Chapter 20: The role of Thomas 'Tucker' Lyttle and his relationship with RUC officers

20.1 It is central to my Terms of Reference to establish the link between any of the individuals
involved in the conspiracy to murder Patrick Finucane and any State agency. I have, therefore,
sought to examine in detail the admissions reportedly made by an Ulster Defence Association
(UDA) 'Brigadier', Thomas 'Tucker' Lyttle, to journalists that he was aware of the conspiracy to
murder Patrick Finucane and that he discussed the targeting of Mr Finucane with a Royal Ulster
Constabulary Special Branch (RUC SB) officer.
Background
20.2 In 1989 'Tucker' Lyttle was the UDA's long-standing West Belfast 'Brigadier'. As one of the socalled 'Brigadiers', he sat on the UDA's Inner Council and by 1989 had become the 'Chairman' of
the UDA. Lyttle was generally considered to be one of the older-generation, less militaristic figures
on the Inner Council. His obituary in the Irish Times reflected this by noting that "by loyalist
paramilitary standards, he was a moderate figure". [1]
20.3 Lyttle was active on the more political side of the UDA and was clearly viewed with suspicion
by the younger, hardline elements of the organisation. Nevertheless, Lyttle was convicted of serious
criminal offences and, as outlined in this report, he was undoubtedly involved in a number of UDA
conspiracies to attack republicans.
The comments made by 'Tucker' Lyttle to journalists
20.4 'Tucker' Lyttle provided at least two interviews to journalists outlining his knowledge of
Patrick Finucane's murder and his alleged conversations with an RUC 'contact' regarding the
targeting of Mr Finucane.
20.5 In the book, 'Stakeknife', the alleged code name of a Force Research Unit (FRU) agent in the
Irish Republican Army (IRA), the journalist Greg Harkin outlined his conversations with 'Tucker'
Lyttle in early January 1990. Lyttle reportedly asked Harkin to visit him and Harkin stated that:
"We all have our police and Army friends I've got mine. But Brian's [Nelson] got the very best of
friends. He [Lyttle] predicted Nelson's arrest and then said that there was 'something big going
down' in relation to Pat Finucane's murder The police and the Army had wanted Finucane dead,
he told me, and the UFF were 'happy to oblige'. Lyttle's reason for calling me was simple: he
expected to be arrested too and he wanted to issue a warning that if he were charged in relation to
the murder of Finucane, he would 'blow this whole thing wide open'. There was more to this than
people thought, he said, and he knew exactly what had happened." [2]
20.6 Harkin also recorded that Lyttle told him that:
" within hours of Hogg's speech in the Commons on 17 January, he, Lyttle, met with his Special
Branch handler Lyttle later claimed that his handler discussed Hogg's comments with him and
said, 'Why don't you whack Finucane?' Brian Nelson was then summoned to Lyttle's home in
Sydney Street West and told to prepare an intelligence file on the lawyer." [3]
20.7 'Stakeknife' included the claim that Lyttle had told Harkin that all the UDA members involved
in the killing, including Nelson, L/20 and Barrett, had attended a celebration party in Lyttle's house.
[4]

20.8 It is difficult to assess the accuracy of the account provided to Greg Harkin. Lyttle certainly
appears to have been tipped off in relation to developments regarding the arrest of UDA members

so his claim to have known in advance that both he and Nelson would be arrested is plausible.
There is, however, no corroboration for the claim that UDA members attended a celebration party in
Lyttle's house. The context in which Lyttle spoke to Greg Harkin must also be considered: in early
1990 Lyttle certainly had an agenda in seeking to exploit the issue of 'leaks'. Given that Lyttle
appears to have consistently denied being an RUC agent, it also seems highly unlikely that he
would have referred to an SB officer as his 'handler' (as opposed to his 'contact').
20.9 For those reasons, I am inclined to prefer Lyttle's accounts provided to the BBC journalist John
Ware in 1993 and 1994. By this stage, Lyttle no longer appears to have been involved in the UDA.
John Ware has submitted to my Review the contemporaneous notes he made of interviews with
Lyttle on 24 December 1993 and 20-22 June 1994.
20.10 John Ware summarised his discussions with Lyttle in a 1998 article in the New Statesman.
The article included the following passage in relation to the murder of Patrick Finucane:
"Lyttle confirmed that the original idea to murder Patrick Finucane came from two RUC
detectives. While a prominent UDA gunman was being held in Castlereagh, an officer entered the
interrogation room and said to his colleague: 'Have you put it to him yet?' They then suggested that
the UDA shoot Finucane. Lyttle said that he was so astonished at this suggestion that he informed a
regular contact in the RUC Special Branch: 'I told him: 'What the hell is going on in Castlereagh?
Why is Finucane being pushed?' The officer said that it would be 'a bad blow for the Provos [the
IRA] to have Finucane removed.' Did that amount to approval that he should be shot? 'Put it this
way,' said Lyttle, 'He didn't discourage the idea that he should be shot'." [5]
20.11 John Ware's notes of his interviews with Lyttle provided a more detailed account of Lyttle's
alleged conversations with an SB officer, as follows:
"With regard to the planned assassination of the lawyer Patrick Finucane, T L told [the RUC
officer] that certain RUC officers were putting pressure on the UDA to have Finucane shot 'They
[Provisional IRA] would take months to recover from this', T L reports [the officer] as having
replied T L said this conversation with [the officer] took place early in 1989 after [L/03] had
been arrested which was in December 1988. Finucane was considered a target by the RUC,
according to T L, because of his brother his [sic] connection with the IRA T L said that [L/28]
began to look at Finucane in January. T L said that there is no question that [L/28]selected
Finucane for targeting after it was made clear to [L/03] and the two others by the RUC officers in
Castlereagh that Finucane should be shot T L adds 'put it this way [the officer] didn't discourage
the idea that Finucane should be shot. And if a man in his position doesn't discourage it then that
amounts to approval." [6]
20.12 I have had access to the full record of John Ware's conversation with 'Tucker' Lyttle. Taken as
a whole, I am struck by the general accuracy of the information provided by Lyttle to Mr Ware.
Examination of the full note of the meeting in the context of the wider information available to my
Review leads me to the conclusion that Lyttle was, broadly speaking, being candid with Mr Ware.
That does not, however, mean that the specific allegations that he makes should be accepted in the
absence of wider corroborative evidence. This is particularly the case given that Lyttle is now
deceased, and so the opportunity to test his allegations further has been lost.
20.13 In view of the serious allegations made by Lyttle, I have conducted an extensive analysis to
establish whether these claims can be corroborated. In order to pursue these allegations, I have
sought to establish whether, in the first instance, Lyttle was aware of the conspiracy to murder Mr
Finucane. I have then sought to analyse whether Lyttle discussed Patrick Finucane with an RUC
officer. To provide the context for this issue, it is necessary to examine in detail whether Lyttle had

been improperly receiving information from an RUC officer or officers in the period before and
after the murder of Mr Finucane.
Was Lyttle involved in the conspiracy to murder Patrick Finucane?
20.14 Despite his apparent admission to journalists, the evidence with regard to Lyttle's potential
involvement in the plot to murder Patrick Finucane is complex and, in parts, contradictory. The
FRU documents, for example, recorded L/28 claiming that Lyttle was unaware of the 'operation'.
The CF dated 14 February 1989 included the following passage:
"[L/28] said that he would be annoyed if the UFF [Ulster Freedom Fighters] were not allowed to
claim the attack. He added that 'Tucker' Lyttle had known nothing about the operation. [L/
28]explained that he had been in [a club] at the time of the attack and Lyttle arrived as soon as he
heard about the shooting. Lyttle was very nervous and chomped his way through a glass of ice
cubes that [L/28] had had for himself." [7]
20.15 Kenneth Barrett's account to BBC Panorama provided a broadly similar picture. Barrett told
Eamon Hardy in September 2001 that "[L/28] knew what was happening, do you understand me?
Tucker didn't."[8]
20.16 The two key UDA figures directing the operation - L/20 and L/28 - were certainly wary of
Lyttle and were capable of keeping him out of the loop with regard to plans for UDA attacks. In
August 1988 Nelson reported the tension between L/28, L/20, L/03 and Lyttle.[9] However, by
November 1988 Nelson was reporting that Lyttle "was secure in his post of commander West
Belfast Bde"[10] and Lyttle was certainly involved in UDA operations around that time.[11] L/28 would
certainly have had a motive to exaggerate his own power and influence by minimising Lyttle's
involvement, so it is not possible to rely on his account.
20.17 The available evidence does lead me to the conclusion that Lyttle was at least aware of the
UDA conspiracy to murder Patrick Finucane. In addition to considering Lyttle's own admissions to
journalists, I have examined the following three intelligence reports linking Lyttle to the conspiracy
to murder Mr Finucane:

The FRU CF dated 20 December 1988 confirmed that Lyttle was present at the meeting at
which, according to reliable Security Service intelligence, a UDA commander planned to
discuss the targeting of three solicitors, including Patrick Finucane (see Chapter 16).[12]

RUC intelligence received on 16 February 1989, four days after the murder, indicated that
Lyttle had "sanctioned" the murder.[13] Having reviewed the background to this intelligence
report, however, I am cautious about placing much weight on this source given his
somewhat limited access to the central UDA figures.

Security Service intelligence dated 15 February 1989 recorded that Lyttle "had mentioned
Home Office Minister Douglas Hogg's comment about PIRA-sympathisers among the legal
profession" in the week prior to the murder of Patrick Finucane. A Security Service officer
noted that, "Lyttle had therefore presumably had some foreknowledge of the Finucane
shooting". [14]
20.18 John Ware's submission to my Review suggested that Lyttle was aware of the targeting of
Patrick Finucane but that he disapproved of the actual shooting.[15]
20.19 I do not regard any of these reports in isolation as conclusive in answering the question as to
Lyttle's knowledge of the conspiracy. However, when considered cumulatively, and in conjunction
with Lyttle's apparent admissions to the two journalists, I am satisfied that Lyttle must have had
foreknowledge of the UDA plan to murder Patrick Finucane. It is, however, none the less possible

that, although Lyttle was aware of the targeting of Patrick Finucane, he was not privy to the
operational details as to how and when the UDA hit team intended to murder him.
20.20 Having established Lyttle's awareness of the conspiracy to murder Mr Finucane, I turn to
consider the nature of Lyttle's relationship, if any, with the RUC during the relevant period.
Did Lyttle discuss Patrick Finucane with an RUC officer?
20.21 I have found no evidence to corroborate Lyttle's claim that he discussed the targeting of
Patrick Finucane with an RUC 'contact'. This is, in itself, not particularly surprising given that
Lyttle's allegation relates to a conversation between two men that was not recorded. Following
Lyttle's death in 1995 it is no longer possible to adequately test his allegation to determine the
weight, if any, that it should be given.
20.22 However, in view of my remit, I have also sought to conduct a more wide-ranging
examination of Lyttle's relationship, if any, with RUC officers during the relevant period.
'Tucker' Lyttle's links to RUC officers
20.23 It has been widely alleged in media reporting and in published books that 'Tucker' Lyttle was
an RUC SB agent.[16] Many of these allegations appear to be purely speculative and need to be
treated with great caution. I am satisfied that there is no sound evidential basis for these reports.
20.24 However, I also recognise that, in the context of Northern Ireland in the late 1980s, there was
a broad spectrum of possible relationships between paramilitary figures and members of the security
forces. The officially sanctioned link between a handler and a paid agent represents only one such
type of relationship. As my analysis in Chapter 11 demonstrates, some members of the UDA had
security force 'contacts' who were willing to provide them with information and assistance during
this period.
20.25 In the light of this, I have sought to examine whether Lyttle was receiving information or
assistance from a member of the RUC during the relevant period. Although it would be possible to
conduct a similar examination of Lyttle's Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) contacts, given the
nature of the allegations in this case, I have focused analysis on whether Lyttle had RUC contacts
during the relevant period.
20.26 I have considered the following sources of evidence on this issue:
(i) intelligence relating to Lyttle's 'RUC contacts';
(ii) Lyttle's account to John Ware of the kidnapping of L/39 in November 1988;
(iii) evidence that Lyttle received RUC intelligence information on Seamus Finucane and others in
February 1989; and
(iv) FRU concerns about Lyttle's relationship with RUC officers.
Intelligence relating to Lyttle's RUC 'contacts'
20.27 Security Service and FRU reports suggest that, from at least 1986 onwards, 'Tucker' Lyttle
had access to a number of RUC 'contacts' who could provide him with assistance. Security Service
intelligence received in 1986 indicated that Lyttle was receiving assistance from an RUC officer at
Superintendent level, though the extent to which this intelligence was subsequently investigated or
corroborated is unclear.[17]

20.28 FRU reports from July and December 1987 suggest that Lyttle had a source who was able to
supply large quantities of RUC photographs of republicans. Although it is not clear who Lyttle
obtained this information from, it is certain that Lyttle had access to this material in December 1987
because he passed it to Nelson who in turn provided copies to his handlers.[18]
20.29 The FRU documentation shows that from May 1988 Lyttle was receiving information
indirectly from the RUC via another member of the UDA. This contact related to the RUC SB
operation to discredit James Pratt Craig and has been examined in more detail in Chapter 7.
20.30 The critical period relevant to my Review is late 1988 to early 1989 when the conspiracy to
murder Patrick Finucane was being formulated. The FRU records suggest that Lyttle was receiving
information from an RUC source in early 1989. The FRU CF dated 25 January 1989 recorded that
Lyttle had warned L/28 that houses were due to be searched by the RUC. As a result of the warning,
Nelson took two holdalls from L/28's house to his Intelligence Cell.[19]
20.31 The CF dated 2 March 1989 also suggested that Lyttle had received very detailed information
about republicans suspected of targeting members of the UDA.[20] Checks made by the FRU
handlers suggested that the information was likely to have been accurate. Nelson commented that
the information:
" may have been obtained by the RUC via sources and in turn passed to the UDA hierarchy." [21]
20.32 Later CFs implied that Lyttle had access to a supposedly senior RUC officer, though it is not
clear whether or not Lyttle was receiving this information indirectly through another member of the
UDA who maintained a number of RUC contacts.[22]
20.33 Throughout his later statements and comments on this case, Brian Nelson maintained that
Lyttle had an 'SB source' during this period (see paragraph 11.31). In his conversations with John
Ware, Nelson repeatedly emphasised that Lyttle had a 'good' police source. On 12 April 1991 John
Ware's notes record Nelson having said that Lyttle had a "very very good police source". On 13 June
1991, Nelson stated that "TL had a good SB source".[23]
20.34 RUC intelligence material also provides support for the proposition that Lyttle had a number
of RUC 'contacts' during this period. Intelligence received in September 1988 suggested that Lyttle
was being "kept informed" of RUC operations by a police contact.[24] Later intelligence received on
2 February 1989 suggested that Lyttle was checking information "through various police contacts".
[25]

20.35 I have also seen Security Service records which strongly suggest that Lyttle was being offered
information on the specific issue of the UDA's links to the Provisional IRA (PIRA) by an RUC SB
contact during this period.[26]
20.36 The intelligence material, when considered as a whole, provides a concerning picture. It is
difficult to corroborate Nelson's reporting of specific leaks to Lyttle during this period, though when
considered in conjunction with the RUC SB records, the evidence certainly provides indications
that Lyttle maintained police 'contacts'. The Security Service records, when considered in
conjunction with the RUC SB operation in relation to James Pratt Craig, confirm that Lyttle was
receiving information from an SB officer on UDA members who were believed to be in contact
with PIRA.
Lyttle's account to John Ware of the kidnapping of L/39 in November 1988

20.37 In the context of Lyttle's allegations to John Ware, I have considered in detail his claim that
an SB contact provided him with the details of a loyalist, L/39, who was suspected of having
provided information to PIRA. L/39 was kidnapped and interrogated by the UDA in November
1988 and subsequently expelled from Northern Ireland.
20.38 In their conversations on 20-22 June 1994, Lyttle was recorded as having told John Ware the
following information:
" [the SB officer] offered to name [L/39]. [He] said 'you've got a problem in South Belfast. I
could help you with this man. But there are certain conditions.'
The condition was that no harm would come to [L/39]. TL gave him [the officer] that undertaking.
[The officer] then disclosed to TL details of where [L/39] went, his movements, his habits, so that
the UDA could pick him up. [The officer] also suggested that his interrogation be videod TL got
the UDA's Inner Council approval for the [L/39]operation. [The officer] wanted a copy of the video
[The officer] said the purpose of kidnapping [L/39] was to get him out of the way so as to disrupt
PIRA intelligence." [27]
20.39 Lyttle's description of the reaction of the RUC officer to the operation was recorded in the
following passage in John Ware's notes:
"TL said that [the officer] suggested the UDA seek publicity for this stunt and that they say [L/39]
was being investigated by a special UDA unit called the 'Special Assignment Section' - a clear echo
of SAS [Special Air Service].
After [L/39] had been removed from the scene [the officer] told TL he was 'well pleased'. However,
TL did not feel he was getting anything out of this relationship. TL said that [the officer] knew very
well that what he wanted was help on senior PIRA leaders like Brian Gillen, Gerry Adams and [T/
13]. [The officer] was stringing me along. He never said point blank that he wouldn't give me help but help never materialised." [28]
20.40 It is important to note that Lyttle stated that he did not receive the assistance he was looking
for in relation to senior PIRA figures. Many aspects of Lyttle's story regarding L/39 do appear to
correlate with the facts of this case. Intelligence records show that the RUC SB had been receiving
detailed information for a number of months indicating that L/39 was providing information to
PIRA. In another example of the interconnected nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland at the
time, the information provided by L/39 may, indeed, have been used by Seamus Finucane to target
loyalists with the intention of murdering them.
20.41 Nelson reported to his handlers on 26 November 1988 that the UDA had "found out who the
PIRA informer was". The CFs confirm Lyttle's claim that Nelson was given a copy of the video
recording of L/39's confession. [29]
20.42 It is also significant that L/39 himself subsequently observed how much information the
UDA held on his links to PIRA. After having been expelled from the country, L/39 was quoted in
The Scotsman as saying he initially believed that he was being questioned by PIRA members:
"I thought that because they knew so much. They knew the names of my three Provo [PIRA]
contacts and a contact telephone number. They knew of my meeting places and they knew I had set
up a UDA man and that the murder was to take place in [a] shopping centre. I said I could set
him up again and that they would get him this time. Then they told me who they were [UDA
men]." [30]

20.43 The most significant evidence which tends to corroborate Lyttle's account, however, comes
from later FRU documentary records. In an account of another case, the FRU recorded the
following information about the kidnapping:
"[L/39] was later compromised to the UDA by RUC and subsequently interrogated and expelled
from NI [Northern Ireland]." [31]
20.44 Having reviewed the FRU document in full, the context in which this information is recorded
suggests to me that the FRU may have been informed by an RUC SB officer that L/39 had been
deliberately compromised. The general fact that information was passed to Lyttle on the UDA's
links to PIRA would also be consistent with the Security Service records and the operation relating
to James Pratt Craig outlined in Chapter 7.
20.45 Considering the evidence as a whole, I do believe that Lyttle was telling John Ware the truth
about an SB officer compromising L/39 to the UDA. The FRU documentary record provides
significant corroboration for Lyttle's account. Although the SB 'contact' appears to have stipulated
that L/39 should not be physically harmed, the passing of such information to a paramilitary
organisation is none the less inexcusable. This led directly to the kidnapping, interrogation and
expulsion of an individual from Northern Ireland.
Evidence that Lyttle received intelligence information on Seamus Finucane and others in February
1989
20.46 As I noted above, 'Tucker' Lyttle told John Ware that he was seeking information from his SB
contact on PIRA figures but did not receive the assistance he was looking for. However, I have seen
evidence suggesting that Lyttle did have knowledge of sensitive intelligence material only four days
after the murder of Patrick Finucane. This information included intelligence about Patrick
Finucane's brother, Seamus.
20.47 In order to establish Lyttle's access to such information, it is necessary to examine both the
FRU and RUC SB documentary records. The FRU CF dated 22 February recorded the content of a
conversation between Lyttle, L/28 and Nelson (referred to here by his source number, 6137) on 16
February 1989. Under the heading "Information from Informer", the CF recorded the conversation
as follows:
"Lyttle told [L/28] and 6137 [Nelson] that PIRA had had a meeting during the previous evening
and they were 'cracking up'. He said that Seamus Finucane was Brian Gillen's Intelligence Officer
and [T/30], [T/17] and [T/11] were members of Gillen's team. Lyttle added that PIRA wanted an
operation involving a limpet mine to be carried out." [32]
20.48 The CF recorded that Lyttle "did not say where this information had come from".[33] The
intelligence was passed by the FRU solely to the Head of the Belfast SB on 23 February 1989 as
part of a MISR entitled 'UDA/SF [Security Force] Contacts'.[34]
20.49 The information imparted by Lyttle to Nelson is, on the face of it, highly detailed and specific
information about PIRA operations and activity. In order to ascertain the potential source of the
information, I have cross-checked Lyttle's 'intelligence' against the SB records to ascertain whether
Lyttle could have received the information from an SB 'contact'.
20.50 It is not possible to ascertain whether PIRA did indeed hold a meeting on the evening of 15
February. However, Lyttle's description of PIRA's Belfast Brigade personalities does appear to have
been essentially accurate: Seamus Finucane was an Intelligence Officer and T/30, T/17 and T/11
were all, in effect, members of Gillen's team.

20.51 The clearest evidence, however, that Lyttle was being provided with accurate and sensitive
intelligence information is provided by the reference in the discussion with L/28 and Nelson to
PIRA's plan to use a limpet mine. Analysis of the RUC SB's Daily Intelligence Book confirms that
Lyttle's information about the limpet mine attack was accurate. SB intelligence recorded a specific
PIRA plan to use a limpet mine. Subsequent RUC SB intelligence indicated that the operation had
been abandoned.[35]
20.52 It appears, therefore, that Lyttle had received sensitive information, which he then
disseminated to other members of the UDA. I have also seen other intelligence material which
provides circumstantial support for the proposition that Lyttle received this information from an SB
'contact' shortly after Patrick Finucane's murder.
20.53 The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) informed me that knowledge amongst
loyalists of the roles played by individuals within Belfast Brigade PIRA was "not unusual" and that
paramilitary groups had knowledge of terrorist personalities from the "other side".[36] It is certainly
true that loyalists had a wealth of information on republican personalities. I have been able to
examine the intelligence dumps held by the UDA and the exceptionally detailed records held by the
FRU in relation to Nelson's knowledge of PIRA personalities. However, having examined this
material, I am satisfied that the information imparted by Lyttle on 16 February was unusual in its
level of detail. The UDA did hold records on such personalities but they generally did not know the
precise roles played by specific individuals within Belfast Brigade PIRA.
20.54 The PSNI also informed me that the limpet mine threat would have been disseminated widely
throughout the police and Army and so this information would therefore have been "widely known".
[37] I have not found any records to confirm how the intelligence relating to the limpet mine threat
was disseminated in February 1989. It is worth noting that other submissions to my Review have
tended to stress the sensitivity with which such intelligence reporting would be handled.
20.55 I am, however, faced with a clear documentary record that Lyttle passed extremely detailed
information to other loyalist paramilitaries on 16 February 1989. The information about a PIRA
meeting the previous evening cannot be confirmed, though there is no indication that Lyttle was
inventing this very specific claim. The information about the make-up of PIRA's Belfast Brigade
was accurate, as was his observation about the limpet mine. I have also been able to review broader
intelligence reporting which provides some circumstantial support for the proposition that Lyttle
received this information from an RUC SB officer.
FRU concerns about Lyttle's relationship with RUC officers
20.56 The documentary evidence suggests that the FRU were concerned about the nature of the
relationship between the UDA hierarchy, including 'Tucker' Lyttle, and the RUC. The FRU report
on Brian Nelson's activity during 1988 included the comment that:
"It is a constant worry that information passed by 6137 eventually gets back to the UDA via the
RUC. 6137 regularly feels himself under suspicion when this occurs " [38]
20.57 The FRU's concern was potentially well founded given that the interrogation of Nelson came
about as a result of warnings made by Lyttle's SB 'contact' that PIRA knew about UDA targeting.
Nelson was specifically asked by his FRU handlers in October 1988 whether Lyttle had mentioned
his SB contact. Nelson replied that he had "heard nothing" at that stage.[39]
20.58 A/13's statements to the Stevens I Investigation included comments that the FRU suspected
information was being passed by the RUC to the "UDA hierarchy". When asked in December 1990

why Lyttle's name had been omitted from a MISR post-dating the murder of Gerard Slane, A/13
stated:
"I believe that, at the time, information had been given to members of the UDA hierarchy by
members of the RUC. I believed that either Tucker Lyttle or someone very close to him was talking
with a member of the RUC. If the information regarding Tucker Lyttle's involvement had been
passed to the RUC, there was a possibility that Tucker Lyttle would hear about it, therefore, in order
to protect our source, Lyttle's involvement was not reported." [40]
20.59 It is difficult to assess the validity of the point made by A/13. The handler was being
questioned in relation to omissions from a MISR and may therefore have been seeking to provide
an excuse for the failure to pass on information. When A/13's statement was put to the PSNI, they
stated that they believed this allegation to be an attempt to "ameliorate the shortcomings in relation
to the recording and dissemination of FRU intelligence rather than a potential leak from the RUC".
[41]

20.60 It is, however, clear that the concerns within the Army extended more widely than A/13. In a
note sent to the Head of GS Sec in response to the Panorama programme, 'Dirty War', the then
Commanding Officer of the Joint Support Group, A/16, stated that:
"FRU had evidence that 'Tucker' Lyttle was often spoken to by his own admission, by senior RUC
personnel and it seemed that Lyttle had been warned by an RUC contact of the impending arrest
[by the Stevens investigation]." [42]
20.61 Although it is possible that the FRU may have sought to highlight Lyttle's links to the RUC in
order to deflect criticism, these concerns were expressed in such a way as to lead me to believe that
they are likely to have been genuine. I do, therefore, weigh the FRU's general concerns about the
nature of the relationship between Lyttle and the RUC in the balance when reaching my overall
conclusions on this issue.
Overview
20.62 I am satisfied that 'Tucker' Lyttle had foreknowledge of the plan to murder Patrick Finucane
in 1989, though he may have been unaware of the details of the UDA's operation to kill Mr
Finucane on 12 February. A detailed examination of the nature of Lyttle's activity both before and
after the murder has highlighted his reported links to RUC 'contacts'. Most significantly, I believe
that Lyttle was told by an SB officer of L/39's activity so that he could be subsequently interrogated
and expelled from Northern Ireland; and that he was in receipt of sensitive intelligence information
on 16 February 1989, including information regarding Seamus Finucane.
20.63 The evidence of Lyttle's links to RUC officers does not enable an inference to be drawn that
he discussed the targeting of Patrick Finucane with an SB 'contact'. As Lyttle is now deceased, it is
not possible to adequately test the veracity of this specific allegation, though I do note that other
aspects of the information he imparted to John Ware in 1994 were accurate. I certainly cannot
exclude the possibility that Lyttle did, as he told John Ware, discuss the targeting of Mr Finucane
with an SB contact.
20.64 However, it is none the less important to draw the general conclusion that Lyttle's relationship
with RUC officers during the relevant period is a source of serious concern. I do believe that Lyttle
was being improperly assisted by RUC contacts in the period before and after Patrick Finucane's
murder and that one of these contacts was an SB officer with access to intelligence information. In
my view, Lyttle's links to some RUC officers during this period were so significant that they

provided him with an entirely improper degree of protection and assistance in conducting his
paramilitary activities as the 'Brigadier' for the West Belfast UDA.

[1] 'Tucker' Lyttle obituary, Irish Times, 20 October 1995

[2] Greg Harkin and Martin Ingram, Stakeknife, O'Brien Press, 2004, p. 203
[3] Ibid., p. 196
[4] Ibid., p. 204
[5] John Ware, 'Time to come clean over the army's role in the "Dirty War"', New Statesman, 24
April 1998
[6] John Ware, notes of conversations with Thomas 'Tucker' Lyttle, 20-22 June 1994
[7] CF 14 February 1989, Item 18 [see Volume II, pp. 10-15]
[8] Panorama transcript of recorded meeting with Kenneth Barrett, 3 September 2001
[9] CF 23 August 1988
[10] FRU report to Security Service, Stormont, 24 November 1988
[11] For example, Lyttle giving approval for attacks on Alex Maskey and Brian Gillen, CF 30
November 1988
[12] CF 20 December 1988
[13] RUC SB50, 16 February 1989 [see Volume II, p. 96]
[14] Security Service intelligence, 15 February 1989
[15] John Ware submission to the Review, p. 6. Mr Ware felt that this disapproval was genuine.
[16] See for example, Ian S. Wood, Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA, Edinburgh University
Press, 2006, p. 144
[17] Security Service intelligence records, 1986
[18] CFs 30 July 1987 and 15 December 1987
[19] CF 25 January 1989
[20] CF 2 March 1989, Items 6-12
[21] Ibid.
[22] CF 20 March 1989
[23] John Ware, notes of conversations with Brian Nelson, 12 April 1991 and 13 June 1991
[24] RUC SB50, 16 September 1988

[25] RUC SB50, 2 February 1989

[26] Security Service intelligence records, 1988
[27] John Ware, notes of conversations with 'Tucker' Lyttle, 20-22 June 1994
[28] Ibid.
[29] CF 26 November 1988, Items 13-14
[30] The Scotsman, 29 November 1988, quoted in Ian S. Wood, Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the
UDA, Edinburgh University Press, 2006, p. 142
[31] Annex to FRU CF on a different intelligence operation
[32] CF 22 February 1989 [see Volume II, pp. 17-18]
[33] Ibid.
[34] MISR 23 February 1989
[35] RUC SB Daily Intelligence Book, February 1989
[36] PSNI letter to the Review, 27 September 2012
[37] Ibid.
[38] FRU report on Nelson, 31 January 1989
[39] CF 11 October 1988
[40] Statement of A/13, 5 December 1990
[41] PSNI letter to the Review, 27 September 2012
[42] A/16 to Head of GS Sec, 9 June 1992
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