Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2f Property Case Digests
2f Property Case Digests
Hodges
G.R. No. 8027-R, September 23, 1952, Vol. 48, No. 12, Official Gazette 5374
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Paz G. Ladera entered into a contract with C.N. Hodges. Hodges promised to
sell a lot with an area of 278 square meters to Ladera, subject to certain terms and
conditions. The agreement called for a down payment of P 800.00 and monthly
installments of P 5.00 each with interest of 1% per month, until P 2,085 is paid in full. In
case of failure of the purchaser to make any monthly payment within 60 days after it fell
due, the contract may be considered as rescinded or annulled.
Ladera built a house on the lot. Later on, she defaulted in the payment of the agreed
monthly installment. Hodges filed an action for the ejectment of Ladera.
The court issued an alias writ of execution and pursuant thereto, the city sheriff levied
upon all rights, interests, and participation over the house of Ladera. At the auction sale,
Laderas house was sold to Avelino A. Magno. Manuel P. Villa, later on, purchased the
house from Magno.
Ladera filed an action against Hodges and the judgment sale purchasers. Judgment
was rendered in favor of Ladera, setting aside the sale for non-compliance with Rule 39,
Rules of Court regarding judicial sales of real property. On appeal, Hodges contends
that the house, being built on a lot owned by another, should be regarded as movable or
personal property.
ISSUE: Whether or not Laderas house is an immovable property.
HELD: YES. The old Civil Code numerates among the things declared by it as
immovable property the following: lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kind
adhered to the soil. The law does not make any distinction whether or not the owner of
the lot is the one who built. Also, since the principles of accession regard buildings and
constructions as mere accessories to the land on which it is built, it is logical that said
accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing.
charge machine) and (g) D-Engine Waukesha-M-Fuel. It was alleged that these
machineries are sitting on cement or wooden platforms, and that petitioner is the owner
of the land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor trucks, a repair
shop, blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with these machineries, which are placed
therein. Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4, 400
petitioner's above-mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the
respondent Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty.
Respondents contend that said equipments, though movable, are immobilized by
destination, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether the equipments in question are immovable or movable properties.
HELD: The equipments in question are movable. So that movable equipments to be
immobilized in contemplation of the law, it must first be "essential and principal
elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be
"unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established."
Thus, the Court distinguished those movable which become immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements in the industry from those which may
not be so considered immobilized because they are merely incidental, not essential and
principal.
The tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not
essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting
passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentalsacquired as
movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even
without such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on, as petitioner has
carried on, without such equipments, before the war. The transportation business could
be carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or
serviced in another shop belonging to another.
it is a real property as it is attached to the ground by means of bolts and that the only
way to remove it is to destroy the concrete floor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery is real or personal property.
HELD: The machinery is a personal property. The Supreme Court explained that if a
house of strong materials may be considered as personal property for purposes of
executing a chattel mortgage, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is
movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not
be likewise treated as such.
as the latter was not in possession thereof at the time he sold it at a public auction is
untenable.
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor
of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
ISSUE: Whether or not real properties were seized under the disputed warrants.
HELD: No. Under Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code, "machinery, receptacles, instruments
or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which
may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, it was said that machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary
right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the present case,
petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. The machineries, while in fact bolted to the ground, remain
movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only
mean one thingthat a building is by itself an immovable property. In view of the
absence of any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an immovable property
irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to
belong to the same owner. The lien so created attaches merely to the immovable
property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was incurred. Therefore,
the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction
of the building attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the obligors.
Yap v. Taada
G.R. No. L-32917, July 18, 1988, 163 SCRA 464
Narvasa, J.
FACTS: Goulds Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. filed a complaint against Yap and his
wife seeking recovery of P1,459.30 representing the balance of the price and
installation cost of a water pump in the latter's premises. Goulds presented evidence ex
parte and judgment by default was rendered by Judge Taada requiring Yap to pay to
Goulds the unpaid balance of the pump purchased by him and interest of 12% per
annum.
Thereafter, the water pump in question was levied by the sheriff and by notice dated
November 4, 1969, scheduled the execution sale thereof. But in view of the pendency of
Yap's motion for reconsideration, suspension of the sale was directed. It appears
however that a copy of the order suspending the sale was not transmitted to the sheriff
Hence, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff went ahead with the scheduled auction sale and
sold the property levied on to Goulds as the highest bidder.
Yap argues that "the sale was made without the notice required by Sec. 18, Rule 39, of
the New Rules of Court," i.e., notice by publication in case of execution sale of real
property, the pump and its accessories being immovable because attached to the
ground with character of permanency (Art. 415, Civil Code).
ISSUE: Whether or not the water pump in question is an immovable property.
HELD: No. Yap's argument is untenable. The Civil Code considers as immovable
property, among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such
a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object." The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was
in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering deterioration.
Obviously, the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated
than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.
of the Provincial Assessors decision to assess real property taxes on the power barges,
alleging that barges are non-taxable items. In its answer, the Provincial Assessor
averred that the barges were real property for purposes of taxation under Section 199(c)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160.
ISSUE: Whether power barges, which are floating and movable, are personal properties
and therefore, not subject to real property tax.
HELD: NO. The power barges are real property and are thus subject to real property
tax. Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith,
with the taxpayer having the burden of proving otherwise. Besides, factual findings of
administrative bodies, which have acquired expertise in their field, are generally binding
and conclusive upon the Court.
Laurel v. Garcia
G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 797
Gutierrez, J.
FACTS: In view of the Reparations Agreement between the Philippines and Japan, four
properties located in Japan were given to the Philippines. One of these properties is the
Roppongi property. The said property was formerly the location of the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy until it was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976. The
Roppongi property has remained abandoned from the time of the transfer due to lack of
funds to develop the said property. Consequently, Administrative orders were issued by
the President authorizing the study of the condition of the properties of the Philippines in
Japan. Subsequently, Executive Order 296 was issued by President Aquino allowing
non-Filipinos to buy or lease some of the properties of the Philippines located in Japan,
including Roppongi.
Petitioners now contend that the Roppongi property cannot be alienated as it is
classified as public dominion and not of private ownership because it is a property
intended for public service under paragraph 2, article 420 of the Civil Code. On the
other hand, respondents aver that it has already become part of the patrimonial property
of the State which can be alienated because it has not been used for public service for
over 13 years. They further contend that EO 296 converted the subject property to
patrimonial property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Roppongi property still forms part of the public dominion
hence cannot be disposed nor alienated.
HELD: Yes. The respondents failed to convincingly show that the property has already
become patrimonial. The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time
for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property.
Under Art. 422 of the Civil Code, there must be a definite and a formal declaration on
the part of the government to withdraw it from being public. Abandonment must be a
certain and a positive act based on correct legal premises. The mere transfer of the
embassy to Nampeidai is not a relinquishment of the propertys original purpose.
The Administrative orders authorizing the study of the conditions of government
properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way
signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties. Likewise, EO 296 did not declare
that the properties lost their public character; it merely made them available to
foreigners in case of sale, lease or other disposition. Thus, since there is no law
authorizing its conveyance, the Roppongi property still remains part of the inalienable
properties of the State.
Rabuco v. Villegas
G.R. No. L-24916, February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 658
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Teehankee, J.
FACTS: The issue in this case involves the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3120
whereby the Congress converted the lots in question together with another lot in San
Andres, Malate that are reserved as communal property into disposable or alienable
lands of the State. Such lands are to be placed under the administration and disposal of
the Land Tenure Administration for subdivision into small lots not exceeding 120 square
meters per lot for sale on instalment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof
and expressly prohibited ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes under Section 2
of the Act. Respondent contends that the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for it
constitutes deprivation of property without due process of law and without just
compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 3120 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its public and
governmental capacity and are therefore public property over which Congress had
absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its private or
proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without
just compensation. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property
calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power, which will not be interfered
with by the courts. The Acts in question were intended to implement the social justice
policy of the Constitution and the government program of land for the landless and that
they were not intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its
character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the
National Government. The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting
subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of
Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of
its right and power to deal with state property.
Macasiano v. Diokno
G.R. No. 97764, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 464
Medialdea, J.
FACTS: The Municipality of Paranque passed an ordinance that authorized the closure
of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at
Baclaran, Paranaque Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon.
Thereafter, the municipal council of Paranaque issued a resolution authorizing
Paranaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into a contract with any service
cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea
markets and/or vending areas. By virtue of this, respondent municipality and respondent
Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall
operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the
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legal limit on the title and if there will be foreclosure because Morato was not able to pay
her debts, the property will be auctioned. It is also a limitation on Morato's right to enjoy
and possess the land for herself. Encumbrance, as defined, is an impairment on the use
or transfer of property, or a claim or lien on the property where there is a burden on the
title. Thus, Morato clearly violated the terms of the patent on these points. Moreover, the
property became a foreshore land because it turned into a portion of land which was
covered most of the time with water, whether it was low or high tide. Foreshore is
defined as land between high and low waters which is dry depending on the reflux or
ebb of the tides. In accordance with this land reclassification, the land can no longer be
subject to a pending patent application and must be returned to the State.
considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental
purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.
Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned, the records do
not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of
Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected
even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact that
provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings such as those in the
case at bar at their own expense, it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by
the National Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress could very well
dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in question.
lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may
not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell
these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws. Thus, the Amended Joint Venture Agreement between
AMARI and PEA was null and void.
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Javier v. Veridiano II
G.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for lot 1641. She later instituted
a complaint for forcible entry against Babol, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed
of a portion of said land. The case for forcibly entry was however dismissed as it was
found by the court that the occupied portion was outside Lot 1641. The same was
dismissed on appeal. Javier was eventually granted a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and
issued an OCT for lot 1641. Babol, however had sold the property he was occupying,
including a portion of 200 square meters to Rosete. Javier demanded the surrender of
the same area from Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply. After 4 years, Javier
instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages
against Babol and Rosete. Rosete moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
judicata. The CFI sustained the argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss.
Javier contends that res judicata cannot apply in the instant case since there is no
identity of parties and causes of action between her complaint for forcible entry, which
had long become final and executory, and her subsequent petition for quieting of title.
Javier maintains that there is no identity of causes of action since the first case was for
forcible entry, which is merely concerned with the possession of the property, whereas
the subsequent case was for quieting of title, which looks into the ownership of the
disputed land.
ISSUE: Whether or not there are really different causes of action between the forcible
entry case and the later quieting of title case.
HELD: Yes. For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following
requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The court
rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The former
judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between the first and second
actions identity of (4a) parties, (4b) of subject matter and (4c) of causes of action.
Javier's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two actions is without
merit. We have repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is required is not
absolute but only substantial identity of parties. But, there is merit in Javier's argument
that there is no identity of causes of action.
"The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of
real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy
underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong
hand, violence or terror." A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is
conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in
any way bind the title or affects the ownership of the land or building.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 is in reality an action to recover a parcel of
land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434 of the Civil Code, and should be
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distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion interdictal. Accion interdictal,
which is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's
possession of the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful
detainer (desahuico) where the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased
to be so by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought within
one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the
date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court; accion publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the
right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, accion reivindicatoria or accion
de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and
the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff
alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is
different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof
of a better right to possess without claim of title.
In Civil Case No. 926 Javier merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the
disputed area without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case
No. 2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership.
heirs of Adriano Soriano entered into extrajudicial settlement of his estate. As a result of
the settlement, the property was divided into two property, Lot No. 60052 which was
assigned to Lourdes and Candido, heirs of Adriano and the heirs of Dionisia another
heir of Adriano. The other property, Lot No. 8459 was assigned to Francisco, Librada,
Elcociado and Roman all heirs of Adriano. The owners of Lot No. 60052 sold the lot to
spouses Braulio and Aquiliana Abalos, and the owners of Lot No. 8459, except Roman
also sold their shares to spouses Briones.
On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman as caretaker and appointed
Isidro Versoza and Vidal Versoza as his substitute. Roman filed a case for
reinstatement and reliquidation against the de Vera spouses in CAR Case No. 1724-P68. On September 30, 1969, the Agrarian Court rendered a decision authorizing the
ejectment of Roman. On appeal, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
The deicion became final and executor. However, before it was executed, the parties
entered into a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman
Soriano to sub-lease the property until the termination of the original lease on June 30,
1982. This agreement was approved by the CAR court in an order dated December 22,
1972.
On August 16, 1976, the Abalos spouses applied for the registration of the disputed
parcel of land. Roman Soriano and the Director of Lands acted as oppositors. On June
27, 1983, the Land Registration Court granted the application for registration. On April
13, 1983, after the expiration of the original lease and sub-lease in favor of Roman
Soriano, the Abalos spouses filed a case for unlawful detainer against Roman Soriano,
later, this case was dismissed on motion of the Abalos spouses. On July 14, 1983,
Elcociado, Librada, Roman, Francisco, Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia filed
a complaint to annul the deeds of sale they executed in favor of the Abalos spouses or
should the deeds be not annulled, to allow Roman, Elcociado and Librada to redeem
their shares in the disputed land and to uphold Roman Sorianos possession of the
fishpond portion of the property as a tenant-caretaker.
After the dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer, the Abalos spouses filed on August
22, 1984, a motion for execution of the post-decisional order embodying the agreement
of Roman Soriano and the de Vera spouses allowing the former to sublease the
property. On October 25, 1984, Roman filed a motion to suspend hearing on the rental
demanded by the Abalos spouses until after the other issues raised in his opposition to
the motion for execution are resolved. The motion to suspend hearing on the issue of
the rentals was denied and the trial court authorized the substitution of the de Vera
spouses by the Abalos spouses. Roman Soriano's motion for reconsideration was
denied on March 16, 1985. Roman filed petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court
of Appeals but the latter denied the petition, pending the denial of this petition, Roman
Soriano died. Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs of Roman
Soriano brought this case in the Supreme Court.
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ISSUE: Whether or not a winning party (ABALOS) in a land registration case can
effectively eject the possessor (SORIANO) thereof, whose security of tenure rights is
still pending determination before the DARAB.
HELD: No. The Court held that a judgment in a land registration case cannot effectively
used to oust the possessor of the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending
determination before the DARAB. There is no dispute that Abalos spouses' title over the
land under litigation has been confirmed with finality. However, the declaration pertains
only to ownership and does not automatically include possession, especially soin the
instant case where there is a third party occupying the said parcel of land, allegedly in
the concept of an agricultural tenant. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of
tenure and they have the right to work on their respective landholdings once the
leasehold relationship is established. Security of tenure is a legal concession to
agricultural lessees which they value as life itself ad deprivation of their landholdings is
tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. The exercise of the right of
ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. The
Supreme Court decided to refrain from ruling whether petitioners may be dispossessed
of the subject property while petitioner's status as tenant has not yet been declared by
the DARAB.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Magpayo was a co-owner of the parcel of the land in
dispute.
HELD: No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists
when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not
prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain
rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty.
Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned
when they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand,
possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to
possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right.
Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and
possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner
himself or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere
holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership,
whether his belief be right or wrong. The records show that petitioner Jose Garcia
occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated
by his parents. An owners act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does
not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latters favor.
Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner was in possession of the property at the
time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of
ownership. All said, the Magpayo spouses were already the owners when they
mortgaged the property to PBCom.
recalled all papers signed by him regarding the subject. Secretary De Jesus likewise
directed RODIL to pay its realty tax delinquency and ordered the issuance of a
temporary occupancy permit to the ASSOCIATION.
On 6 October 1987 RODIL filed an action for specific performance, damages and
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila against the REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas, Factora and the ASSOCIATION. De
Jesus, Banas and Factora were later substituted by Secretary Fulgencio Factoran of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the action for specific
performance. On 31 May 1988 Factora issued Order No. 1 designating the Land
Management Bureau represented by Director Abelardo Palad, Jr. as custodian of all
"former alien properties" owned by the REPUBLIC. Pending the action for specific
performance, RODIL signed a renewal contract with Director Palad which was approved
by Secretary Factora. The renewal contract would extend the lease for ten (10) years
from 1 September 1987. A supplement to the renewal contract was subsequently
entered into on 25 May 1992 where rentals on the previous lease contract were
increased. As a result, the action was dismissed in favour of Rodil. Rodil then filed an
action for unlawful detainer against Divisoria Footwear, Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto and Chua
Huay Soon. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals declared the contracts null and void and
dismissed the actions for unlawful detainer.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rodil has the right to occupy the building by virtue of its lease
contract with the Republic.
HELD: Yes. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition
over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no exception. The
REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into
a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the
REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual
elements required for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present.
Private respondents claim that the agreements of 23 September 1987, 18 May 1992
and 25 May 1992 did not give rise to valid contracts.This is true only of the Contract of
Lease entered into on 23 September 1987 which the REPUBLIC did not approve.
RODIL neither alleged nor proved that such approval was made known to it. The socalled approval of the lease contract was merely stated in an internal memorandum of
Secretary De Jesus addressed to Director Factora. This is evident from the fact that
Secretary De Jesus, in his letter, asked Factora to duly execute a lease contract and
forward it to his office for approval. The consequences of this fact are clear. The Civil
Code provides that no contract shall arise unless acceptance of the contract is
communicated to the offeror. Until that moment, there is no real meeting of the minds,
no concurrence of offer and acceptance, hence, no contract.
However, the same is not true of the contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992. As
argued by RODIL, these contracts are not proscribed by law; neither is there a law
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prohibiting the execution of a contract with provisions that are retroactive. Where there
is nothing in a contract that is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or
public order, the validity of the contract must be sustained.
The Court of Appeals invalidated the contracts because they were supposedly executed
in violation of a temporary restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court. The
appellate court however failed to note that the order restrains the REPUBLIC from
awarding the lease contract only as regards respondent ASSOCIATION but not
petitioner RODIL. While a temporary restraining order was indeed issued against
RODIL, it was issued only on 25 May 1992 or after the assailed contracts were entered
into. As correctly stated by petitioner, one cannot enjoin an act already fait accompli.
Private respondents argue that the "renewal contract" cannot "renew" a void contract.
However, they could cite no legal basis for this assertion. It would seem that
respondents consider the renewal contract to be a novation of the earlier lease contract
of 23 September 1987. However, novation is never presumed. Also, the title of a
contract does not determine its nature. On the contrary, it is the specific provisions of
the contract which dictate its nature. Furthermore, where a contract is susceptible of two
(2) interpretations, one that would make it valid and another that would make it invalid,
the latter interpretation is to be adopted. The assailed agreement of 18 May 1992,
"Renewal of Contract of Lease," merely states that the term of the contract would be for
ten (10) years starting 1 September 1987. This is hardly conclusive of the existence of
an intention by the parties to novate the contract of 23 September 1987. Nor can it be
argued that there is an implied novation for the requisite incompatibility between the
original contract and the subsequent one is not present. Based on this factual milieu,
the presumption of validity of contract cannot be said to have been overturned.
Respondent ASSOCIATION claims that the Decision of the Office of the President
declaring null and void the lease contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 should be
counted in its favor. We do not agree. The contention does not hold water. It is wellsettled that a court's judgment in a case shall not adversely affect persons who were not
parties thereto.
Isaguirre v. De Lara
G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 803
Gonzaga Reyes, J.
FACTS: Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous
Sales Application over a parcel of land with an area of 2,342 square meters. Upon his
death, Alejandro de Lara was succeeded by his wife-respondent Felicitas de Lara as
claimant. On this lot stands a two-story residential-commercial apartment declared for
taxation purposes in the name of respondents sons, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara.
When Felicitas encountered financial difficulties, she approached petitioner Cornelio M.
Isaguirre. On February 10, 1960, a document denominated as Deed of Sale and
Special Cession of Rights and Interests was executed by Felicitas and Isaguirre,
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whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of the subject lot, together with the
two-story commercial and residential structure standing thereon. Sometime in May
1969, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of
ownership and possession of the two-story building. However, petitioner filed a sales
application over the subject property and was issued an OCT. Due to overlapping of
title, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title. Judgment was rendered in favor of the
respondents. When respondent filed a motion for execution, petitioner opposed, and
alleged that he had a right of retention over the property until payment of the value of
the improvements he had introduced on the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith with respect
to the improvements he made on the property.
HELD: No. The petitioner is a possessor in bad faith. Based on the factual findings from
this case, it is evident that petitioner knew from the very beginning that there was really
no sale and that he held respondents property as mere security for the payment of the
loan obligation. Therefore, petitioner may claim reimbursement only for necessary
expenses; however, he is not entitled to reimbursement for any useful expenses which
he may have incurred.
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deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if
the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
HELD: No. Caisip was not even entitled to the right granted by Article 429. This is totally
inapplicable to the case, for, having been given 20 days from June 6th within which to
vacate the lot, Cabalag did not, on June 17th and within said period, invades or usurps
the said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda
owner may have become its co-possessor by reason of the prior order of the Justice of
Peace Court of Nasugbu. Caisip and others did not repel or prevent an actual or
threatened physical invasion or usurpation. They expelled Cabalag from a property
which she and her husband were in possession, despite the fact that the Sheriff had
explicitly authorized Guevarra and Cabalag to stay in said property up to June 26th, and
had expressed the view that he could not oust them without a judicial order. It is clear,
therefore, that Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey, by means of violence, and without legal
authority, had prevented the complainant from doing something not prohibited by law
(weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her to do something against her will
(stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), whether it be right or wrong, thereby taking
the law into their hands, in violation of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code.
and lawful possessor, to use reasonable force to repel an invasion or usurpation, actual,
threatened or physical of his property. The principle of self-defense and the protective
measures related thereto, covers not only his life, but also his liberty and property.
The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force, not only to
prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is a sort of self-defense.
It is lawful to repel force by force. He who merely uses force to defend his possession
does not possess by force. The use of such necessary force to protect propriety or
possessory rights constitutes a justifying circumstance under the Penal Code.
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the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the
obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the
locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to
the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as
the private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. The Court of Appeals justified
this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of the surface rights
and the owners of the sub-surface rights. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is
classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate
claims of title. However, the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself
cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the
land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as
already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so
and became mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were
perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath,
it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the
surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine. If a person is the owner of agricultural
land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the
right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which
such minerals belong.
Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935
prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands,
subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could
not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. The decision is set aside and that of
the trial court is reinstated.
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Abejaron v. Nabasa
G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 47
Puno, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and
claimant of a 118-square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in Silway,
General Santos City. Petitioner Abejaron and his family occupied the 118-square meter
land. At that time, the land had not yet been surveyed. They fenced the area and built
thereon a family home with nipa roofing and a small store. Petitioner later improved their
abode to become a two-storey house. This house, which stands to this day, occupies a
portion of Lot 1, Block 5 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 2 of the same Psu. Lot 2
belongs to petitioners' daughter, Conchita. The small store was eventually destroyed
and in its stead, petitioner Abejaron another store. He later planted five coconut trees on
the property. Knowing that the disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared
only his house, and not the disputed land, for taxation purposes. The last two
declarations state that petitioners' house stands on Lots 1 and 2, Block 5. Petitioner
stated that respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot
1. Nabasa built his house about 4 meters away from petitioner Abejaron's house.
Employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area. Abejaron did not apply for title of
the land on the belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government
property. Without his knowledge and consent, Nabasa applied for and caused the titling
in his name the entire Lot 1, including petitioner Abejaron's 118-square meter portion.
Nabasa was issued an Original Certificate of Title pursuant to a Free Patent covering
Lot 1. As the title included petitioner Abejarons portion of the lot, he filed a protest with
the Bureau of Lands against Nabasa's title and application. The protest was dismissed
for failure of the petitioner to attend the hearings. Petitioner Abejaron then filed an
action for reconveyance with damages against respondent Nabasa before the RTC. The
RTC The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioner in its reconveyance case
declaring the possession and occupancy of Abejaron over 118 square meters of lot in
good faith and thereby declaring the inclusion of said portion in the OCT issued in the
name of Nabasa erroneous. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC
stating that the only basis for reconveyance is actual fraud which in this case was failed
to be substantiated by Abejaron. Without proof of irregularity neither in the issuance of
title nor in the proceedings incident thereto nor a claim that fraud intervened in the
issuance of the title, the title would become indefeasible. The petitioner hence resorts to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has acquired title over the disputed land.
HELD: An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner
whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name after
one year from the date of the decree so long as the property has not passed to an
innocent purchaser for value. The action does not seek to reopen the registration
proceeding and set aside the decree of registration but only purports to show that the
person who secured the registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner
thereof. Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on
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fraud to prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and
convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.
Reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be
erroneously titled in another's name. In the case at bench, petitioner does not claim to
be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential
right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual possession since January
1947. Title to alienable public lands can be established through open, continuous, and
exclusive possession for at least 30 years. Not being the owner, petitioner cannot
maintain the present suit. Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not
question the titles legally issued by the State.
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Ignacio v. Hilario
G.R. No. L-175, August 30, 1946, 76 Phil. 605
Moran, C. J.
FACTS: This case concerns the ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and
partly residential. The lower court rendered judgment holding plaintiffs as the legal
owners of the whole property but conceding to defendants the ownership of the houses
and granaries built by them on the residential portion with the rights of a possessor in
good faith, in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs prayed for an order of execution alleging that since they
chose neither to pay defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot,
said defendants should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense and to
restore plaintiffs in the possession of said lot. Defendants objected to this motion which,
after hearing, was granted by Judge Natividad. Hence, this petition by defendants
praying for (a) a restraint and annulment of the order of execution issued by Judge
Natividad; (b) an order to compel plaintiffs to pay them the sum of P2,000 for the
buildings, or sell to them the residential lot for P45; or (c), a rehearing of the case for a
determination of the rights of the parties upon failure of extra-judicial settlement.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent Court erred in its judgment.
HELD: Yes. The Civil Code provides:
ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or planting, after
the payment of the indemnity stated in articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
ART. 453. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until such expenses are made good to him.
Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of
refunding the amount of the expenses or paying the increase in value which the thing
may have acquired in consequence thereof.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled
to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article
453. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361,
either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he
cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land
and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He
is entitled to another motion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other
party fails to pay for the same.
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The Court holds, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendantspetitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents
only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings not to sell the land, is null
and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is,
furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code.
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FACTS: After appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals held, among other things,
that Filipinas Colleges, Inc. are declared to have acquired the rights of the spouses
Timbang in the questioned lots, they are ordered to pay the spouses Timbang in the
amount of P15,807.90 plus such other amount which said spouses might have paid or
had to pay. On the other hand, Maria Gervacio Blas was also declared to be a builder in
good faith of the school building constructed in the lot in question and was entitled to be
paid the amount of P19,000.00 for the same. Also, in case that Filipinas Colleges, Inc.
failed to deposit the value of the land, which after liquidation was fixed at P32,859.34,
within the 90-day period set by the Court, Filipinas Colleges would lose all its rights to
the land and the spouses Timbang would then become the owners thereof. If that is the
case, the Timbangs are ordered to make known to the court their option under Article
448 of the Civil Code whether they would appropriate the building in question, in which
even they would have to pay Filipinas Colleges, Inc. the sum of P19,000.00, or would
compel the latter to acquire the land and pay the price thereof. Filipinas Colleges, Inc.
failed to pay the sum of P32,859.34 so the spouses Timbang made known to the court
their decision that they had chosen not to appropriate the building but to compel
Filipinas Colleges, Inc., for the payment of the sum of P32,859,34 which was granted by
the Court. As a consequence of which, a writ of execution was issued. Meanwhile, Blas
filed a motion for execution of her judgment representing the unpaid portion of the price
of the house sold to Filipinas which was granted. Levy was made on the house in virtue
of the writs of execution. Then, the Sheriff of Manila sold the building in public auction in
favor of the spouses Timbang, as the highest bidders. Several motion were the
subsequently filed before the lower court wherein the court held that: a) the Sheriff's
certificate of sale covering a school building sold at public auction was null and void
unless within 15 days from notice of said order spouses Timbang shall pay to Blas the
sum of P5,750.00 that the spouses Timbang had bid for the building at the Sheriff's
sale; b) that Filipinas is owner of 245.00/32,859.34 undivided interest in Lot No. 2-a on
which the building sold in the auction sale is situated; and c) that the undivided interest
of the Filipinas in the lot should be sold to satisfy the unpaid portion of the judgment in
favor of Blas and against Filipinas in the amount of P8,200.00 minus the sum of
P5,750.00. The spouses Timbang contends that because the builder in good faith has
failed to pay the price of the land after the owners thereof exercised their option under
Article 448 of the Civil Code, the builder lost his right of retention provided in Article 546
and that by operation of Article 445, the spouses Timbang as owners of the land
automatically became the owners ipso facto of the school building.
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Timbang automatically become the owners of the
building upon failure of Filipinas to pay the value of the land.
HELD: No. Based on Article 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, the owner of the land
has the right to choose between appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of
the value thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land. Even this
second right cannot be exercised if the value of the land is considerably more than that
of the building. In addition to the right of the builder to be paid the value of his
improvement, Article 546 gives him the corollary right of retention of the property until
he is indemnified by the owner of the land. There is nothing in the language of these
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two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify the conclusion of appellants that, upon
the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the
land-owner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under
Article 445. The case of Bataclan vs Bernardo cannot be applied in this case in the
sense that although it is true it was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the
builder to pay the land after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative, the builder's
right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there was nothing said that
as a consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely all rights over his own building.
Also, in the present case, the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas
is entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the school
building. Blas is actually a lien on the school building are concerned. The order of the
lower court directing the Timbang spouses, as successful bidders, to pay in cash the
amount of their bid in the sum of P5,750.00 is therefore correct.
right given to the builder in good faith is the right of reimbursement of necessary
expenses for the preservation of the land; the builder cannot compel the landowner to
sell such land to the former.
Bernardo v. Bataclan
G.R. No. L-44606, November 28, 1938, 66 Phil. 598
Laurel, J.
FACTS: Bernardo bought a parcel of land from Samonte which was located in Cavite.
In order that he may take possession and occupy the said land, he filed a case in the
CFI for such purpose and the court rendered a favorable decision for Bernardo.
However, when he was supposedly set in occupying the said land, he found Bataclan.
He was within the premises because he was authorized by the previous owners to clear
the land and make the necessary improvements he deems fit, further claiming that such
authorization was granted to him ever since 1922. Since Bataclan was not a party in the
first case, Bernardo filed against him a separate case. Bernardo was declared owner
but the defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith for whom the work done and
improvements made by him should be reimbursed. An appeal to the decision of the
court was filed by both Bernardo and Bataclan. The decision was modified by lowering
the price of the land from P300 to P200 per hectare. Bernardo was given 30 days to
exercise his option, whether to sell the land to Bataclan or to buy the improvements
from him. Bernardo chose the option which would require Bataclan to pay him the value
of the land at the rate of P200 per hectare. However, Bataclan informed the court that
he will not be able to pay for the price of the land. The court then gave Bataclan 30 days
to pay the price of the property and after the lapse of the period, the land shall be sold in
a public auction. After 30 days, the land was sold to Teodoro at a public auction, after
failure of Bataclan to pay within the period the purchase price.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bataclan has the right of retention over the parcel of land in
question.
HELD: No. Bataclan no longer has lost the right of retention. The option of the owner
was already exercised where he decided that he will just allow the defendant to
purchase the land such that Bataclan was to comply with the option if he wants to retain
the land. From the moment that he told the courts of his inability to pay for the price of
the land, he already lost his right to retain the land.
received mimeographed notices dated August 2, 1970 and signed by the late Ramon
Durano, Sr., informing them that the lands which they are tilling and residing in, formerly
owned by the Cebu Portland Cement Company (hereafter, Cepoc), had been
purchased by Durano & Co., Inc. The notices also declared that the lands were needed
by Durano & Co. for planting to sugar and for roads or residences, and directed
respondents to immediately turn over the said lands to the representatives of the
company. Simultaneously, tall bamboo poles with pennants at the tops thereof were
planted in some areas of the lands and metal sheets bearing the initials RMD were
nailed to posts.
As early as the first week of August 1970, and even before many of the respondents
received notices to vacate, men who identified themselves as employees of Durano &
Co. proceeded to bulldoze the lands occupied by various respondents, destroying in
their wake the plantings and improvements made by the respondents therein. On
September 15, 1970, Durano & Co. sold the disputed property to petitioner Ramon
Durano III, who procured the registration of these lands in his name under TCT No. T103 and TCT No. T-104.
Respondents contended that the display of force and the known power and prestige of
petitioners and their family restrained them from directly resisting this wanton
depredation upon their property. Respondents urged the Department of Justice to
conduct the preliminary investigation. The RTC found that the case preponderated in
favor of respondents, who all possessed their respective portions of the property
covered by TCT Nos. T-103 and T-104 thinking that they were the absolute owners
thereof. A number of these respondents alleged that they inherited these properties
from their parents, who in turn inherited them from their own parents. Some others
came into the properties by purchase from the former occupants thereof. They and their
predecessors were responsible for the plantings and improvements on the property.
They were the ones who sought for the properties to be tax-declared in their respective
names, and they continually paid the taxes thereto. Respondents maintained that they
were unaware of anyone claiming adverse possession or ownership of these lands until
the bulldozing operations in 1970.
Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals, which, in
turn, affirmed the said decision and ordered the return of the property to all the
respondents-claimants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision ordering the
petitioners to return the properties to the respondents.
HELD: No. The evidence shows that respondents successfully complied with all the
requirements for acquisitive prescription to set in. The properties were conveyed to
respondents by purchase or inheritance, and in each case the respondents were in
actual, continuous, open and adverse possession of the properties. They exercised
rights of ownership over the lands, including the regular payment of taxes and
introduction of plantings and improvements. They were unaware of anyone claiming to
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be the owner of these lands other than themselves until the notices of demolition in
1970 --- and at the time each of them had already completed the ten-year prescriptive
period either by their own possession or by obtaining from the possession of their
predecessors-in-interest.
Furthermore, a purchaser of a parcel of land cannot close his eyes to facts which should
put a reasonable man upon his guard, such as when the property subject of the
purchase is in the possession of persons other than the seller. A buyer who could not
have failed to know or discover that the land sold to him was in the adverse possession
of another is a buyer in bad faith. In the case, respondents were in open possession
and occupancy of the properties when Durano & Co. supposedly purchased the same
from Cepoc. Petitioners made no attempt to investigate the nature of respondents
possession before they ordered demolition in August 1970.
In the same manner, the purchase of the property by petitioner Ramon Durano III from
Durano & Co. could not be said to have been in good faith. It is not disputed that
Durano III acquired the property with full knowledge of respondents occupancy thereon.
There even appears to be undue haste in the conveyance of the property to Durano III,
as the bulldozing operations by Durano & Co. were still underway when the deed of sale
to Durano III was executed on September 15, 1970. There is not even an indication that
Durano & Co. attempted to transfer registration of the property in its name before it
conveyed the same to Durano III.
Since petitioners knew fully well the defect in their titles, they were correctly held by the
Court of Appeals to be builders in bad faith.
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right of indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in
bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be
removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the
person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the
price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to
damages from the builder, planter or sower.
Based on these provisions, the owner of the land has three alternative rights: (1) to
appropriate what has been built without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, or (2)
to demand that the builder remove what he had built, or (3) to compel the builder to pay
the value of the land. In any case, the landowner is entitled to damages under Article
451.
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The Court sustains the return of the properties to respondents and the payment of
indemnity as being in accord with the reliefs under the Civil Code.
the prevailing market price at the time of payment. If buying the improvement will render
respondents Go's house useless, then petitioners should sell the encroached portion of
their land to respondents Go. If petitioners choose to sell the land but respondents Go
are unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter must vacate the subject portion and pay
reasonable rent from the time petitioners made their choice up to the time they actually
vacate the premises. But if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of
the improvement, then respondents Go may elect to lease the land, in which case the
parties shall agree upon the terms, the lease. Should they fail to agree on said terms,
the court of origin is directed to fix the terms of the lease.
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pay realty taxes amounting to P12,000.00, the commercial lot owned was sold at a
public auction. It was purchased by Nepomuceno, which later sold the same to the
Nuguid spouses for P103,000 on October 12, 1983. Pecson then challenged the sale,
alleging that the apartment building, contrary to the claim of the Nuguid spouses, was
not included in the sale. The lower court judged in favor of Pecson, declaring that the
apartment building was indeed not included in the subject sale. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the same. The Spouses Nuguid then filed a motion for delivery of possession
of the lot and the apartment building. The lower court ruled in favor of the private
respondents, but subject to the reimbursement to Pecson of the cost of constructing the
apartment building minus the rents due to the spouses (calculated at P21,000 from
June 23, 1993 to September 23, 1993). With the said decision at hand, the spouses
then made a move to eject Pecson and as well as the tenants residing therein.
However, the spouses have yet to pay Pecson for the construction costs.
ISSUE: Whether the Nuguid Spouses can eject Pecson even if reimbursement hasnt
been given for the construction costs.
HELD: No. The Court ruled that since the spouses still havent reimbursed Pecson for
the cost of construction of the building, the latter has the right to retain the property, and
along with it, the fruits of which during such possession.
The court ruled that though Article 448 do not apply in the case at bar. By its clear
language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more
parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted something. The building,
sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad faith. As in this case,
since the owner himself was the one who constructed the improvement, good faith and
bad faith becomes irrelevant. However, by analogy, the indemnity may be applied,
considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced coownership and that the parties agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are
applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid, although they differ as to
the basis of the indemnity. Since the spouses have opted to appropriate the apartment
building, Pecson is thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the apartment
building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where
the building has been constructed. This is so because the right to retain the
improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or
possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown. The petitioner not
having been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the building and,
necessarily, the income therefrom.
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conclusions of the Court of Appeals that Kee was a builder in good faith. Good faith
consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has
the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee. At the time he built improvements on
Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware
that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee is in good faith. Petitioner failed to
prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kee's bad faith, petitioner points to Kee's violation of paragraphs 22
and 26 of the Contract of Sale on Installment. It has no merit. Such violations have no
bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of
mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may give
rise to petitioner's cause of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual
breach), but may not be the basis to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in
good faith.
2.) Yes. The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent done within
the scope of his authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons. On the
other hand, the agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the damage.
But CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative of
petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee, only that in so acting, it was negligent. It is
this negligence that is the basis of petitioner's liability, as principal of CTTEI, per Articles
1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code. For such negligence, the petitioner should be held
liable for damages. The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in
good faith and owner in good faith, respectively, are regulated by law (i.e., Arts. 448,
546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It was error for the Court of Appeals to make a "slight
modification" in the application of such law [by holding petitioner and CTTEI solidarily
liable], on the ground of "equity".
less, a renewal thereof. And even if the lease legally existed, its implied renewal was
not for the period stipulated in the original contract, but only on a month-to-month basis
pursuant to Article 1687 of the Civil Code. The refusal of the petitioners' mother to
accept the rentals starting January 1986 was then a clear indication of her desire to
terminate the monthly lease. As regard the petitioners' alleged failed promise to sell to
the private respondents the lot occupied by the house, the court held that such should
be litigated in a proper case before the proper forum, not an ejectment case where the
only issue was physical possession of the property.
The court resolved the second issue in the negative, holding that Articles 448 and 546
of the Civil Code, which allow possessors in good faith to recover the value of
improvements and retain the premises until reimbursed, did not apply to lessees like the
private respondents, because the latter knew that their occupation of the premises
would continue only during the life of the lease. Besides, the rights of the private
respondents were specifically governed by Article 1678, which allow reimbursement of
up to one-half of the value of the useful improvements, or removal of the improvements
should the lessor refuse to reimburse.
On the third issue, the court deemed as conclusive the private respondents' allegation
that the value of the house and improvements was P180,000.00, there being no
controverting evidence presented.
On appeal by the private respondents, the RTC of Dagupan City reversed the trial
court's decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 448 or Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply in the
instant case.
HELD: In this case, both parties admit that the land in question was originally owned by
the petitioners' mother. The land was allegedly acquired later by one Maria Lee by virtue
of an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Lee, however, never sought a writ of
possession in order that she gain possession of the property in question. The
petitioners' mother therefore remained in possession of the lot. It has been said that
while the right to let property is an incident of title and possession, a person may be
lessor and occupy the position of a landlord to the tenant although he is not the owner
of the premises let. There is no need to apply by analogy the provisions of Article 448
on indemnity as was done in Pecson vs. Court of Appeals, because the situation sought
to be avoided and which would justify the application of that provision, is not present in
this case. Suffice it to say, "a state of forced co-ownership" would not be created
between the petitioners and the private respondents. For, as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the right of the private respondents as lessees is governed by Article 1678
of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement to the extent of one-half of the value of
the useful improvements.
It must be stressed, however, that the right to indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil
Code arises only if the lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. Since the
53
petitioners refused to exercise that option the private respondents cannot compel them
to reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements. Neither can they retain
the premises until reimbursement is made. The private respondents' sole right then is to
remove the improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property
leased than is necessary.
54
physical possession of Lot 7340. On 15 February 1974, Angelica and Celso Viajar
instituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y.
Ladrido. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of Ladrido, dismissing the
complaint of Angelica and Celso Viajar with costs against them, declaring the Ladridos
are entitled to the possession thereof. Not satisfied with the decision, the Viajars
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
court. The Viajars filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents are entitled to the land on the ground of accretion.
HELD: Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters." The presumption is that the change in the course of the river
was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion. In the present case, the lower court
correctly found that the evidence introduced by the Viajars to show that the change in
the course of the Suague River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not
clear and convincing. The Ladridos have sufficiently established that for many years
after 1926 a gradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot 7511 took place by action of
the current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29,912 sq.ms.
more or less, had been added to Lot 7511. The established facts indicate that the
eastern boundary of Lot 7511 was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For a
period of more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River overflowed its
banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from
the effects of the current of the river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot 7511
due to alluvion or accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed
and planted the same with corn and tobacco. The quondam river bed had been filled by
accretion through the years. The land is already plain and there is no indication on the
ground of any abandoned river bed. Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers
may gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters becomes the
property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. Therefore, the accretion to Lot
7511 which consists of Lots A and B belong to the Ladridos.
decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being
ejected from portions of the subject lots they occupied. Before Nazareno died, he
caused the approval by the Bureau of lands of the survey plan with a view to perfecting
his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. The said petition was protested
by private respondents. After conducting a survey of the subject land, land investigator
Avelino labis recommended that the survey plan be cancelled and that private
respondents be directed to file appropriate public land application covering their
respective portions. Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with the Undersecretary
of the Department of Natural Resources and OIC of the Bureau of lands Ignacio who
denied the Motion. Respondent Director of lands Abelardo Palad ordered Nazareno to
vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove whatever
improvements they have introduced; he also ordered that private respondents be placed
in possession thereof. A petitioner filed a case for annulment of the previous decisions
with the RTC but was dismissed. The CA affirmed the RTC decision contending that the
approved of the survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of lands and the same
shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can claim ownership of the subject land by virtue of
Art 457 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No, accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Art 457 of the NCC
requires the concurrence of the requisites mentioned in the Article. These are called
rules on alluvion, which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the
current of waters. The word current indicates the participation of the body of water in
the flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners, however, admit that the
accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on
portions of the Balacanas creek and the Cagayan River. The Bureau of lands classified
the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust.
Petitioners submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules of
alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner. The subject being public land
is under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of lands, respondent Palad is authorized to
exercise executive control over any form of concession, disposition and management of
the lands of public dominion.
covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan.
Initially, such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the
property formed part of the public domain.
Sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual flied an application to register
and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described
in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual
claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas,
Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on
the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on
the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's
property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as
the riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor
General, filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-ininterest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the
public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land sought to be registered is accretion or foreshore land,
or, whether or not said land was formed by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and
Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay.
HELD: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river;
and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the
eastern and western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern
portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third
requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's
land which is adjacent to the river bank.
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on
what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of
land on the northern side. Applicant Pascual has not presented proofs to convince the
Court that the land he has applied for registration is the result of the settling down on his
registered land of soil, earth or other deposits so as to be rightfully be considered as an
accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers]. Article 457 finds no applicability where
the accretion must have been caused by action of the bay.
The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the aforegoing observation is
that the disputed land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the
public domain. Thus, the disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay
59
being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain.
60
61
HELD: 1.) On the first issue, there is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that
actual or physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original
owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. The agreement entered into in 1859
simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island. The
agreement, in fact, states that the Island to be purchased shall be considered as their
common property. In the second agreement entered in 1868 the co-owners agreed not
only on the sharing proportion of the benefits derived from the Island but also on the
distribution of the Island each of the brothers was allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island
with the children of the deceased brother, Eustaquio Pansacola allocated a 1/4 portion
and the children of Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) also allocated a 1/4 portion of
the Island. With the distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of the
whole, and in this sense, over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at
the same time the sole owner of a portion, in the instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each
group of co-owners) of the Island which is truly abstract, because until physical division
is effected such portion is merely an Ideal share, not concretely determined (3 Manresa,
Codigo Civil, 3rd Ed., page 486, cited in Lopez vs. Cuaycong, 74 Phil. 601; De la Cruz
vs. Cruz, 32 SCRA 307 [1970]; Felices vs. Colegado, 35 SCRA 173 [1970],; Dultra vs.
CFl 70 SCRA 465 [1976]; Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977].)
In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were represented agreed on how
the Island was to be partitioned. The agreement of April 18, 1908 which supplements
that of January 20, 1907 reveals that as of the signing of the 1908 agreement no actual
partition of the Island had as yet been done. The second and fourth paragraphs of the
agreement speaks of a survey yet to be conducted by a certain Amadeo and a plan and
description yet to be made. Virgilio Pansacola, a son of the surveyor named Amadeo
who is referred to in the contract dated April 18, 1908 as the surveyor to whom the task
of surveying Cagbalite Island pursuant to said agreement was entrusted, however,
testified that said contracts were never implemented because nobody defrayed the
expenses for surveying the same.
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a
subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive
possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them
accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of actual
partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Maganon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 [1986]).
Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by
some of the petitioners herein be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. It is
undisputed that the Cagbalite Island was purchased by the original co-owners as a
common property and it has not been proven that the Island had been partitioned
among them or among their heirs. While there is co-ownership, a co-owner's
possession of his share is co-possession which is linked to the possession of the other
co-owners (Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977]).
62
2.) On the second issue, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his coowners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership
(Valdez vs. Olonga, 51 SCRA 71 [1973], Tero vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 100 [1984]). Coowners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners. An action
for partition does not prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 497,
provides that the assignees of the co-owners may take part in the partition of the
common property, and Article 400 of the Old Code, now Article 494 provides that each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property, a provision
which implies that the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred
by laches (Budlong vs. Pondoc, 79 SCRA 24 [1977]). An action for partition does not lie
except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co- owner.
63
Pardell v. Bartolome
G.R. No. L-4656, November 18, 1912, 23 Phil. 450
Torres, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and defendant Matilde Ortiz are the duly recognized
natural daughters of the spouses Miguel and Calixta who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. Prior
to the death of their mother, she executed a will whereby Matilde and Vicenta became
the heirs of all her property. Subsequently, defendants, without judicial authorization or
extrajudicial agreement took over the administration and enjoyment of the properties as
well as collection of the rents, fruits and products thereof. Moreover, Matilde and her
husband occupied the upper storey of the house and the room of the lower floor as an
office. With this, Vicenta demanded that she be given rental payments by Matilde in
occupying the house since she is a co-owner of the property not occupying the same
and as such is entitled to its enjoyment and/or fruits.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vicenta can collect rentals from Matilde who occupies and enjoy
the property alone as a co-owner.
HELD: No. The law grants each co-owner the right to use the property for the purpose
intended provided that the interest of the co-ownership must not be injured or prejudiced
and the other co-owners must not be prevented from using it according to their rights.
Matilde occupied the property owned in common in accordance with the purpose for
which it is intended. Records show no proof that she neither occasioned any detriment
to the interest of the community property nor prevented her sister from utilizing the said
property in accordance to her right as a co-owner thereof. Matilde was excercising her
right as a co-owner without being prejudicial to Vicenta who could have also occupied
her property had she wanted to.
Each co-owner of a property has the right pro-indiviso over the whole property and may
use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests
of his co-owners, for the reason that until a division is made, the respective part of each
holder of a right as a co-owner cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises
joint ownership over the pro-indiviso property in addition to his use and enjoyment of the
same.
64
65
A partition for subdivision was then filed for the purpose. This was accompanied by the
affidavits of Alfredo Benito and Saturnino Benito to the effect that they agree to the
segregation of the land owned in common by the three amigos. A subdivision plan was
made and by common agreement Lot 1-C, with an area of 163 hectares, was ceded to
petitioner, to wit, TCT no. T-4978.
In addition, notwithstanding the ruling in the Caram case wherein the sale of the
property took place after the partition agreement, the court therein saw no difference
with respect to a conveyance which took place before the partition agreement.
Regarding the contention of private respondent that she was not notified of the sale, the
court ruled that since the right of legal redemption does not exist nor apply in this case
because admittedly a subdivision title has already been issued in the name of the
petitioner on Lot 1-C sold to her, it becomes moot and academic. It becomes
unnecessary to decide whether private respondent complied with the requirements for
the exercise of legal redemption under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.
66
appellee [petitioner] filed the instant complaint against him on 5 November 1985, or
more than 49 years after the deed of donation was executed.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is barred to recover the property by the doctrine of
laches.
HELD: Yes. Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it. It has also been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a
right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing
prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. The following are the
essential elements of laches: (1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (2) Delay in asserting
complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has
an opportunity to sue; (3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that
the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) Injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. 32 Under
the present circumstances, all of the aforegoing elements are attendant in this case.
Finally, we agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that, while petitioner is
admittedly still the registered owner of the donated property, and jurisprudence is
settled as to the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens Title, there is equally
an abundance of cases in the annals of our jurisprudence where we categorically ruled
that a registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his
registered property by reason of laches.
petitioner. Finally, petitioner alleged that, as a co-owner of Lot No. 1549, she had a right
to seek partition of the property, that she could not be compelled to remain in the coownership of the same. Respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor
Roque, however, refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of ownership of any portion
of Lot No. 1549 and rejected the plan to divide the land.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be compelled to remain in the co-ownership.
HELD: No. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership" and that "each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." The facts on
record clearly show that petitioner Concepcion Roque had been in actual, open and
continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549 ever since
execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" in November of 1961. The Court notes
that it was only in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim filed with the trial court in
December of 1977 more than sixteen (16) years later that respondents first
questioned the genuineness and authenticity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan." Not
once during those sixteen (16) years did respondents contest petitioner's occupation of
a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549.
Furthermore, if indeed it is true that respondents, as they claim, are the absolute owners
of the whole of Lot No. 1549, it is most unusual that respondents would have allowed or
tolerated such prolonged occupation by petitioner of a major portion (3/4) of the land
while they, upon the other hand, contented themselves with occupation of only a fourth
thereof. This latter circumstance, coupled with the passage of a very substantial length
of time during which petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and uninterrupted in
her occupation and possession, places respondents here in laches: respondents may
no longer dispute the existence of the co-ownership between petitioner and themselves
nor the validity of petitioner's claim of a threefourths (3/4) interest in Lot No. 1549, as
they are deemed, by their unreasonably long inaction, to have acquiesced in the coownership.
HELD: Yes. From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and
exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question
involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership. In such case, the
imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one
of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period
sufficient to vest ownership by prescription. It is settled that possession by the co-owner
or co-heir is that of a trutee. In order that such possession is considered adverse to the
cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements
must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster
of cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the
cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
When the co-owner of the property executed a deed of partition and on the strength
thereof, obtained a cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the
issuance of a new title in his name as the owner, the statute of limitations started to run
for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the
existence of the co-ownership and their rights thereafter. The issuance of a new title
constituted a clear act of repudiation of the trust and co-ownership.
respondent. Petitioner also prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the house by
respondent after their father died. In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged
that he had no objection to the sale as long as the best selling price could be obtained;
that if the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided equally; and,
that being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property.
Rendering judgment by default against defendant, for failure to appear at pre- trial, the
trial court found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in equal shares
on the basis of their written agreement. However, it ruled that plaintiff has been deprived
of his participation in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and
lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants, to
delay partition. The trial court also upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand
partition. Since plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by defendant for the
former's share, the trial court held that this property should be sold to a third person and
the proceeds divided equally between the parties. The CA set aside the order of the trial
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may demand partition of the property.
HELD: Yes. We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the
effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner which we here
declare to commence only after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in
accordance with its order. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall
be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any
time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary
to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible
and the co-owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify
the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to
(1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but
because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would
prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as
to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper
reimbursement of the co-owners. However, being a co-owner respondent has the right
to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use
the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it
is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. 9 Each
co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and
may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective
share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his
co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the same.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the
house and lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been
preventing the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice
and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that the sale
70
the property of Timotea, it is supposed to pass to Paz and Porfirio. However, Porifirio
was surprised to discover that Paz executed an affidavit of adjudication stating that she
is the true and lawful owner of the said property. Moreover, without the knowledge and
consent of Porfirio, Paz sold the property to petitioner Carlos Tam for P10,000.00. Tam
thereafter filed an application for registration for said parcel of land. Subsequently, Tam
sold the property to Tycoon Properties, Inc. Having knowledge of such sale, Porfirio
filed a complaint for Legal Redemption with Damages and Cancellation of documents
against petitioner which was affirmed by the lower court and the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the claim of Porfirio Galvez which is based on an implied trust
has already prescribed because the action was filed 24 years after Paz Galvez
repudiated the said trust?
2.) Whether or not the claim of Porfirio Galvez which is based on an implied trust is
already banned by laches because he failed to assert his alleged right for almost 24
years?
3.) Whether or not Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties are buyers in good faith and
for value and has the right to rely on the face of the title?
HELD: 1.) No. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "a prescription shall not run in
favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of coownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the coownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners;
(3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
period required by law. In this case, we find that Paz Galvez effected no clear and
evident repudiation of the co-ownership. The execution of the affidavit of selfadjudication does not constitute such sufficient act of repudiation as contemplated
under the law as to effectively exclude Porfirio Galvez from the property. This Court has
repeatedly expressed its disapproval over the obvious bad faith of a co-heir feigning
sole ownership of the property to the exclusion of the other heirs essentially stating that
one who acts in bad faith should not be permitted to profit from it to the detriment of
others.
2.) No. On the matter of laches, it is hornbook doctrine that laches is a creation of equity
and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to
defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Neither should its application be used to
prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently
registered in the name of another. The equitable remedy of laches is, therefore,
unavailing in this case.
73
3.) No. As to petitioners Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties, Inc.s claim that they are
buyers in good faith, same fails to persuade. A purchaser in good faith and for value is
one who buys the property without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property and pays its fair price before he has notice of the adverse
claims and interest of another person in the same property. So it is that the "honesty of
intention" which constitutes good faith implies a freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. "Tam did not exert efforts to
determine the previous ownership of the property in question" and relied only on the tax
declarations in the name of Paz Galvez. It must be noted that Carlos Tam received a
copy of the summons and the complaint on 22 September 1994. This notwithstanding,
he sold the property to Tycoon Properties, Inc. on 27 September 1994. Significantly,
Carlos Tam is also an owner of Tycoon Properties, Inc. to the extent of 45%. A notice of
lis pendens dated 8 July 1997 filed with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of La
Union was inscribed on TCT No. T- 40390. Despite the inscription, Tycoon Properties,
Inc. mortgaged the land to Far East Bank and Trust Company for the sum of
P11,172,600. All these attendant circumstances negate petitioners claim of good faith.
and Emeterio Adlawan. Being the sole heir of Dominador, he executed an affidavit
adjudicating the house and lot owned by his father. However, he alleged that out of
respect and generosity to respondents, he granted their plea to occupy the subject
property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the property arise.
Later, when he verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot, they
refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title. He then also filed a complaint for
ejectment. In answer, the respondents, 70 and 59 years of age respectively denied that
they begged petitioner to allow them to say on the property since they have been
staying there since birth. They claimed that the said lot was originally registered in the
name of their deceased parents, Ramon and Oligia Adlawan. Spouses Ramon and
Oligia needed money to finance the renovation of their house. Since they were not
qualified to obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of the lot to Dominador who was
the only one in the family who had a college education. Dominador and his wife,
Graciana did not disturb respondents possession of the property until they died. They
also argued that even if petitioner is indeed Dominadors acknowledged illegitimate son,
his right to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can validly maintain the instant case of ejectment.
HELD: No. Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole
heir of Dominador. However, the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession
invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of the subject
lot. This so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal
wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the death of Dominador. By intestate
succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of the subject lot and house.
Petitioner then contended that even granting that he is a co-owner, he can file the
instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. This article covers all kinds of
actions for the recovery of possession. It includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer
(accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana) and recovery of
ownership (accion de reinvindicacion). A co-owner may bring such action without the
necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed
to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that where
the suit is for the benefit of the petitioner alone who claims to be the sole owner and
entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed.
According to the renowned civilest, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, he explained that a
co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other coowners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for
himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. In this case, it is not
disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for
his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an
affidavit of self-adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear therefore that
petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not
recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the
property of his father, Dominador.
76
Sumipat v. Banga
G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004
Tinga, J.
FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat acquired three parcels of
land. The couple was childless. Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children.
They are the petitioners herein. Lauro executed a document denominated Deed of
Absolute Transfer and/or Quit-Claim over Real Properties in favor of the petitioners. On
the document, it appears that the signature of his wife, Placida which indicates that she
gave her marital consent. Moreover, it was alleged that Lauro executed it when he was
already very sick and bedridden that upon petitioner Lydias request, their neighbor
Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of Lauro whereupon Lydia guided his hand in affixing
his signature on the document. Lydia left but later returned on the same day and
requested Lauros unlettered wife, Placida to sign on the said document. After Lauros
death, his wife, Placida and petitioners jointly administered the properties, 50% of the
produce went to his wife. As wifes share in the produce of the properties dwindled, she
filed a complaint for declaration of partition disclaiming any partition in the execution of
the subject document.
ISSUE: Whether or not a co-ownership was formed from the said deed.
HELD: No. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of
property a donation although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the
condition that he and his wife, Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits
or produce of the parcels of land for their subsistence and support. Where the deed of
donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance,
made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the
deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void. In this
case, the donees acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself
or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently
void. The Court declared that the deeds of sale questioned therein are not merely
voidable but null and void ab initio as the supposed seller declared under oath that she
signed the deeds without knowing what they were. The significant circumstance meant,
the Court added, that her consent was not merely marred by vices of consent so as to
make the contracts voidable, but that she had not given her consent at all.
77
Wong v. Carpio
G.R. No. 50264, October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 118
Bidin, J.
FACTS: William Giger sold a parcel of land through a pacto de recto sale to Manuel
Mercado. Mercado only began to harvest the coconut fruits but he never placed anyone
78
over the land to watch it. Neither did he reside in the land nor was there any hut
constructed thereon to show possession. Thereafter, Ignacio Wong inspected the land
to see if whether there was anyone claiming the land. After finding there was none, he
bought the land from Giger. He placed workers on the land, constructed a farmhouse,
and fenced the boundaries. He couldn't register the sale due to some technicalities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the possession of the disputed land belongs to Ignacio Wong.
HELD: It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of
a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will,
or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right." And that the
execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the
thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary. If, however, notwithstanding the
execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material
tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment
are opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected. Applying the above
pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear that possession passed from vendor
William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro,
and accordingly, the later sale a retro in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession
of the property because there is an impediment the possession exercised by private
respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two
different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise
regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are
two possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of possession are the same,
the one who presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed
in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper
proceedings.
June 26, 1983, respondent Ebenecer Purisima entered the land and constructed a
house thereon. Four days later, petitioner filed against respondent Purisima a complaint
for forcible entry before the same court docketed as Civil Case No. 2013-I. Said case
was later consolidated with Civil Case No. 2032-II.
ISSUE: Whether or not Somodio has actual possession of the property.
HELD: Yes. Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that possession is
acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact
that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. Petitioner took possession of the property
sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to coconut trees, ipil- ipil trees and fruit
trees. In 1976, he started the construction of a building on the property. It is immaterial
that the building was unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan for employment reasons
and visited the property only intermittently. Possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be
said that he is in possession (Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 [1918]). It is
sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will.
Maglucot Aw v. Maglucot
G.R. No. 132518, March 28, 2000, 329 SCRA 78
Kapunan, J.
FACTS: Sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to tentatively partition Lot
No. 1639. By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners occupied specific portions
of Lot No. 1639. It was only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was
filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis,
refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate certificates of title. Significantly,
after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by themselves and/or through their
predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with
the sketch plan. Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of the subject
lot. Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of
subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said
respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental
amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of
Roberto Maglucot, petitioners predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however,
said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot
alleging they had a right over the land because such was not partitioned and they were
co-owners. Manglucot-Aw thus filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against Manglucot.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manglucot-Aw may recover possession by virtue of a valid
partition.
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HELD: Yes. An order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable
because it decides the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted. In this case, both
the order of partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory.
Nevertheless, where parties do not object to the interlocutory decree, but show by their
conduct that they have assented thereto, they cannot thereafter question the decree,
especially, where, by reason of their conduct, considerable expense has been incurred
in the execution of the commission. Respondents in this case have occupied their
respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after
acquiescing to the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the
binding effect thereof. Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners
without being confirmed by the court are not binding upon the parties. However, this rule
does not apply in case where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly
unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of court approval is to give effect to
the sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order
for partition by actually occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue
to do so until the present until this case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court
approval has been met. This statement is not to be taken to mean that confirmation of
the commissioners may be dispensed with but only that the parties herein are estopped
from raising this question by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-binding
sketch/subdivision plan.
Cequea v. Bolante
G.R. No. 137944, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 216
Panganiban, J.
FACTS: The petitioners Fernanda Mendoza Cequea and Eduarda Apiado sought for
the ownership and possession of the land occupied by the respondent Honorata
Bolante. Prior to 1954, the land in Binangonan, Rizal was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, the father of respondent. Sinforoso died in
1930. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza
of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito
Mendoza, the father of the petitioners. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. During the
cadastral survey, respondent Honorata is the present occupant of the land together with
Miguel Mendoza, another brother of the petitioners. The trial court rendered the
petitioners as the lawful owner and possessors of the land. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision because the genuineness and the due execution of the
affidavit. It was said to be insufficient to overcome the denial of respondent and her
mother. Moreover, the probative value of petitioners tax receipts and declarations paled
in comparison with respondents proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. The actual,
physical, exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 gave her a
better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code. The petitioners contended otherwise that
she came into possession through force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil
Code.
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ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the respondent has the actual, physical, exclusive and continuous
possession of the land.
2.) Whether or not tax declarations and receipts are conclusive evidence of ownership
or possession.
HELD: 1.) Yes. Possession by the petitioner before 1985 was not exclusive, as the
respondent also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners father
and brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse
possession of the land. Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the
preferred possessor because, benefitting from her fathers tax declaration of the subject
lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other
hand, petitioners father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
2.) No. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At
most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property
for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse
possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. The
petitioners claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.
82
83
FACTS: CA-G.R. No. 38830-R was a land registration case where petitioner and private
respondents were asking for confirmation of their alleged imperfect titles to the lots in
question under Section 49 (b) of the Public Land Act. In the said decision, the appellate
court found that the petitioner was not entitled to confirmation of its imperfect title to Lots
2 and 3. In separate motions for reconsideration filed by private respondents Heirs of
Octaviano and Heirs of Juan Valdez relating to the same decision, they also asked that
said two lots be registered in their names. On August 12, 1977, the Court of Appeals
denied both motions. Effectively, therefore, in the said decision the appellate court ruled
that neither the petitioner nor the private respondents are entitled to the confirmation of
imperfect title over said two lots. Pursuant to the said decision in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R,
the two lots in question remained part of the public lands. This is the only logical
conclusion when the appellate court found that neither the petitioner nor private
respondents are entitled to confirmation of imperfect title over said lots. The present
actions that were instituted in the Regional Trial Court by private respondents are
actions for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) and not for recovery of ownership
(accion reivindicatoria).
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the possession of the subject lots.
HELD: Yes. Under Article 555 (4) of the Civil Code, it is provided that a possessor may
lose his possession by the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article
537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of
possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. In the case at bar, it is clear that
the petitioner was in possession of the said property as borrower in commodatum from
private respondents since 1906. However, in 1951 petitioner repudiated the trust when it
declared the property for tax purposes under its name. Thus, when petitioner filed its
application for registration of the said property in 1962, it had been in adverse
possession of the same for at least 11 years. Hence, the action for recover of
possession of said property filed by private respondents against petitioner must fail. The
Court, therefore, finds that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the
private respondents to be entitled to the possession thereof. Much less can they
pretend to be owners thereof. Said lots are part of the public domain.
84
85
Dizon v. Suntay
G.R. No. L-30817, September 29, 1972, 47 SCRA 160
Fernando, J.
FACTS: Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3 carat diamond ring. She entered into a
transaction with Clarita Sison, wherein said ring was delivered to the latter for sale on
commission. Upon receiving the ring, the receipt was delivered to Suntay. After a lapse
of a considerable amount of time, the ring was not yet returned and so Suntay
demanded for its return from Sison but the latter could not comply as she had already
pledged it with Dizons pawnshop for P 2,600.00. After insistent demands, Sison
delivered the pawnshop ticket to Suntay. Suntay through her counsel, wrote to Dizon
asking for the delivery of the ring pledged but, the latter refused. She filed an action for
recovery with P 500 as attorneys fees and costs. She asked for the remedy of replevin
upon filing the requisite bond pending final determination of the action. The CFI of
Manila issued the writ and Suntay was able to regain possession during the pendency
of the action. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Suntay. On appeal, Dizon
sought the reversal of the lower courts decision and invoking estoppel. CA affirmed the
lower courts decision. SC affirmed CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of the ring may recover its possession from the
pawnshop owner.
HELD: Yes. Owner of a diamond ring may recover the possession of the same from a
pawnshop where another person had pledged it without authority to do so. Art. 559 of
the civil code applies and the defense that the pawnshop acquired possession of the
without notice of any defect in the title of the pledgor is unavailing. Neither the
promptings of equity nor the mandates of moral right and natural justice come to his
rescue. Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would
manifest itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is offering a jewelry by way
of a pledge is entitled to do so. If no such care be taken he should be the last to
complain if thereafter the right of the true owner of such jewelry should be recognized.
reported to the police authorities and it was found out that the person misrepresenting
himself was actually Suarez who had a long line of criminal cases against him for his
modus operandi. The Holden car was recovered after being abandoned somewhere in
Quezon City. The Honda on the other hand, was discovered to be sold to Ledesma.
Ledesma averred he purchased the vehicle in good faith from one Neyra, as evidenced
by his certificate of registration. Citiwide Motors was able to recover.
ISSUE: Whether or not CITIWIDE MOTORS has been unlawfully deprived.
HELD: No. There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between Citiwide
Motors and Suarez. The subsequent dishonor of the check merely amounted to failure
of consideration which doesn't render a contract of sale void, but merely allows the
prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the sale. This being the
case, Citiwide motors wasn't unlawfully deprived of the property. It is thus not entitled to
the return of the vehicle from Ledesma who bought the property in good faith and for
consideration.
88
Cordero v. Cabral
G.R. No. L-36789, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532
Abad Santos, J.
FACTS: Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo of Meycauayan, Bulacan, husband of the plaintiff
Felipa Cordero and father of the other plaintiffs surnamed Ocampo, died on May 17,
1958. The said deceased left several properties, which were inherited by the plaintiffs
including the land in question which parcel of land was originally registered in
accordance with the Land Registration Act on December 14, 1933, and was registered
and/or transferred in the name of Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo on July 31, 1934. After the
death of the said Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the plaintiffs herein took possession of the
said parcel of land which is a riceland, but they found out that the southern portion of
the same with an area 4,303 square meters, more or less, upon verification, was
possessed by the defendants herein, Victoria P. Cabral, Alejandro Berboso and
Dalmacio Montaos. Victoria P. Cabral claimed to be the owner of said portion while her
co-defendants co-possessed the same as her tenants. The plaintiffs demanded of the
defendants to surrender to the former possession of the portion of land and/or vacate it
but they refused and failed to do so, and the defendant Victoria P. Cabral continued
89
claiming to be the owner of the same while her co-defendants continued recognizing her
as the owner thereof instead of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that because of the
defendants' occupancy of the aforementioned plaintiffs' portion of land with the area of
4,303 square meters, more or less, to the exclusion of the latter, the said plaintiffs failed
to realize a yearly harvest of at least ten (10) cavanes of palay at the rate of P10.00 per
cavan, from the harvest-time of 1958 up to the present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants must reimburse the fruits receive.
HELD: Yes. The disputed land is included in T.C.T. No. 14513 issued to Gregorio Z.
Ocampo, the predecessor of the plaintiffs. The original registration which includes the
disputed land was not vitiated by error or fraud. The defendants, by their own
admission, are in possession of the disputed land. There is no evidence that they were
possessors in bad faith. However, their good faith ceased when they were served with
summons to answer the complaint. As possessors in bad faith from the service of the
summons they "shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate
possessor could have received.
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HELD: 1.) Yes. Robles is the owner of the improvements. The expenditures incurred in
these improvements were not necessary inasmuch as without them the house would
have continued to stand just as before, but were useful, inasmuch as with them the
house better serves the purpose for which it was intended, being used as a residence,
and the improvements consisting of the addition of a dining room, kitchen, closet, and
bathroom in the lower and upper stories of the house, and a stable, suitable as a coach
house and dwelling, it is beyond doubt that such improvements are useful to the
building. Since the improvements are useful and Robles possession is in good faith,
applying Article 453, it is beyond question that Evarista Robles is the owner of such
improvements, and entitled to reimbursement therefor.
2.) Yes. It is a fact that the value of the improvements in question has not as yet been
paid by Lizarraga Hermanos. Wherefore, if Evarista Robles and her husband are
entitled to retain the building until the value of such improvements is paid them,
Lizarraga Hermanos have not yet any right to oust them from the building, nor,
therefore, to be indemnified for any damages caused by the refusal of the plaintiffs
found on their legitimate rights. Hence, due to the non-reimbursement of the aforesaid
useful expenditures, the possessor in good faith has the right of retention until she has
been fully reimbursed with the same.
Jose Roxas and Pablo Roman, Jr. dated December 20, 1982.The Board of Trustees of
petitioner MWSS thereafter passed Resolution 36-83, approving the sale of the subject
property in favor of respondent SILHOUETTE, as assignee of respondent CHGCCI. The
MWSS-SILHOUETTE sales agreement eventually pushed through. Per the Agreement
dated May 11, 1983 covering said purchase, the total price for the subject property is
P50,925,200, P25 Million of which was to be paid upon President Marcos' approval of
the contract and the balance to be paid within one (1) year from the transfer of the title
to respondent SILHOUETTE as vendee with interest at 12% per annum. The balance
was also secured by an irrevocable letter of credit. A Supplemental Agreement was
forged between petitioner MWSS and respondent SILHOUETTE on August 11, 1983 to
accurately identify the subject property. Subsequently, respondent SILHOUETTE, under
a deed of sale dated July 26, 1984, sold to respondent AYALA about sixty-seven (67)
hectares of the subject property at P110.00 per square meter. Of the total price of
around P74 Million, P25 Million was to be paid by respondent AYALA directly to
petitioner MWSS for respondent SILHOUETTE's account and P2 Million directly to
respondent SILHOUETTE. P11,600,000 was to be paid upon the issuance of title in
favor of respondent AYALA, and the remaining balance to be payable within one (1)
year with 12% per annum interest. Respondent AYALA developed the land it purchased
into a prime residential area now known as the Ayala Heights Subdivision. Almost a
decade later, petitioner MWSS on March 26, 1993 filed an action against all herein
named respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking for the
declaration of nullity of the MWSS-SILHOUETTE sales agreement and all subsequent
conveyances involving the subject property, and for the recovery thereof with damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not MWSS failed to provide appropriate security measures over its
own records; Circumstances led NBI to believe that the fraudulent encashment as an
inside job.
HELD: Yes. The records likewise show that MWSS failed to provide appropriate
security measures over its own records thereby laying confidential records open to
unauthorized persons. MWSS's own Fact Finding Committee, in its report submitted to
their General Manager underscored this laxity of records control. It observed that the
"office of Mr. Ongtengco (Cashier VI of the Treasury Department at the NAWASA) is
quite open to any person known to him or his staff members and that the check writer is
merely on top of his table. Relying on the foregoing statement of Mr. Ongtengco, the
NBI concluded in its Report dated 2 November 1970 that the fraudulent encashment of
the 23 checks in question was an "inside job". Thus the NBI believe that the fraudulent
act was an inside job or one pulled with inside connivance at NAWASA. The serial
numbers of the checks in question conform with the numbers in current use of
NAWASA, aside from the fact that these fraudulent checks were found to be of the
same kind and design as that of NAWASA's own checks. While knowledge as to such
facts may be obtained through the possession of a NAWASA check of current issue, an
outsider without information from the inside can not possibly pinpoint which of
NAWASA's various accounts has sufficient balance to cover all these fraudulent checks.
None of these checks, it should be noted, was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
94
96
97
Locsin v. Valenzuela
G.R. No. L-51333, May 18, 1989, 173 SCRA 454
Feliciano, J.
FACTS: Petitioners were co-owners of a large tract of agricultural land known as
Hacienda Villa Regalado. A portion of this land known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 was subject
to lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon. The bulk of this lot was
cultivated by the lessees who customarily delivered the rentals to respondent. In 1972,
PD 27 was enacted, decreasing the Emancipation of Tenants. The tract of land owned
in common by the petitioners, including the portion thereof subject to petitioners
usufructuary rights, fell within the scope of the Operation Land Transfer. Petitioners
sought the opinion of the Department of Agrarian Reform(DAR) as to who should be
entitled to receive the rental payments which continued to be made by the tenants to
respondent. The DAR District Officer rendered the opinion that the rental payments
were properly considered as amortization payments for the land and as such should
pertain to the landowners and not the usufructuary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the usufructuary was extinguished by PD 27 and who, between
the naked owner and the usufructuary, should be entitled to the amounts paid by the
tenants beginning October 21, 1972.
HELD: Yes. The usufruct which had therefore existed as a jus in re aliena in favour of
Helen Schon was effectively extinguished by PD 27. To hold, as private respondent
apparently urges would obviously defeat the purpose of the land reform statute. PD 27
was enacted to emancipate the tenants from bondage of the soil by giving to the
tenant-farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating. Ownership over the
lands subjected to the Operation Land Transfer moved from the registered owner to the
tenants. The Court holds that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared part of the land
reform area and subjected to the Operation Land Transfer, the payments made on
October 21, 1972 by the tenant-farmers constituted amortization payments on the cost
of the land that they were required to pay under PD 27. These payments, therefore,
legally pertain to the petitioners as part of the compensation for the dominion over the
land of which they were deprived of by operation of PD 27.
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Valisno v. Adriano
G.R. No. L-37409, May 23, 1988, 161 SCRA 398
Grino Aquino, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff appellant Nicolas Valisno alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of
land in Nueva Ecija which he bought from his sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. Said
land is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco and other vegetables and
adjoins the land of Felipe Adriano, on the bank of the Pampanga River. At the time of
the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River
through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing Adrianos land. Later, Adriano levelled
a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water and
prevented from cultivating his 57 hectare land. Thus, Valisno filed a complaint for
deprivation of waters rights in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications (Bureau
PWC). Bureau PWC ruled in favour of Valisno. Instead of restoring the irrigation
canal, Adriano asked for a reinvestigation of the case which was granted. In the
meantime, Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense due to his urgent need
to irrigate his watermelon fields. Valisno then filed a complaint for damages. However,
the Secretary of Bureau PWC reversed its decision and dismissed Valisnos
complaint. It held that Eladio Adrianos water rights which had been granted in1923
ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His
non-use of the water rights since then for a period of more than five years extinguished
the grant by operation of law. Hence, the water rights did not form part of his hereditary
estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves. Likewise, Valisno, as vendee of
the land which Honorata received from her fathers estate did not acquire any water
rights with the land purchased. The trial court held that Valisno had no right to pass
through the defendant's land to draw water from the Pampanga River. It pointed out that
under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law, controversies between persons claiming a right to
water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Bureau-PWC and his
decision on the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court within thirty
days. The court may not pass upon the validity of the decision of the Public Works
Secretary collaterally. Furthermore, there was nothing in Valisnos evidence to show
that the resolution was not valid. It dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. Valisnos
motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed to the Court of the Appeals
who certified the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil
Code should apply to this case.
HELD: The provisions of the Civil Code shall apply. The existence of the irrigation canal
on Adrianos land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land
prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to Valisno was equivalent to a title
for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil
Code: The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established
or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be
alienated, as a title in order that he easement may continue actively and passively,
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unless at the time, theownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be
provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be
removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the
division of a thing owned in common on by two or more persons (Civil Code).
This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters which provided:
Whenever a tract of irrigated land which previously received its waters from a single
point is divided through inheritance, sale or by virtue of some other title, between two or
more owners, the owners of the higher estates are under obligation to give free
passage to the water as an easement of conduit for the irrigation of the lower estates,
and without right to any compensation therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed
of conveyance.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water
rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. By the terms of
the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded,
conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title, interest and
participations over the parcel of land above- described, together with one Berkely Model
6 YRF Centrifugal Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No.
5415812 and one (1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe with elbow, nipples,
flanges and footvalves," and the water rights and such other improvements appertaining
to the property subject of this sale. According to Valisno, the water right was the
primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property
would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a
water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is
supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified
as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as property right, which
survives the determination of the necessity. As an easement of waters in favor of
Valisno has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance
or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as Adrianos act of levelling the irrigation
canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.
On May 12, 1953, the defendants along with a number of men maliciously obstructed
plaintiffs right of way by constructing a chapel in the middle of the said road and then
later, by means of force, intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden
posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way thereby
preventing the plaintiff from using it.
The plaintiff claims that he has already acquired the easement of right of way over the
land thru prescription by his continuous and uninterrupted use of the narrow strip of land
as passage way. However, plaintiffs complaint was dismissed by the CFI.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement of right of way can be acquired by prescription.
HELD: No. The Court held than an easement of right of way may not be acquired thru
prescription because though it may be apparent, it is nevertheless discontinuous or
intermittent, and therefore, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, can be acquired
only by a virtue of a title. Furthermore, a right of way cannot be acquired by prescription
because prescription requires that the possession be continuous and uninterrupted.
Taedo v. Bernad
G.R. No. L-66520 August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 86
Padilla, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Antonio Cardenas owned Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B. On
the said two lots, a septic tank was constructed for the common use of the occupants of
both lots. Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner Taedo and the other Lot 7501B was also mortgaged to Taedo as a security for the payment of loan with an
agreement that Cardenas would only sell Lot 7501-B to him. However, said Lot 7501-B
was sold to herein respondent Spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. Upon learning of the
said sale, Taedo offered to redeem the property from Sim but the latter refused.
Instead, Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Taedo built
on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also asked Taedo to remove that
portion of his building enroaching on Lot 7501-B. Taedo was then constrained to file an
action for legal redemption and damages invoking Article 1622 of the Civil Code. On the
other hand, respondent Spouses claimed they are the absolute owners of Lot 7501-B
and that Eduardo Taedo has no right to redeem the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil
Code as the land sought to be redeemed is much bigger than the land owned by
Taedo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners right to continue to use the septic tank, erected
on Lot 7501-B, ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to
different owners who do not have the same interest.
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HELD: No. Applying Article 631 and 624 of the Civil Code, no statement abolishing or
extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501A to Eduardo Taedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and
septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo.
Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the
spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501- B),
cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
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ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be granted his prayer to buy the
additional land to increase the existing one meter road path.
HELD: Yes. Even with the presence of the dried river bed, upon thorough investigation,
it was found to be an inadequate right of way because a concrete bridge traverses it
thereby the jeep would have to jump over said bridge which has a height of 5 meters in
order to reach the highway. It was also found that during the rainy season, the same
was impassable as it became flooded. This right of way could not provide adequate
access to the highway thereby when an estate has no access to a public road, it may
demand for a right of way. Furthermore, under Article 651 of the Civil Code, it is the
needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the right of way.
In this case, since the business of the petitioner grew larger and pushcarts became
tedious to transport his nursery plants, it became necessary for him to do so with a
jeepney. And in order to efficiently make such transportation of his plants, the right of
way had to be widened to accommodate the width of the jeepney of the petitioner. The
petitioner thus shall be granted the additional land to the existing right of way.
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Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is presumed, unless
there is a title or exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among others, in dividing walls
adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation.
The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three cases dealt with in the
said article of the code, and is that of juris tantum unless the contrary appear from the
title of ownership of the adjoining properties, that is to say, that the entire wall in
controversy belongs to one of the property owners, or where there is no exterior sign to
destroy such presumption and support a presumption against the party wall.
It can not be presumed that the aforesaid portion was a party wall, and that it was not
exclusively owned by the respondents, inasmuch as the latter have proven by means of
a good title that has not been impugned by the petitioner, that when one of their
ancestors and principals acquired the property the lot was already inclosed by the wall
on which the building was erected; it must therefore be understood that in the purchase
of the property the wall by which the land was inclosed was necessarily included.
Choco v. Santamaria
G.R. No. 6076, December 29, 1911, 21 Phil. 132
Mapa, J.
FACTS: The defendant in the building of his house, has made several openings and
windows in the walls of the house on both sides overlooking then property of the
plaintiff; that at the time the defendant was building his house, and the windows and the
openings were being made, the plaintiffs protested, and later on and in the year 1905
made written protest and demand on the defendant, and the defendant received the
written protest and referred it to his counsel, who, from the evidence, appears to have
suggested an amicable and adjustment of the matter, but the adjustment was not made,
and this action was brought. The Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs,
Severina and Flora Choco, and against the defendant, Isidro Santamaria, forever
prohibiting the opening of the window stated, which must be closed, and forever
prohibiting the opening of the windows and openings marked, which must be closed or
made to conform to the requirements of law with regard to dimensions and an iron grate
embedded in the wall, with the costs of the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred by not ordering in his judgment the final
and perpetual closing of the large window opened in the balcony of the back part of the
appellee's house and that, though the appellant's lot can be seen through the window, it
is not contiguous to the latter's property.
HELD: To judge from the photographic views, it opens on the boundary line between
the said lot and that the appellee and is situated perpendicularly above a part of the wall
that belongs to the appellants. This opinion is corroborated by the testimony of the
defendant's witness who took the said photographs, in so far as he said that "a part of
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the window in question is in front of the plaintiffs' property, since between it and the
plaintiffs' property there does not intervene the distance required by law that of two
meters in the first case, and 60 centimeters in the second, therefore, its opening is a
manifest violation of the provisions of article 582 of the Civil Code which reads as
follows: Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings projecting
over the estate of the neighbor, cannot be made if there is not a distance of, at least, 2
meters between the wall in which they are built and said estate. Neither can side nor
oblique views be opened over said property, unless there is a distance of 60
centimeters. Because of the lack of the distance required by law, the window in
question must be closed, and consequently the judgment appealed from should be
modified in this sense, as regards this window.
for the benefit of the general public as stated in Article 614 of the Civil Code. In personal
servitude, there is therefore no owner of a dominant tenement to speak of, and the
easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at
large. Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant
owner relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use.
Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public, if that is possible, no
genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement.
Floro v. Llenado
G.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 713
Romeo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Simeon Floro is the owner of Floro Park Subdivision who has its own
egress and ingress to and from the Mac Arthur Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and
the PNR level crossing. On the other hand, Respondent Orlando Llenado, is the
registered owner of Llenado Homes Subdivision, adjacent to Floro Park Subdivision.
Prior to its purchase by Llenado, the land was known as the Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision, a duly licensed and registered housing subdivision in the name of Soledad
Ortega. Bounded on the South by the 5 to 6 meter-wide Palanas Creek, which
separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision, and on the west by ricelands belonging to
Marcial Ipapo. the Llenado Homes does not have any existing road or passage to the
Mac Arthur Highway. However, a proposed access road traversing the idle riceland of
Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of the Emmanuel
Homes Subdivision which was duly approved by the defunct Human Settlement
Regulatory Commission. Meanwhile, the Llenados sought, and were granted permission
by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision as passageway to
and from MacArthur Highway. However no contract of easement of right of way was
ever perfected by both parties. Later, Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks,
wooden posts and adobe stones, thereby preventing its use by the Llenados. Llenado
instituted a complaint before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan against Floro for easement of
right of way. The RTC granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and ordered Floro to open the road and pay damages. Thereafter,
the trial court rendered another judgment dismissing the case and lifting the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction previously issued and ordered the plaintiff to pay
defendant damages and costs. On appeal by Llenado on the CA, the judgment of the
RTC was reversed ordering Floro to open roads 4 and 5 and remove all the objects that
prevent passage on road 5 and to pay the plaintiff damages with costs and payment of
indemnity for the easement of right of way.
ISSUE: Whether or not Llenado is entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way.
HELD: No. For the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way
under the Civil Code, the preconditions provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof
must be established. These preconditions are: (1) that the dominant estate is
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surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art.
649, par. 1); (2) after payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); (3) that the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.);
and, (4) that the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
The burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory
right of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate. On the past subdivision plans by
Emmanuel Homes which is bought by Llenado, there is an indication of an access road
through IPAPOs property although it was not properly paved, a dirt road will suffice.
Seeing this, Llenado has failed to comply with the first requirement. If the servitude
requested by Llenado is allowed, other subdivision developers/owners would be
encouraged to hastily prepare a subdivision plan with fictitious provisions for access
roads merely for registration purposes. Furthermore, if such practice were tolerated, the
very purpose for which Presidential Decree No. 957 was enacted, that is, to protect
subdivision buyers from unscrupulous subdivision owners/developers who renege on
their duties to develop their subdivisions in accordance with the duly approved
subdivision plans, would be defeated.
In order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not
a fictitious or artificial necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not
what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the
face of a necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the servitude, the same should
not be imposed.
The complaint for easement of right of way filed by Llenado in the lower court did not
contain a prayer for the fixing of the amount that he must pay Floro in the event that the
easement of right of way is constituted. Thus, the existence of the second requisite has
likewise not been established. Private respondent Llenado admitted that the Ipapo
riceland was no longer being cultivated. Indications are that it has already been
abandoned as a ricefield. There was no reason for private respondent's failure to
develop the right of way except the inconvenience and expenses it would cost him.
Hence, the third requisite has not been met. Failing to establish the existence of the
prerequisites under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, private respondent Llenado's
bid for a compulsory easement of right of way over Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park
Subdivision must fail.
agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they did, with the
shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road. Located
directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio
designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now
Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. The latter Lot is behind the property of Sotero,
father of private respondent Yolanda Oliveros. Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A
from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his
administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale
she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed
upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on her
adjoining property. Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using
as her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when
Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the
payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her
property. Later, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6B, located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway
between their house from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and
Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is made of strong materials and occupies the
entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long.
Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and
egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself
obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of
the store to reach the road. Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying
for a right of way through Anastacia's property. The report was that the proposed right of
way was at the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting
from the back of Sotero's sari-sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her
property and turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid the store. However, the trial
court dismissed her complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision declaring
that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioners property and that the way proposed
by Yoland would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more
accessible to the public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down the
avocado tree standing thereon.
HELD: Yes. The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way
are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate
outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way
being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of
shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest
distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are
permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the
longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass
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through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will
cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two
(2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least
damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide
egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only
require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.
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built his home on the land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten
(10) years. Those who do not fall within the said category cannot be considered
"legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to purchase the
property should the owner of the land decide to sell the same at a reasonable price
within a reasonable time.
Reta denies that he has lease agreements with Alcantara and Roble. Alcantara, on the
other hand, failed to present evidence of a lease agreement other than his testimony in
court. Reta allowed Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he
gathered tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease.
Roble was also allowed to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his
gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614
of the Civil Code. Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not, the conclusion would
still be the same since the agreement was one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus,
Roble is not a legitimate tenant as defined by PD No. 1517.
With regard to the other petitioners, Reta admitted that he had verbal agreements with
them. This notwithstanding, they are still not the legitimate tenants who can exercise the
right of first refusal under PD No. 1517. From the moment Reta demanded that the
petitioners vacate the premises, the verbal lease agreements, which were on a monthly
basis since rentals were paid monthly, ceased to exist as there was termination of the
lease.
In conclusion, none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first refusal
under PD No. 1517.
There was also no intention on the part of Reta to sell the property. Hence, even if the
petitioners had the right of first refusal, the situation which would allow the exercise of
that right, that is, the sale or intended sale of the land has not happened. PD No. 1517
applies where the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party.
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. On appeal, the CA set aside the assailed order
of the trial court; hence, this petition for review on certiorari. PCRI contends that it is
entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as may be
gleaned from the following provision in the MOU: The above cited lot, being an existing
private road, will remain open to ingress and egress for whatever kind of passage in
favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. or its successors=in-interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction ordering private respondent to allow petitioner to
undertake excavations along the access road for the purpose of installing water pipes.
Held: Yes. There is no question as to the meaning of the terms ingress and egress.
They give petitioner the right to use the private road as means of entry into and exit
from its property on the northwestern side o f the compound. The question concerns the
meaning of the phrase for whatever kind of passage. The trial court read this phrase to
mean that petitioner had the right to make excavations on the side of the access road in
order to install a network of pipes. The word passage does not, however; clearly and
unmistakably convey a meaning that includes a right to install water pipes on the
access road. The ordinary meaning of the word, as defined in Websters Dictionary, is
that act or action of passing: movement or transference from one place or point to
another. this legal meaning is not different. It means, according to Blacks Law
Dictionary, the act of passing; transit; transition.
Villanueva v. Velasco
G.R. No. 130845, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 99
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City. He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property.
When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its southeastern
portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the
Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private
respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way. Unknown to petitioner, even
before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned small
house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also unaware that
private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991 for
easement. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the
contract of easement. On August 13, 1991, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
was issued, ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small
house encroaching on the easement. On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco issued
an Alias Writ of Demolition. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer
to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. He maintains that the writ of demolition could not
apply to his property since he was not a party to the civil case.
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prescribed by law, especially thouse mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and
114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. This reservation, unlike the other
provisos imposed on the grant, was not limited by any time period and thus is a
subsisting condition. Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands
granted by patent, shall further be subject to a right of way not exceeding twenty
meters in width for public highways, railrods, irrigation, ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs
and telephone lines, and similar works as the Government or any public or quasi-public
service or enterprises, including mining or forest concessionaires may reasonably
require for carrying on their business, with damages for the improvements only.
Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that Easements are established either by law or
by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary
easements. In the present case, we find and declare that a legal easement of a rightof-way exists in favor of the government. The land was originally public land, and
awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the
land were originally private property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for
the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way.
cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss
or damages sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of
negligence. This event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force
majeure; a human factor negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect tehn
of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted
from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it
were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the property of appelle, resort
to pertinent provisions of applicable law is imperative. Under Article 637 of the Civil
Code, it is provided that lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally
and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the
stones or earth which they carry with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot
construct works which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher
estate make works which will increase the burden.
A similar provion is found under Article 50 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D.
No. 1067), which provides that lower estates are obliged to receive the water which
naturally and without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the
stone or eath which they carry with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot
construct works which will impede this natural flow, unless he provides an alternative
method of drainage; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will
increase this natural flow.
As worded, the two aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon the lower
estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man
descend from higher estates. However, where the waters which flow from a higher
estate are those which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any damage
occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to compensation.
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process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition
or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally
classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through occupation,
acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i.e.,
through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain contracts, such as
sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature and effect
of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the same with a contract
(deed) of sale. They are not the same. In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting
parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing,
and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other
hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument
when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide
the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an
extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of
hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between
the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership
where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with
knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who
are co-heirs in the succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the
succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on
the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a
sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
De Luna v. Abrigo
G.R. No. L-57455, January 18, 1990, 181 SCRA 150
Medialdea, J.
FACTS: Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of a lot of the Cadastral Survey of
Lucena to the Luzonian University Foundation. The donation was embodied in a Deed
of Donation Intervivos and made subject to certain terms and conditions and provided
for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated property in case of violation or
non-compliance. The foundation failed to comply with the conditions of the donation. De
Luna "revived" the said donation in favor of the foundation, in a document entitled
"Revival of Donation Intervivos" subject to terms and conditions which among others,
required it to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated
property within five (5) years from execution. The automatic reversion to the donor of
the donated area in case of violation of the conditions was also provided. The
foundation, through its president, accepted the donation. A "Deed of Segregation" was
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later executed by De Luna and the foundation whereby the area donated was
adjudicated to the foundation. The heirs of de Luna later filed a complaint with the trial
court alleging that the terms and conditions of the donation were not complied with by
the foundation. Thus, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and the reversion of
the donated land to the heirs. The foundation invoked, among others, the defense of
prescription of action. The court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that under Article 764
of the New Civil Code, actions to revoke a donation on the ground of non-compliance
with any of the conditions of the donation shall prescribe in four years (4) counted from
such non-compliance. In the instant case, the four-year period for filing the complaint for
revocation commenced on April 9, 1976 and expired on April 9, 1980. Since the
complaint was brought on September 23, 1980 or more than five (5) months beyond the
prescriptive period, it was already barred by prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is one for judicial decree of revocation of the
donation in question as contemplated in Article 764 of the New Civil Code and which
prescribes in four (4) years and not an action to enforce a written contract which
prescribes in ten (10) years.
HELD: The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made
subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a
kindergarten school in the donated property within five years from execution of the deed
of donation. It is true that under Article 764, actions for the revocation of a donation
must be brought within for (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the
donation. However, the said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the
specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the
rules on contracts. Therefore, the rules on contracts and the general rules on
prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar.
Furthermore, while the judicial action for the rescission of a contract is generally not
necessary where the contract provides that it may be automatically revoked and
cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions, however, where one of the
parties contests or denies the rescission, judicial intervention is necessary not for
purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed
rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper. Judicial
action will be necessary as without it, the extrajudicial resolution will remain contestable
and subject to judicial invalidation, unless attack thereon should become barred by
acquiescence, estoppel or prescription.
In the instant case, trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the complaint is
barred by prescription under Article 764 because Article 764 does not apply to onerous
donations. As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971, compliance with the
terms and conditions of the contract of donation, shall be made within five (5) years
from its execution. The complaint which was filed on September 23, 1980 was then well
within the ten (10) year prescriptive period to enforce a written contract pursuant to
Article 1144 par. 1, counted from April 9, 1976.
122
Reyes v. Mosqueda
G.R. No. L-45262, July 23, 1990
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS: On May 15, 1969, Dr. Emilio Pascual executed a Deed of Donation of real
property located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St. Tondo, Manila in favor of Ofelia Parungao, a
minor, with her mother, Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift and donation for and in her
behalf. However, Ursula Pascual alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime on
November 2, 1966 executed a Donation mortis causa in her favor covering the said
property. Parungao, upon reaching the age of majority was able to register the Deed of
Donation with the Register of Deeds in Manila and was issued a TCT.
On September 23, 1976, Ursula executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo
property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose, and Emmanuel Reyes. Benjamin filed a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of the TCT of Parungao and/or reconveyance of
the deed of title. The CFI of Manila declared the TCT in the name of Parungao null and
void and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the title. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the 1966 donation to Ursula was inter vivos, which meant that the
property was already transferred to Ursula at that time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to Ursula was Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa.
HELD: It was a Donation Inter Vivos. The title given by the donor in the deed of
donation is not a determinative factor which makes the donation inter vivos or mortis
causa. It is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained therein
and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intent of the donor. In the
case, the donor used the term donation Mortis Causa but from the stipulations of the
deed, it can be clearly inferred that he was actually executing a donation Inter Vivos to
Ursula.
The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to Ursula was immediate and
independent of the death of Dr. Pascual since it was a donation Inter Vivos. The
provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation
to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give
the naked ownership of the properties to Ursula immediately after the execution of the
deed of donation. Hence, he could not have donated the property again in 1969 in favor
of Parungao since the lot was already transferred to Ursula at that time.
FACTS: The case began upon complaint filed by petitioner-appellant against the widow
and heirs of the late Salvador P. Lopez to recover a parcel of land in barrio Davao.
Plaintiff averred to be its legal owner, pursuant to a deed of donation of said land,
executed in her favor by the late owner, Salvador P. Lopez, on 18 May 1943. The
defense interposed was that the donation was null and void for having an illicit causa or
consideration, which was the plaintiff's entering into marital relations with Salvador P.
Lopez, a married man; and that the property had been adjudicated to the appellees as
heirs of Lopez by the court of First Instance, since 1949.
It was ascertained by the Court of Appeals that the donated land originally belonged to
the conjugal partnership of Salvador P. Lopez and his wife, Maria Ngo; that the latter
had met and berated Conchita for living maritally with her husband, sometime during
June of 1943; that the widow and children of Lopez were in possession of the land and
made improvements thereon; that the land was assessed in the tax rolls first in the
name of Lopez and later in that of his widow.; and that the deed of donation was never
recorded.
Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals held that the deed of donation was inoperative,
and null and void (1) because the husband, Lopez, had no right to donate conjugal
property to the plaintiff appellant; and (2) because the donation was tainted with illegal
cause or consideration, of which donor and donee were participants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is valid.
HELD: In the present case, it is scarcely disputable that Lopez would not have
conveyed the property in question had he known that appellant would refuse to cohabit
with him. The cohabitation was an implied condition to the donation, and being unlawful,
necessarily tainted the donation itself.
The rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not be aided by the law
but will both be left where it finds them, has been interpreted by this Court as barring the
party from pleading the illegality of the bargain either as a cause of action or as a
defense. Memo auditor propriam turpitudinem allegans.
The appellant seeks recovery of the disputed land on the strength of a donation regular
on its face. To defeat its effect, the appellees must plead and prove that the same is
illegal. But such plea on the part of the Lopez heirs is not receivable, since Lopez,
himself, if living, would be barred from setting up that plea; and his heirs, as his privies
and successors in interest, can have no better rights than Lopez himself.
Appellees, as successors of the late donor, being thus precluded from pleading the
defense of immorality or illegal causa of the donation, the total or partial ineffectiveness
of the same must be decided by different legal principles. In this regard, the Court of
Appeals correctly held that Lopez could not donate the entirety of the property in
litigation, to the prejudice of his wife Maria Ngo, because said property was conjugal in
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character and the right of the husband to donate community property is strictly limited
by law
126
Francisco, J.
FACTS: Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of
12,199 square meters. He executed a deed entitled Donation InterVivos ceding onehalf portion thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria. Eventually, the whole parcel of land was
ceded to Doria by Calapine. Doria then donated a portion of 157 square meters to the
Calauan Christian Reformed Church. He also sold, transferred and conveyed unto the
spouses Eduarte the parcel of land, saving the 700 square meters on which Dorias
house was erected. However, Pedro Calapine filed a complaint against Doria, the
Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Eduarte claiming that his
signature to the deed of donation was a forgery. He prays for the revocation of the
donation made in favour of Doria, to declare null and void the deeds of donation and
sale that she had executed in favor of the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and
the spouses Eduarte.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are buyers in bad faith of the donated property.
HELD: No. The rule is well-settled that mere possession cannot defeat the title of a
holder of a registered torrens title to real property. When herein petitioners purchased
the subject property from Helen Doria, the same was already covered by TCT No. T23205 under the latter's name. And although Helen Doria's title was fraudulently
secured, such fact cannot prejudice the rights of herein petitioners absent any showing
that they had any knowledge or participation in such irregularity. Thus, they cannot be
obliged to look beyond the certificate of title which appeared to be valid on its fade and
sans any annotation or notice of private respondents' adverse claim. Contrary therefore
to the conclusion of respondent Court, petitioners are purchasers in good faith and for
value as they bought the disputed property without notice that some other person has a
right or interest in such property, and paid a full price for the same at the time of the
purchase or before they had notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the
property. And having established beyond doubt that Helen Doria fraudulently secured
her title over the disputed property which she subsequently sold to petitioners, Helen
Doria should instead be adjudged liable to private respondents, and not to petitioners as
declared by the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals, for the resulting damages
to the true owner and original plaintiff, Pedro Calapine.
Petition granted.
Quilala v. Alcantara
G.R. No. 132681, December 3, 2001, 371 SCRA 311
Ynares Santiago, J.
FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property
Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land. The "Donation of Real
Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The first page contains the deed of
donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta
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Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the
Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before
the notary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act
and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the signatures of
Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures
of Violeta Quilala and the other witness The deed of donation was registered with the
Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No.
143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22,
1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan
Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and
adjudicating unto themselves the above-described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against petitioner and Guillermo T. San
Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds of Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity of the
donation inter vivos. The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by
both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor,
Catalina. Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public
instrument, thus rendering the donation null and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision affirming with modification the decision of the trial court by
dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the filing of
probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will and testament.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation is void for lack of acceptance on the part of
the donee Violeta Quilala.
HELD: No. As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the
Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand
margin, and by the donee and the other witness on the right hand margin. Surely, the
requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand
margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure
that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. The
requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has
already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his
signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that
is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact
that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the
document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the
above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with.
130
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public
does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its
entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in
another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the
deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not
mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is
the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event,
the donee signed on the second page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her
acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of
donation, was made in a public instrument.
property was also null and void so as the mortgage to R & B Insurance. On the other
hand, Kausapin executed an affidavit to affirm the authenticity of the kasundudan in
favor of his stepson, Enrique Hemedes whom she is dependent from for her financial
support.
Siguan v. Lim
G.R. No. 134685, November 19, 1999, 318 SCRA 725
Davide, Jr., C.J.
FACTS: On 2 July 1991, a Deed of Donation conveying parcels of land and purportedly
executed by LIM on 10 August 1989 in favor of her children, Linde, Ingrid and Neil was
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City. On 23 June 1993,
petitioner filed an accion pauliana against LIM and her children to rescind the
questioned Deed of Donation and to declare as null and void the new transfer
certificates of title issued for the lots covered by the questioned Deed. Petitioner
claimed therein that sometime in July 1991, LIM, through a Deed of Donation,
fraudulently transferred all her real property to her children in bad faith and in fraud of
creditors, including her; that LIM conspired and confederated with her children in
antedating the questioned Deed of Donation, to petitioner's and other creditors'
prejudice; and that LIM, at the time of the fraudulent conveyance, left no sufficient
properties to pay her obligations. The RTC ruled in favor of Siguan and rescinded the
Contract, but was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation executed by respondent may be
rescinded for being in fraud of her alleged creditor.
HELD: We resolve these issues in the negative. Art. 1381 of the Civil Code enumerates
the contracts which are rescissible, and among them are "those contracts undertaken in
fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due
them."
The action to rescind contracts in fraud of creditors is known as accion pauliana. For
this action to prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) the plaintiff asking for
rescission has a credit prior to the alienation, although demandable later; (2) the debtor
has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person; (3)
the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim; (4) the act being impugned is
fraudulent; (5) the third person who received the property conveyed, if it is by onerous
title, has been an accomplice in the fraud. The general rule is that rescission requires
the existence of creditors at the time of the alleged fraudulent alienation, and this must
be proved as one of the bases of the judicial pronouncement setting aside the contract.
Without any prior existing debt, there can neither be injury nor fraud. While it is
necessary that the credit of the plaintiff in the accion pauliana must exist prior to the
fraudulent alienation, the date of the judgment enforcing it is immaterial. Even if the
judgment be subsequent to the alienation, it is merely declaratory, with retroactive effect
to the date when the credit was constituted. In the instant case, the alleged debt of LIM
132
in favor of petitioner was incurred in August 1990, while the deed of donation was
purportedly executed on 10 August 1989. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner
became a creditor of LIM prior to the celebration of the contract of donation, still her
action for rescission would not fare well because the third requisite was not met. Under
Article 1381 of the Civil Code, contracts entered into in fraud of creditors may be
rescinded only when the creditors cannot in any manner collect the claims due them. It
is, therefore, "essential that the party asking for rescission prove that he has exhausted
all other legal means to obtain satisfaction of his claim. 20 Petitioner neither alleged nor
proved that she did so. On this score, her action for the rescission of the questioned
deed is not maintainable even if the fraud charged actually did exist."
The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be
counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was
possible for him to bring the action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the
concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1) year period for bringing the
action be considered to have already prescribed. No competent proof was adduced by
petitioner to prove his allegation.
(2) The second parcel was conveyed to defendants' late parents Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman by virtue of a deed of conveyance dated July
14, 1939;
(3) The first parcel was likewise conveyed to defendants Jose Velasquez and
Anastacia Velasquez by virtue of a deed of conveyance (Donation Intervivos)
dated April 10, 1939;
(4) As to the fourth and fifth parcels, the same were owned and possessed by
third parties.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, giving credibility to Santiago Meneses
testimony; declaring the Donation Intervivos, the Deed of Sale, the Deed of Donation,
the Deed of Sale to third parties over the 4th and 5th parcels as null and void insofar as
1/2 of the 6 parcels are concerned legitimately belong to the plaintiffs; and ordering the
defendants to pay damages. Defendants appealed the decision to respondent CA which
affirmed the same. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but the
same was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have acquired absolute and exclusive ownership
of the properties in question.
HELD: Yes. Private respondent Santiago Meneses failed to prove the nullity of the
Deeds of Conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses in favor of petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman since he failed to
adduce any evidence to support his claim other than his bare allegations of its nullity.
On the other hand, petitioners were able to show by documentary evidence that the
Aquino spouses during their lifetime disposed of the four parcels of land subject of the
complaint, to wit: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias, (b) Deed of donation inter
vivos, (c) Escritura de Compreventa with a P500 consideration: (d) Deed of
Conveyance with a consideration of P600 and confirming in the same Deed the
Escritura de donation propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa abovementioned. It
was reversible error for the court to overlook the probative value of these notarized
documents.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from the moment
the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the
donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and
Anastacia Velasquez who were then 19 and 10 years old respectively was accepted
through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was incorporated in the
body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was signed by the donor
and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed, and
the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may be revoked
only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code.
135
The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman
over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second parcel became the
properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation propter nuptias
can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes
mentioned in Article 86 of the Family Code. The alleged reason for the repudiation of
the deed, i.e., that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties
since Anatalia had several children to support is not one of the grounds for revocation of
donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of
conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the
remaining portion of the second parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale, the
Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario Velasquez
and Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance over the second
parcel in the complaint and such deed of sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT
in the names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman. The best proof of the
ownership of the land is the certificate of title and it requires more than a bare allegation
to defeat the face value of TCT which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of
issuance. Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered into contracts of
mortgage and lease over the property as annotated at the back of the certificate of title
which clearly established that he exercised full ownership and control over the property.
Petitioners were able to establish that these four parcels of land were validly conveyed
to them by the Aquino spouses, hence, they no longer formed part of the conjugal
properties of the spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards the fourth and fifth
parcels, petitioners alleged that these were also conveyed to third persons and they do
not claim any right thereto.
In view of the foregoing, the action of partition cannot be maintained. The properties
sought to be partitioned by private respondents have already been delivered to
petitioners and therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could be
partitioned. No co-ownership exists between private respondents and petitioners.
Lilia Gonzales. Prior to the partition of said estate, Ignacio Gonzales executed a Deed
of Donation in favor of his grandchildren but was not registered. When Presidential
Decree No. 27 took effect, the landholdings of the said spouses were placed under
Operation Land Transfer. Private respondents were then issued the corresponding
Certificates of Land Transfer. The administratix of the spouses estate, Lilia Gonzales
filed an application for retention requesting that their property be excluded from the
Operation Land Transfer. Initially, it was denied but was approved due to the deed of
donation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property subject of the deed of donation which was not
registered when P.D. No. 27 took effect, should be excluded from the Operation Land
Transfer.
HELD: No. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that in order that the
donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the done
must satisfy. Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that the titles of
ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or
annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons. From the
foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of
immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a public
document. Registration is not necessary for it to be contained in a public document. It is
not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third
persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of Property. In the case at bar,
the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grand children, although in
writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with law. For this
reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents who did not participate in said
deed nor had no actual knowledge thereof.
137
Leoncio died leaving only two heirs: petitioner and Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962,
Victor was substituted in the complaint for annulment. He moved for the execution of
judgment and it was granted. After 15 years, Victor died and was survived only by his
natural father, Ricardo Villalon. Ricardo Villalon is a lessee of the portion of the subject
property. Villalon died leaving his heirs, Cesar and Teresa Villalon, respondents in this
case. In 1986, respondents filed a complaint for the annulment of the donation.
Allegedly, it impairs the legitime of Victor Imperial.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the respondents have the right to question the inofficious donation
and seek its reduction.
2.) Whether or not the 30-year prescriptive period is applicable in the reduction of the
inofficious donation.
HELD: 1.) Yes. At the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise
agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the
compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement. When Victor
substituted Leoncio, he was not deemed to have renounced his legitime. He was
therefore not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction. Nor are
Victors heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so. This is in accordance with
Articles 772 and 1053 of the new Civil Code, to wit:
Article 772. Only those who at the time of the donors death have a right to the legitime
and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of the inofficious
donation xxx.
and
Article 1053. If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the
inheritance, his rights shall be transmitted to his heirs.
2.) No. Under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by
law must be brought within ten years from the right of action accrues. Thus, the 10-year
prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations required
under Article 771 of the New Civil Code to the extent that they impair the legitime of
compulsory heirs.
The cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donordecedent. Clearly so, since only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on
which basis, the legitimes may be determined. It took 24 years since the death of
Leoncio to initiate this case. Thus, the action has long prescribed. Not only has
prescription set in, they are also guilty of estoppel and laches. Fifteen years after the
death of Leoncio, Victor died. Ricardo Villalon, Victors sole heir, died four years later.
While Victor was alive, he gave no indication of any interest to contest the donation of
his deceased father.
138
139
140
In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read
together. The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and
affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation
of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership
over the properties. Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance
in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with
the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation.
An acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a
requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a
will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. The right
to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give consent
was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. The limitation on the right to
sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and
donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. Hence, the moment that it
was accepted by Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, ownership of the properties was transferred.
Sumipat v. Banga
G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004
Tinga, J.
FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat acquired three parcels of
land. The couple was childless. Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children.
They are the petitioners herein. Lauro executed a document denominated Deed of
Absolute Transfer and/or Quit-Claim over Real Properties in favor of the petitioners. On
the document, it appears that the signature of his wife, Placida which indicates that she
gave her marital consent. Moreover, it was alleged that Lauro executed it when he was
already very sick and bedridden that upon petitioner Lydias request, their neighbor
Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of Lauro whereupon Lydia guided his hand in affixing
his signature on the document. Lydia left but later returned on the same day and
requested Lauros unlettered wife, Placida to sign on the said document. After Lauros
death, his wife, Placida and petitioners jointly administered the properties, 50% of the
produce went to his wife. As wifes share in the produce of the properties dwindled, she
filed a complaint for declaration of partition disclaiming any partition in the execution of
the subject document.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding
circumstances has validly transferred title to the disputed properties to the petitioners.
HELD: No. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of
property a donation although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the
condition that he and his wife, Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits
or produce of the parcels of land for their subsistence and support. Where the deed of
donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance,
141
made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the
deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void. In this
case, the donees acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself
or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently
void. The Court declared that the deeds of sale questioned therein are not merely
voidable but null and void ab initio as the supposed seller declared under oath that she
signed the deeds without knowing what they were. The significant circumstance meant,
the Court added, that her consent was not merely marred by vices of consent so as to
make the contracts voidable, but that she had not given her consent at all.
142