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WORLD-SYSTEM THEORY
Daniel Chirot
School of International Studies, University of Washington,Seattle,
Washington 98195
Thomas D. Hall
Department of Sociology, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma
73019
WORLD-SYSTEM
THEORY
World-systemtheory is a highly political approachto the problemof economic

development in the Third World. It was created by policy-oriented intellectuals in countries at a mediumlevel of developmentto account for their
societies demonstrableinability to catch up to the rich countries. In its
contemporaryAmericanform, world-system theory has broadened into a more
purely academicenterprise designedto explain the historical rise of the West,
as well as the continued poverty of most non-Westernsocieties. But it has
generally remainedthe property of a left, whichdemandsredistribution of the
worlds economicwealth and whichprovides theoretical and ideological support for a "newinternational economicorder" (Dadzie 1980; Bhagwati1977).
How It Differs
From Modernization
Theory
In Americansociology world-systemtheory evolved as a direct attack against

the version of developmenttheory that had prevailed in the 1950sand 1960s.
The older theory had two main parts, one structural, and the other psychological, and the two did not necessarily cohere. But together, they cameto
comprise what was called "modernization theory."
The structural side of modernization theory was a uniform evolutionary
vision of social, political, and economicdevelopment.As Portes (1976) has
explained, the sociological portion of this vision had deep roots in classical
theory and consisted chiefly of a belief in progressive, increasing differentiation as the key to modernization.Parsons(1951) was its principal modern
prophet. Hoselitz (1960), Levy (1966), and Wilbert Moore(Hoselitz &
81
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1963, Moore1979) were amongits most important interpreters. A similar

approach characterized political scientists groupedin the Committeeon Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council (Almond& Verba
1963, Almond& Powell 1966). But it was an economist, W. W. Rostow, who
gave modernization theory its most concrete and best-known form (1960).
The uniform evolutionary theory of development can be summarizedin
Chart 1. Accordingto this theory, all societies, once they begin the process
of modernization, must movefrom developmentstage A to B, B to C, and so
on. Of course even the strictest follower of uniform evolutionary theory
recognizes that the world changesand that a society going through stage A at
time 4 is different from a society that has gone through stage A at time 2;
however,the similarities betweenA2(as experienced by society I) and A3(as
experienced by society II) are moreimportant than the differences caused by
their experiencing stage A at different times. Followers of such theories
recognized that time periods are not uniform. Contemporarysocieties are
likely to movefrom one stage to the next more quickly than, say, Englanddid
in the past; and somesocieties, by purposefully accelerating the process, may
advancemore rapidly than normal. Uniformstages still exist, however, and
in time all of the worlds societies will experience them.
Rostows(1960) stages were: traditional economies,the transition to takeoff (the adoption of scientific methodsof technology), the take-off (rapid
capital accumulationand early industrialization), the drive to maturity (high
industrialization in whichthe standard of living of the massesremains low),
and the age of high consumption. By the late 1960s, manysocial scientists
were predicting a sixth stage, "post-industrial" society (Bell 1973).
The social-psychological version of modernizationtheory explained the rise
of the West by claiming that Westerners(chiefly Protestant Westerners) were
possessed by a high need for achievementand rationality. McClelland(1967)
and Hagen(1962) were this theorys best knownproponents, and though
detail their explanations were by no meanssimilar, their main points were.
Both believed that a contemporarysocietys chances of developmentdepended
Chart 1 Societies I-V, seen at times 1-6, in developmental stages A-E
Society
I
II
III
IV
V
Times
1
Traditional
Traditional
Traditional
Traditional
Traditional
A2
B3
A3
C4
B4
A4
Ds
C~
B~
A5
E6
D6
C6
B6
A6
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WORLD-SYSTEM
THEORY 83
on the psychological make-upof its members.Despite their attempts to link
these theories with Weber(1958) and Schumpeter(1934), however, socialpsychologicalworkfailed to incorporate the importantstructural variables that
determine the direction in whichachievement-orientedindividuals are forced
by their surroundings(Portes 1976). Individual motivation can hardly explain
whyreal estate speculation is moreprofitable in one country, while in another
investmentin electronics factories attracts morecapital.
A more reasonable, but not much more satisfying version of socialpsychological modernization theory saw "modem"men being produced by
contact with modeminstitutions (Lemer 1958, Inkeles &Smith 1974). But
this hypothesis begs the question of whythere are more "modem"
institutions
in, say, Japan than in Java.
All versions of modernizationtheory were meliorative, admitting the possibility of accelerated changethrough such devices as foreign aid (to provide
capital and modemknow-how),psychological manipulation to better motivate
individuals, refonaa of legal and economicnorms, or a combinationof these.
But modernizationtheory tended to refuse the idea that deep structural factors
might prevent economicprogress, and more important, that the very international context of modernizationmight itself be an obstacle.
That recognition camefrom world-system theory, which claims that the
uniform states of developmentposited by Rostow,Almond,and the others are
nonsensical. The existence of strong manufacturingpowerswith the ability to
extend their marketsand their political strength throughoutthe worldredirects
the evolution of feebler societies. Englandmayhave gone through stages A2,
A3, and so on, but Poland, for example, went through entirely different,
though no less "modem"
stages once it becamea grain exporting periphery of
the northwestern Europeanmarket. Instead of going through stages A, B, and
C, it turned into something England had never been--a dependencyof the
capitalist world-system.All the more was this the case with Latin America,
most of Asia, and later, Africa. Noneof these societies remainedtraditional,
but all were forced into different paths of developmentby Westernpowers.
Nor did Englandgo alone through the stages of developmentthat led to its
industrialization: It proceededonly with the aid of the surplus it extorted from
the societies it exploited. Whatis today called thc Third Worldreached its
present state by being systematically underdeveloped;it did not remain stuck
in a stage similar to the Wests feudal period, or somehow
remain even more
primitive during the centuries in whichit was exposedto, and colonized by,
Western Europe.
The economistA. G. Frank, one of the most polemical and simplistic of the
world-systemtheorists, but one of the most intellectually influential, summarizedthis point of viewmostforcefully (1969). Traditional society, he said,
was a myth. "The folk characteristics whichwere studied by Robert Redfield,
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and which Hoselitz seems to associate with the pattern variables of underdeveloped society, do not characterize any whole society existing today."
According to Frank, McClellandcontributed no more than a suggestion that
people in poor countries be given a series of courses on how to improve
themselves. Rostowstypology neglected the benefits of the Wests colonies
to its development,and the destructive effects of that colonization on the
colonies themselves. Therelbre, his stages were nothing more than selfserving mythology,like the rest of modernizationtheory.
It was not Frank, however, but ImmanuelWallerstein whobrought worldsystemtheory (including the nameitself) into the sociological limelight in the
1970s (Wallerstein 1974, 1979, 1980).
Wallerstein
s Macrosociological
Theory of Economic Change
Wallerstein posits historical stages of developmentdifferent from the uniform

evolutionary constructs of modernizationtheorists. At one time all societies
were minisystems. "A minisystemis an entity that has within it a complete
division of labor, and a single cultural framework. Such systems are found
only in very simple agricultural or hunting and gathering societies. Such
minisystemsno longer exist in the world...any such system that becametied
to an empireby the paymentof tribute as protection costs ceased by that fact
to be a system..." (1979). It follows from this that the anthropologists who
have described"tribal" societies in the 19th and 20th centuries as if they were
minisystemsmisseda key ingredient. Virtually all such societies, as B alandier
pointed out (1951; reprinted in English in Wallerstein 1966), existed within
colonies. Basedon such descriptions, the notion of "traditionalism" is vitiated
fromthe start.
Thenthere cameworld-systems,"unit[s] with a single division of labor and
multiple cultural systems. It follows logically that there can...be two varieties of such world-systems, one with a commonpolitical system and one
without." The former (politically united) are called "world-empires,"and the
latter "world-economies" (1979). Until the advent of capitalism, wofld~
economieswere unstable and tended toward "disintegration or conquest by
one group and hence transformation into a world-empire. Examplesof such
world-empires emerging from world-economies are all the so-called great
civilizations of premoderntimes, such as China, Egypt, Rome..." (1979).
World-empires killed the economicdynamismof their areas by using too
muchof their surplus to maintain their bureaucracies. In about 1500 there
began a novel type of world-economy,the capitalist one. "In a capitalist
world-economy,
political energy is used to secure monopolyrights (or as near
to it as can be achieved). The state becomesless the central economicenterprise than the means of assuring certain terms of trade in other economic
transactions. In this way, the operation of the market(not the free operation
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WORLD-SYSTEM
THEORY 85
but nonetheless its operation) creates incentives to increased productivity and
all the consequent accompanimentof moderneconomicdevelopment"(1974).
The reasons for capitalisms success whenother world-economies
failed are
complex,but two stand out. Newtransportation technology allowed far-flung
markets to be maintained, and Westernmilitary technology insured the power
to enforce favorable terms of trade (Cipolla 1965). Unburdened
from the costs
of maintainingunified empires within their economiczones, capitalists could
wax strong. The English and Dutch capitalists were able to beat back the
Hapsburg-Catholicattempt to tum the emergingworld-economyinto a worldempire, and after that capitalism proceeded to spread throughout the globe
(Wallerstein 1974).
This world-economy developed a core with well-developed towns,
flourishing manufacturing, technologically progressive agriculture, skilled
and relatively well-paid labor, and high investment. But the core needed
peripheries from whichto extract the surplus that fueled expansion. Peripheries producedcertain key primary goods while their towns withered, labor
becamecoerced in order to keep downthe costs of production, technology
stagnated, labor remainedunskilled or even becameless skilled, and capital,
rather than accumulating,was withdrawntowardthe core. At first the differences betweenthe core and the periphery were small, but by exploiting these
differences and buying cheap primary products in return for dear manufacturing goods, northwestern Europe expanded the gap. Uneven development,then, is not a recent developmentor a mereartifact of the capitalist
world-economy;it is one of capitalisms basic components(1974).
Wallerstein stresses the importanceof a third category, the semiperiphery.
Societies in this group stand between the core and periphery in terms of
economicpower. Somemayeventually fall into the periphery, as did Spain
in the 17th and 18th centuries, and others mayeventually rise into the core,
as has modernJapan. Semiperipheries deflect the anger and revolutionary
activity of peripheries, and they serve as goodplaces for capitalist investment
whenwell-organized labor forces in core economiescause wagesto rise too
fast. As Spain controlled Latin Americafor the core in the 16th to early 19th
centuries, so did Sweden,and later Prussia, control Polandin the 17th and
18th (1980). Brazil plays a similar role in contemporary Latin America
(1979), and presumablyIran was slated for this role in the MiddleEast of the
1980s. Wallersteinbelieves that without semiperipheries,the capitalist worldsystem cannot function.
Finally, Wallersteinturns the Marxistnotion of class conflict into a question
of international conflict. It is not so muchthat the countries of the core are a
kind of upperclass, the periphery an exploited workingclass, and the semiperiphery a middle class (though someof Wallersteins work suggests precisely
that). Rather, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are world-wideclasses that
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do not operate merely within state boundaries. The term semiperipheral,

however,applies only to states.
This implies that the class and even ethnic structures within particular
countries must be interpreted as mereadjuncts of the international capitalist
division of labor. Theyare analytically important primarily becausethey help
to explain the performanceof individual countries in the international game.
But no single country, or even groupof countries, can escape the logic of this
transnational system. It follows, therefore, that socialist revolution cannot
occur in a single country. Socialism will develop within a socialist worldsystem. Events within a single country mayadvanceor retard the advent of
socialism, but cannot, by themselves, be decisive. The Soviet Union, for
example, cannot be truly socialist even though it has advanced the world
further toward revolution. But until that transformation has been accomplished, even its internal structure is deformedby the fact that it must act in
a larger capitalist system. It mayevenbe acting as another core power(1979).
Wallersteins work is in manyways an extraordinary tour de force because
it brings together so manyhistorical periods and information about so many
places in a single, logical, and consistent framework.Demonstratingthat true
socialism cannot exist in the U.S.S.R. also shows that seeming "feudal"
agrarian relationships in contemporaryLatin Americaare nothing of the sort,
but yet another part of the pervasive world capitalist-system. The rise of the
West in the 16th century is explained with the same logic as the continued
poverty of muchof the world today. The failure of the proletariat to revolt or
even to sustain socialist ideologies in rich Westerncountries (a persistent
problemfor Marxists) is treated within the same context. The proletariat is
largely located in the periphery, or at least consists of "ethnicities" that
originate in the periphery. So revolution will have to comechiefly out of the
periphery and semiperipherywhereproletariat class interests are clearer. The
failure of the "rich" proletariat, boughtoff by the concentration of wealth in
the core, to carry out its mission is understandable,and does not destroy the
original Marxist vision. Both the satisfying scopeof his workand his ability
to resolve manyof the contradictions of Marxist theory without giving up its
revolutionary thrust have endeared Wallerstein to manysocial scientists.
But significant and original as it is, Wallersteins workis itself the product
of a long intellectual history. In one form or another, world-systemtheory has
existed for well over a century. It is important to understand this for two
reasons. First, knowledgeof its antecedents allows us to avoid needless
repetition of manyold debates about the subject. Second, world-systemtheory
is by no meansguaranteed long-term success in Americansocial science. It
maywell be a passing phase. But in someother countries, it has muchdeeper
and older roots, and is more central to prevailing political ideologies and
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WORLD-SYSTEM
THEORY 87
political conflict than in the UnitedStates, whereit is only knownby a small
groupof professional intellectuals.
THE INTELLECTUAL
THEORY

List
ROOTS
OF WORLD-SYSTEM
and the Issue of Comparative Advantage
Someof the problems raised by world-system theory had already been

broachedby mercantilist theoreticians in the 17th and 18th centuries (Heckscher 1955), but it was not until 1817that DavidRicardo formulatedwhat was
to becomethe classical moderneconomictheory of free trade. He argued that
unrestricted exchangebetweentwo countries is always advantageousif they
produce mutually desirable goods at different degrees of efficiency. Portuguese wine should be allowed in Britain, for example,in return for British
cloth because the English producedcloth more efficiently than wine, and the
Portuguese did the reverse. Even if the Portuguese could produce cloth more
cheaplythan the British, the fact that they producedwineeven moreefficiently
meantthat it wouldincrease their total productivity to specialize in wine.
England, on the other hand, should specialize in manufacturedgoods where
it held a comparative advantage (Samuelson 1967; Robinson 1973).
In 1841, in his National Systemof Political Economy,Friedrich List argued
that Ricardo was wrongbecause it might be to the long-run advantage of an
economy
to foster infant industries that could not, in the short term, compete
freely with those of more advancedeconomies. The resulting advantages in
technological sophistication outweighedthe short-run losses in total output
(Senghaas 1977).
The debate has continued betweenthe two sides ever Since. With expansion
and greater sophistication, Ricardos theory has remainedthe majority viewpoint amongWestern economists. From Alfred Marshalls The Pure Theory
of ModernTrade in 1879 (1930) to Paul Samuelson(1948, 1975), free trade
has been vigorously defended. On the other side, leftist economists have
repeatedly attacked it, going considerably further than List, whowas only a
mild protectionist (Robinson 1960, 1973; Emmanuel1972, 1977, 1980).
Wehave neither the space nor the necessary knowledgeof economicsto
resolve this old issue. But we can at least warnsociologists to be cautious
before they blindly accept either of these viewpoints.In almost all discussions
of world-systemtheory, however,the debate reappears in one form or another
as if it had been resolved against Ricardo: Free trade benefits the advanced
industrial economiesbut slows developmentof poorer economies.
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Lenin,
CHIROT
& HALL
Luxemburg, Trotsky,
and Bukharin
In 1902, J. A. Hobsonpublished an attack against imperialism that proved

important not so muchbecauseof its influence on liberals (thoughat the time
that was considerable) but because of Lenins use of Hobsonsideas and data
in his 1917 workImperialism : The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1939). Lenin
argued that the final crisis of capitalism had been avoidedbecause of imperialist exploitation of colonial and quasi-colonial areas. Withoutthe extra profits
gained from these sources, the rate of return on capitalist investment would
fall, the working class in advancedcapitalist countries wouldbe impoverished, and revolution wouldfollow. Consequently, the First WorldWarwas
part of a desperate struggle for colonial empires by the major powers.
But Lenin did not discuss the effects of imperialism on the peasants in the
colonies. This Rosa Luxemburghad done in 1913, particularly in the last
section of The Accumulationof Capital (1951). She described, amongother
cases, the results of the spread of capitalism into Egyptthroughinternational
loans in the 19th century. The Egyptian economyhad been revolutionized and
had becomepart of the greater capitalist system of exchange. Railroads had
been built, cash crops introduced, and the peasants had been deprived of their
land and mined. The Egyptian state had gone bankrupt and been seized by the
British. Progress had gained great profits for Europeanfinance to the detriment
of the Egyptians. Turkey, Russia, India, China, and North Africa were other
examplesof analogous developments. She called these regions "hinterlands"
of capitalism.
In 1930 Trotsky added his revolutionary irony to the emergent Marxist
consensus on "cores" and "peripheries" by commenting on the "semiperipheral" role played by prerevolutionary Russia. He wrote: (1959)
Theparticipationof Russia[in WorldWarI] falls somewhere
between
the participationof
Franceandthat of China.Russiapaidin this wayfor herright to oppressandrobTurkey,
Persia,Galicia,andin generalthe countriesweakerandmorebackward
thanherself. The
twofold
imperialism
of the Russianbourgeoisie
hadbasicallythe characterof an agency
for
other mightierworldpowers...theRussianautocracyonthe onehand,the Russianbourgeoisieonthe other, containedfeaturesof compradorism
.... Theylived andnourished
themselves
upontheir connections
withforeignimperialism,
servedit, andwithoutits support
could not have survived.... Thesemi-comprador
Russianbourgeoisiehad worldimperialistic
interestsin the samesensein which
an agentworking
onpercentages
livesbythe
interestof his employers.
The communisttheoretician who was the closest to modernworld-system
theory was Bukharin.His writing about imperialismis not highly original (in
fact, he took muchof his argumentdirectly from Hilferding), but his language
and emphasis on the importance of world-wide analysis foreshadowed the
mainthrust of the writings of Wallerstein, Frank, and their allies. In 1915,
Bukharin wrote: "The cleavage between town and country, as well as the
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THEORY
89
developmentof this cleavage, formerly confined to one country only, are

nowbeing reproduced on a tremendously enlarged basis. Viewedfrom this
standpoint, entire countries appear to-day as towns, namelythe industrial
countries, whereasentire agrarian territories appear to be country" (1929).
Other Marxistwriters in the early 20th century contributed to the construction of a general theory of imperialism(see Hilferding 1923), but this sketch
of the four best knownshows the development of a kind of world-system
theory long before the SecondWorldWar. Morerecent Marxist works in this
area (e.g. Baran1957) have been elaborations and updates of these classical
positions.
Fascist World-System Theory
It would be a mistake to consider such theories the exclusive property of
Marxistsin the first half of this century. Acurious and today little-known fact
is that right-wing intellectuals in someof the moreadvancedpoor countries of
that time were also developing similar theories. Their appeal was to nationalism rather than to proletariat internationalism, but their analysis was remarkably similar to that of the Marxists.
In 1929 Mihail Manoilescu, a Romanian,published The Theory of Protection and International Trade (1931), in which he attacked the Ricardian
concept of comparative advantage. Wherehad it gotten Portugal, he asked?
By the 20th century, Portugal had become one of the poorest and most
backwardcountries in Europeafter centuries of virtually open trade with
England. It wouldbe better, he argued, for agricultural countries to close
themselvesoff from the world-capitalist market, to industrialize, and to unite
their populationsfor the difficult struggle this wouldentail. Onlyin this way
wouldthe moreadvancedindustrial countries be obliged to cede their unfair
advantages and restructure the international economymore equitably.
But Manoilescu, who"impresses one as raising strikingly contemporary
issues..." (Schmitter 1978), was not a man of the left. His next internationally knownbooks were The Century of Corporatism (1934) and The
Single Party (1938), in whichhe laid out a political programto carry out his
economicideas. He called for Mussolinis kind of fascism to destroy narrow
class interests and discipline nations to overcomethe capitalist world-market.
Manoileseusworkhad wide appeal in eastern and southern Europe, and in
Latin America(Schmitter 1974). His suggestions fit the broad trend of political events in manyof the independent semideveloped countries of these
regions. In the ideological atmosphereof the 1930s fascism, not socialism,
seemedto be the dynamicforce of the future.
In 1977 ImmanuelWallerstein wrote, "The semi-peripheral state is precisely the area where,becauseof a mix of economicactivities, consciousstate
activities maydo mostto affect the future patterning of economicactivity. In
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the twentieth century, this takes the form of bringing socialist parties to
power"(1979). In the 1930s, however,it took the form of bringing fascist and
quasi-fascist parties to powerin a string of semiperipheral countries caught
betweenthe truly backwardareas of the world and what Mussolini called the
"bourgeois" or "plutocratic" nations above them (Chirot 1978). Experiments
in applying right-wing solutions ran from Brazil and Argentina to Portugal,
Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania,Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and all the way
to Japan.
Alongwith a material world-system there is an ideological one. It seems
subject to rapid shifts in fashion, but often the terminologyis all that changes.
Theunderlyingdissatisfaction of intellectuals and leaders in the semiperiphery
and advancedperiphery is neither newnor radically different from that of a
half century ago.
Dependency Theory
Fromthis intellectual and political climate of dissatisfaction in the more
advanced countries of Latin America dependency theory was born. Because
world-system theory is in most ways merely a North Americanadaptation of
dependencytheory, there is little to distinguish them from each other as
theoretical constructs. To understand dependencytheory, and to knowits
literature, is to hold a firm grasp of its latter-day little Yankeebrother. Of
course, cultural imperialismbeing what it is, the world-systemtheorists from
the North are nowbeing used by Southern dependencytheorists to legitimize
their ideas. Nomoreironic illustration could exist of core dominationand use
of peripheral resources. The periphery can nowreimport the product it originally exported, and leave behind a surplus of cultural prestige and strength in
the core.
The father of dependency theory is Ra~l Prebisch, an Argentinian who
headed the United Nations EconomicCommissionfor Latin America (ECLA,
or CEPAL
in Spanish) in the late 1940sand early 1950s. Wallerstein ascribes
the terminology of core and periphery to ECLA(Kaplan 1978), though
course the concepts are older (and in fact WeruerSombartused almost the
samewordsin the samecontext). Prebischs ideas originated with his experiences as a technical advisor to Argentine governmentsin the 1930s while the
country was turning from a proof of the benefits of the Ricardo-Marshall
theory of free trade into a demonstrationof the vulnerability of primaryexport
economiesin times of international economiccrisis. In 1949 Prebisch published an ECLA
report (Relative Prices of Exports and Imports of UnderDeveloped Countries: A Study of Postwar Terms of Trade between UnderDevelopedand Industrialized Nations) showingthat the terms of trade had run
against agricultural exportingcountries fromthe late 19th centuryuntil the late
1930s. "Onthe average," said the report, "a given quantity of primaryexports
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wouldpay, at the end of this period, for only 60 per cent of the quantity of
goods which it could buy at the beginning of the period" (Love 1980). This
wasbecauseof the morerapid increase in productivity of industrial producers.
Comparativeadvantage, therefore, did not operate in favor of the primary
producers.
Prebisch denies having been directly influenced by Manoilescu; but as
Joseph Love has written, "Manoilescus ideas--in Latin Americancircles
where they were known--probably helped pave the way for acceptance of
ECLA
doctrines whenthey appeared in 1949" (Love 1980). In any case, the
Romanianstheories were being published in Argentine economicjoumals in
the late 1930s.
ECLAstheories have since become"dependencytheory." But the elaboration of the theory has gone further than economics;it has created an entire
sociology and political theory of dependentdevelopment(Cardoso &Faletto
1969;Jaguaribe et al 1968; dos Santos 1972). It is importantto emphasize,as
does Portes (1976), that dependencytheory is morethan a simple analysis
a "quasi-colonial situation of economicstagnation and foreign control of
export enclaves. Onthe contrary, contemporarydependencystudies address
a situation in whichdomestic industrialization has occurred along with increasing economicdenationalization; in which sustained economicgrowth has
been accompaniedby rising social inequalities; and in which rapid urbanization and the spread of literacy have convergedwith the even moreevident
marginalization of the masses."
Pablo Gonzalez Casanovas recent article on Mexico(1980) is a good
exampleof this. Far from being backwardand dominated by a small rural
oligarchy, Mexicois urbanized, industrial, and by Third World standards,
rich. But the gap betweenrich and poor is increasing, the growingpopulation
cannot be absorbed into the labor force, and the substantial middle class
demandsmoreconsumption.Foreign capital, allied to a domestic elite, prevents the redistribution of wealth that wouldextend to the poor the benefits of
modemization.Nor is the govemment,
tied as it is to the international fiscal
system, able to direct new investmentand spendingwhereit wishes. Instead,
it inflates the currency. Mexicoshuge newpetroleumwealth alleviates these
problemsfor the time being, but it cannot provide a long-termsolution. To do
that, deep structural reforms are necessary. Thusforeign influence (primarily
North American)is morenoxious as a barrier to structural change than as
directly exploitive colonizer. The MexicanRevolution and the subsequent
policies of nationalizations in the 1930sdid not go far enough.
The problem of inflation induced by the helplessness of Latin American
governmentsto control their ownfinances is a key part of dependencystudies
(Sunkel et al 1973). The Intemational MonetaryFundis viewedas particularly
villainous because its remediesto inflation stifle growthand promoterepres-
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sive regimes. Not only Latin Americanshave discovered this, but also North
Americanresearchers. John Sheehan, for example, found a high correlation
betweenrepression and the application of capitalist efficiency criteria in Latin
America. This makes"bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes the favorites of
international finance (ODonnell & Frankel 1978; Sheehan1980).
Dependencytheorists agree that USmultinational subsidiaries hurt the
long-term prospects for developmentin Latin Americaby investing less than
they withdraw. The debt service of Latin Americaneconomies(acquired to
buy the machinery with which to manufacture their ownsubstitutes for imports) takes too high a share of earnings. The only solution is greater unity in
the face of the giant of the North, and better, integration of Latin American
economieswith each other (Furtado 1970; Evans 1981).
Anequally important and related problemis the availability of technology.
Celso Furtado, a former director of ECLA,has written (1980) that "the control
of technologynowconstitutes the foundation of the structure of international
power...the struggle against dependenceis becomingan effort to eliminate
the effects of the monopolyof this resource by the countries of the core." But
this has not yet happened.
In other words, industrialization based on import substitution in the most
advanced Latin American countries has merely created new forms of dependenceand new sociopolitical imbalances. These are not the sameones that
characterized the early, semi-colonial economies,but they are just as serious
(Jaguaribe et al 1970).
Dependencytheory has also flourished outside Latin America. While we
cannot begin to list all of its important contributors in Africa and Asia, one
whohas caught the attention of North Americanworld-system theorists deserves special mention: Samir Amin.Moreexplicitly radical than most of the
Latin Americans, Aminsempirical experience has been with the far poorer
countries of Africa (1973). Thoughhis analysis of imperialismis similar, his
demandfor socialist revolution is moreinsistent. Capitalism is "debased"and
"sick." Under socialism, not only will exploitation vanish, but menwill
becomemore complete, and (how utopian) even social science, like government, will disappear because it will no longer be necessary. The Cambodian
experimentof Pol Pots KhmerRougeis cited as a correct lesson for emulation
by Africans (1977). This kind of global eschatological revolutionary vision
(Amin1980), closer to Andre GunderFrank and to Wallersteins political
essays (Wallerstein 1979) than to the more cautious likes of Prebisch and
Furtado, stirs the blood of North Americanand Western EuropeanMarxists.
There is little point in arguing whetherdependencytheorists are "right or
wrong." The prevailing view amongWestern development economists is that
their conclusions are "overdrawn...and can be questioned on both theoretical
and empirical grounds" (Meier 1976). Evidenceshowsthat the terms of trade
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of poorer economieshavenot deteriorated continuouslyin the last century, but

have fluctuated widely. Prebischs data captured only a slice of reality (Bairoch 1977). Even an economist like W. Arthur Lewis, sympathetic to the
cause of the Third World, believes that the solutions rest more on purely
internal reforms than on altering the nature of world trade. He particularly
stresses the need to concentrate on agricultural developmentover hasty
industrialization (Lewis1978).
But the widespreadskepticism about dependencytheory, at least in its more
extreme forms, does not negate its contribution. Its introduction into the
United States has at least destroyed the naive optimismabout development
expressed by the North Americanmodernization theorists of the 1950s and
1960s.
WORLD-SYSTEM
SOCIOLOGY
THEORY
AND CONTEMPORARY
Wallersteins influence in macrosociology,historical sociology, and the study

of social change has been immense. His 1974 volume reintroduced older
theories and seized the imaginations of a newgeneration of sociologists.
There were three reasons for this success. First, in the early 1970s modernization theory had been politically discredited by the Viemam
War, which
seemedto be an application of the anti-communist, anti-revolutionary economic development principles of Walt Rostow(1960).
Second,the domesticturmoil of the 1960shad awakenedsociologists to the
inequities and uneven development of the United States itself. Marxism
seemedto be a theoretical solution, and Wallerstein presented it in a modernized international context that tied both foreign and domesticproblemsinto
a neat package.
Third, a significant minority of youngersociologists thirsted for concrete
historical knowledgedenied themby the sterile functionalist positivism that
had prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s. That history should have been held in
such low esteem by the sociology of that period was somewhat strange,
because manyof its great figures--Homans, Merton, Bendix, Eisenstadt,
Barrington Moore,and Lipset--had written major historical works. Perhaps
it was that history was viewedonly as a useful "data source." Wallerstein
legitimized historical sociology for its ownsake, and for this the field owes
him a great debt.
It is paradoxical and alarmingthat in the last few years Wallersteins work
has been misusedby somesociologists, whoonce again claim that dredging
through historical information will allow us to prove or disprove various
conventional and unimaginativesocial theories. But this developmentshould
not let us forget the breath of fresh air that his workoriginally gaveus.
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Wallersteins
Followers
Manyof the first books that followed Wallersteins theories and style were
producedby his ColumbiaUniversity students. Hechter (1975) showedthat
core-peripheryrelation could be used to explain persisting ethnic tensions in
core societies. The exploited Celtic fringe of the United Kingdomhad been
turned into Englandsperiphery. Rather than diminishingCeltic particularism,
this fringes integration into the United Kingdomhad perpetuated and
strengthened it. By analogy, the same model might be applied to Canada,
Spain, the United States, and perhaps even France. Industrialization had not,
as previously predicted, endedregionalism, local ethnic nationalism, or other
"status" distinctions in favor of pure class divisions. Chirot (1976) analyzed
a typically peripheral society, Romania,claiming that after a long exposureto
capitalist market forces, it had found itself hopelessly poor and backward.
Moulder(1977) explained Japans rapid developmentby its ability to shield
itself from economiccolonialism. Qing China, on the other hand, had supposedly been penetrated by western capitalism in the 19th century, and had
been peripheralized so that its development was blocked. Block (1977)
explained the modemcapitalist banking and financial system in worldsystemic terms.
This kind of work has continued and spread (see Kaplan 1978; Goldfrank
1979; Hopkins & Wallerstein 1980; Rubinson 1981). Billingss 1979).
first-rate study of post-Civil WarNorth Carolinas industrialization demonstrates the utility of world-system theory in explaining domestic American
social history. Peter Evanss book on Brazil (1979) combinesa sophisticated
use of Latin American dependency theory and Wallersteinian concepts to
examine the role of the world economy and multinational firms in that
countrys spectacular but unevenindustrialization in the 1960sand 70s. The
political scientist Bruce Cumings,while not directly a "world-system theorist," has used someof the theory to propose a major new interpretation of
the origins of the KoreanWar(1981). Manyrecent and forthcoming books
a variety of countries and historical situations incorporate some of
Wallersteins ideas.
Quantitative
WorM-System Theory
In his ownwork Wallerstein has been studiously nonquantitative, but his

theories are not logically inconsistent with strict quantitative positivism. Hechter (1975) was one of the first to see this. In the late 1970sa wholeschool
quantitative world-system theorists grew up at Stanford. The world-system
componentand the major theoretical impetus camefrom John Meyer, and the
quantitative vigor from Hannan(see the articles in Meyer&Hannan1979).
Beginning with a project to study world education, and movingto problems
of ethnicity, they cameto adopt manyof Wallersteins ideas and to urge their
students to test them with cross-national quantitative data. Rubinsonand
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THEORY 95
Chase-Dunnhave becomethe best knownof their students. Thoughthey do
not limit themselvesto quantitative cross-national data analysis, that is where
they have made their reputations (Rubinson 1976; Chase-Dunn1975; ChaseDunn&Rubinson1977). Bergesen has edited a useful book extending traditional hypothesis-testing techniquesto historical materials (1980).
Such work has gained quick popularity. It combinesthe ideological and
political punch of Marxismwith the safe and marketable technology taught to
modem
sociology graduate students. Becauseit is so easy to find someUnited
Nations data, run it through a machine, and tack on a little world-system
verbiage, it is a style that has been abused. But it has produceda few interesting ideas and tests of Wallersteins theories and those of his followers.
Ragin, occasionally working with Delacroix (also from the Stanford group)
has published major articles in this genre (Ragin 1977; Delacroix &Ragin
1978). He has discussed both the pattern of world economicdevelopmentand
ethnic survival and reaction in developed countries to show some of the
important limitations of world-system formulations. Snyder &Kick (1979)
have devised a wayto use block modelling in world-systemic studies.
Cultural
Anthropology
Oneof the most fruitful areas for the developmentof world-systemtheory has
been cultural anthropology.There, these ideas have helped liberate fieldwork
from overly narrow description by suggesting ways in which major international currents have affected seeminglyisolated and primitive cultures (Danielle 1981). Schneider &Schneiders book about the peripheralization of
Sicily (1976) is a goodexampleof this, as are manyof the articles in Carol
Smiths edited volumes(1976). Verdery is presently completing a book
Transylvanianhistory that combinesthe systematic study of a village with a
larger historical study of the Austro-HungarianEmpire and its role in the
spread of capitalism to c~entral and eastern Europe(forthcoming). John Cole
(1977) has argued that the recent reexamination of European peasants
anthropologists has been influenced by a world-systemic perspective.
Writers on subjects as different as the Peruvian wooltrade (Orlove 1977),
the British Royal Botanical Gardens(Brockway1979), and pre-contact Mesoamerican trade patterns (Pailes &Whitecotton 1979) have used Wallerstein.
Thoughthis literature is not by sociologists, it exemplifies the artificiality
of the boundarybetweenvarious disciplines that study theoretically related
topics.
The Fernand Braudel
Center
After his great success, Wallerstein movedto the State University of New
York at Binghamtonto head the new FernandBraudel Center. There, assisted
by TerenceHopkins,he has established himself at the heart of an international
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enterprise to develop and spread his theories. The Center publishes its own
journal, Review, in whichthe latest related findings and debates can be found.
Wallerstein also edits a series in conjunction with the French Maisondes
Sciences de lHornmefor CambridgeUniversity Press. It has published books
ranging from Romanian
rural history (Stahl 1980), through the history of early
colonial Mexico (Frank 1979), to studies of Algerias economyand ethnographyduring its colonial period (Bourdieu 1979).
Twoof the Braudel Centers most interesting projects are the study of long
cycles in the capitalist world-economy
and the examinationof the history of
Ottomanperipheralization.
The capitalist economyhas always been subject to waves or cycles of
expansion and contraction, and the reasons for these are imperfectly understood. There is little question, for example,that after the boomof the 1950s
and 1960s, most capitalist economiesentered a period of relative stagnation
in the 1970s. This slowdownthreatens to becomea major world economic
crisis in the 1980s. It has affected someof the peripheral and semiperipheral
economieseven more strongly than the core, though a weakcore economylike
Britains has been badly hurt. Nor have communisteconomies, which reentered the capitalist trading networkin the 1960s, been spared. High international debt, falling agricultural production, and inflation have increased
social tensions in such different countries as Poland, Romania,Nigeria, Tanzania, and Peru.
Kondratieffs 1926 study of long (47-60 years) cycles in the capitalist
word-economy
found three periods of rise and fall from the 1780s until the
start of the post-WorldWarI slump (Kondratieff 1979). His predictions have
been surprisingly accurate. The downturnthat beganin the 1920s lasted until
the late 1930s, and completedthe cycle that had begunwith the rising prosperity of the 1890s. The post-WordWarII boomran from the late 1940s until
about 1970, equalling the average 25 year period of previous up cycles. Could
it be that the present downpart of the cycle will last into the 1990s?
The Braudel Centers research on this question (see Review, II, 4, 1979)
begins with Kondratieff, and has tried to extend his wavesfurther into the past
as well as to project theminto the future. So far, convincingexplanations for
the cycles have not fully materialized. Conventional theories have concentrated on the discovery of new techniques for exploiting previously unused
resources. This causes a rapid rise in profits for those whocontrol the new
technologies. There follows a period of falling returns as the new resource
becomesrelatively less abundant and dearer to exploit. In these terms (of
course we are simplifying) the cycle after 1945 might be viewedas a wave
dominated by petroleum, which has gone from being an abundant, cheap
energy source, to being an expensiveone in the 1970s. The great merit of the
BraudelCenters approachis to tie economiccycles to cycles of political and
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97
economichegemonyby particular core powers, and to the creation and exploitation of newperipheries in each cycle. The latest cycle has been characterized by Americandominanceand now decline in the world-economy.
Whether or not a good explanation will be found for this phenomenon
remainsan openquestion. It is not evencertain that we are in a lasting 20 or
30 year decline. But it is at this level that world-systemtheory offers the
greatest promise for the discovery of new ideas, and where a genuinely
world-wide perspective enriches the narrower view of conventional economists and students of social change.
TheOttomanproject (see Review,II, 3) is morehistorically specific, but it
promisesto give us a greater understandingof howperipheralization occurs.
World-systemtheory has been rather weakin distinguishing betweendifferent
types of pre-industrial agrarian empires (see below). If the study of Ottoman
decline and the absorption of its territories into the capitalist world-economy
from the 17th to the 19th century comesto fruition, this weaknesswill be
partially remedied. Again, this is an area muchstudied by historians, but
world-systemtheory can offer newideas and integrate regional history with
larger trends.
Despite this activity and someunquestionable successes, serious questions
have arisen about the adequacyof world-systemtheory, and about major gaps
it has left unexplored in the history of social change and economicdevelopment.
SOME CRITICISMS
OF THE THEORY
World-systemtheory has had few critics in sociology. Those whodislike it

moreor less ignore it, and those whopractice it tend to take its fundamental
assertions as received truths. Minormodifications or additions are made,but
frontal attacks on Wallerstein and his followers have so far been limited to
occasional book reviews (e.g. Skocpol 1977; Janowitz 1977; Chirot 1980).
Somehistorians haveattacked particular applications of his theories, but few
scholars in any field have the encyclopedicknowledgerequired to tackle the
wholeintellectual systemdirectly.
Reversed Causality: Brenners Critique
An important exception is historian Robert Brenner. In 1976 he showedthat
the economicbackwardnessof eastern Europe(primarily Poland) in the early
modernperiod did not arise from "dependence."Rather, it was backwardness
that eventually produced the "dependent" pattern. In England, it was the
reverse. Internal agrarian transformations madeits rapid economicdevelopmentpossible, and it was only this that allowed England to create its
Empire.
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In 1977 Brenner attacked Wallerstein directly using, amongothers, the

works of the Pole MarianMalowist, whohad been one of Wallersteins main
inspirations. Brenners explanations were not new. They repeated the conventional wisdomestablished by most economichistorians whohad studied
these questions. But by tackling Wallerstein, Frank, and their followers (as
well as Sweezy)Brenner highlighted the key gap in their work: They neglect
to study the reasons for the economicsuccess, the technological dynamism,
and the fundamental novelty of what was happening in England and the
Netherlands in the 16th and 17th centuries.
In a little-noticed book review that generally praised Wallerstein, Lenski
(1976) had expressed his surprise at Wallersteins neglect of technology.
Brenner (1977) provedthat this was not an oversight, but was instead the key
to Wallersteins attempt to prove that Poland was not muchbehind the most
advancedparts of western Europein the 15th century. Perry Anderson(1974)
had correctly concluded that in the late middle ages Poland was a vast,
underpopulated area with predominantly poor soils, a backwardagricultural
technology, and a fragile, decayingurban networkbefore the grain trade with
the West began.
Brenner(1977)noted that Wallersteinserror is tied to his refusal to analyze
the interplay betweenclass structure and economicgrowth. It also leads to a
strange misunderstandingabout the presence or absence of strong states. Core
states are necessarily strong, and weakstates are peripheral according to
Wallerstein. True, Poland in the 17th century had becomea weak (decentralized) state, but so were the Netherlandscomparedto, say,. France. Wallerstein (1980) nevertheless continues to maintainthat the Netherlandscomprised
a strong state whoselong-term economicsuccess was based on international
power and conscious manipulation of markets by a strong core government.
The reality was different. The very class structures that favored independent
capitalists madeit impossible for absolutist royal bureaucraciesto flourish.
The capitalists were then successful in their international business because
they were moreinnovative and efficient than their competitors, not because of
their "strong states."
This error, the unwillingnessto analyze internal class dynamicsin search of
explanations for capitalisms economicstrength, has consequences for the
analysis of late 20th century economicproblems. Brenner (1977) showsthat
the Wallerstein-Frankthesis proposesautarkic closure as the best strategy for
developmentby contemporaryThird-Worldcountries. But this shifts the focus
awayfrom increasing productivity of labor to nationalism. It is easy to see how
this "leftist" analysis rejoins the fascist prescriptions of Mussoliniand Manoilescu even if today it appeals primarily to a certain type of neo-Marxist.
(Wallerstein nowdenies that he favors autarky for most peripheral and semiperipheral countries. Nevertheless, his workencourages autarkic solutions,
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THEORY 99
and he greatly admires countries such as North Korea that have tried to
approach autarky. Other world-system and dependency theorists, such as
Samir Amin,have retained their faith in autarky despite the obvious limitations of that policy whereit has been tried.)
Whateverconfirmation of world-systemtheory exists in short-term statistical analysis of Third-Worldeconomiesperpetuates Wallersteins reversal of
causality. Noone denies that patterns of dependencyexist, or that there is a
great transnational capitalist market. But whetherdependencyis a cause or an
effect of backwardnessmakesall the difference in which remedies are suggested. (For discussion of moreinstances of this error in world-systemtheory,
see Chirot 1981.)
A Comprehensive
Theory?
Despite the claims of its supporters, world-systemtheory is far from comprehensive. The treatmentof pre-capitalist societies is skimpy[despite the interesting review article by Moseley& Wallerstein (1978)]. No one can fault
Wallersteinfor not knowingall history, but his insistence on the failure of the
classical empiresto industrialize because their political and economicsystems
happenedto coincide leads to another error symptomaticof a more general
explanatory gap.
Certain long-lasting "world-economies"
failed to producea capitalist worldeconomy. The Persian Gulf, the Iranian Plateau, "and the eastern Mediterranean formedsuch a "system" for two thousand years. So did India from
the time of the Mauryato the British conquest, another two millenia. The
Islamic Near East and North Africa from the collapse of centralized Abbasid
role to the Ottomanconquest were a veritable "world-economy"for five
centuries. Why,then, was Europeso special in the 15th century?
Subsumingall world-empires under one, inherently stagnant rubric is
grossly misleading. China from the time of the Han to the Mingwent through
periods of rapid technological and economicgrowth (Elvin 1973). To compare
this case with that of Egypt, whichwas moreor less stagnant betweenthe time
of the Pyramidsand the Macedonianconquest 2300 years later, is to believe
mistakenly that there existed a single "Asiatic modeof production."
Byturning all pre-capitalist states into a uniform"traditional" type, worldsystemtheory finds it difficult to explain whythe reaction to capitalist penetration was so different fromplace to place and continues to vary in important
waystoday. The general tendencyto lumpall precapitalist societies into two
simple types (and "minisystems" are an even more simplistic type than
"world-empires")is perilously close to the ahistorical eurocentrismthat characterized modernizationtheory. It leads to the sameinability to discriminate
betweendifferent societies without resorting to irrelevant and artificial constructs.
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& HALL

Socialism?
Mostprominentworld-systemtheorists share an enthusiastic faith in socialism
as a solution to problemscausedby capitalist exploitation. This faith affects
their analysis of the world. It mustbe questionedbecauseit leads to moreblind
spots.
Wallerstein (1979) excuses manyof the faults of communistcountries
showingthat they are obliged to operate in a capitalist world-system. They
cannot, therefore, moveto their ideal state until world capitalism is overthrown. But is this a useful way to understand what goes on in communist
countries? It is surely no coincidence that world-systempractitioners have
never produced a serious book about communistsocieties, even though they
have written dozensof interesting ones about the effects of peripherality and
semiperipherality in the rest of the world.
Wallersteins own nomenclature should have suggested a better way of
analyzing the Soviet Unionthan those used so far by world-systemtheorists.
Far from being a core or semiperipheral society, the Soviet Union is an
old-fashioned world-empire,perhaps the last of its kind. It does not exploit
eastern Europeand Cuba,it subsidizes themin return for military and strategic
advantages. Like Rome,at least from the early 2nd century, it is run by and
for a military-bureaucratic ruling class. Its only dynamicimpulse comesfrom
heavy industry used for armaments. Otherwise, like the late RomanEmpire,
it is beset by inherent problemsof stagnation and the discontent of subject
peoples in its administrative periphery.
The emphasis in Wallerstein on future world-socialist revolution entirely
avoids the issue of class dynamicsundersocialism, and it fails to ask the basic
question: Howis long-run increasing labor productivity possible outside capitalism? Among
theoretical issues few could be moreimportant or further from
being solved than this one. [For a first-rate study of these problems, see
Hirszowicz (1980).]
World-systemtheorys transposition of Marxto an international plane has
been accompaniedby an assertion that, on the whole, economically peripheralized people are being continuously immiserized. That is whythere will
eventually be a world revolution against the "bourgeois" core. Wallerstein
(1979) believes that capitalist economicgrowth is a zero-sumgame.Countries
that develop do so only at the expenseof others that lose. Since only a few
grow, most decline. The widening gap in per capita GNPbetween rich and
poorcountries, then, is not an anomalybut a natural result of capitalist growth.
Onlysocialism can change this.
But is capitalist economicdevelopment a zero-sum game?Kuznets (1971)
and Bairoch (1977) have shownthat it is not, and that in the post-Second
WorldWarperiod the growthrate of poorer countries has been higher than the
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historic growth rate of the old core. Morerecent data (NewYork Times 1979)
confirmthis. Thehigher per capita growthrate of richer countries is entirely
a function of the rapid populationgrowthin the poorer parts of the world; and
no matter what one thinks about population problems, this growth is itself
proof of the increasing availability of material goodsand services that insure
higher survival rates. As Morris (1979) has shown,almost the whole world has
experiencedgreat improvement
in the measurable"quality of life" in the last
several decades.
Capitalism may,indeed, fail to stimulate production sufficiently to meet
future population growth, and we mayone day be faced with a desperate
Malthusiancrisis. But this is by no stretch of the imaginationthe result of a
constant trend towardabsolute immiserization,nor is it evena certain future.
Blamingcapitalism and hoping for a socialist revolution to rescue the world
once again obviates study of what is going on within countries. Whyhave
somelimited their population growth while others have not?
Economic
historians are no longer sure that capitalist colonialism itself was
harmful to economicgrowth in the periphery. The outcomedepended on the
colony, the colonizers, and the period of colonization. For example, the
effects of plantation slavery in the Caribbeanmayhave been negative (Mintz
1977)for the reasonsasserted by world-systemtheory, but British rule in India
maynot have retarded industrialization at all (Morris et al 1969).
The Issue of Culture
For world-systemtheorists as for most other Marxistsideas are merelyepiphenomenal.But even if cultures are ultimately produced by material conjunctions, once they are in place they take on a life of their own.World-system
theorys refusal to study such matters reduces its grasp of social changeand
economicprogress.
That the triumphof a specific type of capitalist rationality in westernEurope
in the 16th and 17th centuries resulted from the success of the bourgeois
classes in asserting their independencefrom church and king, and that it had
further consequencesin the flowering of modemscience, is part of Webers
central theory of capitalist development (Weber1968). Merton (1970)
others have shownthat the historical connectionbetweenincreasing religious
rationality and the growthof science was tight.
The capitalist cores ability to exploit weakperipheries was neither a new
nor an unusual phenomenon,and it maynot have been decisive in sustaining
economicgrowth.But toleration and eventually support of free thinking intellectuals for so long and on such a large scale was unique. It remainsan unusual
phenomenon
outside the capitalist core to this day.
Capitalisms toleration goes beyondsupport of intellectuals. It has been
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extended to muchof the population of Westerncapitalist societies. This has

contributed to raising large portions of the massesto a high level of skill and
education. It has, over time, with muchdifficulty, and with frequent reverses,
inculcated a secular, scientific approachto the calculability of economicactions.
The failure of world-systemtheory to grapple with these facts is evident in
its inability to explain whyeconomicdevelopmentaffects large areas with
roughlysimilar historical and cultural traditions in similar ways, regardless of
their poweror position in the world-system.Thus northwestern Europe, which
industralized before the rest of the world, included England,followed closely
by Belgium,northern France, western Germany,Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Switzerland was a weak, internationally insignificant state; Belgium
was not independentuntil well after its industrialization; and westernGermany
was politically subordinated to the state that absorbed it. Later, industrialization spread to Scandinaviawherein the 18th century there had supposedly
existed only a peripheral (Denmark)and a failed semiperipheral (Sweden)
society destined for the samefate as Spainafter its failure a century earlier
(Wallerstein 1980; Bairoch 1965).
Thesefacts are no more surprising than the later successes of the United
States, Canada, and Australia, despite their entry into the world-systemas
primary exporters, and despite the continued peripherality (in strict dependencytheory terms) of the latter two. Somesocieties learned the culture
of industrialization easily becausethey were close to it fromthe start.
CONCLUSION
World-systemtheory and its close ally dependencytheory have manyflaws.
Their economichistory sometimeshas been wrong. The naked political bias
and revolutionary polemicevident in someof their writings showhoweasy it
is to fall into blind dogmatism.The attack against capitalism has not been
accompaniedby a convincing explanation of what might replace it. There are
major empirical and theoretical gaps. But this cannot deprive them of their
importanceand real virtues.
Studyingindividual societies in isolation fromeach other is both misleading
and dangerous. It hides the powerful transnational forces that have been a
major part of all social and economictransformations since the 15th century.
It yields incomplete, and often wrongconclusions about the nature of social
problems. Sociologyhas tended to fall into this kind of a trap. World-system
theory can thus be seen as a necessary remedy.Whetheror not one agrees with
all of its conclusions, it is abundantlyclear that a world-wideperspective has
becomea minimal requirement for the intelligent study of social change.
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Wallersteinandhis followers have reminded

us, too, that such a perspective
mustnecessarily be historical anddeal in centuries, not merelydecades,even
for the study of contemporary
problems.
Noneof this is new,nor mustit comewith a leftist bias. Webersprogram
for the study of sociology was broadly comparativeand historical, and it
combinedeconomic,political, andcultural research. But because Weberhad
beenmorecited than followed, it wastime to bring backthat kind of vision
to the forefront of sociology. That it camein the particular formknownas
world-system
theoryis the productof intellectual andideological forces in our
world. Thoseof us whodislike these forces are nonethelessobliged to recognize the contribution madeby world-systemtheory. Thoseothers of us who,
on the contrary, are pleased by the ideology that accompaniesthe theory
should equally recognize that its importanceis not based primarilyon its
ideological stance.
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Annual Reviews

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

World-systemtheory is a highly political approachto the problemof economic

In Americansociology world-systemtheory evolved as a direct attack against

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

CH1ROT & HALL

1963, Moore1979) were amongits most important interpreters. A similar

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

Theory of Economic Change

Wallerstein posits historical stages of developmentdifferent from the uniform

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

do not operate merely within state boundaries. The term semiperipheral,

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

and the Issue of Comparative Advantage

Someof the problems raised by world-system theory had already been

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

In 1902, J. A. Hobsonpublished an attack against imperialism that proved

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

developmentof this cleavage, formerly confined to one country only, are

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

CHIROT & HALL

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

of poorer economieshavenot deteriorated continuouslyin the last century, but

Wallersteins influence in macrosociology,historical sociology, and the study

CHIROT & HALL

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

In his ownwork Wallerstein has been studiously nonquantitative, but his

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

CHIROT & HALL

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

World-systemtheory has had few critics in sociology. Those whodislike it

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

CHIROT & HALL

In 1977 Brenner attacked Wallerstein directly using, amongothers, the

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

CH1ROT & HALL

extended to muchof the population of Westerncapitalist societies. This has

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

Wallersteinandhis followers have reminded

Chapel Hill NC: Univ. N. Carolina Press.

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

CHIROT & HALL

Chirot, D. 1981. Changing fashions in the

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

The WoolExport Economyand Regional Society of Southern Peru. NY:Academic.270

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

CHIROT & HALL

international economic order. Economics

nomica. Buenos Aires: Paidos. 139 pp.

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 1982.8:81-106. Downloaded from arjournals.annualreviews.org

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