Legal Ethics Digests

A. LAWYER

1.

Duty to the Court/Negligence of a Lawyer

In Re: Vicente Y. Bayani

A.C. No. 5307. August 9, 2000

Facts: Atty. Vicente Bayani was the lawyer for the appellant in a criminal case.
He failed to submit his proof of service in his appellant's brief which
subsequently caused the inability of the appellee to file his own brief. The IBP
was order to investigate on the matter and despite repeated notices, Bayani
failed to submit the proof of service and his answer to the IBP's query. Hence,
this administrative complaint.

Held: GUILTY. Atty. Bayani's failure to submit proof of service of appellant's

brief and his failure to submit the required comment manifest willful
disobedience to the lawful orders of the Supreme Court, a clear violation of
the canons of professional ethics. It appears that Atty. Bayani has fallen short
of the circumspection required of a member of the Bar. A counsel must
always remember that his actions or omissions are binding on his clients. A
lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that
representation. Further, lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the
rudiments of law and legal procedure and anyone who deals with them has
the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and
competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to his client's cause. Having
been remiss in his duty to the Court and to the Bar, Atty. Bayani was
suspended from the practice of law for 3 months and until the time he
complies with the Order of the Supreme Court to submit the required proof of
service.

2.

Duty to Client/Accounting of Clients Money/Negligence

Teodulfo B. Basas vs. Atty. Miguel I. Icawat

A.C. No. 4282. August 24, 2000

Facts: Atty. Miguel Icawat was the lawyer for Teodulfo Basas and some other
laborers in their complaint against their employer. The NLRC rendered an
adverse decision. Basas and his fellow workers, however, insisted that they
appeal the decision. Atty. Icawat, however, failed to file the required
memorandum of appeal. Basas filed an administrative complaint, also
alleging that Atty. Icawat issued a receipt for an amount less than that which
they had paid him.

Held: GUILTY. Respondent's failure to file the memorandum of appeal required

by the NLRC Rules of Procedure reveals his poor grasp of labor law.
Respondent practically admitted that he did not file the memorandum. His
failure to file the memorandum clearly prejudiced the interests of his clients.
Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in
violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 further provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable. For his failure to issue the proper receipt for the money he received
from his clients, respondent also violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client. The Court fined
Atty. Icawat in the amount of PhP 500, with a warning that a repetition of the
same offense or a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

3.

Duty of Lawyer to Client/Proper Conduct

Teodoro R. Rivera vs. Atty. Sergio Angeles

A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000

Facts: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2
others in a civil case. Rivera and his 2 co-plaintiffs received a favorable
decision. Atty. Angeles received almost PhP 50,000 from one of the
defendants in the case as partial fulfillment of the judgement against the

latter. Atty. Angeles, however, never told his clients of the amount he had
received and never remitted the same to him, leaving them to discover such
fact on their own. Rivera and his co-plaintiffs filed an administrative
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angeles.

Held: GUILTY. Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the Court ruled that his act
amounted to serious misconduct. The Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyers
equipment in the practice of his profession. For it cannot be denied that the
respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a
member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. The Court is not
oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has
extended to his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by
appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There should
never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to
the fees of his own lawyer. For deceit in dealing with his client, Atty. Angeles
was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.

Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon
A.C. No. 4690. August 29, 2000

Facts: Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the
COMELEC and held the position of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively
for the Pasig City Board of Candidates. The respondents helped conduct and
oversee the 1995 elections. Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.
alleged that the respondents tampered with the votes received by them by
either adding more votes for particular candidates in their Statement of Votes
(SoV) or reducing the number of votes of particular candidates in their SoV.
Pimentel filed an administrative complaint for their disbarment. Respondents
argued that the discrepancies were due to honest mistake, oversight and
fatigue. Respondents also argued that the IBP Board of Governors had
already exonerated them from any offense and that the motion for
reconsideration filed by Pimentel was not filed in time.

Held: GUILTY. Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities
attended the canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only
explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could be
due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the

members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs. There is a

limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight
due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of
the error renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue,
as incredible and simply unacceptable. Indeed, what is involved here is not
just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as
reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous
figures in one or two SoVs but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of
certain senatorial candidates at the expense of the petitioner in complete
disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A lawyer who holds a
government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However,
if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such character as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct.
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents
committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By
express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the
government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as
lawyers to do no falsehood. The Court found the respondents guilty of
misconduct and fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued a stern warning that
similar conduct in the future will be severely punished.

4.

Misrepresentation and Non-payment of IBP Dues

Soliman M. Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Francisco R. Llamas

A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000

Facts: Complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership

dues. It appears that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not
indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all,
he only indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has been using this for at least 3
years already. On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred
that he is only engaged in a limited practice of law and under RA 7432, as a
senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and included in
this exemption is the payment of membership dues.

Held: GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar
shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year,
default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquents name from the Roll
of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in
limited practice of law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent
does not include exemption from payment of membership or association
dues.
In addition, by indicating IBP Rizal 259060 in his pleadings and
thereby misprepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his
IBP dues to the Rizal Chpater, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a
violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.
Lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later.

B. JUDGES

1.

Gross Ignorance of the Law

Improper Imposition of the Punishment of Contempt

Flaviano B. Cortes v. Judge Felina Bangalan

A.M. No. MTJ-97-1129. January 19, 2000

Facts: Complainant was one of the co-accused in an adultery case filed before
the sala of respondent Judge Bangalan. In a letter-complaint, he moved for
the voluntary inhibition of respondent judge on the ground that the latter
cannot be impartial over the criminal case because complainant previously
filed an opposition to the appointment of respondent as RTC judge.
For this, respondent judge issued an order citing Complainant in direct

contempt of court, averring further that his pleading contained derogatory,

offensive or malicious statements "equivalent to misbehavior committed in
the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings
before the same within the meaning of Rule 71. When complainant appealed
said order in the same court, after posting a notice of appeal, respondent
judge ordered him to submit a record on appeal. Upon failure to do so,
respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest against Complainant for which he
was arrested and jailed for 1 day with a fine of P10.00.
Thus, Complainant charges respondent judge with gross ignorance of
the law, oppressive conduct and abuse of authority when the latter held him
in contempt of court on account of the statements he made in his lettercomplaint which statements, complainant insists, are absolutely privileged in
nature. Complainant further alleges that he filed a notice of appeal from the
order of contempt but respondent directed him to submit a record on appeal
despite the fact that the same is not required under the rules.

Held: GUILTY. Judge B was fined in the amount equivalent to 1-month salary
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more
seriously. The Court said that while it is true that the complainant attached
the administrative letter-complaint in his letter for respondent judge to inhibit
in the criminal case, it was used merely to support his contention in his
motion for inhibition. A judge is bound never to consider lightly a motion for
his inhibition that questions or puts to doubt, however insignificant, his
supposed predilection to a case pending before him. Furthermore, the alleged
offensive and contemptuous language contained in the letter-complaint was
not directed to the respondent court.
A judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing concern on
his impartiality even if the judge may have been insulted therein. While the
power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order
in judicial proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice,
judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their
contempt powers for correction and preservation not for retaliation or
vindication.
Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law in requiring complainant to
submit a record on appeal, we find the respondent judge's order to be not it
accord with the established rule on the matter. Contempt proceedings is not
one of those instances where a record on appeal is required to perfect an
appeal. Thus, when the law is elementary, so elementary, not to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Payment of Docket Fees in Election Cases

Alfredo B. Enojas v. Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr.

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1513. January 19, 2000

Facts: Judge Gacott is being administratively charged in this case with serious
misconduct, inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law. This complaint arose
when respondent Judge dismissed an election case on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees, although the case was had been previously admitted
and was deemed properly filed by the original Judge (inhibited himself due to
relationship to ones of the parties) whom Judge Gacott replaced. Jugde G
issued the dismissal order relying on a case (Manchester vs. CA) which states
that - a case is deemed commenced only upon the payment of the proper
docket fees. To his opinion, the required fees in this case was not yet paid by
the protestant. Hence, this complaint charging him primarily with gross
ignorance of the law.

Held: GUILTY. Based on the facts and circumstances attendant to the case,
the election protest was properly filed. In fact, the original Judge already
made an order that from the deposit given by the protestant for the expenses
of reopening the questioned ballots, an amount shall be allocated for the
payment of the required fees. More importantly, the Court held that the
Manchester ruling relied upon by respondent Judge does not apply to election
cases. In a latter case ( Pahilan), the evil sought to be avoided in the
Manchester case does not exist in election cases. Truth is, the filing fee in an
election case is fixed and the claim for damages, to which the docket fees
shall be made to apply, is merely ancillary to main cause of action and is not
even determinative of the courts jurisdiction.
While it is true that not every error or mistake of a judge renders him
administratively liable, in this case, it is clear that the respondent judge was
in utter disregard of established rules amounting to gross ignorance of the
law. The Pahilan case was decided long before the respondent made a ruling
on the election case. Thus, the respondent judge was duty bound to adhere
to, and apply the recent ruling, and he cannot feign ignorance thereof,
because the Code of Judicial Ethics requires him to be an embodiment of,
among other things, judicial competence. On e of the principal duties of a
judge is to be abreast with law and jurisprudence since the administration of
justice requires continuous study of the law and jurisprudence. A perusal of

the challenge order reveals that respondent judge failed to live up to what is
expected of him as a dispenser of justice.

Granting of Bail

Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Policarpio S. Camano, Jr.

A.M. RTJ-00-1522 January 20, 2000

Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of discretion, grave abuse of authority, violation of Canons 1, 2,
and 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and incompetence in connection with
granting bail to the accused in a criminal case for child abuse.
The complaint alleges that respondent Judge granted bail while
pending the holding of a preliminary investigation. The defense moved to
quash the information against the accused on the alleged absence of a
preliminary investigation. Consequently, respondent Judge ordered that a
preliminary investigation be had by the state prosecutor. During the
pendency of this, he granted bail in favor of the defendant after several
notices of hearing to the state prosecutor to which the latter failed to appear.
After such grant, complainant herein now accuses respondent of denying the
prosecution the chance to adduce evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused was strong and that bail should not have been granted in his favor.

Held: NOT GUILTY. There was no denial of due process. It was not necessary to
hold hearing so that the prosecution could show that evidence of guilt of the
accused was strong since a preliminary investigation had been ordered by
the court. At that point, bail was still a matter of right. Respondent judge,
knowing that bail was indeed a matter of right at that stage, nevertheless set
the hearing for the petition for bail four times. However, complainant failed to
appear and present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused was
strong. It thus appears that complainant is actually the one who was remiss
in the performance of his duties. Considering that the case was referred to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, the
accused could be considered as entitled to bail as a matter of right. Thus,
respondent judges decision granting bail to the accused was proper and in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Issuance of an Order of Release

Jesusa Santiago vs. Judge Eduardo Jovellanos

Margarita Sanchez vs. Judge Eduardo Jovellanos
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1289. August 1, 2000

Facts: Jesusa Santiago and Margarita Sanchez were complainants in two

different criminal cases before the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan and the RTC
of Rosales, Pampanga, respectively. The suspects in each of the criminal
cases were caught by authorities and detained. However, both suspects were
released by order of Judge Eduardo Jovellanos, presiding judge of the MCTC of
Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan. The complainants questioned both Orders for
Release issued by Judge Jovellanos, alleging that the requirements for the
bailbond had not been fulfilled and that the said judge had no jurisdiction to
order the release.

Held: GUILTY. There are two defects in the Orders for Release signed by Judge
Jovellanos. First, in both cases, the detainees had not registered the bailbond
in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure. One may not be given
provisional liberty if the bailbond is not registered with the proper office.
Secondly, Judge Jovellanos did not have jurisdiction to order the release of the
detainees. The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that when a suspect is
arrested outside of the province, city or municipality where his case is
pending, he may either apply for bail with the court where his case is pending
or with any RTC in the province, city or municipality where he was arrested. If
a RTC judge is not available, he may apply for bail with any MTC or MCTC in
the place where he was arrested. In this case, Judge Jovellanos entertained
motions for bail and ordered release for suspects whose cases were not
pending in his court nor were they arrested within his jurisdiction. As an
advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is
expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the interpretation of our
laws. A judge should be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as
with statutes and procedural rules. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a
sign of incompetence which goes against Canon 3, specifically Rule 3.01, of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge,
Judge Jovellanos owes the public and the court he sits in proficiency in the
law. He must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is expected
to maintain professional competence at all times. Judge Jovellanos was
suspended for 1 year without pay issued the warning that similar conduct in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Grant of a Motion for Reconsideration

Gloria Lucas v. Judge Amelia A. Fabros

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000

Facts : Complainant Lucas was the defendant in an ejectment case pending

before respondent judge. She alleges that Judge Fabros granted the plaintiffs
motion for reconsideration after the case had been dismissed the case for
failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the Preliminary Conference.
She averred that it is elementary, under Section 19(c) of the Rules of
Summary Procedure, that a motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but
respondent judge, in violation of the rule, granted the motion for
reconsideration. She added that, notwithstanding the fact that the
respondent herself had pointed out in open court that the case is governed
by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the judge ordered the revival of the
case out of malice, partiality and with intent to cause an injury to
complainant. Thus, the instant complaint, charging respondent judge with
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion

Held: NOT GUILTY. The SC held that respondent judge not guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion.
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under
Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. This rule, however,
applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered
on the merits. Here, the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due to
failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not
a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the
reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated
under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus,
respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of
ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion for reconsideration
subject of the present

Imposition of Proper Penalty

Felicidad Dadizon vs. Judge Aniceto Lirios

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1295. August 1, 2000

Facts: Felicidad Dadizon was the complainant in a prosecution for Falsification

of a Public Document (Art. 172, RPC) which was tried and decided by Judge
Aniceto Lirios of the MTC of Naval, Biliran. Judge Lirios convicted the accused,
Pablo Suzon, and sentenced him to a straight penalty of 7 months
imprisonment and imposed a PhP 1,000 fine. Dadizon questioned the
punishment meted by the said judge, alleging that the straight penalty of 7
months is way below the penalty provided by law. Judge Lirios defended his
decision, stating that he had to appreciate the mitigating circumstance that
Suzon was already 70 years of age.

Held: GUILTY. As judge of thirty-three (33) years, respondent should have

known that the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides for the imposition of a
prison sentence in the minimum and maximum term for offenses punishable
by the Revised Penal Code or the special laws. The offense committed was
Falsification by a Private Individual and Use of Falsified Document punishable
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for a penalty of
imprisonment of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
(ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 days to 6 years) and a fine of not
more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). Respondent Judge appreciated
one (1) mitigating circumstance (old age), which is merely an ordinary
mitigating circumstance. The imposition of a straight penalty of seven (7)
months by respondent Judge is clearly erroneous. While a judge may not
always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or
decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or
abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. It is true
that a judge may err in fixing the minimum and maximum terms of an
indeterminate sentence. However, the unawareness of or unfamiliarity with
the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and duration and
graduation of penalties merit disciplinary action from reprimand to removal.
Every judge should know that in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law for
offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the indeterminate sentence
should have a fixed minimum and maximum. And when the law is so
elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Judge Aniceto Lirios was fined in the amount of
PhP 5,000 and issued stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely by the Court.

Application of Rules of Procedure

Alfonso C. Ortiz vs. Judge Alex L. Quiroz

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1259 August 4, 2000

Facts: Alfonso Ortiz initiated a criminal complaint against Inocencia

Hernandez for malicious mischeif and grave threats. The case was assigned
to Judge Alex Quiroz, presiding judge of Branch 69 of the MTC of Pasig City.
Before trial, however, Judge Quiroz ruled that the case would be governed by
ordinary rules of procedure rather than the summary rules of criminal
procedure because the case fell within the exceptions in P.D. 1508. Ortiz filed
an administrative complaint against Judge Quiroz, arguing that the summary
rules not the ordinary rules should be followed for his case.

Held: GUILTY. Under the Revised Penal Code, grave threats is penalized with
imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day to 6 months (arresto mayor) and a fine
not exceeding PhP 500, if the threat is not subject to a condition (Article 282).
Malicious mischief, on the other hand, is penalized with imprisonment of 2
months and 1 day to 6 months (arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods) if the value of the damage caused exceeds PhP 1,000 (Article 329).
In this case, the alleged damage to complainant was estimated to be PhP
50,000. Thus, the subject criminal cases should have been tried under the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, considering that such rule is applicable
to criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
is imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding PhP 1,000 or
both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise or of
the civil liability arising therefrom [Section 1 B(4), Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure]. Respondent judge, therefore, erred in applying the ordinary rules
of procedure instead of the rules of summary procedure. A judge has a duty
to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. In fact, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that judges
must be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. He must
have the basic rules at the palm of his hand and be proficient in the
interpretation of laws and procedural rules. Judge Quiroz was reprimanded,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be
dealt with more severely.

Issuance of a Writ of Execution

Teresita Jason vs. Judge Briccio Ygana

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1543. August 4, 2000

Facts: Teresita Jason was the defendant in an ejectment case before the MTC
of Pasig City. Having received an adverse judgement, Jason appealed the
decision to Branch 153 of the RTC of Pasig City, presided by Judge Briccio
Ygana. Respondent judge affirmed the decision of the MTC and subsequently
issued a Writ of Execution for the judgement. The Sheriff of Branch 153
executed upon some personal properties of Jason and gave a Notice to
Vacate. Jason filed an administrative complaint against Judge Ygana, arguing
that the Writ of Execution should have been issued by the court of origin and
not the appellate court.

Held: GUILTY. The case should have been remanded back to the MTC for
execution. The rule is that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is
appealed the regional trial court and the decision of the latter is itself
elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision thereafter become final, the
case should be remanded through the regional trial court to the metropolitan
trial court for execution. The only exception is the execution pending appeal
which is not evident from the records of this case. A judge is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. Canon
4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge should be studious of
the principles of law. Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his office
with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering
that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction
of law. Judge Ygana was fined PhP 10,000 for gross ignorance of the law.

Conducting Hearings for Probation

Carlos B. Creer vs. Judge Concordio Fabillar

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1218. August 14, 2000

Facts: Respondent Judge Concordio Fabillar, acting presiding judge of the 9th
MCTC of Giporlos-Quinapundan, Eastern Samar, convicted Carlos Creer of
grave coercion. Creer appealed the conviction to the RTC where it was
affirmed. Creer subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Creer was
then apprehended and jailed by order of Judge Fabillar. Creer alleged that
respondent judge made him sign an application for probation which the said
judge denied. The RTC subsequently reversed the conviction of Creer and
ordered his release. Creer filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Fabillar, charging the latter with gross ignorance of the law for conducting

hearings for probation despite his pending appeal.

Held: GUILTY. The rule is that no application for probation shall be entertained
or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction. At the time complainant applied for probation, an appeal had
already been perfected. Although respondent Judge eventually denied the
application, the fact still remained that he had acted on it by asking the
probation officer to conduct a post-sentence investigation instead of
outrightly denying the same as so explicitly mandated by the law.
Observance of the law, which he is bound to know and sworn to uphold, is
required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to
his office to know and to simply apply it; anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Fabillar was suspended from
service for 6 months without pay and ordered to pay a PhP 20,000 fine. He
was further warned with the most severe penalty for another infraction by
him.

Order of Acquittal

Fredesminda Dayawon v. Judge Maximino A. Badilla

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1309. September 6, 2000

Facts: Ms. Fredesminda Dayawon charged Judge Maximino A. Badilla of the

Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, with "Gross Ignorance of the Law
and Incompetence" relative to Criminal Case for estafa.
Complainant averred that respondent Judge acquitted the accused and
declared her to only be liable civilly, despite Alamos admittance in open
court that she had received the subject goods from complainant to be sold on
commission basis with the obligation to remit the proceeds of the sale or to
return the items, if unsold, but had failed to comply seasonably therewith
despite demand. Complainant stressed that these admissions, together with
the finding that the accused had acted in bad faith, were clearly sufficient to
convict the accused of the crime of estafa.

Held: GUILTY. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; so long as he remains on
the bench, it is imperative that he continues to be conversant with the basic

law and maintain the desired professional competence.

The Court finds it fit, however, to reduce the recommended fine of P5,000.00
to P2,000.00 considering that no nefarious motive on the part of respondents
judge has been shown.

Issuance of Hold Departure Order

Re: Hold-Departure Order Dated August 9, 1999 Issued by Judge Salvador B.

Mendoza, MCTC, Poro-San Francisco-Tedela-Pilar, Poro, Cebu Office of the
Court Administrator v. Judge Salvador B. Mendoza
A.M. No. 00-1281-MTJ. September 14, 2000

Facts: MTC Judge Mendoza issued a Hold Departure Order in Criminal Case
No. T-1806, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Arnie Pena Osabel." pending
before him in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Poro-San Francisco-Tedela-Pilar,
Poro, Cebu. The Secretary urged the Court Administrator to look into the fact
that the order in question was issued in violation of Supreme Court Circular
No. 39-97 dated June 19, 1997.

Held: GUILTY. Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure
orders to the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases within their exclusive
jurisdiction.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be
"faithful to the law and maintain professional competence." The Court has
not been remised in reminding judges to exert diligent efforts in keeping
abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence. Needless to state, the
process of learning the law and the legal system is a never-ending endeavor,
hence, judges should always be vigilant in their quest for knowledge so they
could discharge their duties and responsibilities with zeal and fervor.

2. Habitual Tardiness

Antonio Yu-Asensi vs. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1245. January 19, 2000

Facts: Complainant charges Judge Villanueva for serious misconduct and/or

inefficiency particularly violating the Canons of Judicial Ethics on promptness
and punctuality. Judge V had been consistently late for 45 minutes to 1 1/2
hours during scheduled hearings, thus delaying the cause of complainant
where he was the plaintiff in a reckless imprudence case. Due to his
tardiness, C's lawyer had also been compelled to extend trial even beyond
the prescribed period provided for by law.

Held: GUILTY. Habitual tardiness amounts to serious misconduct and

inefficiency in violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Several SC Circulars
have been issued which enjoin judges to be punctual in the performance of
their judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and
attorneys are of value, and that if the judge is not punctual in his habits, he
sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction in the
administration of justice. Furthermore, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates: "A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods."

3. Gross Inefficiency and Duty/Liability over Court Personnel

Atty. Martin Pantaleon v. Judge Teofilo Guadiz

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1525 January 25, 2000

Facts: In this case, respondent Judge is charged with Gross Inefficiency,

Neglect and Delay in Elevating the Records of Civil Case No. 88-2187, to
which the complainant was the plaintiffs counsel. After receiving an adverse
decision, complainant filed a Notice of Appeal within the reglementary period
and consequently, respondent Judge issued an order for the transmittal of the
records of the case to the appellate court. However, despite constant followup by counsel, three years have passed and the records of the case have not
been transmitted.
In his Answer, respondent judge contends that the court stenographer
misplaced the transcript of the testimony of one of the witnesses, hence the
record could not be transmitted to the Court of Appeals. He further averred
that complainant should have invited his attention by filing the proper motion

or by writing a personal letter informing him of the non-transmittal of the

records within three months from the date of his order of transmittal.

Held: GUILTY. A judge cannot hide behind the incompetence of his

subordinates. He should be the master of his own domain and take
responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects.
The non-transmission of the records by reason of inefficiency of the
staff cannot exonerate respondent judge from administrative liability. As
administrative officer of the court, a judge is expected to keep a watchful eye
on the level of performance and conduct of the court personnel under his
immediate supervision who are primarily employed to aid in the
administration of justice as required by Canon 3, Rule 3.09 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
In the case of Re: Judge Fernando Agdamag, the Court stated: he
(judge) sits not only to judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but
that his responsibilities include being an effective manager of the court and
its personnel. He is presumed to be cognizant of his responsibilities as a
worthy minister of the law. At the very least, he is expected to keep abreast
with his docket.
Certainly, a delay of three years in the transmission of court records
to the appellate court, where only a period of 30 days is required, is
inexcusable.

Acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosilo v. Dante dela Cruz Rivera, Sheriff III,
Branch 34, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City
A.M. No. P-00-1424. September 25, 2000

Dante dela Cruz Rivera, Sheriff III, Branch 34, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Quezon City vs. Acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosilo, Branch 34, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Quezon City.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1316. September 25, 2000

Facts: Sheriff Dante Rivera allegedly falsified his Personal Data Sheet. For
this, respondent Judge accused him of dishonesty and subsequently
prevented him from reporting for work. Afterwhich, respodent Judge filed an

administrative complaint against the sheriff.

Held: GUILTY. A judge has no authority or power to prevent an employee from

reporting for work. If indeed complainant Rivera committed falsification in the
accomplishment of his personal data sheet, the most that Judge Bellosillo
could have done was to file an administrative charge against complainant
Rivera, which he later on did but after the complainant Rivera filed an
administrative charge against him (Judge Bellosillo) for conduct unbecoming.
While a judge may have supervision over his employees, he should not
however exercise his authority over them in an oppressive or despotic
manner. Judge Bellosillo should have realized that it is the Supreme Court
which has the authority to discipline/dismiss his subordinate. The most that
he can do is merely to file an administrative complaint against the erring
employee.

4.

Impartiality and Impropriety of a Judge

Issuance of Conflicting Orders

Daniel & Suprema Dumo v. Judge Romeo V. Perez

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1242 January 20, 2000

Facts: Spouses Dumo filed this administrative complaint against respondent

Judge Perez for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and
patent partiality.
Respondent MTC Judge issued a Writ of Execution to enforce the
decision of a case involving quieting of title and recovery of ownership of real
property. However, said writ was returned unsatisfied because the herein
complainants was the actual owners and occupants of the questioned
property without being impleaded in the original case. Subsequently,
respondent Judge issued an order stating that complainants shall not be
affected by said writ because they were not made parties to the case.
Despite such order, he moved on to issue a Writ of Possession in favor of the
original plaintiff (Espinas). As a consequence, Espinas used such Writ of
Possession against the herein complainants in order to eject them from their
property and deprived them from the enjoyment of the same.

The crux of this controversy therefore is the issuance of respondent

Judge of conflicting orders, which according to complainants, showed patent
partiality over Espinas, the original plaintiff in the case for quieting of title.

Held: GUILTY. First of all, respondent Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law. As
a municipal trial court judge, he obviously had no jurisdiction over the action
for quieting of title and recovery of ownership filed by Espinas against the
original defendants. It must be stressed that the case was NOT for ejectment
over which MTCs have original jurisdiction, but for quieting of title and/or
ownership falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts. The
question of jurisdiction if so basic and elementary a matter that a judges
ignorance of it is simply inexcusable.
Secondly, the judges act of issuing conflicting orders is likewise
inexcusable. After declaring that the Writ of Execution cannot be made
enforceable against herein complainants as they were not made parties to
the case, he reversed himself nevertheless by issuing the Writ of Possession.
Under said writ of possession, it was patent that he was contradicting his
previous ruling by ordering therein to eject all adverse occupants, which of
course, was so broad to affect all persons including herein complainants. The
issuance of said writ gave rise to the suspicion of partiality or bias in favor of
Espinas.
The presumptions of regularity and good faith in the performance of
judicial functions on respondents part are negated by the circumstances of
record. While a judge cannot be made liable for any criminal, civil, or
administrative charge for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith and in
the absence of fraud, it is imperative that he should have basic knowledge of
the law. Judges must keep abreast of the laws and jurisprudence to be able to
render justice and maintain public confidence in our legal system.
More importantly, judges should not only be impartial but should also
appear impartial. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that: a
judge should also avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. (Rule 2.01, Canon
2).

Leopoldo G. Dacera, Jr. vs. Judge Teodoro A. Dizon

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573. August 2, 2000

Facts: Leopoldo Dacera, Jr. was the complainant in a prosecution for Qualified
Theft filed with Branch 37 of the RTC of General Santos City with Judge
Teodoro Dizon presiding. The prosecutor later filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds that Dacera had executed and signed an Affidavit of Desistance from
pursuing the prosecution. Dacera, however, opposed the Motion to Dismiss,
alleging that Judge Dizon had unduly influenced him to sign the Affidavit of
Desistance and that he had not been fully appraised of the consequences of
his actions in doing so. The Supreme Court assigned an Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals to investigate into the matter.

Held: NOT GUILTY. The investigation did not find any conclusive evidence that
Judge Dizon was personally biased in favor of either party in the disposition of
the case in question. It must be noted that respondent judge did not actually
dismiss the case upon motion of the prosecutor and even voluntarily inhibited
himself upon motion of Dacera to disqualify him. However, the investigation
did reveal that Judge Dizon had made telephone calls to Dacera and even had
discussions with him inside his chambers in order to verify the truth about the
Affidavit of Desistance. While there is no clear proof of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations, the acts of respondent in calling and
meeting with the complainant still leave much to be desired and are
deserving of reprimand. A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must
also appear to be impartial. Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this
appearance. Canon II of the Code of Judicial Conduct basically provides that
judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities and should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. It is clear that the acts of the
respondent judge have been less than circumspect. He should have kept
himself free from any appearance of impropriety and should have
endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of
indecorum. The complaint filed by Dacera against Judge Dizon, Jr., was
dismissed for lack of merit. However, respondent Judge was admonished to
refrain from making calls to any parties-litigant and/or counsel with cases
pending in his sala and sternly warned that a repetition of the same will be
dealt with more severely.

William R. Adan vs. Judge Anita Abucejo-Luzano

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1298. August 3, 2000

Facts: William Adan was the complainant in 2 criminal cases for Grave Oral

Defamation tried and decided by Judge Anita Abucejo-Luzano of the MCTC of

Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. Respondent judge convicted the accused
and sentenced them accordingly. Upon Motion for Reconsideration, however,
respondent judge reversed her decision and rendered a judgement for
acquittal. Adan questioned the reversal of the conviction, alleging that Judge
Abucejo-Luzano had modified her judgement because having received new
information from the accused, she conducted a personal ocular inspection of
the place where the crime was committed without the presence of the parties
involved.

Held: GUILTY. Respondent Judge should have known that an ex-parte ocular
inspection without notice to nor presence of the parties and after the case
had already been decided was highly improper. If respondent Judge had
entertained doubts that she wished to clarify after the trial had already
terminated, she should have ordered motu proprio the reopening of the trial
for the purpose, with due notice to the parties, whose participation therein is
essential to due process. Thus, it is error for the judge to go alone to the
place where the crime was committed and make an inspection without
previous knowledge or consent of the parties. The conduct of the ex-parte
inspection, the result of which apparently influenced her to reconsider her
earlier decision, was highly improper as she, in effect, admitted additional
evidence without giving the prosecution a chance to object to its introduction
or to controvert the same. Her actions show an ignorance of the law and
proper procedure to be followed for a situation such as this. Furthermore,
respondent judge has opened herself to charges of partiality and bias by
meeting with the accused privately. No matter how noble her intentions may
have been, it was improper for respondent judge to meet the accused without
the presence of complainant. Respondent Judge has failed to live up to the
norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial. She thus violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
provides that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. Judge Abucejo-Luzano was fined PhP 10,000 and
issued a stern warning that any similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

5. Gross Misconduct amounting to Violation of a Constitutional Right/

Serious/Grave Misconduct

Atty. NapoleonS. Valenzuela v. Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1241 January 20, 2000

Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the

constitutional right of subject accused to assistance by counsel of her own
choice, gross misconduct, oppression, partiality and violation of the Code of
Judicial Ethics.
In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite
not being accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time. It
appears that Judge granted bail without the assistance of the counsel of
record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested that the latter should be
replaced by another counsel. Aghast by such decision, Atty. V filed his Notice
of Withdrawal, in conformity with his clients decision, Meriam Colapo.
Subsequently, he filed the instant administrative complaint against
respondent Judge. To support his position, he attached an Affidavit allegedly
executed by his client Colapo. However, during the hearing of the case, he
failed to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country
although she was willing to testify at that time.

Held: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the assistance of
counsel, the Court held that it was valid and sufficiently based on the
Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With regard to the alleged act of
respondent Judge suggesting to the accused that she should change her
counsel (complainant Atty. V) and recommending a different lawyer, the Court
found that the evidence adduced by the complainant was insufficient to
substantiate the charges against him. The only evidence offered by
complainant was the Affidavit of his client Meriam Colapo, and it cannot be
the basis of a finding of guilt even in an administrative case. The
complainants failure to present his principal witness, in the absence of other
evidence to prove his charges was fatal and said Affidavit cannot be given
credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant being placed on the
witness stand.
The employment or profession of a person is a property right within
the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. This applies also to Judges.
Respondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the charges against
him without affording him a chance to confront the said witness, Meriam
Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed.

Erlinda Sy vs. Danilo Norberte

A.M. No. 00-1398-P. August 1, 2000

Facts: In her civil case versus Antoinetta Galvez, complainant Erlinda Sy

obtained a writ of preliminary attachment against all properties of the former.
She alleged, however, that respondent Danilo Norberte, Sheriff of Branch 125
of the RTC of Kalookan City, tipped off Galvez about the said writ. She further
alleged that Norberte actively assisted Galvez in the removal of her personal
property from the latter's residence. Sy filed a complaint with Branch 125 of
the RTC of Kalookan City which was submitted for investigation.

Held: GUILTY. The investigation revealed that Norberte was positively

identified and seen by the complainant Sy and 2 other witnesses in the act of
helping Galvez remove her personal property from her residence. Norberte's
alibi did not prove to be credible. The offense of serious or grave misconduct
refers to such misconduct that shows the element of corruption, clear intent
to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules. In tipping off and
assisting Galvez, Norberte's actions are an attempt to circumvent a valid
court order. Even if Norberte did not tip off Galvez, his mere presence at the
scene is punishable. Being an officer of the Court, respondent sheriff should
have refrained from actuations though innocent and in good faith which may
result in suspicion of impropriety and may consequently taint the good image
of the judiciary. The nature and responsibilities of officers of the judiciary are
not mere idealistic sentiments but true working standards and attainable
goals that should be matched with actual deeds. They are expected to serve
with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and
to conduct themselves with propriety and decorum at all times. Norberte was
suspended for 1 month without pay and issued the warning that similar
conduct in the future will be punished more severely.

In Re: Procedure adopted by Judge Daniel Liangco

(A.M. No. 99-11-158-MTC. August 1, 2000)

Facts: RTC Judge Pedro Sunga of San Fernando, Pampanga received

information about irregularities in the disposition of jueteng cases before the
MTC's of the said region. Upon investigation, Judge Sunga discovered that of
the 55 jueteng cases filed in July 1999, 53 were assigned to Branch 1 of the
MTC of San Fernando presided by Judge Daniel Liangco. Noting that statistical
improbability that 53 out of 55 jueteng cases should be assigned to only 1

Branch, Judge Sunga demanded a written explanation as to how such a

situation had come about. In his letter, Judge Liangco explained that it has
been his practice to automatically take over all jueteng cases without the
need for raffling. The reason he cited is that the accused in such cases are
deprived of their liberty and that by automatically assigning these cases to
his branch, the accused can file motions for bail and the same can be
entertained immediately without waiting for the raffle. In short, because of
the need for provisional liberty, all jueteng cases are considered to be
automatically raffled to his branch so that he may entertain motions for bail
and the accused can be immediately released upon filing of the bond. The
Supreme Court ordered further investigation of the case and placed Judge
Liangco on preventive suspension.

Held: GUILTY. Judge Liangco clearly violated Supreme Court Circular No. 7
which provides: "All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where
there are two or more branches shall be assigned or distributed to the
different branches by raffle. No case may be assigned to any branch without
being raffled." There is no connection at all between respondents alleged
desire to facilitate the release of such accused on bail and his questionable
act of retaining the records of the cases for direct assignment to his own sala.
For after granting bail to the accused, his alleged purpose of immediately
extending provisional liberty to the accused shall already have been served.
There is thus no need or justification to retain the records of the cases and
consider them raffled off to his own sala. The questioned acts of respondent
Judge Liangco constitute a clear breach of his duty as a judge. The Code of
Judicial Conduct mandates that: A judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Respondent judges manner of automatically assigning jueteng cases to its
own branch without the benefit of raffle, casts doubt on his integrity as a
judge and erodes the confidence of the people in the judicial system. A
judges official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties
should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond
reproach. Judge Liangco was suspended from service for 6 months without
pay and issued the warning that similar conduct in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.

6. Neglect of Duty/Abuse of Authority

Zenaida S. Beso v. Judge Juan Daguman

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000

Facts: In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso

charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his
jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the
marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
In his comment, the respondent judge alleged that the marriage of the
complainant had to be solemnized in Calbayog City though outside his
territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar because : 1) physically
indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita; 2)
complainant said she had to fly abroad that same day; 3) that for the parties
to go to another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail
serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of
witnesses or sponsors; 4) if they failed to get married on August 28, 1997,
complainant would be out of the country for a long period and their marriage
license would lapse and necessitate another publication of notice; 5) if the
parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared
it would complicate her employment abroad.

Held: GUILTY. The authority of a judge to solemnize marriage is only limited

to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no
longer within his area of jurisdiction. Additionally, there are only three
instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a marriage
may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other
than his sala, and the circumstances of this case do not fall in any of these
exceptions.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when
he failed to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman. Such
duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which
provides:

"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either
of the
contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in
Article 6
and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificates not later
than

fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where
the
marriage was solemnized. xxx"

Lastly, a judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that

the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact.
There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The
records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent
Judges part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record
management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business. It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the
one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.

7.

Prompt Disposition of Cases/ Inefficiency/Abuse of Authority

State Prosecutor Romulo Tolentino vs. Judge Nilo Malanyaon

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1444. August 3, 2000

Facts: Judge Nilo Malanyaon, presiding judge of Branch 30 of the RTC of

Camarines Sur, dismissed 5 separate criminal cases for lack of evidence and
also refused to issue warrants of arrest on the ground of lack of probable
cause. Acting State Prosecutor for Camarines Sur Romulo Tolentino assailed
the orders for dismissal and the refusal to issue the warrants for arrest
alleging that Judge Malanyaon had abused his authority and knowingly
rendered unjust orders. Tolentino also complained that several motions had
been filed before respondent judge and have yet to be resolved and decided
upon.

Issues: (1) Did Judge Malanyaon exercise grave abuse of discretion and act in
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal cases?
(2) Was Judge Malanyaon guilty of unreasonable delay for failing to
act on the motions filed by State Prosecutor Tolentino?

Held: (1) NO. The allegations that respondent judge had violated Canons 1, 2
and 3 of the Canons of Judicial Conduct are without merit. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt or improper consideration are sufficient defenses
protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and
promulgation of an unjust decision from being held accountable for errors of
judgment on the premise that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the administration of justice can be infallible. There is no proof of
grave abuse of discretion. These charges were dismissed by the Court.
(2) YES. The motions/incidents were left unacted upon from 3 to 5
months and were still pending when the administrative complaint was filed
against respondent. Respondent should be aware of his duties as an arbiter of
justice. Under Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge shall dispose
of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods. While the prosecutor in this case is not without fault, the respondent
cannot escape responsibility for his inaction of the pending motions before
him. Even assuming arguendo that the various motions filed by the
prosecutor were considered to be mere scraps of paper or without merit, the
judge must nevertheless resolve on those matters promptly by granting or
denying them. It is the duty of the judge to rule upon the motions filed
before him even if his actions are merely to deny them. Respondent judge
was found guilty for his failure to resolve pending motions and/or incidents
and, accordingly, a penalty of reprimand was imposed upon him with the
warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation will be dealt with a
more severe penalty by the Court.

Juan Luzarraga vs. Hon. Amaro M. Meteoro

A.M. No. 00-1572. August 3, 2000

Facts: Juan Luzarraga was the plaintiff in a civil case assigned to Branch 41 of
the RTC of Camarines Norte. After the said plaintiff had rested his case and
presented his evidence, the case was transferred to the newly-created Branch
64 of the RTC of Camarines Norte, presided by Judge Amaro Meteoro. It was
only 2 years later that Judge Meteoro proceeded with the presentation of the
defendant's evidence. The case was finally submitted for decision a year
later. After an elapse of more than 7 months without a decision on the case,
Luzarraga filed an administrative complaint against Judge Meteoro.
Respondent judge pleaded for the understanding and compassion of the
Court, citing that his branch had more than 300 cases pending before it, that
he had trouble recruiting and training competent personnel and that he had
suffered a stroke.

Held: GUILTY. More than one year had already elapsed since the submission of
the case and respondent Judge has not decided the same despite the Motion
for Early decision filed the complainant. The Court has consistently held that
the failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency and non-observance of said rule
is a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. Rule 3.05
of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose
of the court's business promptly and to decide cases within the periods fixed
by law. The failure to render a decision within the 90-day period constitutes
serious misconduct in derogation of the speedy administration of justice.
When circumstances arise that would prevent the judge from disposing a
case within the reglementary period, all that he has to do is to file an
application with the Court asking for a reasonable extension of time within
which to resolve the case. However, the record of this administrative matter
does not show that respondent made an attempt to make such a request.
Instead, he preferred to keep the case pending, thereby inviting suspicion
that something sinister or corrupt is afoot. That he was burdened with a
heavy case load and is a stroke victim, serve only to mitigate the penalty, not
to exonerate him. Judge Meteoro was fined P20,000 with the warning that a
repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. He was further
directed to decide the subject case within a non-extendible period of 30 days
from receipt of resolution, and to submit to the Office of the Court
Administrator a copy of his decision within 10 days from promulgation
thereof.

Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 87 and 98,
Quezon City
A.M. No. 99-11-423-RTC. August 16, 2000

Facts: On September 15 to 17, 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator

conducted an audit and physical inventory of pending cases in Branches 87
and 98 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by Judge
Elsie Ligot-Telan and Judge Justo M. Sultan, respectively. The audit team
reported that Judge Ligot-Telan had a well-managed docket. Judge Sultan,
however, was a different story. Of the 57 cases submitted for decision, 34
were already beyond the reglementary period, some of which involve
detention prisoners. It was observed that the said branch gave the least
preference to cases submitted for decision, and it has no effective docket
system and recording of cases. In fact, the Branch Clerk of Court had not

submitted the required docket and inventory of cases for a number of years.
Records did not show that Judge Sultan ever requested for an extension of
time within which to decide the cases submitted before him.

Held: GUILTY. The Court reiterates that failure to decide cases within the
required period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency which is a
ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge, either by a
fine or suspension from the service, depending on factors that tend to
aggravate or mitigate his liability. This is in accordance with the mandate that
the judge shall dispose of the business of the court promptly and decide
cases within the prescribed periods. Conformably, the rules require the courts
to decide cases ready for decision within 3 months from date of submission.
The Court is not unmindful of the Herculean task trial judges are faced with
the perennial clogged dockets of the lower courts. However, this should not
be an excuse for them to abdicate their duty to dispense justice. Judges must
adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to
bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business. Furthermore, if the
caseload of the judge prevents the disposition of cases within the
reglementary periods, he should ask this Court for a reasonable extension of
time to dispose of the cases involved. This is to avoid or dispel any suspicion
that something sinister is going on. The Court fined Judge Sultan PhP 20,000
to be taken from his retirement benefits.

Dominga D. Quillal-Lan vs. Judge Alicia L. Delos Santos

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1269. August 24, 2000

Facts: The daughter of complainant Dominga Quillal-Lan was the defendant in

a Forcible Entry case before Judge Alicia Delos Santos of the MTC of Digos,
Davao del Sur. The complainant alleges that respondent judge failed to
decide the case within the mandatory 30-day period as provided by the Rules
on Summary Procedure. Judge Delos Santos avers that she was on sick leave
and therefore could not be expected to decide upon the case within the said
period.

Held: GUILTY. There is no doubt that a case of Forcible Entry falls within the
Rules of Summary Procedure and as stated therein, must be decided within
30-days. Respondent should have rendered judgment in the forcible entry
case before she went on leave. Delay in the disposition of cases covered by

the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure defeats the very purpose of said
rule, which is the expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. Failure
to decide such cases on time renders the rationale for the rule meaningless
and inutile. Respondent appears to be remiss in her duties as judge when she
failed to render judgment in the case as mandated by the rules. Under Rule
3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, she is required to dispose of the courts
business promptly and to decide cases within the required time frame. We
have time and again reminded judges to comply with the rules regarding the
period to decide cases, in pursuance of the Courts oft-repeated policy of
speedy disposition of quality justice for all. Judge Delos Santos was fined PhP
1,000 and issued a warning that similar conduct in the future will be dealt
with more severely.

Cob C. Dela Cruz v. Judge Rodolfo M. Serrano

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1582. September 4, 2000

Facts: Complainant contends, among others, that it took one (1) year and
five (5) months instead of three months to render a decision in civil case. The
civil case was submitted for decision on April 1996, but the decision thereon
was only promulgated on October 8, 1997.

Held: GUILTY. It is not disputed that it took respondent Judge one (1) year and
five (5) months, after Civil Case No. 908 was submitted for decision, to decide
it which is way beyond the three-month period mandated by the Constitution.
Section 15 (1) of Article VIII of the Constitution provides that all cases filed
before the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three (3) months
from date of submission. The Code of Judicial Conduct likewise provides that
a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay [Rule 1.02.]
and directs a judge to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods. [Rule 3.05.]
It is an oft-repeated maxim that justice delayed is often justice denied. Thus,
any delay in the administration of justice may result in depriving the litigant
of his right to a speedy disposition of his case and will ultimately affect the
image of the judiciary. A delay in the disposition of cases amounts to a denial
of justice, brings the court into disrepute and ultimately erodes public faith
and confidence in the judiciary.

Rolando Sulla v. Hon. Rodolfo C. Ramos

A.M No. MTJ-00-1319. September 27, 2000

Facts: Dr. Rolando A. Sulla charging respondent Judge Rodolfo C. Ramos,

presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Jaro, Leyte, with unreasonable
delay or refusal to render a decision in criminal Case No. 8121. The case was
submitted for decision in April 1997. But as of May 21, 1999, date of
complainants letter, and despite constant requests for its early resolution,
respondent Judge Ramos has not rendered any decision in the said case.

Held: GUILTY. This Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to
decide cases promptly and expeditiously pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the
Constitution. Judges are presumed to be aware of Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which calls for a judge to be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence. Rule 3.05 admonishes all judges to dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the period fixed by law.

8.

Negligence/Incompetence of a Judge

Norma Esguerra vs. Judge Guillermo Loja

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1523. August 15, 2000

Facts: Norma Esguerra was the complainant in a criminal case for Falsification
of a Public Document tried before Judge Guillermo Loja of Branch 26 of the
RTC of Manila. Complainant alleged that Judge Loja failed to decide the case
within the 90-day reglementary period and further accused him of falsifying
his certificate of service in order to make it appear that he had decided the
case. Judge Loja countered by stating that he had indeed decided upon the
case but rather, the decision was just not dated.

Held: GUILTY. A careful study of the facts shows that Judge Loja is guilty only
of SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE and not of the administrative complaint filed against
him. There is no clear proof that the respondent judge falsified his certificate

of service simply because his decision was dated. Even assuming that there
was a slight delay in deciding the case, it must be taken into consideration
that Judge Loja has a heavy case load (almost 800 cases pending) and that
this is the first offense by a judge who provided long and consistent service to
the Judiciary. The Court fined Judge Loja PhP 2,000 and issued a warning that
similar conduct in the future will be more severely punished.

9. Duty of Court Employees

Marta Bucatcat v. Edgar Bucatcat and Gene Jaro

A.M. No. P-93-985. January 28, 2000

Facts:Marta T.Bucatcat (complainant) charged her husband, Edgar Y.

Bucatcat, and Gene S. Jaro (respondents), Court Interpreter respectively, of
the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Gandara, Samar, with immorality.
Complainant avers that she is the legal wife of respondent Bucatcat. She
claims that respondents are having an illicit relationship with each other.
Moreover, respondents allegedly have two (2) children together and that
respondent Jaro, at the time of the filing of the letter-complaint, was pregnant
with their third child.

Held: GUILTY. There is sufficient evidence to hold respondents liable for

immorality for
maintaining an illicit relationship with each other. Every employee of the
judiciary should
be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant,
he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings
with other people, to preserve the courts good name and standing. It cannot
be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the
conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the
judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court employees have been enjoined to
adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their
professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and
integrity of courts of justice.
Respondents DISMISSED from service.

JUNE 1998-1999

A. JUDGES

1.

Good Faith in Rendering Decisions

Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero v. Hon. Adriano Villamor (296 SCRA 88)

Facts: Carlos and his counsel, Guerrero, charged respondent with gross
ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment after they
lost a civil and a criminal case tried by respondent. They were also thwarted
on appeal. However, in the pleadings before the CA, they used abusive
language in describing the respondents acts, hence, respondent judge cited
them for direct contempt, which was later set aside by the SC.

Held: Case dismissed. The order of direct contempt may only be considered
as an error of judgment. A judge may not be administratively charged for
mere errors of judgment, in the absence of showing of any bad faith, malice
or corrupt purpose. Moreover, judges cannot be held to account criminally,
civilly, or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by them in
good faith.

Impartiality

Re: Inhibition of Judge Eddie R. Rojas (292 SCRA 306)

Facts: Atty. Rojas was appointed a judge. One of the criminal cases he
inherited was one in which he acted as prosecutor. He explained that his
delay in inhibiting himself from presiding on that case was because it was
only after the belated transcription of the stenographic notes that he
remembered that he handled that case. He also says that the counsels did
not object and he never held full-blown hearings anyway.

Held: Judge is filed & reprimanded. The Rules of Court prevent judges from
trying cases where they acted as counsel without the consent of the parties.
This prevents not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of
impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part in a
proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. He should
administer justice impartially & without delay. The prohibition does not only
cover hearings but all judicial acts (e.g. orders, resolutions) some of which
Judge Rojas did make.

Carlito D. Lazo v. Judge Antonio V. Tiong (300 SCRA 214)

Facts: Judge Tiong was accused of failing to inhibit himself in a criminal case
because he was related within the fourth degree of affinity to the accused.
The judge claims he did so in the hopes that his presence would allow the
parties to settle amicably.

Held: Judge reprimanded. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where

his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Also, Rule 137, Rules of
Court, provides that no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, inter alia, is related to either party within the sixth degree pf
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree computed
according to the rules of the civil law. Under this provision, the Presiding
Judge is mandated to disqualify himself from sitting in a case. He cannot
exercise his discretion whether to inhibit himself or not.

2.

Speedy Administration of Justice

Baltazar D. Amion v. Judge Roberto S. Chiongson (301 SCRA 614)

Facts: A is a policeman charged with murder. During the trial, J ordered that
he be represented by counsel de officio because As attorney was ill. A then
charged J with ignorance of the law & oppression because the fact that the
counsel de officio did not know the particulars of the case meant that A would
be denied due process.

Held: Complaint dismissed. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a

judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. A judge should
always be imbued with a high sense of duty & responsibility in the discharge
of his obligation to promptly administer justice. In this case, the reason J
appointed a FLAG lawyer was because As lawyer had postponed several
hearings because he was ill or out of town. Also, A had various lawyers
during the said case who always postponed the hearings for various reasons
such as illness, lack of knowledge of the case or unavailability for trial. These
are all legal but clearly dilatory means used by the complainant to delay the
case for 4 years. J should be commended for his efforts to expedite the case.

Fe T. Bernardo v. Judge Amelia A. Fabros (307 SCRA 28)

Facts: B accused F of inaction in an unlawful detainer case for 7 months when

the rules on summary procedure call for a decision in 30 days. F does not
deny the inaction but says B has no standing as she is only the attorney-infact of the plaintiffs to the civil case.

Held: FINED. Judges must decide cases expeditiously, especially in summary

proceedings. She should either ask for additional time to decide or devise an
efficient filing system to expedite decision. Finally, standing or personal
interest of the complainant is immaterial in administrative cases which
involves the public good.

Dolores Gomez v. Judge Rodolfo A. Gatdula (293 SCRA 433)

Facts: Gomez is the complainant in 2 different criminal cases before Judge

Gatdula. When she petitioned the SC to change the venue of 1 of the cases,
Respondent suspended the scheduled hearings in both cases. When required
by the SC to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against
him, he delayed his comment thereto. He eventually explained that the
suspension of hearing was made because the request for change of venue
was pending in the SC.

Held: Judge Gatdula acted vindictively & oppressively, apparently irked by

the request of petitioner. He need not have suspended both hearings as the
change of venue only involved one case. His delay in commenting on the
change of venue also effectively delayed both cases by 5 months. His acts
are not free from the appearance of impropriety, let alone beyond reproach,
as required by Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Re: Cases Left Undecided by Judge Narciso M. Bumanlag, Jr. (306 SCRA 50)

Facts: Upon retirement, B left 7 criminal and 3 civil cases undecided within
the 90-day period required by section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution. He
said his failure was due to a serious illness.

Held: FINED. Members of the bench have a duty to administer justice without
undue delay. Failure to do so within the reglementary period constitutes a
neglect of duty warranting administrative penalties. If hindered by illness, a
judge should inform the Office of Court Administrator and ask for additional
time to decide in order to avoid the sanctions. However, if there is no malice
or bad faith, and the judge is prevented by factors beyond his control, the
penalty will be mitigated.

Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court Branch
24, Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur; Branch 2, Isabela, Basilan; and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Labason, Zamboanga del Norte (303 SCRA 208)

Facts: Judge Apostol had a backlog of 280 cases. Also, there had been no
actions on 268 other cases assigned to him. Judge says he has constant
medical problems and no legal researchers to help him. These and the peace
and order problems in his locality prevent him from expediting.

Held: Fined for gross neglect of duty. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides
that a judge should administer justice without delay and dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the reglementary periods.
If his health problems were preventing him from doing his duty, he should
have retired early so a healthier successor could act on the case load.

Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 68 of Camilang,
Tarlac (305 SCRA 61)

Facts: Judge R was due for compulsory retirement. The OCA found that he had
many pending cases, some of which were undecided beyond the 90-day
period.

Held: FINED but penalty mitigated. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 enjoins all judges to
attend promptly to the business of the court and decide cases within the time
fixed by law. A judge is mandated to render judgment not more than ninety
(90) days from the time the case is submitted for decision. Failure to render
the decision within the prescribed period of ninety (90) days from submission
of a case for decision constitutes serious misconduct and gross inefficiency.
However, since after being reminded of this, Judge R cleared most of his
docket (even those not overdue for decision) before retiring, the fine is
mitigated.

Atty. Raula A. Sanchez v. Judge Augustine A. Vestil (298 SCRA 1)

Facts: Complainant charged RTC Judge Vestil with falsifying his monthly
certificate of service submitted to the SC by stating that he has no pending
case submitted for decision or resolution that has gone beyond the NINETY
(90) day period allowed by law when in fact there were numerous civil &
criminal cases which the respondent failed to resolve within the said period.
Respondents say most of the cases were either inherited & substantially
heard by other judges, or that they require further study or whose
stenographic notes were yet to be transcribed and these are excepted from
being included the certificate by a proviso contained therein.

Held: Respondent Judge suspended and fined. Judges are mandated to

decide cases seasonably. Judges who cannot comply with such mandate
should ask for additional time, explaining in their request the reasons for the
delay. Neither the proviso nor the fact that notes are to be transcribed is a
valid defense for not deciding within the required time. The SC has
consistently held that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the

required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency & the nonobservance of said rule is ground for administrative sanction against the
defaulting judge.

B. LAWYERS

1.

Assisting in the Speedy Administration of Justice

Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (293 SCRA
622)

Facts: Judgment was rendered against the petitioner ordering it to reconvey

the cemetery to the rightful owners. Despite the final decision of the SC,
petitioner was able to prevent the execution for 17 years, and thus render the
judgment ineffectual. They filed several petitions and motions for
reconsideration with the trial court and the CA despite the fact that it would
never prosper as the trial courts decision had long become final before the
said petitions were filed.

Held: Petition denied. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest
of the client and zeal in the defense of their clients right, they are also
officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. They should not misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. The facts and the law
should advise them that a case such as this should not be permitted to be
filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for
sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

Duty to Protect Clients Interest

Development Bank of the Philippines and Asset Privitization Trust v. Court of

Appeals and Continental Cement Corporation (302 SCRA 362)

Facts: CCC filed an injunction suit to prevent the DBP and APT from
foreclosing on its mortgages. During trial, DBP & APT were unable to appear
for cross-examining CCCs witnesses because the respective counsels were
unprepared, unavailable or ill. The lower court decided this as a waiver,
hence judgment was rendered for CCC. DBP & APT filed this petition alleging
denial of due process.

Held: Petition denied. There can be no denial of due process where a party
had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings but did not do so.
Counsel for APT was absent on several occasions because of withdrawal of
previous counsel, unreadiness to conduct the cross-examinations and serious
illness. The withdrawal of APTs previous counsel in the thick of the
proceedings would be a reasonable ground to seek postponement of the
hearing. However, such necessitates a duty on the part of the new counsel to
prepare himself for the next scheduled hearing. The excuse that it was due to
the former counsels failure to turn over the records of the case to APT, shows
the negligence of the new counsel to actively recover the records of the case.
Counsel should have taken adequate steps to fully protect the interest of his
client, rather than pass the blame on the previous counsel. A motion to
postpone trial on the ground that counsel is unprepared for trial
demonstrates indifference and disregard of his clients interest. A new
counsel who appears in a case in midstream is presumed and obliged to
acquaint himself with all the antecedent processes and proceedings that
have transpired prior to his takeover. Also, even if counsel had been ill with
dengue, he chose not to notify his co-counsels who could have conducted the
cross-examination.

2.

Falsehood/Forum-shopping/Dilatory Tactics

Ban Hua U. Flores v. Atty. Enrique S. Chua (306 SCRA 465)

Facts: Chua was charged with many offenses. The evidence was found to
support the charges that he notarized a forged deed of sale, that he caused
to be published an advertisement of a SEC decision in order to bring ridicule
and shame upon a corporation, that he filed a civil case knowing that the
reliefs he prayed for were probably granted in the SEC case thus belying his
certification against forum shopping. He has also been previously

reprimanded for bribing a judge and for consistently using dilatory tactics to
prolong a litigation.

Held: DISBARRED. He has thus violated Rules 10.01, 12.02, 12.04 (foisting or
commission of falsehood, forum-shopping and causing in court proceedings),
Canon 19 (failing to resort to lawful means in representing his client), 27,
3.01 and 13.02 (causing undue publication of a pending action). He had an
active role in committing fraud since he falsely stated that the person making
the deed of sale appeared before him and stated that the same was his free
act and deed- when evidence shows the signature was forged; also, he
prolonged a family dispute by using dilatory tactics and placing an
advertisement in order to ridicule his opponents in violation of Rule 1.04
that lawyers should encourage their clients to end a controversy by a fair
settlement. A lawyer must uphold the integrity of the profession. He brings
honor to it by honesty and fair dealing and by performing his duties to
society, the bar, the courts and his clients.

3.

Good Moral Character

Tomas Cabulisan v. Judge Adrian N. Pagalilauan (297 SCRA 593)

Facts: Cabulisan filed an administrative complaint against respondent for

grave misconduct committed as follows : (1) peeping into the bathroom
where Marilyn C. Dumayas, a public health nurse, and daughter of the owner
of the house where he was boarding, was then taking a bath; (2) having a
mistress in the neighboring town; and (3) allowing local practitioners to write
decisions for him.

Held: Respondent filed for voyeurism, other charges dismissed for lack of
evidence. People who run the judiciary, particularly justices and judges, must
not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the
law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest degree on integrity
and probity and an unquestionable moral uprightness both in their public and
private lives. By committing the acts in question, respondent violated the
trust reposed in him and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and rigid
standards of morality required in the judicial profession.

Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson (300 SCRA 129)

Facts: respondent was accused of having appropriated for his own benefit
the amount of P 2, 5000.00 representing the amount which was delivered by
the Resurreccion to the respondent as compensation or settlement money of
a case for homicide thru reckless imprudence. Sayson did not turn over the
amount to his client, the Complainant in the criminal case, forcing
Resurreccion to pay the same amount again. Sayson was later convicted for
estafa.

HELD: SAYSON DISBARRED. GOOD MORAL CHARACTER IS NOT ONLY A

CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ADMISSION TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION, BUT IT
MUST ALSO REMAIN EXTANT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ONES GOOD STANDING
IN THAT EXCLUSIVE AND HONORED FRATERNITY. ACTS OF MORAL TURPITUDE
(I.E. DONE CONTRARY TO JUSTICES, HONESTY & GOOD MORALS) SUCH AS
ESTAFA OR FALSIFICATION RENDER ONE UNFIT TO BE A MEMBER OF THE
LEGAL PROESSION. ALSO, SAYSONS ACTS OF DELAYING THE HEARINGS
BEFORE THE OSG AND THE IBP REINFORCE THIS VIEW.

4.

ABUSE OF AUTHORITY

Rosalia Villaruel, et al v. Grapilon, et al: In the Matter of the Petition to

Remove Atty. Jose A. Grapilon as President, IBP (302 SCRA 138)

Facts: G was accused of 16 IBP employees who sought his removal as IBP
President for: Immorality, questionable disbursements of funds, dishonesty,
failure to turn over IBP donations from private individuals, refusal to turn over
records and money pertaining to the Employees Loan Savings Association,
Appropriation of Office Property, Extending loans to IBP employees,
oppression/harassment, appointment of unworthy employees and relatives
and organization of a secret society. The issue regarding legal ethics is
whether the SC can assume jurisdiction or should it be considered a labor
dispute under the jurisdiction of the NLRC.

Held: Charges dropped. All the accusations of the petitioners were either
unsubstantiated or refuted by controverting evidence. As to the issue of
jurisdiction, the SC has previously assumed administrative jurisdiction over
the IBP president. If the petitioners allege that the IBP terminated them as an
act of reprisal and with malice or bias, this would constitute gross abuse of
authority and serious misconduct warranting the use of the SCs supervisory
powers over the IBP. Lastly, even if there was no wrongful act, G is ordered to
transfer the funds of the savings and loan association to an account in their
name to prevent the appearance and suspicion of impropriety.

5.

GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

Jesus Conducto vs. Judge Iluminado C. Monzon (291 SCRA 619)

Facts: Respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law. He
refused to suspend the mayor due to criminal charges against the latter for
the crime of unlawful appointment. The judge opined that an official cannot
be suspended for something that has happened in a previous term. Settled
jurisprudence says this only applies to administrative, not criminal cases.

Held: Fined for P5000. While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency
on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, it is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. A judge is
called upon to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with the statutes
and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with the basic
legal principles and aware of well-settled and authoritative doctrines. Also, if
he did the act deliberately, he violated Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics directs a judge to administer his office with due regard to the integrity
of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of
arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. An RTC judge cannot
overturn a settled doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court, otherwise,
litigation would be endless.

6.

GROSS IMMORAL CONDUCT

Julieta B. Narag vs. Atty. Dominador M. Narag (291 SCRA 451)

Facts: Atty. Narags spouse filed a petition for disbarment in the IBP alleging
that her husband courted one of his students, later maintaining her as a
mistress and having children by her. Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a
possessive, jealous woman who abused him and filed the complaint out of
spite. IBP disbarred him, hence, this petition.

Held: Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute the
testimony given against him and it was proved that his actions were of public
knowledge and brought disrepute and suffering to his wife and children.
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member
of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral
integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice
law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a
condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for
all members. Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct,
he may be suspended or disbarred. Grossly immoral means it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. As a
lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous relationships but must not
behave in a way that scandalizes the public by creating a belief that he is
flouting those moral standards.

Remedios Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar (293 SCRA 331)

Facts: Respondent was previously dismissed as CFI judge for maintaining and
cohabiting with his mistress. Despite this, he later married the same woman
and had children with her. He even made statements displaying contempt for
the SC and mocking the law and said court. Petitioner, his lawful wife, filed a
letter-complaint for disbarment against her husband. IBP disbarred him.

Held: Disbarred (ratio is the same as the Narag case). A judge is a visible
representation of the law and, more importantly of justice. Ordinary citizens
consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law. A
judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all actuations, lest it
be a demoralizing example to others. Likewise, an attorney is also invested
with public trust. As officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and

confidence of the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility.
A high degree of moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community
where he resides. The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus
proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. The power to disbar,
however, is one to be exercised with great caution and only in a clear case of
misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Keeping a mistress,
entering into another marriage while a prior one subsists, as well as
abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his
disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the
lawyers oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly
shows a serious flaw in respondents character, his moral indifference to
scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms.

GROSS MISCONDUCT

Erlinda Alonto-Frayna v. Judge Abdulmajid Astih (300 SCRA 199)

Facts: Judge Asith did not act on the case of the herein complainant for over
2 years despite the orders and directives of the Office of the Court
Administrator to resolve it without delay. In addition, when asked to explain
his actions before the SC, respondent failed to reply.

Held: A Judge who deliberately and continuously refuses to comply with the
resolution of the SC is guilty of gross misconduct & insubordination. It is
gross misconduct & even without outright disrespect for the SC for the
respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolutions requiring him to
comment on the accusations contained in the complaint against him.
Furthermore, failure to render a decision beyond the 90 day period from its
submission constitutes serious misconduct to the detriment of the honor &
integrity of his office & in derogation of a speedy administration of justice.

Romulo F. Manuel v. Judge Demetrio d. Calimag (307 SCRA 657)

Facts: M charged C with selling him a stolen car, for which he was arrested.

Held: CASE DISMISSED. No evidence to substantiate the charges. The SC also

said that to warrant dismissal for misconduct, it must be shown that the
misconduct is serious and has a direct relation to his official duties amounting
to misadministration, or intentional neglect and failure to discharge said
duties. The judicial acts complained of must be so corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law.

Felicidad L. Oronce, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. (298 SCRA 133)

Facts: During a dispute over land, Flaminiano illegally took possession of the
property in litigation using abusive methods. She was aided by her husband,
a lawyer. The illegal entry took place while the case was pending in the CA &
while a writ of preliminary injunction was in force.

Held: Atty. Flaminianos acts of entering the property without the consent of
its occupants & in contravention of the existing writ or preliminary injunction
& making utterances showing disrespect for the law & this Court, are
unbecoming of a member of the Bar. Although he says that they peacefully
took over the property, such peaceful take-over cannot justify defiance of
the writ of preliminary injunction that he knew was still in force. Through his
acts, he has flouted his duties as a member of the legal profession. Under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he is prohibited from counseling or
abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.

Re: Leaves of Absence Without Approval of Judge Eric T Calderon, Municipal

Trial Court Judge of Calumpit, Bulacan (302 SCRA 92)

Facts: Administrative case against Judge C for incurring leaves of absence for
an almost straight period of 3 years. His excuse is that he was suffering from
a lingering illness of malignant hypertension. However, despite the fact that
medical certificates were presented in his favor, most were made by his
personal doctor (an orthopedic doctor). Also, the tests given by the Court
physician contradict the diagnosis given by his doctor.

Held: Guilty of gross misconduct and abandonment of office, judge dismissed.

Judge C should have been more conscious of his court duties, as well as more
cautious of his actuations, than he has shown in the performance of his
functions and the discharge of his responsibilities to the Court and the
citizenry. Further, he should have been aware that, in frequently leaving his
station, he has caused great disservice to many litigants and has denied
them speedy justice. From the record it could be fairly concluded that he had
habitually abandoned his sala for no justifiable excuse at all. The doctrine of
res ipsa loquitor , that the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges
whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance
of the law, or misconduct, is patently applicable to the instant case.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals (296 SCRA 171)

Facts: Petitioner filed a case for recission against the Quetulios and Abadillas
alleging that the former sold the land that had already been expropriated.
The Quetulios did not file an answer, but at the hearing on the motion for
default, co-defendant Hernando was permitted by the judge to appear as
counsel for the defendants and file an answer.

Held: Case reinstated. Evidently, when respondent Hernando appeared

before the trial court and filed the Answer/Motion to dismiss, he was still
under suspension from the practice of law. A suspended lawyer, during his
suspension, is certainly prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, and if
he does so, he may be disbarred. The reason is that, his continuing to
practice the profession during his suspension constitutes a gross misconduct
and a willful disregard of the suspension order, which should be obeyed
though how erroneous it may be until set aside.

IMPROPRIETY

Flaviano B. Cortes v. Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili (249 SCRA 423)

Facts: Respondent was charged with impropriety and gross ignorance of the
law. In a case for illegal logging, he dismissed the case and returned illegally
cut timber to the defendants because the search warrant was invalid. He was
also seen in eating and drinking in the company of said defendants, and this

supposedly influenced his decision.

Held: Judge Agcaoili is fined and suspended. Respondent erred in returning

the seized articles even though the warrant was invalid, illegal articles
(illegally cut lumber) are not returned to the possessor. He also violated
Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Ethics i.e. to avoid impropriety or
even or even the appearance of impropriety. Even though it was not proven
that he was influenced by the defendants (the dismissal was proper), he
should not have fraternized with litigants who had a pending case before him.
To do so erodes public confidence in the integrity and independence of the
judiciary. A judge must avoid even the semblance of impropriety.

Carlos Dionisio v. Hon. Zosimo V. Escano (302 SCRA 411)

Facts: E posted an advertisement for waitresses and singers to work at his

restaurant at the RTC bulletin board. He also conducted interviews for this in
his sala. He was later caught when a reporter from Hoy Gising! taped an
interview which revealed that he intended to operate a drinking pub with
scantily clad waitresses.

Held: SUSPENDED. Rules 2.00, 5.02 and 5.03 provide that a judge should
avoid impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety. He should also
refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on
the courts impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial
activities, or increase involvement with lawyers and litigants. He should also
manage financial interests so as to minimize the number of cases giving
grounds for disqualification. Finally, the halls of justice should not be used for
unrelated purposes.

Benalfre J. Galang v. Judge Abelardo H. Santos (307 SCRA 582)

Facts: S was a judge and the publisher/columnist for a tabloid; he was also a
writer for another paper. G charges him with using his columns to ventilate
his views. He has repeatedly used insulting and inflammatory language
against the governor and the provincial prosecutor and legal adviser.

Held: JUDGE DISMISSED. While S has the right to free speech, his writing of
vicious editorials compromise his duties as judge in the impartial
administration of justice. They reflect both on his office and on the officers he
ridicules. The personal behavior of a judge in his professional and everyday
life should be free from the appearance of impropriety. Improper conduct
erodes the public confidence in the judiciary.

Benjamin Sia Lao vs. Hon. Felimon C. Abelila III (295 SCRA 267)

Facts: in a family dispute over a parcel of land, respondent judge committed

acts of forcible entry, attempted to deny complainant of possession despite a
lease in the latters favor. He also gave firearms to his men in order to
assault complainants workers. Respondent also fled from police when called
in for questioning.

Held: Respondent DISMISSED. A judge is the visible representation of the law

and the embodiment of the peoples sense of justice and that, accordingly, he
should constantly keep himself away from any act of impropriety, not only in
the performance of his official duties but also in his everyday actuations. No
other position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than perhaps a seat in the judiciary. A judge
must be the first to abide by the law and to weave an example for the others
to follow.

Spouses Benedicto & Rose Godinez v. Hon. Antonio Alano and Sheriff Alberto
Ricardo Alano (303 SCRA 259)

Facts: G charged A with committing irregularities in a civil case for sum of

money. In said case, a writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the
effects seized were kept in Judge As house. The court investigator found that
the writ was improperly issued because the allegations of fraud and attempts
to abscond in the affidavit were bare assertions and not substantiated by the
facts.

Held: FINED. The writ was issued in error. But in order to merit a disciplinary
sanction, the error or mistake committed by a judge should be patent, gross,
malicious, deliberate, or done in bad faith. Absent a clear showing that the
judge has acted arrantly, the issue becomes judicial in character and would
not properly warrant the imposition of administrative punishment. Judge A is
fined for storing the effects in his house and their intent to charge storage
fees. Judges should avoid impropriety of the appearance of impropriety.

Gregorio & Teresita Lorena v. Judge Adolfo Encomienda (302 SCRA 632)

Facts: Spouses Lorena were evicted from the property of Judge Es brother.
They refused to vacate. The mayor invited the parties to a conciliation
meeting but they still refused. The owners allowed them to stay on the
condition that they sign a written promise to leave after the grace period.
When L refused, E phoned him and tried to convince him to sign. L still
refused, E then said: mga tarantado, mabulok kayo sa kalabos! and
slammed the phone down. L accuses E and his conspirators of abuse of
authority for later throwing them in jail.

Held: REPRIMANDED. Although the charges against E were refuted by

evidence, the serious nature of the tasks of judges requires them to be
circumspect in both their public and their private dealings. As they are
expected to rise above human frailties they must, in all their activities,
avoid not only impropriety but even the appearance of impropriety. Hence, E
should not have called L by [hone which gave the impression of undue
pressure and influence. He should not have cursed L over the phone as a
judges behavior must be beyond reproach.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. (Judge) Florentino S. Barron (297 SCRA
376)

Facts: Judge Barron was arrested during an entrapment operation when he

tried to solicit bribes from an American national in exchange for ruling in the
latters favor in a pending case.

Held: Judge dismissed. A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and

propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt

whatsoever about his honesty. The conduct of respondent shows that he can
be influenced by monetary considerations. His act of demanding and
receiving money from a party-litigant constitutes serious misconduct in office.
It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct, no matter how nominal the
amount involved, which erodes the respect for the law and the courts.

Sarah B. Vedana vs. Judge Eudarlo B. Valencia (295 SCRA 1)

Facts: Complainant is the court interpreter and a relative of respondent

judge. She claims that he kissed and fondled her when she went to his sala
to inform him that the cases for the day were ready for trial.

Held: Respondent guilty of violating Canons 2, 3 and 22 of the Code of

Judicial Ethics. The Code mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free
of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his
judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. A public official is also judged by his private morals. A judge, in
order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judges official life can
not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence.

NEGLIGENCE

Corazon T. Reontoy v. Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit (302 SCRA 604)

Facts: On January 28, 1998 the SC found Ibadlit administratively liable and
suspended him from the practice of law for 1 year for failing to appeal within
the reglementary period the decision rendered against his client. His reason
was, an appeal would only be futile. SC declared that it was highly improper
for him to have adopted such opinion. SC said that a lawyer was without
authority to waive his clients right to appeal and that his failure to appeal
within the reglementary period constituted negligence and malpractice,
proscribed by Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides (a) lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. This is a
motion for reconsideration.

Held: Suspension lowered to 2 months his arguments are partly persuasive,

he believed in good faith that his clients case was weak and that she
accepted his explanation that the adverse decision was not worth appealing
anymore. Besides, it was only several years later that she complained when
no more relief was available to her. Also, complainant had reasonable
opportunity to hire another counsel for a second opinion whether to appeal
from the judgment or file a petition for relief, that he did not commit to
handle his clients case on appeal and that the testimonies of complainant
and her brother were unpersuasive. This is also his first offense.

People of the Philippines v. Sevilleno ( 304 SCRA 519)

Facts: In a criminal case for rape with homicide, the accused pleaded guilty.
However, the 3 PAO lawyers assigned as counsel de officio did not perform
their duty. The first did not advise his client of the consequences of pleading
guilty, the second left the courtroom during trial and thus did not crossexamine the prosecution witnesses. The third postponed the presentation of
evidence for the defense, and when he did appear, he said he would rely
solely on the plea in the mistaken belief that it would lower the penalty to
reclusion perpetua.

Held: Case remanded. Canon 18 required every lawyer to serve his client with
utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him
administratively liable. In this case, the defense lawyers did not protect,
much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused.

N.B. Case remanded because of error by the judge in not using searching
questions to find if the plea was made knowingly.

Rodolfo P. Velasquez v. CA & PCIB (GR No. 124049, June 30, 1999)

Facts: As an incident in the main case, V appointed his counsel as attorney-infact to represent him at the pre-trial. Counsel failed to appear, hence V was

declared in default. The order of default was received by counsel but no steps
were taken to have it lifted or set aside.

Held: Binding on V. V was also guilty of negli8gence because after making the
special power of attorney, he went abroad and paid no further attention to
the case until he received the decision. Thus, no FAME which will warrant a
lifting of the order.

PROPERTY UNDER LITIGATION

Regalado Daroy vs. Esteban Abecia

Facts: Daroy was plaintiff in a forcible entry case. He hired Abecia as his
lawyer and won. To satisfy the award for damages, a parcel of land of the
defendant was sold to Daroy at an execution sale. The land was then sold to
Daroys relative, who then sold it to Abecias wife. He now claims that these
sales are void because Abecia forged his signature on the deeds of sale. IBP
disbarred Abecia.

Held: Reversed. The evidence shows that Daroy was a party to the sale at
the time ot was made and did not discover it 9 years later as he claimed.
He was not defrauded <real issue the parties thought that because the land
had been acquired at a public sale to satisfy a judgment in a case in which
respondent was complainants counsel, the latter could not acquire the land.
The parties made this arrangement to circumvent Art. 1491 of the Civil Code
which prevents lawyers from acquiring property and rights that may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take by virtue of their profession.
The prohibition in Art. 1491 does not apply to the sale of a parcel of land
acquired by a client to satisfy a judgment in his favor, to his attorney was not
the subject of the litigation. While judges, prosecuting attorneys, and others
connected with the administration of justice are prohibited from acquiring
property or rights in litigation or levied upon in execution the prohibition
with respect to attorneys in the case extends only to property and rights
that may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue
of their profession.

QUALIFICATIONS

Ruferto Gutierrez and Maritess Passion vs. Judge Estanislao S. Belan

(294 SCRA 1)

Facts: Concerned citizens of Binan Laguna charged respondent MTC judge

with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. They claim he
committed perjury for failure to disclose a previous charge for two criminal
offenses in his written application to the JBC.

Held: Judge is dismissed. Every prospective appointee to the judiciary must

apprise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for
judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect on his integrity
and probity. These are qualifications specifically required of appointees to the
judiciary by Article VIII, Sec. 7(3) of the Constitution. The act of concealing
the two criminal cases against him is a clear proof of his lack of the said
qualification and renders him unworthy to sit as a judge- even if he was
ultimately acquitted. He is not being chastened for having had a pending
criminal case at the time of his application for a judicial position but for his
dishonesty and misrepresentation in the process of seeking that office.

Unlawful Conduct

Cleto Docena vs. Atty. Dominador Q. Limon (295 SCRA 262)

Facts: Respondent was petitioners lawyer in a civil case. During that case,
he asked the petitioners to post a supersedeas bond to stay execution of the
appealed decision. Petitioners forwarded the money to Limon. Later, the
case was decided in their favor. They were unable to recover the money
because the clerk of court said no such bond had ever been filed. IBP
suspended him for one year. Hence this petition.

Held: Disbarred (see Canon 1.01 and 16.01). Respondents allegation that
the money was payment of his fees was overcome by other evidence. The
law is not a trade nor craft but a profession. Its basic ideal is to render public
service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. If it has to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, lawyers should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. By extorting money from his client through

deceit, Limon has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law and has
indirectly eroded the peoples confidence in the judicial system. He is
disbarred for immoral, deceitful and unlawful conduct.

Victor Nunga v. Atty. Verancio Viray (306 SCRA 487)

Facts: N accused V of notarizing documents without a commission. It appears

that in 1987 and 1991 he notarized deeds of sale of property between the
bank he works for and his minor son. At those times, he was not
commissioned as a notary public.

Held: SUSPENDED. Notarization is invested with public interest because3 it

converts a private document into a public one. Notarizing without commission
is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws (the Notarial Law) and by
making it appear that he is so authorized is a deliberate falsehood which
violates the lawyers oath and Rule 1.01 (CPR) that a lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Atty. Prudencio Penticostes v. Prosecutor Diosdado Ibaez (304 SCRA 281)

Facts: Pascual was sued for non-remittance of SSS benefits. She gave the
contested amount to respondent, who was supposed to forward the same to
the SSS and drop the charges. Respondent did not forward the amount. He
only remitted the amount after his complaint for misconduct was filed with
the IBP.

Held: REPRIMANDED. A high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is

expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 provides that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
While Pascual may not strictly be considered a client of respondent, the rules
relating to a lawyers handling of funds of a client is still applicable, thus,
lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by
them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct. Also, even if he was acting as a prosecutor, Canon 6 provides
that these canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks.

ATTORNEYS FEES

Renato S. Ong & Francia N. Ong v. Court of Appeals, Inland Trailways, Inc. &
Philtranco Service Enterprise, Inc. (301 SCRA 387)

Facts: Renato Ong was injured during a vehicular collision. He was awarded
damages by the trial court. On appeal, the CA, the awards for actual
damages, moral damages & attorneys fees were reduced because (1) the
cost & feasibility of corrective surgery had not been adduced in evidence, (2)
the document relied upon to prove actual damages was not formally offered
in evidence and (3) no evidence but the bare assertion of counsel was put
forward to prove damages for unearned income.

Held: Attorneys fees is an indemnity for damages ordered by a court to be

paid by the losing party to the prevailing party, based on any of the cases
authorized by law. It is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless the
2 have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof. The Court has established a set of
standards in fixing the amount of attorneys fees. Counsels performance,
however, does not justify the award of 25 percent attorneys fees. The nature
of the case was not exceptionally difficult, and his handling of the case was
sorely inadequate, as shown by his failure to follow elementary norms of civil
procedure & evidence. It is well-settled that such award is addressed to
sound judicial discretion and subject to judicial control.