Post-Constitutional Analysis

Politics consists mainly of individual and group attempts to obtain the most benefits from government and to pay the least
amount of taxes. According to Buchanan, post-constitutional analysis involves the examination of strategies players adopt
within defined constitutional rules and principles. During the post-constitutional stage players treat the rules of the game as
constraints and devise strategies to deal with them. Today, most government taxation and spending policy is dictated by
pressure groups acting in their own perceived special interests and not by politicians acting in the public interest.
Buchanan distinguishes between the protective state and the productive state which has evolved into the redistributive
state. He says that what we generally consider to be a limited state actually includes more than merely the protective and
judicial services associated with the night watchman stateit also includes the productive state which furnishes public
goods such as roads and schools. The protective state enforces agreed-to rights and the productive state produces collective
goods. The protective state enforces neutral, unanimously agreed upon law. In turn, the productive state may operate
through rules of less than unanimity given that at the constitutional stage those rules find unanimous agreement. Whereas
the protective state functions in an objective fashion to determine rule infractions, the actions of the productive state are
subject to choice. Buchanans economic theory of the origins of law is consistent with the state provision of public goods.
When the protective state was set up, the consenting persons discerned that public goods in the future may be wanted and
that without a productive state many public goods would be unobtainable. The framers realized that there would be
difficulties financing projects because anyone can use such services without contributing financially.
The modern state is transforming into the illiberal and redistributionist state as the productive state does not simply provide
public goods but also intervenes in the private economy by promoting the same ends pursued in the private sector. The
government has taken over many functions previously left to markets. With no meaningful distinction between public and
private interests, people dissatisfied with their results in the private sector will increasingly turn to the public sector.
Coalitions of voters seek special advantages from the state to obtain legislation favorable to them. Buchanan explains that
looking to the government to remedy things can lead to more harm than good.
Much of todays politics can be viewed as rent-seeking activity (e.g., pork barrel politics). A rent-seeking society leads to
the redistributive state that transfers wealth from one party to another through collective action. If there is value to be gained
through the political process, people will invest time and resources in their attempts to capture this value for themselves.
The emergence of the welfare state and the growth of government have increased opportunities for, and rewards of,
redistributive activities. Interest groups in a rent-seeking society will make efforts to gain their own benefits at the expense
of others through the use of government. More and more, individuals are investing in rent-seeking and rent protection.
The Public Choice application of the logic of microeconomics to politics has revealed the prevalence of rent-seeking and
free riding on the part of voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and the recipients of public monies. With costs spread over the
taxpayers at large, individuals with concentrated interests in increased government expenditures (as benefits) take a free ride
on people with diffuse interests in lower taxes. This reflects the logic of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs. Politics
produces a policy mix which affords short term and easily identified benefits at the expense of largely hidden and long term
costs. The resulting cost shifting leads to the overprovision of government goods and services as majority voting rules allow
for many separate coalitions. When factions dominate the voting process, projects tend to be funded that cannot be justified
on an aggregate cost-benefit basis. Value taken in the form of such transfers make the investment wasteful in an overall
sense.