Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Article 1732 does not distinguish between a carrier offering its services
to the general public, that is the general community or population, and
one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population.
The Civil Code does not provide that the transportation should be by
motor vehicle.
Undertakes to carry for all people indifferently and thus is liable for
refusal without sufficient reason (Lastimoso vs. Doliente, 3 SCRA ,
[1961]);
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, (4) of her holds were
presumably inspected by the charterers representative and found fit to take a
load of urea in bulk. After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores
hired by and under the supervision of the shipper, the steel hatches were
closed with heavy iron lids. Upon arrival of vessel at port, the petitioner
unloaded the cargo pursuant to the terms and conditions of the charter-party.
The hatches remained open throughout the duration of the discharge.
Upon arrival at petitioners warehouse a survey conducted over the
cargo revealed a shortage and the most of the fertilizer was contaminated
with dirt. As such, Planters filed an action for damages. The defendant argued
that the public policy governing common carriers do not apply to them
because they have become private carriers by reason of the provisions of the
charter-party.
Issue: Whether or not the charter-party contract between the ship owner and
the charterer transforms a common carrier into a private carrier?
Held: A charter party may either her be time charter wherein the vessel is
leased to the charterer, wherein the ship is leased to the charterer for a fixed
period of time or voyage charter, wherein the ship is leased for a single
voyage. In both cases, the charter party provides for the hire of the vessel
only, either for a determinate time or for a single or consecutive voyage.
It is therefor imperative that such common carrier shall remain as such,
notwithstanding the charter of the whole or part of the vessel by one or more
persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a
time-charter or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both ship
and its crew as in bareboat or demise that it becomes a private carrier.
Undoubtedly, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains in possession
and control of the ship, although her holds may be the property of the
charterer.
3. CALVO V. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE (G.R. NO. 148496 MARCH 19,
2002)
Facts: Petitioner Virgines Calvo, owner of Transorient Container Terminal
Services, Inc. (TCTSI), and a custom broker, entered into a contract with San
Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of 114 reels of semi-chemical
fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the port area to the
Tabacalera Compound, Ermita, Manila.
The cargo was insured by
respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.
On July 14, 1990, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived in Manila on
board M/V Hayakawa Maru. After 24 hours, they were unloaded from
vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila Port Services, Inc.
From July 23 to 25, 1990, petitioner, pursuant to her contract with SMC,
withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMCs
warehouse in Manila. On July 25, the goods were inspected by Marine Cargo
Surveyors, reported that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper were
wet/stained/torn and 3 reels of kraft liner board were also torn. The
damages cost P93,112.00.
SMC collected the said amount from respondent UCPB under its
insurance contract. Respondent on the other hand, as a subrogee of SMC,
brought a suit against petitioner in RTC, Makati City. On December 20, 1995,
the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner liable for the damage to the
shipment. The decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier?
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Held: In this case the contention of the petitioner, that he is not a common
carrier but a private carrier, has no merit.
Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who
does such carrying only as ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids
making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e.,
the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that
Article 1733 deliberately refrained from making such distinction. (De Guzman
v. CA, 68 SCRA 612)
Te concept of common carrier under Article 1732 coincide with the
notion of public service, under the Public Service Act which partially
supplements the law on common carrier. Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of
the Public Service Act, it includes:
x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage,
or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited
clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general
business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction
railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or
without fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier
service of any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines,
ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight
or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, icerefrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power,
water supply and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless
communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other
similar public services. x x x
4. FABRE VS. CA (259 SCRA 426 G.R. NO. 111127, JULY 26, 1996)
Facts: Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a Mazda
minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for
school children which they operated in Manila. It was driven by Porfirio Cabil.
On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian
Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with the petitioners for the transportation of
33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in
consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the amount of
P3,000.00.
The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan.
However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who
was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La Union), was forced to
take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30
that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway. The road
was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at
the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus
hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of
one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a
full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A
coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion. Because
of the mishap, several passengers were injured particularly Amyline Antonio.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Criminal complaint was filed against the driver and the spouses were
also made jointly liable. Spouses Fabre on the other hand contended that
they are not liable since they are not a common carrier. The RTC of Makati
ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the defendants were ordered to pay jointly
and severally to the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
Issue: Whether the spouses Fabre are common carriers?
Held: Petition was denied. Spouses Fabre are common carriers.
The Supreme Court held that this case actually involves a contract of
carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business
of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common
carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held: 10 Art. 1732, Common
carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who
does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline").
Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and
one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to
the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who
offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such
distinctions.
5. TATAD VS. GARCIA (241 SCRA 334, GR. NO. 114222. APRIL 6, 1995)
Facts: DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along Edsa.
EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation was awarded the contract
to build, lease and transfer the said light railway.
The said award was questioned by the petitioners on the basis that a
foreign corporation cannot own the EDSA LRT III, a public utility as it violates
the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not an owner and lessor of the facilities used by a public
utility constitute a public utility?
Held: EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. Is admittedly a foreign corporation duly
incorporated and existing under the laws of Hong Kong. However, there is no
dispute that once the EDSA LRT III is constructed, the private respondent, as
lessor, will turn it over to DOTC as lessee, for the latter to operate the system
and pay rentals for the said use.
What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks, rail
stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise
is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not
themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility in not
their ownership but their use to serve the public.
The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the
operation of a public utility. However, it does not require a franchise before
one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does
not operate them to serve the public. In law, there is a clear distinction
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
between the operation of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities
and the equipment used to serve the public.
6. FISHER VS. YANGCO STEAMSHIP (31 PHIL 1)
Facts: The complained alleges that plaintiff is a stockholder in Yangco
Steamship
Company, the owner of the large steam vessels, duly licensed to
engage in the coastwise trade of the Philippine Island; that on or about June
10, 1912, the directors of the company, adopted a resolution which was
thereafter ratified and affirmed by the stockholders of the company expressly
declaring and providing that the classes of merchandise to be carried by the
company in its business as common carrier do not include dynamite, powder
or other explosives, and expressly prohibiting the officers, agents an d
servants of the company from offering to carry, accepting for carriage or
carrying said dynamite, powder or other explosives.
Issue: Whether the refusal of the owner and officer of a steam vessel, to
accept for carriage dynamite, powder or other explosives for carriage can be
held to be a lawful act?
Held: The traffic in dynamite gun powder and other explosive is vitally
essential to the material and general welfare of the inhabitants of this islands
and it these products are to continue in general use throughout the
Philippines they must be transported from water to port to port in various
island which make up the Archipelago.
It follows that a refusal by a particular vessel engage as a common
carrier of merchandise in coastwise trade in the Philippine Island to accept
such explosives for carriage constitutes a violation.
The prohibition against discrimination penalized under the statute,
unless it can be shown that there is so Real and substantial danger of
disaster necessarily involved in the courage of any or all of this article of
merchandise as to render such refusal a due or unnecessary or a reasonable
exercise or prudence and discreation on the part of the ship owner.
7. LOADSTAR SHIPPING VS. CA (315 SCRA 339, 1999)
Facts: On November 19, 1984, loadstar received on board its M/V
Cherokee bales of lawanit hardwood, tilewood and Apitong Bolidenized for
shipment. The goods, amounting to P6,067, 178. Were insured for the same
amount with the Manila Insurance Company against various risks including
Total Loss by Total Loss of the Vessel. On November 20, 1984, on its way to
Manila from the port of Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte, the vessel, along with its
cargo, sank off Limasawa Island. As a result of the total loss of its shipment,
the consignee made a claim with loadstar which, however, ignored the same.
As the insurer, MIC paid to the insured in full settlement of its claim, and the
latter executed a subrogation receipt therefor. MIC thereafter filed a complaint
against loadstar alleging that the sinking of the vessel was due to fault and
negligence of loadstar and its employees.
In its answer, Loadstar denied any liability for the loss of the shippers
goods and claimed that the sinking of its vessel was due to force majeure.
The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of MIC., prompting loadstar to
elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals, which however, agreed with the
trial court and affirmed its decision in toto. On appeal, loadstar maintained
that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued a Certificate of
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
Public Convenience, it did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed
route, and there was only one shipper, one consignee for a special crago.
Issue: Whether or not M/V Cherokee was a private carrier so as to exempt it
from the provisions covering Common Carrier?
Held: Loadstar is a common carrier.
The Court held that LOADSTAR is a common carrier. It is not
necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience, and
this public character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in
question was periodic, occasional, episodic or unscheduled. Further, the bare
fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of cargo for one shipper,
which appears to be purely co-incidental; it is no reason enough to convert
the vessel from a common to a private carrier, especially where, as in this
case, it was shown that the vessel was also carrying passengers.
Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled
basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population.
8. FIRST PHILIPPINES INDUSTRIAL CORP. VS. CA (300 SCRA 661)
Facts: Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under R.A. No. 387, as
amended, a contract, install and operate oil pipelines. The original pipeline
concession was granted in 1967 and renewed by the Energy Regulatory
Board in 1992.
Sometime in January 1995, petitioner applied for a mayors permit with
the Office of the Mayor of Batangas City. However, before the mayors permit
could be issued, the respondent City Treasurer required petitioner to pay a
local tax based on its gross receipts for the fiscal year 1993 pursuant to the
Local Government Code. The respondent City Treasure assessed a business
tax on the petitioner amounting to P956,076.04 payable in four installments
based on the gross receipts for products pumped at GPS-1 for the fiscal year
1993 which amounted to P181,681,151.00. In order not to hamper its
operations, petitioner paid the tax but under protest in the amount of P239,
019.01 for the first quarter of 1993.
On June 15, 1994, petitioner filed with the RTC of Batangas City a
complaint for tax refund with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against
respondents City of Batangas and Adoracion Arellano in her capacity as City
Treasurer.
Traversing the complaint, the respondents argued that petitioner
cannot be exempt from taxes under Sec. 133(J) of the Local Government
Code as said exemption applied only to transportation contractors and
persons engaged in the transportation by hire and common carriers by air
land and water. Respondents assert that pipelines are not included in the
term common carrier which refers solely to ordinary carriers as trucks,
trains, ships and the like. Respondents further posit that the term common
carrier under the said Code pertains to the mode or manner by which a
product is delivered to its destination.
Issue: Whether the petitioner, an oil pipeline operator is a common carrier,
and therefore exempted from paying local taxes?
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
business with PUB service for passengers and freight and various certificates
for public conveniences (CPC) to operate passenger buses from Metro
Manila to Bicol Region and Eastern Samar. On March 27,1980 PANTRANCO
through its counsel wrote to Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) requesting
authority to lease/purchase a vessel named MN "Black Double" "to be used
for its project to operate a ferryboat service from Matnog, Sorsogon and Allen,
Samar that will provide service to company buses and freight trucks that have
to cross San Bernardo Strait. In a reply of April 29,1981 PANTRANCO was
informed by MARINA that it cannot give due course to the request.
PANTRANCO nevertheless acquired the vessel MN "Black Double" on
May 27, 1981 for P3 Million pesos. It wrote the Chairman of the Board of
Transportation (BOT) through its counsel, that it proposes to operate a ferry
service to carry its passenger buses and freight trucks between Allen and
Matnog in connection with its trips to Tacloban City. PANTRANCO claims that
it can operate a ferry service in connection with its franchise for bus operation
in the highway from Pasay City to Tacloban City "for the purpose of continuing
the highway, which is interrupted by a small body of water, the said proposed
ferry operation is merely a necessary and incidental service to its main
service and obligation of transporting its passengers from Pasay City to
Tacloban City. Such being the case there is no need to obtain a separate
certificate for public convenience to operate a ferry service between Allen and
Matnog to cater exclusively to its passenger buses and freight trucks.
Without awaiting action on its request PANTRANCO started to operate
said ferry service. Acting Chairman Jose C. Campos, Jr. of BOT ordered
PANTRANCO not to operate its vessel until the application for hearing on Oct.
1, 1981. In another order BOT enjoined PANTRANCO from operating the MN
"Black Double" otherwise it will be cited to show cause why its CPC should
not be suspended or the pending application denied.
Epitacio San Pablo (now represented by his heirs) and Cardinal
Shipping Corporation who are franchise holders of the ferry service in this
area interposed their opposition. They claim they adequately service the
PANTRANCO by ferrying its buses, trucks and passengers. BOT then asked
the legal opinion from the Minister of Justice whether or not a bus company
with an existing CPC between Pasay City and Tacloban City may still be
required to secure another certificate in order to operate a ferry service
between two terminals of a small body of water. On October 20, 1981 then
Minister of Justice Ricardo Puno rendered an opinion to the effect that there
is no need for bus operators to secure a separate CPC to operate a ferryboat
service.
Thus on October 23, 1981 the BOT rendered its decision holding that
the ferryboat service is part of its CPC to operate from Pasay to Samar/Leyte
by amending PANTRANCO's CPC so as to reflect the same.
Cardinal Shipping Corporation and the heirs of San Pablo filed
separate motions for reconsideration of said decision and San Pablo filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration that were denied by the BOT on July
21, 1981. Hence, San Pablo filed the herein petition for review on certiorari
with prayer for preliminary injunction seeking the revocation of said decision,
and pending consideration of the petition the issuance of a restraining order
or preliminary injunction against the operation by PANTRANCO of said ferry
service
Issue: Whether or not the ferry boat is a common carrier?
Held: Considering the environmental circumstances of the case, the
conveyance of passengers, trucks and cargo from Matnog to Allen is certainly
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
10
E. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
CARRIER
Common Carrier
As to passengers
Holds himself out for all
indiscriminately.
COMMON
CARRIER AND
PRIVATE
Private Carrier
people Contracts with particular individuals
or groups only.
As to required diligence
Requires extraordinary diligence.
As to state regulation
Subject to regulation.
11
2.
Code.
3.
B. Land Transportation
a.
Common Carriers
Private Carriers
Object merchandise
Code of Commerce primary law
Civil Code suppletory law
C. Air Transportation
1.
2.
Domestic Transportation
Civil Code
Code of Commerce
International
Transportation
Warsaw
Convention
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
12
VS.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
Facts: Sometime in or prior to June 1977, the M/S Asiatica, a vessel operated
by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines Inc., loaded at Kobe, Japan for
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
13
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negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate inandated
to discharged it directly. Furthermore rate fixing or making is a delicate and
sensitive government function that requires dexterity of judgment and sound
discretion with the settle goal at arriving at a just and reasonable rate
acceptable to both public utility and the public.
1. REGISTERED OWNER RULE
GELISAN VS. ALDAY (154 SCRA 388)
Facts: Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu entered into a contract where
the former hired the truck of Gelisan for the purpose of transporting goods at
the price of P18.00. It is also agreed that Espiritu shall bear and pay all
losses and damages attending the carriage of the goods to be hauled by him.
Benito Alday, a trucking operator, had a contract to haul the fertilizers of the
Atlas Fertilizer Corporation from Pier 4, North Harbor, to its Warehouse in
Mandaluyong. Alday met Espiritu at the gate of Pier 4 and the latter offered
the use of his truck with the driver and helper at 9 centavos per bag of
fertilizer. The offer was accepted by plaintiff Alday and he instructed his
checker Celso Henson to let Roberto Espiritu haul the fertilizer. Espiritu made
two hauls of 200 bags of fertilizer per trip. The fertilizer was delivered to the
driver and helper of Espiritu with the necessary way bill receipts, Exhibits A
and B. Espiritu, however, did not deliver the fertilizer to the Atlas Fertilizer
bodega at Mandaluyong.
Subsequently, plaintiff Alday saw the truck in question on Sto. Cristo
St. and he notified the Manila Police Department, and it was impounded by
the police. It was claimed by Bienvenido Gelisan. As a result of the
impounding of the truck according to Gelisan and that for the release of the
truck he paid the premium of P300 to the surety company.
Benito Alday was compelled to pay the value of the 400 bags of
fertilizer, in the amount of P5,397.33, to Atlas Fertilizer Corporation so that, on
12 February 1962, he (Alday) filed a complaint against Roberto Espiritu and
Bienvenido Gelisan with the CFI Manila
Bienvenido Gelisan, upon the other hand, claimed that he had no
contractual relations with the plaintiff Benito Alday.
Issue: Whether Gelisan being a registered owner is responsible for
damages?
Held: The Court has invariably held in several decisions that the registered
owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise
from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of
the passengers therein. The claim of the petitioner that he is not able in view
of the lease contract executed by and between him and Roberto Espiritu
which exempts him from liability to third persons, cannot be sustained
because it appears that the lease contract, adverted to, had not been
approved by the Public Service Commission. It is settled in our jurisprudence
that if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another
without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding upon the
public and third persons.
Bienvenido Gelisan, the registered owner, is not however without
recourse. He has a right to be indemnified by Roberto Espiritu for the amount
that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito
Alday, since the lease contract in question, although not effective against the
public for not having been approved by the Public Service Commission, is
valid and binding between the contracting parties.
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
15
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Held: Kabit system is defined as, when a person who has been granted a
certificate of convenience allows another person who owns a motor vehicle to
operate under such franchise for a fee. This system is not penalized as a
criminal offense but is recognized as one that is against public policy;
therefore it is void and inexistent.
It is fundamental that the court will not aid either of the party to enforce
an illegal contract, but will leave them both where it finds them. Upon this
premise, it was flagrant error on the part of both trial and appellate courts to
have accorded the parties relief from their predicament. Specifically Article
1412 states that:
If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not
constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed: when the
fault, is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he
has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the others
undertaking.
The principle of in pari delicto is evident in this case. the proposition is
universal that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no
suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property
agreed to sold or delivered, or damages for its property agreed to be sold or
delivered, or damages for its violation. The parties in this case are in pari
delicto, therefore no affirmative relief can be granted to them.
TEJA MARKETING V. IAC (148 SCRA 347)
Facts: Pedro Nale bought from Teja Marketing a motorcycle with complete
accessories and a sidecar. A chattel mortgage was constituted as a security
for the payment of the balance of the purchase price. The records of the
Land Transportation Commission show that the motorcycle sold to the
defendant was first mortgaged to the Teja Marketing by Angel Jaucian though
the Teja Marketing and Angel Jaucian are one and the same, because it was
made to appear that way only as the defendant had no franchise of his own
and he attached the unit to the plaintiff's MCH Line. The agreement also of
the parties here was for the plaintiff to undertake the yearly registration of the
motorcycle with the Land Transportation Commission. The plaintiff, however
failed to register the motorcycle on that year on the ground that the defendant
failed to comply with some requirements such as the payment of the
insurance premiums and the bringing of the motorcycle to the LTC for
stenciling, the plaintiff said that the defendant was hiding the motorcycle from
him. Lastly, the plaintiff also explained that though the ownership of the
motorcycle was already transferred to the defendant, the vehicle was still
mortgaged with the consent of the defendant to the Rural Bank of Camaligan
for the reason that all motorcycle purchased from the plaintiff on credit was
rediscounted with the bank.
Teja Marketing made demands for the payment of the motorcycle but
just the same Nale failed to comply, thus forcing Teja Marketing to consult a
lawyer and file an action for damage before the City Court of Naga in the
amount of P546.21 for attorney's fees and P100.00 for expenses of litigation.
Teja Marketing also claimed that as of 20 February 1978, the total account of
Nale was already P2, 731, 05 as shown in a statement of account; includes
not only the balance of P1, 700.00 but an additional 12% interest per annum
on the said balance from 26 January 1976 to 27 February 1978; a 2% service
charge; and P546.21 representing attorney's fees. On his part, Nale did not
dispute the sale and the outstanding balance of P1,700.00 still payable to
Teja Marketing; but contends that because of this failure of Teja Marketing to
comply with his obligation to register the motorcycle, Nale suffered damages
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
18
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
19
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they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give
his seat to the white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in
the plane after being threatened that he will be thrown out of the plane if he
does not oblige. The captain of the plane, when asked to intervene, refused
to do so.
Issue: Whether or not there was bad faith on the part of Air France, petitioner,
entitling Rafael Carrascoso, respondent for moral and exemplary damages as
against the petitioner?
Held: The court held in favor of the respondent, Carrascoso.
The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees
need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of
petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree
from any other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an
air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the traveling
public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a
right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy
and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees.
So it is that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier.
The court held that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not
suffer from reversible error. CA decision affirmed.
3. TIU VS. ARRIESGADO G.R. NO. 138060, SEPTEMBER 1, 2004
Facts: At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck marked
"Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise" bearing plate number
GBP-675 was loaded with firewood in Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City.
Upon reaching Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck
passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio
Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the national highway and
removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop, about 700
meters away. Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the
stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away
behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles. The
trucks tail lights were also left on. It was about 12:00 a.m., March 16, 1987.
At about 4:45 a.m., D Rough Riders passenger bus with plate number
PBP-724 driven by Virgilio Te Laspias was cruising along the national
highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu. The passenger bus
was also bound for Cebu City, and had come from Maya, Daanbantayan,
Cebu. Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado and
Felisa Pepito Arriesgado, who were seated at the right side of the bus, about
three (3) or four (4) places from the front seat.
As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspias saw the stalled truck,
which was then about 25 meters away. He applied the breaks and tried to
swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus
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rammed into the trucks left rear. The impact damaged the right side of the bus
and left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado lost consciousness and
suffered a fracture in his right colles. His wife, Felisa, was brought to the
Danao City Hospital. She was later transferred to the Southern Island Medical
Center where she died shortly thereafter.
Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of
contract of carriage, damages and attorneys fees before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 20, against the petitioners, D Rough Riders bus
operator William Tiu and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspias on May 27, 1987. The
respondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was cruising at a fast
and high speed along the national road, and that petitioner Laspias did not
take precautionary measures to avoid the accident.
The petitioners, for their part, filed a Third-Party Complaint against the
following: respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. (PPSII),
petitioner Tius insurer; respondent Benjamin Condor, the registered owner of
the cargo truck; and respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of the truck. They
alleged that petitioner Laspias was negotiating the uphill climb along the
national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, in a moderate and
normal speed. It was further alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted
manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of the highway, and that no early
warning device was displayed. Petitioner Laspias promptly applied the
brakes and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on, but despite
his efforts to avoid damage to property and physical injuries on the
passengers, the right side portion of the bus hit the cargo trucks left rear.
HELD: The rules which common carriers should observe as to the safety of their
passengers are set forth in the Civil Code, Articles 1733, 1755and 1756. It is
undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the
destination agreed upon. In actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such
contract, and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need to be proved.
This is because under the said contract of carriage, the petitioners assumed the
express obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination safely
and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all circumstances. Any
injury suffered by the passengers in the course thereof is immediately attributable to
the negligence of the carrier. Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that
he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. It must be stressed
that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in
creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the
recklessness of their drivers. While evidence may be submitted to overcome such
presumption of negligence, it must be shown that the carrier observed the required
extraordinary diligence, which means that the carrier must show the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons as far as human care and foresight can provide, or that the
accident was caused by fortuitous event. As correctly found by the trial court,
petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut such presumption. The negligence of
petitioner Laspias as driver of the passenger bus is, thus, binding against petitioner
Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a common carrier.
B. EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE
REQUIREMENT OF EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE
Common Carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence on the vigilance
over goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them
according to all the circumstances of each case. (Art. 1733, Civil Code)
Coverage
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1.
2.
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C.
The common carrier shall be liable even if the shipper or owner merely
contributed to the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, the
proximate cause thereof being the negligence of the common carrier,
the latter shall be liable in damages, which, however, shall be equitably
reduced. (Art. 1741, Civil Code)
The rule is that if the improper packing is known to the carrier or his
employee or is apparent upon ordinary observation, but he
nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception
notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved of liability for the
resulting damage. (A.F. Sanchez Brokerage Inc. vs. C.A., 447
SCRA 427, [2004])
Said public authority must have the power to issue the order (Article
1743, Civil Code). Consequently, where the officer acts without legal
process, the common carrier will be held liable. (Ganzon v. CA 161,
SCRA 646 [1988])
Cases:
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The contention of the petitioner that the loss is due to casa fortuito
exempting them from liability is untenable. Petitioner failed to show that such
natural disaster or calamity was the proximate and only cause of the loss.
Human agency must be entirely excluded from the cause of injury or loss. In
other words, the damaging effects blamed on the event or phenomenon must
not have been caused, contributed to, or worsened by the presence of human
participation. The defense of fortuitous event or natural disaster cannot be
successfully made when the injury could have been avoided by human
precaution.
The monsoon is not the proximate cause of the sinking but is due to
the improper stowage of logs. The logs were not secured by cable wires,
causing the logs to shift and later on the sinking the ship. This shows that
they did not exercise extraordinary diligence, making them liable for such
loss.
SWEET LINES INC, VS. CA (121 SCRA 769)
Facts: Herein private respondents purchased first-class tickets from petitioner
at the latters office in Cebu City. They were to board M/V Sweet Grace bound
for Catbalogan, Western Samar. Instead of departing at the scheduled hour of
about midnight on July 8, 1972, the vessel set sail at 3:00 am of July 9, 1972
only to be towed back to Cebu due to engine trouble, arriving there on the
same day at about 4:00 pm. The vessel lifted anchor again on July 10, 1972
at around 8:00 am. Instead of docking at Catbalogan (the first port of call), the
vessel proceeded direct to Tacloban. Private respondents had no recourse
but to disembark and board a ferry boat to Catbalogan. Hence, the suit for
breach of contract of carriage.
Issue: Whether or not the mechanical defect constitutes a fortuitous event
which would exempt the carrier from liability.
Held: No. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, there was no
fortuitous event or force majeure which prevented the vessel from fulfilling its
undertaking of taking the private respondents to Catbalogan. In the first place,
mechanical defects in the carrier are not considered a caso fortuito that
exempts the carrier from responsibility. In the second place, even granting
arguendo that the engine failure was a fortuitous event, it accounted on for
the delay of departure. When the vessel finally left the port, there was no
longer any force majeure that justified by-passing a port of call.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. CA 234 SCRA 7
Facts: On December 4, 1981, two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from
Yokohama, Japan for delivery vessel "SS EASTERN COMET" owned by
defendant Eastern Shipping Lines under a bill of lading. The shipment was
insured under plaintiff's Marine Insurance Policy. Upon arrival of the shipment
in Manila on December 12, 1981, it was discharged unto the custody of
defendant Metro Port Service, Inc. The latter excepted to one drum, said to
be in bad order, which damage was unknown to plaintiff.
On January 7, 1982 defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation received
the shipment from defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., one drum opened and
without seal. On January 8 and 14, 1982, defendant Allied Brokerage
Corporation made deliveries of the shipment to the consignee's warehouse.
The latter excepted to one drum which contained spillages, while the rest of
the contents was adulterated/fake.
Plaintiff contended that due to the losses/damage sustained by said
drum, the consignee suffered losses totaling P19, 032.95, due to the fault and
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was on he running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his
bayong which he left under one its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor
was not shut off while unloading suddenly started moving forward, evidently
to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still
attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when
the bus was again placed in a complete stop, it had traveled about 10 meters
from point where plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately jumped
form the running board without getting his bayong from conductor. He landed
on the side of the road almost board in front of the shaded place where he left
his wife and his children. At that time, he saw people beginning to gather
around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed,
and without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was
run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together her parent.
For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit against the
defendant to recover from the latter damages.
Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of the bus
involved in the incident, and therefore, the contract of carriage was already
terminated?
Held: There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned,
when he returned to the bus for his bayong which was not unloaded, the
relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner remained
subsisting. The relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease
where the latter, after alighting from the car aids the carriers servant or
employee in removing his baggage from the car.
It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease the
moment the passenger alights from the carriers vehicle at a place selected
by the carrier at the point of destination but continues until the passenger has
had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers
premises.
The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was
not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel must have followed
her father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the
bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started
to run, so that even he had jumped down from the moving vehicle. It was that
this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and
killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carriers agent had
exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person required by
Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the
discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. The driver,
although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started
to run the bus even before the conductor gave him the signal to go and while
the latter was still unloading part of the baggage of the passengers Beltran
and family. The presence of the said passengers near the bus was not
unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of
the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORP. VS. CA (179 SCRA 95)
Facts: On May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded M/|V Antonio from
Occidental Mindoro bound for Manila. Upon arrival on May 12, 1975, the
passengers therein disembarked through a gangplank connecting the vessel
to the pier. Viana, instead of disembarking through the gangplank,
disembarked through the third deck, which was at the same level with the
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door, the train suddenly picked up speed. The old woman and the child
stumbled from the train causing them to fall down the tracks and were hit by
an oncoming train, causing their instant death.
A criminal information was filed against Victor Milan, the driver,
Hermogenes Buencamino, the assistant conductor and Clemente Brinas for
Double Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. But the lower court acquitted
Milan and Buencamino. On appeal to the CA, respondent CA affirmed the
decision.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling the accused-appellant was
negligent?
Held: There was no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in
the conclusion drawn from the findings.
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common
carriers like trains and buses that before reaching a station or flagstop they
slow down and the conductor announces the name of the place. It is also a
matter of common experience that as the train or bus slackens its speed,
some passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to
disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This is especially true of a
train because passengers feel that if the train resumes its run before they are
able to disembark; there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped.
The appellant was negligent because his announcement was premature and
erroneous, for it took a full 3 minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan
was reached. The premature announcement prompted the two victims to
stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said announcement, the
victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats when the train
jerked and picked up speed. The proximate cause of the death of the victims
was the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant.
GACAL VS. PAL (183 SCRA 189, G.R. NO. 55300 MARCH 16, 1990)
Facts: Plaintiffs Franklin Gacal, his wife and three others were passengers of
PAL plane at Davao Airport for a flight to Manila, not knowing that the flight,
were Commander Zapata with other members of Moro National Liberation
Front. They were armed with grenades and pistols. After take off, the
members of MNLF announced a hijacking and directed the pilot to fly directly
to Libya, later to Sabah. They were, however, forced to land in Zamboanga
airport for refueling, because the plane did not have enough fuel to make
direct flight to Sabah. When the plane began to taxi at the runaway of
Zamboanga airport, it was met by two armored cars of the military.
An armored car subsequently bumped the stairs leading inside the
plane. That commenced the battle between the military and the hijackers,
which led ultimately to the liberation of the planes surviving crew and
passengers with the final score of ten passengers and three hijackers dead.
Issue: Whether or not hijacking is a case fortuito or force majeure, which
would exempt an aircraft from liability for, damages to its passengers and
personal belongings that were lost during the incident?
Held: In order to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt from liability
under Art 1174 of the civil code, it is necessary that the following elements
must occur: (a) the cause of the breach of obligation must be independent of
human will; (b) the event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event
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must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in
a normal manner; (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
Applying the above guidelines, the failure to transport the petitioners
safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident staged buy
the MNLF without connection to the private respondent, hence, independent
of will of PAL or its passengers.
The events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligation in a
normal manner and it cannot be faulted for negligence on the duty performed
by the military. The existence of force majeure has been established thus
exempting PAL from payment of damages.
PILAPIL VS. CA 180 SCRA 546
Facts: On September 16, 1971, Jose Pilapil boarded defendants bus
bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City at about 6:00PM. Upon reaching
the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, on the
way to Naga City City, an unidentified man ( a bystander) hurled a stone at
the left side of the bus, which apparently hit petitioner above his left eye. He
was then immediately brought by private respondents personnel to the
provincial hospital in Naga City.
Issue: Whether or not the nature of the business of a transportation company
requires the assumption of certain risks and the stroking of the bus by a
bystander resulting in injury to petitioner-passenger is one such risk from
which the common carrier may not exempt itself from liability?
Held: The Supreme Court held that while the law requires the highest degree
of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers
and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not however,
make the carrier an insurer of absolute safety of its passengers. A tort,
committed by a stranger which causes an injury to a passenger does not
accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for
which a common carrier is responsible is the negligent omission by the
carriers employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same
could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, it is to be noted
that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as
in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the
common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father
of the family.
COMPANIA MARITIMA VS COURT OF APPEALS AND VICENTE
CONCEPCION (162 SCRA 685)
Facts: Vicente Concepcion is doing business under the name of
Consolidated Construction. Being a Manila based contractor, Concepcion had
to ship his construction equipment to Cagayan de Oro. On August 28, 1964,
Concepcion shipped 1 unit pay loader, 4 units of 6x6 Roe trucks, and 2 pieces
of water tanks. The aforementioned equipment was loaded aboard the MV
Cebu, which left Manila on August 30, 1964 and arrived at Cagayan de Oro
on September 1, 1964. The Reo trucks and water tanks were safely unloaded
however the pay loader suffered damage while being unloaded. The
damaged pay loader was taken to the petitioners compound in Cagayan de
Oro.
Consolidated Construction thru Vicente Concepcion wrote Compania
Maritima to demand a replacement of the broken pay loader and also asked
for damages. Unable to get a response, Concepcion sent another demand
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negligence. Neither shall it be liable for loss due to fortuitous events such as
dangers of the sea and war.
Issue: Whether or not the carrier should be held liable for the destruction of
the goods
Held: No. There is nothing on record to show that the carrier incurred in
delay in the performance of its obligation. Since the carrier even notified the
plaintiffs of the arrival of their shipments and had demanded that they be
withdrawn.
The carrier also cannot be charged with negligence since the storage
of the goods was in the Customs warehouse and was undoubtedly made with
their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged and maintained
by the Government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant
since it has no control over the same.
DSR SENATOR LINES VS. FEDERAL PHOENIX 7 OCTOBER 2003
Facts: Berde plants, Inc. delivered 632 units of artificial trees to C.F. Sharp
and Company, Inc., the General Sip Agent of DSR- Senator Lines, a foreign
shipping corporation, for transportation and delivery to the consignee, Al-Mohr
International Group, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Sharp issued an international
bill of landing for the cargo, with a stipulation that the port of discharge for the
cargo was at the Khor Fakkan port and the port of delivery was Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia.
On June 7, 1993, the vessel left Manila for Saudi Arabia with the cargo
on board. When the vessel arrived in Khor Fakkan Port, the cargo was
reloaded on board DSR-Senator Lines feeder vessel, however while in transit,
the vessel and all its cargo caught fire.
Consequently, Federal Phoenix Assurance paid Berde Plants
corresponding to the amount of the insurance for the cargo. In turn, Berde
Plants executed in its favor a Subrogation Receipt.
Federal Phoenix demanding payment on the basis of the subrogation
receipt. C.f. Sharp denied any liability that such liability was extinguished
when the vessel carrying the cargo was gutted by fire. Thus, Federal Phoenix
filed a complaint for damages against DSR-Senator Lines and C.F, Sharp.
Issue: Whether or not there was a breach of contract of carriage.
Held: Fire is not one of those enumerated under Article 1734 of the Civil
Code to wit,
Art. 1734, Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following
causes only:
1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
calamity;
2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international civil;
3. Act or omission of the shipper or the owner of the goods;
4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers;
5. Order or act of competent public authority.
6. Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by them. Accordingly, they are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently of the
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ought to know that it was still necessary to verify first from Thai International if
they would honor the endorsement of his JAL ticket or confirm with the airline
if he had a seat in the July 2 flight.
The court finds no justification for the relief prayed for by the petitioner.
He has failed to show that the findings of the respondent court are not based
on substantial evidence or that it conclusions are contrary to law and
applicable jurisprudence.
VASQUEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS (138 SCRA 553)
Facts: MV Pioneer Cebu left the port of Manila and bounded for Cebu. Its
officers were aware of the upcoming typhoon Klaring that is already building
up somewhere in Mindanao. There being no typhoon signals on their route,
they proceeded with their voyage. When they reached the island of Romblon,
the captain decided not to seek shelter since the weather was still good. They
continued their journey until the vessel reached the island of Tanguingui,
while passing through the island the weather suddenly changed and heavy
rains fell. Fearing that they might hit Chocolate island due to zero visibility, the
captain ordered to reverse course the vessel so that they could weather out
the typhoon by facing the strong winds and waves. Unfortunately, the vessel
struck a reef near Malapascua Island, it sustained a leak and eventually sunk.
The parents of the passengers who were lost due to that incident filed
an action against Filipinas Pioneer Lines for damages. The defendant
pleaded force majeure but the Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, it reversed the decision of the lower stating
that the incident was a force majeure and absolved the defendants from
liability.
Issue: Whether of not Filipinas Pioneer Lines is liable for damages and
presumed to be at fault for the death of its passenger?
Held: The Supreme Court held the Filipinas Pioneer Lines failed to observe
that extraordinary diligence required of them by law for the safety of the
passengers transported by them with due regard for all necessary
circumstance and unnecessarily exposed the vessel to tragic mishap. Despite
knowledge of the fact that there was a typhoon, they still proceeded with their
voyage relying only on the forecast that the typhoon would weaken upon
crossing the island of Samar. The defense of caso fortuito is untenable. To
constitute caso fortuito to exempt a person from liability it necessary that the
event must be independent from human will, the occurrence must render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, the
obligor must be free from any participation or aggravation to the injury of the
creditor. Filipina Pioneer Lines failed to overcome that presumption o fault or
negligence that arises in cases of death or injuries to passengers.
GATCHALIAN V DELIM AND CA 203 SCRA 126
Facts: Gatchalian boarded the respondents Thames minibus at San
Eugenio, Aringay, La Union bound of the same province. On the way, a
snapping sound was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and shortly
thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road,
went off the road and fell into a ditch. Several passengers including the
petitioner was injured. They were taken into an hospital for treatment. While
there, private respondents wife Adela Delim visited and paid for the
expenses, hospitalization and transportation fees. However, before she left,
she had the injured passengers including the petitioner sign an already
prepared Joint Affidavit constituting a waiver of any future complaint.
However, notwithstanding this document, petitioner filed an action Ex
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Held: It is clear that the carrier is not an insurer of the passengers safety. His
liability rest upon negligence, that his failure to exercise utmost degree of
diligence that the law requires.
The passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the
selection and use of the equipment and the appliances in use by the carrier.
Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective
equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while carrier usually
has. It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not an insurer of the
safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for flaws of
his equipment if such cause were at all discoverable.
C. DEFENSE/S
Cases :
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES INC.
COURT (150 SCRA 463)
VS.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
Facts: Sometime in or prior to June 1977, the M/S Asiatica, a vessel operated
by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines Inc., loaded at Kobe, Japan for
transportation to Manila loaded 5,000 pieces of calorized pipes valued at
P256,039.00 which was consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills Co, Inc. and
7 cases of spare parts valued at P92, 361.75 consigned to Central Textile
Mills. Both sets of goods were inured against marine risk for their stated value
with respondent Development Insurance and Surety Corp.
In the same vessel, 2 containers of garment fabrics were also loaded
which was consigned to Mariveles Apparel Corp worth $46,583. The said
cargoes were consigned to Nisshin Fire and Marine Insurance. Another
cargo loaded to the vessel was the surveying instruments consigned to Aman
Enterprises and General Merchandise and insured against respondent Dowa
Fire & Marine Insurance for $1,385.00.
On the way to Manila, M/S Asiatica caught fire and sank. This resulted
to the loss of the ship and its cargoes. The respective Insurers paid the
corresponding marine insurance values and were thus subrogated to the
rights of the insured.
The insurers filed a suit against the petitioner carrier for recovery of the
amounts paid to the insured. However, petitioner contends that it is not liable
on the ground that the loss was due to an extraordinary fortuitous event.
Issues:
1. Whether the Civil Code provisions on Common Carriers or the Carriage of
the Goods by Sea Act will govern the case at bar?
2. Whether or not the common carrier has the burden of proof to show its
compliance with the diligence required by law, which is extraordinary
diligence?
Held:
1. The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs
the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration. The liability of petitioner is governed primarily by the Civil Code
however, in all matters not regulated by the Civil Code, the Code of
Commerce and Special Laws will govern with respect to the rights and
obligations of the carrier. Therefore COGSA is suppletory to the provisions of
the Civil Code.
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2. YES. The Common Carrier has the burden to prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence required by law. The Court is of the opinion that fire
may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity. This must be so as it
almost arises invariably from some act of man or by human means. It does
not fall within the category of an act of God unless caused by lightning or by
other natural disaster or calamity. However, petitioner failed to discharge the
burden of proving that it had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by
law and therefore cannot escape liability for the loss of the cargo.
GANZON VS. CA (161 SCRA 646)
Facts: Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. Ganzon to
haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on
board the lighter LCT "Batman." Pursuant to this agreement, Mauro B.
Ganzon sent his lighter "Batman" to Mariveles where it docked in 3 feet of
water. Then, Gelacio Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to Filomeno Niza,
captain of the lighter, for loading which was actually begun on the same date
by the crew of the lighter under the captain's supervision. When about half of
the scrap iron was already loaded, Mayor Jose Advincula of Mariveles,
Bataan, arrived and demanded P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing. The
latter resisted the shakedown and after a heated argument between them,
Mayor Jose Advincula drew his gun and fired at Gelacio Tumambing. The
gunshot was not fatal but Tumambing had to be taken to a hospital in
Balanga, Bataan, for treatment. After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron
was resumed. But on 4 December 1956, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub,
accompanied by 3 policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza and his crew to
dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked. The rest was brought to
the compound of NASSCO. Later on Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt
stating that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron.
Tumambing instituted with CFI Manila an action against Ganzon for
damages based on culpa contractual. The trial court rendered a decision
absolving Ganzon from liability. On appeal, however, the appellate court
reversed and set aside the decision appealed. Hence, the petition for review
on certiorari.
Held: Now the petitioner is changing his theory to caso fortuito. Such a
change of theory on appeal we cannot, however, allow. In any case, the
intervention of the municipal officials was not In any case, of a character that
would render impossible the fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation. The
petitioner was not duty bound to obey the illegal order to dump into the sea
the scrap iron. Moreover, there is absence of sufficient proof that the issuance
of the same order was attended with such force or intimidation as to
completely overpower the will of the petitioner's employees. The mere
difficulty in the fullfilment of the obligation is not considered force majeure. We
agree with the private respondent that the scraps could have been properly
unloaded at the shore or at the NASSCO compound, so that after the dispute
with the local officials concerned was settled, the scraps could then be
delivered
in
accordance
with
the
contract
of
carriage.
D. DURATION OF RESPONSIBILITY OR LIABILITY OF COMMON
CARRIERS
A. IN CASE OF GOODS
START: From the time that the goods are delivered to the common carrier.
(Article 1736, Civil Code. Cia Maritima vs. Insurance Co. of America)
TERMINATION: When the goods are delivered, actively or constructively, by
the carrier to the consignee/person who has the right to receive them, or the
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consignee/person who has the right to receive them has been informed of the
arrival of the goods and the consignee had reasonable time to remove such.
(Article 1736 and 1738, Civil Code)
The liability remains in full force and effect even when they are
temporarily unloaded or stored in transit unless the shipper or owner made
use of the right of stoppage in transitu. (Article 1737, Civil Code)
WHEN RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU IS EXERCISED:
It is the right of the unpaid seller who has parted with his goods to stop
its delivery while in transit when the buyer of the goods is or turns insolvent.
(Article 1530, Civil Code)
The common carrier who holds the goods becomes the warehouseman
or ordinary bailee and the contract is terminated when such right is exercised.
Requisites:
1. Unpaid seller (Article 1525, Civil Code);
2. Goods must be in transit (Article 1531, Civil Code);
3. The seller must either actually take possession of the goods sold or
give notice of his claim to the carrier or other person in possession
(Article 1532 [1], Civil Code);
4. The seller must surrender the negotiable document of title, if any,
issued by the carrier or bailee (Article 1532[2], Civil Code);
5. The seller must bear the expenses of delivery of the goods after the
exercise of the right (Article 1532[2], Civil Code); and
6. The buyer is in a state of insolvency or becomes insolvent.
B. IN CASE OF PASSENGERS
START: The carrier is bound to exercise utmost diligence with respect to
passengers the moment the person who purchases the ticket (or a token)
from the carrier presents himself at the proper place and in a proper manner
to be transported. Such person must have bona fide intention to use the
facilities of the carrier, possess sufficient fare with which to pay for his
passage, and present himself to the carrier for the transportation in the
manner provided. (Vda. De Nueca v. Manila Railroad Company, CA, G.R. No.
31731, January 30, 1968)
It is the duty of carriers of passengers to stop their conveyances for a
reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to
board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding
passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their
conveyances (Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. vs. CA, 202 SCRA [1991])
TERMINATION: Until the passenger has, after reaching his destination,
safely alighted from the carriers conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity
to leave the carriers premises. (La Mallorca v. CA, 17 SCRA 739 [1966])
A person by stepping and standing on the platform of a bus, is already
considered a passenger and is entitled to all rights and protection pertaining
to such conventional relation (I.d.).
E. RULES ON PASSENGERS BAGGAGE
1. Baggage in the custody of the passengers or their employee:
That baggage, while in transit will be considered as necessary deposits. The
common carrier shall be responsible for the baggage as depositaries,
provided that notice was given to them or its employees and the passengers
took the necessary precautions which the carrier has advised them relative
to the care and vigilance of their baggage.
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Case/s
QUISUMBING VS. CA
Facts: Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. and Gunther Leoffler were among the of ...
(PAL's) Fokker 'Friendship' PIC-536 plane in its flight of November 6, 1968
which left Mactan City at about 7:30 in the evening with Manila for its
destination.
After the plane had taken off, Florencio O. Villarin, a Senior NBI Agent
who was also a passenger of the said plane, noticed a certain 'Zaldy,' a
suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez, seated at the front seat near the door
leading to the cockpit of the plane. A check by Villarin with the passenger's
ticket in the possession of flight Stewardess Annie Bontigao, who was seated
at the last seat right row, revealed that 'Zaldy' had used the name 'Cardente,'
one of his aliases known to Villarin. Villarin also came to know from the
stewardess that 'Zaldy' had three companions on board the plane."
Villarin then scribbled a note addressed to the pilot of the plane
requesting the latter to contact NBI duty agents in Manila for the said agents
to ask the Director of the NBI to send about six NBI agents to meet the plane
because the suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez was on board (Exh. 'G').
The said note was handed by Villarin to the stewardess who in turn gave the
same to the pilot.
After receiving the note, which was about 15 minutes after take off, the
pilot of the plane, Capt. Luis Bonnevie, Jr., came out of the cockpit and sat
beside Villarin at the rear portion of the plane and explained that he could not
send the message because it would be heard by all ground aircraft stations.
Villarin, however, told the pilot of the danger of commission of violent acts on
board the plane by the notorious 'Zaldy' and his three companions.
While the pilot and Villarin were talking, 'Zaldy' and one of his
companions walked to the rear and stood behind them. Capt. Bonnevie then
stood up and went back to the cockpit. 'Zaldy' and his companions returned to
their seats, but after a few minutes they moved back to the rear throwing ugly
looks at Villarin who, sensing danger, stood up and went back to his original
seat across the aisle on the second to the last seat near the window. 'Zaldy
and his companion likewise went back to their respective seats in front.
Soon thereafter an exchange of gunshots ensued between Villarin
and 'Zaldy' and the latter's companions. 'Zaldy' announced to the passengers
and the pilots in the cockpit that it was a hold-up and ordered the pilot not to
send any SOS. The hold-uppers divested passengers of their belongings.
Issue: Whether or not Pal is liable for damages against the passengers for
loss caused by the robbers on board?
Held: It is illusive to assume that had these precautions been taken, the
hijacking or the robbery would not have succeeded. The mandatory use of the
most sophisticated electronic detection devices and magnetometers, the
imposition of severe penalties, the development of screening procedures, the
compilation of hijacker behavioral profiles, the assignment of sky marshals,
and the weight of outraged world opinion may have minimized hijackings but
all these have proved ineffective against truly determined hijackers. World
experience shows that if a group of armed hijackers want to take over a plane
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41
in flight, they can elude the latest combined government and airline industry
measures. And as our own experience in Zamboanga City illustrates, the use
of force to overcome hijackers, results in the death and injury of innocent
passengers and crew members. We are not in the least bit suggesting that
the Philippine Airlines should not do everything humanly possible to protect
passengers from hijackers' acts. We merely state that where the defendant
has faithfully complied with the requirements of government agencies and
adhered to the established procedures and precautions of the airline industry
at any particular time, its failure to take certain steps that a passenger in
hindsight believes should have been taken is not the negligence or
misconduct which mingles with force majeure as an active and cooperative
cause.
BRITISH AIRWAYS VS. CA (285 SCRA 450)
Facts: On April 16, 1989, Mahtani is on his way to Bombay, India from
Manila. His trip was Manila-Hong Kong via PAL and then Hong Kong-India
via British Airways. Prior to his departure, he checked in two pieces of
luggage containing his clothing and other personal effects, confident that the
same would be transferred to his BA flight.
Unfortunately, when he arrived in India, he discovered that his luggage
was missing.
The RTC awarded Mahtani damages which was affirmed by CA.
Issue: Whether or not in a contract of air carriage a declaration by the
passenger is needed to recover a greater amount?
Held: American jurisprudence provides that an air carrier is not liable for the
loss of baggage in an amount in excess of the limits specified in the tariff
which was filed with the proper authorities, such tariff being binding on the
passenger regardless of the passengers lack of knowledge thereof or assent
thereto. This doctrine is recognized in this jurisdiction.
The inescapable conclusion that BA had waived the defense of limited
liability when it allowed Mahtani to testify as to the actual damages he
incurred due to misplacement of his luggage, without any objection.
It is a well-settled doctrine that where the proponent offers evidence
deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason,
the latter has the right to object. However, such right is a mere privilege
which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest
opportunity, in case of silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate
as a waiver of objections.
F.LIABILITY OF SUCCESSIVE AIR CARRIERS
KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES VS CA (65 SCRA 237)
Facts: Spouses Mendoza approached Mr. Reyes, the branch manager of
Philippine Travel Bureau, for consultation about a world tour which they were
intending to make with their daughter and niece. Three segments of the trip,
the longest, was via KLM. Respondents decided that one of the routes they
will take was a Barcelona-Lourdes route with knowledge that only one airline,
Aer Lingus, served it. Reyes made the necessary reservations. To this, KLM
secured seat reservations for the Mendozas and their companions from the
carriers which would ferry them throughout their trip, which the exception of
Aer Lingus. When the Mendozas left the Philippines, they were issued KLM
tickets for the entire trip. However, their coupon for Aer Lingus was marked
on request.
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When they were in Germany, they went to the KLM office and obtained
a confirmation from Aer Lingus. At the airport in Barcelona, the Mendozas and
their companions checked in for their flight to Lourdes. However, although
their daughter and niece were allowed to take the flight, the spouses
Mendozas were off loaded on orders of the Aer Lingus manager, who
brusquely shoved them aside and shouted at them. So the spouses
Mendozas took a train ride to Lourdes instead.
Thus, they filed a complaint for damages against KLM for breach of
contract of carriage. The trial court decided in favor of the Mendozas. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. Hence, KLM brings this petition to the
Supreme Court. KLM cites Art 30 of the Warsaw Convention, which states:
the passenger or his representatives can take action only against the carrier
who performed the transportation during which the accident or delay
occurred. Also, KLM avers that the front cover of each ticket reads: that
liability of the carrier for damages shall be limited to occurrences on its own
line.
Issue: Whether or not KLM is liable for breach of contract of carriage?
Held: The applicability of Art. 30 of the Warsaw Convention cannot be
sustained. The article presupposes the occurrence of delay or accident. What
is manifest here is that the Aer Lingus refused to transport the spouses
Mendozas to their planned and contracted destination.
As the airline which issued the tickets, KLM was chargeable with the
duty and responsibility of specifically informing the spouses of the conditions
prescribed in their tickets or to ascertain that the spouses read them before
they accepted their passage tickets.
The Supreme Court held that KLM cannot be merely assumed as a
ticket-issuing agent for other airlines and limit its liability to untoward
occurrences on its own line.
The court found, that the passage tickets provide that the carriage to
be performed therein by several successive carriers is to be regarded as a
single operation.
FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR. VS. LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES
(G.R. NO. L-28773 JUNE 30, 1975)
Facts: Direct appeals of both parties plaintiff, Francisco Ortigas, and
defendant Luthansa German Airlines, from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila Branch Y, condemning the defendant to pay plaintiff the
amount of P100,000 as moral damages, P30,000 as exemplary or corrective
damages, with interest of both sums at the legal rate from the
commencement of this suit until fully paid, P20,000 as attorneys fees and the
costs for the former failure to comply with its obligation to give first
accommodation to (the latter) a (Filipino) passenger holding a first class
ticket, aggravated by the giving of the space instead to a Belgian and the
improper conduct of its agents in dealing with him during the occasion of such
discriminatory violence of its contract of carriage.
Issue: Whether Lufthansa is liable for damages?
Held: The court said that when it comes to contracts of common carriage,
inattention and lack of care on the part of the carrier resulting in the failure of
the passenger to be accommodated in class contracted for amounts to bad
faith and fraud which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages in
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43
accordance with the 2220 of the Civil Code. But in the instant case, the
breach appears to the graver nature, since the preference given to the
Belgian passenger over plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton disregard of
plaintiffs rights and his dignity as a human being and as a Filipino, who may
not be discriminated against with impunity, as found by the court below what
worsened the situation of Ortigas was that Lufthansa succeeded in keeping
him as its passenger by assuring him that he would be given first class
accommodation at Cairo, the next station, the proper arrangements therefore
having been made already, when in truth such was not the case. Although
molested and embarrassed to the point that he had to take nitroglycerine pills
to ward off a possible heart attack, Ortigas hardly had any choice, since his
luggage was already in the plane. To his disappointment, when the plane
reached Cairo, he was told by Lufthansa office there that no word at all had
been received from Rome and they had no space for him in first class. Worse,
similar false representations were made to him at Dharham and Calcutta. It
was only at Bangkok where for the first time. Ortigas was at last informed that
he could have a first class seat in the leg of the flight, from Bangkok to Hong
Kong. This Ortigas rejected, if only to make patent his displeasure and
indignation at being so inconsiderately treated in the earlier part of his
journey. In the light of all foregoing, there can be no doubt as to the right of
Ortigas to damages, both moral and exemplary. Precedents we have
consistently adhere to so dictate.
CHINA AIRLINES VS. CHIOK (23 JULY 2003)
Facts: Daniel Chiok purchased from China Airlines a passenger ticket for air
transportation covering Manila-Taipei-Hong Kong-Manila. The said ticket was
exclusively endorsable to PAL.
Before Chiok his trip, the trips covered by the ticket were prescheduled and confirmed by the former. When petitioner arrived in Taipei, he
went to CAL to confirm his Hong Kong- Manila trip on board PAL. The CAL
office attached a yellow sticker indicating the status was OK.
When Chiok reached Hong Kong, he then went to PAL office to confirm
his flight back to Manila. The PAL also confirmed the status of his ticket and
attached a ticket indicating a status OK. Chiok proceeded to Hong Kong
airport for his trip to Manila. However, upon reaching the PAL counter, he was
told that the flight to Manila was cancelled due to typhoon. He was informed
that all confirmed flight ticket holders of PAL were automatically booked for
the next flight the following day.
The next day, Chiok was not able to board the plane because his name
did not appear on the computer as passenger for the said flight to Manila.
Issue: Whether or not CAL is liable for damages?
Held: The contract of air transportation between the petitioner and
respondent, with the former endorsing PAL the segment of Chioks journey.
Such contract of carriage has been treated in this jurisprudence as a single
operation pursuant to Warsaw Convention, to which the Philippines is a party.
In the instant case, PAL as the carrying agent of CAL, the latter cannot
evade liability to respondent, Chiok, even though it may have been only a
ticket issuer for Hong Kong- Manila sector.
III.
CODE
OF
COMMERCE
PROVISIONS
ON
OVERLAND
TRANSPORTATION (*Unless otherwise indicated, reference is to Code of
Commerce)
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However, the carrier cannot limit its liability for injury to, or loss of,
goods shipped where such injury or loss was caused by its own
negligence.
o
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are to be shipped is already in the port where the goods are held for
shipment.
On-Board Bill of Lading v. Received for Shipment Bill of Lading:
An On Board Bill of Lading is one in which it is stated that the goods
have been received on board the vessel which is to carry the goods. An on
board bill of lading is issued when the goods have been actually placed
aboard the ship with every reasonable expectation that the shipment is as
good as on its way. It is, therefore, understandable that a party to a maritime
contract would require an on board bill of lading because of its apparent
certainty of shipping as well as the seaworthiness of the vessel which is to
carry the goods. (Magellan Mfg.,etc. v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 116117[1991])
A Received for Shipment Bill of Lading is one which it is stated that
the goods have been received for shipment without specifying the vessel by
which the goods are to be shipped. Received for shipment bills of lading are
issued wherever conditions are not normal and there is insufficiency of
shipping space. (Magellan Mfg., etc. v. Court of Appeals,201 SCRA 116)
OBLIGATIONS OF THE CARRIER
A. Duty to Accept the Goods
General Rule: A common carrier cannot ordinarily refuse to carry a
particular class of goods.
Exception: For some sufficient reason the discrimination against the
traffic in such goods is reasonable and necessary. (Fisher vs. Yangco
Steamship Co. 31 Phil 1 [1915]).
Instances when the carrier may validly refuse to accept the goods:
1. Goods sought to be transported are dangerous objects, or substances
including dynamite and other explosives;
2. Goods are unfit for transportation;
3. Acceptance would result in overloading;
4. Contrabands or illegal goods;
5. Goods are injurious to health;
6. Goods will be exposed to untoward danger like flood, capture by
enemies and the like;
7. Goods like livestock will be exposed to disease;
8. Strike;
9. Failure to tender goods on time.
In case of carriage by railway, the carrier is exempted from liability if
carriage is insisted upon by the shipper, provided its objections are
stated in the bill of lading.
o However, when a common carrier accepts cargo for shipment for
valuable consideration, it takes the risk of delivering it in good condition
as when it was loaded. (PAL vs. CA, 226 SCRA 423 )
B. Duty to deliver the goods
Not only to transport the goods safely but to deliver the same to the
person indicated in the bill of lading. The goods should be delivered to the
consignee or any other person to whom the bill of lading was validly
transferred or negotiated.
o
TIME OF DELIVERY
Stipulated in Contract/Bill
of Lading
Carrier is bound to fulfill the
contract and is liable for any
delay; no matter from what
No stipulation
1.
2.
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Effects of delay:
1. Merely suspends and generally does not terminate the contract of
carriage.
2. Carrier remains duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence.
3. Natural disaster shall not free the carrier from responsibility (Art.1740,
Civil Code)
4. If delay is without just cause, the contract limiting the common carriers
liability cannot be availed of in case of loss or deterioration of the goods
(Art.1747, Civil Code)
C. Duty to exercise extraordinary diligence
o Inquiry may be made as to the nature of passengers baggage, but
beyond this constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being
transgressed. (Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., 30 SCRA 68)[this
doctrine is not applicable to aircrafts because of Section 8 of AntiHijacking Law (RA 6235)]
RIGHT OF CONSIGNEE TO ABANDON GOODS
Instances:
1. Partial non-delivery, where the goods are useless without the others (Art.
363, Code of Commerce);
2. Goods are rendered useless for sale or consumption for the purposes for
which they are properly destined (Art. 365, Code of Commerce); and
3. In case of delay through the fault of the carrier (Art. 371, Code of
Commerce).
NOTICE OF DAMAGE
Requisites for Applicability:
1. Domestic/inter-island/coastwise transportation
2. Land/water/air transportation
3. Carriage of goods
4. Goods shipped are damaged (Art. 366, Code of Commerce)
Rules:
a. Patent damage: shipper must file a claim against the carrier immediately
upon delivery (it may be oral or written)
b. Latent damage: shipper should file a claim against the carrier within 24
hours from delivery.
o These rules do not apply to misdelivery of goods. (Roldan vs. Lim
Ponzo)
o The filing of notice of claim is a condition precedent for recovery.
Purpose of Notice: To inform the carrier that the shipment has been
damaged, and it is charged with liability therefore, and to give it an
opportunity to make an investigation and fix responsibility while the matter is
fresh.
Prescriptive Period
Not provided by Article 366. Thus, in such absence, Civil Code rules on
prescription apply.
If despite the notice of claim, the carrier refuses to pay, action must be
filed in court.
1. If no bill of lading was issued: within 6 years
2. If bill of lading was issued: within 10 years.
COMBINED CARRIER AGREEMENT
General Rule: In case of a contract of transportation of several legs, each
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carrier is responsible for its particular leg in the contract. (Art. 373, Code of
Commerce)
Exception: A combined carrier agreement where a carrier makes itself liable
assuming the obligations and acquiring as well the rights and causes of action
of those which preceded it.
ARTICLE 366 (COC)
The filing of claim under either (a) or (b) is a condition precedent for
recovery.
If the claim is filed, but the carrier refuses to pay, enforce carriers
liability in court by filing a case:
1. Within six (6) years, if no bill of lading has been issued; or
2. Within ten (1) years, if a bill of lading has been issued.
Written demand within twenty-four (24) hours is necessary only when the
package does not show exterior signs of damage but when there are exterior
signs of damage, a verbal claim made immediately is sufficient compliance
with law. (Mapaso Goldfields v. Compania Maritima [CA], 2 OG 307)
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there is no delivery action should be filed from the day of the goods
supposed delivery.
Where there was delivery to the wrong person, the prescriptive period
is ten years because there is a violation of contract, and the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) does not apply to cases of misdelivery.
49
The limited liability doctrine applies not only to the goods but also in
all cases like death or injury to passengers. (Heirs of Amparo Delos
Santos vs. CA, 186 SCRA 649)
If the vessel is not entirely lost, the hypothecary nature will not apply,
unless the shipowner or the ship agent abandons the vessel.
When Applicable:
1. Civil liability for indemnities in favor of third persons which arise from
the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which the vessel
carried. (Art. 587, Code of Commerce)
2. Civil liability arising from collisions. (Art. 837, Code of Commerce)
3. Unpaid wages of the captain and the crew if the vessel and its cargo
are totally lost by reason of capture or shipwreck. (Art. 643, Code of
Commerce)
Rules on Principle of Limited Liability of the Shipowner and Ship Agent
o Where the shipowner or ship agent validly exercised his right of
abandonment of the vessel with all her equipment and the freightage
earned during the voyage, the abandonment amounts to an offer to the
injured party of the value of the vessel, of her equipment, and the freight
money earned during the voyage. (Phil. Shipping Co. v. Garcia-Vergara
96 Phil 201)
o
This is not to say, however, that the limited liability rule is without
exceptions, namely: (1) where the injury or death to a passenger is due
either to the fault of the shipowner, or to the concurring negligence of the
shipowner and the captain. (Phil. Am. Gen. Insurance Co., Inc. v. CA, 273
SCRA 649,271 [1997]); (2) where the vessel is insured; and (3) in
workmens compensation claims. (Monarch Insurance Co., Inc. v. CA,
333 SCRA 71 [2000])
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Contrary to the theory that the limited liability rule has been rendered
obsolete by the advances in modern technology, which considerably
lessen the risks involved in maritime trade, this Court continues to apply
the said rule in appropriate cases. (Monarch Insurance Co., Inc. v. CA,
333 SCRA 71 [2000])
ABANDONMENT
Abandonment of the vessel is necessary to limit the liability of the
shipowner. The only instance were abandonment is dispensed with is when
the vessel is entirely lost (Luzon Stevedoring vs. CA 156 SCRA 169[1987]).
o
51
4. Supercargoes
5. Engineer
SHIPOWNERS AND SHIP AGENTS
Shipowner (proprietario) - Person who has possession, control and
management of the vessel and the consequent right to direct her navigation
and receive freight earned and paid, while his possession continues.
Ship Agent (Naviero) - Person entrusted with provisioning and representing
the vessel in the port in which it may be found; also includes the shipowner.
(Chua Hek Yong vs. IAC, 166 SCRA 183)
Not a mere agent under civil law; he is solidarily liable with the ship owner.
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PILOT
A person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of
ports, or in certain waters.
Liability of Pilot
General Rule: On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot is
responsible for damage to a vessel or to life or property due to his negligence.
Exceptions:
1. Accident caused by force majeure or natural calamity provided the pilot
exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damages.
2. Countermand or overrule by the master of the vessel in which case the
registered owner of the vessel is liable. (Sec.11, Art.III Philippine Ports
Authority Administrative Order 03-85)
DESERTION
An act by which a seaman deserts and abandons a ship or vessel before
the expiration of his term of duty without leave and without intention to return.
(Singa Ship Management Phils. v. NLRC 276 SCRA 201[1997])
CAUSES OF REVOCATION OF VOYAGE
1. War or interdiction of commerce;
2. Blockade;
3. Prohibition to receive cargo at destination;
4. Embargo;
5. Inability of the vessel to navigate. (Art. 640, Code of Commerce)
Terms:
1. Interdiction of Commerce A governmental prohibition of commercial
intercourse intended to bring about an entire cessation for the time being
of all trade whatever.
2. Blockade A sort of circumvallation of a place by which all foreign
connection and correspondence is, as far as human power can effect it, to
be cut off.
3. Embargo A proclamation or order of a state, usually issued in time of
war or threatened hostilities, prohibiting the departure of ships or goods
from some or all the ports of such state until further order.
Vessels
LOPEZ VS. DURUELO 52 PHIL 229
Facts: On February 10, 1927, plaintiff Augusto Lopez was desirous of
embarking upon the interisland steamer San Jacinto in order to go to Cebu,
the plaintiff embarked at the landing in the motorboat Jison which was
engaged in conveying passengers and luggage back and forth from the
landing to the boats at anchor.
As the motorboat approached San Jacinto in a perfectly quiet sea, it
came too near to the stern of the ship, and as the propeller of the ship had not
yet ceased to turn, the blades of the propeller strucked the motorboat and
sank it at once. As it sank, the plaintiff was thrown into the water against the
propeller, and the revolving blades inflicted various injuries upon him. The
plaintiff was hospitalized. He filed a complaint seeking to recover damages
from the defendant. The defendant however alleged that the complaint does
not have a right of action, a demurrer was submitted directed to the fact that
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the complaint does not allege that the protest had been presented by the
plaintiff, within twenty-four hours after the occurrence to the competent
authority at the port where the accident occurred as provided for Article 835 of
the Code of Commerce.
Issue: Whether the motorboat Jison is a vessel provided for by Article 835 of
the Code of Commerce?
Held: The word vessel as used in the third section of tile IV, Book III of the
Code of Commerce, dealing with collisions, does not include all ships, craft or
floating structures of any kind without limitation. The said section does not
apply to minor craft engaged in a river and bay traffic.Therefore, a passenger
on boat like the Jison, is not required to make protest as a condition
precedent to his right of action for the injury suffered by him in the collision
described in the complaint.Article 835 of the Code of Commerce does not
apply.
1. Nature and characteristic of Maritime transactions, Arts. 585, 587
RUBISO VS. RIVERA (27PHIL72) G.R. No. L- 11407 October 30, 1917
Facts: The counsel of plaintiff brought a suit alleging that his clients were the
owners of the pilot boat named Valentine, which has been in bad condition
and on the date of the complaint, was stranded in the place called Tingly, of
the municipality of Battings. The defendant Rivera took charge or took
possession of the said boat without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff
and refused to deliver it to them, under the claim that he was the owner
thereof. The refusal on the part of the defendant has caused the plaintiff
damages because they were unable to derive profit from the voyages for
which the said pilot boat was customarily used. The defendant, on the other
hand, alleged that they purchased the subject pilot boat. The plaintiff alleged
that the sale on behalf of the defendant Rivera was prior to that made at
public auction to Rubio, but the registration of this latter sale was prior to the
sale made to the defendant.
Issue: Whether or not, the plaintiff still has the better right over the subject
vessel?
Held: Under the Code of Commerce, Art 573 provides:
Merchant vessels constitute property that may be acquired and
transferred by any of the means recognized by law. The acquisition of a
vessel must be included in a written instrument, which shall not produce any
effect with regard to third persons if not recorded in the commercial registry.
The requisite of registration in the registry of the purchase of a vessel
is necessary and indispensable in order that the purchasers rights may be
maintained against a claim filed by third person. It is undeniable that Riveras
right cannot prevail over those acquired by Rubiso in the ownership of the
pilot boat, thought the latters acquisition of the vessel at public auction was
subsequent to its purchase by the defendant, Rivera.
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(156 SCRA 169)
Facts: A maritime collision occurred between the tanker CAVITE owned by
LSCO and MV Fernando Escano (a passenger ship) owned by Escano, as a
result the passenger ship sunk. An action in admiralty was filed by Escano
against Luzon. The trial court held that LSCO Cavite was solely to blame for
the collision and held that Luzons claim that its liability should be limited
under Article 837 of the Code of Commerce has not been established. The
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Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The SC also affirmed the CA. Upon
two motions for reconsideration, the Supreme Court gave course to the
petition.
Issue: Whether or not in order to claim limited liability under Article 837 of the
Code of Commerce, it is necessary that the owner abandon the vessel
Held: Yes, abandonment is necessary to claim the limited liability wherein it
shall be limited to the value of the vessel with all the appurtenances and
freightage earned in the voyage. However, if the injury was due to the ship
owners fault, the ship owner may not avail of his right to avail of limited
liability by abandoning the vessel.
The real nature of the liability of the ship owner or agent is embodied in
the Code of Commerce. Articles 587, 590 and 837 are intended to limit the
liability of the ship owner, provided that the owner or agent abandons the
vessel. Although Article 837 does not specifically provide that in case of
collision there should be abandonment, to enjoy such limited liability, said
article is a mere amplification of the provisions of Articles 587 and 590 which
makes it a mere superfluity.
The exception to this rule in Article 837 is when the vessel is totally lost
in which case there is no vessel to abandon, thus abandonment is not
required. Because of such loss, the liability of the owner or agent is
extinguished. However, they are still personally liable for claims under the
Workmens Compensation Act and for repairs on the vessel prior to its loss.
In case of illegal or tortious acts of the captain, the liability of the owner
and agent is subsidiary. In such cases, the owner or agent may avail of
Article 837 by abandoning the vessel. But if the injury is caused by the
owners fault as where he engages the services of an inexperienced captain
or engineer, he cannot avail of the provisions of Article 837 by abandoning the
vessel. He is personally liable for such damages.
In this case, the Court held that the petitioner is a t fault and since he
did not abandon the vessel, he cannot invoke the benefit of Article 837 to limit
his liability to the value of the vessel, all appurtenances and freightage earned
during the voyage.
YANGCO VS. LASERNA (73 PHIL 330)
Facts: On the afternoon of May 26, 1927, the steamer SS Negros left the port
of Romblon on its return trip to Manila. Typhoon signal no. 2 was then up and
in fact, the passengers duly advised the captain before sailing. The boat was
overloaded. After 2 hours of sailing, the boat encountered strong winds and
rough seas between the islands of Banton and Simara. While in the act of
maneuvering, the vessel was caught sidewise by a big wave which caused it
to capsize and sink. Many of the passengers died on the mishap. Civil actions
were instituted in the CFI of Capiz, the petitioner sought to abandon the
vessel to the plaintiffs in three cases.
Issue: Whether the shipowner or agent is liable for damages for the
consequent death of its passengers notwithstanding the total loss of the
vessel?
Held: The petitioner is absolved from all complaints.
Under Article 587 the ship agent shall also be civilly liable for
indemnities in favor of third persons which arise from the conduct of the
captain in the vigilance over the goods which the vessels carried; BUT he
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may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all her
equipment and the freight he may have earned during the voyage.
Whether the abandonment of the vessel sought by the petitioner in the
case was in accordance with the law or not, is immaterial. The vessel having
totally perished, any act of abandonment would be idle ceremony.
NO VESSEL, NO LIABILITY.
MANILA STEAMSHIP CO. INC. VS. INSA ABDULHAMAN (100 PHIL 32)
Facts: Insa Abdulhaman together with his wife and five children boarded M/L
Consuelo V in Zamboanga City. The said ship was bound for Siokon under
the command of Faustino Macrohon. On that same night, M/S Bowline Knot
was navigating from Marijoboc towards Zamboanga.
Around 9:30 to 10:00 in the evening of May 4, 1948, while some of the
passengers of the M/L Consuelo V were then sleeping and some lying down
awake, a shocking collision suddenly occurred. The ship that collided was
later on identified as the M/V Bowline Knot. M/L Consuelo V capsized that
resulted to the death of 9 passengers and the loss of the cargoes on board.
The Court held the owners of both vessels solidarily liable to plaintiff
for damages caused to the latter under Article 827 of the Code of Commerce
but exempted defendant Lim Hong To from liability due to the sinking and total
loss of his vessel. While Manila steamship, owner of the Bowline Knot was
ordered to pay all of plaintiffs damages.
Petitioner Manila Steamship Co. pleads that it is exempt from any
liability under Article 1903 of the Civil Code because it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees,
particularly the officer in command of the M/S Bowline Knot.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Manila Steamship Co. is exempt from any
liability under Art. 1903 of the Civil Code?
Held: NO. Petitioner is not exempted from liabilities. While it is true that
plaintiffs action against petitioner is based on a tort or quasi delict, the tort in
question is not a civil tort under the Civil Code but a maritime tort resulting in
a collision at sea, governed by Articles 826-939 of the Code of Commerce.
Under Art. 827 of the Code of Commerce, in case of collision between two
vessels imputable to both of them, each vessel shall suffer her own damage
and both shall be solidarily liable for the damages occasioned to their
cargoes. The shipowner is directly and primarily responsible in tort resulting in
a collision at sea, and it may not escape liability on the ground that exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the vessels officers and
crew.
VASQUEZ VS. CA (138 SCRA 553)
FACTS: The litigation involves a claim for damages for the loss at sea of
petitioners respective children after the shipwreck of MV Pioneer Cebu due to
typhoon Klaring in May of 1966. When the inter-island vessel MV Pioneer
Cebu left the Port of Manila in the early morning of May 15, 1966 bound for
Cebu, it had on board the spouses Alfonso Vasquez and Filipinas Bagaipo
and a four-year old boy, Mario Vasquez, among her passengers. The MV
Pioneer Cebu encountered typhoon Klaring and struck a reef on the southern
part of Malapascua Island, located somewhere north of island of Cebu and
subsequently sunk. The aforementioned passengers were unheard from
since then.
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Due to the loss of their children, petitioners sued for damages before
the Court Instance of Manila. Respondent defended on the plea of force
majeure, and extinction of its liability by the actual loss of the vessel. After
proper proceedings, the trial court awarded damages. On appeal, respondent
Court reversed judgment and absolved private respondent from any liability.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether the shipowners liability is extinguished despite of the loss of
the ship?
Held: With respect for the private respondents submission that the total loss
of the vessel extinguished its liability pursuant to Article 587 of the Code of
Commerce as construed in Yangco vs. Laserna, 73 Phil. 330 (1941), suffice it
to state that even in the cited case, it was held that the liability of the
shipowner is limited to the value of the vessel or to the insurance thereon,
Despite the total loss of the vessel therefore, its insurance answers for the
damages that the shipowners agent may be held liable for by reason of the
death of its passengers. Judgment of the CFI reinstated.
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60
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existing duty or from a special contract and (3) success in whole or in part, or
that the service rendered contributed to such success. The court said that the
above elements are all present in the instant case. Salvage charges may thus
be assessed on the cargoes saved from the vessel. As provided for in Section
13 of the Salvage Law, The expenses of salvage, as well as the reward for
salvage or assistance shall be a charge on the things salvaged or their value.
In Manila Railroad Co. vs. Macondray Co., 37 Phil. 583. It was also held that
When a ship and its cargo are saved together, the salvage allowance should
be charged against the ship and the cargo in the proportion of their respective
values, the same as in the case of general average Thus, the
compensation to be paid by the owner of the cargo is in proportion to the
value of the vessel and the value of the cargo saved.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, respondent court affirmed the trial
courts findings and conclusion; hence, the present petition for review before
this Court on the following error, among others:
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Court erroneously adopted with
approval the Trial Courts conclusion that the expenses or averages incurred
in saving the cargo constitute general average?
Held: On the issue whether or not respondent court committed an error in
concluding that the expenses incurred in saving the cargo are considered
general average, we rule in the affirmative. As a rule, general or gross
averages include all damages and expenses which are deliberately caused in
order to save vessels, its cargo or both at the same time, from a real and
known risk. While the instant case may technically fall within the purview of
the said provision, the formalities prescribed under Article 813 and 814 of the
Code of Commerce in order to incur the expenses and cause the damage
corresponding to gross average were not complied with. Consequently,
respondent ESLIs claim for contribution from the consignees of the cargo at
the time of the occurrence of the average turns to naught.
The Court reversed and set aside the judgment of the respondent court
and ordered respondent Eastern Shipping Lines. Inc. to return to petitioner
Philippine Home Assurance Corporation the amount it paid under protest in
behalf of the consignees.
SALVAGE LAW (ACT NO. 2616)
Provides a compulsory reward to those who save cargo by requiring the
owner of the property to give a reward equivalent to the maximum of 50% of
the value of the property saved.
SALVAGE (Two Concepts)
1. Service one person renders to the owner of a ship or goods, by his own
labor, preserving the goods or the ship which the owner or those entrusted
with the care of them have either abandoned in distress at sea, or are
unable to protect or secure.
2. Compensation allowed to persons by whose voluntary assistance a ship at
sea or her cargo or both have been saved in whole or in part from
impending sea peril, or such property recovered from actual peril or loss,
as in cases of shipwreck, derelict or recapture.
Requisites:
1. Valid object of salvage; valid object of salvage; that the vessel is
shipwrecked beyond the control of the crew or shall have been
abandoned;
2. Object must have been exposed to marine peril (not perils of the ship);
3. Services rendered voluntarily (neither an existing duty nor out of a preexisting contract);
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4.
Subjects of Salvage:
1. Ship itself;
2. Jetsam goods which are cast into the sea, and there sink and remain
under water;
3. Floatsam or Flotsam goods which float upon the sea when cast
overboard;
4. Ligan or Lagan goods cast into the sea tied to a buoy, so that they may
be found again by the owners (Diaz, Notes on Transportation Law, p.173).
Persons Who Have No Right to a Reward for Salvage:
1.
Crew of the vessel saved;
2.
Person who commenced Salvage in spite of opposition of the Captain
or his representative;
3.
In accordance with Sec. 3 of the Salvage Law, a person who fails to
deliver a salvaged vessel or cargo to the Collector of Customs.
DERELICT
A ship or her cargo which is abandoned and deserted at sea by those who
are in charge of it, without any hope of recovering it, or without any intention
of returning to it.
Rules on Salvage Reward
1. The reward is fixed by the RTC judge in the absence of agreement or
where the latter is excessive. (Sec. 9, Act No. 2616)
2. The reward should constitute a sufficient compensation for the outlay and
effort of the salvors and should be liberal enough to offer an inducement to
others to render services in similar emergencies in the future.
3. If sold (no claim being made within 3 months from publication), the
proceeds, after deducting expenses and the salvage claim, shall go to the
owner; if the latter does not claim it within 3 years, 50% of the said
proceeds shall go to the salvors, who shall divide it equitably, and the
other half to the government. (Secs. 11-12, Act. No 2616)
4. If a vessel is the salvor, the reward shall be distributed as follows:
a. 50% to the shipowner;
b. 25% to the captain; and
c. 25% to the officers and crew in proportion to their salaries. (Sec. 13,
Act No. 2616)
5. Expenses incurred in the salvage must be shown to be necessary and
reasonable in amount before they will be allowed to the salvors.
CONTRACT OF TOWAGE
A contract whereby one vessel, usually motorized, pulls another, whether
loaded or not with merchandise, from one place to another, for a
compensation. It is a contract for services rather than a contract of carriage.
BARRIOS VS. GO THONG & CO. (7 SCRA 535)
Facts: Honorio Barrios was the captain and master of the MV Henry I
operated by William Lines, Inc. which plied the route from Cebu to Davao
City. On its voyage on May 1, 1958 the MV Henry I intercepted an SOS
signal from the MV Don Alfredo owned and operated by Go Thong & Co.
Responding to the SOS, Henry I approached the Don Alfredo and found out
that the Don Alfredo was suffering from engine failure. After agreeing to
assist the disabled ship, the crew of Henry I attached tow lines and
proceeded to tow the Don Alfredo heading towards the port of Dumaguete
City. The following morning, they encountered a sister ship of Don Alfredo,
the MV Lux. Upon the request of the captain of the Don Alfredo, the crew of
the Henry I released the towlines and continued on their voyage.
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Bareboat Or Demise
The charterer provides crew, food and fuel. The charterer is liable as if he
were the owner, except when the cause arises from the unworthiness of
the vessel. The shipowner leases to the charterer the whole vessel,
transferring to the latter the entire command, possession and consequent
control over the vessels navigation, including the master and the crew,
who thereby become the charters servants. It transforms a common
carrier into a private carrier.
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B.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
At Shipowners Request:
1. If the extra lay days terminate without the cargo being placed
alongside the vessel;
2. Sale by the owner of the vessel before loading the charterer.
C.
Fortuitous causes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
War;
Blockade;
Prohibition to receive cargo;
Embargo; and
Inability of the vessel to navigate.
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LAY DAYS: Days allowed to charter parties for loading and unloading the
cargo.
EXTRA LAY DAYS: Days which follow after the lay days have elapsed.
BILL OF LADING
Written acknowledgment of receipt of goods and agreement to transport
them to a specific place to a person named or to his order. (Compania
Maritima v. Insurance Comp. of North America, 12 SCRA 213)
The consignee and the shipper who accepts a bill of lading even
without signing are bound by the terms and conditions thereof. (Keng
Hua Paper Products v. CA 286 SCRA 257[1998])
Acceptance of the consignee is implied if he claims reimbursement for
missing goods and files a case based on the bill of lading. (Belgian
Overseas Chartering v. Phil. First Insurance, 383 SCRA 23 [2002])
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
The parties to a loan, whether ordinary or maritime, may agree on any rate
of interest (CB Circular 905); provided the same is not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy (Art. 1306, Civil Code)
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4. Shipwreck
A.
AVERAGE
An extraordinary or accidental expense incurred during the voyage
order to preserve the cargo, vessel or both, and all damages
deterioration suffered by the vessel from departure to the port
destination, and to the cargo from the port of loading to the port
consignment. (Art. 806, Code of Commerce)
in
or
of
of
CLASSES OF AVERAGES:
1. Gross or General Average
2. Particular or Simple Average
Where both vessel and cargo are saved, it is general average; where
only the vessel or only the cargo is saved, it is particular average.
o
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Jettisoned goods are not res nullius nor deemed abandoned within
the meaning of civil law so as to be the object of occupation by
salvage.
In order that the jettisoned goods may be included in the gross or
general average, the existence of the cargo on board should be proven
by means of the bill of lading. (Art. 816, Code of Commerce)
Under the York-Antwerp Rules, deck cargo is permitted in Coastwise
Shipping but prohibited in Overseas Shipping.
1. If deck cargo is located with the consent of the shipper on overseas
trade, it must always contribute to general average, but should the
same be jettisoned, it would not be entitled to reimbursement
because there is a violation of the York-Antwerp Rules.
2. If the deck cargo is located with the consent of the shipper on
coastwise shipping, it must always contribute to general average
and if jettisoned would be entitled to reimbursement.
Domestic
Deck cargo is allowed
With shippers consent
General average
Without shippers consent
Captain is liable
International
Deck cargo is not allowed
Particular average
Captain is liable
B.
In such arrival the captain must file a protest which is merely a disclaimer.
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C.
COLLISION
The impact of two moving vessels.
Zones of Time in the Collision of Vessels:
a. 1st zone all time up to the moment when risk of collision begins;
b. 2nd zone time between moment when risk of collision begins and the
moment it becomes a practical certainty; and
c. 3rd zone time when collision has become a practicable certainty to
the point of actual impact.
Allision - Impact between a moving vessel and a stationary one.
Rules on Collision of Vessels
1. The collision may be due to the fault, negligence or lack of skill of the
captain, sailing mate, or any other member of the complement of the
vessel. The owner of the vessel at fault may be liable for losses or
damages. (Art. 826, Code of Commerce)
2. The collision may be due to the fault of both vessels. Each vessel shall
suffer its own losses, but as regards the owner of cargoes both vessels
shall be jointly and severally liable. (Art.827, Code of Commerce)
3. If it cannot be determined which vessel is at fault, each vessel shall
also suffer its own losses and both shall be solidarily liable for losses
or damages on the cargoes. (Art. 828, Code of Commerce)
4. The vessels may collide with each other through fortuitous event or
force majeure. In this case, each shall bear its own damage.
5. Two vessels may collide with each other without their fault by reason of
a third vessel. The third vessel will be liable for losses and damages.
(Art. 831, Code of Commerce)
6. A vessel which is properly anchored and moored may collide with
those nearby, by reason of storm or other cause of force majeure. The
vessel run into shall suffer its own damage and expense. (Art. 832,
Code of Commerce)
Nautical Rules to Determine Negligence
1. When two vessels are about to enter a port, the farther one must allow
the nearer to enter first; if they collide, the fault is presumed to be
imputable to the one who arrived later, unless it can be proved that
there was no fault on its part.
2. When two vessels meet, the smaller should give the right of way to the
larger one.
3. A vessel leaving port should leave the way clear for another which may
be entering the same port.
4. The vessel which leaves later is presumed to have collided against one
which has left earlier.
5. There is a presumption against the vessel which sets sail in the night.
6. There is a presumption against the vessel with spread sails which
collides with another which is at anchor and cannot move, even when
the crew of the latter has received word to lift anchor, when there was
no sufficient time to do so or there was fear of a greater damage or
other legitimate reason.
7. There is a presumption against an improperly moored vessel.
8. There is a presumption against a vessel which has no buoys to
indicate the location of its anchors to prevent damage to vessels which
may approach it.
9. Vessels must have proper look-outs or persons trained as such and
who have no other duty aside therefrom. (Smith Bell v. CA 197 SCRA
201)
Nautical Rules as to Sailing Vessel and Steamship
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Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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Error in Extremis
Sudden movement made by a faultless vessel during the third zone of
collision with another vessel which is at fault during the 2nd zone. Even if
such sudden movement is wrong, no responsibility will fall on said
faultless vessel. (Urrutia and Co. v. Baco River Plantation Co., 26 Phil.
632)
Rules on Liability in Collision and Allision
Consequential Damages Covered:
1. Damages caused to vessel
2. Damages caused to the passenger
3. Damages caused to the cargo
Rule:
1. One vessel at fault
Vessel at fault is liable for damage caused to the vessel,
passenger, and cargoes of both vessels. (Art. 826, CoC)
2. Both Vessels At Fault
Each vessel must bear its own loss, but as to the other damages,
the passenger and cargoes, they shall be both solidarily liable. (Art.
827, CoC)
3. Vessel at fault not known
Each vessel must bear its own loss, but both shall be solidarily
liable for losses and damages on the cargoes. (Art. 828, CoC)
Doctrine of Inscrutable Fault
In case of collision where it cannot be determined which between the
two vessels was at fault, both vessels bear their respective damage,
but both should be solidarily liable for damage to the cargo of both
vessels.
4. Third vessel at fault
The third vessel will be liable for all the losses and damages. (Art.
831, Code of Commerce)
5. Fortuitous event/force majeure
No liability. Each party shall bear its own loss. However, due
diligence must be exercised by the carrier to lessen the damages
before, during, and after the impact (Art. 830, Code of
Commerce).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in case a moving vessel
strikes a stationary object, such as a bridge post, dock, or navigational
aid. (Far Eastern Shipping v. CA, 297 SCRA 301; Luzon Stevedoring
vs. CA, 156 SCRA 169)
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MARITIME PROTEST
It is a written statement made under oath by the captain of a vessel after
the occurrence of an accident or disaster in which the vessel or cargo is lost
or damaged, with respect to the circumstances attending such occurrence, for
the purpose of recovering losses and damages.
Excuses for not filing protest: 1) where the interested person is not on
board the vessel; and 2) on collision time, need not be protested. (Art.
836, Code of Commerce)
SHIPWRECK
It is the loss of the vessel at sea as a consequence of its grounding, or
running against an object in sea or on the coast. It occurs when the vessel
sustains injuries due to a marine peril rendering her incapable of
navigation.
If the wreck was due to malice, negligence or lack of skill of the captain, or
because the vessel put to sea was insufficiently repaired and equipped;
the owner of the vessel may demand indemnity from said captain. (Art.
841, Code of Commerce)
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Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
73
Cebu Area Manning Unit of the NSB. Thereafter, private respondent boarded
the vessel. On 28 December 1976, before expiration of his contract, private
respondent was required to disembark at Port Kelang, Malaysia, and was
returned to the Philippines on 5 January 1977. The cause of the discharge
was described in his Seaman's Book as 'by owner's arrange".
Shortly after returning to the Philippines, private respondent filed a complaint
before public respondent NSB, which complaint was docketed as NSB-133177, for violation of contract, against Mullion as the shipping company and
petitioner Litonjua as agent of the shipowner and of the charterer of the
vessel.
Issues: Whether or no the admiralty law as embodied in the Philippine Code
of Commerce fastens liability for payment of the crew's wages upon the ship
owner, and not the charterer.
Held: The first basis is the charter party which existed between Mullion, the
shipowner, and Fairwind, the charterer. In modern maritime law and usage,
there are three (3) distinguishable types of charter parties: (a) the "bareboat"
or "demise" charter; (b) the "time" charter; and (c) the "voyage" or "trip"
charter. A bareboat or demise charter is a demise of a vessel, much as a
lease of an unfurnished house is a demise of real property. The shipowner
turns over possession of his vessel to the charterer, who then undertakes to
provide a crew and victuals and supplies and fuel for her during the term of
the charter. The shipowner is not normally required by the terms of a demise
charter to provide a crew, and so the charterer gets the "bare boat", i.e.,
without a crew. Sometimes, of course, the demise charter might provide that
the shipowner is to furnish a master and crew to man the vessel under the
charterer's direction, such that the master and crew provided by the
shipowner become the agents and servants or employees of the charterer,
and the charterer (and not the owner) through the agency of the master, has
possession and control of the vessel during the charter period. A time charter,
upon the other hand, like a demise charter, is a contract for the use of a
vessel for a specified period of time or for the duration of one or more
specified voyages. In this case, however, the owner of a time-chartered
vessel (unlike the owner of a vessel under a demise or bare-boat charter),
retains possession and control through the master and crew who remain his
employees. What the time charterer acquires is the right to utilize the carrying
capacity and facilities of the vessel and to designate her destinations during
the term of the charter. A voyage charter, or trip charter, is simply a contract of
affreightment, that is, a contract for the carriage of goods, from one or more
ports of loading to one or more ports of unloading, on one or on a series of
voyages. In a voyage charter, master and crew remain in the employ of the
owner of the vessel.
It is well settled that in a demise or bare boat charter, the charterer is
treated as owner pro hac vice of the vessel, the charterer assuming in large
measure the customary rights and liabilities of the shipowner in relation to
third persons who have dealt with him or with the vessel. In such case, the
Master of the vessel is the agent of the charterer and not of the shipowner.
The charterer or owner pro hac vice, and not the general owner of the vessel,
is held liable for the expenses of the voyage including the wages
VALENZUELA HARDWOOD VS. CA (30 JUNE 1997,274 SCRA 643)
Facts: On January 16, 1984, plaintiff entered into an agreement with Seven
Brothers Shipping corporation whereby the latter undertook to load on board
its vessel M/V Seven Ambassadors 940 Lauan round logs for shipment from
Isabela to Manila. On January 20, plaintiff insured the cargo with South Sea
Surety and Insurance for two million pesos. However on January 25, 1984,
the M/V Seven Ambassador sank, resulting in the loss of petitioners logs.
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Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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Pursuant to the loss, petitioner filed a claim with South Sea Surety and
Insurance for the insured amount of the logs, but the latter refused, denying
liability under the policy. Petitioner likewise filed a formal claim against Seven
Brothers Shipping Corporation for the value of the lost logs, but the latter
likewise denied their claim.
The trial court found for the plaintiff, holding South Sea and Seven
Brothers liable for the loss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part
the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the liability of
South Sea Surety and Assurance but exonerated Seven Brothers, stating that
the latter is a private carrier therefore the provisions on common carriers is
not applicable to their contract. Hence the present appeal.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in upholding the validity of the stipulation in the charter party executed
between petitioner and Seven Brothers exempting the latter from liability of
loss arising from the negligence of its captain.
Held: The decision of the Court of appeals is correct. The contract between
petitioner and Seven Brothers is one of Private Carriage hence the provisions
on common carriage do not apply. In a contract of private carriage parties are
free to stipulate that the responsibility for the cargo rests solely in the
charterer, such stipulations are valid because they are freely entered into by
the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good custom, public
order or public policy.
SWEET LINES VS. CA (121 SCRA 769)
Facts: Herein private respondents purchased first-class tickets from petitioner
at the latters office in Cebu City. They were to board M/V Sweet Grace bound
for Catbalogan, Western Samar. Instead of departing at the scheduled hour of
about midnight on July 8, 1972, the vessel set sail at 3:00 am of July 9, 1972
only to be towed back to Cebu due to engine trouble, arriving there on the
same day at about 4:00 pm. The vessel lifted anchor again on July 10, 1972
at around 8:00 am. Instead of docking at Catbalogan (the first port of call), the
vessel proceeded direct to Tacloban. Private respondents had no recourse
but to disembark and board a ferry boat to Catbalogan. Hence, the suit for
breach of contract of carriage.
Issue: Whether or not the mechanical defect constitutes a fortuitous event
which would exempt the carrier from liability?
Held: No. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, there was no
fortuitous event or force majeure which prevented the vessel from fulfilling its
undertaking of taking the private respondents to Catbalogan. In the first place,
mechanical defects in the carrier are not considered a caso fortuito that
exempts the carrier from responsibility. In the second place, even granting
arguendo that the engine failure was a fortuitous event, it accounted on for
the delay of departure. When the vessel finally left the port, there was no
longer any force majeure that justified by-passing a port of call.
TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING VS. CA (254 SCRA 260)
Facts: Plaintiff (herein private respondent Atty. Renato Arroyo) bought a ticket
from herein petitioner for the voyage of M/V Asia Thailand Vessel to Cagayan
de Oro from Cebu City. Arroyo boarded the vessel in the evening of
November 12, 1991 at around 5:30. At that instance, plaintiff noticed that
some repair works were being undertaken on the evening of the vessel. The
vessel departed at around 11:00 in the evening with only one engine running.
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After an hour of slow voyage, vessel stopped near Kawit Island and
dropped its anchor threat. After an hour of stillness, some passenger
demanded that they should be allowed to return to Cebu City for they were no
longer willing to continue their voyage to Cagayan de Oro City. The captain
acceded to their request and thus the vessel headed back to Cebu City. At
Cebu City, the plaintiff together with the other passengers who requested to
be brought back to Cebu City was allowed to disembark. Thereafter, the
vessel proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City. Plaintiff, the next day boarded the
M/V Asia Japan for its voyage to Cagayan de Oro City, likewise a vessel of
the defendant.
On account of this failure of defendant to transport him to the place pf
destination on November 12, 1991, plaintiff filed before the trial court a
complaint for damages against the defendant.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of a common carrier to maintain in
seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage a breach of its
duty?
Held: Undoubtedly, there was, between the petitioner and private respondent
a contract of carriage. Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, the petitioner was
bound to observed extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the private
respondent. That meant that the petitioner was pursuant to the Article 1755 off
the said Code, bound to carry the private respondent safely as far as human
care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In this case, the Supreme
Court is in full accord with the Court of Appeals that the petitioner failed or
discharged this obligation.
Before commencing the contact of voyage, the petitioner undertook
some repairs on the cylinder head of one of the vessels engines. But even
before it could finish these repairs it allowed the vessel to leave the port of
origin on only one functioning engine, instead of two. Moreover, even the lone
functioning engine was not in perfect condition at sometime after it had run its
course, in conked out. Which cause the vessel to stop and remain adrift at
sea, thus in order to prevent the ship from capsizing, it had to drop anchor.
Plainly, the vessel was unseaworthy even before the voyage begun. For the
vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for the voyage and
manned with the sufficient number of competent officers and crew. The
Failure of the common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel
involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty prescribed in
Article 1755 of the Civil Code.
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Commonwealth Act. No. 65; Public Act
No. 521, 74th US Congress)
Domestic Trade: Civil Code and Code of Commerce applies.
Foreign Trade: COGSA applies.
The Civil Code and the Code of Commerce is suppletory to COGSA in the
carriage of goods from foreign ports to the Philippines.
The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall
govern the liability of the common carrier for loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods. (Art 1753, NCC)
The Civil Code is the primary law on goods that are being shipped from a
foreign port to the Philippines. However, COGSA remains to be a
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Under the COGSA, suits for loss or damage to the cargo should be
brought within one year after:
1. Delivery of the goods; or
2. The date when goods should have been delivered.
The one-year period shall run from delivery of the last package and is not
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The rule applies in cases of collision, but it starts not from the date of
collision, but when the goods should have been delivered had the cargoes
been saved.
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delivery at all was made by the shipper of the goods because the same had
perished, gone out of commerce, or disappeared that their existence is
unknown or they cannot be recovered. It does not include a situation where
there was indeed delivery, but delivery to the wrong person.
The applicable rule on prescription is that found in the Civil Code,
either: ten years for breach of contract or four years for quasi-delict. In either
case, the plaintiffs cause of action has not yet prescribed. Thus, the case is
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
MERCHANTS INSURANCE COMPANY VS. ALEJANDRO
(145 SCRA 42)
Facts: Plaintiff Choa Tiek Seng filed a complaint against the petitioner before
the then Court of First Instance of Manila for recovery of a sum of money
under the marine insurance policy on cargo. Mr. Choa alleged that the goods
he insured with the petitioner sustained loss and damage in the amount of
P35, 987.26. The said goods were delivered to the arrastre operator E.
Razon, Inc., on December 17, 1976 and on the same date were received by
the consignee-plaintiff.
Petitioner disclaims liability and imputes against plaintiff the
commission of fraud. A similar complaint was filed by Joseph Benzon Chua
against the petitioner for recovery under the marine insurance policy for cargo
alleging that the goods insured with the petitioner sustained loss and damage
in the sum of P55,996.49. The goods were delivered to the plaintiff-consignee
on or about January 25-28, 1977.
Petitioner filed third-party complaints against private respondents for
indemnity, subrogation, or reimbursement in the event that it is held liable to
the plaintiff.
The private respondents, carriers Frota Oceanica Brasiliera and
Australia-West Pacific Line
alleged in their separate answers that the
petitioner is already barred from filing a claim because under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, the suit against the carrier must be filed within one year
after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered
Petitioner contended that provision relied upon by the respondents
applies only to the shipper and not to the insurer of the goods.
Respondent judge dismissed both third-party complaints.
Issue: Whether or not the one-year period within which to file a suit against
the carrier and the ship, in case of damage or loss as provided for in the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act applies to the insurer of the goods.
Held: The coverage of the Act includes the insurer of the goods. Otherwise,
what the Act intends to prohibit after the lapse of the one-year prescriptive
period can be done indirectly by the shipper or owner of the goods by simply
filing a claim against the insurer even after the lapse of one year. This would
be the result if we follow the petitioner's argument that the insurer can, at any
time, proceed against the carrier and the ship since it is not bound by the
time-bar provision. In this situation, the one-year limitation will be practically
useless. This could not have been the intention of the law which has also for
its purpose the protection of the carrier and the ship from fraudulent claims by
having "matters affecting transportation of goods by sea be decided in as
short a time as possible" and by avoiding incidents which would
"unnecessarily extend the period and permit delays in the settlement of
questions affecting the transportation."
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In the case at bar, the petitioner's action has prescribed under the
provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Hence, whether it files a
third-party complaint or chooses to maintain an independent action against
herein respondents is of no moment.
MAYER STEEL PIPE CORP. VS. CA (19 KIME 1997)
Facts: Hongkong Government Supplies Department henceforth, Hong Kong
contracted petitioner Mayer Steel Pipe Corp to manufacture and supply
various steel pipes and fittings from August to October 1983, Mayer shipped
the said items to Hong Kong. Prior to shipment the items were insured
against all risks with respondent South Sea Surety and Insurance Co. and
Charter Insurance Corp for $212,772.09 with South Sea and $149,470 with
Charter.
Petitioners jointly appointed Industrial Inspection Inc as 3 rd party
inspector to examine the items to see if they were in accordance with the
contract. They certified it as such prior to shipment. However, when they
reached Hong Kong it was revealed that a substantial portion was damaged.
Petitioners now claim for damages against the respondents for indemnity
under the insurance contract.
Respondents paid part of the petitioners demand but declined the rest
claiming that the insurance surveyors report allegedly showed that the
damage was a factory defect and hence not covered by the insurance
policies. The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner finding the damage not
caused by manufacturing defects. It also noted that the insurance contract
insured against all risks or all causes of conceivable loss or damage save
those caused by fraud or intentional misconduct. At the court of appeals the
CA found the all risks provision covered the damage endured but set aside
the decision because the complaint had been bared by prescription. Sec 3(6)
of the COGSA specifically bared it because it had been more than 1 year
since the damage had been done before the demand was made.
Held: The cause of action had not yet prescribed.
Ratio: Sec 3(6) of the COGSA covers only the liability of the carrier
which is extinguished if no suit is brought within a period of one year.
However, the liability of the insurer is not extinguished because the COGSA
governs the relationship between carrier and shipper, and consignee and
insurer. It defines a contract of carriage. The relationship at bar is properly
governed by the Insurance code. Thus the CAs finding of prescription as per
the COGSA is overturned.
SHEWARAM VS, PAL (17 SCRA 606, (1966)
Facts: A PAL ticket, on the reverse side, stated in fine print that if the value of
baggage is not stated, and the baggage is lost, the maximum liability of PAL is
P100.00 if value in excess of P100.00 is stated, PAL will charge extra
because PAL is being held liable for an amount exceeding P100.00.
Shewaram, a Hindu from Davao, boarded a PAL plane for Manila. Among his
baggage was a camera with P800.00 and it was lost. PAL offered to pay
P100.00. Shewaram wanted full payment of P800.00.
Issue: Whether the limited liability rule shall apply in the case at bar?
Held: The limited liability rule shall not apply. Since this is a stipulation on
qualified liability, which operates to reduce the liability of the carrier, the
carrier and the shipper must agree thereupon. Otherwise, the carrier will be
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Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
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liable for full. PAL is fully liable (for full) because Shewaran did not agree to
the stipulation on the ticket, as manifested by the fact that Shewaram did not
sign the ticket. Ticket should have been signed.
ONG YUI VS. CA (91 SCRA 223)
Facts: On august 26, 1967, Ong Yiu was a fare paying passenger of
respondent PAL from Mactan, Cebu to Butuan City wherein he was scheduled
to attend a trial. As a passenger, he checked in one piece of luggae, blue
maleta for which he was issued a claim ticket. Upon arrival at Butuan City,
petitioner claimed his luggage but it could not be found. PAL Butuan sent a
message to PAL Cebu which in turn sent a message to PAL Manila that same
afternoon. PAL Manila advised PAL Cebu that the luggage has been
overcarried to Manila and that it would be forwarded to PAL Cebu that same
day. PAL Cebu then advised PAL Butuan that the luggage will be forwarded
the following day, on scheduled morning flight. This message was not
received by PAL Butuan as all the personnel had already gone for the day.
Meanwhile, Ong Yiu was worried about the missing luggage because it
contained vital documents needed for the trial the next day so he wired PAL
Cebu demanding delivery of his luggage before noon that next day or he
would hold PAL liable for damages based on gross negligence. Early
morning, petitioner went to the Butuan Airport to inquire about the luggage but
did not wait for the arrival of the morning flight at 10:00am. which carried his
luggage. A certain Dagorro, a driver of a colorum car, who also used to drive
the petitioner volunteered to take the luggage to the petitioner. He revelaed
that the documents were lost. Ong Yiu demanded from PAL Cebu actual and
compensatory damages as an incident of breach of contract of carriage.
Issue: Whether or not PAL is guilty of only simple negligence and not gross
negligence?
Whether the doctrine of limited liability doctrine applies in the instant
case?
Held: PAL had not acted in bad faith. It exercised due diligence in looking for
petitioners luggage which had been miscarried. Had petitioner waited or
caused someone to wait at the airport for the arrival of the morning flight
which carried his luggage, he would have been able to retrieve his luggage
sooner. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or fraud, the petitioner is
not entitled to moral damages. Neither is he entitled to exemplary damages
absent any proof that the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless
manner.
The limited liability applies in this case. On the presumed negligence of
PAL, its liability for the loss however, is limited on the stipulation written on the
back of the plane
Ticket which is P100 per baggage. The petitioner not having declared a
greater value and not having called the attention of PAL on its true value and
paid the tariff therefore. The stipulation is printed in reasonably and fairly big
letters and is easily readable. Moreso, petitioner had been a frequent
passenger of PAL from Cebu to Butuan City and back and he being a lawyer
and a businessman, must be fully aware of these conditions.
V. PUBLIC SERVICE ACT (COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 146)
PUBLIC SERVICE
- Includes every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or
control in the Philippines for hire or compensation, with general or limited
clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general
business purposes, any common carrier or public utility, ice plants, power and
water supplies, communication and similar public services. (Sec. 13b, CA
146)
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The Public Service Commission created under the Public Service Law has
already been abolished under P.D. No. 1 and other issuances. It has been
replaced by the following government agencies: LTO; LTFRB; ATO; BOE;
NTC; NEA; ERB; NWRC; CAB; and Marina.
Three-Fold Purpose:
1. To protect the public against unreasonable charges and poor,
inefficient service;
2. To protect and secure investments in public services;
3. To prevent ruinous competition.
AUTHORITY TO OPERATE PUBLIC SERVICES
General Rule: No public service shall operate without having been issued a
certificate of public convenience or a certificate of public convenience and
necessity.
Exceptions:
1. Warehouses;
2. Animal drawn vehicles and bancas moved by oar or sail;
3. Airships, except for the fixing of maximum rates for fare and freight;
4. Radio companies, except for rates fixing;
5. Public services owned or operated by the government, except as to rates
fixing;
6. Ice plants; and
7. Public markets.
PUBLIC UTILITIES
- Privately owned and operated business whose services are essential to the
general public.
A foreigner can own a public utility. The right to operate a public utility
may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the
facilities thereof. One can own facilities without operating them as
utility, or conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning
the facilities used to serve the public.
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One which yields to the carrier a fair return upon the value of the
property employed in performing the service; and
One which is fair to the public for the service rendered.
Exceptions to Kabit system:
When neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held
liable for damages.
When the case arose from the negligence of another vehicle in using
the public road to whom no representation or misrepresentation as
regards the ownership and operation of passenger jeepney was made
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When the riding public was not bothered or inconvenienced at the very
least by the illegal arrangement. (Lim vs. CA, 373 SCRA 394)
The policy, which prohibits the Kabit System, may also be applied to vessels
and aircrafts that are covered by certificates of public convenience and
necessity. Persons who do not have such certificates cannot circumvent the
law by using the certificate of another. (Sec. 23, Public Service Act)
BOUNDARY SYSTEM
Features:
The driver does not receive a fixed wage but gets only the excess of
the receipt of the fares collected by him over the amount he pays to the
jeep owner.
The gasoline consumed by the jeep is for the account of the driver.
These two features are not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between the
owner and the driver from that of employer and employee. The jeepney owner
is subsidiarily liable as employer in accordance with Art.103 of RPC (Magboo
vs. Bernardo, 7 SCRA 952)
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER VS GARCIA
239 SCRA 538 (1994)
Facts: The Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center (KMU) assails the
constitutionality and validity of a memorandum which, among others,
authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the
prescribed transportation fares without application therefore with the LTFRB,
and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency.
Issue: Whether or not the absence of notice and hearing and the delegation
of authority in the increase or decrease of transportation fares to provincial
bus and jeepney operators is illegal?
Held: Under Section 16 (c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, the
legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of
fixing the rates of public services. LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today,
is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order 202.
The authority given by the LTFRB to the bus operators to set fares over
and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid, as it is
tantamount to undue delegation of legislative authority. Under the maxim
potestas delegate non delegari potest what has been delegated cannot be
delegated.
The policy allowing provincial bus operators to change and increase
their fares would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state
of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport
operators who may increase fares, every hour, every day, every month or
every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever they deem it necessary to
do so. Furthermore, under the Section 16 (a) of Public Service Act, there must
be proper notice and hearing in the fixing of rates, to arrive at a just and
reasonable rate acceptable to both the public utility and the public.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. VS. CIBIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
(270 SCRA 538)
Facts: Grand Air applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The Chief Hearing Officer
issued a notice of hearing directing Grand Air to serve a copy of the
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
87
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
88
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
89
90
TRANSPORTATION LAW: Lawrence Jeffrey Delfin, Flerida Emma Manglicmot, Mark Joseph Mupas,
Melanie Pascua, Gilbert Ricaforte, Renato Segubiense Jr., Katleen Grace Serrano, Mary Jane Timbang
91