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Brittle fracture - Stress States

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Metals and alloys generally have adequate gross ductility. However, under
certain conditions of stress-state strain rate and temperature, brittle
fracture can occur without a significant plastic flow prior to fracture. If
the part contains a flaw or crack, and a load is applied, the stresses and
strains at the crack tip are intensified. When these are increased to a
critical value called fracture toughness, KIC), the crack propagates and the
part fractures. Low values of KIC indicate ease of crack propagation.
The value of KIC in certain carbon and alloy steels shows an abrupt change in
a narrow temperature range which is called the ductile-brittle transition
temperature. Fracture above this transition temperature is predominantly
by movement of dislocations in slip planes and by microvoid coalescence.
The Pearls-Nabarrow lattice friction stress increases with decreasing
temperature, and, at temperatures below the ductile-brittle transition, K IC
becomes very low and fracture occurs by cleavage.
Consider the example of the brittle fracture of a steel storage tank used
to store I million bushels of corn (see Figure 4). The tank collapsed without
warning on a cold winter day when its wall split and was pushed outward by
the flow of corn. The tank was 49 m in diameter, 15 m tall, and was
constructed by welding 6 rings of steel plates. It had a 1.4-cm thick bottom
and a 2.1 by 2.1 m access door that was reinforced by a 1.9-cm thick steel
plate. Fracture occurred when the ambient temperature suddenly dropped
to about - 23' C. Chevron markings on fracture surfaces all indicated that
the crack began near a sharp rectangular corner of the reinforcing plate
weld joint at the top of the access door.
Laboratory investigations found that the steel plates used were in
conformance with the ASTM A283 Grade C carbon steel requirement. They
had 471-MPa tensile strength, 249-MPa yield strength, 34 percent
elongation, and 75- to 78-RB hardness. The weld joint was made by the
multi-pass fusion weld method and the weld metal exhibited little porosity,
a columnar grain structure, and 24-RC hardness. Scanning electron

fractography near the crack origin area showed a cleavage-type brittle


fracture with flat grain facets and a river pattern typical of a steel
fracture below the ductile-brittle transition temperatures (see Figure 5).
Attempts were made to determine the ductile-brittle transition
temperature of the steel using the Charpy V-notch impact test method,
and to determine the fracture toughness K IC with the center crack test
method using specimens machined from the tank wall. At the fracture
temperature of 23C, the impact energy for fracture measured 12 J with
0.1 percent lateral expansion. The fracture toughness KIC measured 59
MPa.m. The critical crack size was about 3.5 cm, which is close to the
value that can be predicted by fracture mechanics analysis.
Stress calculations indicated that the hydrostatic pressure stress at the
fracture origin area for the full tank load of corn, based on Rankine's
formula, was 128 MPa, and the vertical compressive stress due to steel
weight was 0.97 MPa. Thus, the allowable design stress was about 129 MPa,
or 3.6 times smaller than the fracture strength of steel. If we assume a
temperature gradient of about 22o C due to the sudden drop in ambient
temperature, the thermal stress that may develop on the tank wall would
be 45 MPa. The square-cut reinforcing plate can cause an additional stress
concentration, which was estimated as 2.0 by Roark's formulas. The total
stress including these factors is still below the load-carrying capacity of
steel. Fusion welding creates residual weld stress and when it is
superimposed on the local applied stress, the total can reach the fracture
stress of steel and initiate a crack. Once the crack was formed below the
ductile-brittle transition temperature, it propagated rapidly and caused the
catastrophic fracture of the storage tank.
It should be pointed out that because of the interrelation of the different
effects, the exact combination of stress, temperature, weld structure, and
flaws that will cause brittle fracture in a given steel structure cannot be
accurately calculated. Therefore, the general design practice is to select a
steel with an appropriate ductile-brittle transition temperature for the
application. This is common practice for the design of pressure vessels and
should have been followed in the design of this steel storage tank for cold
climate use. The court found the engineering company responsible for the
collapse of the storage tank and for damages.

Hydrogen-induced Cracking
Chemical attack and thermal effects can also cause brittle fractures in
metals and metal alloys. These effects include hydrogen-induced cracking,
stress-corrosion cracking, and cracking by structural change.
Hydrogen embrittlement occurs when high strength steels and certain
other alloys absorb excessive amounts of hydrogen in a variety of
environments, such as in the presence of hydrocarbons or hydrogen sulfide,
or during pickling in acids, plating, welding, and heat treating. If steels have
a flaw, hydrogen tends to diffuse to the stress concentration region and
can initiate cracking. The crack propagates in a brittle manner through
grain boundaries, giving a "rock-candy"-type fracture appearance.
A steel tank was fractured catastrophically in an oil refinery. The tank was
2.4 m in diameter, 18-m tall, and was constructed from 2.54cm thick steel
plate, in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, by
welding six cylindrical rings together between two ellipsoidal ends. it was
used to remove H.sub.2S from a propane/butane liquid mixture by the
counterflow of an aqueous solution of monoethanol amine. The hydrocarbon
liquid entered the tank near its bottom at 38' C and 1.4 MPa pressure, and
the amine solution entered at the top and exited at the bottom. The
H.sub.2S gas tended to collect in the lower part of the tank and produced
hydrogen blisters in the tank wall. After five years in service, the second
ring from the bottom was replaced by a new steel ring welded in place by
the shielded metal arc process. Two years later, the tank developed a leak
near the inlet valve and fractured catastrophically, causing an explosion and
fire, and extensive damage.
Field investigation indicated the fracture path followed the weld line of the
replacement ring. When the fracture surfaces were cleaned with high
pressure steam, it was noted that a black deposit extended from the inner
surface of the wall for nearly 30 percent of the circumference. Chemical
analysis showed the black deposit was rich in sulfur. Since it was formed
prior to fracture, it delineated the crack that existed at the time of final
rupture. This pre-existing crack was as deep as 2.36 em when the leakage
occurred.

Laboratory investigations indicated that the steel used was ASTM A5]6
Grade 70 carbon steel with 540-MPa tensile strength, 304-MPa yield
strength, and 29 percent elongation. Metallographic examination showed
the pre-existing crack was in the heat-affected zone of the repair weld
area and consisted of hard spots with 410 to 490 KHN.sub.500 (41 to 47
RC) hardness with martensitic structure. A typical scanning electron
micrograph of the pre-existing crack surface exhibited rock-candy"-type
brittle intergranular fracture generally associated with hydrogen-induced
cracking.
Operating pressure of 1.4 MPa in a steel tank 2.54-cm thick with a 2.4-m
diameter produced an axial stress of about 34 MPa. When the tank wall
thickness was reduced by a crack, the value of axial stress increased to
close to the value of the breaking stress of steel. The crack propagated
until it reached a critical size and the remaining thin, solid metal shell
fractured, causing leakage. At the same time, the through-crack continued
to grow. When it reached 80 cm, catastrophic crack propagation occurred.
Fracture mechanics analysis based on Irwin's empirical relation indicated
that the crack tip opening displacement (CTOD) was about 0.064 mm. Tests
conducted by the National Bureau of Standards using notched ASTM A516
steel plate specimens yielded a CTOD measurement of about 0. 17 mm.
Therefore, hydrogen embrittlement reduced the fracture resistance of
the steel by more than half.
It should be pointed out that special precautions are required in welding
ASTM A516 carbon steel plates to avoid hydrogen embrittlement. AWS
Di.1 Standards stipulate that low hydrogen-coated electrodes preheated to
22' C or higher must be used, and that these temperatures must be
maintained when welding 1.9 cm or thicker steel plates. Neglecting these
standard welding procedures appears to have been the primary cause for
the hard spots in the weld joint which resulted in hydrogen-induced
cracking of the steel tank.
Stress-Corrosion Cracking
Stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) is the acceleration of cracking from the
combined effects of stress and a corrosive environment. These stresses
can include residual stress due to fabrication, or a combination of residual

and operating stresses. Stress corrosion normally is initiated at several


sites by localized pitting or intergranular attack at the metal surface. It
continues slowly, and eventually a crack develops. The crack propagates
either between granules (intergranularly) or across them (transgranularly),
and when a critical size is reached the remaining solid metal ligament
ruptures by mechanical overloading. Crack propagation often is difficult to
see and detailed microscopic examination is necessary to confirm that the
fracture was indeed the result of SCC.
Many chemical, electrochemical, and mechanical mechanisms have been
suggested to interpret the features of stress-corrosion behavior of
metals. They include chemisorption of surface active species, as in liquid
metal embrittlement, fracturing of surface oxide films, anodically active
paths through dissolution, or formation of co-planar dislocation arrays.
The fracture of a steel cylinder by SCC is shown in Figure 1. The cylinder
was manufactured in accordance with Department of Transportation
Specification 178.36 (OT-3A480). It was made of seamless steel to handle
a 480-psi (33.6 kg/cm.sup.2) service pressure, and had 85-kg tare weight,
126-liter volume, 68-kg ammonia capacity, 38-cm outside diameter, and
5.58-mm wall thickness. It was used to supply anhydrous ammonia to a
blueprint machine. One day it exploded, discharging toxic fumes and hurling
pieces of steel some 10 meters across the room, causing property damage.
Laboratory investigations indicated that the fracture occurred
longitudinally with a fishmouth thick-lip fracture almost through the entire
length. Tensile tests indicated 415-MPa tensile strength, 276-MPa yield
strength, and 32 percent elongation. The cylinder was manufactured in
1938, was in good appearance, and was hydrostatically tested at five-year
intervals. The latest test was two years prior to the accident at 63 kg/cm
2 , and showed no permanent deformation. The ammonia vapor pressure at
room temperature is about 9 kg/cm 2, which can develop hoop stresses in
the cylinder wall (30 MPa) considerably below the stress developed by the
test pressure of 63 kg/cm.sup.2. It is clear that the cylinder wall thickness
was reduced by internal cracks to cause catastrophic failure.
Visual examination of the chevron pattern indicated that the fracture
began at the site of the maximum bulge in the cylinder wall (see Figure 2).

The wall at the fracture site had a reduced thickness (of about 4.4 mm as
compared to 5.58-mm normal thickness) resulting from a bulge and
exhibited a flat surface. The inner diameter edge at the fracture site had
a 1.0-mm deep layer with interference colors ranging from light yellow
brown to blue, followed by a rust color zone almost to the outer diameter
of about 10 cm in length. The inner diameter surface had longitudinal
microcracks with a depth of 2.5 mm; these microcracks extended
transgranularly (see Figure 3). Scanning electron micrographs of the
fracture initiation site showed transgranular cleavage and
radial microcracks.
Fracture mechanics analysis showed that at hydrotest pressures of 209
MPa, the cylinder could resist cracks 2.3-mm deep without fracture, and
could resist a critical through-crack size of 3.0 cm without crack
extension. Assuming that the rust region of fracture of about 10 cm in
length represents the critical crack size, the cylinder wall must have been
reduced in thickness to a very thin value (about 0.4 mm) after hydrotest
before catastrophic failure occurred.
The ammonia used was pure-grade with 33 ppm water content. (The DOT
requires that commercial grade ammonia cylinders contain 50 ppm or more
of water.) Addition of 0.08 wt percent of water was found to inhibit SCC.
It has been reported that carbon steels do not exhibit SCC in pure grade
ammonia unless it is contaminated with oxygen. The formation of an
oxygen-iron-ammonia film, along with fracturing by slip in the base metal,
was necessary for crack propagation.
The use of pure-grade, water-uninhibited liquid ammonia, failed to prevent
air contamination when filling the cylinders, and infrequent and improper
testing and inspection to detect microcracks were the contributing factors
in the catastrophic fracture of the steel cylinder.
In general, austenitic stainless steels exhibit excellent corrosion
resistance to many environments and are widely used in the process
industries. The chromium and nickel in steel provide an effective passive
layer and reduce the corrosion rate. Certain environments that reduce the
breakdown of passivity can initiate pitting, where cracks start in a pit and
propagate transgranularly. The low stacking fault energy favors the

formation of co-planar dislocation arrays and tends to increase solute atom


concentration at the crack tip, thus increasing the susceptibility of
austenitic stainless steels to stress corrosion.
Structural Change-induced Cracking
There is a strong relationship between the microstructure of metals and
alloys and the effect of environmental factors on crack propagation. Castiron underground pipes, for example, generally have a long service life.
However, when such a pipe is located in mildly corrosive soils that are
constantly moist or contain high calcium sulfate and chlorides, it is subject
to graphitic corrosion.
For example, a gray-iron underground water pipe 20 cm in diameter was
fractured after 20 years in service, causing flooding (see Figure 6).
Metallographic examination of the fractured section indicated the
presence of type B graphite flakes in pearlite and ferrite matrix. Graphitic
corrosion occurred, where the graphite in the pipe acted as a cathode and
iron was selectively leached out onto the outer diameter surface of the
pipe. The leaching process left a lacy porous residue that had the shape of
the original pipe, but practically no strength. The effective wall thickness
of the pipe was severely reduced, decreasing the pipe's ability to handle
loads. As a result, a slight external bending force (added to the pressure
of the water flowing through the pipe) was sufficient to cause a sudden
brittle fracture to occur.
This article is adapted from a paper presented at the ASME Winter Annual
Meeting, San Francisco, Calif., Dec. 10-15, 1989.

A283 does not have adequate toughness at the temperature you mention. A
temperature of -30F or -30C is not cryogenic, its just a low temperature.

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