her repeated acts of oppression
against lawyers and court staff (gross misconduct) which constitute serious charge pursuant to Rule 140, Section 8 of
the Revised Rules of Court punishable by dismissal, suspension from office for more than three (3) to six (6) months
or a fine of more than P20,000.00 to P40,000.00.[77]

The OCA also held that respondent Judge is also guilty of habitual tardiness which is a less serious charge sanctioned
by either suspension from office for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.[78]

The OCA noted that the penalties that may be imposed on respondent Judge may be mitigated by her being a first
offender as she has never been previously sanctioned.[79] She has also offered her apology.[80] One staff member
said that she would sometimes show motherly care and compassion towards her staff.[81] Further, her "temper
explosions" are no longer as frequent as before.[82]

Anent Justice Singh's recommendation that respondent Judge be transferred to a different court considering the
strained relations between respondent Judge and the court staff, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be
given a fair chance to change her unpleasant attitude and behavior.[83] The OCA averred that, with this present
administrative case, her court staff have now become emboldened and are no longer afraid to speak up.[84] They can
easily initiate another complaint against respondent Judge if circumstances warrant.[85] As a deterrent against future
abuses, the OCA proposed that a periodic report be submitted to the OCA to apprise the OCA of any untoward
incident involving respondent Judge in her dealings with her court staff and the public.[86]

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA.

The Court has time and again reminded the members of the bench to faithfully observe the prescribed official hours to
inspire public respect for the justice system. It has issued Supervisory Circular No. 14 dated October 22, 1985,
Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987, and Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 to reiterate the trial
judges' mandate to exercise punctuality in the performance of their duties.

Section 5 of Supervisory Circular No. 14 issued by the Court on October 22, 1985 states:

5. Session Hours. - Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall hold daily sessions from Monday to Friday, from 8:30 to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. assisted
by a skeletal force, also on rotation, primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters. (Emphasis supplied)

Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987 entitled, "Guidelines m the Administration of Justice" provides that:

Guidelines for Trial Courts

xxxx

Punctuality and strict observance of office hours. - Punctuality in the holding of scheduled hearings is an imperative.
Trial judges should strictly observe the requirement of at least eight hours of service a day, five hours of which should
be devoted to trial, specifically from 8:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 as required by par. 5 of the Interim
Rules issued by Supreme Court on January 11, 1983, pursuant to Sec. 16 of BP 129. (Underscoring in the original)
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 entitled, "Strict Observance of Session Hours of Trial Courts
and Effective Management of Cases To Ensure Their Speedy Disposition," reiterates the mandate for trial judges to
exercise punctuality in the performance of their duties, thus:

To insure speedy disposition of cases, the following guidelines must be faithfully observed:

I.
The session hours of all Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall be from 8:30A.M. to noon and from 2:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M., from
Monday to Friday. The hours in the morning shall be devoted to the conduct of trial, while the hours in the afternoon
shall be utilized for (1) the conduct of pre-trial conferences; (2) writing of decisions, resolutions or orders, or (3) the
continuation of trial on the merits, whenever rendered necessary, as may be required by the Rules of Court, statutes,
or circular in specified cases.

xxxx

II.
Judges must be punctual at all times.

xxxx

IV.
There should be strict adherence to the policy on avoiding postponements and needless delay.

xxxx

VI.
All trial judges must strictly comply with Circular No. 38-98, entitled "Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No.
8493" ("An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of All Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes") issued by the Honorable Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa on 11 August 1998 and
which took effect on 15 September 1998.[87] (Italics supplied)
The aforesaid circulars are restatements of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which enjoin judges to be punctual in the
performance of their judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value, and that
if the judge is not punctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction in the
administration of justice.[88]

The OCA aptly found that the testimonies of the prosecutors and the court staff unquestionably proved that
respondent Judge failed to observe the prescribed official hours as repeatedly enjoined by the Court. Respondent
Judge's own branch clerk of court even testified that court sessions commenced between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.
although the Minutes of the Proceedings reflected the time at 8:30 a.m.[89]

The OCA also correctly observed that respondent Judge failed to show compassion, patience, courtesy and civility to
lawyers who appear before her in contravention of the mandates of the Code of Judicial Ethics, which sets the high
standards of demeanor all judges must observe.[90]

Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct clearly provides:

Section 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties,
witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to
the proper performance of such duties.

In relation to Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides that judges must always be courteous and
patient with lawyers, litigants and witnesses appearing in his/her court, thus:

Rule 3.04- A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants,
witnesses and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind
that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts to the litigants.

Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct likewise states:

Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction
or control.

The Court is convinced that respondent Judge is guilty of Oppression as shown in several incidents of misbehavior by
respondent Judge, some of which are stated below:

1)
Respondent Judge displayed antagonistic behavior towards Atty. Macapado who appeared as defense counsel in
three (3) criminal cases and who might have increased the tone of his voice in their verbal tussle. He filed with the
court apologizing for the incident but prayed for respondent Judge to extend a little respect to all lawyers who appear
before her court in the presence of their clients and other litigants.[91]
2)
Respondent Judge engaged in an argument in open court with a certain Atty. Gerardo Padilla who appeared as
defendants' counsel in Civil Case No. 06-7010.[92] Atty. Padilla found the behavior of respondent Judge antagonistic
which led to the exchange of words between respondent Judge and Atty. Padilla who was prompted to utter the words
"xxx you can do you worst and I will do my best"[93] to respondent Judge, maintaining civility towards the court
despite the exchange.

3)
Assistant City Prosecutor Diaz was humiliated by respondent Judge who admonished her also in open court because
respondent Judge felt displeased with ACP Diaz's reaction and alleged disrespectful behavior which led ACP Diaz to
cry and made her unable to continue with the presentation of her witness.[94]

4)
Respondent Judge exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge when she shouted at a court staff in her chambers while
correcting the court staffs draft orders which she dictated in open court and called the court staff, "bogo ba nimo" (you
are dumb or stupid).[95] Although respondent Judge and the court staff were alone in the chambers, the court staff felt
humiliated as she was berated for fifteen (15) minutes and she cried when she went to the staff room.[96]

5)
Another court staff also experienced being berated and humiliated by respondent Judge. In correcting the court staffs
eleven (11) draft orders, respondent Judge humiliated her by repeatedly pointing at her mistakes in an elevated voice
in the presence of a friend of respondent Judge, who happened to be a party in a civil case pending before their
court.[97] Nearly in tears, the court staff went out of the chambers and told her co-workers that she would no longer
help in drafting orders in bail bond applications so she could concentrate on her drafts.[98] Respondent Judge found
court staff's reaction to be improper, so respondent Judge followed her to the staff room and continued to scold her in
front of the other staff members, and even called for an emergency staff meeting[99] where respondent Judge even
called the court staff "punyeta ka, buwisit ka" in front of the other staff.[100]
The Court has previously ruled that "[a] display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of trial is a norm of
behavior incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge.''[101]

Thus, the Court finds the imposition of fines amounting to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) and Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00), appropriate given the prevailing facts of the present case vis-a-vis respondent Judge's record for
habitual malfeasance in office.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby finds respondent Presiding Judge Leonor S.
Quiñones, Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, Iligan City GUILTY of (1) Oppression (gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct) and FINED in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00); and (2)
Habitual Tardiness and FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

The Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, Iligan City) is hereby DIRECTED to SUBMIT a status
report on the working relationship in the court within fifteen (15) days from the end of each semester for two (2) years.

SO ORDERED.