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Wills and Succession Case Digests
Wills and Succession Case Digests
Case Digest
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not
apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir.
However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D.
No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited
in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written.
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased
Brigido Alvarado,
Cesar ALVARADO, petitioner vs.
Hon. Ramon GAVIOLA
G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993
FACTS:
Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled, Huling Habilin wherein he disinherited an
illegitimate son, Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a previously executed a holographic will
at the time awaiting probate before RTC. As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the
notary public and Cesar, the testator did not read the final draft of the will, instead, Atty. Rino, as
the lawyer who drafted the document read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the
three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. While the testators will was admitted to
probate, a codicil was subsequently executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to
generate cash for the testators eye operation because he was then suffering from glaucoma. But
the disinheritance and the revocatory clauses remained and as in the case of the notarial will, the
testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was Atty. Rino who read it
alound in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses and of the notary
public. Upon the testators death, Atty Rino as executor filed a petition for probate of the notarial
will which was in turn opposed by Cesar alleging that the will sought to be probated was not
executed and attested as required by law. Upon failure of Cesar to substantiate his Opposition, a
Probate Order was issued from which an appeal was made to IAC stating that the probate of the
deceaseds last will and codicil should have been denied because the testator was blind within
the meaning of the law at the time his Huling Habilin and the codicil thereto was executed;and
that since reading required by Art. 808 was admittedly not complied with. CA concluded that
although Art. 808 was not followed, there was, however, as substantial compliance.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Brigido Alvarado was blind within the meaning of Article 808 at the
time his Huling Habilin and codicil were executed.
2. If so, whether or not the requirement of double-reading in said Article was complied
with such that whether or not, they were validly executed.
RULING:
Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another,
are incapable of reading their wills. Since the deceased was incapable of reading the final drafts
of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his poor, defective, or
blurred vision, there can be no other course but to conclude that he comes within the scope of
the term blind as used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of
ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his
instruction. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential to
ascertain whether or not Art. 808 had been complied with.
There is no evidence and Cesar does not allege that the contents of the will and codicil were
not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to
the Huling Habilin, the day of the execution was not the first time that the testator had affirmed
the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. Moreover, with four persons following the
reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was
reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the
typewritten documents. This is especially true considering the fact that the three instrumental
witnesses were persons known to the testator.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Art. 850, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The cause for the institution heirs must be stated in the will;
2. The cause must be shown to be false; and
3. It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
The article quoted above is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator
may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when
one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the
institution of he had known the cause for it to be false. The words used in her will to describe the
class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance offer no absolute indication that
the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she
was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her
estate which largely favored Cruz, et al. shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the
respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Testacy is favored
and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of
the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. Moreover, so compelling is the principle
that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could
even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.
In the Matter of the summary settlement of the Estate of the decease Anacleta
Abellana
Lucio BALONAN, petitioner-appellee vs.
Eusebia ABELLANA, et al., oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-15153, August 31, 1960
FACTS:
The last Will and Testament sought to be probated consists in two (2) typewritten pages. The
first page is signed by Juan Bello and on the left margin appears the signatures of the three (3)
instrumental witnesses. On the second page appears the signature of said witnesses, at the
bottom of which appears the signature of the notary public and below said signature is his
designation as notary public. On the left margin of the second page (last page of the will) appears
the signature of Juan Bello under whose name appears handwritten the phrase, Por la
Testadore Anacleta Abellana (For the Testate of Anacleta Abellana). The will is duly
acknowledged before the notary public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the signature of Juan Bello above the typewritten statement, Por la
Testadora Anacleta Abellana comply with the requirements of law prescribing the manner in
which a will shall be executed.
RULING:
Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end there of
by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
The law requires that the testator himself sign the will, or if he cannot do so, the testators
name must be written by some other person in his presence and by his express direction. In this
case, the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana does not appear written under the will by said
Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Bello. There is therefore, a failure to comply with the express
requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed
thereto by some other person in his presence and by his express direction. Hence, the will of the
deceased Anacleta Abellana must not be admitted to probate.
These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in
the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sister
can concur with the widow or widower, they do not concur, but are excluded by the surviving
children, legitimate or illegitimate.
Further, the death of Francisco does not improve the situation of appellants. The rights
acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the
appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, pursuant to Article 992.
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit the same
manner from the illegitimate child.
However, the hearing on the probate must still proceed to ascertain the rights of Cacho as
testamentary heir.
In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews
and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is
excluded by law from the inheritance.
The reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives reservatarios to whom the
property should be returned, but within that group, the individual right to the property should be
decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Article 891 does not
specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an
exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the
purpose of the law.
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on instestate succession,
the plaintiffs must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two parcels of land
which he had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another
ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquire them by operation of law, she is obligated to
relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita
Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), where the lands proceeded. The trial courts ruling that they
partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the
law.
The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any
doubt at all, the rights to use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion,
although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has under an express provision of the law the
right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess
it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion,
even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be
reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is
reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually or constructively
or formally, in their possession; and moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the
Spouses Alvaro PASTOR, Jr. and Ma. Elena Achaval de PASTOR, petitioners, vs.
The COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. Juan Y. REYES, and Lewellyn QUEMADA,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983.
FACTS:
Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate children
Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn
Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will
of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of
Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter, the
probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr.
whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. Consequently, Quemada instituted
against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of estate which
included the properties subject of the legacy which were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and
Ma. Elena, who claimed to be the owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The probate
court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The order was affirmed by CA and on petition
for review, the SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same to the probate court after
denying reconsideration. For two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all
pleadings of both parties remained unacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set the hearing
on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the ground of
pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court required the
parties to submit their respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was still pending in
another court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the
question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to
Quemada was not inofficious. Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly to
Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedents estate, of which Quemada was authorized to
retain 75% for himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees was
ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada. Being immediately
executory, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment. The
oppositors sought reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the probate court ordered
suspension of payment of all royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after resolution of
oppositors motion for reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction assailing the
writ of execution and garnishment issued by the probate court. However, said petition was denied
as well as their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and
intrinsic validity.
RULING:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the
extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court
may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order
allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However,
As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day, month and year of
its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith,
undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is
whether or not the date FEB/61 appearing on the holographic will is a valid compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle
of substantial compliance.
In the Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez,
Apolonio TABOADA, petitioner, vs.
Hon. Avelino S. ROSAL, Judge of Court of First Instance
of Southern Leyte (Branch III, Maasin) respondent.
G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982
FACTS:
In the petition for probate filed with respondent court, Taboada attached the alleged last will
and testament of the late Dorotea Perez which was written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and
consisting two pages: the first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at
the bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by three (3) instrumental
witnesses; and the second page contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is
signed at the end of such clause by the said instrumental witnesses and at the left hand margin
by the testatrix. The trial court, through Judge Pamatian, denied the probate of the will for want of
formality in its execution and ordered Taboada to submit the names of the intestate heirs,
however, the latter did not comply with the said order. Instead, he filed a manifestation and/or
motion ex parte praying for a thirty-day period within which to deliberate on any step to be taken
as a result of the disallowance of the will and further, he filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order denying the probate of the will. However, the motions could not acted upon by Judge
Pamatian due to his transfer and thus, Judge Rosal assumed the position. Meanwhile, Taboada
filed a motion for the appointment of special administrator. Subsequently, the three motions filed
by the petitioner were denied, hence this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law requires that the testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting
witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one another.
RULING:
Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every
page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
cause some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will
in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of identification. The
signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not
only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as
embodied in the attestation clause.
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case
when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the
testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly identified by the subscribing
witnesses. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.