case digests

Commissioner Jose T. Almonte, petitioner v Honorable Conrado Vasquez,

respondent

Facts:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal
Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for
1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the
investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB
which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous
activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the
subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the
Government.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while
Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management
Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in
connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally
disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the
EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with
copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of
subpoena duces tecum to provide documents relating tWhether or not an
Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to
provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB
employers.o personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be
disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.
Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports

and information. "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as,
but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be
sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a
privilege resting on other considerations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection
of subpoenaed documents be made personally in camera by the
Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.

ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner

v
HON. JOSE HERRERA, respondent

Facts:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose
Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and to command respondents to return
immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records alleged to have
been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application
of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness,
Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed
criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion,
against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200
Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-

graft Division of the NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket
Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance
company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the
board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and
carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is void.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and
distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4)
insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule
126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than
one specific offense."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of
October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby
ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized
or taken thereunder. Without costs.

Malacat v Court of Appeals

Facts:
On August 29, 1990 at about 6:30 in the evening, allegedly in response to
bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police

District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police

Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police
officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near
the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of
Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted
at opposite sides of the corner of stop and frisk, where a warrant and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and
whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the
police officer seeks to obtain more information; and that the seizure of the
grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus
found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under
Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less
than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and
not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February
1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the
Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court
of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of
stop and frisk.
Ruling:
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was
akin to a stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either
to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to
obtain more information. Probable cause was not required as it was not
certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an
investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been premature.
The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were confronted with an
emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the
destruction of evidence and the officers had to act in haste, as petitioner
and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and
reported cases of bombing. Further, petitioners group suddenly ran away
in different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus it is
reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is
not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to
pursue his investigation without fear of violence. The trial court then ruled
that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest, and since petitioner later voluntarily admitted such fact to the police

investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store, concluded
that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioners guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction
on the part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of
10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is
REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED
and ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his further
detention is justified for any other lawful cause.

PEOPLE
V
RUBEN MONTILLA

Facts:
Ruben Montilla, was charged for violating Section 4, Article 2 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, R. A. No. 6425, as amended by R. A. No. 7659
in an information which alleges that on or about June 20, 1994, at Brgy.
Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, the above named accused, not being authorized
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer,
transport and deliver 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves which are considered
prohibited drugs.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the
evidence obtained from him?
Ruling:
A legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting officer with
authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous
weapons and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on
appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the search on his

belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as aresult

thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5
(a) Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SANTIAGO SY JUCO, defendant.

Facts:
The crime alleged is fraud of revenue against the Government. Pursuant to a
search warrant issued, the officers searched the building occupied by
Santiago Sy Juco. In the process, the authorities seized, among others, an art
metal filing cabinet claimed by Atty. Remo to be his and contained some
letters, documents and papers belonging to his clients. Also, books belonging
to Salakam Lumber Co., Inc., were seized.
Issue:
1. Is the search warrant in question valid or not, taking into consideration the

provisions of the law and of the Constitution relative thereto?

2. Does the art metal filing cabinet seized by the agents of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue belong to Santiago Sy Juco or to Teopisto B. Remo?
Ruling:
The search and seizure was not valid. It is not stated in the affidavit that the
books, documents or records referred to therein are being used or are
intended to be used in the commission of fraud against the Government and,
notwithstanding the lack of such allegation; the warrant avers that they are
actually being used for such purpose.
Also, it assumes that the entire building is occupied by Santiago Sy Juco,
when the only ground upon which such assumption is based is the BIR
agent's statement which is mere hearsay (coming from an informant) and
when in fact part thereof was occupied by Atty. Remo. It was not asked that
the things belonging to Atty. Remo and to others also be searched and seized.
For all the foregoing reasons, and finding that the errors assigned by the
appellant are very well founded, the appealed judgment is reversed, and it is
ordered that the art metal filing cabinet, together with the key thereof seized
by the internal revenue agent by virtue of the judicial warrant in question,
which is hereby declared null and void, be immediately returned unopened to
the appellant; and that a copy of this decision be sent to the Solicitor-General
for him to take action, if he deems it justified, upon careful investigation of
the facts, against the internal revenue agent or agents who obtained and
executed the warrant in question, in accordance with the provisions of article
129 of the Revised Penal Code, without special pronouncement as to costs.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner,

vs.

MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent.

FACTS:
Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros married Milagros Orbiso
on 10 July 1983.] Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he married
Milagros who was then 43 years old. On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the
GSIS an application for retirement benefits effective 18 February 1985 under
Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance
Act of 1977 (PD 1146). In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his
wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary.[Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for
survivorship pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim
because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to
survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.]
According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year
from his date of retirement on 17 February 1984.
On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for
declaratory relief questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146
disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and was granted of the
survivorship pension.
GSIS appealed to the COA, which affirmed the decision of the trial court.
In a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she
already accepted the decision of the GSIS and is not interested anymore of
the survivorship pension. GSIS wants the court to decide on the case basing
on the merit of the letter given by Milagros(respondent).
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not the decision of Section 18 of PD 1146 is
unconstitutional.
RULING:
SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the death of a pensioner, the
primary beneficiaries shall receive the applicable pension mentioned under
paragraph (b) of section seventeen of this Act: Provided, That, the dependent
spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner
is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension. When the pensioner dies within the period covered by the lump
sum, the survivorship pension shall be paid only after the expiration of the
said period. This shall also apply to the pensioners living as of the effectivity

of this Act, but the survivorship benefit shall be based on the monthly
pension being received at the time of death.
The main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section
18 of PD 1146, which proviso prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving
survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within
three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension (the proviso).
We hold that the proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of
Milagros claim, is unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause.
The proviso is also discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for
being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the law the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No.
1146, which proviso states that the dependent spouse shall not be entitled
to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three
years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. The Government
Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros
for survivorship benefits based on this invalid provison.
No pronouncement as to costs.

BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH ALINDOGAN, petitioners,

v HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
respondents.

FACTS:
On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of
search warrants by the respondent Judge against Banjamin V. Kho, now
petitioner, in his residence at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St., BF Homes,
Phase I, Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent,
applied with the same court for the issuance of search warrants against the
said petitioner in his house at No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk,
Paranaque. The search warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents
had conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses
referred to on the basis of confidential information they received that the
said places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and
chop-chop vehicles. On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the

necessary examination of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he

issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-13, 90-14, and 90-15.
On the following day, May 16, 1990, NBI conducted the simultaneous
searches on the said residences of the petitioner (Kho) and they were able to
confiscate the above mention objects stated in the warrant and the
simultaneous searches also resulted in the confiscation of various radio and
telecommunication equipment. The confiscated items were verified in Camp
Crame and were proven that all of them are unlicensed.
Petitioner (Kho) question the validity of the warrant and filed a Motion to
Quash the previous decision.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the issuance of the search warrant by the respondent
Judge valid?
2.
Whether or not the Motion to Quash filed by the petitioner (Kho)
alleging that there was an abuse enforcement of the challenge search
warrant valid?
3.
Whether or not the Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) from using the objects seized by
virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed against them
and to return immediately the said items valid.
RULING:
The Court believes, and so holds, that the said warrants comply with
Constitutional and statutory requirements. The law does not require that the
things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave
no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. Otherwise, it
would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they
would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Since the
element of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent in
researching on the details to be embodied in the warrant would render the
purpose of the search nugatory.
The question of whether there was abuse in the enforcement of the
challanged search warrants is not within the scope of a Motion to Quash. In a
Motion to Quash, what is assailed is the validity of the issuance of the
warrant. The manner of serving the warrant and of effecting the search are
not an issue to be resolved here. As aptly opined and ruled by the
respondent Judge, petitioners have remedies under pertinent penal, civil and
administrative laws for their problem at hand, which cannot be solved by
their present motion to quash.

Considering that cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explosives and
Violation of Section 3 in relation to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539,
otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, have been instituted
against the petitioners, the petition for mandamus with preliminary and
mandatory injunction to return all objects seized and to restrain respondent
NBI from using the said objects as evidence, has become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit and on the ground that it has become moot
and academic, the petition at bar is hereby DISMISSED. No pronoucement as
to costs.

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V.ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and
GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department
of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional
Trial Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE
DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
SEDFREY ORDOEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE
CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR,
Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila,
respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No.
82585.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for
petitioner in G.R. Nos. 82827 and 83979.

FACTS:
. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of
Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran
was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the
President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the
administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
Petitioner Beltran also said that the issuance of the warrant of
arrest is not valid because the judge did not personally examined the
complainant and witnesses.
.On the other hand, Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to
file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be
a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction.
This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of
immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be
exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
So, the petitioners raised 3 questions to contend if there is a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public

respondents, respectively:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for
libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima
facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of
Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his
arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if
any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the
Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against
the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent.
RULING:
The first question was rendered moot and academic. The allegation of
denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the
fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require
that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits
before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required
is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if
he is so minded.
The second question, court interpreted the provision under Article III, sec
2, which states that, no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The court said that, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence
of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and

require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in

arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
The third question, court said that, the rationale for the grant to the President
of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from
requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate
acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction.
Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved
to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to
maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc
dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is
LIFTED.

G.R.No. 74869

July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after
disembarking from the M/V Wilcon, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in
fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what

looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for

investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him
and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were
verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act was filed against him.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had
in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of
pants. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the
marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and
arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. The trial
court was not convinced of the statement of the Aminnudin (accusedappellant) because of lack of proof to show that he was really manhandled to
force him to admit the crime and trial court said that it was valid through Rule
113, sec 6(b) the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search
also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the application of Rule 113, sec 6(b) the Rules of
Court on warrantless arrests is valid.
Whether or not the decision of the Trial court in convicting the
accused-appellant valid.
RULING:
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by
a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable
cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant
was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had
just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113
of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with
the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example.
Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches
and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be
secured.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the
case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and
should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is
that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to
use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a
lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless

arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence
against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption
that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accusedappellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant,
known only as Benjie, that a certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from
Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of
marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of
P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo
Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt.
Abello asked Aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it
to the former. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana
leaves packed in a plastic bag marked Cash Katutak. Upon examination of
the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a
Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded positive results for
marijuana, a prohibited drug. She was charged with violating the Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act and sentenced
her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On her defence, accused-appellant reputed the above accusations against
her and said that immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from
Choice Theater where she watched the movie Balweg. While about to cross
the road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the
middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to
go with them to the NARCOM Office. During investigation at said office, she
disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman and averred that
the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover,
she added that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.
ISSUE:

1.
Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by P/Lt. Abello and
his team valid.
RULING:
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime.
Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime.
Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any
manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to
suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the
informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as
the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The
NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not
for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the
evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect
that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger
of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a
clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the
rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a
warrantless search of accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause
and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated
otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful
arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the
articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for
these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected,
pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights
of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For
lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accusedappellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for some other legal
grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC.

VS.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY
G.R. No. L-23794

Facts:

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964
imposing any of all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc
Sugar Co. Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale
to the United States and other foreign countries.

Ormoc Sugar Company paid a total of P12, 087.50 under protest and
subsequently filed a case before the Court of 1st Instance of Leyte for being
unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection clause (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III)
and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22 [1], Art. VI).
On August 6, 1964, the Court rendered a decision that upheld the
constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant
chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other
forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.

Issue:
Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.

Ruling:

Yes. The ordinance is discriminatory for its taxes only the Ormoc Sugar
Company and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently sugar central from the coverage of
the tax. Even later when a similar company will be set up, it cannot be
subject to tax because the ordinance expressly points only the Ormoc Sugar
Company.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged

ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are
hereby ordered to refund the P12, 087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under
protest. No costs. So ordered

YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, ET AL.

VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 126859

Facts:

On March 31, 1995, Presiding Judge Mangay of the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City issued search warrants for the search and seizure of certain of
certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road,
Kalookan City and found the 2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16
ammunitions, among others. Likewise, the police searched also the
Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol.
The firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other incendiary devices seized at
the apartments were acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 Melanio de
la Cruz.

Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City,
Branch 123, in informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. C-48666-67,
accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thereafter, petitioners
were arrested and detained.

At the hearing for bail, the RTC denied petitioners' motion for bail earlier filed.

Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2
and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and articles seized
were not described with particularity.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion
when itruled that the search and seizure orders in question were valid and
the objects seized admissiblein evidence.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The search conducted at

Apartment No. 8 is hereby declared illegal and the item (.45 caliber pistol)
seized therein is inadmissible in evidence. However, the search at Apartment
No. 2 pursuant to Search Warrant 55-95 is hereby declared valid and legal,
and the articles seized from Apartment No. 2 are found admissible in
evidence. Let this can be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City, Branch 123, for trial on the merits of Criminal Cases Nos. C-48666-67
with dispatch.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS.
PRISCILLA DEL NORTE
G.R. No. 149462

Facts:

On August 1, 1997, a search warrant was served on Ising Gutierrez Diwa,

residing at No. 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City, by SPO1 Angel Lumabas and their group for alleged violation
of Republic Act No. 6425. They were ordered to forthwith seize and take
possession of an undetermined quality of shabu and marijuana leaves. They
found a bundle of marijuana wrapped in manila paper under the bed and
inside the room. Appellant was brought to the police headquarters for further
investigation.

Appellant assailed the validity of the search warrant against her. She asserted
that she lived at 376 Dama de Noche, Brgy. Balsa, Caloocan City and that she
was just visiting a friend, Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service Road corner
Cruzada Street., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

No. The search warrant has irregularity because the authorities did not have
personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the search. They did
not conduct surveillance before obtaining the warrant and their knowledge
was based on pure hearsay only. The prosecution witness failed to establish
appellants ownership of the house where the prohibited drugs were
discovered.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of

Caloocan City is reversed. Appellant is acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS.
ALVANO SAYCON Y BUQUIRAN
G.R. No. 110995

Facts:

The trial court rendered, on June 15, 1993, a judgment of conviction. The
court found Alvano Saycon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having
transported four (4) grams of Metamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00

On July 8, 1992, 6:00 A.M. the Coastguard personnel received information

from Narcotics Command agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected shabu
courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doa Virginia,
which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the
information, the Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, instructed them to
intercept the suspect. NarCom agents, Philippine Coastguard personnel and
Senior Police Officers posted themselves at the gate of Pier 1.

The MV Doa Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in
Dumaguete City. Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag
and went through the checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard where
he was identified by police officer. He was invited to the Coastguard
Headquarters at the Pier area and willingly went with them. The coastguard
asked him to open his bag and willingly obliged. In it were personal
belongings and a maong wallet. Inside the maong wallet was a Marlboro pack
containing the suspected shabu. The police officer, Winifredo Noble asked
Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the suspected shabu was
his, Saycon merely bowed his head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected
shabu were brought to the NARCOM office for booking. When he was
arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest.

Alvaro Saycon appeal before this court seeking reversal of the decision of the
trial court and contends that the search of his bag was illegal because it had
been made without a search warrant and that therefore, the shabu
discovered during the illegal search was inadmissible in evidence against
him.

Issue:

Is the warrantless search valid? Is the warrantless arrest valid?

Rulings:

Yes. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehiclesautomobiles, trucks, etc. without need of a warrant, it not being practicable
to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may
be sought. Also, a peace officer may without a warrant, arrest a person when
he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 10325, is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONS, however, appellant shall suffer
imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from six (6) months of
arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correctional as
maximum, and that the fine of P20,000.00 shall be DELETED. No
pronouncement as to cost.

PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION ET AL

VS.
HON. PETE PRADO ET AL
G.R. No. 110995

Facts:

The petition assails the constitutionality of Sec. 35 of Republic Act No. 7354
as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
92-98. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial

Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and
its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

The Philippine Judges Association averred that the law is discriminatory as it

disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the
franking privilege of others such as the President of the Philippines, the Vice
President of the Philippines, Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC and former Presidents of the Philippines
among others.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection before the law.

Ruling:

Yes. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of
the laws on all persons or things without distinction. What the clause requires
is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other
in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Sections 35 of R.A. No.

7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar
as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds
to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary
restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES,

INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 132922. April 21, 1998]
FACTS:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers and
registered voters. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this
case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer
from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Other
petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring
this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television
broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Sec. 92
of B.P Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide
free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and
other political purposes. Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the
ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just
compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies
the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power
given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of
communication or information during the period of election. Petitioner claims
that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC
Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial

election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so

again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the
radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to
require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in
providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it
stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for COMELEC Time.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.
(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property
without due process of law and without just compensation.
RULING:
Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether
radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to
broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves
and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images.
They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such
exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance
by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to
operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the
state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require
payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is
likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending
of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the
broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for
what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no
private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the
COMELEC. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the
states duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find
their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they
may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common
good.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.

MARIA CASTRO and CO LING petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union,
and SGT. ERNESTO LUMANG, respondents.

G.R. No. L-28642 April 30, 1976

FACTS:
Respondent Ernesto I. Lumang admitted that "he has been informed" and was
of the belief that Maria Castro and Co Ling, whose place of residence was not
indicated, although subsequently mention was made of their being at Barrio
Padasil, Bangar, La Union, "have in possession narcotics and other
contraband." There is a claim that he had verified the report and that he had
"reasons to believe that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the
undersigned to take possession" of such narcotics and other contraband. The
application was accompanied by the joint affidavit of a Sergeant Francisco C.
Molina and a Corporal Lorenzo G. Apilado of the Philippine Constabulary.
Again, mention was merely made of their information about narcotics and
other contraband being kept by Castro and Co Ling. They allege that they
conducted rigid surveillance, but all they could come out with is that
petitioner Co Ling is an overstaying alien for almost ten years conducting
such traffic and that after verification, he was not registered in the
Immigration Office. Then, on the very same day, the search warrant was
issued for illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. Again, there was
reference to the possession by Castro and Co Ling of such forbidden goods.
As to the complete and detailed description of the properties to be seized,
the search warrant merely mentioned illegal traffic of narcotics and
contraband inside the warehouse and premises of petitioners. In the
resolution upholding the validity of the search warrant, respondent Judge did
state the following: "On July 10, 1967, Ernesto Lumang, Sgt. of the PC, with a
long service behind, appeared in chamber before the Presiding Judge of
Branch I of this Court. With him were Sgt. Molina and Cpl. Apilado both of the
PC Command of La Union. The three submitted to the Presiding Judge in
chamber an application for search warrant which is Exhibit I in this case and a
joint affidavit supporting the search warrant asked. As Sgt. Lumang said,
testifying regarding this incident, those appearing were asked, although not
in writing and not recorded, some questions by the Presiding Judge regarding
their request of the search warrant on the knowledge of Molina and Apilado
on the facts stated on the application and on the joint affidavit. The inquiry
was brief. The barrio to be searched was handwritten in ink, Maria Cristina
cancelling the typewritten name Padasil. But this correction was not done in
the duplicates. Anyhow Padasil and Maria Cristina are adjoining barrios. After
the routine taking of their oath and examination questions and answers, the
Presiding Judge of this Branch signed the application for search warrant, the
joint affidavits, and forthwith issued the search warrant.
ISSUE:

Whether or not a search warrant issued without complying with the requisites
of the Constitution and the Rules of Court should have been nullified
RULING:
Respondent Judge conducted the required "examination under oath" be
justified merely because respondent Lumang was "a Sergeant of the PC, with
a long service behind him.
He did not even bother to take the depositions of the witnesses in writing,
attaching them to the record. There was thus a manifest and palpable
violation of the constitutional standard as to the quantum of proof to show
the existence of probable cause. The Constitution requires, for the validity of
a search warrant, that there be a particular description of "the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized." As admitted by the judge in
the challenged resolution, there was a mistake concerning the residence of
petitioners, which was set forth in the search warrant as being in Barrio
Padasil when in fact it is in Barrio Maria Cristina. Another infirmity was the
failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a search warrant
"shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense."

Reference was made to "an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband." The
latter is a generic term covering all goods exported from or imported into the
country contrary to applicable statutes. More than one offense could arise
from the activity designated as illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. As
a matter of fact, in the challenged order, reference was made to at least
three charges having been filed, the violation of Section 203 of the Internal
Revenue Code, its Section 1039 on tax evasion, as well as illegal possession
of opium. It is the established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the illegality of
the search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the
possession of which is prohibited by law. The issuance of the search warrant
in question the judge did not comply with the requirements of section 98 of
General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the
opium and its paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant,
and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of
the judge. The SC held that the search warrant in question is tainted by
illegality for being violative both of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Likewise notwithstanding the illegality of such search warrant, the challenged
order of respondent Judge can be sustained only insofar as it would limit the
return of the articles seized to the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the bottle
of distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin taken under such search
warrant.

BERNARD R. NALA, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE JESUS M. BARROSO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
10, 10th Judicial Region, Malaybalay City, respondent
G.R No. 153087, August 7, 2003
FACTS:
On June 25, 2001, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser together with his witness
Ruel Nalagon applied for the issuance of a warrant to search the person and
residence of petitioner Bernard R. Nala, who was referred to in the application
as Rumolo Nala alias Long of Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon. The
application was filed in connection with petitioners alleged illegal possession
of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9 mm. pistol in violation of Illegal
Possession of Firearms. On the same day, respondent Presiding Judge of RTC
of Malaybalay City, issued Search and Seizure Warrant .On July 4, 2001, at
around 6:30 in the morning, Alcoser and other police officer search the
petitioners house and allegedly seized the following: (1) one piece caliber .38
revolver (snub-nose) with Serial Number 1125609; (2) one pc. Fragmentation
grenade (cacao type); (3) one pc. .22 long barrel; (4) 5- pcs live ammunition

for caliber .38 revolver; and (5) 4- four pcs. of disposable lighter and
unestimated numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu. Petitioner
questioned the validity of the search warrant and filed an Omnibus Motion to
Quash but was denied by the judge.
Lower court found that probable cause was duly established from the
deposition and examination of witness Ruel Nalagon and the testimony of
PO3 Alcoser who personally conducted a surveillance to confirm the
information given by Nalagon. The fact that the items seized were not exactly
the items listed in the warrant does not invalidate the same because the
items seized bear a direct relation to the crime of illegal possession of
firearms. Respondent judge also found that petitioner was sufficiently
identified in the warrant although his first name was erroneously stated
therein as Romulo and not Bernard, considering that the warrant was
couched in terms that would make it enforceable against the person and
residence of petitioner and no other.
ISSUES:
(1) Was petitioner sufficiently described in the search and seizure warrant?
(2) Was there probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant
against petitioner?
(3) Whether or not the firearms and explosive allegedly found in petitioners
residence are admissible in evidence against him even though said firearms
were not listed in the search and seizure warrant. Immaterial due to a void
search warrant.
RULING:
(1) YES. the failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the
first name of petitioner, which is Bernard and not Romulo or Rumolo,
does not invalidate the warrant because the additional description alias
Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao,
Bukidnon sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate and identify the
petitioner. . What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party, and
not one which, as in the instant case, contains a descriptio personae that will
enable the officer to identify the accused without difficulty.
(2) NO. Nowhere in the affidavit and testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor
in PO3 Macrino L. Alcosers application for the issuance of a search warrant
was it mentioned that petitioner had no license to possess a firearm. PO3
Alcoser and his witness Ruel Nalagon did not have personal knowledge but
only personal belief of petitioners lack of license to possess firearms,
ammunitions and explosives; and did not adduce the evidence required to

prove the existence of probable cause. Hence, the search and seizure warrant
issued on the basis of the evidence presented is void.

(3) The settled rule is that where entry into the premises to be searched
was gained by virtue of a void search warrant, prohibited articles seized in
the course of the search are inadmissible against the accused. Prohibited
articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it
was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a
warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short,
the military officers who entered the petitioners premises had no right to be
there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. Search

and Seizure Warrant is declared VOID and the articles seized by virtue thereof
are declared inadmissible in evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO C. ESTELLA, appellant.
[G.R. Nos. 138539-40. January 21, 2003]

FACTS:
Prior to Nov. 20, 1996, Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the RTC
of Zambales issued a warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure in the
residence of appellant at Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc,
Zambales. On same day, Senior Police Officer (SPO1) Antonio Buloron, then
Intelligence and Investigation Officer, together with SPO1 Jose Arca and
several other members of the Provincial Special Operation Group based in
Burgos, San Marcelino, Zambales, coordinated with the members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) in Masinloc and sought the assistance of
Barangay Captain Rey Barnachea of Baloganon, Masinloc for the enforcement
of the search warrant. On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw Estrella
sitting on a rocking chair located about 2 meters away from a hut owned by
Narding Estella, brother of appellant, and being rented by Estrella's live-in
partner, named Eva. They approached Estrella and showed him the search
warrant. Estrella surrendered to the team 2 cans containing dried marijuana
fruiting tops. One can contained 20 bricks of fruiting tops. The team searched
the hut in the presence of Estrella and his live-in partner. They found a plastic
container which contained 4 big bricks of dried marijuana leaves and a .38
caliber revolver with four live ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited
drug, the revolver and ammunitions. SPO1 Buloron and his companions
arrested Estrella and brought him to San Marcelino, Zambales.
The defense, however has different version, denied having surrendered to
policeman Buloron tin cans containing marijuana and likewise having any
firearm. Appellant also claims that the hut, which was searched by the police
and where the subject marijuana was recovered, does not belong to him. He
points to another house as his real residence. Estella was investigated at San
Marcelino, Zambales where he informed the police officers of the fact that the
house they searched was occupied by Spouses Vicente and Fely Bakdangan.
Still, Estrella was charged for possession of prohibited drugs and unlicensed
firearms. On the other hand, Estrella was acquitted from the charge of
violation of PD 1866 The .38 caliber revolver without serial number and 4 live
ammunitions, subject of the offense, were however ordered delivered to any

authorized representative of the Philippine National Police, Firearms and

Explosives Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City. Estrella appealed said
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the search undertaken inside the hut during which the incriminating
evidence was allegedly recovered was legal.
RULING:
There is no convincing proof that Estrella indeed surrendered the
prohibited drug, whether voluntarily or otherwise. In fact, the testimony of
Prosecution Witness Barnachea clouds rather than clarifies the prosecution's
story. Given this backdrop, the police authorities cannot claim that the search
was incident to a lawful arrest. Such a search presupposes a lawful or valid
arrest and can only be invoked through Section 5 (Arrest without warrant;
when lawful), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
All told, without sufficient admissible evidence against appellant, the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt with moral certainty. Not only did its
evidence fall short of the quantum of proof required for a conviction, it has
also failed to present any evidence at all. Under our Bill of Rights, among the
fundamental rights of the accused is to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. To overcome such presumption, the prosecution must
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Our criminal justice system dictates
that if the prosecution fails to do so, it becomes not only the right of the
accused to be set free, but also the constitutional duty of the court to set
them free. This principle leaves this Court no option but to acquit Appellant
Antonio C. Estella for insufficiency of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE. Antonio C. Estella is
ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. MELLY SARAP y ARCANGELES and ROGER AMAR y MATEO, accusedappellant.
[G.R. No. 132165. March 26, 2003]
FACTS:
Armed with a search warrant, SPO4 Gelacio R. Guarino, Chief of Police of
Banga, Aklan together with PO2 Jhanny Navida, raided the house of Conrado
Ricaforte at Rizal St., Poblacion, Banga, Aklan on March 2, 1996, relative to
the reported sale of marijuana by its occupants, Jonalyn Duran, Joysie Duran
and Pepe Casabuena. The three were apprehended for illegal possession of
marijuana and were detained at the Banga Police Station. In the course of
their investigation, the police learned that a certain Melly from Capiz and

Roger Amar were the suppliers of marijuana and that they will be back on
March 4, 1996.
On March 4, 1996, Janet Iguiz, caretaker of the house of Conrado Ricaforte
informed Guarino that there were two strangers looking for the Duran sisters.
Then they proceeded to the house and saw a woman, who turned out to be
accused-appellant Melly Sarap. Melly saw Guarino and Navida in police
uniform and immediately threw away her black canvass bag, which Roger
Amar picked up. Guarino Blocked Saraps path and grabbed from her the
green plastic bag she was holding. The plastic bag was found to contain two
blocks of marijuana fruiting tops. Navida pursued Amar and arrested him. The
accused-apellant denied the accusations against her. The Court fines accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article II, Sec 4 of Republic Act
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. The accused appealed
the decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
(1)

Whether the warrantless search and arrest conducted is legal.

(2) Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to find

the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
A search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a
warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution. Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and
seizures are inadmissible as evidence, pursuant to Article III, Section 3 (2) of
the Constitution. Warrantless searches and seizures may be made without a
warrant in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2)
search of a moving motor vehicle, (3) search in violation of custom laws, (4)
seizure of the evidence in plain view, (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, (6) stop and frisk and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances. These instances, however do not
dispense with the requisite of probable cause before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted. In warrantless search cases, probable
cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a
crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the appellants conviction cannot
stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence to convict her. That the search
disclosed marijuana fruiting tops in appellants possession, and thus
confirmed the police officers initial information and suspicion, did not cure its
patent illegality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest
effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search for being a

fruit of a poisonous tree.

All told, the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt measured by the required moral certainty of conviction. The evidence
presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome the presumption
of innocence as constitutionally ordained
Wherefore the Accused-appellant Melly Sarap y Arcangeles is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Ramon B. Ceniza, Federico C. Cabilao Jr., Nelson J. Rosal and Alejandro R.

Alinsug, petitioners
vs.
Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit and National Treasurer,
respondents

G.R. No. L-52304

January 28, 1980

Facts:
On December 22, 1978, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg.
51, providing rules regarding the upcoming local election on January 30,
1980. To implement this act, the Commission on Elections(COMELEC) adopted
Resolution No. 1421, which barred qualified voters from highly urbanized and
chartered component cities(unless if its charter provides the contrary) to
vote for positions in the provincial level. The resolution listed the City of
Mandaue and Cebu among the cities not entitled to participate in the proprovincial elections. Cebu was included because it was classified as a highly
urbanized city(having income not less than 40,000,000 pesos) while Mandaue
though only a component city, however its charter expressly provides that its
registered voters cannot vote, except to be a candidate thereof. Ramon
Ceniza, in behalf of a group called DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved
to Succeed), filed a petition assailing that Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 and
Republic Act No. 5519(Charter of Mandaue City) are unconstitutional. The
petitioners contend that, Section 96, Art. XVIII of the Charter of Mandaue is
unconstitutional for it went into effect without the benefit of ratification by
the residents in a plebiscite or referendum. They also claimed that political
and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of BP Blg. 51 pointing
out the province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition
bailiwick. Most importantly, Sec. 3 of Batas Blg. 51, that classifies Cebu City
as a highly urbanized city as the only basis for not allowing its electorate for
provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional and such
classification is not based upon substantial distinctions making it
unreasonable which amounts to denial of equal protection.

Issue:
Are the voters of Mandaue and Cebu City denied with the equal protection of
the law?

Ruling:
The Court found no merit in the petition. The classification of cities into
highly urbanized cities and components cities on the basis of their regular
income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would

show whether or not is capable of existence and development as a relatively

independent social, economic and political unit. Cities with smaller income
need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the
continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in
some instances.
The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of
similar right and privileges granted by law. The law would have been
discriminatory and a denial of equal protection of the law if the statute
prohibited an individual or group of voters in the city from voting for
provincial officials while granting it to another individual or groups of voters in
the same city. Moreover, the practice of allowing voters in one component
city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in
another city is a matter of legislative discretion which neither violates the
Constitution nor the voters right of suffrage. It cannot be considered also an
infringement upon such right since the Constitution confers no right to a
voter in a city to vote for provincial officials of the province where the city is
located. Their right is limited to the right to vote for elective city officials in
local elections in which the questioned statute neither withdraw nor restrict.
On the constitutionality of the Charter of the City of Mandaue; the
constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or in a barrio
should be subjected to the approval by the majority of votes cast in a
plebiscite in the government unit or units affected is a new requirement that
came into being only with the 1973 Constitution, which is prospective
therefore cannot affect the creation of Mandaue City on June 21, 1969.
Finally, on the claims of political and gerrymandering motives is of no
factual or legal basis. Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an
appointment of representative districts as to give an unfair advantage to the
party in power. The questioned statutes do not apportion representative
districts nor has it been shown that there has been an unfair advantage in
favor of the candidates in power.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. Costs against the petitioners

Gil V. Manlavi, complainant,

vs.
Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, City of Puerto
Princesa, respondent
A.M. No. RTJ-95-1293
May 9, 1995

Facts:
On January 18, 1991 at Brgy. Mandaragat, Pureto Princesa City, the accused
dis then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess illegally caught assorted
fish with the use of explosives weighing more or less eight thousand (8,000)
kilos. The complainant filed thereafter Criminal Cases No. 9210(Illegal
Possession of Explosives Intended for Fishing) and 9211 (Illegal Possession of
Illegally Caught Fish) against the accused. The cases were consolidated for
trial at the sala of the Honorable respondent. The accused then moved to
quash Criminal Case No. 9210 on the ground that the evidence of the
prosecution was a product of a warrantless and illegal search and seizure and
also moved to quash Criminal Case Criminal case 9211 on the ground that
the information failed to charge the offense of illegal possession of fish
caught by explosives for its failure to allege the element of profit.

The respondent granted both the motion to quash the criminal cases filed.
The prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the order but was denied.
The complainant then charged the respondent with partiality, miscarriage of
justice and knowingly rendering an unjust decision in connection with the
dismissal of the Criminal Cases Nos. 9210 and 9211.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge erred in dismissing the case due to warrantless
arrest and search and seizure.
Ruling:
The complaint is dismissed. As to the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 9210,
complainant himself admitted that the search and seizure was conducted in
the absence of a warrant and that the search warrant was only produced by
the complainant after the search and seizure took place. The complainant
invoked Circular No. 130(s.1967) of the Office of the President to justify the
warrantless search. The said circular pertains to the procedure in the
confiscation of fish caught by the use of explosives. Such confiscation may be
exercised only by the Commissioner of Fisheries or his representatives who
can only take a sample of the fish caught (not to exceed one kilo) for testing
if the fish were indeed caught through the use of explosives. It is only upon
the determination that the fish were caught through the use of explosives
when the seizure of the entire catch may be authorized. Thereafter, an
appraisal of the value of the fish caught shall be made, which shall be paid to
the accused should he be subsequently acquitted in the criminal case filed
against him. The arresting officer failed to show compliance with the
procedure prescribed by the very circular they invoked.
As to the dismissal of the Criminal Case 9211, though the respondent
erred in holding that the information was defective that the information was
defective in not alleging that the offense was committed knowingly
because the element of knowledge was encompassed within the word
willfully; however, the information failed to allege the element of profit.
Though it is true that the prohibits Presidential Decree No. 704 prohibits the
separate acts of possessing, dealing in, selling or disposing of illegally caught
fish and aquatic products, but said acts must not only be done knowingly
but also for profit, as essential element of the offense.

People of the Philippines, plaintiff- appellee,

vs.
Rolando Codilla, German Lucanas and Marcelo Putulin, accused-appellants

Facts:

On May 24, 1990 at about 3:00 oclock in the early morning at Brgy.
Concepcion, Ormoc City, Helen and her sister Leticia Pepito were awakened
from their sleep. When they opened their eyes they were surprised to see two
men carrying bolos and flashlights. One of the men asked if they had money;
when Helen replied that they have none, she was ordered to go down the
kitchen while her sister was brought to the sala by and there Helen was
allegedly raped by Rolando Codilla and while her siste was raped by Marcelo
Putulin.
Also on November 27, 1990 at 3:00 o clock in the morning, Margarita
Alpos was sexually abused by two men who she identified as Rolando Codilla
and German Lucanas. At around 2:30 of the same date, Sgt. Romeo
Penarada together PFC Mamento Sarcol Jr, PFC Diosdado Tagalog, Pat.
Eduardo Bituin and CVO Manuel Pepito proceeded to the place where the
alleged rape suspects were hiding and thus the police were able to
apprehend the suspects and brought them to the Ormoc City Police Station.
The RTC convicted the appellants for the crime of rape and as well as to
indemnify the victims for damages.
The accused-appellants then filed a petition to review and reverse the
decision. However, during the pendency of the appeal, Roland Codilla
escaped from jail on July 27, 1991 while German Lucanas whereabouts
remains unknown after a flashflood hit their cells. As such only the appeal of
Putulin was the only petition the court has resolved.

Issue:
Whether or not the nature and circumstances surrounding their arrest is
violative of their constitutional right against illegal warrantless arrest.

Ruling:
The appellant started his defense by challenging his warrantless arrest and
detention for two days without any charges being filed against him. However,
this argument must be rejected by the court for the simple reason that he is
estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being
raised for the first time by the appellant before this court. He did not move
for the quashal of the information before the trial court. Hence, any
irregularity for his arrest, if any was cured when he voluntarily submitted

himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and
participating in the trial.
Wherefore, the assailed judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs
against the petitioners.

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin Jr., accused-appellant

Facts:
At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, the Cavite City Police
Station has receiveda telephone call that a person had been shot near the
cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this
reason, a police team composed of SPO1 Malinao Jr. , PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy
Jr., PO3 Manicio and SPO3 Manalo responded to the call and found Henry P.
Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle. A tricycle driver, who refused to
divulge his name, then told PO3 Rosal that the accused-appellant and the
victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Caf, located about a
kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. Danet Garcellana, a food
server/ waitress at the said caf told the police investigators that she had
seen the accused arrive together with the victim however she did not know if
they left together. Garcellano described the accused-appellant in which then
another tricycle driver told the investigators that he knows a person that fits
the description given by the waitress and told them where his house is.
As they went to the house and upon entering, SPO1 Malinao noticed a
bloodied white Hanes t-shirt. As he picked up the shirt, two(2) spent .38
caliber shells fell. As they proceeded the search, PO3 Estoy found on top of a
plastic water container outside the bathroom a homemade Smith and Wesson
caliber .38 revolver and five live ammunitions. The police station then took
custody of Cubcubin and the evidences found. After an evaluation of the
evidence, a formal criminal complaint was then filed against the accusedappellant.
The trial court convicted the accused-appellant guilty as
charged for murder.

Issues:
Whether or not the arrest of the accused- appellee was valid.
Whether or not the search and seizure of the alleged incriminating evidences
was valid and legal.

Ruling:
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended
points out the three instances when warrantless arrest is lawful. The case at
bar, falls under par. B Sec. 5 which provides that for a warrantless arrest to be
valid, two conditions must concur: first, the offender has just committed an
offense and second, the arresting peace officer has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has
been held that personal knowledge of facts in an arrest without warrant
must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable ground for suspicion. In this case, the arrest of the accusedappellant was shortly after the victim was killed. The question therefore, is
whether there was probable cause for the arresting officer to believe that
the accused committed the crime. The court found none. The arresting
officers did not have personal knowledge of the facts as their knowledge of
the circumstance from which they allegedly inferred that the accused was
probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been told by others.
They merely relied on information given to them by others.
As to the validity of the search and seizure, even assuming that the
warrantless arrest to be valid as the prosecution contends, the search cannot
be considered incidental thereto. A valid warrantless search incidental to a
valid arrest allows only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either
in the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.
It is clear that the warrantless arrest cannot be justified on this ground for
neither the t-shirt nor the gun were within the area of accused-appellants
control. Nor the warrantless search is justified under the plain-view
doctrine. The alleged evidences against the accused did not merely stumble
upon the police officers as such they are purposely sought it. Hence the
things obtained as a result of the search are illegal and are inadmissible
evidence against the Cubcubin.
Wherefore, the decision of the RTC charging the accused guilty of murder is
reversed and he is acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
Antolin Cuizon y Ortega, Steve Pua y Clofas alias Stephen Po y Uy or
Tommy Sy and Paul Lee y Wong alias Paul Leung, accused-appellants

Facts:
On February 21, 1992 accused Cuizon and his wife from Hongkong at the
NAIA. After which they proceeded to the arrival area of the airport where they
handed down four (4) travelling bags to the accused Steve Pua and Paul Lee.
On the other hand, a group of NBI agents have posted themselves before the

arrival of the couple at the airport for the purpose of apprehending them
because they allegedly brought with them a huge quantity of shabu as tipped
by an informant from Hongkong. The accused Pua and Lee loaded the bags in
a taxicab which they boarded in leaving the airport while the accused Cuizon
and his wife took another vehicle. At this juncture, the other team positioned
at the parking area was radioed to intercept the vehicle accused Pua and Lee
boarded, however the communication was not completely received as they
radio ran out of battery power.
Realizing the failure, the group followed the vehicle taken by Pua
and Lee which proceeded to Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati. With the help
of the Chief Security Officer of the hotel, they apprehended Lee and Pua in
their hotel room and confiscated four (4) travelling bags; three (3) of which
yielded a plastic containing a white substance suspected to be shabu.
Thereafter, the team proceeded to the house of accused Cuizon, taking with
them Pua and Lee. Retrieved from the accused Cuizons residence was
another bag containing a substance likewise suspected to be shabu; in
addition a .38 caliber firearm.
All of them were then taken into custody by the NBI and was the
charged (with the exception of Cuizons wife) in violation of Section 15 of R.A.
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The RTC found the accusedappellants guilty as charged.

Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrests and warrantless search and seizures
conducted by the NBI against the accused are legal and constitutional.
Ruling:
The court cannot agree at the conclusion of the trial court that the appellants
were caught in flagrante delicto which would have justified the warrantless
search. Paragraph (a) of Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful
arrest without warrant requires that the person be arrested after he has
committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to
commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. These
requirements are not present, for at the time of the arrest, appellants Pua and
Lee were merely resting in their hotel room and appellant Cuizon was in his
bed resting with his wife and children. No offense had just been committed,
or was being committed by the accused n the presence of the lawmen.
Paragraph (b) of the same rule is also inapplicable as such its
requirements have not been met. The prosecution failed to establish that at

the time of the arrest an offense has in fact just been committed and the
arresting officer has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
accused-appellants have committed it. Appellant Cuizon could not, by the
mere act of handing over four(4) pieces of luggage to the other two
appellants be considered to have committed the offense of carrying and
transporting prohibited drugs. The only reason why such it became a
felonious deed was because of an alleged tip received by the NBI that
morning. The NBI merely relied on hearsay information and such under the
circumstance it failed to establish that they have personal knowledge
sufficient and reasonable enough to believe that the appellants had
committed a crime at the point when the search and seizure were made.
Therefore, accused-appellant Cuizon is acquitted on constitutional ground.

G.R. NO. 128845,

JUNE 1, 2000
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor
and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the
Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his
capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is
a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of
foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree
authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel
selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities,
such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations
attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted
for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers
as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and
(2) local-hires. Classification varies from four (4) queries, viz;
a. What is one's domicile?
b. Where is one's home economy?
c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was
the School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.
Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a
legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all
faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether
foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually
caused a deadlock between the parties.

ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the
NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School.
ISSUE:
Should the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires?

RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is
entitled to humane conditions of work. These conditions are not restricted
to the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as
well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor
Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates
to afford labor full protection. The State has the right and duty to regulate
the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely
contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts,
collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the
local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of
all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to
the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1)
the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of
employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining units
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will
best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their

intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective

bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that
these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited
tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform
similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires,
foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreignhires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include
foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either
group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby
GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according
foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.

G.R. No. 133254-55,

April 19, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant
FACTS:
On December 26, 1995, around 10:30 p.m., a group of about ten (10)
policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of the
accused-appellant, Roberto Salanguit y Ko, a search warrant was shown, and
the police operatives started searching the house. They found heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip
box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried
leaves which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. Charges against
Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for
possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-

64358, respectively) were filed, and after hearing, the trial court convicted
him in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16
and 8, respectively.
The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against him was
inadmissible because the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.
ISSUES:
1.
Was the warrant find invalid for failure of providing evidence to support
the seizure of drug paraphernalia?
2.
Whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the
plain view doctrine.
RULING:
Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu
and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of
the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that
there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is
void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized
by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant
issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it
authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure
of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented
showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the
seizure of shabu from Salanguits residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly
issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined
by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
With respect to, and in light of the plain view doctrine, the police failed to
allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was
recovered on Salanguits person or in an area within his immediate control.
Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the
shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in
his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to
Criminal Case Q-95-64357, accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of
possession of illegal drugs S16 of R.A.No. 6425.

GR No. 94054-67
February 19, 1991

VICENTE LIM SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, petitioner

Vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, respondents

FACTS:

On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the
airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of
Masbate province of Masbate ,Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his
security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro,
and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante
Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the
assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
An investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated
investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service
at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim,
Sr.,Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez,
Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the
crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport
incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order
dated July 31, 1989 stating therein that . . . after weighing the affidavits and
answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary
examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable
cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named
accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie
Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr.,
Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy
Dumalag and Rene Tuallaalias Tidoy.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court
several motions and manifestations which in substance prayed that an order
be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary
inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate
for the best enlightenment regarding the existence of a probable cause or
prima facie evidence as well as the determination of the existence of guilt,
pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall
be issued unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally
convinced of such probable cause.
In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing
to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light
of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary
investigation. It should also be noted that the Lims also presented to the
respondent Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies
were used to establish a prima facie case against them.

On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of
merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against
the accused including the petitioners herein. The judge wrote, In the instant
cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial
Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that
the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are
probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial
Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate
informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to
whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of
probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and
there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely
on the prosecutor's certification in each information
Petitioners question the judgment of Judge Felix.
ISSUE:
WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on
the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause
exists?
RULING:
The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56,
Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID
and SET ASIDE. As held in Soliven v. Makasiar, the Judge does not have to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can
perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence.
However, there should be necessary documents and a report supporting the
Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge. We cannot
determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination
should be. Usually, this depends on the circumstances of each case. The
Judge has to exercise sound discretion; after all, the personal determination is
vested in the Judge by the Constitution. However, to be sure, the Judge must
go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever
necessary. As mentioned in the facts (stated above), the Lims presented
documents of recantations of the witnesses. Although, the general rule is that
recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in
the granting of a new trial the respondent Judge before issuing his own
warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the records of the
preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now
presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones"
prevailing in the cases. In making the required personal determination, a
Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by

responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances

of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the
Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues
a warrant of arrest. Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix)committed a
grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutors certification and issued
the questioned Order dated July 5,1990 without having before him any other
basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.

G.R. Nos. 130568-69

March 21, 2000.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
CHE CHUN TING alias DICK, accuses-appellant
FACTS:
Accused-appellant, Che Chun Ting alias DICK, a Hong Kong national, was
charged and convicted for dispatching in transit and dispatching 999.43
grams of shabu and possessioning and control 5, 578.68 grams of the same
drug. He contends that the methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is
inadmissible in evidence as it was seized without a valid search warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether the white crystalline seized under his Unit without valid search
warrant an inadmissible in evidence.

RULING:
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless

search under the exception, the same must be limited to and circumscribed
by the subject, time and place of the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless
search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and
things that may be seized from him are limited to dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search, it must be
contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the
search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or
immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested,
or the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
It must be stressed that the purposes of the exception are only to protect the
arresting officer against physical harm from the person being arrested who
might be armed with a concealed weapon, and also to prevent the person
arrested from destroying the evidence within his reach. The exception
therefore should not be strained beyond what is needed in order to serve its
purposes.
As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion
thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. They are
regarded as having been obtained from a polluted source, the fruit of a
poisonous tree. However, objects and properties the possession of which is
prohibited by law cannot be returned to their owners notwithstanding the
illegality of their seizure. Thus, the shabu seized by the NARCOM operatives,
which cannot legally be possessed by the accused under the law, can and
must be retained by the government to be disposed of in accordance with
law.

GR No. 96177,
January 27, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

Vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant

FACTS:

On December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga City, accused-appellant,

Mari Musa was willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sells to one Sgt. Amado
Ani, two (2) wrappers of plastic bags containing dried marijuana leaves
during the buy-bust operation.

Accused-appellant contends that seizure of the plastic bag is

unreasonable, hence, inadmissible evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana
inside it is unreasonable and the found evidence is inadmissible.

RULING:

Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not

be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident
to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the
object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the
plain view of the object.

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police.
They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in
search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore,
the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the
plain view of said object.

Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally
and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of
the Constitution.

G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and
TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for
short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male
and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity
of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and
Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against
males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of
the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in
character.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents
Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988,
the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of
Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria,
and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines,"
the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. The
petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act
similarly with respect to male workers.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the Department Order No. 1 Series of 1988 of the

Department of labor and Employment
violates the constitution?

RULING: .
The discrimination of male workers from the female workers was justified
because there is no evidence that the male workers were abused. But the
Order was not in contrary to the constitution because it is the duty of the
state to provide full protection to labor and that Department Order No. 1 did
not prescribe a total ban on overseas deployment and the alleged violation of
right to travel was not violated because such right must submit to the
demands and necessities of the Statess power of regulation for public safety.

[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1576. June 28, 2001]

SIMPLICIO ALIB, for himself and in behalf of the members of the
MANDALAGAN SMALL FARMERS COOPERATIVE, complainants, vs. JUDGE
EMMA C. LABAYEN of the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, Branch
46,respondent.
FACTS:
Complainants charge the respondent Judge Emma Labayen of the Regional
Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 with grave abuse of authority and grave
misconduct. They allege that an Information for Perjury docketed to Criminal

Case No. 98-19271 was filed against several members of the Mandalangan
Small Farmers Cooperative with Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City. Judge
Labayen issued a warrant of arrest against the accused therein. The accused
filed a "Motion for Re- investigation and Recall of Warrant of Arrest" and a
Supplemental thereto alleging that the court has no jurisdiction as the crime
of perjury is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities.
Respondent Judge Labayen filed a Supplemental Pleading reiterating that as
pairing judge of Branch 45, it was ministerial on her part to sign warrants of
arrest coming from Branch 45 and that when she realized that the case was
within the jurisdiction of the MTCC, she had the case remanded as shown in
her Order dated October 2, 1998. Respondent Judge claims she acted
without malice and in good faith.
ISSUES:
Whether or not acting without malice and in good faith not knowing the
exact probable cause of the warrant of arrest issued constitutes gross
ignorance of the law?
RULING:
Yes, before issuing a warrant of arrest, a judge must not rely solely on the
report or resolution of the prosecutor, he must evaluate the report and the
supporting documents which will assist him to make his determination of
probable cause. A finding of the existence of a probable cause is a prerequisite to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and strict compliance
therewith is required of judges.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay
City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar. On
November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said
complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner a telegram to summon him.
On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to
operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D.
Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205.
On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita
B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty.
Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to
implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted
by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal
and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner
at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that
petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place,
the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora
Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora
Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with
Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials,
she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon
twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty
more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were
duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora
Salazar.

On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA stating to return the
confiscated items on the ground that the said seizure was contrary to law and
against the will of the owner and among the others reasons are they have not
been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order
No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed
under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution. Their action also violates
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the
people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose." And lastly the premises invaded by Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5)
others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family,
and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal properties
belonging to our client were without her consent and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color
of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293
and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUES:
Whether the promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
Yes, the promulgated Presidential Decree was unconstitutional because
under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no
other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search where the only exception
is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, for the purpose of
deportation.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138881. December 18, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LEILA JOHNSON Y
REYES, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58
years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a
former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on June 16, 1968
and had since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric
patients and those with Alzheimers disease, in convalescent homes in the
United States.
On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her sons family in
Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26.
On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic
on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out
at 5:30 p.m. the next day, June 26, 1998.

At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker
at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing
passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited
drugs, contraband goods, and explosives.
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger
bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt
something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson
explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone
an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy.
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her
superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty
lang po iyon. (Sir, I do not believe that it is just a panty.) She was directed
to take accused-appellant to the nearest womens room for inspection.
Ramirez took accused-appellant to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1
Rizalina Bernal. Ramirez then asked her to bring out the thing under her
girdle. Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez
then turned over to Embile, outside the womens room. The confiscated
packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a total of 580.2 grams
of a substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
ISSUES:
Whether the arrest without warrant is lawful?
RULING:
Yes, because according to Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Vs
. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION
FACTS:The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
counts[1] is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his
having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUES: Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that
allows different treatment?
RULING: The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded.

People

vs.
Lacerna
G.R. No. 109250
September 25, 1997
Facts:
On September 12, 1992, Marlon Lacerna and Noriel Lacerna were
aboard in a taxi cab when the mobile patrol car of PO3 Angelito Camer and
PO3 Carlito P. Valenzuela, members of the Mobile Patrol Division of Western
Police District stop them for being so suspicious. The police officer asked
permission if they can search the vehicle, and the occupants answered yes.
When the police officer went searching they found in the occupants luggage
a knapsack and a dark blue plastic bag. When the police officer asked what is
the content of the plastic bag, Noriel Lacerna immediately answered that it
contains his vomit. Sceptical to Noriel Lacernas answer, PO3 Valenzuela
made a small hole and peeped inside and saw several bricks wrapped in a
newspaper. Officer Valenzuela took a brick and when he opened it, it turned
out to be Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Issue:
Whether or not the bricks of Marijuana be admissible in the court
and use as evidence against the accused
Held:
Yes, the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable
searches and seizure are not violated and the evidences are obtained legally
and the evidence does not constitute as fruit of a poisonous tree. The
accused allowed to be searched when he gave the consent to be search to
the police officers. It was his consent which validated the search, waiver
being a generally recognized exception to the rule against warrantless
search. The marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained legally through a valid
search and seizure. They were admissible in evidence.

Jose Burgos
vs.

Chief of Staff
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984

Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the
premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of
items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed
that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for
the return of the seized items and articles, and thus those seized articles will
not be used by the respondents against the petitioners in the court.
The petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and
that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In
addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.
Issue:
Whether or not, the two warrants are valid to justify the seizure of
the items.
Held:
The warrants are null and void. The Court found out that the
affidavit for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of
probable cause because the statements of the witnesses are mere
generalizations. Furthermore, jurisprudence prohibits the issuance of general
warrants. In this case, the warrant issued doesnt describe and enumerate
the items to be searched and seized and did not indicate and specify the
subversive nature of the said items.

People
vs.
Mendoza
G.R. No. 109279
January 18, 1999
Facts:
On November 11, 1988, Octavio Mendoza, his wife Cecilia and their
10 yr. Old daughter Charmaine went to the birthday party of a relative in
McDonalds, Harrison Plaza. During the party, Octavio left without telling his
wife and kid, and went to Kentucky Fried Chicken and Restaurant where he
had some beer. Since Cecilia and Charamaine couldnt find him in the party,
they went home at #2 TRAMO ST. CAMELLA HOMES, PHASE III, PAMPLONA,
LAS PINAS. They arrived home at 7pm, and still Octavio was not at home and
Cecilia left again to go to her parents in Bacoor to bring perfume. They got
home around 9pm and saw Octavios car parked in the garage of their
neighbour. All the lights were opened but the front door was locked. After a
while, Octavio opened the back door and let them in. He was drunk and told
her daughter to get cold water and douse him. She followed and was
instructed to go to her room. She went and got ready for bed. She heard her
parents arguing about them leaving the party without Octavio. Afterwards,
she heard THREE GUNSHOTS, ran to their room and saw her mom on the floor
bleeding. She also saw her dad hide a gun under the bed. Octavio called his
brother-in-law Sgt. Antonio Gabac. When Gabac arrived, they all brought him
to Perpetual Help Hospital where Cecila was declared dead on arrival. The
policemen investigated Gabac and found a gun in his waist. A .38 calibre
revolver. He told them that Octavio handed it over to him as soon as he
arrived at the crime scene. Cecilias father, Alipio Eusebio learned of his
daughters death and that valuable were being taken away from her house.
He and his sons decided to go there and remove the rest of the property,
including a memorandum receipt signed by Octavio and a mission order
authorizing him to carry such weapon. At court, Charmaine testified that she

saw her father hide the gun under the bed. On her second testimony, she
said she saw no such act. Octavio also denied that he killed his wife and that
he owned that gun. He said that the memorandum receipt and mission order
were illegally procured by Eusebio in violation of his right against
unreasonable search and seizure.

Issue:
Does the Constitutional right of Octavio Mendoza against unreasonable
searches and seizures have been violated when Eusebio took the
memorandum receipt to the court?

Held:
No, because the peoples Constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizure can only be invoke if there is interference from the
Government and it these rights cannot be extended if the acts are committed
by private individuals. In this case, the memorandum receipt and other
articles were discovered by Alipio, Cecilias father, a private individual and
handed it over to Eusibio.

Peralta
vs.
COMELEC
G.R.No. L-47771
March 11, 1978
Facts:
Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang
Pambansa Elections. He, along with others, assailed the constitutionality of

PD 1269 or the 1978 Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to

28, of the 1978 Election Code, grants the voter the option to vote either for
individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of
candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political
party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided for in the
ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation or office-block
ballot. Peralta was determined in contending that the optional block voting
scheme is violative of this provision of the Constitution: Bonafide candidates
for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination. He sought the shelter of its protection for himself and other
independent candidates who, according to him, would be thus made to suffer
if the assailed provision is not nullified. Essentially, in terms of individual
rights, he would raise a due process and equal protection question. The main
objection of Peralta against the optional straight party voting provided for in
the Code is that an independent candidate would be discriminated against
because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a political party, a voter
would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage which the
independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that the
candidate who is not a party-member is deprived of the equal protection of
the laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec 9 of Article XII, of
the 1973 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not 1978 Election Code violates the equal protection
clause
Held:
The SC ruled that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares his
ballot, the voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No
candidate will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or
as a candidate of a party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for
the individual candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The
choice is his. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of
candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent candidate or to
join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion.
Certainly, before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the
advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a political party or group.
If he wishes to avail himself of such alleged advantages as an official
candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a political party group or
aggrupation. In other words, the choice is his. In making his decision, it must
be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered the
relative advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the
application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot,

after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim of discrimination.

Waterous Drug Corporation

vs.
NLRC
G.R. No. 113271
October 16, 1997
Facts:
On August 15, 1988, Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a
pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corporation. Catolico purchased 10 bottles of
Voren tablets from Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals a price of 364php per bottle
with its original price of 320php per bottle, overpriced amounting 64php per
bottle. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals sent a check to WDRC for refund of jack-up
price amounting 640php addressed to Catolico. Ms. Saldana, the WDRC clerk
opened the envelope and found out that there was a check amounting
640php issued by YSP. On March 5, 1990, Waterous Drug Corporation issued a
memorandum for Catolicos termination by reason of dishonesty.
Issue:
Whether or not the check admissible in the court as evidence
against Catolico
Held:
Yes. The rationale is the doctrine laid down in the case of People vs.
Marti which states that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. Since
the envelope was opened by Saldana, a private individual, the check is
admissible to court as evidence.

G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994

ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner,

vs.
People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Mapayo ,RTC, Br. 11, Davao City,
respondents

Facts:
Ishmael Himagan, a policeman was assigned in the medical
company of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at Camp
Catitigan, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the
attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations were filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City on September 16, 1992, the trial court
issued and Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on
the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior
and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides the accused suspension
from the office until the case is terminated and such case shall be terminated
within 90 days from arraignment of the accused. The petitioner filed to lift the
order of suspension relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service
Decree and cases of Layno & Deloso but his motion was denied.

Issue:
1.Whether or not the preventive suspension of the petitioner may
be lifted if the case is not terminated within 90 days.

Ruling:
There is nothing in the R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive
suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within the
period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period
without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions. If the
trial is unreasonably delayed without the fault of the accused such that he is
deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy, he may ask
for the dismissal of the case.

The petitioner had also misapplies Sec, 42 of PD 807 which clearly shows the
lifting of preventive suspension in pending ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION
and not in CRIMINAL CASES.

The petitioners reliance on the cases Layno and Deloso is misplaced for the 2
cases only involved in graft and corruption and not in the present case which
Himagan is accused in the crime of murder under the Revise Penal Code. It is
undisputed that he falls under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states
that his suspension shall last until the case is terminated.

Furthermore, the reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from
other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the
application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that the
policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the
legislative discussions. The petition is hereby denied.

G.R. No. 82544, June 28, 1988

Andrew Harvey, John Sherman and Adriaan Van Del Elshout, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago, Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, respondent.

Facts:
Andrew Harvey( 52 years old) and John Sherman (72 years old) are
both American nationals residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna while Adriaan Van
Elshout (58 years old) is a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna.
The petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles
who were apprehended after the three months of close surveillance by CID
(Commission on Immigration and Deportation) agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Seized during petitioners arrest were rolls of photo negatives and
photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as
boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other
literature advertising the child prostitutes. During the operation Harvey was
found together with two young boys and Sherman was found with two naked
young boys inside his room and in the case of Van Den Elshout there were

two children ages 14-16 which subject readily accepted having been in his
care and live-in for quite some time. Petitioners availed for this petition a writ
of Habeas Corpus questioning the validity of their detention.

Issue:

1.
Whether or not the respondent has the authority to arrest and detain
the petitioners pending determination of the existence of probable cause
leading to an administrative investigation.
2.
Whether or not the CID agents were clothed with valid warrants, search
and seizure as required by the Constitution.

Ruling:
The right against unreasonable searches and seizure which is
guaranteed by the constitution is available to all persons including ALIENS
whether accused of a crime or not. One of the constitutional requirements of
a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must have a probable
cause. In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on a probable cause
determined after a close surveillance for three (3) months during which
period their activities was monitored. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and
posters and the said articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and
are therefore, admissible in evidence.

The petitioners were not caught in the act does not make their
arrest illegal. The Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective
rooms, the ones with Sherman were naked. The CID agents had a reasonable
ground to believe that the petitioners had committed pedophilia and it is a
behavior which is offensive to public morals and against State policies. . Also
it is a fundamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when
the confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was
illegal at the beginning. The petition was dismissed and the Habeas Corpus
was denied.

G.R. No. 11920, September 20, 1996

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
Nilo Solayao, accused-appelant

Facts:
On July 9, 1992 about 9 oclock in the evening SPO3 Jose Nino with
CAFGU members conducted intelligence patrol in the Barangay Caulangohan,
Caibiran, Biliran to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming
around the barangays of Caibiran. From Caulangohan they proceeded to
another barangay and met the group of the accused Nilo Solayao. The group
of Spo3 Jose Nino had become suspicious when they observed that that the
latter were drunk and the accused himself was wearing a camouflage
uniform. Upon seeing the government agents the group fled and Nilo was left
behind. The Police officer Nino had seized the dried coconut leaves which Nilo
was carrying and found wrapped a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally
known as latong. SPO3 confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the
custody of the policeman of Cabiran and was charged before the RTC of

Naval, Biliran with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

Issue:
1.

Whether or not there is an unlawful search warrant.

2.
Whether or not the prosecutor was able to prove that there is an
absence of a license or permit to possess the subject firearm.

Ruling:
The argument of the accused-appelant in which there is an
unlawful search warrant is hardly tenable. He and his companions drunken
actuations aroused the suspicious of SPO3 Ninos group as well as the fact
that he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform or single suit and upon
seeing the government agents, his companions fled. It should be noted that
the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports
that armed persons were roaming around the barangay of Caibiran. There
was a justifiable cause to stop and frisk the accused when his companion
fled upon seeing the group of SPO3 Nino. Thus, there was no violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The prosecutor was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that

the accused-appelant admitted before the Police Officer at the time he was
accosted that he did not have any authority or license to carry the subject
firearm when he was asked if he had one, the prosecutor had relied in the
accused appellants admission and didnt do its duty to establish the lack of a
license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a
certification from the government agency concerned. Thus, Nilo Solayao was
acquitted for insuffiency of evidence.

G.R. No. 11318, August 28, 1996

Columbia pictures Inc., petitioners
vs.
Court of Appeals, respondents

Facts:
The Petitioners with the National Bureau of Investigation filed a
complaint for violation of P.D. 49 and sought assistance with the NBIS antifilm privacy against Sunshine Home Video Inc. which is owned and operated
by Danilo A. Pelindario. On November 14, 1987 NBI Senior Agent Reyes
applied for a search warrant with a court a quo against Sunshine Home Video
Inc. seeking the seizure, among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted
films and television sets, video cassettes, laser recording equipments and
other machines and paraphernalia used for the unlawful exhibition, showing,
reproduction, sale, lease or disposition of videogram tapes in the premises.
The search warrant was served about 1:45 p.m. on December 14, 1987 and
seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or
exclusively distributed by private complainants, machines and equipments.
On December 16, 1987 a RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT was filed with the

court and MOTION TO LIFT THE ORDER OF SEARCH WARRANT for lack of merit
in which the master tapes from which the pirated films were allegedly copies
were never presented in the proceedings in the issuance of search warrant.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a probable cause for the issuance of the
Search Warrant.

Ruling:
Probable cause for a search warrant has been defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be search. Hence, the
applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare with the
purchase evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether
the latter is an authorized reproduction of the owner. The judge bases for the
issuance of the search warrant is only the personal knowledge of the subject
matter of NBI Agent Reyes, Atty. Rico Domingo and Rene Baltazar and also
their respective testimonies without stating the fact by which these were
pirated and it is a conclusion of facts without basis. A search warrant not
based on a probable cause is a nullity, or is void, and the issuance thereof is,
in legal contemplation and arbitrary.

G.R. No. 95122-23, May 31, 1991

Board of Commissioner, petitioner

vs.
Judge De la Rosa

Facts:
Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen
following the citizenship of his natural mother, Machana Gatchalian, on July
12, 1960. Santiago had 5 children and one of those children had a son named
William Gatchalian who arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria,
Francisco and Johnson carried with them the Certificates of Registration and
identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong which was signed by
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. On January 24, 1962 the Secretary of Justice

issued a memorandum No. 9 directed the Board of Commissioner to review

all the cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a
Philippine Citizen among these cases was William Gatchalian and others. The
citizenship of William was questioned and he was alleged as an alien. A
warrant of arrest was issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for
purposes of investigation of William.

Issue:
Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration is null and void for being unconstitutional.

Ruling:
The Immigration Act of 1940 reads that the following aliens shall
be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the
Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien.
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of
implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are
concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrests
only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of
the ground for deportation charged against the alien. In other words, a
warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid,
must be for the sole purpose of executing final order of deportation.
It is not necessary that an alien be arrested for the purpose of
investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of warrant of arrest is to
determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of
constitutionality for only JUDGES can issue the same.
Hence, a warrant issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for
purposes of investigation only is null and void for being unconstitutional.

G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939

The People of the Philippines
Vs
Cayat
Facts:
Cayat is a native of Baguio prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 and was
sentenced by the justice of the peace of Baguio to pay a fine or suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On January 25, 1937, the City of Baguio accused Cayat of illegally possessing
a gin, which the members of his tribe have been accustomed themselves to
make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Cayat interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, Cayat
admitted the alleged facts but pleaded not guilty. But trial court found him
guilty and sentenced him of the fine or imprisonment.
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds: (1)
That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.

(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Issue:
1.Whether or not Cayat accused of illegally possessing a gin?

2. Whether or not that is improper exercise of the police power of the state?

Held:
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated
by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to
be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
(1) Substantial Distinction: . It is not based upon "accident of birth or
parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of
civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious
belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives
of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities." This distinction is
unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar
conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.
(2) Germane to the purpose of law: it is unquestionably designed to insure
peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad
experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that
the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have
often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of
the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
(3) it must not be limited to conditions: The law is not limited in its
application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended
to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist.

(4) apply to all members of the class: that the Act applies equally to all
members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair
in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their

degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the
non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and
intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and
unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can
be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater
Philippines.

People
vs

Encinaba, G.R. No. April 3, 1998

Facts:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known
only as Benjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City
the following day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana.
Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose
Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and
Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in
the afternoon of December 14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex
gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of
P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the
PNB building while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the
letters BGO printed on its front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB
building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from where two
females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out
to the team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying a traveling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt.
Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it
to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed
in a plastic bag marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag
together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his
signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for
investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the
confiscated marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime
Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic
Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded
positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the
above technical report, the prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a "Demurrer to Evidence"
alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating
accused-appellant's constitutional right against unreasonable search and

seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.

The said "Demurrer to Evidence" was, however, denied without the trial court
ruling on the alleged illegality of the search and seizure and the
inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead,
the trial court continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected,
her version of the incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed
that immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater
where she watched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross the road, an old
woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road,
Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the
NARCOM Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the
identity of the woman and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be
found after she was arrested. Moreover, she added that no search warrant
was shown to her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a
"Comment and/or Objection to Prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence"
contesting the admissibility of the items seized as they were allegedly a
product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and
five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in
violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 2uin
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin charge for with a
large volume of Marijuana?
Ruling:
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may
be held criminally and civilly liable, theStonehill case observed that most
jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is "the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. This
approach is based on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that "only
in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed." 35

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights
of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government. 36
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding
the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to
pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil
that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble
part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of
evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant
ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.

PEOPLE

VS.

GERENTE
G.R. No. 95847-48, March 10 1993

FACTS:
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that Gabriel Gerente, together with
FredoEchigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking
marijuana in the house of the appellant. She overheard the three mentalking

about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. Fredo, Totoy Echigoren and Gerente
carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace . Reyes, testified that she witnessed
the killing as follows: Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito
Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice
with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a
hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to
a place behind the house of Gerente.

Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report

from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the
Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed
by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death
was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object.

Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling
incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a
hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by Reyes,
that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the
three men who killed Clarito.

The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then
sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced
themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a
coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette
foil. Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The
other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.

Two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor

Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic
Act No. 6425, and for Murder. The trial court convicted him of Violation of
Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced
in evidence by the prosecution; and
2. Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the

crimes charged despite the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
The appealed decision was affirmed.

ARREST
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and
his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and
when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of
death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used
to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the
happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of
the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente
and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a
warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he
would have fled the law as his two companions did.

SEARCH and SEIZURE

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was
made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible
precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the
person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them
unless he is first

CONSPIRACY
When there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is
the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of
Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions
conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a

piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no
evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved
by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit".

G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

Hubert Webb, petitioner
vs

Hon. Raul de leon

Ponente:Puno

Facts:
June 1994, NBI filed with DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioner Hubert
Webb, and other persons with the crime of rape with homicide. Forthwith, DOJ
formed a panel of prosecutors headed by assistant chief state prosecutor to
conduct the PI of the charged with the rape and killing of the Visconti in their
home in Paranaque.
During the PI, NBI presented: (1) sworn statement of their principal witness
Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission of the crime. (2) sworn statements
of two former housemaids of the Webb (3) sworn statement of Cristobal who
allegedly that he was a passenger of United Airlines bound for New York and
expressed doubt on whether Webb was his co-passenger in the trip (4) sworn
statement of Barrier, former live-in partner of Belong, who narrated the
manner of how Belong investigated and tried to cover up the crime (5) sworn
statements of two Visconti maids, security guard and engineer. (6) Autopsy
reports of the victims showing the number of stab wounds and genital
examination of the victims.
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, Webb filed with DOJ panel a motion
for production and examination of evidence and documents for the NBI to
produce some documents like (1) certification of US FBI on the admission to
and stay of Hubert Webb in the US from March 9, 1991 to October 22, 1992
(2) Laboratory report of the medico legal officer (3) sworn statement of
Belong (4) photographs of the fingerprints lifted from the Visconti residence
taken during investigation (5) investigation of NBI.
The motion was granted by DOJ and the NBI submitted the photocopies of the
requested documents. Then Webb filed a civil case in RTC of Makati for the
purpose of obtaining the original of said sworn statement and has succeeded
to obtain the original copy. This was submitted to the DOJ together with his
other evidence. But Webb failed to obtain the document from US FBI.
During PI, Webb denied the crime as he went to the US and was not in the
Philippines when the crime happened. This alibi was supported by the other
persons accused and the documentary evidence of Webb's purchase of
bicycle in the US, the driver's license State of California issued for him and
the letter of the legal attach of the US embassy confirming his arrival at San
Francisco, California on March 9, 1991.
The other respondents submitted their sworn statement as well.

On August 1995, DOJ Panel issued a resolution finding probable cause to hold
the respondents for trial and recommending that an information for rape with
homicide be filed against petitioners and their co-respondents, which was
complied on the same date with the RTC of Paranaque. The case was raffled
to branch 258 with Judge Cano, however it was Judge de Leon, pairing judge
of Judge Cano who issued the warrant of arrest against the accused. But later,
Judge Cano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion
considering that he was with NBI before his appointment to the bench. The
case was re-raffled again to branch 274 with Judge Tolentino who issued new
warrants of arrest against the accused, then Webb with other accused
voluntarily surrendered to the police.
In their petitions, the petitioners contend: (1) Judge de Leon and Tolentino
gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct PI before issuing
warrants of arrest (2) DOJ panel gravely abused its discretion in holding that
there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide
(3) DOJ denied them their constitutional right to due process during the PI
(40) DOJ panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to
charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewisegravely abused its discretion in
holdingthat there is probablecause to charge them with the crime of rape and
homicide.
2. Whether or not respondent Judges deLeon and Tolentino gravely abused
their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before
issuing warrants of arrest against them.
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due
process during their preliminary investigation.
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative
when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

Ruling:
Petition without merit. (1) 24 The terms are legally synonymous and their
reference is not to a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a
judge but to the average man on the street. 25 It ought to be emphasized

that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of
evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of
common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance.
Misdescription of Alfaro did not erode the credibility of Alfaro. (2) The
voluminous number of exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his
defense of denial and alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and
thorough evaluation of the records, believes that they cannot outweigh the
evidence submitted by the complainant. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification made by a prosecution witness. Verily, alibi deserves scant
consideration in the face of positive identification especially so where the
claim of alibi is supported mainly by friends and relatives. The receipts of the
bicycle purchase and the driver's license were considered weak also
compared to the affirmative testimonies of the witnesses affirming that Webb
is in the country. (3) In arrest cases there must be probable cause that a
crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it,
which of course can exist without any showing that evidence of the crime will
be found at premises under that person's control. With respect to warrants of
arrest, section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that "upon filing of an
information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused. That before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine
personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing
so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of
probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence. (4) We reject these contentions. The records will show that the DOJ
Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste.
Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause
against them. Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the
Information in court against them for rape with homicide on the ground that
they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to
the Secretary of Justice. The filing of said Information is in accord with
Department of Justice Order No. 223, series of 1993, dated June 25, 1993. We
quote its pertinent sections, viz.:
Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. No appeal may be taken from a
resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial
or City Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest
error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest
error or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the
appellant had already been arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the
pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu propio by the
Secretary of Justice.

An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable

cause, however, shall not hold the filing of the information in court.
Sec. 2. When to appeal. The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the questioned resolution by the party or his
counsel. The period shall be interrupted only by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution and shall
continue to run from the time the resolution denying the motion shall have
been received by the moving or his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)
Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an
Information in court after the consummation of the preliminary investigation
even if the accused can still exercise the right to seek a review of the
prosecutor's recommendation with the Secretary of Justice.
Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Alfaro in the Information
considering her alleged conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with
homicide. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act
No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And
Benefit Program And For Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. . In
truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of
government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws
are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our
laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the discretion of whether, what
and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not
constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in
the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a
witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution.
(5) petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery
proceedings during their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April
28, 1995 original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report.41
Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the right to move for a
bill of particulars and for production or inspection of material evidence in
possession of the prosecution. 42 But these provisions apply after the filing of
the Complaint or Information in court and the rights are accorded to the
accused to assist them to make an intelligent plea at arraignment and to
prepare for trial. We hold that the finding of a probable cause by itself
subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or
diminution. In the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of petitioners cannot be
understated for they are charged with the crime of rape with homicide, a nonbailable offense when the evidence of guilt is strong.

Raro
vs
Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 108431, July 14, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Oscar G. Raro, a lawyer, was the Corporate Secretary of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). As such, petitioner was the

Acting Manager of the Special Projects Department that was in charge of the
experimental Small Town Lottery (STL), which under PCSO Resolution No. 118,
dated April 1987, was to be operated in certain areas of the country. On July
30, 1987, the PCSO, through Atty. Reynaldo E. Ilagan of the Special Projects
Department, authorized Elmec Trading and Management Corporation (ELMEC)
to operate the STL in the province of Camarines Norte. ELMEC in turn
employed Luis (Bing) F. Abao, a resident of Daet, Camarines Norte, as
Provincial Manager of the experimental STL in said province.[1] Abao
allegedly invested P100,000.00 in the STL operation in that province.
In a complaint that he filed with the Tanodbayan in Manila on May 20, 1988,
Abao alleged that petitioner, in his capacity as PCSO Corporate Secretary,
personally and directly intervened in the operation of said lottery to his
financial benefit and advantage .

The complaint against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act was referred by the Deputy Ombudsman to the NBI for
investigation. The NBI recommended the prosecution of the petitioners.
However, the petitioners argue that the four-year delay in the completion of
the preliminary investigation violated right to speedy disposition of cases.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying a
motion to quash an information on the ground that the preliminary
investigation allegedly violated the right of the accused to due process of law.
HELD:
It took the NBI 2 years to complete its report. The resolution recommending
the filing of the case against petitioner has to be reviewed. The length of
time it took before the conclusion of the preliminary investigation may only
be attributed to the adherence of the Ombudsman and NBI to the rudiments
of fair play.
Ruling:
Finally, there is no ground to give credence to petitioners claim that the
complainant should be charged as a briber on account of his admission that
he gave petitioner some sum of money; or that evidence presented during
the preliminary investigation, specifically the affidavits of witnesses, were
hearsay and inadmissible. As we stated earlier, this Court cannot supplant
the Ombudsmans discretion in the determination of what crime to charge an

accused.
All told, this Court finds no reason to reverse the assailed Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners insinuation that he was subjected to the
proceedings before the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan for politically
motivated reasons, has not been established with sufficient evidence. In
the absence of any imputation that public respondents were impelled by illmotive in filing the case against him, it is presumed that there is no such
motive and that public respondents merely filed the case to correct a public
wrong.[69]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are hereby
AFFIRMED. The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate
dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 17800.
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
Rolito Go y Tambunting, petitioner
vs.
The Court of Appeals, The Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, Presiding Judge Branch
168 Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and People of the Philippines,
respondents.
Facts:
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained
him. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioners plate
number and reported the same to the police. Another eyewitness who was at
the police station at that time identified petitioner as the gunman who shoot
Eldon Maguan on July 2, 1991. According to the police reports and of the
eyewitnesses, petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way
street, almost had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got
out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off.
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio informed petitioner,
in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to
preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any
such waiver.
Issues:
The principal issues at stake are whether or not the arrest by the San Juan

Police with respect of the petitioner was unlawful and whether or not
petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Held:
Both the petitioner and the prosecutor erred on relying on Umil v. Ramos,
wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days
from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted
continuing crimes, i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed
organization, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was
arrested was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in
time and space and not a continuing crime.
Furthermore, the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant
case does not fall within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure. Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the
shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers obviously were not present at the
time of the commission and none of the arresting officers had any personal
knowledge of facts thereof. Moreover, petitioner was not arrested at all as he
walked into San Juan Police Station, he neither expressed surrender nor any
statement that he was or was not guilty of a crime. There was substantive
error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right
should have been accorded him without any conditions. Since petitioner had
not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was entitled to be released
forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.

G.R. No. 119246. January 30, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO CORREA y CAYTON @ BOYET, RITO GUNIDA y SESANTE @
DODONG, and LEONARDO DULAY y SANTOS @ BOY KUBA accusedappellants

Facts:
On or about June 18, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused
Antonio Correa, Rito Gunida and Leonardo Dulay conspired together, not
being authorized by law to possess, sell, deliver, and transport eight (8)
bundles of dried flowering tops of MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug, wrapped in

pieces of papers and plastic tapes weighing 16.1789 kilograms. On 12 July

1994, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
35), docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-137528, indicting appellants Antonio
Correa y Cayton @ Boyet, Rito Gunida y Sesante @ Dodong, and
Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ Boy Kuba for having violated Section 4, Article
II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The defense, however, contends
that the 3 accused were arrested without warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan
City, enroute to Dulays house to get the things of his child allegedly rushed
previously to the Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged charge of trafficking on
'shabu,' and were brought to the WPDC headquarters at U.N. Avenue, where
they were detained. After trial, on March 3, 1995, the lower court found the
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced to death to be
executed by the means provided by law, and to pay a fine of P
10,000,000.00, plus the costs.

Issue:
Whether the accused are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and
seizure, due to waiver on their part.
Held:
Antonio Correa y Cayton @ "Boyet," Rito Gunida y Sesante @
"Dodong," and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ "Boy Kuba" are precluded from
assailing the warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted
to it as shown by their actuation during the search and seizure. They never
protested when the police officer opened the tin can loaded in their vehicle,
nor when he opened one of the bundles, nor when they, together with their
cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to the police station for
investigation and subsequent prosecution. When one voluntarily submits to a
search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly. Further, they effectively waived their
constitutional right against the search and seizure by their voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a plea of
not guilty upon arraignment and by participating in the trial. While the
conviction of the appellants of the crime charged is proper, we find, however,
that the penalty of death imposed by the trial court is not in accordance with
the law. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance which
attended the commission of the offense in this case, and considering that the
quantity of the subject prohibited drug exceeded 750 grams, the proper
penalty that should be imposed on each of the appellants is reclusion

perpetua and a fine of Ten Million Pesos.

G.R. No. 143944July 11, 2002

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon, accused-appellant.
Facts:
On December 27, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City rendered
judgment finding the accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section VI, Article III of Republic Act
6425 as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as
amended by RA 7659.
The antecedent facts of his conviction showed that on March 11, 1999, the
accused boarded M/V Super Ferry 5, sailing from Manila to Iligan City. At
about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port
of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint
from passenger Lorena Canoy about a missing jewelry. Diesmo and four (4)
other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for
the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The suspect was
identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of
the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent,
he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by
two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage and
took a Samsonite suitcase. When requested by the security, the accused
opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs

containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be

"shabu," the security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship
captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents.
The accused testified that the suitcase was not his but was owned by Alex
Macapudi who requested him to give it to Macapudis brother in the Iligan
port. On appeal, the accused contends that the Samsonite suitcase was
forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of
his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any
evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is
inadmissible in evidence against him.

Issue:
A question was raised whether the contention of the accused-appelant on
unlawful search and seizure valid.

Held:
The Supreme Court held the contention devoid and without merit. The right
against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution. Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose
between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right to the
search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against
transgression committed by the government or its agent. The search and
seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as
one conducted by the police authorities tasked to maintain peace and order.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, : (1) that the accused is in
possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2)
that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug. The first two elements were
sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed. In the case at
bar, the third fact was missing. It has been ruled, however, that possession of
dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation of such possession. Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to
the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal
Case No. 06-7542, is affirmed.

People
vs.
Albofera,

FACTS:

Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro
Carancio a forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but
did not participate in the killing.
The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain
Sisneros and accused Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was
subsequently arrested.
Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit
Judge. He stated therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear
of his life; that said group had ordered the arrest of the victim, Carancio,
and that the group sentenced him (the victim) to die by stabbing.
Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused
Albofera sent a letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as
evidence by prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera was asking Esma to
change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his favor instead.
Later the accused were convicted of murder.

ISSUE:

Whether the Alboferas letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light

of alleged unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accuseds privacy?

HELD:

No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an
unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or
invasion into Alboferas privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and
it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and identified the
same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really
self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his
declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Alboferas) favor. Furthermore,
nothing Alboferas tated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a
determination of his culpability.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
ANDRE MARTI

Facts:

On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes
went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich,

Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the
packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package
making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes,
husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an
inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon
opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took
sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and
invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI
agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana
leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425
and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the
Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated
and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as
evidence against him.

Issue:

Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private

individuals?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that
the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the
state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures

therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job
Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in
his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert
the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and
siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that
which is in plain sight is not a search.

The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.

Tan
vs
Del Rosario
G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994
FACTS:
These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R.
No. 109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly
known as the Simplified Net Income Taxationn Scheme (SNIT), amending
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Regulations No. 293,
promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law.
Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional
requirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable in that the law
would now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently
from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships.
Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued
implementation of the amendatory legislation.
ISSUES:
1. Is Republic Act No. 7496 a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely
entitled, Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession (Petition in G.R. No.

109289)
2. Does Republic Act No. 7496 violate the Constitution for imposing taxes that
are not uniform and equitable.
3. Did the Secretary of Finance and the BIR Commissioner exceed their rulemaking authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships?
HELD:
The Petition is dismissed. Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of
equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation,
similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan
Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend
classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are
substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the
legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present
and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all
those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3;
Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 771).
What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is
the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the
schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to
maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations.
We certainly do not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.
Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law
declared unconstitutional for being violative of due process must perforce fail.
The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear
contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the
tax power.
Tiu
vs
Ca G.R. No. 127410. January 20, 1999
J. Panganiban

Facts:
Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227
entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of MilitaryReservations Into
Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development

Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."
Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted
there to special privileges. President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97,
clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. The President issued
Executive Order No. 97-A, specifying the area within which the tax-and-dutyfree privilege was operative. The petitioners challenged before this Court the
constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal
protection ofthe laws. This Court referred the matter to the Court of
Appeals.Proclamation No. 532 was issued by President Ramos. It delineated
the exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port
Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 7227. Respondent Court held that "there
is no substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12
of RA 7227. In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise and well-defined as '. . . the
lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as
embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended . . .'"
Issue:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 97-A violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution

Held:

No. The Court found real and substantive distinctions between the
circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base,
thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification. The fundamental right
of equal protection of the lawsis not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differentlyfrom another. The classification must also be germane to the
purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be
germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions
only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The Supreme
Court believed it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the
application of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military
base. It is this specific area which the government intends to transform and
develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a selfsustaining industrial and commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and

local investors to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries.

G.R. No. 56515 April 3, 1981

United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), petitioner,
vs.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), respondent.

Facts:
At a time when the country was already under martial law, amendments to
the 1973 Constitution were proposed by the Batasang Pambansa. The
amendments to the constitution were to be placed in a plebiscite for the
peoples approval. The Commission on elections, pursuant to the powers
vested in it by the Constitution, the 1978 Election Code and pertinent
enactments of the Batasang Pambansa, issued three (3) Resolutions 14671469 providing for equal opportunity on public discussions and debates,
equal time on the use of broadcast media, and equal space on the use of
print media.
On March 12, 1981, President Marcos advanced his campaign for the YES
votes on the constitutional amendments in his nationwide Pulong-Pulong sa
Pangulo radio-television program carried live from 9:30 to 11:30 PM via radio
and television. Pursuant to the resolutions promulgated by the COMELEC,

petitioner UNIDO demand exactly the same opportunity, the same prime
tune, the same number of TV and radio stations all over the country at the
earliest possible date to campaign for NO votes in the forthcoming
plebiscite.
After due and careful deliberation, the Commission held and ruled that the
demand of the UNIDO cannot be granted and thereby denied. UNIDO filed a
Motion for Reconsideration to the Commission appealing that such denial is a
basic ground for contradiction to the Constitution and the Law, and moreover,
violate the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play.

Issue:
The question was raised whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection
by virtue of the COMELECs denial of their request.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that UNIDO was not denied due process nor were
they not afforded equal protection.
It is considered view of the Commission that when President Marcos
conducted his pulong-pulong or consultation with the people on March 12,
1981, he did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines
and not as the head of any political party. The President/Prime Minister is
responsible for the program of government and the guidelines of policy. It
cannot be denied that seeking constitutional changes constitutes a program
of government imbued with the nature of highest importance to enlighten the
people on its sense and significance.
The UNIDO or any of its leaders does not have the same constitutional
prerogatives vested in the President/Prime Minister as above discussed. As
such, it has no right to 'demand' equal coverage by media accorded President
Marcos. The UNIDO, however, is free to enter into appropriate contracts with
the TV or radio stations concerned.

G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

Ricardo C. Valmonte and Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Peoples Rights
(ULAP), petitioners,
vs.
Gen. Renato De Villa and National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC), respondents.

Facts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC)
was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within
its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing
an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing
an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development
of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety
being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at
dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their
alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin
Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was
gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning
the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring
and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to
speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also

claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where
he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court
order or search warrant. Instances have occurred where a citizen, while not
killed, had been harassed. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave
the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. Finally, on 17
July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily
lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police
and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital
Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director.
Issue:

The question was raised as to whether or not checkpoints violate the right of
the people against unreasonable search and seizures.
Held:

The Supreme Court held to dismiss the petition. True, the manning of
checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in
the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at
the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfareand and individuals right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former
should prevail.

G.R. No. L-30026,

January 30, 1971

MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO

PADUA and PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.

FACTS:

Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to

reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The
decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954 and the
third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with
reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners have been
imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their convictions.
They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which
negated such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed down until after
their convictions have become final. In People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that
the information against the accused for rebellion complexed with murder,
arson and robbery was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there being
no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after their
convictions have become final. Since Hernandez served more than the
maximum penalty that could have been served against him, he is entitled to
freedom, and thus, his continued detention is illegal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive
effect is applicable in this case.

RULING:

Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied

retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the accused who is

not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal system.
Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal protection, given
that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they have,
though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of
benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision.

G.R. No. 79543.

October 16, 1996

JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police
District in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A
recipient of various awards and commendations attesting to his competence
and performance as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one
day he would be sitting on the other side of the investigation table as the
suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van. Filoteo
admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers,
namely ,Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned
out to be adischarged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in the afternoon
of May 30, 1982,petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before
M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero. Peitioner however sought
later that his confession be inadmissible evidence, saying that the law should
favour him as an accused.

Issue:
Whether or not Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution shall be given a
retroactive effect and petitioners extrajudicial confession be held as
inadmissible evidence.

RULING:
No, since what he did was not a penal offense. Under the penal law, a person
guilty of felony who is not a habitual criminal may be given favour by the law.

[G.R. No. 148825. December 27, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
SUSAN CANTON, appellant.

FACTS:
On February 12, 1998, at about 1:30 p. m., Susan Canton was at
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, being a departing passenger bound for
Saigon, Vietnam. When the metal detector alarmed while Susan was passing
through, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National Action
Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that
time, made a pat down search on the former. Upon Frisking, Susan, Mylene
felt something bulging at her abdominal area and when the latter inserted
her hand under the skirt of Susan, She noticed that the packages contained
what felt like rice granules. Mylene then reported the matter tom SPO4
Victorio de los Santos, her supervisor on duty. The supervisor then instructed

Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring Susan to a comfort
room for a thorough physical investigation. Upon further frisking, Mylene and
Lorna discovered three packages individually wrapped and sealed in grey
colored packing tape which Susan voluntarily handed to them. Mylene turned
over the packages to SPO4 De los Santos and after laboratory examination, it
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug.
SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation
Office, testified that no investigation was ever conducted on Susan. However,
Susan signed a receipt of the following articles seized from her: (1) three
bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100
grams; (2) one American passport bearing Number 700389994; (3) one
Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock control number 0414381077;
and (4) two panty girdles. He said that he informed Susan of her
constitutional rights but admitted that she did not have a counsel when she
signed the receipt. Yet he told her that she had the option to sign or not to
sign the receipt.

ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the search conducted on Susan was incidental to a
lawful arrest.
2.
Whether or not the scope of a search pursuant to airport security is
confined only to search weapons under Terry Search doctrine.
3.

Whether or not Susan was lawfully arrested without a warrant.

4.
Whether or not the constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused
under custodial investigation was violated.
5.

Whether or not Susans conviction and penalty on her are correct.

RULING:
The Supreme Court did not agree with the trial court and the OSG
that the search and seizure conducted in this case were incidental to a lawful
arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed. Susans arrest did not precede the search. . It was only after the
strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline
substances inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that

SUSAN was arrested.

Under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235, the provision is clear that
the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. The Terry
search or the stop and frisk situation refers to a case where a police officer
approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating
possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection. To assure himself that the person with whom he is
dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. In this case, after the metal detector alarmed Susan, R.A. No.
6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. Thus, the strip
search in the ladies room was justified under the circumstance.
Warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the
knowledge that Susan was committing a crime, the airport security personnel
and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her, under paragraph (a) of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
As testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome
Cause, no custodial investigation was conducted after Susans arrest. She
affixed her signature to the receipt of the articles seized from her, but before
she did so, she was told that she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In
any event, her signature to the packages was not relied upon by the
prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her
during her detention and used in evidence against her. Hence, her claim of
violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law. For possession of regulated drugs, the law fixes the range
of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million. In view of the net weight of
methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession of Susan, the trial
courts imposition of fine in the amount of P1 million is well within the range
prescribed by law.
Susan Canton was found guilty beyong reasonable doubt of the
violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972 ( Republic Act
No. 6425) as amended and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). The appellants
passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to her.

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL.,Defendants-Appellants.

FACTS:

About March 15, 1945, (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias
Soliman alias Amado alias AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo Capadocia
alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G. Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias
Bakal alias Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo Saulo alias Elias alias
Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5) Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben alias Andy (6)
Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio alias Arong, (7) Aquilino Bunsol
alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2,
alias Jessie Wilson alias William, (10) Jacobo Espino, (11) Amado Racanday,
(12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian Lumanog alias Manue, were accused of
being members of PKP Community Party of the Philippines which was actively
engaged in an armed rebellion against the government of the Philippines.
With the party of HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon), they
committed the crime of rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting plunder,
etc., enumerated in 13 attacks on government forces or civilians by HUKS.
The prosecution maintained that Hernandez is charged with
rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital
punishment may be imposed. The defense contends, among other things,
that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The lower
court sentenced Hernandez merely to life imprisonment. A petition for bail
was filed by Amado Hernandez on December 28, 1953, which was denied by
a resolution of the Supreme Court dated February 2 , 1954. A similar petition
for bail was filed by Hernandez on June 26, 1954 and renewed on December
22, 1955.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Amado V. Hernandez is entitle to bail.

RULING:
The court ruled that murder, arson, and robbery are mere
ingredient of the crime of rebellion as means necessary for the perpetration
of the offense. Such common offense is absorbed or inherent of the crime of
rebellion. In as much as the acts specified in Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code, one single crime it follows that said acts offer no occasion for the
application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which requires therefore
the commission of at least two crimes.
The crime charged in the amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion,
not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and
robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot

exceed 12 years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; and that, in

conformity with the policy of the Supreme Court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed
bail.

[G.R. No. 130644. October 27, 1997]

THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, represented in this suit by his
mother MARGARITA G. LARRANAGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

On October 1, 1997, petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga filed a

petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction seeking to annul the information for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention against her minor son, Francisco Juan
Larranagga alias Paco, filed in the RTC of Cebu City as well as the warrant of
arrest issued as a consequence thereof. On October 6, 1997, petitioner filed
a Supplemental Petition asking for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
to relieve her son from his alleged illegal confinement or to grant him bail.
On September 15, 1997, the police tried to arrest the Larranaga
without a warrant for the alleged crime of kidnapping and raping Marijoy and
Jacqueline Chiong in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 but his counsel persuaded
the arresting officer that he would be presented in the preliminary
investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on September 17, 1997. On
September 17, 1997, Larranagas counsel attended the preliminary
investigation and made a request to the prosecutor that his client be given a
preliminary investigation and that he be granted a period of twenty days to
file the defence affidavit. As well pointed of his motion, Larranaga travelled
from Cebu City to Quezon City on June 8, 1997 to pursue a Diploma at the
Centre for culinary arts in Quezon City. On July 16, 1997, he was taking
examinations during the entire day and then went to a restaurant in the
evening. He stayed with friends until the next morning. On July 17, 1997, he
took another examination before taking a plane back to Cebu City at 5pm.
The prosecutor denied this request, arguing that Larranaga was entitled only
to an inquest investigation. On September 19, 1997, Larranagas counsel
appealed to the Court of Appeals to prevent the filing of criminal information
against Larranaga. However, criminal charges had already been filed on
September 17, 1997 with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. On September
22, 1997, counsel filed a petition with the Court of Appeals requesting that
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City prevent Larranagas arrest.
Nevertheless, he was arrested on that day with a warrant issued by the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Cebu City, the Honorable Priscilla Agana.
Another petition was filed in the Court of Appeals against his arrest and
dismissed on September 25, 1997. This decision was appealed to the
Supreme Court. Despite this pending appeal, Larranaga was brought before a
judge on October 14, 1997. He did not enter a plea and the judge thus
entered a plea of not guilty to two counts of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention. On October 16, 1997, the Supreme Court temporarily restrained
this judge from proceeding with the case to prevent the issues before the
court from becoming moot.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation.
2. Whether or not petitioner should be released from detention pending the
investigation.
3. Whether or not the arresting officer had legal authority to make
warrantless arrest of the petitioner

RULING:
The Court resolves: (1) to set aside the inquest investigation of
petitioner and to order the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a
regular preliminary investigation of the petitioner in accord with section 3,
Rule 112; (2) to annul the order for Detention During The Pendency of the
Case issued by Executive Judge Priscilla Agana against the petitioner in Crim.
Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304; (3) to order the immediate release of
petitioner pending his preliminary investigation and (4) to order the Presiding
Judge of Br. VII, RTC of Cebu City to cease and desist from proceeding with
the arraignment and trial of petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and
45304, pending the result of petitioners preliminary investigation.
It is within petitioners constitutional and legal rights to demand
that a regular preliminary investigation rather than a mere inquest be
conducted before resolving the issue of whether or not to file informations
against him. The petition be given due course and petitioner be accorded
his right to preliminary investigation and during the pendency thereof,
petitioner be released from detention.
The arresting officer had no legal authority to make warrantless
arrest. Under Sec 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,

Section 7. The arresting officers obviously were not present, within the
meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly committed the
crime. Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge
of facts.

MELVIN L. ESPINO and ESTRELLITA L. IGPIT, complainants,

vs.
HON. ISMAEL L. SALUBRE, Municipal Trial Court, Tagum, Davao del Norte,
respondent.

FACTS:
On July 17, 1997, Wilfreda Clamucha filed a complaint for frustrated
murder before the Municipal Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, presided
by respondent Judge Ismael Salubre, against Joemar Telleron and two (2)
unknown assailants, only known as alias Dodong and John Doe, for stabbing
and mortally wounding her son, Ruel Clamucha who later died from his
wounds.
On November 20, 1997, Wilfreda Clamucha executed a
Supplemental Sworn Statement before the Tagum Police Station to the
effect that she was informed by the accused Joemar Telleron that the true
name of alias Dodong is Peter Erer and that of their other companion
designated as John Doe is Melvin Espino alias Bentot.
Despite the fact that respondent Judge had no more jurisdiction
over the case, he conducted a further preliminary examination and after
allegedly finding the existence of probable cause, respondent Judge issued a
warrant for the arrest of Peter Erer and Melvin Espino on November 27, 1997.
On February 23, 1998, Melvin Espino, represented by his aunt,
Estrellita Igpit, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before Judge Bernardo V.
Saludares of the Regional Trial Court , Branch 2, Tagum City naming Judge
Ismael Salubre, Police Chief Pytagoras Cervantes and the Warden of Tagum
District Jail as respondents. In said petition, it was averred that Melvin
Espino was restrained of his liberty without a valid warrant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Salubre is guilty of gross ignorance of law.

RULING:
Yes. The Court finds respondent Judge Ismael L. Salubre GUILTY of
gross ignorance of the law and is hereby FINED in the amount of Five
Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same will
merit a more severe penalty.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of
must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but were
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption. These
circumstances were not at all attendant in the case at bar.

Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no

one - not even judges. They are expected to keep abreast of our laws and
the changes therein as well as with latest decisions of the Supreme Court. A
judge should be acquainted with legal norms and principles as well as with
the statutes and procedural rules. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a
sign of incompetence, which goes against Canon 3, specifically Rule 3.01, of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge,
respondent judge owes the public and the court she sits in to be proficient in
the law. She must have the basic rules at the palm of her hand as she is
expected to maintain professional competence at all times.

G.R. Nos. 76649-51 August 19, 1988

20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO M. BARRETO, RAUL SAGULLO and FORTUNE

LEDESMA, respondents.

FACTS:
On August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation through
counsel, in a letter-complaint, sought the National Bureau of Investigation's
(NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with
the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint
alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in
the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form
which constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise
known as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property).
The NBI, in response to the letter-complaint, conducted surveillance and
investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently
filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets
owned by the private respondents. The applications were consolidated and
heard by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132.
On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants on
the basis of the statements of applicant NBIs witnesses which were taken
through searching questions and answers. The NBI, accompanied by the
petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described in
the three warrants.
The lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the
private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the
issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations
of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy
of a particular film have been committed.
On October 8, 1985, the lower court issued an order in lifting the three search
warrants issued earlier against the private respondents by the court.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by
the lower court in its order dated January 2, 1986.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul
the October 8, 1985 and January 2, 1986 orders of the lower court.
The petition was dismissed. The questioned decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are affirmed.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier.
2. Whether or not respondent court did commit a grave abuse of discretion
when it issued the questioned order.

RULING:
YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.
In the absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D.
49, the copyright infringement law, the court lifted the three questioned
search warrants.
NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the
subject matter. Of the three witnesses in the application of search warrant,
only one of them, who is the petitioners counsel, had the personal
knowledge of the subject matter. The lower court declared that the testimony
of the petitioners counsel did not have much credence because the master
tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the
application.
A careful review of the record of the case shows that the
respondent Court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it issued
the questioned orders. Grave abuse of discretion' implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in
other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. But far from being
despotic or arbitrary, the assailed orders were motivated by a noble desire of
rectifying an error, much so when the erroneous findings collided with the
constitutional rights of the private respondents. In fact, the petitioner did not
even contest the righteousness and legality of the questioned orders but
instead concentrated on the alleged denial of due process of law.

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

Patricio Dumlao, Romeo B. Igot, and Alfredo Sapantan, Jr., petioners

Vs.
Commission on Elections, respondent

Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming
elections of January 30, 1980. He specifically questions the constitutionality
of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the
equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Section 4 Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and
who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective local office from which he has retired. He claimed that the
aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him, and that the
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and,
therefore, class legislation.
His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidacy of
a person who was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment for
conviction and the prima facie nature of the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes. He also questioned the accreditation of some
political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the
Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Apart form
this, he also attacked the term of office and the election period. These were
Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.

Issues:
1. Did petitioners have standing?
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?

Ruling:
1. No.
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.

Petition granted

Ratio:
1. Dumlao sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to
determine judicial review, three requisites are present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question

a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been
filed for his disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has
yet been adversely affected by the operation of the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for
resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity
would require that his suit be dismissed.

However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest
involved and the imminent elections.

2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The

constitutional guarantee ofequal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from
another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age,
have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. The requirement to retire
government employees at 65 may or may not be a reasonable classification.
Young blood can be encouraged to come in to politics. But, in the case of a
65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided for in the
challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The
tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is

emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared

himself tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by
virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for the very
reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection,
neither does it permit such denial. In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal
protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is
a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional
guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the
purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class. The
purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local
governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it
cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the
objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.
Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional
provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not
synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional
presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from
public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him
before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In
ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made
between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom
charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to
run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the
ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the
same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of
arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right
to hold office during the term of the sentence. And although the filing of
charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity
of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence
against him. A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be
allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was
meritorious.

G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,

Vs.
Basilio Damaso @ Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza @ Ka Dado, accused-appellant
Facts:
Accused-appellant charged in an information of violation of PD
1866 in connection with the crime of subversion assailed the legality of a
search and seizure conducted at his house at night when he was not around,
on the ground that it violated constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure.
Issue:
Whether or not a search on a house of a person without the
owners presence is valid.
Ruling:
No. The search in the dwelling of the accused-appellant without his
knowledge is a violation of the constitutional immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures.

G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002

Rudy Caballes, petitioner
Vs.
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents

Facts:
While on a routine patrol in Brgy. Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, Sgt.
Victorino Nocejo and Pat. Alex de Castro spotted a passenger jeep unusually
covered with kakawati leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with
smuggled goods, the two officers flagged down the vehicle. Being the driver
of the jeep, Caballes was asked by the officers as to what was loaded in the
jeep, to which he did not respond, appearing pale and nervous. The officers
checked the cargo and discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires
exclusively owned by National Power Corporation. Caballes and the vehicle
with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station,
where he was imprisoned for 7 days. The trial court found Caballes guilty of
the crime of Theft of property. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial courts judgment of conviction.

Issue:
Whether or not the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible
against Caballes.

Ruling:
No; the evidence are not admissible in evidence.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is
not absolute, but admits of certain exceptions. The situation in the case at
bar does not fall under any of the accepted exceptions.

1.

Search of a moving vehicle

The rules governing searches and seizures of moving vehicles have been
liberalized for the purposes of practicality. Obtaining a warrant for a moving
vehicle is particularly difficult for want of a specific description of the place,
things, and persons to be searches. Also, it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. Still, however, there must be probable
cause to conduct such warrantless search. One form of search of moving
vehicles is the stop-and-search without warrant at checkpoints, which has
been declared as not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the
exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may
involve an extensive search. Routine inspections are not regarded as violative
of an individuals right against unreasonable search. The circumstances in
this case, however, do not constitute a routine inspection. They had to reach
inside the vehicle, lift the leaves and look inside the sacks before they were
able to see the cable wires. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a search would be constitutionally permissible only if
the officers have probable cause to believe that either the motorist is a lawoffender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime
in the vehicle to be searched. In this case, the officers flagged down the jeep
because they became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle
was covered with kakawati leaves, which, to them, was unusual and
uncommon. The Court believes that the fact that the vehicle looked
suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered in
kakawati leaves does not constitute probable cause to justify a search
without a warrant. In addition, there was no tip or confidential information
that could have backed up their search, as jurisprudence is replete with cases
where tipped information has become sufficient to constitute probable cause.

2.

Plain view doctrine

It is clear from the records that the cable wires were not exposed to sight
because they were placed in sacks andcovered with leaves. They had no clue
as to what was underneath the leaves. Object was not in plain view which
could have justified mere seizure without further search.

3.

Consented search

At most, there was only implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity,

which is no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches.
G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987
In the matter of proceedings for disciplinary action against Atty. Wenceslao
Laureta, and of contempt proceedings against Eva Maravilla-Illustre in G.R.
No. 68635, entitled Eva Maravilla-Illustre
vs.
Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.

Facts:
Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the
dismissal of her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minuteresolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and
knowingly promulgated by the 1st division, that it was railroaded with such
hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in
her letter that, there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from
finished by a long shot. She threatened that she would call for a press
conference. Illustres letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro
Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a
law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents.
The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the
minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap
but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was
not aware that Atty. Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made
clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still, Illustre
wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more
threats to expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting
travesty of justice. True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint
before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an
unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged
of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute
Resolution. Atty. LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of
the complain to the press, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the
Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were charged with
graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC
is charging them with contempt. They claim that the letters were private
communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor the court.

Issue:
WON privacy of communication was violated.

Held:
The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for
the entire court.
There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty
under the premises is
unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous
attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals
and ethics of the legal profession.

G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998

Francisco I. Chavez, petitioner
Vs.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and Magtanggol
Gunigundo, (in his capacity as chairman of the PCGG), respondents

Facts:
Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a
former government official) initiated this original action seeking (1) to
prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately
entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of
the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the
properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or
abroad including the so-called Marcos goldhoard"; and (2) to compel
respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they
ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such
negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."Chavez is the same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their
cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the
systematic subjugation of the country's economy; he says that what impelled
him to bring this action were several news reports 2 bannered in a number of
broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1)
the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in
various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a
compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs,
on how to split or share these assets.-PETITIONER DEMANDS that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining
to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that
any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue
of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the
country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest

of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have aright to know the
transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise
agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action
is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to
disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may
not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and
conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.PETITIONER INVOKES Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law. Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.-RESPONDENT
ANSWERS that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed and
operative official acts, not to those still being considered.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the
details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental
Agreement dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs
entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law
and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government
functionaries and officials who are or may be directly or indirectly involved in
the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their
associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed
compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such
alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussion sembodied in this
Decision. No pronouncement as to cost.

G.R. NO. L-22196June 30, 1967

Esteban Morano, Chan Sau Wan & Fu Yan Fun, petitioner-appellants
v.
Hon. Martiniano Vivo, Actibg Commissioner of Immigration, respondantappellant

FACTS:

Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukein, China on Jan.6,1932,

arrived in the Philippines on Nov.23, 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee
Malaps. She left in China two of her children bt the first marriage. With her
was Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage on Sept, 11,
1957.She and her son were permitted only into the Phils. Under a temporary
visitors visa for 2 months and after they posted a cash bond of Php4,000.

On Jan. 24 1962,Chan Sau Wan married Esteban Morano, a nativeborn Filipino citizen, born to his union on Sept. 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano,
Jr.
To prolong their stay in the Phils., Chan Sau Wan & Fu Yan Fun obtained
several extentions. The last extention was Sept. 10,1962.

On Aug. 10 1962, the Commissioner ordered her and son to leave the
countryon or before Sept. 10, 1962 w/ a warning that upon failure to do so, he
will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of the
bond. But instead of leaving the country, on Sept. 10 1962, Chan Sau Wan w/
her husband Esteban Morano & Fu Yan Fun petitioned the court of First
Instance of Mla. for Mandamus to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to
cancel petitioners alien certificate of registration, prohibition to stop him
from issuing a warrant for their arrest & preliminary injunction of confiscating
their cash bond & from issuing warrants of arrest pending resolution of the
case. The trial court on Nov. 3, 1962, issued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for, upon a Php. 2,000 bond.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Chan Sau Wan and her son Fu Yan Fun violated sec. 37(a) of
the Phil. Immigration Act and the Naturalization Law requisite.

COURT RULING:

The petition for mandamus and prohibition w/ respect to petitioner Chan Sau
Wah was denied and the judgement declaring her a citizen of the Phils.
directed respondent to cancel her alien certificate of registration & other
immigration papers, and declaring the preliminary injunction w/ respect to
her permanency were all set aside. With respect to her citizenship, Chan Sau
Wah didnt possessed all the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law.

G.R. NO.78596
July 13, 1989
Lucien Tan Van Nghia, petitioner
v.
Hon. Ramon J. Liwag, Acting Commisioner of the Commision on Immigration
and Deportation(CID), and John Doer, agents of the CID, respondents

FACTS:

Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national w/ temporary address in

Sta. Ana, Mla.He was in the Phils. on Nov. 1, 1981 as a temporary visitor but
his status was changed to an immigrant on Nov.16, 1984 based on his
representation that he is financially capable & will invest in the Phils. but has
not made any investment & has engaged only in French tutoring & practice
acupressure.

On May 28, 1987, CID Commissioner Liwag recieved a sworn complaint from
a certain Dionisio G. Cabrera. Jr. , as the landlord of Lucien Tran allegedly
accused the latter of being an undesirable alien for being hostile to public
safety progress.

On June 1, 1987, Commisioner Liwag issued a mission order to a team

of seven CID agents to locate & bring Lucien to Intelligence Division for
proper disposition & submission of report. But on the following day, as the
CID went to the residence of Lucien in Sta. Ana inviting him to the formers
headquarter for verification of his status but failed to obey instead lacked
themselves w/ his lady companion in their bedroom, refused indeed to talk to
the agents. In such manner compelled them to sought assistance of members
of the Western Police District. But then again, Lucien adamantly refused to be
taken in resulted to the injury of both parties due to ensuing struggle until
Lucien subdued & immediately taken to the CID intelligence office.The
warrant of arrest was issued on this day.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest and detention of petitioner by the authority,

the Immigration Commision is legal.

COURT RULING:

The petition was dismissed. Petitioner Lucien Tran Van is not similarly
restrained with the condition in his bailbond is to obey by appearing and
answering the complaint with will hold himself, amenable to the courts
orders and processes & after conviction will surrender in execution of such
judgement. The records therein show that formal deportation proceeding
have been initiated against Lucien before the Board of Special Inquiry of the
CID.
The restrain has therefore become legal as well as the writ of habeas corpus
has served its purpose.

G.R. NO. 115455

Aug. 25, 1994
Arturo M. Tolentino, et al
v.
Executive Sec., Sec. of Finance, Commission of Internal Revenue, et al
FACTS:

Petitioners Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716

otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino
declare that the revenue bill did not originate exclusively as required Art. VI
s. 24 of the Constitution from the House of Representatives. The result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct bills, House No. 1197 & Senate No. 1630 must
retain the essence of H.No. 1197. Albeit RA 7716 originated as House Bill
11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the House of Representatives, the
same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading, the
2nd reading as well as the approval were on the same day by votes of 13 of
its members w/ 1 abstain. Deprived in fact the succinct scrutiny as a vital
piece of legislation. That upon referral to the Senate Ways & Means
Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill
1630. Petitioner declare that what Senate could have done is amend HB
11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of Senate Bill
1630 in such way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just
becomes the text of the House Bill.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Expanded Value Added Tax Law is constitutionally valid.

Whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion by passing its own
version of the Bill.

COURT RULING:

The Supreme court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation
was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the House of Representatives.
According to the 9 justices, the constitution meant that the initiative must
come from the House of Representatives. There were instances indeed
before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR
version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This has always
been accepted in terms of amendments by substitution. There is no showing
that it would make a significant difference. What Tolentinos concerned was
basically a matter of form but failed to established a substantial difference on
both Bills.
Therefore, R.A. No. 7716 is not unconstitutional. It is not the only instance in
which the senate proposed an amendment to a House revenue bill by
enacting its own version. This has happened before twice during the eight
Congress.
In like manner on the question if theres grave abuse of discretion
though Art. VI sec. 24, the Supreme Court ruled as theres none.

G.R.NO. 136066-67
Feb. 3, 2003
People of the Phils., plaintiff-appelle
v.
Binad Sy Chua, accused-apellant

FACTS:

On Sept. 21, 1996 in the city of Angeles, Binad Sy Chua was accused
of a criminal case, illegal possession of plastic bags containing
methamphetamine Hydrocloride known as SHABU weighing 1,955.815 grams
w/c is a regulated drug w/o any authority. Another criminal act was charged
on him on the same date and place of willfully & unlawfully in his possession
and under his controla 20 pcs.of live .22 cal. Ammunitions w/o the license or
permit to carry them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Binad Sy Chua is guilty of criminal cases nos.96-507 & 96513.

COURT RULING:

The decision of the RTC of Angeles City in criminal cases nos. 96-507

& 96-513 convicting the accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was reversed and
set aside in violation of sec. 16 Art.III, R.A. No. 6425, sentencing the latter to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua & to pay a fine of Php 1000000. He
was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. The lack of merit of his
arrest then was reviewed. Consequently, he is ordered to be released from
the custody unless hes lawfully held for another crime.

ICHONG
VS.
HERNANDEZ

Facts:
The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes theretail
trade business, Republic Act No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate theRetail

Business, prohibiting aliens in general to engage in retail trade in

ourcountry.Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents,corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions
of RA No.1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said
Act isunconstitutional.

Issue:
Whether Congress in enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, theUN
Declaration of Human Rights and the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity.

Held:
The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rightsand
freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights
containsnothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard
of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China guarantees equality
of treatment to the Chinese nationals upon the sameterms as the nationals
of any other country. But the nationals of China are notdiscriminated against
because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States,
who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are allprohibited from
engaging in the retail trade.But even supposing that the law infringes upon
the said treaty, the treaty isalways subject to qualification or amendment by
a subsequent law, and the samemay never curtail or restrict the scope of the
police power of the State

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
KAGUI MALASUGUI,
defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-44335 July 30, 1936DIAZ,

:Facts:

On March 5, 1935, Tan Why, a Chinese merchant, a resident of Cotabato, a

victim of robbery was found lying on the ground,with several wounds in the
head, on a path leading to the barrio of Carcar, Cotabato. Shortly before the
victims death he was ableto mention the appellants first name, Kagui,
when he was asked about assailant.Appellant was later searched by the
investigating police, without opposition or protest on his part, and it was
discovered that healso had the victims pocketbook, containing P92 in bills,
the victims identification card and a memorandum of amounts with
someChinese characters. In one of the pockets of his pants was found some
change, making the total amount of money found in hispossession P92.68.
The said search was conducted after the appellant had voluntarily produced
the bracelets Exhibit A and placedthem on Lieutenant Jacaria's table,
because, upon being asked if he had anything, he tremblingly answered in
the negative. The appellant testified at the trial that Lieutenant Jacaria and
Sergeant Urangut had forcibly and through intimidation taken fromhim the
bracelets the pocketbook and all the money which he and that, but for the
printing thereon, the identification card found inthe pocketbook then was

blank and there was no memorandum of the kind, in Tan Why's handwriting,
inside the pocketbook,'

Issue:

WON the search and seizure conducted on the accused legal?Article III,
section 1(3), of the 1935 Constitution

:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effectsagainst unreasonable search and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported byoath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized," contains noprohibition of arrest, search, or
seizure without a warrant, but only against "unreasonable" searches and
seizures.

SC ruling:

Yes. The SC held that When the search of the person detained or
arrested and the seizure of the effects found in hispossession are incidental
to an arrest made in conformity with the law, they cannot be considered
unreasonable, much lessunlawful. To hold that no criminal can, in any case,
be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without
awarrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the
shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating
their escape in many instances. The record shows that before proceeding
with the trial in the lower court, the appellant asked for the return of
saideffects to him on the ground that they were unlawfully taken away from
him. Leaving aside the foregoing considerations, histestimony cannot prevail
against nor is it sufficient to counteract that of the government witnesses,
Lieutenant Jacaria andSergeant Urangut, who testified that when Lieutenant
Jacaria asked him what other things he carried, after having voluntarilyplaced
the two pairs of bracelets, Exhibit A, on the table, and Sergeant Urangut felt
his body, he did not show the leastopposition. It follows, therefore, that the
lower court committed no error in accepting as evidence the items taken
from theaccused, not only because the appellant did not object to the taking
thereof from him when searched, but also because theeffects found in his

possession of a person detained or arrested are perfectly admissible as

evidence against him, if theyconstitute the
corpus delicti
or are pertinent or relevant thereto. It is certainly repugnant to maintain the
opposite viewbecause it would amount to authorizing the return to the
accused of the means of conviction seized from him, notwithstandingtheir
being eloquent proofs of crime, for him to conceal, destroy or otherwise
dispose of, in order to assure his impunity.
Pasion Vda. De Garcia vs. Locsin

Facts:

Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from the

justice of the peace of Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of the
law to search the person, house or store of the petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac,
for certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers relating
to her activities as usurer. The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit
given by the said Almeda.
On the same date, the said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of
the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of the petitioner in Victoria,
Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the petitioners bookkeeper,
Alfredo Salas, and, without the presence of the petitioner who was ill and
confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof
The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time
by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the
respondent fiscal who subsequently filed six separate criminal cases against
the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.
The legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the
petitioner in the six criminal cases and the devolution of the documents
demanded. The respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for the
reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the
part of the petitioner.
HELD:
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right
and for a search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and

not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant
and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued
must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to
be seized.
In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by
the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as
true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It
does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any.
Even accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient
and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within
the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court
which issued the warrant, as required by law.
Instead, they were turned over to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in
building up cases against petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant
was issued, there was no case pending against the petitioner, the averment
that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without
basis.
Filed under Constitution and tagged arrest, Bill of rights, case digest,
examination of witness, se

RAMIREZ V CA
7NOV
G.R. No. 93833 |

Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon
City RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation
in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile
and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and
personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled
An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on
granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the petitioners
MR, hence the instant petition.
Issue:

W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in

the conversation
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkietalkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law

makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the

statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent courts conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or
by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute.
The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: Nowhere
(in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator,
the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person
should be professed.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1
of R.A. 4200 does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary
meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning to share or
to impart. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing
or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the process by which
meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of meanings or thoughts which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latters office. Any
doubts about the legislative bodys meaning of the phrase private
communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
conversation and communication were interchangeably used by Senator
Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

VILLEGAS VS HIU CHIONG

Facts:
Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March
1968, then Manila mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The
said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be employed within the City of
Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The permit
will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition
against the said Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes
no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed
P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of
registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit
the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal
delegation of legislative powers. Judge Arca of Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao
Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Mayor of Manila.
HELD:
The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay
down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to
state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayors
action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit,
enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard,
thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or
deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an
undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity

per se lawful. Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or
suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the
power which has been granted to him by the ordinance. The ordinance in
question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.