Case No.

129
Balaoing vs. Calderon
A.M. No. RTJ-90-580
April 27, 1997
FACTS:

1. SEVERAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST BALAOING.

a. BALAOING vs. JUDGE DOJILLO

Balaoing was required to show why he should not be disciplinarily dealt

for suppressing certain material facts of which he was charged with knowledge
and for having engaged in forum-shopping.Balaoing’s motion for reconsideration
was denied, his explanation was declared unsatisfactory and he was severely
censured for having instituted a patently unfounded and frivolous admin action
and warned that the commission of same conduct will be dealt more severely.

b. BALAOING vs. JUDGE MALIWANAG

Grave misconduct for failure and regusal to issue corresponding write of

action (pending appeal) prayed for by complainant in his motion in civil case,
ZABALA vs. BUENO. Balaoing’s use of unsavory, defamatory and offensive
language against Judge brought dismissal to the complaint, 1-year
suspension and P1000 fine for violation of canons.

c. 2 MORE COMPLAINTS: CALDERON AND MALIWANAG.

BALAOING: filed complaint against CALDERON for grave abuse of

authority and malicious delay in administration of justice.CALDERON does
not follow the Circular and merely treats it as directory; practice of Judge to
automatically grant postponements and deferment of hearing of cases to a
later hour whenever his OIC makes a manifestation in open court that a
certain lawyer or party called up requesting that his case be postponed.Judge
drinks a lot and fraternizes openly.Delayed cases:Allowed defendants to keep
postponing hearings more than 1 year.Cahoots with deputy sheriff, unlawfully
prevented implementation of writ of Possession.Charged both CALDERON
AND OIC, MANIAGO with misconduct, grave abuse of authority and malicious
delay in admin of justice.OIC MANIAGO alleges BALAOING calling her
notorious, swindler, insane.CALDERON: Balaoing won a foreclosure case and
became the highest bidder in the public auction, Certificate of Sale was issued
 and registered.He prevented the writ of Possession dude to prejudice.
Gavilan’s widow (former owner), Alice and children were residing in the
properties; period to redeem the properties had not yet expired.When
redemption period elapsed, he issued write of possession but up to present
time, Balaoing has not yet taken possession and showed his disinterest.
MALIWANAG denied BALAOING allegation, judgment is based on equity and
justice against injustice by a lawyer on the unlearned and poor couple from
Baguio.
ISSUE:

WON Balaoing’s admin complaints hold merit? NO.

Is Balaoing guilty of gross misconduct? YES.

HELD:

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS DISMISSED. BALAOING DISBARRED.

1. CANON 11: Lawyer shall observe and maintain respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
a. Rule 11.03: Lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before Courts.
b. Rule 11.04: Lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported
by record or have no materiality to the case.
2. Complaints are based on his personal interpretation of the law and not on
material allegations of fact, substantiated by evidence. 
Case No. 130
Maceda vs. Vasquez
(G.R. No. 102781)
April 27, 1993

Facts:

Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera
alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all
civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days
have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in
fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10
criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that
petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

Issue:

Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an

encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held:

A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for
serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally
liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard
to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative

supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA
down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC
that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take
the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer
the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties.
Case No. 131
PEOPLE v. JARDIN
(G.R. No. L-33037-42, August 17, 1983)

FACTS:

The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter-complaint of the Provincial Auditor

of Quezon requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public
funds thru falsification of public documents on six counts. The cases were assigned to
Assistant Fisca lMeliton V. Angeles who set them for preliminary investigation. The
accused moved to postpone the investigation four times but the accused and his
counsel failed to appear every time. Inspire of their absence, the preliminary
investigation was conducted and shortly afterwards, the six information’s were filed
against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
The arraignment was set for May 9, 1967. On the records it was show that from May 9,
1967, the arraignment was re-set for June 6; then re-set for June 26; then from August
16, the same was re-set for September 5, all because of the motions for postponement
filed at the instance of the accused. When the arraignment of the accused was called
on September 5, 1967, counsel for the accused verbally moved for reinvestigation on
the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity to present his defense
during the preliminary investigation. This was granted by the court and the first
reinvestigation was set on November 24, 1967. Accused moved to postponement many
times, failed still to appear. When he finally appeared with his counsel, they asked for
15days to file memorandum. The memorandum was never filed, so the investigating
fiscal filed a manifestation before the court that the records of these cases be returned
and the trial on the merits of the same be set. The court transferred the case to new
branch of CFI Quezon without acting on manifestation. Arraignment date was set but
more postponements was filed at the instance of accused; moved for reinvestigation
again. Arraignment finally happened on Sept 8, 1970. Accused pleaded NOT GUILTY
and asked for trial to be postponed. On postponed date, accused asked for another
postponement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acts of the accused and his counsel obstruct the administration of
justice.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the dilatory tactics of the defense counsel and the failure
of both judge and the fiscal to take effective counter measures to obviate the delaying
acts constitute obstruction of justice. An attorney as an officer of the court is called
upon to assist in the due administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an
instrument to advance its cause. For this reason; any act on the part of a lawyer that
obstructs perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and
justifies disciplinary action against him. Acts which amount to obstruction in the
administration of justice may take many forms. They include such acts as instructing a
complaining witness in a criminal action not to appear at the scheduled hearing so that
the case against the client, the accused, would be dismissed. asking a client to plead
guilty to a crime which the lawyer knows his client did not commit, advising a client
who is detained for a crime to escape from prison prosecuting clearly frivolous cases or
appeals to drain the resources of the other party and compel him to submit out of
exhaustion and filing multiple petitions or complaints for a cause that has been
previously rejected in the false expectation of getting favorable action.
Case No. 132

ARTIAGA VS. VILLANUEVA

(163 SCRA 638,July 29, 1988) *** To follow powsss
Case No. 133
JAVELLANA VS. LUTERO
(G.R. No. L- 23956 , July 14, 1967)

Facts:
On March 1963, the Roman Archbishop in Jaro, Iloilo Filed detainer complaint against
Elpidio Javellana in the municipal court which was presided by Judge Nicolas
Lutero. The hearing was reset four times, all the behest of Elpidio Javellana’s Lawyer
who gave reasons as filmsy as a painful toe, or an unfinished business transactions on
Manila. This last postponement was granted by the municipal court, with a warning that
no further postponements shall be allowed. When the case was called for trial on
August 27, 1963, neither the defendant nor his counsel Atty. Hautea appeared although
one Atty. Romy Peña who was present in court verbally moved for the postponement of
the trial on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in Manila attending to a business
transaction. The Plaintiff’s counsel were well aware of the court’s previous admonition
that no further postponement of the case would be granted , and then manifested that
the witnesses and the evidence for the plaintiff were ready for presentation on that
date.

The Verbal motion was denied, and plaintiff was directed to adduce his evidence.
During the hearing, a telegram arrived from Atty. Hautea asking for a postponement of
the hearing. However, the hearing still continued. The court on the same date rendered
judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant.

About 50 days later, the defendant this same counsel filed a petition for relief (from the
judgment of the municipal court ) with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo , praying that
the decision in question be set aside, that the detainer case be set for trial on the
merits, and pending determination of the petition , that an injunction issue retraining
the enforcement of the decision. Counsel for the petitioner averred that his absence on
the date of the trial was excusable as he attended to a very urgent business transaction
in Manila; that before his departure for the latter city he verbally informed the
respondent judge that his return to Iloilo might be delayed and that he might arrive on
time for the trial of the case as set; that he called at both the law office and the
residence of the counsel for the private respondent to inform him of the desired
postponement and the reason therefor, but the latter as in Bacolod at the time; that he
exercised utmost diligence and precaution in the sense that while in Manila he sent a
telegram to the respondent Judge, asking for postponement ; and that notwithstanding
all the foregoing , the municipal court nevertheless proceeded with the trial in his
absence and that of his client, allowed the private respondent to present his evidence
ex parte, and rendered decision against petitioner , thus depriving the latter of his day
in court . Counsel for the petitioner further asserted that his client has a good and
substantial defense, which is, that the complaint had given his client an option to buy
premises subject-matter of the complaint below, and that a reopening of the case
would cause the private respondent no real injury .
Issue:

Whether or Not Atty. Hautea was negligent in his duties as a lawyer

Held:
A counsel for any part in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal
ethics, and with due regard for the elementary standards for fair play, is duty bound to
prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct Is no less
applicable in a detainer case, such as one at bar, even if the issues are essentially
simple and uncomplicated. It is obvious that the counsel for the petitioner –appellant
has been remiss in this respect
Case No. 134
Villasis VS. CA
(G.R. No. L- 34369,September 30, 1974)

FACTS:
An action for quieting of title with recover of possession and damages by the private
respondent was granted by CFI. Petitioner went to the CA, they were given 45 days to
submit their brief. However, they have failed to file their brief because of their counsel’s
utter inaction and gross indifference and neglect since receipt of due notice to file it.
They have change their counsel but the period of filing brief had already expired.

ISSUE:
WON Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared
himself on the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order
of its preferences. He should also be ready with the original documents for comparison
with the copies, have been violated.

RULING:
The appellate court gave them all the time and opportunity to duly prosecute their
appeal by filing their brief in the interval to no avail. The appellate court committed no
error therefore in dismissing the appeal. Petitioners-appellants have shown no valid and
justifiable reason for their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only
themselves to blame for their counsel's utter inaction and grow indifference and neglect
in not having filed their brief for a year since receipt of due notice to file the same.
Case No. 135
Macias VS. Uy kim
(G.R. No. L-31174, May 30, 1972)

Facts :

Petitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias field on DECEMBER 02, 1969 a petition for

review by certiorari against respondents Uy Kim,Andres Co, Nesemio CO,. Mauel
Sosantong , reliable Realty Corporation , And Brach x of the Manila court of first
instance . It Appearing from the complaint that there is presently pending in Branch
VIII of this Court Speciual proceeding No. 63866 for the settlement of the inheritance of
the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson. That the plaintiff claims to be a beneficiary by
hereditary title of her estate. It being unquestionable that the authority to distribute the
inheritance of the deceased person and determine the persons entitled thereto belongs
exclusively to the court or branch thereof taking cognizance of the proceedings of its
settlement (Brach VIII) in this case. The orders sought to be annulled and set aside by
herein petitioner-appellant
In his complaint against private respondents which was assigned to Branch X of the
Manila Court of the First Instance presided over by Judge Jose L. Moya., were issued by
Judge Barcelona presiding over Branch VIII of the same court. The petitioner field a
separate civil case in Branch X , seeks to recover his distributive share of the state of
the decedent Rosina.

Issue:
Whether or not the Judge of Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance can legally
interfere with, or pass upon the validity of said orders of the Judge of Branch VIII, as
the probate court

Held:

No, Branch VIII as the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of the
decedent, including the validity of the will, the declaration of heirs, the disposition of
the estate for the payment of its liabilities, and the distribution among the heirs of the
residue thereof. Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, “the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts. “Pursuant to this provision , therefore all questions
concerning settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should
be filed before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance , then presided over by
former Judge, now Justice of the Court Of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where Special
Proceedings NO. 63866 for settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina
Marguerite Wolfson was field and is still pending. The reason for this provision of the
Law is obvious. The settlement of the estate of a deceased person in court constitutes
but one proceeding. For the successful administration of that state it is necessary that
there should be but one responsible entity, one court, which should exercise have
exclusive control of every part of such administration. To entrust it to two or more
courts, each independent of the other, would result in confusion and delay. The Court
cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant herein to file several actions
covering the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief , which is
unduly burdening the courts.
Case No. 136

NELITA MORENO VDA. DE BACALING V HECTOR LAGUNA

(G.R. No. L-26694, DECEMBER 18, 1973)

FACTS:

Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a residential land situated at La Paz, Iloilo City. Many
years back, petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, with the acquiescence of
private respondent Laguda, constructed a residential house on a portion of said lot fronting
Huevana Street, paying a monthly rental of P80.00. Unable to pay the lease rental from July
1959 to September 1961, totalling P2,160.00, an action for ejectment was filed by private
respondent Laguda against petitioner in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the estate of
her late husband, Dr. Bacaling. The filing of said case spawned various court suits. Petitioner
suffered a series of legal reverses and ended up with a compromise agreement with the
respondent. Trial court approved the amicable settlement however the petitioner failed to
comply with the terms.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner is a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled to reimbursement, and/or
reasonable expenses that may be incurred in transferring the house to another place

HELD:

Petitioner's contention that she be considered a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled to
reimbursement in addition to reasonable expenses that may be incurred in transferring place,
the same cannot stand legal scrutiny. The rule is well-settled that lessees, like petitioner, are
not possessors in good faith, because they knew that their occupancy the premises continues
only during the life of the lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their
improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed . Their
rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement of lessees up
to one-half of the value of their improvements if the lessor so elects