Castillo Munoz 1

Pedro Castillo Munoz

Professor Lynda Haas
Writing 39C
May 25, 2015
Inefficiency and Immorality Behind Animal Experimentation: Nonhuman Primates
Introduction
According to the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), more than 120,000
nonhuman primates (NHPs) are subjected to invasive experiments and killed every year in
the United States (Primates in Laboratories). Furthermore, in December 2011 the Institute
of Medicine and National Research Council found that most of these invasive experiments
are unnecessary and unpredictable, given that the difference between humans and primates
DNA accounts for a lot of error and ambiguity (Fact Sheet: Chimpanzees Used in
Research). As a result, organizations such as PETA and the Humane Society of the United
States agree that invasive experimentation on NHPs is unethical and unnecessary. Over time,
the inefficiency and immorality involved in NHP experimentation have caused this type of
invasive research to be questioned throughout the world.
Nonhuman primate experimentation, however, has not always been regarded as a
negative practice. The origin of chimpanzee experimentation is traced to the early 1920s in
an unsophisticated laboratory established in a Pennsylvania rural setting by Robert Yerkes, an
American psychologist and ethologist. Despite his limitations, Yerkes was able to purchase a
young bonobo and a chimpanzees and, through observation, he was able to contribute to a
great extent to the field of primatology, thus becoming one of the founding fathers of
primatology in the United States (Chimpanzees in Research: Past, Present, and Future).
The importance behind this story rests on the fact that Yerkes unsophisticated laboratory
grew to become what today is known as the Yerkes National Primate Research Center

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(YNPRC), located at Emory University in Georgia. Even more important, in the 1940s a
critical change of focus and purpose occurred at YNPRC, shifting from observation of
behavior and ethology studies to the invasive experiments and biomedical research of
infectious diseases (Committee on Animal Models in Biomedical Research 1995). This event
triggered a chain of research pertaining to NHPs, ranging from aeronautics research in the
1950s to AIDS research from 1980s to the present . Although we are not certain whether
Yerkes was aware of these ongoing events and the consequences it yielded for NHPs, what
we do know is what started as a simple, primitive laboratory with observation and learning
purposes lead to one of the most controversial conflicts the US scientific community has ever
dealt with.
For the last sixty years, primatologists have also conducted another type of research
(non-invasive) that proves non-human primates communicate, mourn, socialize, and have
consciousness that is very close to humans. Jane Goodall, English primatologist and expert
on chimpanzees, for example, has been studying non-human primates since the late 60s
focusing on social and family interactions among themselves (Goodall 2). In addition,
scholars such as Thom Scott-Phillips and Diane Doran-Sheehy continue to discuss different
behaviors that have been detected in non-human primates during observational experiments
that could definitely be considered signs of consciousness. Taking these factors into
consideration will lead to the conclusion that invasive experimentation performed on NHPs is
unethical and unnecessary for the purposes that animal experimentation advocates use to
justify it.
First Step to Primate Equality: Understanding They Are Conscious
Philosophy professor from the University of New York (Toronto), Kristin Andrews, focuses
her research on the nature of social cognition and examines human social relations and the
relationships among, and between, animals of different species. In her essay The First Step

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in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for Other Minds, Andrews states that
before nonhuman primates can be considered equal, the idea that they (and other animals) are
not conscious must be demolished (131). Andrews argument is partially based on the fact
that apes can also rationally think and also possess problem-solving skills. In her own words
she states that one who accepts the existence of humans minds is then rationally compelled
to accept the existence of great ape minds in general (132). This section outlines noninvasive
experiments that prove NHPs are rational and self-conscious living creatures.
Since the beginning of the 20 century, primatologists have focused on determining
th

whether communication among NHPs is intentional or not; Professor Scott-Phillips from

Durham Universitys anthropology department, however, has focused his research on the
structure of nonhuman primate communication while also tying his results to the origins of
language. In other words, Scott-Phillips article, Nonhuman Primate Communication,
Pragmatics, and the Origins of Language, traces the origins of human language to NHP
communication by telling us that ape communication involves the use of metacognitive
abilities that ... were exapted for use in what is an evolutionarily novel form of
communication: human ostensive communication (56). Scott-Phillips makes reference to
the first experiments that focused on comparing human to ape communication. As a early as
1920, playback experiments in which animal vocalization were recorded and then played to a
different group of animals, but of the same species. Their reactions were then observed and
compared to words in human language (Seyfarth, Cheney, Marler 1980b). Nevertheless,
Scott-Phillips mentions that words and monkey reactions to alarm calls identified in this
research completely rely on different cognitive mechanism and cannot be directly compared
to one another (53). This raised the question of whether apes communicate intentionally. As
well as Scott-Phillips, comparative psychologists Josep Call and Michael Tomasello, agree
that ape communication is not intentional. Nevertheless, Scott-Phillips argues that there are

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other aspects of communication that are at least as important as intentionality that have
received far less attention(53). In the section Does Nonhuman Primate Communication
Use Ostension and Inference of his article, he proves that ape communication is not
ostensive by proving that ape communication uses a form of code model that allows apes to
communicate. He mentions that ape gestural communication is very sophisticated and it is
based on a process that scientist refer to as ontogenetic ritualization, in which a behavior
takes on a communicative function by virtue of its repeated use in the interactions of two (or
more) individuals (Nonhuman Primate Communication, Pragmatics, and the Origins of
Language). As a result, one can conclude that this code is simply enhanced by
metapsychological abilities that humans use to communicate, thus making it clear to see that
human language evolved from this simplistic form of ape communication.
In addition to Scott-Phillips findings, Doctor Roberta Salmi and professor Diane
Doran-Sheehy narrowed down the topic of ape communication to a specific form exhibited in
western gorillas. In the article The Function of Load Calls (Hoot Series) in Wild Western
Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) Salmi and Doran-Sheehy established that western gorillas use loud,
long-distance calls (Hoot Series) to reunite the group in a specific place (379). To begin their
research, they first established whether hoot series were used to establish spatial proximity
among them. They outlined four criteria that needed to be met in order to exactly tell what the
function of hoot series is. First, the hoot series should vary from one individual to the other in
order to allow recipient to distinguish who was making the call and respond to the sender
correspondingly. Secondly, the call should only be emitted when the sender and the recipient
become further apart than normal. Thirdly, the distance between the sender and the caller
should be either stable or increasing before the call is emitted and should immediately
decrease after the call has been emitted. Lastly, the call should differ from those recipients
that are in the group from those that are not (380). In order to make sure these criteria were

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met, Salmi and Doran-Sheehy collected all the behavioral data and vocal recordings over a
period of fifteen months from a healthy, well-habituated group of gorillas that lived in the
Mondika Research Center located in the Republic of Congo. The conclusion of the
experiment was that between the beginning and the start of a hooting series the distance
between the sender(s) and the recipient(s) decreased significantly (See figure 1). As a result,
Salmi and Doran-Sheehy said that because inter-individual distances were increasing prior
to the calls and decreasing only after, we [Salmi and Doran-Sheehy] conclude that hoot series
function as signals for individuals to regroup (386). In addition to ape gestural
communication, Hoot series could also be considered an example of the process ScottPhillips referred to as ontogenetic ritualization in his article. As described above, the
repetition of the series becomes a form of communication among NHPs that although differs
from human communication, it is very similar to human communication and it is a sign of
consciousness. It is important, though, to note that there are many other aspects about

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nonhuman primates, such as grief and mourning, that tell us that they are conscious.

In chapter twelve of her book, How Animals Grieve, Barbara King describes
observations made by primatologists, such as Jane Goodall, as early as 1900 . King starts off
by describing two different situations, one in the wild and one in captivity, in which
chimpanzees show specific behaviors that signal ape grief. She mentions that the apes eat less
than normal, sleep less and in different places than they are used to when a companion or a

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member of their group dies. King describes these behaviors as an altered routine or a
disturbed mood (129). To illustrate, King describes the death of mother chimpanzee Pansy
who lived in a Scottish safari park together with another chimpanzee mother called Blossom.
Pansy fell ill, describes King, and started having problems breathing, to the point that the
owners of the park anticipated her death. The mothers offspring, Chippy and Rosie, both
seemed to know that something was not in order and immediately started showing signs of
agitation and desperation. In Kings own words in the ten minutes before her death, they
groomed her or caressed her at what the observers judged to be a higher than usual rate
(King 130). After Pansys death different behaviors were observed: Chippy (Blossoms son)
attacked Pansys corpse by pounding her torso repeatedly times that night; Rosie (Pansys
daughter) stayed near the corpse for long periods of time; Blossom (the other mother
chimpanzee) did not sleep much and although she used to sleep on the platform on which
Pansys body lay, she did not sleep there neither did the other chimpanzees (King 131). King
expands on another example of a strange behavior in monkeys when another monkey
dies.More specifically, King discusses the action that mother chimpanzees take when their
offspring die shortly after they have been born by making reference to Peter Fashings
research which observed gelada monkey of Guassa, Ethiopia. King gives specific attention to
three cases that in which three mother gelada monkeys carry their offspring after they had
died for thirteen, sixteen, and forty-eight days. King notes that the carrying behavior does,
after all, represent a substantial energy expenditure by the mother (66). So the question
remains, why do monkeys exhibit these behaviors? To the plain human eye it might seem like
the mother just does not know the baby has died, or to some it might look like another way
for NHPs to communicate a message, in this case pain and grief. Consequently, these
behaviors have over time influenced humans to start considering animals and relating with
them through stronger bonds. In order to explain these bonds, we must take into account the

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ethics behind the scientific evidence that I have provided thus far. I have outlined behaviors
exhibited by nonhuman primates that leads us to think that they are rational beings with the
ability to form social relations with one another and even with humans, but in the next section
of this issue, I shall explain the ethical and scientific perspectives on the issue, accounting for
the inefficiency and immorality behind experimentation on primates.

Defining the Problem: Inefficiency and Immorality

When determining the efficiency of experimentation on apes, it is necessary to first
understand the fields that fall under invasive research. To obtain this overview, we look at the
work of Andrew Knight, who is an European Veterinary Specialist in Animal Welfare
Science, Ethics and Law. In his essay The Beginning of the End for Chimpanzee

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Experiments? Knight presents a compilation of data collected from three major biomedical
bibliographic databases. In his own words, I [Andrew Knight] sought to assess the value of
research on captive chimpanzees, particularly when invasive ... because such research incurs
the greatest bioethical and social concerns. This compilation allows us to see which fields
make use of invasive experimentation, while also giving us a main idea of the relevance of
these issues published on the databases. Figure 2 shows a chart made by Knight as he
randomly picked out 95 essays and determined if they were cited by subsequent
essays/scholars (The Beginning of the End for Chimpanzee Experiments?). This chart
allows to see that more than half of these randomly selected papers dealing with some kind of
invasive experimentation on chimpanzee were not cited.
Although the lack of citations does not explain the problem explicitly, it does show a
developing pattern. Advocates of NHP experimentation argue that chimpanzees have been of
great help in the development of human health care because of their DNA being only 4-5%
different than humans; however, Knight explains that that difference is sufficiently
important to result in a difference of around 80% in protein expression, yielding marked
phenotypic differences between the species (The Beginning of the End for Chimpanzee
Experiments?). In her article Chimpanzees in research and testing worldwide: Overview,
oversight and applicable laws, Kathleen Conlee from the Humane Society of the United
States addresses two arguments used by the opposition: the study of Hepatitis C... and as-ofyet unknown diseases that could arise in the future. Conlee says that recent studies have
discovered alternatives to the field of Hepatitis C, which is to cultivate the virus in vitro
instead of infecting chimpanzees. Additionally, Conlee argues that although it is hard to
develop an argument against a disease that does not yet exist, one can analyze the historical
results of NHP experimentation in response to crises such as HIV/AIDS in which NHPs did
not represent a good model for the response of human beings. As a result, the use of NHPs in

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research for medical purposes is unnecessary; yet, recent PETA statistics show that there are
still more than 900 chimpanzees kept in laboratories around the United States with 80%
percent of them no longer needed in research.
This statistic leads to the ethical problem behind NHP experimentation. Scientists,
scholars, politicians, and civilians have started pondering the issue, having second thoughts
about what is being done with these primates. Tom Beauchamp, for example, a professor of
Philosophy and Senior Research Scholar at Kennedy Institute of Ethics, explains one of the
major ethical problems of animal experimentation. In his article Opposing Views on Animal
Experimentation: Do Animals Have Rights? he claims that animals have rights that we are
morally obligated to respect, and by performing experiments on them, we are violating such
rights. More specifically, in his article Beauchamp says that there exists a grading scale
(moral standing) that separates beings whose interests we morally must consider from
beings whose interests count for less. For animals to be morally considered by humans, they
must show cognitive capacities such as the ability for self-consciousness, to communicate in
a language, to make moral judgments, and to be rational (Opposing Views on Animal
Experimentation: Do Animals Have Rights?). The more these capacities are exhibited, the
higher in the grading scale animals are placed. Having stated this analysis of morality, since
NHPs exhibit multiple instances of these capacities, in this cognitive theory we are obligated
to consider their moral interests, or in other words, grant them freedom.
The Beginning of an End: Solution to the Problem
It would be very difficult to immediately stop NHP experimentation, but not
impossible if the right gradual solution is posed. Some of the argument against experimenting
with NHPs, as stated before, include social ethics, experiment inefficiency, moral standings,
etc; however, alternatives have not been discussed yet. The key in stopping NHP
experimentation would be giving the advocates of NHP experimentation an alternative that

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allows them to continue their desired research. Despite the fact that such an alternative has
not yet been discovered, some suggestions have been made. The study of virus populations
in-vitro, for example, proved to be effective in replacing NHPs when developing the studies
of Hepatitis C. In the end, however, scientists argued that this method is very limited and
could never fully replace NHPs (R&R Project). As a result, there could countless alternatives
to using NHPs in research but a new counter argument will always be born. For this reason,
the right solutions to advocate are: the development of or revising of existing governmental
policies that eliminate or help replace NHPs in invasive experimentation and continuing the
efforts of raising awareness and gaining support from both the public and scientific
communities through media campaigns.
Scientists have always relied on the use of NHPs for their purposes because these
animals have always been available and so they do not have the need to keep looking for
alternatives, but what would happen if this was no longer an option? As for chimpanzees,
Kathleen Conlee says that we must consider that prohibiting the use of chimpanzees will
likely result in scientists successfully developing alternatives to the use of chimpanzees and
will stop the cycle of researchers automatically turning to chimpanzees simply because they
are available (Chimpanzees in research and testing worldwide: Overview, oversight and
applicable laws). Having stated this idea, I am left to share efforts that are needed from the
governmental side. In her essay, Conlee also mentions the Chimpanzee Health Improvement,
Maintenance, and Protection Act of 2000 (CHIMP Act), which is mostly based on a report
published by the Institute for Laboratory Animal Research (ILAR) regarding a formal request
to address the chimpanzee surplus for HIV research. This act prohibits euthanasia of
chimpanzees except for humane health reasons during an intractable illness, establishes a
federally funded retirement system for chimpanzees no longer needed for research, and

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requires that the government take responsibility for at least the partial cost of lifetime care for
a former research subject outside of the laboratory setting.
Now, it is obvious that this act contains numerous flaws, the main one being the
inclusion of chimpanzees only. Nevertheless, Conlee states that the major impact of the
CHIMP Act has been a shift in thinking and policy related to the use of chimpanzees for
research purposes. Now that this shift in thinking and policy has been made, what it is left to
do is the revision of the act to include all nonhuman primates. Conlee states that results of a
survey conducted in 2006 reveal that nearly three-fourths of the American public (71%)
believes that a chimpanzee used for more than 10 years in research should be retired, which is
estimated to make up 90% of chimpanzees in research laboratories. Hence, if this act were
to cover all nonhuman primates, NHP experimenters would lose a lot of their creatures and,
with time, they would lose every single NHP. Another addition that must be taken into
account is the implementation of a grading scale that sets limits to what can be done with
NHPs, for example, as was done with the issue of the death penalty, a scenario in which
policies were made that insure the pain is reduced to a minimum. Just as we have done with
humans, we can also do with nonhuman primates in regulating the pain, side effects, and
treatments that they are submitted to during experiments.
Lastly, we must consider how to implement this changes. Andrew Knight states in his
article The beginning of the end for chimpanzee experiments? that in order to have a
successful campaign, it must gain support from various sources such as civilians, scientists,
organizations and even politicians, not only from the the United States, but also seek support
from foreign countries. Organizations like PETA that have international social media
campaigns, open many doors for advocating the use of NHPs in invasive research and
informing about what is happening both inside and outside of the United States. As Conlee
tells us, in 2007 the European Parliament adopted a written declaration that calls for making

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an end to the use of great apes and wild-caught primates for research an urgent priority as
well as for the establishment of a timetable to replace nonhuman primates in experiments
with alternatives. The speed at which information is shared allows us to follow the footsteps
of the European community and grant thousands of animals the life in freedom they deserve
to live, just like any other creature in this world.

Work Cited
Andrews, Kristin. The First Step in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for
Other Minds. Etica & Animali: The Great Ape Project. (1996): 131-141.
Beauchamp, Tom L. "Opposing Views on Animal Experimentation: Do Animals Have
Rights?" Ethics & Behavior 7.2 (2010): 113-21. 08 Jan. 2010. Web. 18 May 2015.
"Chimpanzees in Laboratories." PETA Chimpanzees in Laboratories Comments. People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals, n.d. Web. 28 May 2015.
Conlee, Kathleen M. "Chimpanzees in Research and Testing Worldwide: Overview,
Oversight and Applicable Laws." Proc. 6th World Congress on Alternatives & Animal
Use in the Life Sciences (2007): 111-18. The Humane Society of the United States, 21
Aug. 2007. Web. 18 May 2015.
Conlee, Kathleen M. "Chimpanzees in Research: Past, Present, and Future. Animals Studies
Repository (2005): 119-137. The Humane Society of the United States, Aug. 2005.
Web. 18 May 2015.
Doran-Sheehy, Diane, R. Salmi. The Function of Load Calls (Hoot Series) in Wild Western
Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla). American Journal of Physical Anthropology 155.1 (2014):
379-391.

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Goodall, Jane, and Hugo Van Lawick. My Friends, the Wild Chimpanzees. Washington, D.C.:
Society, 1967. Print.
Jolly, Allison. Conscious Chimpanzees? A Review of Recent Literature. Cognitive
Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1991. 231-252. Print.
King, Barbara J. How Animals Grieve. Chicago: Univ of Chicago, 2014. Print.
Knight, Andrew. "The Beginning of the End for Chimpanzee Experiments?" Philosophy,
Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 3.16 (2008): 186-195. 02 Jun. 2008. Web. 18 May
2015
Rudy, Kathy. Loving Animals: Toward a New Animal Advocacy. Minneapolis: U of
Minnesota, 2011. Print.
Scott-Phillips, Thomas C. "Nonhuman Primate Communication, Pragmatics, and the Origins
of Language." Current Anthropology 51.6 (2015): 56-80.
Seyfarth, R. M., D. L. Cheney, and P. Marler. 1980a. Monkey responses to three different
alarm calls: evidence of predator classification and semantic communication. Science
210:801803.
"The CHIMP Act | Laws | Release & Restitution for Chimpanzees." The CHIMP Act | Laws |
Release & Restitution for Chimpanzees. Project R&R, 15 Jan. 2015. Web. 28 May
2015.
Tomasello, M., J. Call, and A. Gluckman. 1997. Comprehension of novel communicative
signs by apes and human children. Child Development 68(6):10671080.