Castillo Munoz 1

Pedro Castillo Munoz

Professor Lynda Haas
Writing 39C
May 10th, 2015
Equality Extended Beyond Humans: The Great Apes
For the last sixty years, primatologists have conducted research that proves non-human
primates communicate, mourn, socialize, and have consciousness that is very close to
humans. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh , for example, spent thirty years of her life teaching a
bonobo named Kanzi to communicate through the use of pictograms. Likewise, American
researcher Francine Patterson began experimenting with nonhuman primates as early as 1965
and 40 years later her research on ape acquisition of language is still going. Furthermore,
scientists have created organizations such as The Great Ape Project to expand on research
that proves between chimpanzees and humans there is only a 1.23% difference in DNA. This
substantial scientific evidence has led top primatologists like Dr. Allison Jolly to claim that
non-human primates should be granted the fundamental rights to life and freedom (250). Jane
Goodall, English primatologist and expert on chimpanzees, for example, has been studying
non-human primates since the late 60s focusing on social and family interactions among
themselves (Goodall 2). The ethical problem voiced by Goodall over fifty years ago is still
portrayed through different media such as the recent movie Monkey Kingdom, despite the
fact that the movies goal is to provide a very close point of view on nonhuman primates
lifestyle. Primatologists continue to discuss different behaviors that have been detected in
non-human primates during observation experiments that could definitely be considered signs
of consciousness. The discussion opens up with experiments that post the question whether

Castillo Munoz 2

apes communicate, such as Scott-Phillips article "Nonhuman Primate Communication,

Pragmatics, and the Origins of Language" which deals with Primate communication and
pragmatics. Moreover, Doran-Sheehy and Salmis experiment that analyzes communication
amongst Gorillas through what they refer to as hoot series (The Function of Loud Calls
(Hoot Series) in Wild Western Gorillas). Next, Barbara Kings recent book, a culmination of
many years of her research, How Animals Grieve includes chapters on ape grief and
mourning, which ties social conduct to physical activities . Last, a review of the ethics behind
these experiments is discussed in Kristin Andrews article The First Step in the Case for
Great Ape Equality: The Argument for Other Minds. The purpose behind this literature
review is to familiarize readers with scientific evidence that prove non-human primates are
conscious living creatures; therefore, they deserve fundamental rights such as the right to live
and be free.
Since the beginning of the 20th century, primatologists have focused on determining
whether communication among nonhuman primates is intentional or not; Professor ScottPhillips from Durham Universitys anthropology department, however, has focused his
research on the structure of nonhuman primate communication while also tying his results to
the origins of language. In other words, Scott-Phillips article, Nonhuman Primate
Communication, Pragmatics, and the Origins of Language, traces the origins of human
language to great ape communication by telling us that great ape communication involves
the use of metacognitive abilities that ... were exapted for use in what is an evolutionarily
novel form of communication: human ostensive communication (56). Scott-Phillips makes
reference to the first experiments that focused on comparing human to ape communication.
As a early as 1892, playback experiments in which animal vocalization were recorded and
then played to a different group of animals, but of the same species. Their reactions were then
observed and compared to words in human language (Seyfarth, Cheney, Marler 1980b).

Castillo Munoz 3

Nevertheless, Scott-Phillips mentions that words and monkey reactions to alarm calls
identified in this research completely rely on different cognitive mechanism and cannot be
directly compared to one another (53). This raised the question of whether apes communicate
intentionally. As well as Scott-Phillips, comparative psychologists Josep Call and Michael
Tomasello agree that ape communication is not intentional. Nevertheless, Scott-Phillips
argues that there are other aspects of communication that are at least as important as
intentionality that have received far less attention(53). In the section Does Nonhuman
Primate Communication Use Ostension and Inference of his article, he proves that ape
communication is not ostensive, thus assuming that ape communication uses a form of code
model that allows apes to communicate. He mentions that ape gestural communication is very
sophisticated and it is based on a process that scientist refer to as ontogenetic ritualization, in
which a behavior takes on a communicative function by virtue of its repeated use in the
interactions of two (or more) individuals (Call and Tomasello 2007). As a result, if one sees
the view that this code was simply enhanced by metapsychological abilities that humans use
to communicate, it is clear to see that human language evolved from this simplistic form of
ape communication.
In addition to Scott-Phillips findings, Doctor Roberta Salmi and professor Diane
Doran-Sheehy narrowed down the topic of great ape communication to a specific form
exhibited in western gorillas. In the article The Function of Load Calls (Hoot Series) in Wild
Western Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) Salmi and Doran-Sheehy established that western gorillas
use loud, long-distance calls (Hoot Series) to reunite the group in a specific place (379). To
begin their research, they first established whether hoot series were used to establish spatial
proximity among them. They outlined four criteria that needed to be met in order to exactly
tell what the function of hoot series is. First, the hoot series should vary from one individual
to the other in order to allow recipient to distinguish who was making the call and respond to

Castillo Munoz 4

the sender correspondingly. Secondly, the call should only be emitted when the sender and
the

recipient become further apart than normal.

Thirdly, the distance between the sender and the
caller should be either stable or increasing before
the call is emitted and should immediately
decrease after the call has been emitted. Lastly,

the

call should differ from those recipients that are in the

group from those that are not (380). In order to make sure these criteria were met, Salmi and
Doran-Sheehy collected all the behavioral data and vocal recordings over a period of fifteen
months from a healthy, well-habituated group of gorillas that lived in the Mondika Research
Center located in the Republic of Congo. The conclusion of the experiment was that between
the beginning and the start of a hooting series the distance between the sender(s) and the
recipient(s) decreased significantly. As a result, Salmi and Doran-Sheehy proved that
because inter-individual distances were increasing prior to the calls and decreasing only
after, we [Salmi and Doran-Sheehy] conclude that hoot series function as signals for
individuals to regroup (386). In addition to ape gestural communication, Hoot series could
also be considered an example of the process Scott-Phillips referred to as ontogenetic
ritualization in his article. As described above, the repetition of the series becomes a form of
communication among nonhuman primates that differs from human communication, yet it is
still a sign of consciousness. It is important, though, to note that there are many other aspects
about nonhuman primates, such as grief and mourning, that tell us that they are conscious.
In chapter twelve of her book, How Animals Grieve, Barbara King describes
observations made by primatologists, such as Jane Goodall, as early as 1986 . King starts off
by describing two different situations, one in the wild and one in captivity, in which
chimpanzees show specific behaviors that signal ape grief. She mentions that the apes eat less

Castillo Munoz 5

than normal, sleep less and in different places than they are used to when a companion or a
member of their group dies. King describes these behaviors as an altered routine and as a
disturbed mood (129). To illustrate, King describes the death of chimpanzee Pansy who
lived in a Scottish safari park together with another chimpanzee mother called Blossom.
Pansy fell ill, describes King, and started having problems to breathe, to the point that the
owners of the park anticipated her death. The mothers offspring, Chippy and Rosie, both
seemed to know that something was not in order and immediately started showing signs of
agitation and desperation. In Kings own words in the ten minutes before her death, they
groomed her or caressed her at what the observers judged to be a higher than usual rate
(King 130). After Pansys death different behaviors were observed: Chippy (Blossoms son)
attacked Pansys corpse by pounding her torso repeatedly times that night; Rosie (Pansys
daughter) stayed near the corpse for long periods of time; Blossom (the other mother
chimpanzee) did not sleep much and although she used to sleep on the platform on which
Pansys body lay, she did not sleep there neither did the other chimpanzees (King 131). King
expands on another example of a strange behavior in monkeys when another monkey dies.
More specifically, King discusses the action that mother chimpanzees take when their
offspring die shortly after they have been born by making reference to Peter Fashings
research which observed gelada monkey of Guassa, Ethiopia. King gives specific attention to
three cases that in which three mother gelada monkeys carry their offspring after they had
died for thirteen, sixteen, and forty-eight days. King notes that the carrying behavior does,
after all, represent a substantial energy expenditure by the mother (66). So the question
remains, why do monkeys exhibit these behaviors? To the plain human eye it might seem like
the mother just does not know the baby has died, or to some it might look like another way
for nonhuman primates to communicate a message, in this case pain and grief. In any event,
these kind of behaviors have over time influenced humans to start considering animals and

Castillo Munoz 6

relating with them through stronger bonds. In order to explain these bonds, we must take into
account the ethics behind the scientific evidence that I have provided thus far. I have outlined
behaviors exhibited by nonhuman primates that leads us to think that they are rational beings
with the ability to form social relations with one another and even with humans, but there is
another point of view on the matter that I wish to reveal through the work of Kristin Andrews.
Philosophy professor from the University of New York (Toronto), Kristin Andrews,
focuses her research on the nature of social cognition and examines human social relations
and the relationships among, and between, animals of different species. In her essay The
First Step in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for Other Minds, Andrews
states that before great apes can be considered equal, the idea that they (and other animals)
are not conscious much be demolished (131). Andews argument is partially based on the fact
that great apes can also rationally think and also possess some problem-solving skills.
Andrews makes reference to Wolfgang Koehlers studies in which he hung food out of the
monkeys reach, locked it in a box, and kept it outside their cage. Koehler observed that
almost every time the monkey would find a way to obtain the food, simply by using common
objects kept in the cage (138). This indicates that monkeys have the ability to use human
tools in order to
achieve a
desired goal, in
other words
chimps have
what

Andrews refer
to as instrumental
rationality

(138). Andrews then argues that

this behavior can

Castillo Munoz 7

also be observed in the wild as chimpanzees use several tools to gather food and seek
protection. For example, Andrews says that chimps use hammers or anvil type tools to open
nuts, use tools as weapons to threaten or attack intruders, and use leaves to clean their bodies
of blood and feces (139). Although Andrews also covers communicative ability, I will not
expand on that section of her essay simply because I have already made reference to other
sources. Lastly, to support her argument that great apes are conscious, Andrews states that if
humans believe that other humans are conscious based on the argument from analogy, the
rational conclusion is to believe that apes are also conscious. In her own words she states that
one who accepts the existence of humans minds is then rationally compelled to accept the
existence of great ape minds in general (132). Putting all the pieces together, we can
conclude that because of the criteria outlined in this paragraph and the rest of the body, great
apes are conscious individuals and should therefore be considered as equal in our community.
In conclusion, there are numerous studies and experiments that point to the conclusion
that animals, for my purpose great apes, are conscious and explicitly show that great ape are
very organized and charismatic living creatures. But the question that remains is the
following: what influence does this statements have in humans? Some of the treatment that
these animals experience seem to disregard the results outlined in this paper. Taking offspring
away from their mothers, performing painful experiments with long-lasting effects, and
keeping them [great apes] in captivity are just some of the mistreats that these great animals
have to endure. Now presented with the facts it is up to us to decide what we want to change;
I am aware, however, that things do not change from one day to another and that many things
need to happen before anything is settled, but the advocacy of animal consideration can start
by simply loving animals. As doctor Kathy Rudy argues in her book Loving Animals, the best
way to stop mistreat of animals is through love and affection, given that we (humans) are
emotionally driven (Rudy 4). Despite the fact that over time we have become very

Castillo Munoz 8

knowledgeable about animals, there is still a lot left to and the sooner we start the better for
these creatures will be.

Work Cited

Castillo Munoz 9

Andrews, Kristin. The First Step in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for
Other Minds. Etica & Animali: The Great Ape Project. (1996): 131-141.
Doran-Sheehy, Diane, R. Salmi. The Function of Load Calls (Hoot Series) in Wild Western
Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla). American Journal of Physical Anthropology 155.1 (2014):
379-391.
Goodall, Jane, and Hugo Van Lawick. My Friends, the Wild Chimpanzees. Washington, D.C.:
Society, 1967. Print.
Jolly, Allison. Conscious Chimpanzees? A Review of Recent Literature. Cognitive
Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1991. 231-252. Print.
King, Barbara J. How Animals Grieve. Chicago: Univ of Chicago, 2014. Print.
Rudy, Kathy. Loving Animals: Toward a New Animal Advocacy. Minneapolis: U of
Minnesota, 2011. Print.
Scott-Phillips, Thomas C. "Nonhuman Primate Communication, Pragmatics, and the Origins
of Language." Current Anthropology 51.6 (2015): 56-80.
Seyfarth, R. M., D. L. Cheney, and P. Marler. 1980a. Monkey responses to three different
alarm calls: evidence of predator classification and semantic communication. Science
210:801803.
Tomasello, M., J. Call, and A. Gluckman. 1997. Comprehension of novel communicative
signs by apes and human children. Child Development 68(6):10671080.