CRIMREV 4D A.Y.

2020-2021 DOCTRINES COMPILATION (MIDTERMS)

MODULE 1:

1 Ient v. Tullett Prebon, G.R. No. 189158, 11 January 2017

• In all criminal prosecutions, the existence of criminal liability for which the accused is made
answerable must be clear and certain.
• Penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.
When there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused.

2 Minucher v. Scalzo, G.R. No. 142396, 11 February 2003

• The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule
of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to
the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by
its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official
capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit
without its consent.

3 Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, 28 January 2000

• Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent enjoys immunity
from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions.

4 Del Socorro v. Van Wilesem, G.R. No. 193707, 10 December 2014

• Considering that respondent is currently living the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s
claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the NCC, applies
to the instant case, which provides that “[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety
shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations.”
5 Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2006
• The Conduct of Unbecoming an Officer is service-connected and therefore cognizable by the
court martial. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged
violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted
authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession.
In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers.
• What the law has conferred the courts should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the
law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or
nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional amendment or
legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts
is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be." Evidently, such declaration
by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and is, therefore, void.

6 People v. Tulin, G.R. No. 111709, 30 August 2001

• Piracy is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. It is likewise, well-settled that
regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole
world

7 People vs. Lol-lo, G.R. No. 17958 27 February 1922

• Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished
in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he
may be carried.

8 People v. Abilong, G.R. No. L-1960, 26 November 1948

• Construction of RPC; Spanish Text Governs over the English Text of the RPC. The Revised
Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, thus the Spanish text governs.
• Destierro; though does not constituting Imprisonment is a deprivation of liberty. It is equally
clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting
imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present
case, the appellant by his sentence of Destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City
of Manila.

9 Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, 5 December 2017

• When exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law
imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to
direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not
so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.
10 People v. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, 29 November 1950
• In order that an exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there
be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the
least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be
a total deprivation of freedom of the will.

11 Ladonga v. People, G.R. No. 141066, 17 February 2005

• In the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which,
by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
• Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime
does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.

12 People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994

• The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of
the former, cannot be invoked where there is:
o (1) a legal or physical impossibility of, or
o (2) a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.

13 People v. Sylvestre & Atienza, G.R. No. 35748, 14 December 1931

• Mere passive presence at the scene of another’s crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation
required by Article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime
witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent.

14 Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, 29 November 2005

• Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is
performed with deliberate intent; furthermore, malice is defined as a mental state or condition
prompting the doing of an overt act WITHOUT legal excuse or justification from which another
suffers injury. When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been
done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional. For one to
be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an
evil intent.
15 People v. Puno, G.R. No. 97471, 17 February 1993
• In the determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances
where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard
to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in
perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation
and accurate conclusion thereon.

16 People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, 28 January 2003

• Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific
intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. What is primordial
then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal
complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with — that of murder or
kidnapping.

17 US v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. 5272, 19 March 1910

• Ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in
larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a
conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under
the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor
incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from
that which he intended to commit.

18 People v. Oanis, G.R. No. 47722, 27 July 1943

• The theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact or the maxim ignorantia facti
excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the
instant case, appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and
opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a
bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was
unarmed.

19 Padilla v. Dizon, A.C. No. 3086, 23 February 1988

• Proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses published by special
laws, which are mala prohibita.
20 Magno v. CA, G.R. No. 96132, 26 June 1992
• In cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law has been violated, proof
of criminal intent is not necessary for the conviction of the accused, The acts being prohibited
for reason of public policy and the defense of good faith and absence of criminal intent being
unveiling in prosecution of said offense.

21 Garcia v. CA, G.R. No. 157171, 14 March 2006

• Mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished
by a special law. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are
not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden.

22 People v. Pugay, G.R. No. L-74324, 17 November 1988

• If his act resulted into a graver offense, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the
aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.

23 Ivler v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, 17 November 2010

• Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are
Material Only to Determine the Penalty. Hence, it is held that prosecutions under Article 365
should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences.

24 People v. Guillen, G.R. No. L-1477, 18 January 1950

• In accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any
person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. In the words of Viada, "in
order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention
to cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the
felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause
an evil of such gravity as that produced. And, as held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do
an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such
unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be
considered as reckless imprudence.
25 People v. Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, 15 July 2015
• One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of
the rule is found in the doctrine, ‘el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado’, or
he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.

26 People v. Sabalones, G.R. No. 123485, 31 August 1998

• Mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in
on his intended victim.

27 People v. Albuquerque, G.R. No. 38773, 19 December 1933

• Mitigating Circumstances.—The following are mitigating circumstances:
o “3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.”
• Article 49, Revised Penal Code Penalty to Be Imposed Upon the Principals When the Crime
Committed is Different from that Intended. — In cases in which the felony committed is
different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be
observed:
o 1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding
to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the
latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.
o 2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding
to the one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
o 3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the
acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of
another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in
which case the penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated crime shall be
imposed in its maximum period.

28 Bataclan v. Medina, G.R. No. L-10126, 22 October 1957

• Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
29 Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, 7 January 1988
• Proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

30 Intod v. CA, G.R. No. 103119, 21 October 1992

• Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself.

31 Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, 13 July 2009

• Impossible Crime – Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be
incurred: By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate to ineffectual means.
MODULE 2:

1 US v. Eduave, G.R. No. 12155, 2 February 1917

• In case of frustrated crimes the subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the crime
is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjective
phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If
the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond his control.

2 Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, 25 January 2006

• When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is in the
attempted stage. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct
or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of
a felony by dolo.

3 Baleros v. People, G.R. No. 138033, 22 February 2006

• Under Article 6, in relation to the Article 335 of the RPC (rape), rape is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all
the acts of execution which should produce the crim of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Expounding on the nature of an
attempted felony, the Court stated that “the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that
which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of
an execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator; leading directly to its realization
and consummation.” Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation
of the cause and effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not
certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, when what
obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the
standpoint of the Penal code.

4 Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, 21 June 2007

• In theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of
the thing with intent to appropriate the same , although his act of making use of the thing was
frustrated.

5 People v. Dio, G.R. No. L-36461, 29 June 1984

• There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
6 People v. Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163, 26 April 1990
• From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no
opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete. The crime is
consummated when the robber acquires possession of the property, even if for a short time,
and it is not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he
should have actually carried the property away, out of the physical presence of the lawful
possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it.

7 People v. Lamahang, G.R. No. L-43530, 3 August 1935

• The attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical
relation to a particular, concrete offense. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense,
inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the
standpoint of the Penal Code.

8 People v. Borinaga, G.R. No. 33463, 18 December 1930

• The essential condition of a frustrated crime, that the author perform all the acts of execution,
attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work of the assailant
completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces
independent of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from further acts.
What is known as the subjective phase of the criminal act was passed.

9 People v. Kalalo, G.R. No. 39303-05, 17 March 1934

• It is true that under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines murder, the
circumstance of "abuse of superior strength", if proven to have been presented, raises
homicide to the category of murder; but this court is of the opinion that said circumstance may
not properly be taken into consideration in the two cases at bar, either as a qualifying or as a
generic circumstance, if it is borne in mind that the deceased were also armed, one of them
with a bolo, and the other with a revolver. The risk was even for the contending parties and
their strength was almost balanced because there is no doubt but that, under circumstances
similar to those of the present case, a revolver is as effective as, if not more than three bolos.
For this reason, this court is of the opinion that the acts established in cases Nos. 6858 and
6859 (G.R. Nos. L-39303 and 39304, respectively), merely constitute two homicides, with no
modifying circumstance to be taken into consideration because none has been proved.
10 People v. Trinidad, G.R. No. 79123-25, 9 January 1989
• When the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only
Attempted Murder, because the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that
would have brought about death.

11 Martinez v. CA, G.R. No. 168827, 13 April 2007

• A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should
result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the subjective phase in the
commission of the crime.

12 Mondragon v. People, G.R. No. L-17666, 30 June 1966

• The intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide,
said element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. That element must be proved
with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The
inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to
prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.

13 People v. Sy Pio, G.R. No. L-5848, 30 April 1954

• It is not necessary that the accused actually commit all the acts of execution necessary to
produce the death of his victim, that it is sufficient that he believes that he has committed all
said acts. In these cases, the court held that the crimes committed were frustrated murder,
because there was full and complete belief on the part of the assailant that he had committed
all the acts of execution necessary to produce the death of the intended victim.

14 People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, 3 April 1990

• The SC have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the
labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is
sufficient to warrant conviction.

15 People v. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, 30 March 2000

• Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all
the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
16 US v. Valdes, G.R. No. L-14128, 10 December 1918
• The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the
acts conceive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes independent
of his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot
be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house, for the reason
that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and
the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition
might have started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.

17 Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, 1 July 2015

• Generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.
Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal
conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing,
unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.

18 People v. Aguilos, G.R. No. 121828, 27 June 2003

• There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy may be implied it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined
acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. There may be
conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders, and even
though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme
from the beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it. One
who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his
coconspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the
act of one would be the act of all.
19 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, G.R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016
• Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. In this jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a
crime in itself or a mere means to commit a crime.
• As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and prescribes a
penalty for it. The exception is exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit
treason), Article 136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection)
and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit sedition) of the Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy
is a means to commit a crime, it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime
among all the conspirators, or their community of criminal design must be alleged and
competently shown.

20 People v. Bokingco, G.R. No. 187536, 10 August 2011

• Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful
act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or
common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. Unity of purpose
and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of
conspiracy.
MODULE 3:

1 Manaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150723, 11 July 2006

• Unlawful Aggression is an Indispensable Requisite of Self-Defense. When the accused
invokes self-defense, he in effect admits killing the victim and the burden is shifted to him to
prove that he killed the victim to save his life.

2 Senoja v. People, G.R. No. 160341, 19 October 2004

• It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a
real threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided in imminent and actual, not
merely imaginary.

3 People v. Decena, G.R. No. 107874, 4 August 1994

• The basic requirement for self-defense, as a justifying circumstance, is that there was an
unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. It must be positively shown that
there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the life of the accused in
danger and forced him to inflict more or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing
therefor reasonable means to resist said attack.

4 People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 128359, 6 December 2000

• When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the
killing has been legally justified.
• Self-defense requires that there be:
o (1) An unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed by the offender,
o (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful
aggression, and
o (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
• All these conditions must concur.

5 People v. Jaurigue, G.R. No. 384, 21 February 1946

• The attempt to rape constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put a person in a state of
legitimate defense. To be entitled to self-defense of chastity, there should have an actual
danger of being raped.

6 People v. Ricohermoso, G.R. No. L-30527-28, 29 March 1974

• Justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or injury cannot be applied if it was clear
that accused acted in conspiracy and did not avoid a greater evil but insured the execution of
the crime.
7 People v. Norma Hernandez, CA-G.R. No. 22553-R, 14 April 1959
• A party to an agreement to marry who backs out cannot be held liable for the crime of slander
by deed, for then that would be an inherent way of compelling said party to go into a marriage
without his or her free consent. The said party has the right to avoid to himself or herself the
evil of going through a loveless marriage pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code.

8 People v. Delima, G.R. No. L-18660, 22 December 1922

• Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime, and
he is hereby acquitted with the costs de oficio. The deceased was under the obligation to
surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and
disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an
extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances.

9 People v. Lagata, G.R. No. L-1940-42, 24 March 1949

• Should necessity dictates, the custodians of prisoners would be authorized to fire against the
prisoners. It must be for self-defense or absolutely necessary to avoid escape. They shoulder
the burden of proof as to such necessity.

10 Mamangun v. People, G.R. No. 149152, 2 February 2007

• The most important element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim to justify a claim
of self defense was absent. Lacking this essential and primary element of unlawful aggression,
petitioner’s plea of self-defense, complete or incomplete, must have to fail.

11 People v. Dagani, G.R. No. 153875, 16 August 2006

• Two requisites must concur before this defense can prosper:
o (1) The accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right or office; and
o (2) The injury caused or the offense committed should have been the necessary
consequence of such lawful exercise.

12 People v. Beronilla, G.R. No. L-4445, 28 February 1955

• Actus Non Facit Reum, Nisi Mens Sit Rea: Crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of to be innocent. The accused acted upon orders of their
superior officers, which as military subordinates, they could not question and obeyed in good
faith without being aware of its illegality.
13 Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103501-03, 17 February 1997
• It is settled that this is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation for it would negate
criminal intent on the part of the accused. To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain
crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or
indifference to duty or to consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent.
• A crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is
innocent. Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of
malversation.

14 People v. Taneo, G.R. No. L-37673, 31 March 1933

• The defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were not
voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.

15 People v. Bonoan, G.R. No. L-45130, 17 February 1937

• In determining insanity the court looks upon pertinent facts that will indicate the actual state
of mind of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime such as the recent medical
condition of the accused.

16 People v. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, 29 November 1950

• In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely
of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.

17 People v. Puno, G.R. No. L-33211, 29 June 1981

• Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code states that insanity means that the accused must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing
the crime. Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and helpless victim.

18 People v. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991

• Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. Generally, in
criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However, in the defense of
insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in favor of sanity. The burden of
proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense.
19 People v. Rafanan, G.R. No. L-54135, 21 November 1991
• In order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there
be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is:
o that the accused be deprived of reason;
o that there be no responsibility for his own acts;
o that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the
power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
• For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the
act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. The Supreme Court of Spain
likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated with] imbecility or insanity.
• The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that
the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented a few moments prior to or
during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition.

20 People v. Madarang, G.R. No. 132319, 12 May 2000

• Evidence of insanity after the fact may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of
abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to commission of crime. Appellant
failed to establish convincing evidence of alleged insanity at the time of killing his wife.

21 People v. Robios, G.R. No. 138453, 29 May 2002

• Insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the offense, or the accused must
have been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would still be criminally responsible.
Verily, his alleged insanity should have pertained to the period prior to or at the precise
moment when the criminal act was committed, not at anytime thereafter. Indeed, when
insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence must
refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.
If the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused
cannot be acquitted.
22 People v. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, 17 March 2004
• He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it, for
insanity as a defense is in the nature of confession and avoidance. An accused invoking
insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he is
insane. The testimony or proof of an accused’s insanity must, however, relate to the time
immediately preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is
charged. It is, therefore, incumbent upon accused’s counsel to prove that his client was not in
his right mind or was under the influence of a sudden attack of inanity immediately before or
at the time he executed the act attributed to him.

23 Verdadero v. People, G.R. No. 216021, 2 March 2016

• Generally, evidence of insanity after the commission of the crime is immaterial. It, however,
may be appreciated and given weight if there is also proof of abnormal behavior before or
simultaneous to the crime.

24 People v. Genosa, 341 SCRA 493, 419 SCRA 537

• The battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which
has three phases:
o (1) the tension-building phase;
o (2) the acute battering incident; and
o (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
• Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as
the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an
argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because
the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from
the assailant.
• Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor
must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party
attacked.
25 People v. Doqueña, G.R. No. 46539, 27 September 1939, 68 Phil. 580
• The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a
minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his
mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may
be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude,
the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission
of the act, but also after and even during the trial.

26 Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, 20 August 2008

• For one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a
crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or
voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. By virtue of the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344), the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to
15 years old.

27 People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, 20 July 2011

• The presence of privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, can reduce the penalty by one
or two degrees, or even more.

28 Samahan Ng Mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City. G.R. No. 225442, 8 August 2017
• The disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not
penalties as they are not punitive in nature and are generally less intrusive on the rights and
conduct of the minor. Their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for
the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
• A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or
imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as
"a severe or formal reproof." The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service and Philippine jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty, hence,
prohibited by Sec. 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
29 US v. Tañedo, G.R. No. L-5418, 12 February 1910
• If life is taken by misfortune or accident while the actor is in the performance of a lawful act
executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability.
• When the accused, under the plea of accidental killing, offers testimony tending to prove the
substance of his plea, the burden is upon the State to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the killing was intentional.

30 People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, 29 June 2007

• "Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence. The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance are:
o (1) a person is performing a lawful act
o (2) with due care;
o (3) he causes and injury to another by mere accident
o (4) without fault or intention of causing it.
• In the case at bar, defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof.
MODULE 4:

1 People v. Jaurigue, G.R. No. 384, 21 February 1946

• The Immediate and voluntary and unconditional surrender to the barrio lieutenant, admission of
having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and agreeing to go to her house
shortly thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, and the
further fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against
her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation,
or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be considered as mitigating circumstances.

2 People v. Narvaez, G.R. No. L-33466-67, 20 April 1983

• Pursuant to Article 69, the penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is
not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same
or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided
that the majority of such conditions be present.

3 People v. Ulep, G.R. No. 132547, 20 September 2000

• Justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11(5) of the Revised Penal Code to
be successfully invoked two requisites must be proved: (1) he acted in the performance of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office and (2) that the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise
of such right or office. There is an incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty which
is deemed as special or privileged mitigating circumstance. Such circumstance reduces the
penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law in accordance to Article 69 of the RPC.

4 Guillermo v. People, G.R. No. 153287, 20 January 2009

• Elements of self-defense are enumerated under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code which
states that anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur: (1)Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. Where only one element that is "reasonable means” is lacking one is entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. Consequently, the penalty may be
lowered by one or two degrees, at the discretion of the court.

5 People v. Ural, G.R. No. L-30801, 27 March 1974

• Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is a mitigating circumstance. It should be manifest from
the proven facts that the accused had no intent to commit so grave a wrong.
6 People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 139542, 21 June 2001
• The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is obtaining when there
is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the
resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime
is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed, and the injury sustained by
the victim.
• Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the
provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed.

7 People v. Pagal, G.R. No. L-32040, 25 October 1977

• The aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed with insult or in disregard of the
respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age or sex may be taken into account only
in crimes against persons or honor, when in the commission of the crime there is some insult or
disrespect shown to rank, age, or sex.

8 Urbano v. People, G.R. No. 182750, 20 January 2009

• While intent to kill may be presumed from the fact of the death of the victim, the mitigating factor
of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed may still be considered when
attendant facts and circumstances so warrant.

9 People v. Benito, G.R. No. L-32042, 13 February 1975

• Grave offense must be directed to the accused.
• The OSG said that the defamatory remark was not specifically directed at Benito. The SC said
that even assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, Benito "had more than
sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it.” The six-hour
interval between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo against Benito and the
assassination was more than sufficient to enable Benito to recover his serenity. But instead of
using that time to regain his composure, he evolved the plan of liquidating Moncayo.

10 Bacabac v. People, G.R. No. 149372, 11 September 2007

• For such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the act should be, following Article 13, paragraph
5 of the Revised Penal Code, “committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the
one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or
adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree.
11 People v. Gelaver, G.R. No. 95357, 9 June 1993
• It is necessary to establish the existence of an unlawful act sufficient to produce such a condition
of mind. The act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might have recovered his
equanimity.

12 People v. Bello, G.R. No. L-18792, 28 February 1964

• MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; PASSION AND OBFUSCATION. — The accused’s insistence
that his common law wife abandon her work as hostess and live with him again, and his rage at
her rejection of the proposal, cannot be properly termed as arising from immoral and unworthy
passions, and therefore the accused in the case at bar can be given the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of having acted on a provocation sufficiently strong to produce passion and
obfuscation.

13 People v. Amaguin, G.R. Nos. 54344-45, 10 January 1994

• For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements
must be present:
o (a) the offender has not been actually arrested;
o (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and
o (c) the surrender must be voluntary

14 People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. L-45284, 29 December 1936

• Plea of guilty does not become a mitigating circumstance when it is not spontaneous and not
made prior to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution.

15 Canta v. People, G.R. No. 140937, 28 February 2001

• The circumstance of voluntary surrender has the following elements:
o (1) the offender has not actually been arrested;
o (2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and
o (3) the surrender is voluntary.
• It has been repeatedly held that for surrender to be voluntary, there must be an intent to submit
oneself unconditionally to the authorities, showing an intention to save the authorities the trouble
and expense that his search and capture would require. In petitioner's case, he voluntarily took
the cow to the municipal hall of Padre Burgos to place it unconditionally in the custody of the
authorities and thus saved them the trouble of having to recover the cow from him. This
circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender and should be considered in
favor of petitioner.
16 People v. Legaspi, G.R. Nos. 136164-65, 20 April 2001
• For insanity to be considered, Paragraph 1, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code requires a
complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act, i.e., that the accused be deprived of
reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete
absence of the power to discern.
• The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved, however, for there is a presumption
that acts penalized by law are voluntary.

17 People v. Capalac, G.R. No. L-38297, 23 October 1982

• 1. The mere fact that appellant Mario is a member of the police force did not by itself justify the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public office/position.
• 2a. There was conspiracy since the two brothers, as well as their 2 companions, apparently had
one purpose in mind, to avenge the stabbing of Moises. They all acted in concert.
• 2b. There was treachery since the crime was committed to ensure that Jimmy would die. His
situation was hopeless. Any defense he could have put up would be futile and unavailing.
• 2c. There is no evident premeditation. The brothers were prompted by their desire to avenge
Moises. They went after Jimmy, assaulted him, and relied on the weapons that they carried. There
was no evidence that they deliberately employed means to add ignominy to the natural effects of
the act.
• 2d. There is mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication since the purpose of the crime was
to vindicate the stabbing of Moises by Jimmy.

18 People v. Gapasin, G.R. No. 73489, 25 April 1994

• Voluntary surrender may be considered in appellant's favor but this is offset by the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of public position. Therefore, only the generic aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation may be appreciated against appellant. As such, the correct
penalty would have been death in accordance with Articles 248 and 64(3) of the Revised Penal
Code were it not for the fact that such penalty is constitutionally abhorrent.

19 People v. Tiongson, G.R. No. L-35123-24, 25 July 1984

• The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act of killing a human being must be proved in
an evident and incontestable manner, mere presumptions or deductions from hypothetical facts
not being sufficient to consider them justified.
20 People v. Magdueño, G.R. No. L-68699, 22 September 1986
• The aggravating circumstance of insult to public authority to be considered it must not only be
shown that the crime was committed in the presence of the public authority but also that the crime
was not committed against the public authority himself.

21 People v. Tac-an, G.R. Nos. 76338-89, 26 February 1990.

• Utterances cannot be regarded as the unlawful aggression which is the first and most fundamental
requirement of self-defense, and such statements could not reasonably inspire the “well-grounded
and reasonable belief” claimed by Renato that “he was in imminent danger of death or bodily
harm.”

22 People v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-24002, 21 January 1974.

• There is treachery (alevosia) is there was deliberate surprise or assault to the victim.
• There is abuse of superior strength, if Two armed young men unexpectedly assaulted an unarmed
sexagenarian. However, it is absorbed by treachery.
• For old age to be appreciated the accused must deliberately offend or insult the age of the victim.
• Evident premeditation, “sufficient interval of time, more than one-half day”.

23 People v. Arizobal, G.R. No. 135051-52, 14 December 2000

• Generally, dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only be committed in the abode
of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery
with homicide the authors thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity
of the victim's domicile. Thus it can be appreciated as aggravating circumstance.

24 People v. Daniel, G.R. No. L-40330, 20 November 1978

• In the aggravating circumstance of a crime having been committed in a dwelling, it is not
necessary that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or
a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.

25 People v. Apduhan, G.R. No. L-19491, 30 August 1968

• The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons,
like the offense at bar. The rationale behind this pronouncement is that this class of robbery could
be committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. Morada is inherent
only in crimes which could be committed in no other place than in the house of another, such as
trespass and robbery in an inhabited house.
26 People v. Mandolado, G.R. No. L-51304-05, 28 June 1983
• In order that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary that “there exists a
relation of trust and confidence between the accused and one against whom the crime was
committed and the accused made use of such a relationship to commit the crime.

27 People v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-30449, 31 October 1979

• Qualifying circumstances should be alleged in the Information to be considered in the trial.
• The information alleges that the crime of murder was attended by the two qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Neither of these qualifying circumstances
was proved; hence, the killing cannot be qualified into murder, and constitutes instead the crime
of homicide.
• It is not controverted that the accused voluntarily surrendered to the authorities; they are therefore
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. This lone mitigating circumstance
offset by the two generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of superiority and nocturnity,
produces the result that in the crime of homicide, one aggravating circumstance remains.

28 People v. Rodas, G.R. No. 175881, 28 August 2007

• Nocturnity - this circumstance is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the commission
of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of
impunity.
• Abuse of Superior Strength - What should be considered is not that there were three, four, or
more assailants as against one victim, but whether the aggressors took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the offense. The glaring disparity of strength should
be considered.

29 People v. Damaso, G.R. No. L-30116, 20 November 1978

• The aggravating circumstance of a band exists whenever more than three armed malefactors act
together in the commission of an offense. It is immaterial what kind of firearm was carried.
• Treachery is present if the victim is killed while bound in such a manner as to be deprived of the
opportunity to repel the attack or escape with any possibility of success.
• The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the
scene of the crime, but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility
of the victim receiving some help.
30 People v. Baldera, G.R. No. L-2390, 24 April 1950
• Where one of several codefendants turns state's evidence on a promise of immunity but later
retracts and fails to keep his part of the agreement, his confession made under such promise may
then be used against him.
• In the crime of robbery with homicide it is not essential that the robbery be in band, although that
circumstance may be taken into account as an aggravation in the imposition of the penalty.

31 People v. Melendrez, G.R. No. 39913, 19 December 1933

• The aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account in imposing the principal
penalty in its corresponding degree, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant is also sentenced
to suffer an additional penalty as a habitual delinquent.

32 US v. Manalinde, G.R. No. 5292, 28 August 1909

• Requisites of evident premeditation:
o 1. The time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
o 2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and
o 3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution (to allow him to
reflect on its consequences).

33 People v. Ilaoa, G.R. No. 94308, 16 June 1994

• Cruelty is inflicting unnecessary physical and moral pain for pleasure and satisfaction, causing
the victim to suffer slowly and painfully. Number of wounds alone is not the criterion for the
appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance. Neither can it be inferred from the mere
fact that the victim’s dead body was dismembered. Evident Premeditation is the result of
meditation, calculation or resolution.

34 People v. Bibat, G.R. No. 124319, 13 May 1998

• There is evident premeditation when the following requisites are met:
o 1. The time when the offender determined (conceived) to commit the crime;
o 2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and
o 3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.
• The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought
and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient
to arrive at a calm judgment. As held in the case of People v. Dumdum, the killing of the deceased
was aggravated by evident premeditation, because the accused conceived of the assault at least
one hour before its perpetration.
35 People v. Empacis, G.R. No. 95756, 14 May 1993
• The aggravating circumstance of craft or fraud was properly appreciated when the offenders
pretend to be bona fide customers of the victim's store and on his pretext gained entry into the
latter's store and later, into another part of his dwelling.
• Nighttime is not per se aggravating. It must be shown that nocturnity was deliberately and
purposely sought to facilitate, or that it actually facilitated, the commission of the crime.
• For the aggravating circumstance of superior strength to be deemed present in a case, it does
not suffice to prove superiority in number on the part of the malefactors; it must appear that they
purposely employed excessive force, force out of proportion to the means of defense available to
the person attacked.

36 People v. Bigcas, G.R. No. 94534, 2 July 1992

• It is not sufficient that there be superiority in number or strength; it is necessary that the accused
must have cooperated and intended to use or secure advantage from such superior strength
testimony insufficient.

37 People v. Sangalang, G.R. No. L-32914, 30 August 1974

• There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

38 People v. San Pedro, G.R. No. L-44274, 22 January 1980

• The aggravating circumstance of Treachery applies when the victim did not have a chance to
defend himself at the time of the crime. The circumstance of Craft, on the other hand, is intellectual
trickery to lure the victim. Therefore, these two aggravating circumstances are separate for this
case and cannot be combined into one. With the presence of two aggravating circumstances, the
single mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction will not make any difference.

39 People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 120282, 20 April 1998

• For evident premeditation be be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the
crime itself, of the following elements:
o 1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime,
o 2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and
o 3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself time to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.
40 People v. Arizobal, G.R. No. 135051-52, 14 December 2000
• The fact that the offense was committed at 9:30 in the evening does not suffice to sustain
nocturnidad for, by itself, nighttime is not an aggavating circumstance. To be properly so
considered, it must be shown that nocturnidad was deliberately and intentionally sought by
accused-appellants to help them realize their evil intentions.

41 People v. Escote, G.R. No. 140756, 4 April 2003

• Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the information, treachery cannot aggravate the
penalty for the crime.

42 People v. Villonez, G.R. Nos. 122976-77, 16 November 1998

• Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person.
What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate.

43 People v. Guzman, G.R. No. 169246, 26 January 2007

• Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under the circumstances that renders the victim
unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack.
It is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person to murder.
• Two essential elements/conditions are required in order that treachery may be appreciated: The
employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender’s safety
from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus no opportunity for self-
defense or retaliation; deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods or manner of execution.
Further, it must always be alleged in the information and proved in trial in order that it may be
validly considered.
• On the other hand, the essence of evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance is that
the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution
to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. It
implies a deliberate planning of the crime before executing it. It must also be shown how and
when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out. Further, there
must be proof that the accused meditated and reflected on his intention between the time when
the crime was conceived by him and the time it was actually perpetrated.

44 People v. Torriefel CA-GR. No. 659-R, 29 November 1947

• Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to
the material injury caused by the crime. This aggravating circumstance is applicable when the
crime committed is against chastity.
45 People v. Jose, G.R. No. L-28232, 6 February 1971
• As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes
committed, and the latter is the more serious; hence, pursuant to the provision of Art 48 of the
RPC, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the
appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity
to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature
of the penalty to be imposed.

46 People v. Butler, G.R. No. L-50276, 27 January 1983

• 1.) To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attached. This circumstance should
always be considered whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between the aggressor,
assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. To property appreciate it,
not only is it necessary to evaluate the physical conditions of the protagonists or opposing forces
and the arms or objects employed by both sides, but it is also necessary to analyze the incidents
and episodes constituting the total development of the event.
• 2.) The rule is that a generic aggravating circumstance not alleged in the information may be
proven during the trial over the objection of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the
penalty.

47 People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 132470, 27 April 2000

• In the recent case of People v. Regala, the Court held that the additional rapes committed should
not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance despite a resultant "anomalous situation"
wherein robbery with rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes in terms of
gravity. The Court realized that there was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s
for that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance.
• Enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive,
unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code which enumerates the mitigating circumstances where
analogous circumstances may be considered.
48 People v. Atop, G.R. No. 124303-05, 10 February 1998
• Relationship as an alternative aggravating circumstance under Art. 15 of the RPC encompasses
only the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, and
relative by affinity in the same degrees. Outside these enumerations and consistent with the
doctrine that criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused, no relationship,
kinship or association between the offender and the victim may aggravate the imposable penalty
for the crime committed.

49 US v. McMann, G.R. No. L-2229, 1 July 1905, 4 Phil. 561

• Whatever the cause may have been it is not absolutely necessary for us to find a motive. Motive
is only important as to doubt whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed the act.
• The question of motive is of course very important in cases where there is doubt as to whether
the defendant is or is not the person who committed the act, but in this case, where it is proved
beyond all doubt that the defendant was the one who caused the death of McKay, it is not so
important to know the exact reason for the deed.

50 People v. San Pedro, G.R. No. L-44274, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 306
• Lack of instruction is not applicable to crimes of theft and robbery, much less to the crime of
homicide. The reason is that robbery and killing are, by their nature, wrongful acts, and are
manifestly so to the enlightened, equally as to the ignorant.
MODULE 5:

1 People v. Yanson-Dumancas, G.R. No. 133527-28, 13 December 1999, 320 SCRA 584
• In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the following must be present:
(1) the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime, and (2)
such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor. To
constitute inducement, there must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and
the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation
to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation to commit the crime.

2 People v. Maluenda, G.R. No. 115351, 27 March 1998

• Legarto may not have had a direct hand in the kidnapping, but he received part of the ransom
and used it to pay off his arrears in his motorcycle loan. Thus, having knowledge of the kidnapping
for ransom and without having directly participated therein, he took part in the crime subsequent
to its commission by promoting from its effects. He may not be the devil with the face of an angel
that the trial court described, but he is definitely not a saint. He is criminally liable as an accessory
to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, accessories
are defined as those who (1) have knowledge of the commission of the crime, (2) did not take
part in its commission as principal or accomplice, but (3) took part in its subsequent to its
commission by any of the three modes enumerated in this article, one of which is by profiting or
by assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the crime. These elements are all present
and proven in Legarto's case.

3 People v. Montealegre, G.R. No. L-67948, 31 May 1988

• Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not
have been accomplished are considered as principals.
• Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can be inferred from the acts of the
appellants. It is enough that, at the time the offense was committed, participants had the same
purpose and were united in its execution; as may be inferred from the attendant circumstances.

4 People v. Madali, G.R. No. L-67803, 30 July 1990

• The penalty for frustrated murder in accordance with Article 50 in relation to Article 248 is prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period.
5 Abejuela v. People, G.R. No. 80130, 19 August 1991
• Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal is essential in order that someone can be
convicted as an accomplice in the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document. To
be convicted as an accomplice, there must be cooperation in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts. The cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance
rendered knowingly or intentionally, which assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior
cognizance of the offense intended to be committed.

6 People v. Doble, G.R. No. L-30028, 31 May 1982

• Defendants-appellants are only liable as accomplices when it is not established by evidence that
they all agreed to kill and not just rob.

7 People v. De Vera, G.R. No. 128966, 18 August 1999

• Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being included in Article
17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts." The Court has
held that an accomplice is "one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates
knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be
committed just the same." To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be
present: (1) the "community" of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;" and (2) the performance of
previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
• The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of its effect on
appellant's penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and not individual. The
act of one of them is deemed the act of all. In the case of an accomplice, the liability is one degree
lower than that of a principal.

8 Garces v. People, G.R. No. 173858, 17 July 2007

• The two elements necessary to hold petitioner liable as an accomplice are present: (1) community
of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose; and (2) performance of previous or simultaneous acts that
are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
• Since simple rape is punishable with reclusion perpetua, the penalty of reclusion temporal should
also be imposed on petitioner in its medium period in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty should range
from prision mayor, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
9 People v. Talingdan, G.R. No. L-32126, 6 July 1978, 84 SCRA 19
• Whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her attitude
regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was
killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute
"concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an
accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.

10 Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, 11 July 1994

• Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article,
item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact
that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is
reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her
possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the
presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law.
• The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on the
testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary,
even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she
used to buy from a certain Fredo.

11 People v. Tabaco, G.R. No. 100382, 19 March 1997

• When various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes.

12 People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 127663, 11 March 1999

• Complex Crimes; Where there was more than one gunman and several victims, each act by each
gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different
persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime of
multiple murder.

13 People v. Sanchez, G.R No. 131116, 27 August 1999

• The act of shooting the victims using armalites in automatic firing mode does not constitute a
single act and, thus, the felonies resulting therefrom are not considered as complex crimes.
• It is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be considered as producing the several
felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them.
14 People v. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500, 11 September 2012
• Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular
moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a
complex crime.

15 People vs. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26, 18 July 1956

• The murders, arsons and robberies described in the information are mere ingredients of the crime
of rebellion. They merely means “necessary” for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; thus
the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not
the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies.

16 Enrile vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, 5 June 1990

• Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission
or as an intended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

17 Batulanon v. People, G.R. No. 139857, 15 September 2006

• Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial
document, appellant could be convicted of falsification of private document under the well-settled
rule that it is the allegations in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not
the technical name given in the preamble of the information.

18 People v. Madrigal-Gonzales, G.R. No. L-16688, 30 April 1963

• Continuing crime is a single crime consisting of a series of acts but all rising from one criminal
resolution. It is continuous, unlawful acts set on foot by single impulse and operated by an
intermittent force, however long a lime it may occupy.

19 People v. Mallari, G.R. No. L-58886, 13 December 1988

• A comparison of the Informations filed in the two cases under consideration as well as the findings
of facts of the appellate court tells us that they refer to the same series of acts. These series of
acts amount to what is known in law as a continued, continuous or continuing offense. A continued
crime is a single crime consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. It
is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an
unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. Although there are series of acts, there
is only one crime committed. Hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.
20 Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993
• For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time;
unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or
more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution
leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.