EUROCK 2004 & 53rd Geomechanics Colloquium. Schubert (ed.

) 2004 VGE

The Development of Sprayed Concrete Lined (SCL) Tunnelling

in the UK

A.H.Thomas
Mott MacDonald Ltd

N.B. Legge
Mott MacDonald Ltd

D.B. Powell
Mott MacDonald Lt

The last fifteen years have seen significant changes in tunnelling in the UK. Successful use of
sprayed concrete lined (SCL) tunnels in the construction of the Channel Tunnel in the late 1980s
led to a steady growth in SCL use in the UK. The 1994 Heathrow Express collapse was
instrumental in shaping current UK practice. In response to this incident, and against a background
of increasingly formalised risk management, a distinct approach to SCL tunnelling in soft ground /
weak rock has evolved in the UK. This is characterised by detailed ground investigation, risk
assessments and the use of sophisticated numerical models to produce a robust, fully-engineered
design. A tightly controlled risk management process during construction is implemented that
relies on both predictions and observations to monitor and verify the works. The strengths and
weaknesses of this approach will be discussed, and also the need for independent checks.

INTRODUCTION

The core principles of tunnel design in soft ground and weak rocks, including understanding
ground behaviour and applying ground-support interaction, were established some years ago.
Developments, including the NATM and the use of sprayed concrete, were largely driven by the
need to improve efficiency and economy by applying these principles and new support techniques.
Regardless of the debate about the NATM, the drive and contribution of Austrian engineers in the
1960s and 1970s to SCL tunnelling has been highly significant.
Tunnelling is acknowledged as a high risk activity, and it is natural that techniques develop in
response to new challenges. The collapse on the Heathrow Express project in particular resulted in
a major review of SCL tunnelling in the UK, and caused both regulatory authorities and insurers to
seek improved safety and risk control measures. All aspects of the design and construction process
were examined in detail following the collapse, with the findings clearly demonstrating that a more
holistic approach to the management of major tunnelling works was necessary. This included the
site organisation and the associated decision making structures, the experience of the staff involved
and the systems and procedures that are necessary to ensure that safety and risk are managed
properly. Improvements recommended following the Heathrow incident (HSE 1996, 2000) are
now an integral part of any project work in the UK. These nature and implications of these
developments are discussed in this paper.

DEVELOPMENT OF SCL TUNNELLING IN THE UK

Although used on a few major projects in rock, e.g. Dinorwic pump storage scheme (1977) and
Kielder water transfer project (1980), sprayed concrete linings for tunnels were not widely used in
the UK until the Channel Tunnel project. Largely due to its perceived flexibility and cost
effectiveness SCL tunnelling played a significant role on the Channel Tunnel (1987-91), most
notably near the UK portals and the Crossover cavern (Figure 1). Through the 1990s the
application of sprayed concrete spread rapidly as designers and architects recognised its potential in
terms of shape and scale for creating modern underground space. Since 1994 more than 200,000
m3 of underground space has been created in the UK using SCL methods. Major projects included
Heathrow Express, Heathrow Baggage Transfer tunnel, London Underground Jubilee Line
Extension, Channel Tunnel Rail Link and Heathrow Terminal 5.

Figure 1: The Channel Tunnel UK Crossover Cavern under construction

The collapse of 3 SCL tunnels at Heathrow airport on 20 October 1994 had a profound effect on
SCL tunnelling in the UK. A detailed review by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE 2000)
found that a crucial aspect of the incident was widespread organisational failure which
compromised the design, quality control, the engineering supervision and safety management. This
aspect is discussed further in Section 3.
As might be expected, an immediate consequence of the collapse was increased conservatism of
SCL designs. However, since 1994 there has been much investigation in the UK into the behaviour
and performance of shallow SCL tunnels in soft ground (e.g. Van der Berg, Clayton, & Powell
2003). While the recently published British Tunnelling Societys Tunnel Lining: Design Guide
(BTS 2004) covers all types of tunnel linings, it is also an attempt to consolidate best practice in
SCL design.
2.1

Impact of health & safety legislation

Recent developments in the legislative framework affecting construction have also had a significant
impact on UK tunnelling works, principally by defining, controlling and managing both technical
and organisational safety risks.
The UK safety legislation places a duty on employers to identify hazards and avoid or mitigate
the associated risks. One part of this is the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations
(CDM - HMSO 2000). Explicit risk management and better communication between the client,
designer and the constructor are central to the CDM regulations. It is important to note that these

regulations apply to all construction work, both above and below ground, and that SCL tunnelling
is treated in the same manner as any other type of tunnelling. However, due to the complexity of
SCL methods these requirements actually complement their use as risk-based design methods assist
all parties to understand how construction, design and safety interact. In particular, for SCL
tunnels the temporary conditions during construction require more detailed consideration by the
design than may be the case in other methods.
Health concerns over Hand Arm Vibration Syndrome (HAVS) have also influenced
construction practice in the UK. Traditional tunnelling methods using timbering and cast in situ
concrete or segments rely heavily on manual work using vibrating tools, e.g. pneumatic clay
spades. To minimise the risk of HAVS this type of manual work must now be limited, and SCL is
frequently used as an alternative (Field, Legge & Liew 2000). Within SCL tunnelling itself there is
a drive to maximise automation for the same reason.

3
3.1

CURRENT UK PRACTICE
Design and Monitoring

Broadly two approaches to SCL tunnel design exist. These may be described as the semiempirical and numerical approaches.
3.1.1 Semi-empirical design
The semi-empirical method makes use of past experience in similar conditions to define initial
support and lining thicknesses. Ground parameters are based on sampling and testing, but may also
be based on back-analyses of measurements taken in similar conditions. Calculations frequently
use analytical or closed-form solutions to determine support resistance and lining thicknesses. This
approach allows for significant flexibility during construction. Support types and lining
thicknesses may be determined by observation of actual ground conditions, and through
measurement of ground and lining behaviour. This approach to SCL tunnelling was largely
developed for use in Alpine geology where steeply dipping strata, large thrust or shear zones
associated with highly disturbed ground conditions, and unpredictable, high in situ stresses made
detailed characterisation difficult.
Where there are significant uncertainties a large number of residual risks remain after the design
and these are managed during construction. This approach relies heavily on experienced site staff.
3.1.2 Numerical approach
The numerical approach makes use of detailed characterisation of ground conditions, and
modelling using powerful commercial stress-analysis software to develop the design. In particular
the effects of 3D geometry, the support sequences, ground heterogeneity, varying in situ stresses,
and time related issues such as consolidation and creep may be explicitly investigated. Soilstructure interaction effects impacting adjacent and/or surface structures, particularly important for
urban projects, can also be assessed directly. The numerical approach results in a fully-engineered
design before construction begins. Contingency measures are also designed in advance.
Monitoring is used to verify performance and confirm the assumptions and parameters used in the
design.
While this approach is suited to ground conditions that are well-understood, such as in London
clay in which much SCL tunnelling has taken place, the numerical approach also has application in
ground conditions which were not well-understood, or where there is little experience of tunnelling.
The design of a shallow, large span tunnel for the San Diago Mission Valley East project in waterbearing conglomerate, is a good example of this (Pound, Casson, Thomas, & Powell 2003).
Careful calibration of the nonlinear elastic constitutive model for the ground against insitu tests led
to realistic predictions. The actual performance of the tunnel matched well the behaviour
anticipated by the numerical model. With this more fundamental approach risks can, to a large
extent, be reduced and/or mitigated during the design phase. Despite their sophistication numerical
methods have limitations, principally the assumptions made and input data used. Improving the
performance of numerical models and minimising errors is discussed in Thomas, 2003.

3.1.3 UK design approach

Many of the soft ground SCL tunnels constructed or planned in the UK in the last 15 years have
been in urban areas, where the demands of modern large infrastructure projects are complex. In
such situations the numerical approach has been found appropriate. Mindful of the consequences
of a tunnel collapse, third parties such as insurers now require explicit proof by calculations of the
robustness of the design (AIB, 2003). The UK CDM Regulations also require that all aspects of
the works are adequately designed and detailed for all foreseeable circumstances before
construction; this lends itself to the use of the numerical approach and a fully engineered design
solution. It is noted that both approaches to SCL design have their merits, and indeed both are
recognised in the UK (ICE, 1996; HSE, 1996).
3.2

Project and Risk Management

The most significant recent change to occur in the management of tunnelling projects is the
integration of preventative systems. These are applied during both design and construction (see
Figure 2).The aim of risk management during the design process is to either avoid risks, or reduce
them to a condition where they are ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practical).

Tunnel Engineering Design Process

Risk Management
CDM Regs.
Hazard identification
Prepare risk registers

Risk assessment:
Risk mitigation
Define residual risks

Live risk registers

Review monitoring
Contingency measures

Design Phase

Conceptual
Ground
characterisation
Lining
definition
Experience &
best practice

Detailed
2/3D Numerical
analyses

Construction
Management &
Control

Design Management
Operational requirements
Performance criteria
Value Engineering
Environmental issues

Contractual compliance
Third parties interfaces

Compliance Issues
Fully engineered design
Performance monitoring

Figure 2 Typical Aspects of the Engineering Design Process

For the San Diego Mission Valley East project (Thomas, Casson & Powell, 2003 Figure 3) key
hazards, such as low cover and ravelling ground, were identified early in the design process, and
solutions for them interrogated using the numerical design approach outlined above. Various
construction sequences and contingency measures were examined during the design and the most
suitable ones were included in the final design. The contract envisaged that the required support
would vary within the designed tunnel support classes depending on the prevailing ground
conditions; and contingency measures were prescribed including canopy tubes and spiling if
required.

Residual safety risks, i.e. those which cannot be eliminated through design, are entered into a
project risk register and are subject to continuous review during construction. Contingency
measures are designed to manage the significant residual risks and monitoring must play a key role
in this. For this approach to be successful the team on site must understand the residual risks, how
to manage them and how the design handles the other risks. The size and complexity of many
large infrastructure projects mean that the various parties involved also have large teams. The
organisational management of a project needs to ensure that communication, coordination and
control issues are clearly defined. A key issue highlighted by the HEX collapse was the need to
have appropriately qualified staff on site, in particular those who understand the implications of
changes to the design, as well as an auditable decision making process. This can be achieved most
easily by having a Designers Representative on site (e.g. Thomas, Casson & Powell, 2003).

Figure 3: Mission Valley East tunnel, San Diego, USA

3.2.1 Independent Checking Engineer
Since the 1990s there has been an increasing trend on large tunnelling projects for clients to
employ an independent checking engineer to verify the design. The checker performs an
independent set of calculations to assess structural durability and stability. Opinion is divided on
the merit of independent checkers. Some point out that as tunnelling is a high risk activity, projects
should benefit from such close scrutiny. Others (e.g: Muir Wood 2003) suggest that at least in
their current role - an external checking engineer may add little to the design process, and that
normal design procedures for review and checking should be adequate themselves. Indeed,
experience suggests that the checker may increase costs, especially if they lack the necessary
experience or simply because they fail to appreciate that they are not there to close out all risks
simply to ensure that where there are residual risks that these are managed.
3.3

Recent Developments

From the Channel Tunnel to the present day, there has been a growth in the UK domestic
knowledge of SCL tunnelling and a reduction in the role of international companies. Through
know-how transfer, recruitment, investment in education and to a lesser degree in research,
some UK consultants have developed their own SCL design capability. Mott MacDonald is a

notable example of this because of its lead role in an EC-funded research project on sprayed
concrete (Powell & Norris 1999) and its support for research at universities.
Overall SCL technology in the UK has reached the point where rather than just following
trends, the UK is beginning to make its own contribution to advancing this technology. The best
example of this is the Lasershell method developed by MorganEst in partnership with the
Austrian company Beton und Monierbau (Eddie & Neumann 2003). The first major use of
Lasershell is at the Terminal 5 project at Heathrow, where it has demonstrated the viability of
constructing SCL tunnels without lattice girders for shape control, relying instead on spot-checks
with the laser distometer of a modified total station. By removing the need for lattice girders, the
time spent by men working at the face is minimised, enhancing safety, and a key potential source
of corrosion is removed. Also to minimise the risk of corrosion of steel in this single shell
permanent sprayed concrete lining, steel fibres were used instead of mesh reinforcement. A final
point to note is the inclusion of polypropylene fibres for fire-resistance.

CONCLUSIONS

The emphasis on safety in the UK could be seen as introducing conservatism into design which is
likely to increase costs. This is not necessarily the case. It has simply focused the attention of
consultants and contractors more clearly on how they manage risk. While many may argue that
engineers with experience will do this based on their training, it is apparent in todays climate that
this is not enough. The attitude of the insurers is reinforcing this position.
There are in fact many positive aspects. These relate to improved technologies, greater
awareness of how to control and manage risk, better training and improved documentation. These
will all contribute to better safety, and in the long term improved efficiency, as these issues become
resolved and integrated into the overall design and construction process. No doubt it will also drive
better methods of analysis and new support techniques.

REFERENCES
AIB 2003 The Joint Code of Practice for Risk Management of Tunnel Works in the UK. Joint
publication by The Association of British Insurers & The British Tunnelling Society.
BTS 2004. Tunnel Lining: Design Guide. British Tunnelling Society, London, Thomas Telford.
Eddie, C. & Neumann, Ch. 2003. Lasershell leads the way for SCL tunnels. In Tunnels & Tunnelling
International, June, pp 38 42.
Field, G., Legge, N. & Liew, B. S. 2000. Optimising Shaft Design and Construction Using Sprayed
Concrete. In Our World in Concrete and Structures, 25th Anniversary Conference, Singapore.
HMSO 2000. The construction (design and management) (amendment) regulations. HMSO, London.
HSE 1996. Safety of New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM) Tunnels. Health & Safety Executive
Books, HMSO, Norwich.
HSE 2000. The collapse of NATM tunnels at Heathrow Airport. Health & Safety Executive Books,
HMSO, Norwich.
ICE 1996. Sprayed Concrete Linings (NATM) for tunnels in soft ground. Institution of Civil Engineers
design and practice guides, Thomas Telford, London.
Muir Wood, A. 2003. What tends to go wrong in tunnelling. In Kolymbas (ed.) Summerschool on
'Rational Tunnelling' in Innsbruck, Logos Verlag Berlin, pp 61 92.
Norris, P. & Powell, D. 1999. Towards quantification of the engineering properties of steel fibre
reinforced sprayed concrete. In 3rd Int. Symposium on Sprayed Concrete, Gol, Norway, pp 393 - 402.
Thomas, A.H. 2003. Numerical modeling of sprayed concrete lined (SCL) tunnels. PhD thesis, University
of Southampton.
Thomas, A.H., Casson, E.M. & Powell, D.P. 2003. Common ground the integration of the design and
construction of a sprayed concrete lined (SCL) tunnel in San Diego, USA. In Underground Construction
2003, pp 71 - 82.
Van der Berg, J.P., Clayton, C.R.I., & Powell, D.B. 2003. Displacements ahead of an advancing NATM
Tunnel in London Clay. In Geotechnique, Vol 53, No 9, November, p 767-784.