Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Persons Part 1
Persons Part 1
Vincent Juan)
1st EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION
ARTICLE 2
TANADA v TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO
S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have
this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected
or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are
without the requisite legal personality to institute this
mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved
parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
TANADA v TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TA;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET
AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding
the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which
they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as
a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the
decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of these decrees,
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
ARTICLE 3
TANADA v TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985
TANADA v TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986
ZULUETA v ZULUETA
G.R. No. 428, April 30, 1902
MANZANO v SANCHEZ
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, March 8, 2001
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
ROQUE
R.
SANCHEZ,
MTC,
Infanta,
Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two
contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing
marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint
against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal
Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant
Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with
gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May
1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the
late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May
1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City.[1] Four children were born out of that
marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his
Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was
legally married. What he knew was that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years already
without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the late
Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not
to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged
with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to
harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment,
the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be
ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to
manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
thus
disagree.
of
the
legal
profession.
GARCIA-RECIO v RECIO
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
THIRD DIVISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March
1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship
issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina
-- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our
Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In
their application for a marriage license, respondent was
declared as single and Filipino.[8]
Issues
Petitioner
consideration:
submits
the
following
issues
for
our
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree
obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated
his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him
to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized
Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry
constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the
petitioners marriage to the respondent
3
First Issue:
xx
xxx
(5)
If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxx
x
xx
x x x
1.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze
Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is
the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19,
1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate
children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook
Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and
desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat
[Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing,
the probate court, finding among others that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp.
12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the
legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp.
28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of
Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo,
pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and
appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the
intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69;
Rollo, pp. 105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
modifying that of the probate court, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN
YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SYBERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in
Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind
real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth
P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita SyBernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of
letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings
Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition they alleged
among others that (a) they are the children of the deceased
with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died
intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao
Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they
nominate Aida
Sy-Gonzales
for
appointment
as
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [Record
on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that
she had five children with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are
alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan
[TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for
presentation to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support
Sze Sook Wah's application for a marriage license, wherein
Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego
that Sy Kiat told her he has three daughters with his Chinese
wife, two of whomSook Wah and Sze Kai Choshe
knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp.
87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of
Yao Kee with Sy Mat according to the laws of China, they
cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only
that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural
children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao
Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are
acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's
recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension
to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the
full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the
deceased's acknowledged natural children with Asuncion
Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25)
years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their
favor their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a
compromise agreement entered into by and between their
parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on
February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged
them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made
provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law
husband and wife and that out of such relationship, which
they have likewise decided to definitely and finally terminate
effective immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida
Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953;
Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now
deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy,
born on May 7, 1958.
November 1, 1927
MICIANO v BRIMO
G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G.
Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of
partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased,
opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his
participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion
for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4)
the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are
impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the
approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the
deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the
depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph
G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of
his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as
being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among
other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions,
in respect to the order of succession as well as to
the amount of the successional rights and the
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the
nature of the property or the country in which it may
be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said
testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence
FIRST DIVISION
March 30, 2011
Our Ruling
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss
of her right to answer; and her pending petition for
certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the
motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all
suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the
RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of
her right to due process. She was never declared in default,
and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her
interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the
suspension of the period to file an answer and of the
proceedings in the trial court until her petition
for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her
Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said
case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which,
apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to
Dismiss, instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The
filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her
Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the
Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent
Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The
Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order
denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under
Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now
Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period
provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less
than five (5) days computed from service on her of the
aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file
her Answer to the complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita
obviously
misappreciated Macias.
All
we
pronounced therein is that the trial court is mandated to
suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that
is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the
trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of
the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be
raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court
failed to observe due process in the course of the
proceeding of the case because after it denied the wifes
motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the
husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case
with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure,
the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case,
Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the
motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier
granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension
of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its
judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution of
her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently,
before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA
correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari
the
law
law
this
therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the
validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void
marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the
spouses may file the petition to the exclusion of compulsory
or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by
the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured
spouse." If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior
spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this
is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action
if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period
that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the
conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance,
the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is
the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not
only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the
spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat
asunken vessel and in payment of his share of the
expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated
petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated
Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of
P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3,
1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated
reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 2 was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated
in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being
sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days
and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of
P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought
exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for
the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict
of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987
by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3
i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P.
Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the
check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to
the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on
September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing"
check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a
punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a
Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4),
dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa
nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to
guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether
pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for
either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s.
1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981;
Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo,
October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs.
Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589,
s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by
another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12)
almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the
"bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983.
Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular
No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based
on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang
Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill,
i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the
parties and required them thereafter to file simultaneously
their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised
during the oral argument 34 to the effect that the citizenship
qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate
(or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter.
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time
that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is
not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given
retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under
said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to
have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August
17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case,
it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law
should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and
transactions existing even before the law came into being -in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos
possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and
expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law
apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such
law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his
application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law
that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the
part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that
damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or
injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his
repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any
vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
oath of allegiance
Government."
to
the
Philippine
of
Citizenship
Jurisdiction
78
of
the
of
xxx
xxx
ARTICLE III
PERSONS ENTITLED TO RETIREMENT PRIVILEGES
The Case
The Facts
(a) All faculty members and employees who attain the age
of 65 years while employed with the Manuel L. Quezon
Educational Institution, Inc., provided that they have
rendered at least ten (10) years of continuous
service. (Underscoring supplied)
(b) Those who have not attained the age of 65 years, but
who have rendered at least 20 years of continuous service to
the Manuel L. Quezon Educational Institution, Inc. at the
date of retirement.(Underscoring supplied)
(c) This plan does not apply to members of the Board of
Regents, the President, the Executive Officer, and the
Treasurer, whose retirement shall be determined by the
Board of Regents without prejudice to their retirement under
this plan as members of the faculty.
ARTICLE IV
COMPULSORY NATURE OF RETIREMENT
(a) Upon fulfillment of the conditions set forth in paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Article III, retirement of faculty members and
employees concerned shall be compulsory, unless the Board
of Regents expressly and in writing decides to defer their
retirement on a year to year basis or for a definite period.
ARTICLE V
x x x
ARTICLE I PURPOSE
The Board of Regents of the Manuel L. Quezon Educational
Institution, Inc., recognizing the value of long and loyal
service and desiring to reward those who remain in its
employ continuously for a substantial number of
years, approves this Retirement Plan to assist financially its
officers, faculty members and administrative personnel by
providing for their retirement. (Underscoring supplied)
xxx
xxx
The Fallo
SO ORDERED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ATIENZA v BRILLANTES
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29, 1995
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
The Issue
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality
and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco
Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda
De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street,
Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said
The Case
The Facts
The Issues
the
First Issue:
Propriety of Petition with the CA
xxx
xxx
Second Issue:
Propriety of Consolidation
by
by
this
Court
PEOPLE v MORILLA
G.R. No. 189833, February 5, 2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189833
February 5, 2014
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151085
ALLEGED
VICTIM
REGARDING
THE
CIRCUMSTANCES
ATTENDING
THE
COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST
1996.34
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings
of the CA are conclusive on this Court, we are not prevented
from overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if
considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner
stresses that from the testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be
deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain.
Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are
true that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her
vagina, certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions,
wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking
into consideration her age at the time and the alleged size of
petitioner's penis. However, such allegation is completely
belied by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day
after the alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on
AAA and found that there were no signs or indications that
AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA
committed a grave error when it disregarded such medical
report since it disproves the allegation of the existence of
rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its
case; thus, the presumption of innocence in favor of the
petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA,
petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent,
unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. As such, it is
incredible and contrary to human reason that a 13- year-old
boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of AAA,
whose reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be
controlled or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was
MMM's motive in filing the instant case, as she wanted to
extort money from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner
points out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that
the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were
relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period
of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the
medical examination on December 12, 1996, or after the
lapse of eleven (11) days after the alleged incident of rape,
and that AAA's parents only filed the instant case after
almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case
of slander by deed against FFF, it is not inconceivable that
MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and
to depart from the initial confession of AAA that it was
actually BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner submits that
AAA and BBB were merely coached by MMM to fabricate
these stories.35
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends
that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere
reiterations of his disquisitions before the CA; the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the testimonies of both
doctors since despite the absence of abrasions, rape is
consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips
of the female organ; what is relevant in this case is the
reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her in August
and December of 1996; even in the absence of force, rape
was committed considering AAA's age at that time; as such,
VIII
BIDIN, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Virgilio Callanta seeks
the annulment or setting aside of the decision of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
dated September 10, 1991 which reversed the finding of
illegal dismissal and order of reinstatement with backwages
by the Executive Labor Arbiter Zosimo T. Vassalo.
The undisputed fact are as follows:
From June 18, 1986 to December 31, 1986, petitioner was
appointed as sub-agent by respondent company under
supervision of Edgar Rodriguez with specific assignment at
Iligan City and Lanao Province.
In October of 1986, or before the expiration his appointment,
petitioner was promoted to the position of national promoter
salesman of respondent company for Iligan City, Lanao del
Norte and Lanao del Sur (Rollo, p. 29). On 28 April 1987, a
however, a "spot audit" was conducted and petitioner was
found to have a tentative shortage in amount of P49,005.59
(Rollo, p. 30).
1987
LIMPE
Manager
Co.,
Inc.
Dear Sir:
No. 6715 was not yet in force at the time the appeal was
filed. Neither can R.A. No. 6715 be deemed to have
retroactive effect, prospective application of the law being the
rule rather than the exception (Article 4, New Civil Code).
More so in the present case where the law (R.A. No. 6715)
itself did not provide for retroactive application (Inciong vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 185 SCRA 651
[1990]).
Thus, applying the old rules, where perfection of the appeal
involved only "the payment of the appeal fee and the filing of
the position paper containing among others, the assignment
of error/s, the argument/s in support thereof, and the reliefs
sought within the prescribed period" (Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code Book V, Rule I Section 1(s),
there is no doubt that private respondent company's appeal
was duly perfected.
It cannot be denied, however, that upon the effectivity of R.A.
No. 6715, public respondent NLRC ordered private
respondent company to post the additional requirement of
cash bond and immediate reinstatement of the petitioner. By
this time, the appeal of private respondent company has
already been perfected in accordance with the old rules.
Consequently, the latter's failure to timely comply with the
bond requirement cannot be deemed in any way to affect the
perfection of the appeal. Besides, considering the factual
peculiarities of the present petition as above-described,
compliance with the bond requirement, although a
jurisdictional requirement, should be liberally construed to
give way to substantial justice. The same sentiment was
expressed by this Court in the 1990 case of YBL (Your Bus
Line) vs. NRLC (190 SCRA 160), where the factual
background of the case likewise played a vital role in
upholding a liberal interpretation of the rules. In the
aforementioned case, We held:
The Court finds that while Article 223 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 6715, requiring a cash or surety bond
in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from for
the appeal to be perfected, may be
considered a jurisdictional requirement,
nevertheless, adhering to the principle that
substantial justice is better served by
allowing the appeal on the merits threshed
out by the NLRC, the Court finds and so
holds that the foregoing requirement of law
should be given a liberal interpretation.
In rebuffing the contentions of petitioner involving the issue
of immediate execution, public respondent NLRC correctly
ruled that it had no jurisdiction to act upon the motion for writ
of execution. Since it was the labor arbiter who issued the
decision sought to be executed, the motion for execution
should also be filed with the labor arbiter, as explicitly
provided in the New Rules of Procedure of the National
Labor Relations Commission Rule V Section 16 (3) to wit:
1987
Limpe
Co.
Inc.
Balintawak
Sir:
ARTICLE 7
GARCIA v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 165835, June 22, 2005
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 165835
exercise
24
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery
of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25
February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved
therein.80
Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file the petition
for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. However, the
Ombudsmans exercise of the correlative powers to
investigate and initiate the proper action for recovery of illgotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases
for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986.81 As regards such wealth
accumulated on or before said date, the Ombudsman is
without authority to commence before the Sandiganbayan
such forfeiture actionsince the authority to file forfeiture
proceedings on or before 25 February 1986 belongs to the
Solicitor Generalalthough he has the authority to
investigate such cases for forfeiture even before 25 February
1986,
pursuant
to
the
Ombudsmans
general investigatory power under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No.
6770.82
It is obvious then that respondent Office of the Ombudsman
acted well within its authority in conducting the investigation
of petitioners illegally acquired assets and in filing the
petition for forfeiture against him. The contention that the
procedural requirements under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 were
not complied with no longer deserve consideration in view of
the foregoing discussion.
Now to the charge that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping.
Forum-shopping is manifest whenever a party "repetitively
avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues
either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some
other court."83 It has also been defined as "an act of a party
against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in
one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special
civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition."84 Considered a pernicious evil, it
adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since it
clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and
human resources of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks
judicial processes.85 Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is
a ground for summary dismissal of the complaint or initiatory
pleading with prejudice and constitutes direct contempt of
court, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions, which
may both be resolved and imposed in the same case where
the forum-shopping is found.86
CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork for
a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for
its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex
station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of
the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising
agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation
is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners
and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no
fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of
Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the
remedy prayed for. The appellee's insistent assertion of its
claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the
challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of
the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live
controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be
gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal
right on one side and a denial thereof on the other,
concerning a real not a mere theoretical question or
issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are
substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by
the divergence of views on the issue of construction
hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To
the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's proposed
contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold
and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent
to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud
order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted
by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable
litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by
a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of
the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And,
contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long
past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's
"desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of
others" which admittedly does not confer a cause of
action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable
controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into
a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36
Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
July 8, 2003
turnover; and that the fact that it did not complain shows
completion of such turnover.9
Both branches of MeTC-Manila separately ordered
Remington to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable
rent and attorney's fees to YMCA.10
Remington separately appealed both decisions to the
Regional Trial Court, Manila (RTC-Manila). Its appeal from
MeTC-Manila, Branch 20 was docketed as Civil Case No.
01-102435 and assigned to Branch 40, while the appeal from
MeTC-Manila Branch 17 was docketed as Civil Case No. 03107655 and assigned to Branch 25. Branches 40 and 25 of
RTC-Manila separately reversed the respective decisions of
MeTC-Manila and dismissed the two complaints for unlawful
detainer.11 YMCA filed separate motions for
reconsideration12 which were denied.13
YMCA then filed separate petitions for review14 in the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R SP Nos. 74292 and 88599.
On
January
16,
2003,
the
CA
issued
a
Resolution15 dismissing outright the petition for review in CAG.R. SP No. 74292 involving unit 964 on the ground that
William Golangco, the signatory to the Verification and
Certification on Non-Forum Shopping, failed to show his
proof of authority to file the petition for review.
On February 10, 2003, YMCA filed a Motion for
Reconsideration16 therein, appending thereto a Secretary's
Certificate17 dated December 26, 2002 executed by YMCA's
Corporate Secretary attesting to a December 13, 2002
Resolution of the Board of Directors authorizing William
Golangco to prepare and file the petition for review.
On July 29, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution 18 denying
YMCA's motion for reconsideration. Citing Spouses Melo v.
Court of Appeals,19 the CA underscored the mandatory
nature of the requirement that the Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping should be annexed to, or simultaneously filed with
the petition and that subsequent compliance therewith
cannot excuse a party's failure to comply in the first instance.
Hence, the present petition involving only unit 964 anchored
on the following ground:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION RAISED BEFORE IT WHEN IT
FOUND THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO SUBMIT THE
AUTHORITY OF THE AFFIANT WHO SIGNED FOR THE
PETITIONER CORPORATION AND THE SUBSEQUENT
SUBMISSION OF THE SECRETARY'S CERTIFICATE DID
NOT CURE SAID DEFECT IN THE CERTIFICATION
AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.20
YMCA argues that the rules do not require that the filing of
the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
should include therewith the authorization of the person
June 5, 2009
I.
II.
THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON
MISAPPREHENSION
OF
FACTS,
SPECULATIONS,
SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.5
Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the
Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's
Resolution dismissing the cases against petitioners because,
under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch,
investigate and recommend the filing of proper cases against
erring officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute.
They point out that under the Constitution, the power to
prosecute belongs to the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan),
which was intended by the framers to be a separate and
MR. RODRIGO:
MR. COLAYCO:
Yes.
MR. MONSOD:
Yes.
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The
Tanodbayan shall continue to function and exercise
its powers as provided by law."
MR. COLAYCO:
MR. MONSOD:
I agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO:
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the
Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the
legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
xxxx
MR. MONSOD: (reacting
Commissioner Blas Ople):
to
statements
of
xxxx
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal,
we would like to say that we are promoting the concept in its
form at the present, but we are also saying that he can
exercise such powers and functions as may be provided by
law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of
Commissioner Rodrigo. We do not think that at this time we
should prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at some
future time if it feels that it may need to designate what
powers the Ombudsman need in order that he be more
effective.1awphi1 This is not foreclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is
not an irreversible disability.7
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which
subsumed the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman,
was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was explained,
thus:
x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office
of the Special Prosecutor as among the offices under the
Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770 ("An
Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization
of the Office of the Ombudsman and for Other Purposes") is
unconstitutional and void.
The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x
xxxx
x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then
existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of
the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and
exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by
law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman
created under this Constitution." The underscored phrase
the
petition
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 9
SILVERIO v REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
NARVASA, J.:
PAGASIAN v AZURA
A.M. No. RTJ-89-425, April 17, 1990
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-89-425 April 17, 1990