Marriage

Case Doctrines
MARRIAGE
1. Vda. De Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, 22 January 2014
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.
2. Silverio vs. Republic, G.R. No. 174689. October 19, 2007

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations—it is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status; There is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects.—A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family
relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of
the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status
shall be governed by special laws. But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing
sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
To grant the changes in name and sex sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations—it will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
—The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred
social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of
its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These
laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
3. Republic v. Cagandahan G.R. 166676, 12 September 2008
Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex; Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive—it is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.—Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition.
Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous
genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male. Ultimately, we are of the view that where the
person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his
body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support
for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
4. Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.―Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is
an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any
essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for consent to be
valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely
given” consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of
the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the
parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Marriages in Jest; A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound; Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for
vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.―In ruling that
Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by
way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke,
with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding
that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a
purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no
intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent.
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
Marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,
are equally valid.―Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does
not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate
their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their
marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes,
limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration
in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

5. Ronulo v. CA, G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014

While Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, does not specifically define a
“marriage ceremony” and what constitutes its “illegal” performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the
Family Code are clear on these matters.—While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not
specifically define a “marriage ceremony” and what constitutes its “illegal” performance, Articles
3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from
Article 55 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 of the Marriage Law
with no substantial amendments. Article 6 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary,
however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other
as husband and wife.”
6. Savilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006
The certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register
despite diligent search.—The certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must
categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not
be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack
or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No.
2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be
found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot
easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein. (in
this case, there was no categorical statement that the certificate is non-existent, the register
merely stated that they are having difficulty in locating the same for the employee handling it was
already retired and due to its loaded work.)
7. Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. No. 183896. January 30, 2013
The certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license
was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.―In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,
following the case of Republic, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that
their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties
had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove
that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. Gloria has
failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage
license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce
a copy of the alleged marriage license.
Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is
void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to
34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.―All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure
the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35(2).” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.
8. Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan Jr., G.R. No. 201061. July 3, 2013
The words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status
of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership.―As regards the seven
remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the
name of Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to Sally.” The property covered by CCT
Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally with the descriptive title “married to
Benjamin” while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the
name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words “married to” preceding the
name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do
not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there
can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
9. Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. NO. 141528, October 31, 2006
Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is—between the
first and second actions—identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.—Res
judicata requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2)
it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a
judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is—between the first and the second—identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions.—Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three
requisites. What is in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence
will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance
of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are
considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
10. Navarro vs. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
subsequent marriage.—There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision.
In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been
precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not
proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
Instances where a marriage can be held outside of the judge’s chambers or courtroom.—As the
aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge’s chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to
this effect.
Article 8 which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and
does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer.—Under Article 3, one of the
formal requisites of marriage is the “authority of the solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7,
marriage may be solemnized by, among others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court’s jurisdiction.” Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability
11. Beso vs. Daguman, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, 28 January 2000
Exceptions to the Rule that Marriage Should be Held in the Judge’s Chambers.—As the above-
quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom
only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with
Article 29; or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
12. Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.—Issues most
commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court
laid down guidelines for determining its existence. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the term
psychological incapacity was defined, thus—“. . . [P]sychological incapacity” should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated… The
psychological incapacity must be characterized by—(a) Gravity—It must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence—It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) Incurability—It
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
While it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, such psychological incapacity must be established by the totality
of the evidence presented during the trial
13. Republic v. Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005
The Supreme Court holds that paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.—This
case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while
in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on
a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage. x x x We
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute
may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
14. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code—the
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.—Given the rationale and intent behind the
enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC
was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
Recognition of Foreign Judgments; The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip such aliens of legal interest to petition the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree—direct involvement
or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite
interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment.—We
qualify our above conclusion—i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens—with the complementary statement that this conclusion is
not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does
not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. * * * To our mind, direct involvement
or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite
interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a
divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
15. Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez (Art. 34), A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001
Free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not sever the tie
of a subsisting previous marriage—marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption
from marriage license.—Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for
seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least
five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a
long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is
merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for
respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior
existing marriage