Case Doctrines

Preliminary Considerations
1. Tanada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
Fact that a Presidential Decree or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their
publication in the Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the
present situation where the President may on his own issue laws.—The clear object of the above-
quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
2. Tanada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen- day period shall be shortened or extended. All statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws
and not to the requirement of publication. The prior publication of laws before they become
effective cannot be dispensed with
3. Philsa vs. CA, G.R. No. 103144, 4 April 2001
An Administrative Circular that was never filed with the National Administrative Register cannot
be used as basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions. The fact that POEA
Administrative Circular No. 2 is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment
agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of the ruling in Tañada v.
Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, which is clear and categorical—administrative rules and regulations must
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation
4. Unciano Paramedical vs. CA, G.R. No. 100335, April 07, 1993
When a doctrine of the court is overruled, new doctrine is applied prospectively. Settled is the
rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof
5. Cui vs. Arellano University, G.R. No. L-15127, May 30, 1961
In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as
to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is
inconsistent with sound policy and good morals, or tends clearly to undermine the security of
individual rights.
The stipulation in a contract, between a student and the school, that the student’s
scholarship is good only if he continues in the same school, and that he waives his right to
transfer to another school without refunding the equivalent of his scholarship in cash is contrary
to public policy and, hence, null and void because scholarships are awarded in recognition of
merit and to help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien, and
not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige and increase its business
potential.
6. People vs. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, 27 February 1974
The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim “legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet”—the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law.
When a doctrine ofthis Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
7. Van Dorn vs. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985
A divorce decree granted by a U.S. Court between a Filipina and her American husband is
binding on the American husband.—There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as
an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in
any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and
binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law.
An American granted absolute divorce in his country with his Filipina wife is estopped from
asserting his rights over property allegedly held in the Philippines as conjugal property by him
and his former wife. —Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over
the alleged conjugal property.
8. Quita vs. CA, G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law; Once proved that a wife was no longer a Filipino citizen
at the time of her divorce from her husband, then she could very well lose her right to inherit
from the latter. — Then in private respondent’s motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower
court’s decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the
ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed
therefore that the case be set for hearing. Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely
address the issue on her citizenship. The trial court did not grant private respondent’s prayer for a
hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were
“Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines.” It maintained that their divorce obtained
in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce
that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court
was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner’s citizenship at the time of their divorce.
The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed.
The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no
longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
9. Catalan v. Braganza, G.R. NO. 167109, February 06, 2007
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. —Divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must
be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
10. San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. No. 134029, February 6, 2007
For purpose of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be
his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.—It is
incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence,” for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to
say, there is a distinction between “residence” for purposes of election laws and “residence” for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated
as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
“residence” of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence
in one place and domicile in another.
11. Bayot v. Bayot, G.R. No. 163979. November 7, 2008
A foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as
valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was
clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree
duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
12. Aznar vs. Garcia G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
Court of domicile bound to apply its own law as directed in the conflict of law rule of decedents
state; Application of the renvoi doctrine.—The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946
Civil Code, refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of domicile can not and should not refer the
case back to California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because
the case will then be tossed back and forth between the two states. If the question has to be
decided, the Philippine court must apply its own law as the Philippines was the domicile of the
decedent, as directed in the conflict of law rule of the state of the decedent, California, and
especially because the internal law of California provides no legitime for natural children, while
the Philippine law (Articles 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them).
13. Bellis vs. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967
Third paragraph of article 17 of New Civil Code does not modify article 16.— The third
paragraph of article 17 of the New Civil Code is not an exception to the second paragraph of
article 16. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the
next preceding article," when it incorporated article 11 of the old Civil Code as article 17, while
reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of article 10 of the old Civil Code,
as article 16. The legislative intent must have been to make the second paragraph of article 176 a
specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As a further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under article 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is governed by the decedent's national law
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.”
14. Llorente vs. CA, G.R. No. 124371, 23 November 2000
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them; Foreign laws must be alleged and proved.—True, foreign laws do not
prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. While the substance of the foreign law
was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the
trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was “referred back” to the law of
the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.