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ABSTRACT
Recent years have witnessed a continual growth in the number of companies
reporting publicly on various aspects of their environmental and social
performance. Accompanying this growth has been a discernible rise in the
number of these reports that are being verified by independent third parties in
order to increase the credibility of their contents for readers. In this paper we
undertake a detailed critical analysis of assurance statements appearing in
leading edge environmental, social and sustainability reports as represented by
those shortlisted for the 2002 ACCA UK and European Sustainability Reporting
Awards scheme. Prior studies have questioned the credibility of statements
which appeared in the mid to late 1990s, raising fundamental questions as to
their value for external stakeholders. Drawing on an evaluative framework
centrally informed by the recently issued AccountAbility, FEE and GRI guidelines
on assurance, we advance previous work by assessing whether current leading
edge assurance practices offer more in terms of enhancing transparency and
accountability than did their predecessors.
Our analysis indicates some improvement in terms of the rigour of work
undertaken and independence of the assurance exercise. However, it also
exposes a large degree of management control over the assurance process, as
evidenced by a reluctance to address statements to specific stakeholder
constituencies and a general absence of stakeholder participation in assurance
processes. Distinct approaches to assurance among accountant and consultant
assurers are also highlighted with the former primarily adopting a cautious,
limited approach aimed at providing low assurance levels. While consultant
assurers take a more evaluative approach and appear to provide higher level
assurance, their focus on aiding corporate strategic direction potentially blurs
their independence. We contend that their apparent intertwining of the concepts
of accountability and value added needs careful scrutiny as this may reflect an
ultimate accountability to corporate management as opposed to other
stakeholders.
Authors
David Owen is Professor of Environmental and Social Accounting at the
International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility (ICCSR) at Nottingham
University Business School.
Brendan ODwyer, BComm MBS DPA PhD ACA lectures in the Department of
Accountancy at the Michael Smurfit Graduate School of Business, University
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a steady growth in the number of companies reporting
publicly on various aspects of their environmental and social performance. For
leading edge reporters, predominantly, but not exclusively, large companies
operating in sensitive industrial sectors the preferred means of dissemination has
increasingly become the production of a substantial stand alone paper and/or web
based report. Since 1993, KPMGs tri-annual survey of reporting practice has charted
the steady growth in the number of reporters.
example, it is noted that 45% of the top 250 companies of the Global Fortune 500
(GFT250) now issue an environmental, social or sustainability report compared to
35% in 1999 (KPMG, 2002). A significant growth rate is also noted in the number of
reports issued by the top 100 companies in eleven countries (including nine from
Europe together with the USA and Australia) up from 13% in 1993 to 28% in 2002.
Accompanying the growth in reporting has been a discernible rise in the proportion of
environmental, social and sustainability reports that are verified by independent third
parties. This trend is primarily driven by a realisation that the growing levels of
disclosure are being undermined by a credibility gap arising from a lack of confidence
in both the data and the sincerity of reporting organisations (Doane, 2000; Swift and
Dando, 2002; Dando and Swift, 2003). According to KPMGs figures, 29% of GFT250
report issuers in 2002 had their reports verified (1999: 19%) whilst similarly 27% of
top 100 companies included a third party verification statement in their report
compared with just 18% in 1999 (see also, CSR Network, 2003; Kolk, 2003).
Amongst leading edge reporters verification is significantly more prevalent, with
SustainAbilitys (2002) analysis of sustainability reporting indicating that 68% of the
worlds best sustainability reports feature some form of assurance statement. KPMG
(2002) suggests that the increased prevalence of verification arises from the
demand for reliable and credible information from management, for managing the
companys environmental and social risks, and from stakeholders who want
assurance that the report truly represents the companys efforts and achievements
of the
AccountAbility, FEE and GRI guidelines that centrally inform our evaluative
framework.
2.
and
programmes
as
well
as
associated
indicators,
targets
and
ii.
iii.
iv.
A title
An addressee
A statement identifying the party responsible for the subject matter of the
report and the responsibilities of the assurance provider
In cases where the report is for restricted purposes, identification of the parties
to whom the report is restricted and for what purpose it was prepared
Identification of the criteria against which the subject matter of the report was
evaluated
The name of the assurance provider and place of issue of the report
Whereas carrying out an assurance exercise is not mandatory under the GRI
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, auditability of information forms one of the laid
down reporting principles considered essential for underpinning the production of a
balanced and reasonable report. Furthermore, a working group was formed in 1999
to explore issues and options for strengthening the credibility of sustainability
reports through various assurance mechanisms (GRI, 2002, p. 25). Guidance as to
what might be included in an independent assurance report arising as a result of the
groups consultations is contained in annex four appended to the Guidelines
document. The guidance has much in common with that provided by FEE including
recommendations that:
The identity and location of the assurance provider together with date of report
is included.
The GRI guidance, however, goes a little further than that of FEE in a number of
instances. Firstly, it is specified that a statement affirming the assurance providers
independence and freedom from bias and conflicts of interest should, rather than
may, be included. Secondly, a brief description, or outline, of how evidence providing
the basis for the conclusion reached was obtained is called for. Significantly, it is
noted that this will include the extent to which different categories of stakeholders
participated in the planning and execution of the assurance process and indicate any
constraints on this process (GRI, 2002, p. 79). Finally, the GRI guidance is a little
more prescriptive than that of FEE concerning wording of any conclusion reached in
7
that this should address the accuracy, completeness, reliability and balance of
the sustainability report, relative to the scope of the engagement (GRI, 2002, p. 79).
3.
As noted earlier, our sample of assurance statements for analysis comprises those
appearing in environmental, social and sustainability reports shortlisted for the 2002
ACCA UK and European Sustainability Reporting Awards. The total number of
reports shortlisted was 81, of which 48 were from the UK. Of the UK reports 28
contained assurance statements (58%), whereas for the European reports, 13
assurance statements were located (34%). The latter figure, however, gives a rather
understated picture of assurance practice within large European companies in that
none of the seven companies shortlisted in the separate SME category for the
European scheme featured an assurance statement within their report, whilst
additionally we were unable to access English language versions of a further four
reports. Excluding these eleven reports from the overall sample moves the
percentage assured up to 59%, a figure much more in line with that observed in the
UK.
In carrying out our analysis we have followed the practice of earlier researchers (Ball
et al., 2000; Kamp-Roelands, 2002) in looking for variations in approach between
accountant and consultant verifiers and draw attention to notable differences where
appropriate. Additionally, we have looked for differences in assurance practice
applied to environmental and social/sustainability reporting exercises. A priori we
would expect some variation in the former instance, with accountant verifiers
presumably more likely than consultants to be influenced by the accountancy
approach of FEE and the GRI. In the case of type of report we wouldnt, however,
necessarily expect much in the way of differences of approach, save except perhaps
for more reference to issues of stakeholder engagement and dialogue in the case of
social/sustainability reporting. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the FEE (and to a large
extent the GRI) guidelines, as noted, draw on IFACs ISA 100 standard, which
applies to any report intended to convey a high level of assurance. Secondly, the
term sustainability report is increasingly being used to cover the broad range of
formats in which companies are reporting on their social and environmental
performance, whether within individual social, environmental, corporate
citizenship or environmental, health and safety reports; as part of their corporate
8
Total
Assurance Provider
Accountant
Consultant
Environmental
13 (32%)
Social/Sustainability
28 (68%)
10
18
19 (46%)
22 (54%)
Total
41
Noteworthy from Table 1 is that the dominant position of consultant verifiers identified
in the Ball et al. and Kamp-Roelands studies appears to have been significantly
eroded (at least as far as our sample is concerned), although accountants seem
more prominent in environmental rather than social/sustainability assurance
provision. Also, the preponderance of social/sustainability reports contrasts
somewhat with the picture painted by KPMGs (2002) survey referred to earlier, whilst
however providing some support for AccountAbilitys assertion above.
The evaluative framework employed for analysing our sample of assurance
statements is developed from the AccountAbility, FEE and GRI guidelines outlined in
the previous section. Key questions focussed upon are as follows:
What level of basic information concerning the assurance provider and the
assurance process is provided? Issues addressed are whether FEE and GRI
stipulations as to clearly identifying the type of statement (title), the addressee
and respective responsibilities of preparer and assurance provider are
followed, and whether information concerning the assurance providers
competencies is provided.
9
performance
itself
made,
with
weaknesses
highlighted
and
In what form are opinions stated? For example, do conclusions reached on the
report address issues such as accuracy, completeness, reliability and balance
as called for in the GRI guidance?
A detailed questionnaire was partially derived from the instrument used in Ball et al. (2000).
However, this instrument was substantially revised to accord with the evaluative framework
outlined above. The initial analysis was undertaken by a research assistant who read each
assurance statement in detail on numerous occasions. Give that there is an element of
subjectivity in the interpretation of aspects of the evaluative framework, both authors then rechecked these results by reading the statements independently on several occasions.
Numerous changes were made to the overall analysis and the statements were again analysed
in depth by the authors to confirm and agree these revised findings.
4.
Results
content for the very name of the firm to indicate competence to undertake the
assurance process. We identified only two instances (11% of the accountant sample)
in which some clear indication was given of past assurance experience and four
examples (22% of the accountant sample) of the particular area of expertise brought
to bear on the assurance process being mentioned. In the former case, for example,
KPMGs attestation report for Volkswagen AG notes that experience and findings
from previous audits of environmental reports assisted them in identifying critical
areas for examination and drawing up an audit strategy. In terms of disclosing areas
of expertise, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) review of Abbey Nationals corporate
citizenship report is identified as being conducted by their environmental
management consultancy arm, whilst in a similar vein the verification of BASFs
social responsibility report is attributed to Deloitte and Touche Global Environment
and Sustainability Services. For their part, KPMG refer to the assembly of a
multidisciplinary team of social responsibility and assurance specialists to undertake
work on the Co-operative Insurance Societys social accountability report.
Consultant verifiers were more likely to disclose details of past assurance
experience, areas of expertise and relevant qualifications for undertaking the
assurance exercise with almost half (48%) disclosing in this vein. For example,
Ashridges verification report for Camelot refers to the verification team leader being
a Certified Member and Director of AccounAbility while Casella-Stanger append to
their verification statement for BAAs sustainability disclosures a note that they are a
UK based environmental consultancy which has expertise in a wide range of areas,
such as corporate social responsibility, EMS, risk, air quality, noise, water quality and
ecology. Additionally, the company has experience in the design, development and
verification of sustainability reports in a wide range of sectors, and several staff are
registered with the Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment (EMA)
as qualified auditors and members of AA1000.
Turning to information provision concerning the assurance process itself, we were
somewhat surprised to note that, notwithstanding the cautionary approach to
terminology adopted in the FEE guidelines, verification statement or verifiers report
was by a considerable margin the most popular term employed for independent
opinion statements. This term was used on twenty occasions (49% of overall sample)
which contrasts somewhat with the relative unpopularity of the term assurance
11
which appeared only six times (17%). It should however be noted that accountants
were much less likely to employ the term verification, using it in just five cases (26%
of accountants sample). Significantly, the accountant verifiers were also far more
likely to draw attention to the respective responsibilities of report verifiers and
preparers than were consultants. Indeed, we found only one occasion where no
specific reference was made identifying responsible parties. This was in the context
of Deloitte and Touches checking of certain data control procedures operated by
Grundfos, in which case the firm is at pains to point out that neither an audit or review
has been carried out in accordance with Danish accounting standards and that no
assurance is provided on the correctness of the total report. For consultants, by
contrast, on nine occasions (41%) no specific reference is made to the
responsibilities
of corporate management for report preparation, although it should be acknowledged
that the responsibilities undertaken by the verifier are generally most clearly spelt out.
One significant area where FEE and GRI guidelines seem to be having little impact is
in the specification of an addressee for the assurance statement. In only eleven
instances (27% of sample) did this occur and this was exclusively among the
accountant verifiers. They identified the board of directors on seven occasions, the
company itself on three and, rather quaintly, the readers of the report on the
remaining one. Intriguingly, when looking at the constituencies the organisations
report itself purports to address we see that employees are identified in 66% of
cases, customers 59%, the local community 54% and shareholders 49%. We can but
contrast the situation here with that of financial reporting where the report is prepared
for shareholders and the audit report is also clearly addressed to the same
constituency. There are significant issues of corporate governance to unpick in the
realm of sustainability reporting that presently go somewhat unacknowledged.
4.2
In total, just under half (46%) of assurance statements made some reference to the
providers independence from the reporting organisation. Consultant verifiers (65% of
cases) were more likely than accountant verifiers (39%) to provide such a statement
or reference, particularly in the context of verifying social/sustainability reports.
Indeed, for accountants, in the majority of cases simply labelling their statement as
being independent was deemed to suffice. Generally, by contrast, the consultant
12
13
throughout the coming year. This presents a conflict of interest, particularly in relation
to future assurance exercises (emphasis added).
The final example of a less than fully independent relationship is provided by The
Corporate Citizenship Companys attestation statement for South African Breweries
corporate accountability report where attention is drawn to the fact that they have
acted as consultants to the company since 1999. The nature of the relationship is
rather underlined by Michael Tuffreys (co-founder of The Corporate Citizenship
Company) external commentary on the report which commences with the
resounding statement:
Having worked with SAB since soon after its London listing, it is personally
pleasing to see how frequently the company is now cited as a leader in social
reporting.
We would suggest that this is not the ideal way to commence an attestation
statement if one wants to achieve credibility with ones readership. Indeed, the rest of
the commentary does rather tend to accentuate the positive and ends with the
rallying call that SABs record is already a strong one. Meeting the social challenge
will make it stronger still.
Whilst we have drawn particular attention to situations where the relationship
between the company and its assurance provider may fall short of one of full
independence, it must be acknowledged that these now appear to be very much the
exception. However, similar issues of corporate governance that we drew attention to
in the previous sub-section are again relevant when considering the concept of
independence in the fullest sense of the term. Put simply, the assurance exercise is
commissioned by corporate management, rather than individual stakeholder groups,
who are thus able to place restrictions on the areas of performance and reporting
upon which the assurance provider can bring to bear independent judgement. An
example of this is provided in a footnote to Lloyds Register Quality Assurance
Limiteds (LROA) verification statement on BT Groups 2002 social and
environmental report where it is noted that:
14
Whereas all assurance statements make some reference to the scope of the
exercise undertaken, only fifteen statements (37%) go on to provide clear and
specific information on areas not reviewed or assessed. Information provision on the
level of assurance provided and specific criteria employed is provided by less than
half of the sample (41%).
Accountant verifiers (53%) seem more likely than their consultant counterparts (30%)
to spell out the exact level of assurance pursued. In a number of cases, notably in
work performed by PwC, it is indicated that there are limitations in the degree of
assurance being offered. Thus, for example, in their review of Abbey Nationals
corporate citizenship report it is clearly stated that, we have not conducted an
audit, as defined in auditing standards, and we do not express an audit opinion on
the performance data and information in the Report. The same phrase appears in
the firms review of BG Groups social and environmental report, with the additional
information provided that work had been planned and performed, in order to
obtain reasonable, rather than absolute, assurance on the information tested,
although a belief is stated that the work carried out, provides a reasonable basis
for our findings. The health warning appended to the attestation statement for BPs
environmental and social review is rather more stark, indicating that the statement in
itself, should not be taken as a basis for interpreting BPs performance in relation
to its non-financial policies. By contrast, in a rare example of a non Big 4
accountants verification exercise, Rainbow Gillespie convey the fact that they have
audited the social accounts of Traidcraft in accordance with AccountAbility 1000
Section 3 - Guidelines for the social and ethical auditor. Interestingly, the only two
other examples of (Big 4) verification exercises offering a high level of assurance are
both confined to environmental reports. PwC give an audit opinion concerning
environmental and safety indicators published in Rhodias sustainable development
report, whilst KPMG are clear that they are performing an audit of Volkswagens
environmental report. Significantly, the existence of Generally Accepted Audit
Standards for Audits of Environmental reports (IDW PS 820), issued by the German
15
16
% of
Environmental
Reports
(13 reports)
% of
Social/Sustainability
Reports
(28 reports)
in
93
93
93
data
85
69
93
Validation of achievement
of targets
12
15
11
Validation of governance
arrangements
17
21
56
69
50
Staff interviewed
85
77
89
Stakeholders interviewed
10
11
Nature of Work
Undertaken
Validation
report
of
data
Validation
of
collection systems
Comparing figures on work undertaken during the assurance process in the above
table with those appearing in Ball et al.s (2000) study suggests that a discernible
improvement in the rigour with which the process is conducted has taken place.
Notably, for our sample 93% of assurance providers make reference to having
undertaken a review of data in arriving at an opinion as against 70% in Ball et al.s
study. Additionally, 85% refer to having undertaken a review of systems (Ball et al.
43%), 56% to site visits (Ball et al. 32%) and 85% to having interviewed client staff
(Ball et al. 61%). Significantly, the latter figure contrasts somewhat starkly with the
number of statements (10%) that refer to interviews being carried out with
stakeholders as part of the assurance process. Interestingly, however, for the few
assurance providers commenting on governance issues, reference is generally made
to the need for involving stakeholders more closely in the reporting process. Thus, for
example, URS Verification Ltd note that the process of evaluation of stakeholder
opinion is emerging and the link to reporting is yet to be clearly established in their
verification of Unilevers report. In similar vein Bureau Veritass verification of BATs
17
Assurance
Standard,
information
is
material
if
its
omission
or
misrepresentation in the Report could influence the decisions and actions of the
Reporting Organisations stakeholders (AccountAbility, 2003b, p. 15). The
completeness principle calls for an evaluation of the extent to which the reporting
organisation can identify and understand material aspects of its sustainability
performance (p. 17) which encompasses activities, impacts and stakeholder views.
Finally, the responsiveness principle requires the assurance provider to evaluate
whether the reporting organisation has responded to stakeholder concerns, policies
and relevant standards, and adequately communicated these responses in its report
(p. 18).
We found instances of specific reference being made to materiality issues in thirteen
assurance statements (31% of sample). However, the general procedure adopted
was to offer a very broad statement rather than specific details of how materiality
levels had been set or indeed what exactly material implied. For example, PwCs
review of BG Groups social and environmental report notes simply that it
addresses the material Health, Safety, Security and Environmental issues associated
with BGs operations, whilst Ernst and Youngs attestation of BPs environmental
and social review states that we are not aware of any material modifications that
should be made to the HSE data which would affect assessment of group-wide HSE
performance. Significantly, the latter report also points out that decisions regarding
matters included in the review have been made by the company and that the
degree to which the Review contents address key stakeholder concerns are based
18
on BPs judgement. We could find only two assurance statements which specifically
and unambiguously addressed the issue of materiality from a stakeholder
perspective. These were Bureau Veritas verification statement for BATs social
report which focussed centrally on the stakeholder dialogue process employed by the
company and KPMGs statement on CIS social accountability report which in
drawing attention to improvements made by the company against the eight AA1000
(1999) principles noted under the materiality heading that:
CIS is integrating social, ethical and environmental risks into a new risk
management process. Stakeholder dialogue is used in risk identification and
CIS is experimenting with various techniques of stakeholder dialogue with
different groups and issues.
One further example of reference being made to a stakeholder centred notion of
materiality worthy of particular mention is PwCs review of Cable and Wirelesss
environment report which notes that further work is required to strengthen the
framework for gathering and reporting environmental information including:
Development of a Group-wide approach to stakeholder engagement to
confirm the material environmental issues at Group, business and site level.
Turning to the issue of completeness, we found fourteen instances (34% of sample)
where the assurance provider offered some specific degree of assessment of the
extent to which the reporting organisation is able to identify and understand its own
sustainability performance. Consultant assurance providers (39% of cases) appeared
more likely to offer comment in this vein than accountant assurance providers (27%).
Specific comment was made suggesting that all information was provided to enable
stakeholders to make informed judgements on only four occasions (10% of sample).
In particularly forthright style in this context Ashridges verification of Camelots social
and environmental report claims confidence that:
this report presents a true, complete, balanced and accurate account of
how the organisation is implementing the values and principles stated in the
success models relevant to each stakeholder group.
However, their statement goes on to express two minor qualifications relating to the
level of detail of data provision, making the full report difficult for all but the most
19
has adopted the AA1000 Assurance Standard. In these cases reference is generally
made to evaluation of the reporting organisation having:
communicated the above in its report in a manner that is both timely and
accessible to stakeholders.
22
One of the more illuminating features of our analysis was the rather terse use of
wording in the opinions of most Big 4 accountant assurance providers. Significantly,
there was an absence of the use of the term true and fair in these opinions despite
23
company, whilst Arthur D Little note that Novartis HSE report contains a fair
summary of relevant HSE impacts at Novartis own sites. For their part, Earth Tech
in their verification of Pennon Groups environmental and social report find that it
provides a fair and balanced representation of the significant environmental and
social sustainability issues and actions being taken under the control of the Pennon
Group. Finally in this context, a particularly strong endorsement of Unilevers web
based disclosures is offered by URS Verification:
URSVL considers that the report text and data relating to environmental
performance and management addresses the significant environmental
aspects of the business and these have been reported in a fair and balanced
manner.
In summary, clear distinctions between accountant and consultant assurance
provider opinions pervade our sample. From our analysis, a greater level of
assurance can be gleaned from the opinions of consultants, which certainly offer
more in terms of robustness and fullness of commentary. This review of opinions, of
course, is simply consistent with our earlier impression that there are very few
instances where Big 4 assurance providers are prepared to offer a high level of
assurance to report readers. Consultant assurance providers seemingly have far
fewer inhibitions. Whether their boldness is fully justified would be easier to ascertain
if details of fees paid for such assurance work were routinely disclosed, as is the
case with financial audit engagements.
5.
Our objective in this paper was to carry out a critical analysis of assurance
statements appearing in leading edge environmental, social and sustainability reports
as represented by those shortlisted for the 2002 ACCA UK and European
Sustainability Reporting Awards scheme. Using an evaluative framework centrally
informed by the AccountAbility, FEE and GRI guidelines, we examined the extent to
which the contents of assurance statements satisfactorily address key elements of
these guidelines such as independence, clear identification of the scope of the
engagement
together
with
standards
and
criteria
employed,
materiality,
reluctance
to
address
assurance
statements
to
specific
stakeholder
the decisions and actions of stakeholders. From this, we can assume that identified
stakeholders are viewed as the key users of these reports, so why the reluctance to
address assurance statements to them? If these reports are addressed only to
management they merely represent an internal assurance exercise being published
externally. If credibility and trust are to be enhanced, the next wave of assurance
statements will need to move beyond this restrictive approach which implicitly defines
materiality as it pertains to management. Providing statements to management for
management is hardly likely to counter the apparent scepticism surrounding social/
sustainability reporting (Dando and Swift, 2003).
This reluctance to identify key constituents is also reflected in the lack of any
substantive consideration of materiality, defined in stakeholder terms, in assurance
statements. Materiality is a thorny and emerging issue in the area of assurance
(Zadek, 2003) but as Zadek (2003) points out:
if stakeholders dont think the information is relevant [or material], it just
wont count [and] public reporting [will] flunk as an accountability
mechanism.
AccountAbilitys recent attempt to provide a five part test of materiality may provide
for improved assurance by guiding providers more specifically, as well as providing
greater legal protection for reluctant directors (AccountAbility, 2003d). However, this
would also mean involving stakeholders more in assurance processes (see
JustAssurance, 2003), which, as we outline above, is not prevalent among our
sample.
An increasingly clear distinction is emerging between the approaches of accountant
and consultant assurance providers. The former tend to adopt a cautious approach
that largely focuses on the issue of consistency of information appearing in the
organisations report with underlying data sets. The phrase true and fair is
conspicuously lacking in accountants opinion statements, whilst completeness of
information provision is generally not attested to. Indeed, accountant assurance
providers are in many cases at pains to point out that, in the absence of generally
accepted social audit standards, high level assurance cannot be offered. The only
exceptions to this rule occurred in two instances of clearly delineated assurance
28
30
To us, this suggests that, to quote Power (1997, p. 127), more [assurance will] not
necessarily mean more and better accountability merely more value added for
management as they manage key risks imposed by various stakeholder groups who
need to be controlled.
However, a key irony in the added value approach of consultants in our sample is
that, despite the potentially compromising position they find themselves in, they tend
to, through their assurance statements, provide the reader with higher levels of
assurance on the reports and processes they assess. This is an issue that would
benefit from more in-depth exploration with these assurance providers in order to
ascertain how they juggle these potentially sensitive roles.
In our view, it is, however, very difficult to envisage how more robust levels of
assurance can be brought about when the assurance provider is effectively
accountable to corporate management (the paymaster) and in the absence of any
countervailing power (Frank, 2001) to which he or she may have recourse in the
case of dispute. This has been an ongoing concern in financial auditing for many
years given that, despite shareholders legally appointing auditors, corporate
management effectively undertake this role with shareholders mostly rubber
stamping their recommendation thus leaving auditors at the mercy of management.
As others have pointed out, any dependence on the organisation by assurors could
lead to sensitive issues being ignored in the assurance processes (ODwyer, 2001)
with materiality being defined in narrow terms. The nature of these power relations
and their potential influence on the reporting process need greater in-depth
exploration and also bring us back to our concern for greater stakeholder
involvement and empowerment in assurance. If crucial governance issues and the
intertwining of the very different concepts of accountability and value added
continue to be ignored then current efforts to standardise environmental and social
auditing practice will sow the seeds of their own failure and an ongoing expectations
gap will evolve.
We fully accept that our analysis above, while detailed and comprehensive, is based
on a specific sample, albeit that of recognised leading edge practitioners, and infers
levels of assurance based on statements released externally. In order to examine in
greater depth the complexities and challenges involved within these assurance
31
6.
References
33
Published Papers
No. 01-2003
No. 02-2003
Christine Coupland
Corporate identities on the web: An exercise in the construction and deployment of
morality
No. 03-2003
David L. Owen
Recent developments in European social and environmental reporting and auditing
practice A critical evaluation and tentative prognosis
No. 04-2003
No. 05-2003
No. 06-2003
No. 07-2003
Robert J. Caruana
Morality in consumption: Towards a sociological perspective
No. 08-2003
No. 09-2003
No. 10-2003
No. 11-2003
No. 12-2003
No. 13-2003
No. 14-2003
No. 15-2003
Andrew Crane
In the company of spies: The ethics of industrial espionage
No. 16-2004
No. 17-2004
No. 18-2004
Brendan ODwyer
Stakeholder Democracy: Challenges and Contributions from Accountancy
No. 19-2004
James A. Fitchett
Buyers be Wary: Marketing Stakeholder Values and the Consumer
No. 20-2004
Jeremy Moon
Government as a Driver of Corporate Social Responsibility: The UK in Comparative
Perspective
No. 21-2004
No. 22-2004
Jem Bendell
Flags of inconvenience? The global compact and the future of United Nations
No. 23-2004