WILLS & SUCCESSION

CLASS CASE DIGESTS

COMPILATION

Submitted by:
LL.B. Section 3-B Class

Submitted to:
Atty. Joe Allan C. Baptista
Professor in WILLS & SUCCESSION
University of the Cordilleras – College of
Law
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Table of Contents
Estate of K. H. Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. ............................................... 5
Pacio vs. Billon ............................................................................................................ 6
Maria Uson vs. Maria Del Rosario............................................................................ 7
xxx vs. xxx.................................................................................................................... 9
De Borja vs. De Borja .............................................................................................. 10
Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons ................................................................................. 11
Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals .................................................................................. 12
Heirs of Reganon vs. Rufino Imperial .................................................................... 14
xxx vs. xxx .................................................................................................................. 17
Ramirez vs. Baltazar .................................................................................................. 18
Marina Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, et al. .................................................................... 19
Vda. De Villaflor vs. Juico ........................................................................................ 22
Maria Gervacio Blas, et al. vs. Rosalina Santos, et al. ............................................ 23
Fidela De Guzman and Emeterio De Guzman vs. In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of the Deceased Francisco Benitez, Dionisia Valenzuela and Melquiades
Valenzuela .................................................................................................................. 24
Nenita De Vera Suroza vs. Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado of CFI Rizal, Pasig Br 25
and Evangelista Yuipco, Deputy Clerk of Court .................................................. 25
Reyes vs. Vda. De Vidal ........................................................................................... 26
Lucio Balonan vs. Eusebia Abellana ....................................................................... 28
Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia, et al vs. Hon. Conrado M Vasquez, et al. ............ 29
Nera vs. Rimando ...................................................................................................... 30
Taboada vs. Rosal ...................................................................................................... 31
Icasiano vs. Icasiano .................................................................................................. 32
Cagro vs. Cagro .......................................................................................................... 33
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. Jose S. Lopez vs. Agustin Liboro................................... 34
Rosario Feliciano Vda. De Ramos vs. Court of Appeals ...................................... 35
In the matter of the Petition for the Allowance of the Will of Gregorio
Gatchalian, deceased. Pedro Reyes Garcia vs. Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G.
Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G. Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and Angeles
G. Talanay .................................................................................................................. 38
Cruz vs. Villasor ......................................................................................................... 39
Jose Antonio Gabucan vs. Hon.Luis D. Manta, Josefa Vda. De Ysalina and Nelda
G. Enclonar ............................................................................................................... 40
Garcia vs. Lacuesta .................................................................................................... 41
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased
Brigido Alvarado vs. Hon. Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. ................................................ 42
Gil vs. Murciano......................................................................................................... 43
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Caneda vs. Court of Appeals .................................................................................... 44

Roxas vs. De Jesus ..................................................................................................... 46
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will Of Melecio Labrador, Sagrado
Labrador et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, Gaudencio Labrador, and Jesus Labrador
..................................................................................................................................... 48
Gan vs. Yap ............................................................................................................... 49
Rodelas vs. Aranza ..................................................................................................... 50
Azaola vs. Singson ..................................................................................................... 51
Jose Rivera vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Adelaido J. Rivera ................ 53
Kalaw vs. Relova ........................................................................................................ 54
Ajero vs. Court of Appeals ....................................................................................... 55
Paula de la Cerna, et al., vs. Manuela Rebaca-Potot, et al. .................................... 56
Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals ................................................... 57
Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased. Francisco Gago vs. Cornelio Mamuyac,
Ambrisio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac.............................. 58
Testate Estate of the late Adriana Maloto vs. Court of Appeals ......................... 59
Pedro Gallanosa, et al. vs. Hon. Ubaldo Arcangel ................................................ 61
Rafael E. Maninang an Soledad L. Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Ricardo
L. Pronove, Jr. as Judge of CFI of Rizal and Bernardo S. Aseneta .................... 62
xxx vs. xxx .................................................................................................................. 63
Jimenez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court .............................................................. 64
Roman Ozaeta vs. Maria Cuartero .......................................................................... 65
Pascual Coso vs. Fermina Fernandez Deza, et al. ................................................. 66
xxx vs. xxx .................................................................................................................. 68
Sofia Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals and Rufina Gomez ............................. 70
Ethel Grimm Roberts vs. Judge Tomas R. Leonidas, Branch 38, Court of First
Instance of Manila; Maxine Tate-Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II and Linda
Grimm ........................................................................................................................ 71
Austria vs. Reyes ........................................................................................................ 72
Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu ............................................................................................ 74
Remedios Nuguid vs. Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid ............................. 76
City of Baguio vs. Fortunato De Leon.................................................................... 77
xxx. vs. xxx.................................................................................................................. 78
Cayetano vs. Leonidas ............................................................................................... 80
Balanay vs. Balanay .................................................................................................... 81
Ramirez vs. Ramirez .................................................................................................. 83
Paz Garcia Vda. De Mapa, Segundo Mapa, Priscilla M. Monzon, Teresa Mapa,
Ignacio Salazar and Jose Salazar vs. Court of Appeals, et al. ............................... 84
Crisologo vs. Court of Appeals ................................................................................ 85
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Emeterio A. Rodriguez and Jose Ayala vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Petra
Rodriguez, Antonia Rodriguez and Rosa Rodriguez ............................................ 86
Juan Castro vs. Court of Appeals, et al. .................................................................. 88
Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan 90
Baritua vs. Court of Appeals .................................................................................... 92
Van Dorn vs. Romillo ............................................................................................... 93
Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales, Irenea C. Rosales vs. Fortunato Rosales,
Magna Rosales Acebes, Macikequerox Rosales and Antonio Rosales ............... 94
Dionisia, et al. vs. Melania Baldovino, et al. ........................................................... 95
xxx vs. xxx .................................................................................................................. 97
Sienes vs. Esparcia ..................................................................................................... 98
Ricardo Lacerna, et al. vs. Agatona Paurillo Vda. De Corcino, and Jacoba
Marbebe.................................................................................................................... 100
Celedonia Solivio vs. Court of Appeals ................................................................ 101
Chua vs. CFI of Negros Occidental ...................................................................... 103
Encarnacion Florentino, et al. vs. Mercedes Florentino, et al. ........................... 104
Beatriz Gonzales vs. CFI of Manila....................................................................... 105
Francisca Tioco De Papa, et al., vs. Dalisay Tongko Camacho ........................ 107
Prima G. Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup vs. Francisca Salak De Paz and Ernesto
Bautista ..................................................................................................................... 108
Mariquita Sumaya and Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court and Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, Erasto, Luisa,
Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo ........................................................ 109
Bonifacia Mateo, et al. vs. Gervasio Lagua, et al.................................................. 111
Vda De. Tupas vs.RTC of Negros Occidental .................................................... 112
Angela Rodriguez, Maria Rodriguez, et al. vs. Hon. Juan De Borja, et al......... 114
Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain vs. Hon. Eufrocinio S. De La Merced
and Loreta Sta. Maria .............................................................................................. 115
Delos Santos vs. Dela Cruz .................................................................................... 116
Isabel De La Puerta vs. Court of Appeals ............................................................ 117
In Re: Summary Settlement of the Estate of Melodia Ferraris. Filomena Abellana
De Bacayo vs. Gaudencia Ferraris De Borromeo ............................................... 119
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals ................................................................................... 120
xxx vs. xxx ................................................................................................................ 122
Wencesla Cacho vs. John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan .................................. 123
Cuartico vs. Cuartico ............................................................................................... 124
Tomas Corpus vs. Rafael Corpus .......................................................................... 126
Anselma Diaz, guardian of Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmia and Miguel, all surnamed
Santero, and Felixberta Pacursa, guardian of Federico Santero, et al., vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court and Felisa Pamuti Jardin .................................... 128
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Cresenciano Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals, Maria Cailles, James Bracewell and
Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc................................................................................ 129
Vda. De Crisologo vs. Court of Appeals .............................................................. 131
xxx vs. xxx ................................................................................................................ 132
Santillon vs. Miranda ............................................................................................... 133
Testate Estate of the Late Reverend Father Pascual Rigor. The Parish Priest of
the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac vs. Belina Rigor, Nestora Rigor,
Francisca Escobar De Rigor and Jovita Escobar de Fausto .............................. 134
Dionicia Cid, et al., vs. Nancy W. Burnaman, Elis J. Burnaman and the Court of
Appeals ..................................................................................................................... 135
Dimayuga, et al. vs. Court of Appeals and Manuel Dimayuga .......................... 136
Leviste vs. Court of Appeals .................................................................................. 137
Buhay De Roma vs. Court of Appeals and Felicidad Caringal .......................... 139
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CASE NO. 01
Digested By: SALVADOR, Kathleen Allyssa; ELKE, Samantha; and
WAGGAY, Fidencio
Estate of K. H. Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
G.R. No. L-8437, November 28, 1956
FACTS:
The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty
different indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct
principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor) in all
of them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.’s of having guaranteed, the
various principals in favor of different creditors.
The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the
value of the twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds,
and further asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary
stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 per cent interest thereon.
Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of
Hemady’s estate, the lower court dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co., on
two grounds: (1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were
not contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of the
undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since they were not liabilities incurred
after the execution of the counterbonds; and (2) that “whatever losses may occur
after Hemady’s death, are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death
he ceased to be guarantor.”
ISSUES: Whether or not the losses aftr Hemady’s death are chargeable to his
estate, because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor.
RULING:
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not
altered by the provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased
must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed
among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made
from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the
amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs
would have been entitled to receive. Under our law, therefore, the general rule is
that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors.
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CASE NO. 02
Digested By: BONDAD, Ramil A.
CATBAGAN, Julie Ann O.
Pacio vs. Billon
G.R. No. L-15088. Jan. 31, 1961; 1 SCRA 384
FACTS:
In 1901, Flaviano Pacio married Severa Jucutan. Herein defendants were
their children. Severa died in 1930; and thereafter Flavio married the plaintiff
Toribia Fontanilla, who bore him the other four plaintiffs. The dispute between
the parties concerned two parcels of land which defendants allegedly retained
without any right thereto. The litigants later agreed to a partition of the first
parcel, and the court sodecreed. As to the second parcel, a hearing was held,
and it was awarded to the defendants, on the ground that it had been donated
propter nuptias to Severa, in 1901, by Flaviano Pacio, who was thenadmittedly
the owner. However, the plaintiffs-appellants contend that the donation was void
because it was not made in a public instrument.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the donation propter nuptias was void?

RULING:
Yes. Art. 633 of the Spanish Civil Code states that "In order that a
donation of real property be valid it must be made by public instrument in which
the property donated must be specifically described and the amount of the
encumbrances to be assumed by the done expressed...”
And this Court has held that a donation propter nuptias of real property
written on a private instrument is not valid even between the parties.
It follows that Flaviano Pacio continued to be the owner of the land as the
donation had no effect and there was no prescription. Upon his death, the land
became the joint property of his children by the first and second marriage.
Subject of course to the rights of his surviving spouse, the plaintiff Toribia
Fontanilla.
Reversing the decision in so far as this parcel is concerned, we hereby
order the return of the expediente to the court below for further proceedings on
partition in accordance with these views.
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CASE NO. 03
Digested By: BELINO, Elma
MALICDAN, Jaspherose
Maria Uson vs. Maria Del Rosario

G.R. No. L-4963. January 29, 1953; 92 PHIL 530

FACTS:
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death
in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other
heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino
Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession
illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment. With
this reason, Maria Uson filed an action for recovery of the ownership and
possession of five parcels of land in Labrador, Pangasinan, against Maria del
Rosario and her four children
During the trial, the defendanrs in their answer set up as special defense
that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino
Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as
husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given
a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to
inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death.
However, the court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the
plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute. Aggrieved,
defendants then interposed the present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maria Uson has the right to inherit

RULING:
Yes, Maria Uson’s rights of inheritance became vested upon the death of
Faustino.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of Faustino
Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case.
There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario was merely a common-law
wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children,
her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945
much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is
evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was
seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his
widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The
property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the
same before his death" . From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance
of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
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The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right
over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future
property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of
separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for
the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor
can it be renounced.
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CASE NO. 04
Digested By: BAWAAN, Rae Ann B. & DOMIGAN, Chelsea
xxx vs. xxx
46 SCRA 577
FACTS:
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died,
Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal.
He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose became
the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died;
she instituted testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death
and was appointed special administatrix.
Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed
the approval of the compromise agreement.
She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of
agreement without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the
agreement was made, the will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva
Ecija.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco
has not yet been probated.
RULING:
YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800, 000 as full payment for
her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa. There was here no
attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs
thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor
in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
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CASE NO. 05

Digested By: BAGUIWEN, Feric B.

BANGILAN, Fervent Hope
De Borja vs. De Borja
46 SCRA 577
FACTS:
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died,
Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal.
He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose became
the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died;
she instituted testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death
and was appointed special administatrix.
Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed
the approval of the compromise agreement.
She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of
agreement without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the
agreement was made, the will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva
Ecija.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco
has not yet been probated.
RULING:
YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800, 000 as full payment for
her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa. There was here no
attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs
thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor
in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
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CASE NO. 06
Digested By: AMINDALAN, Alfred
ESNARA, Carlito
Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons
G.R. No. L-15499, February 28, 1962
FACTS:
Jose V. Ramirez is a co-owner of a house and lot in Sta. Cruz, Manila. He died
later and in his last will and testament, he bequeathed his undivided share in the
property to his children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free
portion to plaintiff-appellant Angela M. Butte. Mrs. Marie Vda Ramirez, one of
the co-owners in Sta. Cruz property sold her share to Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc.
Mrs. Butte offered to redeem the property sold by Vda. Ramirez but was denied.
She then filed an action for legal redemption.
ISSUES: Whether or not a beneficiary of the free portion can exercise right of
legal redemption over the property sold by original co-owner.
RULING:
YES. Appellant Butte, beneficiary of the free portion, is entitled to exercise the
right of legal redemption because as testamentary heir of the estate of Jose V.
Reyes, she and her co-heirs acquired an interest in the undivided share owned by
the predecessor (causante). By virtue of the consequence of the fundamental rule
of succession, when the heirs of a co-owner acquired his undivided share, they
became co-owners together with the original co-owners. A co-owner of an
undivided share is necessarily a co-owner of the whole. As co-owner, the law
entitles Mrs. Butte to exercise the right of legal redemption over undivided
properties sold by a co-owner to third person.
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CASE NO. 07
Digested By: ABQUIREN, Illyssa Jane
BENAN, Rhobee Jyn
Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals
154 SCRA 270, September 24, 1987
FACTS:
Two parcels of land (Lot No. 12 and Lot No. 1) in Quezon City are
covered by a TCT in the name of Alfredo Ong Bio Hong married to Julita Go
Ong. Alfredo dies and Julita was appointed administratrix of her husband’s
estate. Julita sold Lot no. 12. She also mortgaged Lot no. 1 to the Allied Banking
Corporation to secure a loan of P900,000.00. The mortgage was registered on
TCT No. 188705 with the following notation: "... mortgagee's consent necessary
in case of subsequent alienation or encumbrance of the property other
conditions set forth in Doc. No. 340, Page No. 69, Book No. XIX, of the Not.
Public of Felixberto Abad". On the loan there was due a sum and Allied tried to
collect it from Julita. Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the contract for
lack of judicial approval which the bank had allegedly promised to secure from
the court. In response, the bank averred that it was Julita who promised to secure
the court’s approval.
Trial court ruled for Julita, stating that the contract is valid. CA affirmed
with modification the lower court’s decision
ISSUES: Whether or not the mortgage constituted over the parcel of land under
petitioner’s administration is null and void for want of judicial approval.
RULING:
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval,
quoted Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court . The CA aptly ruled that
Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, since the mortgage
was constituted in her personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix
of the estate of her husband. Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code applies in a case
where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with, for instance, the
sale or mortgage of property under administration for the payment, say of a
conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are
excluded from the requisite judicial approval for the reason already adverted to
hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is caused others, including the
government.
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the CA cannot be
faulted in ruling that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under
administration, by authority of the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack
of judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal share and to her hereditary
rights.
Petitioner cited cases arguing that in the settlement proceedings of the
estate of the deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership property of the
marriage is under administration. While such may be in a sense true, that fact
 P a g e | 13

alone is not sufficient to invalidate the whole mortgage, willingly and voluntarily
entered into by the petitioner.. Under similar circumstances, this Court applied
the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-owners
shall each have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership
The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court
cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of private respondent to dispose of
her Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her husband’s
death, and her hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the death of the
decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership
formed between her and the other heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code,
supra.)
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CASE NO. 08
Digested By: ABATEN, Wilson M. & FERNANDEZ, Shelvin Echo
Heirs of Reganon vs. Rufino Imperial
G.R. No. L-24434, January 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 80
FACTS:
Residuary Estate of Eulogio Imperial – money accumulated in his
guardianship proceedings from the monthly allowances given to him by the US
Veterans Administration during his lifetime. The Heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a
complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of about 1 hectare portion
of a parcel of land in Zamboanga Del Norte against Rufino Imperial. Trial court
rendered a decision declaring the heirs of Reganon as lawful owners of the land
and entitled to its peaceful possession, ordering Imperial to immediately vacate
the portion occupied by him. The court sentenced him to pay plaintiffs the
amount of P1,929.20 and the costs.
A writ of execution was granted by the RTC and the deputy provincial
sheriff submitted a sheriff’s return reporting the garnishment of a carabao and
goat of Imperial for P153.00 and attachment & sale of defendant’s land for
P500.00. (In short, ang properties ni Imperial were not enough to satisfy the
judgment) However, on March 13, 1964, PNB deposited with PNB-Dipolog
Branch the residuary estate of its former ward, EULOGIO IMPERIAL
(predecessor of defendant) in the amount of P10,303.80. The heirs of Eulogio
Imperial (including the defendant) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of
the Residuary Estate wherein defendant was apportioned with P1,471.97.
When petitioners learned about this development, they filed an ex parte
motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution and of an order directing the
manager of PNB Dipolog to hold the share of defendant and deliver the same
to the provincial sheriff to be applied to the satisfaction of the balance of the
money judgment. RTC granted the motion and the deputy provincial sheriff
notified the defendant of the garnishment of the rights, interests, shares and
participation that defendant may have over the residuary estate of the late
Eulogio Imperial consisting of the money deposited in PNB Dipolog.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the property of an incompetent under guardianship is in custodia
legis and therefore cannot be attached.
1. Upon the death of the ward, is the money accumulated in his guardianship
proceedings (deposited in the bank) still considered in custodia legis and
therefore cannot be attached?
2. Whether or not there transmission of rights from the death the ward,
Eulogio Imperial in favor of his heirs?
3. Is the residuary estate of a US Veteran (Eulogio Imperial) exempt from
execution?
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RULING:
First Issue:
NO. The money deposited in the bank is no longer considered in custodia
legis and can therefore be attached.
The New Rules of Court provides for the procedure to be followed in
case what is attached is in custodia legis. The clear import of this new provision
is that property under custodia legis is NOW ATTACHABLE, subject to the
mode set forth in said rule.
Besides, the ward having died, the guardianship proceedings no longer
subsist since death of the ward necessarily terminates the guardianship, and
thereupon all powers and duties of the guardian ceases, except the duty, which
remains, to make proper accounting and settlement in the probate court.
Branch I of CFI Zamboanga del Norte (where the guardianship
proceedings were heard) directed PNB (guardian) to deposit the residuary estate
of Eulogio Imperial (ward) with its bank agency in Dipolog, in the name of the
estate of the deceased ward Eulogio Imperial, preparatory to the eventual
distribution of the same to the heirs when the latter shall be known, and “upon
proof of deposit of said residuary estate, the guardian Philippine National Bank
shall forthwith be relieved from any responsibility as such, and this proceeding
shall be considered closed and terminated.”
This condition has been fulfilled by PNB when it deposited the money
with PNB Dipolog.
Second Issue:
YES. When Eulogio Imperial died on Sept. 13, 1962, the rights to his
succession – FROM THE MOMENT OF HIS DEATH- were transmitted to
his heirs, one of whom is his son – RUFINO IMPERIAL.
This automatic transmission cannot but proceed with greater ease and
certainty than in this case where the parties agree that the residuary estate is not
burdened with any debt. For, the rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of death, and where, as in this case, the heir is of
legal age and the estate is not burdened with any debts, said heir immediately
succeeds, by force of law, to the dominion, ownership, and possession of the
properties of his predecessor and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the
latter.
That the INTEREST OF AN HEIR IN THE ESTATE of a deceased
person MAY BE ATTACHED for purposes of execution, even if the estate is
in the process of settlement before courts, is already a settled matter in this
jurisdiction.
The heirs of Eulogio Imperial, including defendant, executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition which suffices to settle the entire estate of the deceased.
 P a g e | 16

Therefore, the estate for all practical purposes have been settled. The heirs are at
full liberty to withdraw the residuary estate from the bank and divide it among
themselves.
Third Issue:
NO. The residuary estate of Eulogio Imperial is NOT EXEMPT from
execution.
Any pension, annuity, or gratuity granted by a Government to its officers
or employees in recognition of past services rendered, is primordially aimed at
tiding them over during their old age and/or disability. This is therefore a right
personalissima, purely personal because founded on necessity.
It requires no argument to show that where the recipient dies, the
necessity motivating or underlying its grant necessarily ceases to be. Even more
so in this case where the law providing for the exemption is calculated to benefit
U.S. veterans residing here, and is therefore merely a manifestation of comity.
Besides, as earlier stated, the heirs of Eulogio Imperial, one of whom is
appellant, have already executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition — the end
result of which is that the property is no longer the property of the estate but of
the individual heirs.
When the heirs by mutual agreement have divided the estate among
themselves, one of the heirs cannot therefore secure the appointment of an
administrator to take charge of and administer the estate or a part thereof. The
property is no longer the property of the estate, but of the individual heirs,
whether it remains undivided or not.
 P a g e | 17

CASE NO. 09
Digested By: SALVADOR, Kathleen Allyssa; ELKE, Samantha; and
WAGGAY, Fidencio
xxx vs. xxx
G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993, 220 SCRA 703
FACTS:
Senator John Osmeña
ISSUES: Whether or not
RULING:
NO.
 P a g e | 18

CASE NO. 10
Digested By: FIDER, Cyrus Dominic B.
Ramirez vs. Baltazar
G.R. No. L-25049, August 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 918
FACTS:
Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar,
defendants in this case. Upon demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors
of the deceased, filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of Victoriana’s
estate; alleging further that the plaintiffs Felimon and Monica Ramirez are heirs
of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as adminstrator but did not qualify
so that Artemio Diawan was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate.
The mortgagees then filed a foreclosure of the property in question and
succeeded, after Diawan failed to file an answer against the petition. The
foreclosure sale ensued, the property was bought by the mortgagees themselves
and the sale was confirmed by the court. Felimon sued for the annulment of the
entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging among others the failure of the judicial
administrator to protect their interests. Defendants contended that plaintiffs
have no legal capacity to sue and hava no cause of action.
ISSUES: Do the plaintiffs have cause of action against the defendant?
RULING:
YES. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically
transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. While,
as a rule, the formal declaration or recognition to such successional rights needs
judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special circumstances, protected
these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial
declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal
standing in court upon the commencement of testate or intestate proceedings,
this rule admits of an exception as “when the administrator fails or refuses to act
in which event the heirs may act in his place.”
 P a g e | 19

CASE NO. 11
Digested By: FIDER, Cyrus Dominic B.
Marina Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, et al.
G.R. No. L-24561, June 30, 1970
FACTS:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez. a widow, died in
Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six
legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon,
Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon,
and a legitimate grand-daughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate
child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said
decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the
executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, I960 and
written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-
named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren,
namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her
properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 among her abovenamed heirs.
The last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted
to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the
testatrix’ estate.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death
thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the
seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. (1/7 of the half of the estate
reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants). In her will, the
testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her
testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real
properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six
children and eight grandchildren.
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in
substance adjudicating the estate as follows:
“(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (executrix-
appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in
the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants,
namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their
respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given
them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective
legitimes to P129,254.96;
 P a g e | 20

(3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that
they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete
the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain
untouched.”

On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition.

“(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value
of one-half (1/2) of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half (1/2)
amounting to P905,534.78;
(b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their legitime,
plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced;
(c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the
properties devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or
cash are adjudicated to them; and
(d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the
properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert
D. Garcia Et. Al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be
proportionally reduced.”

Under the oppositors’ counter-project of partition, the testamentary

disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01,
as above stated, were proposed to be reduced, while the other half of the estate
(P905,534.78) would he deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrix-
appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them in seven equal
parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix’
project of partition, ruling that “Articles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code
specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same
shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been
followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the
executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the
portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime.
The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a
distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New
Civil Code” adding that “the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will
for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the
limitation of the law, as aforecited.” The lower court ruled that “the payment in
cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the
law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical
and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix.”
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix’ will
are in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and
therefore subject to reduction;
 P a g e | 21

(2) Whether or not the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime
under Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime
under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and
(3) Whether or not the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in
cash on account of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties
left by the Testatrix.
RULING:
The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his
will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial,
relative to its execution and fulfilment, must be settled in accordance therewith,
following the plain and literal meaning of the testator’s words, unless it clearly
appears that his intention was otherwise.
The testator’s wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law
in the matter of testaments, and when expressed clearly and precisely in his last
will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully
obeyed and complied with by his executors heirs and devisees and legatees, and
neither those interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion
for the testator’s will.
Where the testator in her will expressed the wish and commanded that her
property be divided in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter
following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated
the particular heir among her compulsory heirs and seen other grandchildren to
whom she bequeathed said testator made a valid partition of her estate as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil
Code. This right of a testator is subject to the right of compulsory heirs to their
legitime.
The distribution made in the will of the deceased in favor of a compulsory
heir should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. And the sale
made by the heir, to a stranger or the property thus partitioned in the will is valid
since a "partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership
of the property adjudicated to him" from the death of his ancestors subject to
the rights and obligations of the latter, and, he cannot be deprived of his rights
thereto except by the methods provided for by law.
 P a g e | 22

CASE NO. 12
Digested By: EVANGELISTA III, Pablo H.
Vda. De Villaflor vs. Juico
G.R. No. L-15737, February 28, 1962
FACTS:
Don Villaflor was a wealthy man of Zambles who died on 1922 with a will
without begetting any child with his c wife Donya Fausta. The latter administered
the estate of the late husband. On 1956, Donya Fausta died without having
contracted second and without having any child. The defendant Juico has been
duly appointed by the Court to be the qualified judicial administrator of the estate
of the late Donya Fausta.
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor filed a complaint against the defendant that upon
the widow’s death, the personal and real properties of late Don Villaflor shall be
vested upon him. The defendant argued that the widow had not been given a full
ownership but only the right to their possession and use during her lifetime.
ISSUES: Whether or not the properties shall be vested upon the plaintiff or to
the administration of the defendant
RULING:
The properties shall be vested upon the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held
that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, ad all questions raised at the trail,
relative to its execution and fulfilment, must be settled in accordance therewith,
following the plain and literal meaning of the testator’s words, unless it clearly
appears that his intention was otherwise.
 P a g e | 23

CASE NO. 13
Digested By: WAGGAY, Fidencio
Maria Gervacio Blas, et al. vs. Rosalina Santos, et al.
G.R. No. L-14070, March 29, 1961; 1 SCRA 899
FACTS:
Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom he
had three children. He also had grandchildren from his children with Marta Cruz.
In 1898, Marta Cruz died. In 1899, Blas married Maxima Santos (they had no
children) but the properties he and his former wife acquired during the first
marriage were not liquidated.
In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his properties in
favor of Maxima the other half for payment of debts, Blas also named a few
devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of this, Maxima executed a document
whereby she intimated that she understands the will of her husband; that she
promises that she’ll be giving, upon her death, one-half of the properties she’ll
be acquiring to the heirs and legatees named in the will of his husband; that she
can select or choose any of them depending upon the respect, service, and
treatment accorded to her by said legatees/heirs/devisees.
In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos
became administratrix of her estate. In the same year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child
of Simeon Blas in his first marriage, together with three other grandchildren of
Simeon Blas (heirs of Simeon Blas), learned that Maxima did not fulfill her
promise as it was learned that Maxima only disposed not even one-tenth of the
properties she acquired from Simeon Blas.
The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas’
property precisely because Maxima promised that they’ll be receiving properties
upon her death.
ISSUES: Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the
promise of Maxima.
RULING:
YES. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though it is
not a will (it lacks the formality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said
promise was actually executed to avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas’
estate) hence it is a compromise.
It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of
Simeon Blas for the reason that the conjugal properties of his first marriage had
not been liquidated. It is an obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit
one-half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which
properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the
husband.
 P a g e | 24

CASE NO. 14
Digested By: PANLASIQUI, Marben M.
Fidela De Guzman and Emeterio De Guzman vs. In the Matter
of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Francisco Benitez,
Dionisia Valenzuela and Melquiades Valenzuela

G.R. No. 61167-68, January 20, 1989

FACTS:
On December 10, 1970, Dionisia Valenzuela and her brother, Melquiades
Valenzuela, first-cousins of the deceased Francisco Benitez, filed in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, a petition for administration of his intestate estate and
for the issuance of letters of administration to Dionisia who, during the lifetime
of the deceased, had been administering the said estate as judicial guardian of his
person and property duly appointed on January 22, 1957. Francisco Benitez was
the only surviving child of the spouses Tiu Cuaco, alias Pascual Benitez, and
Camila Valenzuela whose brother was the father of private respondents, Dionisia
Valenzuela and Melquiades Valenzuela. The petition for administration was
opposed by Emiterio de Guzman on the ground that the deceased left a will
bequeathing his entire estate to him (De Guzman) and that a petition for its
probate was docketed as Spl. Proc. No. 352 in Branch II of the same court the
two cases were later consolidated and jointly heard in Branch IV of the court.
Emiterio de Guzman died on April 20, 1973 and was substituted by his heirs,
Fidel, Cresencia and Rosalie, all surnamed De Guzman, in both proceedings.
On April 4, 1975, Judge Maximo Maceren rendered judgment disallowing
the will and appointing Dionisia Valenzuela administratrix of the intestate estate
of the deceased. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed
by that Court stating “The foregoing premises leads this Court to the conclusion
that at the time Francisco Benitez executed his supposed will on August 18, 1945
he was not possessed of a sound and disposing mind. Wherefore the same is not
allowed probate”.
ISSUES: Whether or not deceased Francisco Benitez was not possessed of a
sound and disposing mind when he executed his will??
RULING: YES. The decision of the Court of Appeals reveals that that Court
carefully weighed the evidence on the question of the testamentary capacity or
lack of it, of the deceased Francisco Benitez and found "no compelling reason
to disturb the lower court's findings and conclusions." The resolution of that
question hinged on the credibility of the witnesses. The cardinal rule on that
point is that the trial courts, assessment of the credibility of witnesses while
testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior
advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when
supported by convincingly credible evidence, shall not be disturbed on appeal.
Wherefore, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit.
CASE NO. 15
 P a g e | 25

Digested By: ESDIO, Patrick Allan

Nenita De Vera Suroza vs. Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado of CFI
Rizal, Pasig Br 25 and Evangelista Yuipco, Deputy Clerk of
Court
A.M. No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981
FACTS:
In 1973, Marcelina Suroza supposedly executed a notarial will bequeathing
her house and lot to a certain Marilyn Suroza. In 1974, Marcelina died. Marina
Paje was named as the executrix in the said will and she petitioned before CFI
Rizal that the will be admitted to probate. The presiding judge, Honrado
admitted the will to probate and assigned Paje as the administratrix. Honrado
also issued an ejectment order against the occupants of the house and lotsubject
of the will. Nenita Suroza, daughter in law of Marcelina (her husband, son of
Marcelina was confined in the Veteran’s Hospital), learned of the probate
proceeding when she received the ejectment order (as she was residing in said
house and lot). Nenita opposed the probate proceeding. She alleged that the said
notarial will is void because (a) the instituted heir there in Marilyn Suroza is
actually Marilyn Sy and she is a stranger to Marcelina, (b) the only son of
Marcelina, Agapito Suroza, is still alive and is the compulsory heir, (c)the notarial
will is written in English a language not known to Marcelina because the latter
was illiterate so much so that she merely thumb marked the will, (d) the notary
public who notarized will admitted that Marcelina never appeared before him
and that he notarized the said will merely to accommodate the request of a lawyer
friend but with the understanding that Marcelina should later appear before him
but that never happened. Honrado still continued with the probate despite the
opposition until testamentary proceeding closed and the property transferred to
Marilyn Sy. Nenita then filed this administrative case against Honrado on the
ground of misconduct.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there was sufficient evidence on record to show that the will on
its face was void?
RULING: Upon perusing the will and noting that it was written in English
and was thumb marked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, respondent Judge
could have readily perceived that the will is void .In the opening paragraph of
the will, it was stated that English was a language “understood and known” to
the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read
to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language.” That could only mean
that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and,
therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of Article 804 of the
Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the
testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot
testator, is void
 P a g e | 26

CASE NO. 16
Digested By: GONZALES, Dolores Marietta D.
Reyes vs. Vda. De Vidal
G.R. No. L-2862, April 21, 1952
FACTS:
This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to be the
last will and testament of Maria Zuñiga Vda. De Pando who died in the City of
Manila on October 29, 1945. A petition for the probate of said will was filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila. Dolores Zuñiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of
the deceased, filed an opposition based on several grounds. After several days
of trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court
rendered its decision disallowing the will on the ground that the signatures of the
deceased appearing therein are not genuine, that it was not proven that the
deceased knew the Spanish language in which it was written, and that even if the
signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the deceased was not of sound mind
when she signed the will.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will are
genuine.
(2) Whether or not there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the
language in which the will was written.
(3) Whether or not the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind when she
signed the will.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court REVERSED the judgment and DISMISSED the
case as the ordinace in question is found to be valid.
On the first issue:
YES. The standards used by Espinosa, an expert witness in hand writing, in
making his comparative study bear dates much closer to that of the disputed
signatures. The selection of the proper standards of comparison is of paramount
importance especially if we consider the age and the state of the health of the
author of the questioned signatures. He followed the standard practice in
handwriting analysis. It is for this reason that the court hold that Espinosa's
opinion deserves more weight and consideration.
On the second issue:
YES. The fact that the testatrix was a mestiza española, was married to a
Spaniard, made several trip to Spain and some of her letters submitted as
evidence by the oppositor were written in Spanish by the testatrix in her own
writing give rise to the presumption that the testatrix knew the language in which
the testament has been written, which presumption should stand unless the
contrary is proven. Where the attestation clause of the will states that the testatrix
 P a g e | 27

knew and possessed the Spanish language though this matter is not required to
be stated in the attestation clause, its inclusion can only mean that the
instrumental witnesses wanted to make it of record that the deceased knew the
language in which the will was written.
On the third issue:
YES. Cornelio Gonzales de Romero stated that she spoke to the deceased before
the signing of the will, and judging from the way she spoke she was of the
impression that the deceased was of sound mind at the time. To the same effect
is the testimony of Consuelo B. de Catindig. She said that her impression when
the deceased signed the will was that she could still talk and read, only that she
was weak. In fact she read the will before signing it. These statements had not
been contradicted. They give an idea of mental condition of the deceased in the
will differ from each other in certain respects, this is only due to her age and state
of health rather than to a defective mental condition. They do not reveal a
condition of forgery or lack of genuineness. These differences or irregularities
are common in the writings of old people and, far from showing lack of
genuineness, are indicative of the age, sickness, or weak condition of the writer.
 P a g e | 28

CASE NO. 17
Digested By: MALICDAN, Jaspherose
Lucio Balonan vs. Eusebia Abellana
G.R. No.L-15153, August 31, 1960
FACTS:
A two-page will left by the testatrix Anacleta Abellana was sought to be
probated. The will was written in Spanish Language. The first page was signed
by the witnesses on the left margin and by a certain Dr. Juan Bello at the bottom.
Under the name of Juan Bello appears the phrase "for the testarix Anacleta
Abellana". On the second page appears the same signature of Juan Bello with the
same phrase appearing under his name.
The Court of First Instance admitted the will to probate. Aggrieved,
Eusebia Abellana appealed to the Court of Appeals, who then reversed the lower
court's decision.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the signature of Juan Bello is considered as compliance to the
requirements of the law.
RULING: The Petition is GRANTED.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no valid compliance.
Article 805 of the Civil Code provides that every will, other than a
holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself
or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witness in the presence of the testator and of one another.
In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not
appear written under the will be said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello.
There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the express requirement in the law
that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto
by some other person in his presence and by his express direction.
Thus, the will was not admitted to probate.
 P a g e | 29

CASE NO. 18
Digested By: BALNEG, Jessalaine Karen T.
Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia, et al vs. Hon. Conrado M Vasquez,
et al.
G.R. No. L-26615, April 30, 1970
FACTS:
Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried on 2 September 1965, leaving
no descendents, ascendants, brother or sister. At the time of her death, she was
said to be 90 years old more or less, and possessed of an estate consisting mostly
of real properties. During her lifetime she executed two will; June 9 1965 will and
December 29 1965 will. On 17 September 1965, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de
Precilla, a niece of the deceased, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila
for probate of the alleged last will and testament of Gliceria A. del Rosario,
executed on 29 December 1960, and for her appointment as special
administratrix of the latter’s estate, said to be valued at about P100,000.00,
pending the appointment of a regular administrator thereof. The petition was
approved by the court. Oppositor now question the probate and the validity of
the Dec. 29 1960 will allege that the eye sight of Gliceria was so poor and
defective that she could not have read the provisions of the will.
ISSUES: Whether or not the 1960 will is valid and the order allowing the probate
is correct.
RULING:
The will is not valid for the reason that Gliceria was considered blind at
the execution of the will thus Article 808 must apply which is READING OF
THE WILL TWICE TO A BLIND TESTATOR; The rationale behind the
requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of
reading the will himself is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that
he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. Failure to
comply with this requirement shall render the will void. The order of the court
in admitting the will for probate is reverse.
 P a g e | 30

CASE NO. 19
Digested By: DOMIGAN, Chelsea
Nera vs. Rimando
18 Phil 450
FACTS:
When a certain will was being signed, it was alleged that the testator and
some subscribing witnesses were in the inner room while the other subscribing
witnesses were in the outer room. What separates the inner room from the outer
room was a curtain. The trial court ignored this fact in its determination of the
case as it ruled that the determination of this specific fact will not affect the
outcome of the case.
ISSUES: What is the true test of the testator’s or the witness’ presence in the
signing of a will?
RULING:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the true test of presence of the
testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually
saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they
chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position
with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.
The position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of
the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other
sign if they choose to do so.
The Supreme Court, in this case, determined that all the parties were in
the same small room when each other signed. Hence, they were in each other’s
presence (though the facts of the case didn’t elaborate – the SC just ruled so).
The SC ruled that if some of the witnesses were really in the outer room (a fact
which was not established according to the SC) separated by a curtain, then the
will is invalid, the attaching of those signatures under circumstances not being
done “in the presence” of the witness in the outer room.
 P a g e | 31

CASE NO. 20
Digested By: HUMIWAT, Jaime P.
Taboada vs. Rosal
G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982
FACTS:
Petitioner Taboada filed a petition for the probate of the will of late
Dorotea Perez. He attached the will written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect
consisting of two pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary
disposition and was signed at the bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and
at the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page
which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgement is signed at the
end of the attestation clause by the three attesting witnesses and at the left hand
margin by the testatrix.
Judge Pamatian of the trial court denied the petition for a want of
formality in the execution of the will and also required the petitioner to submit
the names of the intestate heirs so that they can be properly notified and they
could properly intervene in the summary settlement of the estate. However, the
petitioner instead of complying, filed an MR and a motion for a 30 day period
extension to deliberate. The motions were still pending when judge Pamatian
was transferred to his new station and judge Rosal was appointed as the new
presiding judge of the respondent court. Subsequently, Judge Rosal denied the
motions.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Article 805 of the Civil Code requires that the testatrix and all
the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will.
RULING:
NO. Under article 805 of the Civil Code, a will must be signed at its end
by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written by another in his
presence, and by his express direction and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
In the case at bar, the objects of attestation and subscription were fully
met and satisfied when the witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page
which contains the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was
properly identified by the subscribing witnesses to be the same will executed by
the testatrix. There is no question of fraud behind the questioned order.
 P a g e | 32

CASE NO. 21
Digested By: BASCOS, Jane Lennie T.
Icasiano vs. Icasiano
11 SCRA 422, June 30, 1964
FACTS:
On June 1956, Josefa Villacorte executed a will and testament in duplicate
at the house of her daughter Felisa Icasiano. It was published and attested by 3
witnesses. It was also acknowledge by the testatrix before Atty. Ong Notary
Public and prepared by Atty. Samson. Atty. Samson testified upon cross
examination that he prepared 1 original copy and 2 duplicate copies but he
brought only 1 copy and 1 signed duplicate copy to Manila retaining 1 unsigned
copy in Bulacan. The original copy consist of 5 pages, it does not contain the
signature of one of the attesting witnesses but the duplicate copy attached to the
amended and supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix and 3 witnesses in
each and every page. Witness Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign the
page 3 of the original copy admits that he may have lifted 2 pages instead of 1
when he signed the same. Oppositors introduced an expert testimony but the
court was unconvinced because the expert does not take in to account the
advanced age of the testatrix and the effect of writing fatigue.
ISSUES: Whether or not the failure of one of the attesting witnesses to affix his
signature to a page is sufficient to deny probate of the will
RULING:
NO. The failure of the witness Natividad to sign the page 3 was entirely
through oversight and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise
evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the same time. The amended
petition did not substantially alter the one first filed but merely supplemented it
by disclosing the existence of the duplicate and no showing that new interest
were involved when in fact the contents if the original and duplicate are identical.
Even if the original is in existence a duplicate may still be admitted to probate
since the original copy is deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no other
will but the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be probated.
 P a g e | 33

CASE NO. 22
Digested By: BILOG, Armando
Cagro vs. Cagro
G.R. No. L-5826 (1993)
FACTS:
This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the CFI
of Samar, admitting to probate the will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who
died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on February 14, 1949.
The main objection insisted upon by the appellants is that the will is fatally
defective, because its attestation clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses.
There is no question that the signatures of the 3 witnesses to the will do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the
same is signed by the witnesses on the left hand margin.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the will is fatally defective?
RULING:
YES. The AC is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of
the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it MUST
necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be
considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at
the bottom thereof negates their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the 3 witnesses on
the left hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their
signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are
in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left hand
margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the 3 witnesses at
the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause
to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or
all of the witnesses.
 P a g e | 34

CASE NO. 23
Digested By: CAGAN, Jenalyn A.
Testacy of Sixto Lopez. Jose S. Lopez vs. Agustin Liboro
G.R. No. L-1787, August 27, 1948
FACTS:
On March 3, 1947, six months before his death, Don Sixto Lopez
executed a will wherein he named Jose Lopez as one of his heirs. Agustin Liboro
questioned the validity of the said will based on the following ground, among
others:
The first sheet, which is also the first page is not paged either in letters or
in Arabic numerals.
1. That the witnesses to the will provided contradictory statements.
2. That Don Sixto used his thumb mark to sign the will.
3. There was no indication in the will that the language used therein is known
by Don Sixto Lopez.
ISSUES: Whether or not the will is valid.
RULING: YES, the will is valid.
The omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary,
is supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the
conventional numeral words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly
identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in
relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the
first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the
last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the
bottom of the preceding page. Further, the first pages is captioned
“Testamento”.
The contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are
set out in Liboro’s appelant’s brief are incidents not all of which every one of
the witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order
in which they occurred.
Don Sixto affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his
name. The reason for this was that he was suffering from “partial paralysis.”
There is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use
of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or
preference. Both ways are good.
There is no statutory requirement which prescribes that it must be
expressly placed in the will that the testator knows the language being used
therein. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde.
 P a g e | 35

CASE NO. 24
Digested By: BONDAD, Ramil A.
Rosario Feliciano Vda. De Ramos vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-40804, January 31, 1978
FACTS:
Adelaida Nista who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a
petition for the probate of the alleged will and testament dated March 9, 1963
and codicil dated April 18, 1963 of the late Eugenia Danila who died on May 21,
1966. The petitioner prayed that after due notice and proper hearing, the alleged
will and codicil be probates and allowed and that she or any other person be
appointed as administrator of the testatrix's estate.
Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra filed an
opposition on July 18, 1966 and an amended opposition on August 19, 1967, to
the petition alleging among others that they are the legally adopted son and
daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila; that the
purported will and codicil subject of the petition were procured through fraud
and undue influence; that the formalities required by law for the execution of a
will and codicil have not been complied with as the same were not properly
attested to or executed and not expressing the free will and deed of the purported
testatrix.
The two parties talked and they came up with a compromise agreement which
essentially stated that Nista is admitting the invalidity of the will. The
compromise agreement was approved by the trial court BUT Rosario de Ramos
et al – the other instituted heirs and devisees – intervened. The trial court allowed
the intervention and set aside the compromise agreement. Rosario de Ramos et
al alleged that the Guerras repudiated their shares when they abandoned Danila
and committed acts of ingratitude against her.
Eventually, the probate court admitted the will to probate. The decision was
appealed by the Guerras. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
probate court. The CA ruled that there was a failure to prove that Danila was in
the presence of the instrumental witnesses when she signed the will – this was
because two of the instrumental witnesses (Sarmiento and Paz) testified in court
that the will was already signed by Danila when they affixed their signatures.
HOWEVER, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas, the Notary Public before whom the
will was executed and who assisted in the execution, vehemently assailed the
testimony of the two witnesses. He affirmed Danila and the three instrumental
witnesses were in each other’s presence when the will was signed by them.
Another lawyer, who was also present during the execution of the will,
corroborated the testimony of Atty. Barcenas.
ISSUES: Whether or not the last testament and its accompanying codicil were
executed in accordance with the formalities of the law, considering the
complicated circumstances that two of the attesting witnesses testified against
their due execution while other non-subscribing witnesses testified to the
contrary.
 P a g e | 36

RULING:
There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince us that the will and
codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law. It
appears positively and convincingly that the documents were prepared by a
lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero The execution of the same was evidently supervised
by his associate, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the deeds were also
acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is attended by
some intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman.
The object is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution
of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. If there
should be any stress on the participation of lawyers in the execution of a wig,
other than an interested party, it cannot be less than the exercise of their primary
duty as members of the Bar to uphold the lofty purpose of the law. There is no
showing that the above-named lawyers had been remiss in their sworn duty.
Consequently, respondent court failed to consider the presumption of ty in the
execution of the questioned documents. While the opposition alleged fraud and
undue influence, no evidence was presented to prove their occurrence. There is
no question that each and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic
signatures of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the
attestation claim far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting
witnesses. Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the
will and codicil in the presence of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments
were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was all the time present
during the execution.
Unlike other deeds, ordinary wills by necessity of law must contain an
attestation clause Which, significantly is a separate memorandum or record of
the facts surrounding that the conduct of execution. Once signed by the attesting
witnesses, it that compliance with the indispensable legal formalities had been
observed. This Court had previously hold that the attestation clause basically
contracts the pretense of undue ex execution which later on may be made by the
attesting witnesses. In the attestation clause, the witnesses do not merely attest
to the signature of the testatrix but also to the proper execution of the will, and
their signature following that of the testatrix show that they have in fact at not
only to the genuineness of the testatrix's signature but also to the due execution
of the will as embodied in the attention clause. 5By signing the wilt the witnesses
impliedly to the truth of the facts which admit to probate, including the
sufficiency of execution, the capacity of the testatrix, the absence of undue
influence, and the like.
In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, his
statements of a competent attorney, who has been charged with the
responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to
greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to anticipate in the
act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the
attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney being
conversant of the instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he
is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents in his memory.
 P a g e | 37

The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby reversed in so far

its it disallowed the probate of the will and codicil.
 P a g e | 38

CASE NO. 25
Digested by: DELOS REYES, Carmelo E.
In the matter of the Petition for the Allowance of the Will of
Gregorio Gatchalian, deceased. Pedro Reyes Garcia vs. Felipe
Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G.
Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and Angeles G. Talanay
G.R. No. L-20357, November 25, 1967
FACTS:
On March 15, 1967, Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of age,
died in the municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, leaving no forced heirs. On
April 2 of the same year, appellant filed a petition with the above named court
for the probate of said alleged will (Exhibit "C") wherein he was instituted as sole
heir. Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G.
Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and Angeles G. Talanay, appellees herein, opposed
the petition on the ground, among others, that the will was procured by fraud;
that the deceased did not intend the instrument signed by him to be as his will;
and that the deceased was physically and mentally incapable of making a will at
the time of the alleged execution of said will.
After due trial, the court rendered the appealed decision finding the
document Exhibit "C" to be the authentic last will of the deceased but
disallowing it for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of Article
806 of the New Civil Code — that the will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses.
ISSUES: Whether or not the will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the instrumental witnesses.
RULING: An examination of the document (Exhibit "C") shows that the same
was acknowledged before a notary public by the testator but not by the
instrumental witnesses.
Article 806 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:
Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of
the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.

We have held heretofore that compliance with the requirement contained

in the above legal provision to the effect that a will must be acknowledged before
a notary public by the testator and also by the witnesses is indispensable for its
validity (In re: Testate Estate of Alberto, G. R. No. L-11948, April 29, 1959). As
the document under consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is
obvious that the same may not be probated.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
 P a g e | 39

CASE NO. 26

Digested By: RAMIREZ, Maribeth

Cruz vs. Villasor

G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973; 54 SCRA 31
FACTS:
The case is for the probate of the last will a testament of the late Valente
Z. Cruz. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them is at the
same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been
acknowledged. Despite the opposition of the surviving spouse of Valente Z.
Cruz the Court allowed the probate of the said last will and testament, hence an
appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was
executed in accordance with law, particularly Article 805 which requirs at least
three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will?
RULING:
The last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance
with law.
Article 805 of the Civil Code provides that the will shall be attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be
considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before
himself his having signed the will. To allow the notary public to act as a third
witness would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will,
which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article 805 requiring at
least three credible witnesses to act as such.
The probate of the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz is declared
not valid.
 P a g e | 40

CASE NO. 27
Digested By: WALLANG, Annie Ruth
Jose Antonio Gabucan vs. Hon.Luis D. Manta, Josefa Vda. De
Ysalina and Nelda G. Enclonar
G.R. No. L-51546, January 28, 1980
FACTS:
The court of First Instance of Camiguin in its “decision” of the December
28, 1977 for the probate of the will of the late Roganciano Gabucan, dismissed
the petition on the ground that it does not bear a thirty-centavo documentary
stamp.
According to the respondent Judge, since the requisite documentary
stamp was not affixed to the notarial acknowledgment in the will, it was not
admissible in evidence. He refused to consider the dismissal in spite of
petitioner’s manifestation that he had already attached the documentary stamp
to the original of the will.
ISSUES: Whether or not affixing a documentary stamp to the notarial
acknowledgement is a ground for dismissal of a petition for the probate of a will.
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court holds that the lower court erred in declaring
that because no documentary stamp was affixed to the will, there was “no will
and testament to probate”. What the probate court should have done was to
require the proponent to affix the requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to
the notarial acknowledgement of the will which is the taxable portion of that
document.
This procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that the
non-admissibility of the document, which does not bear the requisite
documentary stamp, subsists only “until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have
been affixed thereto and cancelled”.
SEC. 238. Effect of failure to stamp taxable document. — An
instrument, document, or paper which is required by law to be stamped and
which has been signed, issued, accepted, or transferred without being duly
stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record
of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the
requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled.

No notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths shall add

his jurat or acknowledgment to any document subject to documentary stamp tax
unless the proper documentary stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.Previous
decisions of the court held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at the
time the taxable document is presented in evidence and that it should be noted
that the lack of documentary stamp on a document does not invalidate such
document.
 P a g e | 41

CASE NO. 28
Digested By: WALLANG, Annie Ruth
Garcia vs. Lacuesta
90 Phil 489, November 29, 1951
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing the
will of Antero Mercado, said will is written in Ilocano dialect. The will appears
to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero
Mercado, followed below by "A reugo del testator" and the name of Florentino
Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his
name. The Court of Appeals, reversing the judgement of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, ruled that the attestation clause failed (1) to certify that
the will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the end of
the will by Atty. Florentino Javier at the express request of the testator in the
presence of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses; (2) to certify
that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the former's
request said testator has written a cross at the end of his name and on the left
margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at the end thereof; (3)
to certify that the three witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
ISSUES: Whether or not the will is valid.
RULING: NO.
The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero
Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his
express direction, as required by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
petitioner argues that there is no need for such recital because the cross written
by the testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the signature of Atty.
Florentino Javier is a surplusage. The Court held the mere sign of the cross to a
thumbmark, is not the same and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and
does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark. Thus, it is unnecessary to
determine that there is a sufficient recital in the attestation clause as to the signing
of the will by the testator in the presence of the witnesses, and by the latter in
the presence of the testator and of each other.
 P a g e | 42

CASE NO. 29
Digested By: CUPATAN, Eugene Francis A.
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of
the Deceased Brigido Alvarado vs. Hon. Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr.
G.R. No. L-74695, September 14, 1993; 226 SCRA 374
FACTS:
The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private
respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the 8-page document, read the same aloud
in the presence of the testator, the 3 instrumental witnesses and the notary public.
The latter 4 followed the reading with their own respective copies previously
furnished them.
Said will was admitted to probate. Later on, a codicil was executed, and
by that time, the testator was already suffering from glaucoma. But the
disinheritance and revocation clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the
notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil.
Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the
presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will)
and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.
ISSUES: Whether or not there was a substantial compliance to the reading of
the will?
RULING:
Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for
one reason or another, are incapable of reading their wills. Hence, the will should
have been read by the notary public and an instrumental witness. However, the
spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. In this case, there
was substantial compliance. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the
purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all
kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as
to destroy the testamentary privilege.
In this case, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud
in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary
public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked,
that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the
signing and acknowledgement take place.
 P a g e | 43

CASE NO. 30
Digested By: BELINO, Elma
Gil vs. Murciano
G.R. No. L-3362, March 1, 1951; 88 Phil 260
FACTS:
A last will and testament was executed by Carlos Gil. Early in 1945, before
the application was heard on the merit, the record, along with the will, was
destroyed, necessitating its reconstitution after liberation. The parties submitted
a stipulation of facts agreeing “that the will as transcribed in the record of appeal”
in another case is “a true and correct copy.” CFI Manila admitted to probate the
alleged will and testament.
Carlos Gil’s nephew and sister contended that the will is invalid since the
attestation clause did not state that the testator signed the will, it declared only
that it was signed by the witnesses.
ISSUES: Whether or not the will is valid.
RULING:
NO. It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not
state that the alleged testator signed the will. It declares only that it was signed
by the witnesses. This is a fatal defect, for the precise purpose of the attestation
clause is to certify that the testator signed the will, this being the most essential
element of the clause. Without it there is no attestation at all.
 P a g e | 44

CASE NO. 31
Digested By: MACATANGCAL, Ameena C.
Caneda vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993
FACTS:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children
executed a last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three
attesting witnesses, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Elvaiano Toregosa.
The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a
notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of the last will. It was
declared in said will that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises
his real and personal properties to several persons, all of whom do not appear to
be related to the testator.
The testator himself filed the probate of his will. He died on May 29, 1979.
Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will sought his appointment as
special administrator of the testator’s estate.
Petitioners in case, who claimed to be the nephews and nieces of the
testator opposed the probate of the will and the appointment of special
administrator on the following ground: that the testator could not have possibly
executed such will since he was already in poor health during the alleged date of
execution of his will and that the testator’s signature is not genuine.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of
Caballero complies with the requirement of Art. 805 in relation to A. 809 of the
Civil Code
RULING:
Art. 805 require that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the
will in the presence of the testator and of one another. “Attestation” and
“subscription” differ in meaning.
Jurisprudence provides that attestation consists in witnessing the testator’s
execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are
done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature
of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of
the witness’s names upon the same paper as the will which was executed by the
testator. As it involves a mental act, there would be no means, therefore of
ascertaining by a physical examination of the will whether the witnesses had
indeed signed in the presence of the testator.
While the attestation clause in the case recites that the testator indeed
signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the 3 attesting witnesses and
states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly
state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective
 P a g e | 45

signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
Court ruled that the absence of such statement required by law is a fatal defect
or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will
that is sought admitted to probate.
 P a g e | 46

CASE NO. 32
Digested By: ABQUIREN, Illyssa Jane
Roxas vs. De Jesus
G.R. No. L-38338, January 28, 1985
FACTS:
Following the death of spouses Andres de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus, Simeon Roxas, the brother of Bibiana, filed a Special Proceeding entitled
“In the Matter of Intestate Estate of Andres de Jesus and Bibiana de Jesus”.
Simeon Roxas was then appointed as the administrator.
After Letters of Administration had been granted to Simeon, he delivered
to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic will of Bibiana
de Jesus. Hearing of the probate of the holographic will followed. Simeon
testified that after his appointment as administrator, he found a notebook
belonging to Bibiana and on pages 21-24, a letter-will addressed to her children
and entirely writted and signed in the handwriting of Bibiana was found. The will
is dated “Feb./61”.
The testimony of Simeon was corroborated by the children of Bibiana,
Pedro and Manuel. They recognized the handwriting of their mother and
identified her signature. They further testified that Bibiana understood English
in which the will is written.
Luz Henson, another compulsory heir, filed an opposition to probate
alleging the following:
1. That it was not executed in accordance with law;
2. That it was executed through force, intimidation, undue duress, undue
influence and improper pressure;
3. That the alleged testatrix acted by mistake or did not intend, nor could
have intended the will to be her last will and testament.
In 1973, Judge Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of the
holographic will. Luz filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the alleged
holographic will was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code.
Judge Colayco reconsidered and disallowed the probate of the holographic
will stating that it should contain the day, the month, and year as required by the
Civil Code. In the case, no exact date was indicated.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the date “Feb. /61” appearing on the Holographic Will of
Bibiana de Jesus is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
YES. The prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal
requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or
unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilege. If a will has been executed in
 P a g e | 47

substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad
faith and fraud in the exercise is obviated, said will should be admitted to probate.
If the testator, in executing his will, attempts to comply with all the
requirements, it is sufficient if the objective sought to be accomplished by such
requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the testator.
In this case, the court found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its
execution nor was there any substitution of wills and testaments. There is no
question that the holographic will of Bibiana was entirely written, dated, and
signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no
question as to its genuineness and due execution.
As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day,
month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case, there is no
appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity
of the will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date “Feb./61”
appearing on the holographic will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance.
 P a g e | 48

CASE NO. 33
Digested By: BENAN, Rhobee Jyn
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will Of Melecio
Labrador, Sagrado Labrador et. al. vs. Court of Appeals,
Gaudencio Labrador, and Jesus Labrador
G.R. Nos. 83843-44, April 5, 1990
Ponente: Paras, J.
FACTS:
The deceased, Melecio Labrador, left behind him a parcel of land which
was partitioned among his nine heirs through a holographic will.
Sagrado, therefore, one of his heirs, filed a petition for the probate of the
alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.
However, Jesus and Gaudencio, also heirs of the deceased, filed an
opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or
revoked by implication of law alleging therein that before Melecio’s death, he
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of
Jesus and Gaudencio the parcel of land.
The trial court allowed the probate of the holographic will and declared
null and void the Deed of Sale. Jesu and Gaudencio and appealed to the Court
of Appeals which modified the decision of the trial court. It denied the allowance
of the probate of the will for being undated.
The aggrieved party, therefore, filed a petition to the Supreme Court
alleging among others that the CA erred in not allowing the probate proceeding
withstanding the fact that in the first paragraph of the second page of the alleged
holographic will, which was written in Ilocano, the testator made mention a date
– “month of March, 17th, 1968.
ISSUES: Whether or not the holographic will is dated
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The will has been dated in
the hands of the testator himself in perfect compliance Art. 810.
The law does not specify a particular location where the date must be
placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and
should be executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present
in the subject will. Hence, the probate proceeding should be allowed.
 P a g e | 49

CASE NO. 34
Digested By: ESNARA, Carlito
Gan vs. Yap
G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958
FACTS:
Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died leaving a holographic will she allegedly
executed. Her heir, Faustino Gan initiated probate proceedings of the will in the
CFI of Manila. The subject will was not presented and its contents and due
execution was tried to be established through statements of witnesses. The
probate proceedings was denied.
ISSUES: Whether or not holographic wills may be probated by bare testimony
of witnesses even if said will is not presented.
RULING:
The truthfulness and veracity of a holographic will requires only that it is
entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator himself. It is the will itself the
proof authenticity. Hence, a witness will only explicitly declare that the will and
the signature are the handwriting of the testator. Witnesses need not have seen
the execution of the will.
The non-presentation of a holographic will may not be proved by bare
testimonies of witnesses because the loss of holographic will entails the loss of
the only medium of proof. The handwriting is the only guaranty of authenticity
of a holographic will.
 P a g e | 50

CASE NO. 35
Digested By: AMINDALAN, Alfred
Rodelas vs. Aranza
G.R. No. L-58509. December 7, 1982
FACTS:
The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the
ground that the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.
The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the
original will was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original.
ISSUES: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a
photocopy
RULING:
YES. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined
by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.
 P a g e | 51

CASE NO. 36
Digested By: CATBAGAN, Julie Ann O.
Azaola vs. Singson
109 Phil 509
FACTS:

On September 9, 1957 Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City.

Petitioner submitted for probate her holographic will, in which Maria Azaola was
made the sole heir as against the nephew, who is the defendant. Only one
witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented to testify on the handwriting of the
testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one month, more or less, before the
death of the testatrix, as it was given to him and his wife; and that it was in the
testatrix’s handwriting. He presented pieces of evidence for comparison
purposes.

The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was
procured by undue influence and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend
the instrument to be her last will. The probate was denied on the ground that
under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses
who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix,
the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented “did not
prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the
testatrix.”

Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than
one witness because the will’s authenticity was not questioned; and second, that
Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its
authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive and
that the petitioner is bound to present three witnesses.
RULING:
No. Since the authenticity of the will was not being contested. But even if
the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion
that Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to require the
compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have
been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law
(Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness
possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the
proponent.

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses
be presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived
 P a g e | 52

from the rule established for ordinary testaments. But it cannot be ignored that
the requirement can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary
testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the
execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805).
Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule
requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if
absurd results are to be avoided.

Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by

the words “if the Court deem it necessary”, which reveal that what the law deems
essential is that the Court should be convinced of the will’s authenticity.

The rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely
directory and is not mandatory.

This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows the court
to resort to expert evidence. The law foresees the possibility that no qualified
witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent
witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for
resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the
will’s authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and
the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider
it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent
witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still,
and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in
fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested
as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
 P a g e | 53

CASE NO. 37
Digested By: PASOS, Abigail
Jose Rivera vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Adelaido J.
Rivera

G.R. Nos. 75005-06. February 15, 1990

FACTS:
When Venancio Rivera died, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving
legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Venancio’s estate. This petition was opposed by Adelaido
Rivera who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that
Venancio was his father and did not die interstate but in fact left two holographic
wills. Adelaido Rivera thereafter filed a petition for the probate of the
holographic wills which in turn was opposed by Jose Rivera who reiterated that
he was the sole heir of Venancio's intestate estate.
The lower court found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent
but of a different Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The
Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by
whom he had seven children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to
this estate because the decedent was not his father. Consequently, the
holographic wills were also admitted to probate. On appeal, the decision of the
trial court was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate Court; hence, this
petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not the holographic will was valid.
RULING: YES.
The holographic will was found to have been written, dated and signed by
the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code.
Article 811 of the Civil Code provides that in the probate of a holographic
will, it is necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and
signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in
the handwriting of the testator. Conversely, if the will is contested, at least three
of such witnesses shall be required.
In this case, Jose Rivera is not the son of the testator; thus, being a mere
stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills such that his opposition
thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. It was
sufficient that Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr. authenticated the wills as having
been written and signed by their father.
The petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED
 P a g e | 54

CASE NO. 38
Digested By: BAWAAN, Rae Ann B.
Kalaw vs. Relova
G.R. No. L-40207. September 28, 1984
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J:
FACTS:
Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of
sister Natividad, filed a peition for probate of the latter's holographic will in 1968.
The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's name, designated as the sole heir was
crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written above it. Such was not initialed,
b) Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's ma,e was written
above it. This alteration was initialed by the testator.
Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect so that
she would be the sole heir. The lower court denied the probate due to the
unauthenticated alterations and additions.
ISSUES: Whether or not the will is VALID.
RULING:
No, the will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the will which
could remain valid as there was only one disposition in it. Such was altered by
the substitution of the original heir with another. To rule that the first will should
be given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of mind. However, this change
of mind cannot be given effect either as she failed to authenticate it in accordance
with Art. 814, or by affixing her full signature.
 P a g e | 55

CASE NO. 39
Digested By: BAGUIWEN, Feric B.
Ajero vs. Court of Appeals
236 SCRA 488
FACTS:
The holographic will of Annie Sand was submitted for probate.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament’s body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent;
and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence. The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the
disposition in the will of a house and lot. He claimed that said property could
not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
However, the trial court still admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate.
The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the
identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the
testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to
comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary
capacity of the testatrix. On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that
the decedent did not comply with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It found
that certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by
not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made had
not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUES: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of
the NCC were not complies with.
RULING:
YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate.
If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that
these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render
the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. Unless the
authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of
the holographic will or on testator’s signature, their presence does not invalidate
the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such
changes.
 P a g e | 56

CASE NO. 40
Digested By: LABADOR, Maylane N.
Paula de la Cerna, et al., vs. Manuela Rebaca-Potot, et al.
G.R. NO. L-20234. December 23, 1964; 12 SCRA 576
FACTS: On May 9, 1939, spouses Bernabe de la Cerna and Gervasia Rebaca,
executed a joint last will and testament. They willed that their two parcels of land
acquired during their marriage together with all the improvements thereon shall
be given to their niece Manuela Rebaca because they were childless. And that
while each of the testator is living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of
the two lands. Bernabe died on August 30, 1939. The will was submitted to
probate by Gervasia and Manuela before the CFI of Cebu. The court issued a
probate decree on October 31, 1939. Thirteen years later, Gervasia died. Another
petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed
on November 6, 1952. The CFI heard and declared the testament null and void
for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills under the Civil Code.
Manuela appealed to the CA, and the decision was reversed on the ground that
the decree of probate on 1939 was issued by a court of competent jurisdiction
and conclusive on the due execution of the instrument. The petitioners, intestate
heirs of Bernabe de la Cerna elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not Manuela can initiate another petition for probate of
the same will concerning the estate of Gervasia Rebaca.
RULING: The SC affirmed the decision but with modification. A final
judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the
whole world and public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of
occasional errors judgment of courts should become final at some definite date
fixed by law. The petitioners re concluded by the 1939 decree admitting
Bernabe’s will to probate. Although a joint will is void and can never be validated,
the ultimate decision rests on the probate court, and in the case the court have
spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. BUT, the probate decree
in 1939 could only affect the share of the deceased husband. It could not have
included the disposition of the share of the wife Gervasia because she was still
alive, the probate court could not have acquired jurisdiction over her interest.
Her estate could not then be in issue. A will could not be probated during the
testator’s lifetime. The validity of the joint will, insofar as the estate of the wife
is concerned, must be on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since
a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. The CFI’s ruling that a
joint will is prohibited by law is correct as to the participation of the deceased
Gervasia in the properties in question.
The undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to
her heirs intestate and not exclusively to her testamentary heir, unless some other
valid will in Manuela’s favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir
intestate of Gervasia.
 P a g e | 57

CASE NO. 41
Digested By: LOPEZ, Phoebe Grace D.
Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
90 SCRA 187
FACTS:
Isabel Andres Gonzales, widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor
of Rizal Province died without issue at the age of 85.
A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was written in
Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two month prior
to the death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and
acknowledgment, with the signature of the testatrix on page 4 and the left margin
of all the pages.
Lutgarda Santiago was named as the universal heir and executrix filed a
petition for probate of Isabel’s will. The petition was opposed by Rizalina
Gonzales another niece of Isabel.
The RTC denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed
and attested in accordance with law on the issue of the competency and
credibility of the witnesses.
Lutgarda Santiago appealed to the CA and upon consideration of the
adduced evidence the CA reversed the decision of the Lower Court. Petition
filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court holding that there is no proof
that the three instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUES: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material
to the validity of a will Or Is it required that there must evidence on record that
the witness to a will has good standing in his community or that he is honest and
upright.
RULING: NO. The law requires only that witnesses possess the qualification
under Article 820 of the New Civil Code, and none of the disqualifications under
Article 821. The competency of a person to be an instrumental witness is
determined by the statute, whereas his credibility depends on the appreciation of
his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the court that said
witness is telling the truth. For their testimony to be credible it is not mandatory
that evidence be first established that witnesses have a good standing in the
community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy for
such attributes is presumed to be such of the witness unless contrary is proved
by the opposing party.
 P a g e | 58

CASE NO. 42
Digested By: ELKE, Samantha
Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased. Francisco Gago vs.
Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrisio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and
Catalina Mamuyac
G.R. No. L-26317. January 29, 1927
FACTS: Gago filed a petition to probate the will made my Miguel Mamuyac
executed on 1918. Cornelio mamuyac et al. protested contending that the will
was annulled and cancelled by the testator. It then appeared that another will
was executed by Miguel on 1919 the court dismissed the probate on the ground
of the existence of the second will.
Gago filed another petition to probate the second will, which was again
opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac et al.. contending that the second will was merely
a copy of the first will which was allegedly annuled and revoked. The court
denied the probate of the second will on the ground that it was satisfactorily
proved that it was merely a carbon copy of the first will, whereas the original
copy was last seen in the possession of the testator and could no longer be found
after his death. And that, such will has already been cancelled and revoked by the
testator before his death, as evidenced by the testimonies of two witnesses.
Hence, gago appealed.
ISSUES: Whether or not there has been a revokation of the will.
RULING: The court ruled that the law does not require any evidence of the
revokation of a will. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove it, however,
where the original of a will is unable to be found but is shown to have been in
the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that, in absence
of any competent evidence, such will is deemed cancelled, revoked or destroyed
by the testator himself. In probate proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the
proponent to clearly establish not only its due execution but also its existence.
Having proved these two, the burden is now shifted to the oppositors to prove
its revokation. Where there is no witness as to the act of revokation, all other
evidences pertaining to the revokation perishes with the testator.
Copies of wills should be admitted by courts with great caution. However,
when it is proven by proper testimony that a will was axecuted in DUPLICATE
and each copy was executed with all the formalities prescribed by law, then the
duplicate may be admitted in eveidence when it is made to appear that the
original has been LOST, and was NOT cancelled or destroyed by the testator.
Therefore, since it has been clearly proven that the will in issue has been
cancelled and revoked by the testator during his lifetime, and absent any evidence
to the contrary by the petitioner, the will cannot be probated.
 P a g e | 59

CASE NO. 43
Digested By: SALVADOR, Kathleen Allyssa
Testate Estate of the late Adriana Maloto vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76464. February 29, 1988; 158 SCRA 451
FACTS:
Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private
respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did
not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced an
intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. However, while the
case was still in progress, the parties executed an agreement of extrajudicial
settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the division of the
estate into four equal parts among the parties.
Three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's
counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled
"KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January
3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. The
document was submitted to the office of the clerk of the CFI of Iloilo.
Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will,
Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in
the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of
extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises
and legacies to other parties.
Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named
in the will, filed a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings
therein and for the allowance of the will.
Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter
on whether or not the document or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of
Adriana, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself
and found that the will had been revoked. The respondent court stated that the
presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless,
been sufficiently proven.
ISSUES: Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.
RULING:
Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
xxx
By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of
revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and
by his express direction. If burned, torn cancelled, or obliterated by some other
person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be
established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents,
 P a g e | 60

and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or
obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court. (Emphasis
Supplied.)

It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this
case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is
coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative
that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed
by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the
testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be
the will itself.
“Animus revocandi” is only one of the necessary elements for the
effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or
cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence
and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance
with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana’s
maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less
the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have
been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was
not in her presence.
 P a g e | 61

CASE NO. 44
Digested By: LASTIMOZA, Johanne Rose V.
Pedro Gallanosa, et al. vs. Hon. Ubaldo Arcangel
G..R. No. L-29300. June 21, 1978
FACTS:
Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his
brother Lito. In his will, Florentino bequeathed his ½ share in the conjugal estate
to his second wife, Tecla, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his
½ share would be assigned to spouses Gallanosa. Pedro Gallanosa was Tecla’s
son by her first marriage who grew up under the care of Florentino. His other
properties were bequeathed to his protégé Adolfo Fortajada.
Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile. Opposition
was registered by Florentino’s brother, nephews and nieces. After a hearing,
where the oppositors did not present any evidence, the Judge admitted the will
to probate. The testator’s legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate
and from the order of partition and distribution.
Later, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land against
Pedro alleging that that he had been in continuous possession of those lands and
praying that they be declared owners thereof. Pedro moved for a dismissal which
was later granted by the Judge on the ground of res judicata. The legal heirs did
not appeal from the order of dismissal.
Fifteen years after the dismissal of the first civil case and 28 years after the
probate of the will, the legal heirs filed a case for annulment of the will alleging
fraud and deceit. The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside
the dismissal after the heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUES: Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled?
RULING: NO. The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or
formal validity of the will. That means that the testator was of sound and
disposing mind at the time he executed the will and was not acting under duress,
menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence
of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent
proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. After the
finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution
cannot be raised anymore. The SC also held that the decree of adjudication,
having rendered in a proceeding in rem, is binding upon the whole world.
Moreover, the dismissal of the first civil case, which is a judgment in personam,
was an adjudication on the merits. Thus, it constitutes a bar by former judgment
under the Rules of Court.
 P a g e | 62

CASE NO. 45
Digested By: BUGNAY, Jonathan
Rafael E. Maninang an Soledad L. Maninang vs. Court of
Appeals, Hon. Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. as Judge of CFI of Rizal
and Bernardo S. Aseneta
G.R. No. L-57848. June 19, 1982
FACTS:
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila
Sanitarium Hospital at age 81.
In the will the provision states that all her real properties located in Manila,
Makati, Quezon City, Albas and Legaspi City and all her personal properties shall
be inherited upon her death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family she
have lived continuously for around the last 30 years now.
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate
of the Will of the decedent with the CFI, Quezon City. On July 25, 1977,
respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole
heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the
CFI, Pasig, Rizal the case was consolidated Bernardo then filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and
void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore,
intestacy should ensue.
In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred
that it is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of
inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of
the will; and that respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the
decedent
ISSUES: Whether or not the issue of validity of testamentary provision can be
questioned in a probate proceedings.
RULING: NO. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions
of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose
is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law.
 P a g e | 63

CASE NO. 46
Digested By: DICKPUS, Lindberg
xxx vs. xxx
194 SCRA 367
FACTS:

ISSUES: Whether or not

RULING: NO
 P a g e | 64

CASE NO. 47
Digested By: PUDIN, Aracelli Epie
Jimenez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
194 SCRA 367
FACTS:
Lino Jimenez was married to Consolacion Ungson. They begot 4 children.
During the marriage, the couple acquired 5 parcels of land. After Consolacion
died, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy. They begot 7 children. Lino and
Genoveva both died without a will. Consequently, one of the children of Lino
and Genonveva whose name is Virginia filed a petition to be the administatrix
of the estate of her parents. In her petition, she enumerated all the children of
Lino both from the first and second marriage.
Leonardo Jr., a grandson of Lino Jimenez filed a motion to exclude the
name of his father and his father’s siblings in Virginia’s petition. He contended
that they should no longer be included since they are from the first marriage and
not from the second and also that they already received their inheritance
consisting of the 5 parcels of land acquired during the first marriage.
The court granted Virginia’s petition to be administratrix of the estate. In
her inventory, she included the five parcels of land. As a consequence, Leonardo
Jr. filed for the exclusion of the said 5 parcels of land for the reason that it was
already adjudicated to the children from the first marriage. The probate court
then ordered the exclusion of the 5 parcels of land. Virginia filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied and then she appealed to the Court of Appeals
but was also denied. Thus, she appealed to the Supreme Court on Certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the five parcels of land should be included in the inventory of
the estate
RULING: There was no showing that the conjugal partnership of Lino and his
first wife had not been liquidated nor a judicial or extra-judicial settlement of the
estate of Lino Jimenez was undertaken whereby such adjudication could have
been effected. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The parcels of land should be included in the estate to be administered
by Virginia.
 P a g e | 65

CASE NO. 48
Digested By: FERNANDEZ, Shelvin Echo
Roman Ozaeta vs. Maria Cuartero
G.R. No. L-5597, May 31, 1956
FACTS:
On September 2 1950, Carlos Palanca Tanguinlay died leaving a large
estate and 3 sets of heirs. In 1884 he married Cesarea Gano, with whom he begot
3 children. Cesarea died in 1907, and 1 year thereafter, lived unmarried with Rosa
Gonzales and came to have 8 children. While living with Rosa, Palanca also
sustained relation with Maria Cuartero, and by her he came to have 6 children.
Realizing in his old age and failing health that life’s end was fast approaching, he
married Rosa
Gonzales then later on made a will. Designated in the will as substitute
executor, Roman Ozoeta, on September 20, 1950, filed a petition in the CFI of
Manila asking for the probate of the will, for issuance of letters of administration
and for his appointment as special administrator pending probate. Cuartero and
her 6 children filed their opposition, alleging that the will was not executed in
accordance with law, that it was procured by fraud and undue pressure and
influence on the part of some of the beneficiaries or some other person for their
benefit, and that the decedent’s signature thereon were procured through fraud
and trickery, the same having been affixed by him without any intention of
making the document his will.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the will was obtained by undue influence and improper pressure
on the part of the beneficiaries?
RULING:
NO. The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by undue
influence or improper pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the will cannot be
sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is not enough that there was
opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have been
exercised. There must be substantial evidence that it was actually exercised.
 P a g e | 66

CASE NO. 49
Digested By: ABATEN, Wilson M.
Pascual Coso vs. Fermina Fernandez Deza, et al.

G.R. No. L-16763, December 22, 1921

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
setting aside a will on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted
over the mind of a testator by one Rosario Lopez. The will gives the tercio de libre
disposicion to an illegitimate son had by the testator with said Rosario Lopez, and
also provides for the payment to her of nineteen hundred Spanish duros by way
the reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking care of the testator in
Barcelona during the years 1909 to 1916, when he is alleged to have suffered
from a severe illness.
The evidence shows that the testator, a married man and resident of the
Philippine Islands, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez in Spain in 1898 and
that he had illicit returns with her for many years thereafter. After his return to
the Philippines she followed him, arriving in Manila in February, 1918, and
remained in close communication with him until his death in February, 1919.
There is no doubt that she exercised some influence over him and the only
question for our determination is whether this influence was of such a character
as to vitiate the will.
ISSUES: Whether or not the influence exercised by Rosario Lopez was of such
character to vitiate the will of testator.
RULING: NO.
Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to
invalidate a will; to have that effect the influence must be "undue." The rule as
to what constitutes "undue influence" has been variously stated, but the
substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the
influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind
of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make his express the will of
another, rather than his own.1awphil.net
Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in
regard to the execution of the will in question, either at time of the execution of
the will, or so near thereto as to be still operative, with the object of procuring a
will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary
dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made.
While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for
Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered and
subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and make him express the will
of another rather than his own." He was an intelligent man, a lawyer by
profession, appears to have known his own mind, and may well have been
 P a g e | 67

actuated only by a legitimate sense of duty in making provisions for the welfare
of his illegitimate son and by a proper feeling of gratitude in repaying Rosario
Lopez for the sacrifices she had made for him.
Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not
invalidate a will. No imposition or fraud has been shown in the present case.
 P a g e | 68

CASE NO. 50
Digested By: BANGILAN, Fervent Hope
Testate Estate of Catalina Dela Cruz. Andres Pascual vs. Pedro
Dela Cruz
G.R. No.L-24819, May 30, 1969
FACTS:
On January 2, 1960 Catalina Dela Cruz, 89, died, single and without any
surviving ascendants or descendants. Andres Pascual filed a petition for the
probate of her will. Pascual was named executor and heir therein. Respondents,
nieces and nephews of Catalina, opposed, alleging that Catalina was mentally
incapable of disposing her properties by will at time of execution; that such was
procured through undue influence, etc; and that her signature was procured
through fraud.
Probate court admitted the will. Respondents appealed directly to SC
(properties involved were valued at over 300k)
Respondents: the testimonies of the witnesses and the Notary Public were
inconsistent and contradictory; that the will was not signed by all the witnesses
in the presence of one another. (TC: the instrument was signed in 1954, while
the testimony was given in 1962-8 years difference; not unreasonable for witness
to forget some details. What is important is that there be unanimity and certainty
in their testimony re: the signatures of the testatrix, the witnesses, and the notary
public, and the fact that they were all present at time of signing).
ISSUES: Whether or not the inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimonies would prohibit the will from being probated?
RULING: NO.
Where a will is contested, the subscribing with are generally regarded as
the best qualified to testify on its due execution. However, it is similarly
recognized that for the testimony of such witnesses to be entitled to full credit,
it must be reasonable and unbiased, and not overcome by competent evidence,
direct or circumstantial, for it must be remembered that the law does not simply
require the presence of three instrumental witnesses; it demands that the
witnesses be credible
The Court agreed with the TC that the inconsistencies (weather condition
at the time the will was executed; the sequence of the signing by the witnesses;
and the length of time it took to complete the act) were not important details
that could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory.
Inconsistencies, by themselves, would not alter the probative value of
their testimonies on the due execution of the will
(Estate of Javellana v. Javellana) For the purpose of determining the due
execution of a will, it is not necessary that the instrumental witnesses should give
 P a g e | 69

an accurate and detailed account of the proceeding, such as recalling the order
of the signing of the document by the said witnesses. It is sufficient that they
have seen or at least were so situated at the moment that they could have seen
each other sign, had they wanted to do so.
Catalina, at the time, was suffering from rheumatism (had to wear thick
socks and soft shoes), and it would not have been improbable that she had
Pascual secure witnesses. The main detail considered by the Court is the one that
must have stuck in their minds - that they did witness the signing of the will. That
they did so attested by their signatures and those of the deceased testatrix, which
are nowhere did it impugn; nor is there any claim by appellants that the latter was
incapable of reading and understanding the will that she signed. In fact, the
evidence is that she did read it before signing. The authorities are to the effect
that friendly relations of the witnesses with the testator or the beneficiaries do
not affect the credibility of the former.
SC stated that it was not the first time it admitted probate of a will despite
inconsistencies in the testimonies, for as long as it is satisfied that the will was
executed and attested to in the manner prescribed by law.
(As to fraud) the Court noted that Pascual was not a stranger in the life of
Catalina. It was also found that he had also been named sole heir to the properties
of the sisters of Catalina. Further, respondents presented no proof to prove that
such fraud was present in this case. Their main contention lied upon the
statement by Pascual that Catalina “did not like to sign anything unless I knew
it”.
(As to the selection of the witnesses) Pascual selected Dr. Sanchez, and
not the relatives of Catalina, as it would have meant the disclosure of the terms
of her will to those interested in her succession but who were not favored by her,
thereby exposing her to unpleasant importunity and recriminations that an aged
person would naturally seek to avoid. 11. Respondents: (American jurisprudence)
assumption of undue influence if beneficiary participates in drafting and
execution of will. 12. SC: Not applicable in this case. Pascual was a lawyer, and
in the normal course of events, a lawyer would follow the instructions of the
testatrix. Further, a member of the bar in good standing may not be convicted
of unprofessional conduct or of having conspired to falsify a statement, except
upon clear proof.
 P a g e | 70

CASE NO. 51
Digested By: FLORES, Richard Francis A.
Sofia Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals and Rufina Gomez
G.R. No. L-62952, October 9, 1985
FACTS:
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last and
testament in the said will, the testator named petitioner Sofia Nepumuceno as
his sole and only executor of his estate though it is clearly stated in the will that
the testator in the will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina
Gomez and he had two legitimate children Oscar and Carmela, but he had been
estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and been living since with petitioner.
The testator devised to his forced heirs Rufina Gomez and his children his entire
estate and the free portion to the petitioner.
However, the Trial Court denied the probate of the will on the ground
that the testator admitted in his will to cohabitating with the petitioner, hence
the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
The Court of Appeals respondent court set aside the decision of the Trial
Court and declared the will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the
petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 and 1028
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when after declaring the last will and testament of the testator validity drawn, it
went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision.
RULING:
NO, the respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after
declaring the will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity
of the will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The
general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court area of inquiry is limited to
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule,
however is not absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is
not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the will. The probate of the will might become an idle ceremony
on its face of appears to be instrinsically void.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a poor substitute
marriage when the testator executed the will. The very wordings of the will
invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person whom he had been living in concubinage.
 P a g e | 71

CASE NO. 52
Digested By: ABATEN, Wilson M.
Ethel Grimm Roberts vs. Judge Tomas R. Leonidas, Branch 38,
Court of First Instance of Manila; Maxine Tate-Grimm,
Edward Miller Grimm II and Linda Grimm
G.R. No. L-55509. April 27, 1984
FACTS:
Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the
Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second
wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm
II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm
Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce.
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California.
One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal
property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate
outside the Philippines. In both wills, the second wife and two children were
favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the
will disposing of the estate situated in this country.
Upon Edward’s death, Maxine probated the 2 wills in Utah.
Simultaneously, petitioner Ethel Roberts instituted intestate proceedings in the
Philippines. Maxine was notified of such proceeding. A compromise agreement
was subsequently negotiatied between the two parties in the US.
Meanwhile, the intestate proceeding was coming to an end. A project of
partition has been approved where petitioner was named the administratrix of
the estate of the deceased. The two wills were presented but the court did not
mention it. However, Maxine instituted another probate proceeding in the sala
of respondent judge. The latter ordered that a consolidation of the intestate and
the probate proceedings shall be made in his sala where petitioner objected to
the same. Respondent judge allowed probate of the wills and annulled the
partition. Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate, or that the
proceedings be consolidated and heard in the intestate court.
ISSUES: Whether or not a testate proceeding is proper in this case.
RULING: YES. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died
with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed".
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a
person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore,
the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the
judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
 P a g e | 72

CASE NO. 53
Digested By: ABQUIREN, Illyssa Jane
Austria vs. Reyes
G.R. No. L-23079. February 27, 1970
FACTS:
In July 7, 1956, Basilia Austria vda. De Cruz filed with the CFI a petition
for probate, ante mortem of her last will and testament. The probate was
opposed by Ruben, Consuelo, Laura Austria and some other nephews and nieces
of Basilia. The opposition was dismissed and the probate was allowed. The bulk
of the estate of Basilia will be passed to Perfecto, Benita, Isagani, Alberto, and
Luz, all surnamed Cruz, who were declared by Basilia as her legally adopted
children.
In April 1959, Basilia died. Perfecto Cruz was then appointed executor in
accordance with the last will and testament. In November of the same year,
petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they are the
nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the 5 respondents were not adopted by Basilia
in accordance with law. Hence, they are strangers and cannot succeed Basilia.
The court allowed petitioner’s intervention. Both sides debated on the
matter of authenticity of several adoption papers presented by respondents.
Petitioners contend that Basilia was deceived into believing that she was
legally bound to bequeath ½ of her entire estate to the respondents, that if Basilia
had known that the adoption is spurious, that there would have been no
institution of heirs.
ISSUES: Whether or not the institution of heirs is valid.
RULING:
YES. The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the
legality of the tie which the respondent claim to have with the decedent. The
lower court had assumed that the validity or invalidity of the adoption is not
material nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if the
adoption were spurious, the respondents will nevertheless succeed not as
compulsory heirs but as testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia’s will. Since
petitioners are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can
be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition.
General rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary
institution does not affect the validity of the institution. Before the institution of
heirs may be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites must concur: first, the cause must be stated in the will; second, the
cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the
will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the
falsity of the cause.
 P a g e | 73

The requisites were not met. The decedent’s will, which alone should
provide the answer, is mute that it does not state in a specific and unequivocal
manner the cause for such institution. Also, her disposition of the free portion
of her estate largely favored the respondents. Testacy is favored and doubts are
resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of
the testator to dispose of practically her whole estate.
 P a g e | 74

CASE NO. 54

Digested By: AMINDALAN, Alfred

Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu
19 SCRA 85
FACTS:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto
died he left his share in a will to Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and
a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto
and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his
widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project of
partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed and the shares delivered.
Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she
executed two wills, in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed
Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her
properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was allowed and the
first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of
the children of Salud Barretto, the LC held that Salud was not the daughter of
the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was
appealed to the SC, which affirmed the same.
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a
legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of
the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his
widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion,
thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of
ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other
properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and
not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly
attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of
the court based thereon as well.

ISSUES: Whether or not the the partition from which Salud acquired the
fishpond is void ab initio and Salud did not acquire valid title to it.

RULING:
NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano
Barretto’s last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the
partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was
believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void. The
legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of
heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the
fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude
her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto
was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose.
 P a g e | 75

While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros,
Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father’s will a share smaller
than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here
no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir.
 P a g e | 76

CASE NO. 55
Digested By: BAGUIWEN, Feric B.
Remedios Nuguid vs. Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid
G.R. No. L-23445. June 23, 1966
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid
and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo,
Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on
November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. On June 25, 1963, Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother
of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her
will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios
Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory
heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and
that in consequence the institution is void.
ISSUES: Whether or not the omission of parents of the deceased in the will
constitute preterition.
RULING:
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now
oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits
both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were
deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear
case of preterition.
Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion
de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the
mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-sentence will here
institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific
legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that
the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. The word annul
employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal
institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the
will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir — without any
other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written.
 P a g e | 77

CASE NO. 56
Digested By: BALNEG, Jessalaine Karen T.
City of Baguio vs. Fortunato De Leon
G.R. No. L-24756. October 31, 1968; 25 SCRA 936
FACTS:
Fortunato de Leon appealed to the SC questioning the validity of an
ordinance enacted by the Baguio City Council to collect taxes from real estate
dealers. The source of council’s power to create such ordinance is the amending
act RA 329 of the Baguio Charter empowering the city to fix the license fee and
regulate business, trades and occupations as may be established or practiced in
the City.
He was held liable as a real estate dealer with a property worth more than
10,000.00 Pesos but not in excess of 50,000.00 Pesos. He was obligated to pay a
50 Pesos annual fee. He was further engaged in the rental of his property in
Baguio, deriving income therefrom during the period 1958-1962.
A complaint was thereafter filed by the City Attorney of Baguio for his
failure to pay ,300Pesos as license fee covering the period mentioned.
ISSUES: Whether or not RA329 justifies the enactment of such ordinance.
RULING:
YES. The challenged ordinance cannot be considered ultra vires as there
is more than ample statutory authority for the enactment thereof. Nonetheless,
its validity on constitutional grounds is challenged because of the allegation that
it imposed double taxation, which is repugnant to the due process clause, and
that it violated the requirement of uniformity. t any rate, it has been expressly
affirmed by us that such an “argument against double taxation may not be
invoked where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the
city ..., it being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in
the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same
occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions
thereof.”
 P a g e | 78

CASE NO. 57
Digested By: BANGILAN, Fervent Hope
Balanay vs. Martinez
G.R. No. L-39247. June 27, 1975
FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973
in Davao City at the age of 67. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay,
Sr., and 6 legitimate children: Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B.
Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court for the probate of his mother's notarial
will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English where Leodegaria Julian
declared (a) she was the owner of the "southern half of 9 conjugal lots (b) she
was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land which she inherited from her father
(c) it was her desire that her properties should NOT be divided among her heirs
during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of
the fruits of her properties (d) after her husband's death (age of 82 in 1973) her
paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands should be divided and distributed in
the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the
conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her.
Although initially opposing, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed a Conformation of Division
and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights manifesting that out of respect for his
wife's will he waived and renounced his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of
their 6 children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he
and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would
be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit
and conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void for illegally claiming the
conjugal lands
David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz B.
Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon filed a motion for leave
of court to withdraw probate of the will and requesting authority to proceed by
intestate estate proceeding also referring to the provisions relating to the conjugal
assets as compromising the future legitimes
Lower Court: Will was void and converted to intestate proceedings
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, asked for the
reconsideration of the lower court's order on the ground that Atty. Montaña had
NO authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will
Lower Court on motion for reconsideration: Denied and clarified that it declared
the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions
and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.
 P a g e | 79

ISSUES: Whether or not the will should be void and interstate proceeding
should follow
RULING: NO.
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-
half share of the conjugal partnership but insofar as it partakes of a donation, it
should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil
Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his
support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.
The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect
if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution
and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In
the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children
and the surviving spouse.
 P a g e | 80

CASE NO. 58
Digested By: BASCOS, Jane Lennie T.
Cayetano vs. Leonidas
G.R. No. L-54919. May 30, 1984
FACTS:
On January 31, 1997 Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father,
Hermogenes and her three sisters as surviving heirs. As Hermogenes was the
only compulsory heir, he executed an affidavit of Adjudication. He adjudicated
himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased. Nenita Paguia filed a
petition for reprobate the will which was allegedly executed in the US and for the
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the testatrix. Nenita alleged that
the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a
permanent resident of Pennsylvania USA and that the testatrix died in Manila
while temporarily residing with her sister. Also she alleged that the will was made
according to the laws of Pennsylvania. The petitioner filed an opposition alleging
that the will in question is a forgery and that the intrinsic provisions of the will
are null and void. Meanwhile, the petitioner died and left a will appointing
Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano filed a motion
to substitute herself as petitioner which was granted by the court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner was preterited
RULING:
NO. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the
petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate
outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion
was, at the time of her death an American Citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania USA. Applying article 16(2) of the Civil Code, the law which
governs Adoracion’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, which is the national law of
the decedent. Although the partied admits that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may have been given away by the
testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not
apply because it would contrary to public policy and would run counter to the
specific provisions of Philippine Law. It is a settled rule that as regards the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided by Article 16(2) and
Article 1039 of the Civil Code, the national of the decedent must apply.
 P a g e | 81

CASE NO. 59
Digested By: BAWAAN, Rae Ann B.
Balanay vs. Balanay
G.R. No. L-39247. June 27, 1975
FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12,
1973 in Davao City at the age of 67. She was survived by her husband, Felix
Balanay, Sr., and 6 legitimate children: Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio,
Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B.
Pabaonon
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court for the probate of his mother's
notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English where
Leodegaria Julian declared (a) she was the owner of the "southern half of 9
conjugal lots (b) she was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land which she
inherited from her father (c) it was her desire that her properties should NOT be
divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes
should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (d) after her husband's death
(age of 82 in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands should be
divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She
devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by
her.Although initially opposing, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed a Conformation of
Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights manifesting that out of respect
for his wife's will he waived and renounced his hereditary rights in her estate in
favor of their 6 children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement,
which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal
properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.Avelina B.
Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void for illegally claiming the conjugal
lands
David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Balanay, Jr.,
Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon filed a motion
for leave of court to withdraw probate of the will and requesting authority to
proceed by intestate estate proceeding also referring to the provisions relating to
the conjugal assets as compromising the future legitimes
Lower Court: Will was void and converted to intestate proceedings
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, asked for
the reconsideration of the lower court's order on the ground that Atty. Montaña
had NO authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will
Lower Court on motion for reconsideration: Denied and clarified that it
declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its
provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will should be void and interstate proceeding should follow.
 P a g e | 82

RULING:
NO. Illegal declaration does NOT nullify the entire will and may be
disregarded.
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-
half share of the conjugal partnership but insofar as it partakes of a donation, it
should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil
Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his
support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.
The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect
if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution
and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In
the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children
and the surviving spouse.
The preterition of surviving spouse did not produce intestacy. Moreover,
he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.
 P a g e | 83

CASE NO. 60
Digested By: BELINO, Elma
Ramirez vs. Ramirez

G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982; 111 SCRA 704

Ponente: Abad Santos, J.
FACTS:
Jose Ramirez, a Filipino, died in Spain, with only his widow, Marcelle Ramirez,
French, as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the CFI. In the
project partition, the property was divided into two parts: one to the widow in
satisfaction of her legitime; the other free portion to his grandnephews, Jorge
and Roberto Ramirez. Furthermore, 1/3 of the usufruct of the free portion was
given to the widow and the 2/3 to Wanda Wrobleski, an Austrian.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition. One of their
contentions is that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid
because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within
the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code.
ISSUES: Whether or not the substitution is valid.
RULING: The vulgar substitution is valid. Dying before the testator is not the
only case where a vulgar substitution can be made for it also includes refusal or
incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants
are correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are
not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code
validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the
usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In
fact, the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a
fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked
owners."
 P a g e | 84

CASE NO. 61
Digested By: Benan, Rhobee Jyn S.
Paz Garcia Vda. De Mapa, Segundo Mapa, Priscilla M.
Monzon, Teresa Mapa, Ignacio Salazar and Jose Salazar vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. L- 38972, September 28, 1987
Ponente: Fernan, J.
FACTS: Petitioners Paz Garcia Vda. de Mapa, et al. claimed that the deceased
Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo, in her last will and testament dated June 2,
1951 and admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No. 46015, instituted
Ludovico Hidrosollo as universal heir to the residue of her estate with the
obligation as trustee to hold the same in trust for petitioners herein who are
nephews and nieces of the deceased Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo and for
respondents Luis, Teodoro, Victorina, Corazon, Violets, *** Rosario and
Magdalena, all surnamed Hidrosollo, who are nephews and nieces of Ludovico
Hidrosollo; that Ludovico, however, died without fulfilling the obligation so that
the estate of Concepcion formed part of the estate of Ludovico. They prayed in
the alternative that judgment be rendered either a) declaring a trust to have been
created in their favor and their co-beneficiaries over the residue of the estate of
Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo and ordering therein defendants Luis and
Teodoro Hidrosollo as administrators of the estate of Ludovico Hidrosollo, to
deliver to them 6/13 of the said properties; or b) declaring the institution of
Ludovico Hidrosollo as universal heir with a provision for fideicommissary
substitution in their favor and their co- beneficiaries as null and void, declaring
the residue of the estate of Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo to have been subject
to intestate succession, declaring them to be the sole heirs to said residue and
ordering therein defendants Luis and Teodoro Hidrosollo to turn over to them
the said properties.
ISSUES: Whether or not a fideicomissary substitution was created in the
subject will
RULING: None, there is no fideicommissary substitution because the testatrix
did not impose upon her spouse the absolute obligation to deliver the property
to said petitioners. When the testatrix provided in her will that her husband
dispose of in favor of the petitioners his remaining properties it only shows that
he was not absolutely obligated to preserve and transmit to the petitioners the
properties by him acquired under the will of his deceased wife. If the testatrix
intended to entrust the property to her husband with the obligation to preserve
and to transmit the remaining properties to the petitioners, she could have said
so in an express manner. However, even assuming that Clause 9 could be
interpreted to be a fideicommissary substitution, such substitution cannot be
given effect in the face of an opposition and in view of Art, 863 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, requiring that substitution must not go beyond one degree
from the heir originally instituted. It will be noticed that the second heirs
instituted are merely "sobrinos" of the fiduciary or first heir (surviving spouse).
 P a g e | 85

CASE NO. 62
Digested By: BILOG, Armando
Crisologo vs. Court of Appeals
4 SCRA 491 (1962)
FACTS:
Leona Singson died with a will wherein she devised one-half of a big parcel of
land to her three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, and the other one-
half to a grandniece, Consolacion Florentino, but subject to the condition that
upon Consolacion’s death, whether before or after that of the testatrix, said one-
half of the property devised to her shall be delivered to Evaristo, Manuel and
Dinisio, or their heirs should anyone of them die before Leona and Consolacion.
After the will was admitted to probate, Consolacion demanded for the partition
of the property. Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, however, contended that since
she is only a usufructuary she cannot demand for the partition of the property.
ISSUES: Whether or not the contention is tenable
RULING:
This contention is untenable. Art. 785 (now Art. 865) of the Civil Code
provides that a fideicommissary substitution shall have no effect unless it is made
expressly either by giving it such name or by imposing upon the first heir the
absolute obligation to deliver the inheritance to the second heir. The
testamentary clause under consideration does not call the institution a
fedeicommissary substitution nor does it contain a clear statement that
Consolacion enjoys only a usufructuary right the naked ownership being vested
in the brothers of the testatrix. The will therefore establishes a simple or common
substitution, the necessary result of which is that, upon the death of the testatrix,
Consolacion became the owner of an undivided half of the property. She can,
therefore, demand for partition.
 P a g e | 86

CASE NO. 63
Digested By: BONDAD, Ramil A.
Emeterio A. Rodriguez and Jose Ayala vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals and Petra Rodriguez, Antonia Rodriguez and Rosa
Rodriguez
G.R. No. L- 28734, March 28, 1969; 27 SCRA 546
Ponente: Fernando, J.
FACTS:
Doña Margarita Rodriguez left a last will and testament leaving no
compulsory heirs or forced heirs and, consequently was free to dispose of her
properties even to strangers at will as provided in her will. The testatrix made
letters of trusteeship to petitioners, who were the executors under the will. The
said last will and testament was legalized by virtue of the resolution or order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila without the appellant’s opposition in, hence
the extrinsic validity of the will was substantially not in question. The executor
also presented a project of partition and the same was approved by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, again without the opposition of the appellants. Hence,
the intrinsic validity of the will could never be again questioned.
the trust created by the testatrix was then objected to by private
respondents, who claimed to be first cousins of the deceased. Such an objection
was overruled by the lower court which granted letters of trusteeship to
petitioners, who were the executors under the will. Such an order of the lower
court was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, which, in the original
decision affirmed the action taken by the Court of First Instance.
The motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents resulted in a
resolution which set aside its previous decision and modified the judgment
appealed from insofar as the validity of the provision of clause 10 of the will
creating the trusteeship was concerned. The disputed clause reads thus:
"Ang lahat ng pag-aaring nasasabi Clausulang ito (hindi kasama ang
‘generator’ at automobile) hindi maisasanla o maipagbibili kailan man,
maliban sa pag-aaring nasa Quezon Boulevard, Maynila, na maaring isanla
kung walang pondo sa gagamitin sa ipagpapaigi or ipagpapagawa ng
panibago at alinsunod sa kaayusang hinihingi ng panahon"
The Court of Appeals held that the above "perpetual prohibition to
alienate" the property mentioned, constitutes a clear violation of Article 867 and
Article 870 of the Civil Code. The trust in question is then a nullity for being in
violation of the aforestated rules. There being then no institution of heirs as
regards the properties covered by the trust, the Court of Appeals held that "there
should be intestate succession concerning the same, with the nearest relative of
the deceased entitled to inherit the properties in accordance with the law on
intestacy.
 P a g e | 87

ISSUES: Whether or not the trust in question should be annulled as being in

violation of the rules against perpetuities and the limitation on the prohibition
for the alienation of the property left by the deceased.
RULING: NO. It does not admit of doubt that in the disputed clause
the testatrix did make clear her purpose not to mortgage or to sell forevermore
(kailan man) certain properties left by her. There would seem then some
justification for the Court of Appeals in the challenged resolution to deny force
and effect to such a wish considering that "a perpetual prohibition to alienate" is
by the Civil Code forbidden. The more controlling provision, however, as
already made mention of is supplied by Article 870. Its terms are clear: "The
dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more
than twenty years are void.
The Codal provision does not need any interpretation. It speaks
categorically. What was declared as void is the testamentary disposition
prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year period. In the interim, such a
provision does not suffer from the vice of invalidity. It cannot be stricken down.
The wishes of the testatrix constitute the law. Her will must be given effect. This
is so even if there could be an element of uncertainty insofar as the ascertainment
thereof is concerned. In the language of the Civil Code provision, “If a
testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred.”
Respect for the will of a testator as expressed in his last testamentary
disposition, constitutes the principal basis of the rules which the law prescribes
for the correct interpretation of all of the clauses of the will; the words and
provisions therein written must be plainly construed in order to avoid a violation
of his intentions and real purpose. The will of the testator clearly and explicitly
stated must be respected and complied with as an inviolable law among the
parties in interest.
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than those petitioners could not
challenge the provision in question. It had no right to vindicate. Such a right may
never arise. The twenty-year period is still with us. What would transpire
thereafter is still locked up in the inscrutable future, beyond the power of mere
mortals to foretell. At any rate, We cannot anticipate. Nor should We. We do not
possess the power either of conferring a cause of action to a party when, under
the circumstances disclosed, it had none.
 P a g e | 88

CASE NO. 64
Digested By: BUGNAY, Jonathan
Juan Castro vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. L- 50974-75, May 31, 1989
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro are the brother and sister of
the late Eustaquio Castro while respondent Benita Castro Naval is only child of
Eustaquio Castro.
Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro v. Benita Castro, the plaintiffs filed an
action for partition of properties against the defendant alleging, among other
things, that they are the forced heirs of Pedro Castro who died in Mayantoc,
Tarlac on May 27, 1923. With leave of Court, plaintiffs filed their amended
complaints whereby they converted the original action for partition into an action
for quieting of title. Defendant's husband Cipriano Naval was forthwith
impleaded as party-defendant.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged
and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.
RULING: YES, private respondent is an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.
The Supreme Court applied the provision of the Family Code which states
that it shall have retroactive effect since the respondents have no clear vested
rights in their favor.
Under the Code's Title VI on Paternity and Filiation, there are only two
classes of children legitimate and illegitimate. Article 175 provides that
"Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children."
Articles 172 and 173 on establishing the filiation of legitimate children:
Benita lived with her father and enjoyed the love and care that a parent
bestows on an only child. The private respondents, themselves, admitted in their
complaint in Civil Case, that Benita is a forced heir of Eustaquio Castro.
Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family
is of no special relevance here because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen
were the only immediate family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate children
born of a legitimate wife contesting the inheritance of Benita.
Third, it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and
registered.
Fourth, it was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to
Cipriano Naval.
 P a g e | 89

Fifth, the certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during
the wake for Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of recognition under the
Civil Code, but they add to the equities of this case favoring the petitioner.
Thus, there can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.
In defending her status in this case is similar to an "action to claim legitimacy"
brought during her lifetime.
 P a g e | 90

CASE NO. 65
Digested By: CAGAN, Jenalyn A.
Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Emilie
Dayrit Cuyugan
G.R. No. 95229, June 9, 1992
FACTS:
The case started when one Emilie Cuyugan in her capacity as mother and
legal guardian of her minor son Chad Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint
denominated as Claim for Inheritance, against Corito Ocampo Tayag as the
administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. In her complaint
she alleged that:
1. She is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son Chad, by the
father of the defendant the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo who died
intestate;
2. She and Atty. Ricardo had an illicit amorous relationship with each
other and as a consequence thereof they begot a son Chad.
3. Chad had been showered with exceptional attention, fervent love and
care by his putative father being his only son.
4. The minor, Chad Cuyugan, although illegitimate is entitled to a share
in the intestate estate left by his deceased father as one of the surviving
heirs.
The plaintiff prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the defendant
to render an inventory and accounting of all the real and personal properties left
by Atty. Ricardo.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the g grounds that the action
is premature and the complaint states no cause of action, there is improper
joinder of causes of action, and that Art. 175 of the Family code applies to the
case, thus the action has already prescribed.
ISSUES: Whether or not Chad has a right to claim over his share in the intestate
estate of his deceased father.
RULING: Although petitioners contends that the complaint filed by the herein
private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate
child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations
therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition and the other
to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint.
The right of action of action of the minor child has been vested by the
filing og the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code. The fact of filing of the petition already vested
in the petitioner her right to file it and have the same proceed to final adjudication
in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. It is a well settled rule
that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgement, but who has not
 P a g e | 91

been legally acknowledged may maintain partition proceedings for the division
of the inheritance against his coheirs; and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his natural father. In these cases,
it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgement. The reason is that in partition suits and distribution
proceedings the other person who might take by inheritance are before the court,
and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
 P a g e | 92

CASE NO. 66
Digested By: CATBAGAN, Julie Ann O.
Baritua vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 82233, March 22, 1990
FACTS:
In 1979 Bienvenido Nacario was driving his tricycle in Camarines Sur and
collided with a bus which caused his death and his passenger, damaging the
tricycle he was driving. Subsequently, as a consequence of extra-judicial
settlement his estranged wife received P18,500 and she executed a Release Claim,
discharging all actions, claims and demands arising from the accident.
After a year and 10 months from the accident the parents of Bienvenido
Nacario filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners. The parents alleged
that during the extra-judicial settlement petitioners promised to pay for funeral
expenses and for the damage of tricycle which their son loaned to them.
Trial court decided in favour of the petitioner. Parents then appealed to
CA which reversed the decision. Hence this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not Alicia Nacario (wife) and the one who received the
payment are entitled to it.
RULING: YES. Certainly there can be no question that Alicia although
estranged and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred
to in law as persons authorized to receive payment.
Under ART.887 of Civil Code the compulsory heirs are the ff:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in ART. 287.
Thus, parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without
legitimate descendant. Therefore, parents are not the successors-in-interest
because the wife and legitimate child are still alive.
 P a g e | 93

CASE NO. 67
Digested By: CUPATAN, Eugene Francis A.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard
Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their
residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada,
USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A
suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business
in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and
prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and
he be declared as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUES: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino
citizen
RULING:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He
is estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations
to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated
against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.
 P a g e | 94

CASE NO. 68
Digested By: DAVIS, Angelyn
Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales, Irenea C. Rosales vs.
Fortunato Rosales, Magna Rosales Acebes, Macikequerox
Rosales and Antonio Rosales
G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987
FACTS: On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City,
died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their
two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child,
Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales,
and his widow Irenea C. Rosales. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated
gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). On July 10 1971,
Magna instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Petra. In the
course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16,
1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and
prescribing their respective share of the estate —Fortunata T. Rosales (husband),
1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio
Rosales son, 1/4. Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her
son, Macikequerox Rosales.
ISSUES: Whether or not a widow an intestate of her mother-in-law?
RULING: NO. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely,
those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. Indeed, the surviving
spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. It
is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share
of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the
Code. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no by
blood with her mother-in-law. Thus surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of
his or her parent-in-law.
 P a g e | 95

CASE NO. 69
Digested By: DELOS REYES, Carmelo E.
Dionisia, et al. vs. Melania Baldovino, et al.
G.R. No. L-11960, December 27, 1958
FACTS: Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime.With his
first wife, Gervacia Landig, he had one child named manuel Padura, and his
second, Benita Garing, he had two children named Fortunato Padura and
Candelaria Padura.
Agustin Padura died leaving a last will and testament duly probated in special
Proceedings of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, wherein he bequeathed
his properties among his children Manuel, Fortunato, Candelaria and his
surviving spouse Benita Garing.
Fortunato Padura died unmarried without having executed a will, and not having
any issue, his parcels of land were inherited exclusively by her mother Benita
Garing.
Benita applied for and later was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name,
but subject to condition that the properties were reservable in favor of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, in
accordance with the applicable provision of law.
In 1934 Candelaria Padura died leaving as her only heirs, her four legitimate
children the appellants herein, Melania, Cristeta, Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed
Baldovino. Six years later, in 1940, Manuel Padura also died, surviving him are
his legitimate children, Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Gornelio, Francisco, Juana, and
Severino, all surnamed Padura, the appellees herein.
Upon the death of Benita Garing (reservista), appellants and appellees took
possession of the reservable properties. In a resolution of the CFI the legitimate
children of the deceased Manuel Padura and Candelaria Baldovino were declared
to be the rightful reserves and as such entitled to the reservable properties.
The instant petition filed by appellants Baldovino seeks to have these properties
partitioned, such that one-half of the same be adjudicated to them, and the other
half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherit by right of
representation from their respective parents, the original reserves. The appellees
filed their opposition, maintaining that they should all have an equal share.
The lower court rendered judgment declaring all the reserves “co-owners, pro-
indiviso, equal shares of the parcels of land” subject matter of the suit.
ISSUES: Whether or not, in a case of reserve troncal, where the only reserves
surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the
descendant, but some are nephews of the half-blood and the others are nephews
of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among them
equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as
that of the nephews of the half-blood?
 P a g e | 96

RULING:
The reserve troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return
of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from
which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the
relatives of the inheriting ascendant.
The code Provides:
Art. 891 – The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another scendant, or
a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property came.
Art. 1006 –Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together
with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share
double that of the latter.
Wherefore, the appealed order is reserved and set aside and the
reservatarios who are nephews of the whole blood are decalred entitled to a share
twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood.
 P a g e | 97

CASE NO. 70
Digested By: DICKPUS, Lindberg
xxx vs. xxx
G.R. No. L-19707, August 17, 1967; 20 SCRA 1056
FACTS:
Petitioner
ISSUES: Whether or not
RULING:
YES.
 P a g e | 98

CASE NO. 71
Digested By: DOMIGAN, Chelsea
Sienes vs. Esparcia
G.R. No. L-12957, March 24, 1961
FACTS:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife,
Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and
Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named
Francisco. OCT No. 10275 covering Lot 3368, his inheritance, was issued in the
name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother
administered the property.
When Francisco died single and without any descendant, his mother
Andrea, as his sole heir, executed an EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND
SALE whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of
P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants.
When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her
husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of OOCT No. 10275 — which was in their
possession — the latter refused.
Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of
Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on January
1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes.
ISSUES: Whether or not the sale made by the reservista Andrea was void there
being no right to dispose the same.
RULING:
NO. The Court held that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to
the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a
life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but
subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee
being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death
of the reservista.
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore,
subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by
virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any
person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea
Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable
that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no
legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in
exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
 P a g e | 99

On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters
Paulina and CiprianaYaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law
in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate
and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall
transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the
person obliged to reserve. In the present case, CiprianaYaeso, one of the
reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve,
died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property
upon Andrea’s death.
 P a g e | 100

CASE NO. 72
Digested By: ELKE, Samantha
Ricardo Lacerna, et al. vs. Agatona Paurillo Vda. De Corcino,
and Jacoba Marbebe

G.R. No. L-14603, April 29, 1961

FACTS:
Catalino, Marcelo, Agatona and Bonifacia Lacerna are brothers and
sisters. Bonifacia Lacerna was married to Valentin Marbebe, and had a son
named Juan. Upon her death, the lands she owns passed by succession to Juan.
Juan then according to records, died intestate in 1943. Defendant Agatona, was
the sister of Bonifacia Lacerna, and had in her possession the lands inherited by
Juan. The plaintiffs, who are cousins of Juan, instituted an action against Agatona
since according to them, they are the sole heirs of Juan.
Jacoba Marbebe filed an answer in intervention alleging that she is a half
sister of Juan Marbebe who died intestate, leaving neither ascendants nor
descendants, and that, as his half sister, she is entitled, by succession, to the
properties in dispute. According to her, in the order of intestate succession,
brothers and sisters exclude all other collateral relatives.
Plaintiffs however contend that, in reserva troncal, properties in dispute
should pass to the heirs of the deceased within the third degree, who belong to
the line from which said properties came. Since the property came from the
Juan’s mother, then Jacoba is excluded, and the cousins are to inherit.
ISSUES: Who shall inherit?
RULING:
Jacoba shall inherit. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ allegations, there is NO
RESERVA TRONCAL in this case. This article applies only to properties
inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by an ascendant from a
descendant, and this is not the case before us, for the lands in dispute were
inherited by a descendant, Juan Marbebe, from an ascendant, his mother,
Bonifacia Lacerna. A sister, even if only a half-sister, in the absence of other
sisters or brothers, or of children of brothers or sisters, excludes all other
collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter belong to the line from
which the property of the deceased came.
 P a g e | 101

CASE NO. 73
Digested By: ESDIO, Patrick Allan
Celedonia Solivio vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990
FACTS:
On October 11, 1959, Esteban Javellana, Jr.’s mother Salustia died leaving
all her property, including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, to him. Esteban
Jr,” died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews
or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner
CeledoniaSolivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, SalustiaSolivio; and (2)
the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of
his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr. Pursuant to an agreement
between Concordia and Celedonia, the latter would take care of the proceedings
leading to the formation of the foundation. Celedonia in good faith and upon
the advice of her counsel, filed for a Special Proceeding for her appointment as
special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr., praying that letters
of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased;
and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting,
the estate be adjudicated to her.Concordia filed a civil case in the RTC of Iloilo
for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. Celedonia averred
that the estate of Esteban Jr. was subject to reservatroncal and thus it should
redound to her as a relative within the 3rd degree on his mother side.
ISSUES: Whether or not the estate of the deceased was subject to reservatroncal
and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his
mother’s side.
RULING:
NO. There is no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the estate of
the deceased was subject to reservatroncal, and that it pertains to her as his only
relative within the third degree on his mother’s side. The reservatroncal
provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as
he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who
are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came.
The persons involved in reservatroncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the
ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from
his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees
(reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted
 P a g e | 102

from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from

which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title
and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by
operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not
reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of
his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question.
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his
aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his
mother’s side. The reservatroncal applies to properties inherited by
an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a
brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from
his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
 P a g e | 103

CASE NO. 74
Digested By: ESNARA, Carlito
Chua vs. CFI of Negros Occidental
G.R. No. L- 29901, August 31, 1977
FACTS:
Jose Frias Chua sired three children: Ignacio, Manuel, and Lorenzo, with
his marriage with Patricia S. Militar. When Patricia died, Jose married
Consolacion de la Torre and they had one son, Juanito Frias Chua. Jose Chua
died intestate.
In intestate proceeding, the lower court issued an order adjucating the
estate of Jose, Lot No. 399 equally in favor of second wife Consolacion (1/2)
and son Juanito (1/2). After sometime, Juanito died intestate without any issue
and his mother Consolacion succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399.
Consolacion later died intestate leaving no direct heirs either descending or
ascending except her brothers and sisters.
The heirs of Jose Frias Chua in the first marriage filed a complaint in the
CFI of Negros Occidental praying that the one-half (1/2) portion that formerly
belonged to Juanito but which passed to his mother upon his death be declared
a reservable property by virtue of reserva troncal doctrine under Article 981 of
the Civil Code.
ISSUES: Whether or not the subject property falls under the doctrine of reserva
troncal.
RULING: YES. The requisites of reserva troncal under Article 981 of the Civil
Code were met. The property was gratuitously acquired by Juanito, a descendant,
from his father Jose, his ascendant. Juanito died without any issue. His share was
inherited by his mother Consolacion, his ascendant, by operation of law. Juanito
had remaining relatives within the third degree, his half-brother, a nephew and
niece, the same line where the property came.
DECISION: One-half (1/2) of the property shall remain in the name of
Consolacion while the other half, formerly belonging to Juanito, will be reverted
back to the heirs of Jose Frias Chua on his first marriage.
 P a g e | 104

CASE NO. 75
Digested By: EVANGELISTA III, Pablo H.
Encarnacion Florentino, et al. vs. Mercedes Florentino, et al.
G.R. No. L-14856, November 15, 1919
Ponente: Torres, J.
FACTS:
In 1890, Apolonio II died leaving a notarial will. He was survived by his
ten children and his widow as heirs. Apolonio III received in the partition of the
subject property. When Apolonio III died, the said property were inherited by
his mother Severina, who latter died, leaving a will instituting her only daughter
as her universal heiress. Herein appellants’ demands from Mercedes to deliver
their corresponding share in the reservable property but Mercedes refused. CFI
dismissed the complaint of specific performance.
ISSUES: Whether or not the property inherited by Severina is a reservable
property
RULING: REVERSED. Even if Severina left in her will said property together
with her own property to her only daughter, nevertheless, this property had not
lost their reservable nature in as much as it originated from the common ancestor
of herein appellants. The property was inherited by the son and was transmitted
by operation of law to his mother. Any ascendant, who inherits from his
descendant any property while there is living within the 3rd degree relative of the
latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property
received. But if afterwards, all of such relative die, the said property become free
property by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the
ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his legal succession. There are
seven reservatoris who are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of
Apolonio III:
1. 3 children of the 1 St marriage;
2. 3 children who are represented by their own children (nephews/
nieces);
3. Mercedes All of the appellants is the relatives of the posthumous
son within the third degree. Hence, they are entitled as reservatarios to
the property which came from the common ancestors.
 P a g e | 105

CASE NO. 76
Digested By: FERNANDEZ, Shelvin Echo
Beatriz Gonzales vs. CFI of Manila
G.R. No. L-34395, May 19, 1981
Ponente: Aquino, J.
FACTS:
Benito Legarda y dela Paz (Benito II), son of Benito Legarda y Tuazon
(Benito I), died and was survived by his widow, Filomena and their 7 children.
The real properties left by his deceased father, Benito I, were partitioned in 3
equal parts by Benito II’s sisters and his heirs pro-indiviso. One of his daughters,
Filomena, died without issue and her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena vda
de Legarda
Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties
she inherited from her daughter as a result of which she succeeded her deceased
owner as co-owner of the properties held pro-indiviso by her other 6 children.
Later, Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten documents disposing of the
properties which she inherited from her daughter in favor of her 16
grandchildren (the children of her sons). Eventually, Mrs. Legarda and her 6
surviving children partitioned the co-owned property
Mrs. Legarda died and in the testate proceeding of her estate, Beatriz
Gonzales, one of her daughters, filed a motion to exclude in the inventory of the
properties inherited from Filomena, the deceased daughter, on the ground that
said properties were reservable and should be inherited by Filomena’s 3 sisters
and 3 brothers, not by the 16 grandchildren of Mrs. Legarda, or Filomena’s
nephews and nieces. She also filed an action securing a declaration that the
properties are reservable which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her
holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her 6 chidlren
It is contended here than the properties in question are not reservable
properties because only relatives within the third paternal line have survived and
that when Mrs. Legarda willed the properties to her grandchildren, who are third
degree relatives of Filomena and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for
the reserva troncal has been satisfied: “to prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that should otherwise have
remained therein.”
ISSUES: Whether or not the properties could be conveyed by will to the 16
grandchildren (reservees within the third degree) to the exclusion of the 6
children (reservees within the second degree)

RULING: NO. Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her
16 grandchildren the reservable properties she inherited from her daughter
because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservoir
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as
the reservees survived the reservoir.
 P a g e | 106

Art 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all
the nearest within the third degree from prepositus who in this case are the 6
children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom to the
reservable properties should be given and deprive the other reservees of their
shares therein. To allow the reservoir to make a testamentary disposition of the
reservable properties in favor the reservees in the third degree and, consequently,
to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of Art
891, this cannot be allowed.
Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of the properties in question in her will even if
the disposition is in favor of relatives within the third degree from Filomena. The
said properties, by operation of Art 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda’s 6 children
as reservees within the second degree from Filomena. Reservees do not inherit
from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs
mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor.
The reservation could be extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the
time of Mrs. Legarda’s death. Since at the time of her death, there were reservees
belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose
their reservable character. The disposition of the properties should be made in
accordance with Art 891 and in accordance with the reservor’s holographic will.
 P a g e | 107

CASE NO. 77
Digested By: FIDER, Cyrus Dominic B.

Francisca Tioco De Papa, et al., vs. Dalisay Tongko Camacho

G.R. No. L-28032, September 24, 1986
FACTS:
Appellees and appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho have as a common
ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana
Tioco), fatherof appellees and great grandfather of defendant. During her
lifetime, Romana gratuitously donated four parcels of land to her niece Toribia
Tioco (legitimate sister of appellees). When Toribia died, she was survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children Faustino and
Trinidad (mother of Dalisay). The 4 parcels of land were left as inheritance of
Toribia‟s two children in equal pro-indiviso shares. They too inherited 3 parcels
of land which was supposed to be the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco from
her father Balbino. However, when Faustino died intestate, single and without
issue, the ½ pro-indiviso share in the 7 parcels of land was left to
his father Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said
property subject to a reserve troncal. Subsequently, Trinidad died intestate and
her rights and interests in the parcels of land were inherited by her only legitimate
childe, appellant Dalisay. Eustacio thereafter died intestated, survived by his only
legitimate defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho.
The lower Court declared that the appellees as well as appellant Dalisay
were entitled as reservatarios to ½ of the seven parcels of land in dispute,
in equal proportions.
ISSUES: Whether or not all relatives of the prepositus (Faustino) within the
third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable
property upon the death of the reservista.
RULING: NO. Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the
rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any
right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the
prepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-
appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter.
As held in the case of Abellana v. Ferraris, under the Article 1009, the absence of
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the
other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. Hence, a
decedent’s uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews
and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed,
similar to the case at hand.
 P a g e | 108

CASE NO. 78
Digested By: FLORES, Richard Francis A.
Prima G. Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup vs. Francisca Salak De Paz
and Ernesto Bautista
G.R. No. 104037, May 29, 1992; 209 SCRA 446
Ponente: Bengzon, J.P., J.
FACTS:
Severino Salak and Petra Garcia were the owners of Lot No. 221 of the
Cadastral Survey of Tarlac. On August 16, 1943, Severino sold to Honoria Salak
his ½ portion of said lot. A year later, Severino died and in January 1945, Honoria
Salak and other members of her family died.
As a result, two settlement proceedings were instituted in the CFI of
Tarlac, Special Proceeding No 3, to settle the estate of Severino and Special
Proceeding No. 23, to settle the estate of the Salak family.
A project partition was now submitted in Special Proceeding No. 3 which
adjudicated Lot No. 221 to Francisca Salak de Paz. On the other hand, in Special
Proceeding No. 23, the court held that the heirs entitled to the estates of the of
the Salak family were Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carillo and Francisca
Bautista.
Agustina now filed an action against Francisca to recover the ½ of Lot
No. 221 but on April 24, 1950, Agustina died. Later on, the court held that the
properties inherited by Agustina were subject to reserve troncal.
On, April 22, 1963, Prima Carillo filed a suit for the recovery of 2/3 of ½
of Lot 221 against Francisca but the court dismissed the complaint on the ground
of prescription.
ISSUES: Whether or not the action to recover the property has already
prescribed.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition.
The court stated that, the reserve is extinguished upon the death of the reservista,
as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios who
can bring reivindicatory suit. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the
time for recovering real properties, can be lost by prescription.
The law fixes 10 years as the period of prescription for actions to recover
real property, counted from the time the cause of action accrued. It is clear
therefore, that the right of action accrued in favor of the plaintiffs on April 24,
1950, since the action has been filed only on April 22, 1963 or more than 10 years
from the death of Agustina.
 P a g e | 109

CASE NO. 79

Digested By: GONZALES, Dolores Marietta D.

Mariquita Sumaya and Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Amadeo,
Sancho, Donato, Luis, Erasto, Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all
surnamed Balantakbo
G.R. No. 68843-44, September 2, 1991
Ponente: Medialdea, J.
FACTS:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2)
sets of properties subject of this case: 1) 1/3 interest of a parcel of land from his
father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) 1/7 interest from his
maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950. On June
13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his
mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. deBalantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the
subject real properties.
Vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties
were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr. and from his maternal
grandmother, Luisa Bautista.
Vda de Balantakbo sold the property to Sumaya which was subsequently
sold to Villa Honorio Development Corporation. Villa then transferred and
assigned its rights over the property to Agro Industrial Coconut Cooperative.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above
described properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable character.
On March 4, 1970, five brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and
three surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the
first named Balantakbos, filed civil cases to recover the subject properties which
they claimed were subject to a reserve troncal in their favor.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the buyers in this case were innocent purchasers for value
and in good faith; and
(2) Whether or not it was necessary to annotate the reservable interest of the
reserve in the properties.
RULING:
First Issue:
NO. It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties
in question show that they were free from any liens and encumbrances at the
time of the sale. The fact remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by Consuelo stating the source of the properties thereby showing the
 P a g e | 110

reservable nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna,
and this is sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of
the Property Registration Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496). In this case, the
affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo which
contained a statement that the property was inherited from a descendant, Raul,
which has likewise inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was registered
with the Registry of Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate
the reservable character of the property in the certificate of title cannot be
attributed to Consuelo. Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners
had actual knowledge of the reservable character of the properties before they
bought the same from Consuelo.
Second Issue:
YES. It is necessary to annotate the reservable interest of the reserve in
the properties. The Court disagrees with the disposition of the appellate court
that there is no need to register the reservable character of the property, if only
for the protection of the reservees, against innocent third persons. The reservable
character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value. Consistent
with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed
spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable
character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who
inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited from another
descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also.
 P a g e | 111

CASE NO. 80
Digested By: HUMIWAT, Jaime P.
Bonifacia Mateo, et al. vs. Gervasio Lagua, et al.
G.R. No. L-26270, October 30, 1969
FACTS: Cipriano Lagua own 3 parcels of land in Asingan, Pangasinan with a
total area of 15,191 square m. In 1917, he donated 2 parcels of land to his son
Alejandro in consideration of his marriage to Bonifacia Mateo but the certificates
of titles was still in the donors name. In 1923, Alejandro died. In 1941, Cipriano
Lagua executed a deed of sale of the 2 parcels of land in favor of his younger son
Gervasio. The registered in the latter’s name and was issued certificate of titles
by the register of deeds.
Bonifacia filed a case with the CFI of Pangasinan seeking annulment of
the deed of sale and recovery of possession. CFI rendered judgment declaring
the sale as void and ordered the register of deeds to cancel the TCTs issued in
the name of Gervasio. Such decision became final.
In 1957, Gervasio and CIpriano Lagua then filed another case with the
CFI seeking annulment of the donation alleging that in donating the 2 lots, he
neglected something for his own support and also prejudiced the legitime of his
forced heir. While the case was still pending final resolution, Cipriano Lagua died.
The case was subsequently dismissed on the ground of prescription. The action
to annul having been brought only after the lapse of 41 years.
Alejandro appealed to CA and the decision of the trial court was reversed.
CA ruled that the donation to Alejandro exceeded 494sqm which is the
disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will and to the same
extent, prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano’s other heir. The donation was thus
declared inofficious and defendants were ordered to reconvey to Gervasio a
portion of 494 sqm from the 2 lots.
ISSUES: Whether or not the CA acted correctly in ordering the reduction for
being inofficious.
RULING: NO. CA acted on several unsupported assumptions:
1. The 3 lots were only the properties composing the hereditary estate of the
deceased Cipriano Lagua.
2. That Alejandro and Gervasio were only his legal heirs.
3. That the deceased left no unpaid debts/taxes in which the estate would
be answerable.
Also, in computation of the legitime, the CA did not consider the value of the
properties. In order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there
must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the
disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as legitime in the properties of the
donor. In the present case, it can hardly said that, with the evidence then before
the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation.
 P a g e | 112

CASE NO. 81
Digested By: LABADOR, Maylane N.
Vda De. Tupas vs.RTC of Negros Occidental
G.R. No. L-65800, October 3, 1986
FACTS:
Epifanio Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving
his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also left
a win dated May 18, 1976, which was admitted to probate on September 30, 1980
in Special Proceedings No. 13994 of the CFI of Negros Occidental. Among the
assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre,
admittedly his private capital. But at the time of his death, these lots were no
longer owned by him, he having donated them the year before (on August 2,
1977) to the Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had obtained title to said lots.
Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance,
Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. in the same Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental to have the donation declared inofficious
insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible by ½ or such proportion
as justified and the resulting deduction restored and conveyed to her. The Trial
Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, based on these grounds: (1)
Article 900 relied upon by plaintiff is not applicable because the properties which
were disposed of by way of donation one year before the death of Epifanio
Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his death; (2)
the donation properties were Epifanio's capital or separate estate; and (3) Tupas
Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the donation inter
vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art. 1061.
ISSUES: Whether or not the donation is inofficious insofar as it prejudiced
Partenza’s legitime and must be properly redused.
RULING:
A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations,
one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can give by will.
If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is
deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess,
though without prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's
appropriating the fruits of the thing donated. Such a donation is collationable, its
value is imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the tune of his death
for the purpose of determining the legitime of the compulsory heirs and the
freely disposable portion of the estate. This is true as well of donations to
strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs.
In order to find out whether the donation is inofficious or not the
following step-by-step procedure is to be followed:
(1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the
time of the testator's death;
 P a g e | 113

(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to

be paid out or deducted from the value of the property thus left;
(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the
liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary estate;
(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time
they were made, of donations subject to collation; and
(5) The determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from
the total thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime
of each respective compulsory heir.
Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves
the freely disposable portion by which the donation in question must be
measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed
that difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is
inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount of said excess.
In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be reverted to the Partenza as the
sole compulsory heir of the deceased Tupas.
 P a g e | 114

CASE NO. 82
Digested By: LASTIMOZA, Johanne Rose V.
Angela Rodriguez, Maria Rodriguez, et al. vs. Hon. Juan De
Borja, et al.
G.R. No. L-21993, June 21, 1966
FACTS:
Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court
of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the
petitioners filed a petition before the court to examine the purported will but
which was later withdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The
petitioners now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the settlement
of the decedent's estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the
jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.
ISSUES: Whether or not the CFI of Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with
the testate proceedings?
RULING:
YES. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became
vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if
no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being
deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and
place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to
what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court.
Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the
testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
 P a g e | 115

CASE NO. 83
Digested By: LOPEZ, Phoebe Grace D.
Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain vs. Hon. Eufrocinio S. De La
Merced and Loreta Sta. Maria
G.R. No. L-39975, June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioners Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain are the niece and
nephew respectively of the spouses Benito Catain and Andrea Madarcos.
Francisca is the daughter of the deceased brother (Joaquin) of Andrea Madarcos
while Telesforo is the son of a deceased brother (Gregorio) of Benito Catain. The
Catain spouses died without issue and ab intestato. They left a tract of land with
an area of 50,985 square meters, more or less, situated in Salvacion, Roxas,
Palawan, in the name of Benito Catain on September 28, 1925 by the Register of
Deeds of Palawan.The only heirs of the deceased homesteaders were their
nephews and nieces. In their duly registered Affidavit of Adjudication, said heirs
divided the above parcel of land into several lots. On May 19, 1972, Francisca
Madarcos sold her share of the inheritance, Lot B, to respondent Loreto Sta.
Maria. Subsequently, petitioners Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain
demanded the reconveyance of the Lot. Respondent vendee Loreto Sta. Maria
having refused, they instituted an action for repurchase with damages in the
Court of First Instance of Palawan. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that petitioners had no legal capacity to sue because
they are not the legal heirs contemplated in Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioners are the legal heir of the deceased spouses.
RULING: Petitioners are the legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules
on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses due to the
absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents.
They should be considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119
as entitled to redeem the homestead. Since the Catain spouses were childless and
were survived only by their nephews and nieces, the latter succeeded to the entire
estate of the deceased. Article 975 states that “when children of one or more
brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive,
they shall inherit in equal portions.”
But even as both are decidedly legal heirs of the Catain spouses, only
petitioner Francisca Madarcos can invoke the right of repurchase. The other
petitioner, Telesforo Catain, cannot claim that prerogative as an heir of his
deceased uncle because the homestead had already been partitioned and
distributed among the nieces and nephews. The contested Lot B had been given
to Francisca and it was she who executed the sale to respondent Loreto Sta.
Maria in 1972. Only the vendor has the right to repurchase. As Francisca is still
living, she alone can demand the reconveyance of her share, Lot B, from
respondent vendee.
 P a g e | 116

CASE NO. 84

Digested By: MACATANGCAL, Ameena C.

Delos Santos vs. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. L-29192, February 22, 1971
Ponente: Villamor, J.
FACTS:
Pelagia dela Cruz died intestate on October 16, 1962. Plaintiff-appellee,
the decedent's grandniece, the latter’s mother being the niece of the decedent
who predeceased her seeked implementation of conditions as agreed in an extra-
judicial partition against defendant-appellant, nephew of the decedent. The
defendant claimed that plaintiff has no right to enforce the same since she is not
considered as an intestate heir of Pelagia.
ISSUES: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellee is heir of the decedent.
RULING: NO.
Being a grandniece of the decedent, she cannot inherit from the decedent
by right of representation.
Art.972 provides that the right of representation takes place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brother
or sisters, whether they be full blood or half blood.
Much less plaintiff-appellee could inherit in her own right.
Art. 962 state that in every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it
properly takes place.
In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia are her
nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-
appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from inheritance.
 P a g e | 117

CASE NO. 85
Digested By: MALICDAN, Jaspherose
Isabel De La Puerta vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77867, February 6, 1990
FACTS:
Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will leaving
her properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and
Isabel. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and was
appointed executrix of the will.
A petition for the probate of the will was filed by Isabel. However, it was
opposed by her brothers, who averred that their mother was already senile at the
time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning.
Moreover, some of the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged
to them exclusively.
Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probate
court. Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor.
On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta which was
granted. However, the decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for the
dismissal of the case
On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in
the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly
allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta.
On November 12, 1982, the probate court granted the motion, declaring
that it was satisfied from the evidence at hand that Carmelita was a natural child
of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support.
The court added that "the evidence presented by the petitioner against it (was)
too weak to discredit the same.
On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the illegitimate children of a legitimate child can inherit by right
of representation from the children and relatives of such legitimate parent.
RULING:
NO. Articles 902, 989 and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of
illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon
death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue
of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. Although Art 982
provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation", the same is limited by Art 992 to the end that an illegitimate
 P a g e | 118

child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother (who must be legitimate children themselves). Also, while
it is true that the NCC granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those
articles must however be read in conjunction with Art 992, which prohibits the
right of representation from being exercised where the person to be represented
is a legitimate child. The determining factor therefore is the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the person to be "represented." It must be emphasized that
illegitimate children have only those rights expressly granted to them by law.
 P a g e | 119

CASE NO. 86
Digested By: PANLASIQUI, Marben M.
In Re: Summary Settlement of the Estate of Melodia Ferraris.
Filomena Abellana De Bacayo vs. Gaudencia Ferraris De
Borromeo
G.R. No. L-19382, August 31, 1965
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris, herein decedent, left no surviving
direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral
relatives, namely Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of
decedent’s father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and
Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of
Melodia’s only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased Melodia.
The two classes of heirs claimed to be the nearest intestate heirs and sought to
participate in the estate of said MelodiaFerraris. The trial court ruled in favor of
the appellees. The court held that collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or
sisters of children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance
with Article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUES: Whether or not appellant may inherit.
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held that the trial court was correct in ruling
that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the decedent exclude all other
collaterals (aunts and uncles) from the succession. This rule is apparent in Article
1009 of the Civil Code where the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals being called to
the succession, hence, the preferred position of the former vis-à-vis the other
collaterals.
 P a g e | 120

CASE NO. 87
Digested By: PASOS, Abigail
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1995; 205 SCRA 321
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on Nov. 10, 1952, and Rafaela on
May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on Mar. 23, 1972.
His wife died nine years later, on Mar. 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the
possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to
be their children.
On Apr. 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa and Remedios and Juana,
Isabel’s mother, filed a complaint for partition of the intestate estate of Teodoro
and Isabel.
Subsequently, Delia and Edmundo, both legally adopted, and Doribel as
the legitimate daughter, filed their own complaint for the partition of the intestate
estate of Eleno and Rafaela claiming that they are entitled to inherit Teodoro’s
share in his parents’ estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided by the trial court in favor of the herein private
respondents on the basis of practically the same evidence. The CA affirmed the
lower court’s decision in the case of Mauricio, et. al.; and, modified the trial
court’s decision in the case of Delia, et. al. stating that Delia and Edmundo
Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson.
ISSUES: Whether or not private respondents are capacitated under the law to
inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents.
RULING: YES as to Doribel but NO as to Delia and Edmundo.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus
the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her
deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.
Under Article 981, to wit:
Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who
are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by
right of representation.
Hence, Doribel is entitled to the share her father would have directly
inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents'
other children.
In the case of Delia and Edmundo, however, they are total strangers with
respect to the grandparents. While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, those rights
do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the
 P a g e | 121

adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does
not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
All told, Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista are their exclusive
heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the
petitioners. Only Doribel, however, has the right of representation in the
inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents
being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
The petition is DENIED.
 P a g e | 122

CASE NO. 88
Digested By: PUDIN, Aracelli Epie
Eugenio Del Prado vs. Aurea Santos, legal guardian of the
minor Jesus Santos
del Prado
G.R. No. L-19996, April 30, 1965
FACTS:
Eugenio del Prado is a legitimate brother of Anastacio del Prado, who died single
and intestate. Anastacio cohabited with Aurea Santos (who was legally married)
without the benefit of matrimony and they begot a son named Jesus del Prado
whom Anastacio admitted as his son in Jesus’ birth certificate. At the time of
Anastacio’s death, a parcel of land in his name was adjudicated to Jesus del Prado.
Eugenio then filed a complaint before CFI to annul the deed executed by Aurea
adjudicating to her son a parcel of land left by Anastacio alleging that he
(Eugenio) was deprived of his rightful share in the estate of his brother. The
lower court dismissed the petition, and upon appeal to CA, the appellate court
certified the case to Supreme Court that such involved purely legal questions.
ISSUES: Who has the better right to the parcel of land? Is it the minor left by
Anastacio or the latter’s brother?
RULING:
Since Anastacio del Prado died in 1958, the new Civil Code applies (Article
2263). Illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to successional rights
(Article 287). Where, as in this case, the deceased died intestate, without
legitimate descendants or ascendants, then his illegitimate child shall succeed to
his entire estate (Article 988), to the exclusion of appellant who is only a collateral
relative..
 P a g e | 123

CASE NO. 89
Digested By: RAMIREZ, Maribeth
Wencesla Cacho vs. John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan
G.R. No. L-19996, April 30, 1965
FACTS:
Silvina G. Udan died leaving a purported will naming her illegitimate son,
Francisco G. Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share
alike. Wencesla Cacho, filed a petition to probate said Will in the CFI of
Zambales. This was opposed by Rustico G. Udan, legitimate brother of the
testatrix, but upon the filing of an opposition by Francisco G. Udan, Rustico G.
Udan, through counsel, verbally moved to withdraw his opposition. Francisco
G. Udan then died on June 1961.
After said death of Francisco G. Udan, John G. Udan and Rustico G.
Udan, legitimate brothers of the testatrix, filed their respective oppositions on
the ground that the will was not attested and executed as required by law, that
the testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or
undue influence. The CFI issued an Order disallowing these two oppositions
for lack of interest in the estate. Their Motions for Reconsideration were also
denied hence the filing of a direct appeal with the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan, may
claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister?
RULING:
NO. At the time of her death her illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was
her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. This is clear from Articles 988
and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines, in force at the time of
the death of the testatrix:
ART. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the
illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.

These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate
inherit only in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children.
Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or widower under
Article 1101, they do, not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children,
legitimate or illegitimate.
 P a g e | 124

CASE NO. 90
Digested By: SALVADOR, Kathleen Allyssa
Cuartico vs. Cuartico
16 November 1955 52 O.G. 1489
FACTS:
Petitioner Tranquillo Cuartico was named administrator of the Intestate Estate
of said Patricia Clavecilla. After all money claims against the estate has been
settled, the administrator and his co-petitioners moved that they be declared the
exclusive heirs of the deceased. The oppositors filed a similar motion praying
that they, along with the petitioners, be declared heirs of the deceased. After trial,
the court declared the petitioners and oppositors legal heirs of Patricia Clavecilla
whereupon the petitioners, unsatisfied with the ruling, interposed the present
appeal.
CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANTS: The appellants claiming to be
natural nephews of Patricia Clavecilla aver, moreover, that their mother Maria
Clavecilla is a natural sister of Patricia Clavecilla.
CONTENTION OF THE APPELLEES: The appellees contend that Juan
Clavecilla was legally married to Bonifacia Cardente. The appellees further
maintain that Patricia Clavecilla and Maria Clavecilla, assuming that the latter was
child of Juan Clavecilla, were both adulterous children and could not have been
validly recognized by Juan Clavecilla. The appellees tried to prove that Maria
Clavecilla was neither a natural nor an adulterous daughter of Juan Clavecilla but
was merely a maid of the latter; that Maria’s real name was Maria Romano; and
that she was born of the wedlock between Sinforosa Romano and Benigno
Martinez. Appellees admit that Maria Clavecilla was legally married to their
brother Macario Cuartico; that from said marriage, the herein appellants were
born and that consequently, appellants are entitled to inherit from Patricia
Clavecilla merely in representation of appellants’ father Macario.

ISSUES: Who is entitled to succeed ab intestato to the inheritance left by Patricia

Clavecilla?
RULING:
It appears clear between the parties that Patricia Clavecilla died single and ab
intestate.
No dispute exists that the appellees are the children of Eleno Cuartico and
Susana Germodo. Susana Germodo being the natural mother of Patricia
Clavecilla, it results therefore, that the appellees are natural half-brothers, half-
sisters and half-niece respectively of Patricia Clavecilla.
The oppositors who are legitimate children of Susana Germodo and Lino
Cuartico are seeking to inherit ab intestato from their natural half-sister, Patricia
Clavecilla. This pretension is certainly not countenanced under Article 943 if the
 P a g e | 125

Old Civil Code which provision is substantially reproduced as Article 992 in the
New Civil Code. Article 943 reads:
“Art. 943. A natural child has no right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledge it; nor
shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural child.”

The reason behind the absolute prohibition on intestate succession is obviously

the intervening antagonism and incompatibility between members of the natural
family and those of the legitimate family.
Assuming that Maria Clavecilla was an acknowledged natural child of Juan
Clavecilla and therefore, a natural half-sister of Patricia Clavecilla, the law
applicable would be Article 945 of the Civil Code which recites:
“Art. 945 of the Old Civil Code provide that “In default of natural ascendants,
natural children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in
accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters.”

Remarkably, this legal provision stops with natural brothers and sisters
without making any mention of the latter’s children. Obviously, the legitimate or
natural child of the natural brothers and sister of a natural child are disqualified
from succeeding the latter ab intestato even by representation, for if the law
intended to accord this right to natural nephews and nieces of the natural child,
it would have expressly so provided. It has been held that with the exception of
the relatives mentioned in Art. 944 and 945 of the Old Civil Code, no other
relative of the natural child has the right to succeed it.
In view of all the foregoing, and finding that neither the appellants nor the
appellees are entitled to succeed ab intestato to the inheritance left by Patricia
Clavecilla, it behooves us to call upon the State to succeed.
 P a g e | 126

CASE NO. 91
Digested By: WAGGAY, Fidencio
Tomas Corpus vs. Rafael Corpus
85 SCRA 567
FACTS:
RAMONA ARGUELLES and TOMAS CORPUS were married, blessed
with 5 children: PABLO CORPUS, JOSE CORPUS and 3 others. When
TOMAS CORPUS DIED, RAMONA wed LUIS RAFAEL YANGCO and had
4 recognized acknowledged natural children, one of them was the decedent
TEORORO YANGCO.
TEODORO Yangco died on April 20, 1939. His will was dated August
29, 1934 and was probated 1941. At the time of his death, he had no forced heirs.
He only had his half brother (LUIS YANGCO), half sister (PAZ YANGCO),
wife of Miguel Ossorio (AMALIA CORPUS), the children of his half brother
Pablo Corpus (JOSE and RAMON) and the daughter of his half brother Jose
Corpus (JUANA/JUANITA CORPUS). Juanita died in 1944.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated
November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named
in the will. The said project was contested by the following, on the following
grounds (oppositors):
 Estate of LUIS YANGCO: intestacy should be declared because the will
does not contain an institution of heir
 JUANITA Corpus, PEDRO MARTINEZ and JULIANA DE
CASTO, through ATTY. CRUZ: the proposed partition was not in
conformity with the will as the testator intended that the estate should be
CONSERVED and not physically parititoned.
Nevertheless, the project of partition was approved by the Probate court,
in essence holding that the testator did not really intend to a perpetual prohibition
against alienation when he stated that some of his estate be conserved.
Oppositors appealed to SC but appeal dismissed after the legatees and the
appellants entered into compromise agreements wherein the legatees agreed to
pay P35k to PEDRO MARTINEZ, the heirs of PIO CORPUS, the heirs of
ISABEL CORPUS, and the heir of JUANITA CORPUS – her son TOMAS
CORPUS. For the estate of Luis Yangco, a similar compromise agreement was
entered. The dismissal of the appeal became final and executory.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt
acknowledging that he received from the Yangco estate P2k as “settlement in
full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge
Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case”. The legatees executed an agreement for
the settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate which was approved
by the probate court in 1949. 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified.
 P a g e | 127

TOMAS CORPUS still filed action to recover JUANITA’s supposed

share in Yangco’s intestate estate, alleging that the dispositions in Yangco’s will
sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation which rendered it void under A785,
OCC and that 1949 partition is invalid. The decedent’s estate should have been
distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
The Trial Court DISMISSED the case on the grounds of Res Judicata and
laches.
Petitioner directly appealed to SC. Petitioner contended that the trial court
erred in holding (1) Teodoro Yangco was a natural child; (2) Teodoro Yangco’s
will had been duly legalized; (3) Plaintiff’s action is barred by res judicata and
laches.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the JUANITA CORPUS, TOMAS CORPUS’ mom, was a legal
heir of TEODORO YANGCO so that his mom would have a cause of action
to recover a supposed intestate share in the estate.
(the court deemed it unnecessary to determine if the will has been duly legalized and whether his
action has already been barred by laches)
RULING: NO. JUANITA CORPUS, the petitioner’s mother, was NOT A
LEGAL HEIR of Yangco because there is NO RECIPROCAL SUCCESSION
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.
NCC: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the legitimate child. A992 is based on the theory
that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family
while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the legitimate child. The Law does
not recognize blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment.
TEODORO YANGCO, and 3 other children, was ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD and NOT A LEGITIMATE CHILD, of LUIS RAFAEL
YANGCO and RAMONA ARGUELLES. JOSE CORPUSwas the presumed
legitimate child of TOMAS CORPUS and RAMONA ARGUELLES.
Therefore, TOMAS CORPUS (Petitioner) had no cause of action for the
recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, JUANITA CORPUS,
as legal heir in YANGCO’s estate.
-Legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child.
-The natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the
estate of the legitimate grandparent.
-The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a
legitimate brother of her natural mother.
The SC affirmed the lower court’s judgment.
 P a g e | 128

CASE NO. 92
Digested By: WALLANG, Annie Ruth
Anselma Diaz, guardian of Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmia and
Miguel, all surnamed Santero, and Felixberta Pacursa, guardian
of Federico Santero, et al., vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and
Felisa Pamuti Jardin
G.R. No. L- 66574, February 21, 1990
FACTS:
The petitioners are the minor natural grandchildren of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero. They argue that they have the right to inherit from the intestate
estate of their grandmother by right of representation of their deceased father,
Pablo, the legitimate child of Simona.
Felisa Pamuti Jardin is the niece of Simona from her only sibling. Felisa
was declared the sole legitimate heir of the intestate estate of the latter by the
decision of this court promulgated on 1987.
ISSUES: Whether or not natural grandchildren may inherit by way of
representation, from the intestate estate of their legitimate grandparent.
RULING: No. There are substantial changes in the law of succession with the
New Civil Code, however, illegitimate children inheriting from relatives of their
legitimate parent is not one of them.
Article 982, which states “The grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation and if any one of them should have died, leaving
several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in
equal portions” is not applicable in this case. This is because Article 992 provides
a barrier or iron curtain as it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article
992 the exception.
This court shares the view that the term “relatives” in Article 992 should
be construed in its general acceptation. As amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane said,
“In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should
be understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a
general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make
a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera
debemus.”
Thus, the Supreme Court hereby reiterates their June 17, 1987 decision
and declares Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.
 P a g e | 129

CASE NO. 93
Digested By: BUGNAY, Jonathan
CAGAN, Jenalyn A.
Cresenciano Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals, Maria Cailles,
James Bracewell and Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc.
G.R. No. L-51263, February 28, 1983
FACTS:
Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two
(2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the
son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died
in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be
the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of
properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased
Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly
with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the
properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned
between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all
the income derived from said properties from the time defendants took
possession thereof until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to him
his share therein with legal interest.
Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties
and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of
representation.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Cresenciano Leonardo has established filiation.
(2) Whether or not Cresenciano has legal right to inherit by right of
representation.
RULING:
Plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of
the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since
Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who
subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can consequently
succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation.
In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth
certificate showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro
Timbol, his alleged mother.
Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of
this vital evidence, We have minutely scrutinized the same, looking for that vital
 P a g e | 130

link connecting him to the family tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes. However,
this piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence to his tale.
This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is
not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on
September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his
bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the
'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself.
Thus, even without taking time and space to go into further details, We may
safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental
requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in
question.
If it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot,
by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased
Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was
born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September
13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what
is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes.
(Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
 P a g e | 131

CASE NO. 94
Digested By: BILOG, Armando
RAMIREZ, Maribeth
Vda. De Crisologo vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-44051, June 27, 1985; 135 SCRA 233
FACTS: VDA. DE CRISOLOGO et al., relatives of Julia Capiao, filed an action
against Mallillin for ownership, annulment of sale, and delivery of possession of
various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and damages claiming to
be legal heirs of the vendor, Lutgarda Capiao, the illegitimate child of Julia
Capiao. Lutgarda Capiao died without a will and without any children and/or
immediate forced heirs.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners can inherit from Lutgarda Capiao, the
original owner of the properties in question?
RULING: The petitioners cannot inherit the properties in question because of
Article 992 of the Civil Code.
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestanto from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother, nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

The petitioners being relatives on the legitimate line of Julia Capiao, they cannot
inherit from her illegitimate daughter.
 P a g e | 132

CASE NO. 95
Digested By: PANLASIQUI, Marben M.
PUDIN, Aracelli Epie

xxx vs. xxx

G.R. No. L-44051, June 27, 1985; 135 SCRA 233
FACTS:

ISSUES: Whether or not

RULING: The petitioners
 P a g e | 133

CASE NO. 96
Digested By: BASCOS, Jane Lennie T.
PASOS, Abigail

Santillon vs. Miranda

G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965
FACTS: On November 21, 1953, Pedro Santillon died without testament in
Tayug, leaving one son, Claro and his wife Perfecta Miranda. During his
marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province. Four
years after his death, Claro filed a petition for letters of administration which was
opposed by his mother and spouses Benito Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the
following ground: (a) that the properties are conjugal except 3 parcels claimed by
perfecta to be her exclusive properties (b) that Perfecta conveyed ¾ of her
undivided share (c) that the administration of estate was not necessary, and (d)
Perfecta was better qualified for the post when the administration is necessary.
The court appointed commissioners draft a project of partition and
distribution of all properties of Pedro. Claro filed a motion to declare the share
of heirs and to resolve conflicting claims of the parties invoking Article 892 of
the New Civil Code insisting that after deducting ½ from the conjugal properties,
the remaining ½ must be divided as follows: ¼ for the spouse and ¾ for him.
On the other hand, Perfecta claimed besides her conjugal half, she was entitled
under Article 996 of the New Civil Code to another ½ of the remaining half.
After due notice and hearing, the court held that perfecta is entitled ½ shares
and the remaining ½ share for Claro after deducting the share of the widow as
co-owner of the conjugal properties.

ISSUES: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate is divided when the
only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?
RULING: Intestate proceedings in the New Civil Code chapter of legal or
intestate succession, the only Article applicable id article 996. Our conclusion
that it must be an equal share seems a logical inference from the circumstance
that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code form which article 996 was
taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where
the widow or widower survives with legitimate children as a general rule and
second, where the widow or widower survives with only child as an exception.
Article 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the
legislator’s desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both
situations.
Surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child entitled to ½ of the
intestate estate. When intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with only
legitimate child of the deceased is entitled to ½ of the estate of the deceased
spouse under Article 996 of the new Civil Code.
 P a g e | 134

CASE NO. 97
Digested By: EVANGELISTA III, Pablo H.
MACATANGCAL, Ameena C.

Testate Estate of the Late Reverend Father Pascual Rigor. The

Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac
vs. Belina Rigor, Nestora Rigor, Francisca Escobar De Rigor
and Jovita Escobar de Fausto

G.R. No. L-22036, April 30, 1979

FACTS: Father Rigor, parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan died on August 19, 1935.
He left a will executed on October 29, 1933. Said will was probated by the CFI
of Tarlac. Contained on said will is a controversial bequest allowing a nearest
male relative who will pursue an ecclesiastical vocation and career to administer
Father Rigor's property. For there was no identified nearest male relative who is
taking up ecclesiastical vocation that time, the administratix of the estate
submitted a project allowing the priest of Victoria Tarlac Roman Catholic
Church to administer the property subject of the legacy.
ISSUES: How long after the testator's death would it be determined that he had
a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation?
RULING: The Court ruled that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest
male relative living at the time of his death and not to an indefinite time
thereafter.
The law provides that in order to be capacitated to inherit, the heirs,
devisee, legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens except in
cases of representation, when it is proper.
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly and reasonably
construed. To construe them as referring to testator's nearest male relative at
anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create
uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his
intention.
Art.888 of the Old Civil Code provides that the bequest becoming
inoperative will be merged into the estate except with respect to substitution and
accretion.
Art. 960 of the New Civil Code provides further that legal succession takes
place when the will does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator.
 P a g e | 135

CASE NO. 98
Digested By: HUMIWAT, Jaime P.
LASTIMOZA, Johanne Rose V.

Dionicia Cid, et al., vs. Nancy W. Burnaman, Elis J. Burnaman

and the Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-22036, April 30, 1979

FACTS: The lot in question was decreed in undivided halves, one in favor of
Gregorio Bonoan and the other half in favor of the five petitioners
Julians,Dionicia, Amador, Escolastica, Domingo and Teodoro as owners in equal
shares of said moiety. Gregoria had in her possession Original Certificate of Title
whom she transferred to her children. Hernando ceded by way of absolute sale
all his rights, participation and interest over his entire share of one fourth unto
Nancy Warwick Burnaman for the price of P1,500.00 then conveyed the same
to the same seller for P2,500.00.
Petitioners Julians filed a complaint against Nancy Burnaman, her
husband, Elis J. Burnaman, and Cenon Hernando, seeking the avoidance of the
sale by the latter in so far as concerned a one-fourth undivided interest in the lot,
on the basis that the original half owner, Gregoria Bonoan, died leaving two
children. Cenon and Engracia, the latter being the mother of plaintiffs Julians;
that upon Engracia's death, her children, the Julians, became entitled to half of
Gregoria's half interest in addition to their recorded half share; that the
Burnamans were duly informed of the Julians' claim and were purchasers in bad
faith. They prayed to be declared owners of an undivided three-fourths.
The defendants Burnamans denied the allegations of the complaint;
pleaded good faith in their purchase from Cenon Hernando and counterclaimed
for damages; while Cenon answered admitting that Engracia B. Hernando was
his sister, but denied that she had any right or participation in the land in
question; and pleaded that the lot was purchased with his earnings as a soldier in
the Philippine Scouts, and that his mother, Gregoria, and his sister, Engracia, had
recognized his rights to the undivided half.
ISSUES: Whether or not the sale of an undivided share of lot in the inheritance
valid?
RULING: YES. The Burnamans were purchasers in good faith. Even if they
were in bad faith, such fact would be irrelevant for the purposes of the present
case, since the plaintiffs are not entitled to the proprietary interest that they claim
to have inherited through their mother, Engracia. The question of appellees
Burnamans' good or bad faith can be put in issue only by someone entitled to
the ownership of that undivided interest; either Cenon, if he was properly
acknowledged; and if not, by some other heir of Gregoria, whether ascendant or
collateral, who may be found to be entitled thereto.
 P a g e | 136

CASE NO. 99
Digested By: LABADOR, Maylane N.
LOPEZ, Phoebe Grace D.

Dimayuga, et al. vs. Court of Appeals and Manuel Dimayuga

G.R. No. L-48433, April 30, 1984
FACTS: The spouses Genaro Dimayuga and Segunda Gayapanao, acquired a
Torrens title for homestead in 1928. Segunda died intestate in 1940, survived by
her son, Manuel, and her husband, Genaro. During their marriage, Genaro had
a mistress named Emerenciana by whom he begot five children, named
Filomeno, Pacita, Adelaide, Remedios and Socorro.A sixth child, Nelia
Dimayuga, was born in 1944 or after Segunda's death. On September 16, 1948,
a "partition of real property" was executed. In the partition, Genaro treated the
homestead as his sole property and not conjugal which it actually was. Manuel
was given as share 5 ½ hectares of the homestead. The six illegitimate children
were given 7 and 7/10 hectares. It was amended in 1951 by means of an affidavit.
An additional one hectare was given to Manuel, making his total share 6 and
5/10 hectares because the 1948 partition was prejudicial to him. Nineteen years
later, Manuel having been advised that the entire homestead was inherited by
him from his parents obtained a Torrens title for or the 13-hectare homestead.
About two months later, the six illegitimate children filed a complaint for the
annulment of Manuel's title and for the division of the homestead equally among
Genaro's seven children including Manuel.
ISSUES: Whether or not the 1948 partition is in conformity with law and such
partition shall stand.
RULING: NO. Article 1056 of the old Civil Code provides that "if the testator
should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such
partition shall stand insofar, as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced
heirs." Article 1056 was construed to mean that a person who makes an inter
vivos partition must first execute a will. If the will is void, the partition is void.
With more reason would the partition be void if there was no will. The 1948
partition was not in conformity with law. It assumed that Genaro was the owner
of the entire homestead. One-half of the homestead, subject to the husband's
usufructuary legitime, was inherited in 1940 by Manuel upon the death of his
mother who was married to Genaro for twenty-five years.
 P a g e | 137

CASE NO. 100

Digested By: BALNEG, Jessalaine Karen T.
GONZALES, Dolores Marietta D.

Leviste vs. Court of Appeals

160 SCRA 581
FACTS:
On September 7, 1963, Leviste, a practicing attorney, entered into a
written agreement with the Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition
for probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. It was agreed
that the contigent fee would be 35% of the property Rosa will receive upon the
probate of the will. On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del
Rosario, informing him that she was terminating his services as her counsel due
to “conflicting interest.”
On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a motion to Intervene to Protect
His Rights to Fees for Professional Services but was soon denied since he had
not filed a claim for attorney’s fees nor recorded his attorney’s lien. On
November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a formal statement of Claim for Attorney’s
Fees and Recording of Attorney’s Lien. Despite the denial of his motion to
intervene, Atty. LEviste kept on receiving copies of the court’s orders, as well
the pleadings of the other parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings.
On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-
legatee, filed a motion To Withdraw Petition for Probate. They alleging that Del
Rosario waived her rights to the devise and agreed that the De Guzman brothers
and sisters who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties
left by the decedent.
The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the petition for being
contrary to public policy. The court disallowed the will, holding that the legal
requirements for its validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses. Atty. Leviste
filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The private
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner
was not a party in interest. Atty. Leviste opposed the motion claiming that he has
a direct and material interest in the decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked
that he be substituted as party-petitioner but was denied.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, he suffered the same fate. Leviste
brought this case to the Supreme Court asserting Art. 1052 of the Civil Code:
ART. 1052: If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own
creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the
name of the heir. The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent
sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The excess, should there be any,
shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the persons
to whom, in accordance with the rules established in this Code, it may belong.
Thus, Leviste asserts he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the
extent of 35% thereof the devise in her favor (which she in effect repudiated) to
protect his contigent attorney’s fees.
 P a g e | 138

ISSUES: Whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis
may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his client’s refusal
to appeal the decision of the trial court.
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held Article 1052 of the Civil Code does
not apply to this case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating
heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is
contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will.
Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency
did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee. Also, Article 1052
presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of the
late Maxima C. Reselva. The contract for contingent attorney’s fees neither gives,
nor purports to give, to the lawyer any right whatsoever, personal or real, in his
client’s share of the properties. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the
computation of said fees. SC claimed that the lower court did not err in holding
that notice of an attorney’s lien did not entitle the attorney-appellant to subrogate
himself in lieu of his client. It only gives him the right to collect a certain amount
for his services in case his client is awarded a certain sum by the court.
 P a g e | 139

CASE NO. 101

Digested By: CUPATAN, Eugene Francis A.
FLORES, Richard Francis A.

Buhay De Roma vs. Court of Appeals and Felicidad Caringal

G.R. No. L-46903, July 23, 1987
FACTS: Candelaria de Roma had two legaly adopted daughters Buhay de Roma
and Rosalinda. She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and admin pro were
instituted by respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. But Buhay was appointed
administratix and filed inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda
on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay,
were not included.
The respondent argues that in Art 1062, claims that she has no obligation
to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was
not inofficious.
ISSUES: Whether or not the donation is collationable.
RULING: YES. The court held that there is nothing in the provisions of the
deed of donation which expressly prohibits the collation of the donated
properties. What the court observed was the donation was only irrevocable and
such should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and
equivocally as an exception to Art. 1002. Absent such dear indication of
intention, we apply the rule.
 P a g e | 140

CASE NO. 102

Digested By: FIDER, Cyrus Dominic B.
ESDIO, Patrick Allan

Anita Mang-oy vs. Court of Appeals and Bando Tumpao

G.R. No. L-46903, July 23, 1987
FACTS: Old man Tumpao had a wife and begot three children, the respondents
in this case. After his wife died, he married again. His second wife had two
children she had adopted according to the practice of the Igorots.
On September 4, 1937, Old man Tumpao executed a “Last will and
testament.” According to such, Bandao Tumpao shall be the one to carry or fulfil
the testament, and shall have the power to see and dispose of the Old man
Tumpao’s property. The will was read to the beneficiaries who were already
occupying the lands allotted to them. On September 7, 1937, they had an
agreement recognizing the will and Bando’s appointment. Two days later, Old
man Tumpao died. The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to
them, apparently in obedience to the wish of the old man Tumpao, as expressed
in his last will. However, in 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial
partition of the lands of Old man Tumpao. The latter’s title was cancelled and
the respondents were given a new one. It is that title which is being questioned
the petitioners. The trial court ruled for the petitioners. The CA reversed as it
said that the will was void since it was not probated. The agreement of partition
among the supposed beneficiaries of the will was nullified because it was a
partition inter vivos and had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau
of Non-Christian tribes.
ISSUES: Whether or not the will was VALID.
RULING: NO. The will is NOT VALID since it was NOT PROBATED.
However, the document may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the
Civil Code of 1899, which was in forced at the time the said document was
executed by old man Tumpao in 1937.
Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties
by an act inter vivos, or by win, such partition shall stand in so far as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the forced heris.

Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a testator to partition

inter vivos his property, and distributed them among his heris, and that this
partition is not necessarily either a donation nor a testament, but an instrument
of a special character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante
during his lifetime, and does not operate as conveyance of title until his death. It
derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of legitime
of the forced heirs. It was sufficient, therefore, that the partition should be in
writing. It does not have to be in a public document except to affect third persons
(Article 1280), being valid between the parties who signed it in its present form.
As the trial court puts it, the will alone, would be inoperative for the simple
reason that it was not probated. However, when the persons who were named
therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its
 P a g e | 141

terms probably to save the expenses of probate, and further, carried out its terms
after the death of the testator until now, then it must be held to be binding
between them. Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective
heir before the death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It
was not contested by the defendants, and, after the lapse of 25 years, their rights,
if any, to assail it has prescribed under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Any formal
defect of the deed was cured by the lapse of time. The agreement entered into
by the parties did not have to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-
Christian Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu were
not extended to the Mountain Province. Moreover, the document was not a
conveyance of the properties or property right. It remains to state that the
property in dispute having been registered in 1917, the presumption is that it was
acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be claimed by the
respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and Old Man Tumpao.
Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as their exclusive inheritance
or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the petitioners.
The trial judge, the Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, was correct in ordering the
reconveyance to the petitioners of their respective shares. We affirm his
decision in toto.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that of the trial
court reinstated
 P a g e | 142

CASE NO. 103

Digested By: DELOS REYES, Carmelo E
DICKPUS, Lindberg

xxx Chavez vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-46903, July 23, 1987
FACTS:
ISSUES: Whether or not
RULING:
 P a g e | 143

CASE NO. 104

Digested By: DAVIS, Angelyn
WALLANG, Annie Ruth

Carlos Alonzo and Casimira Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate

Court and Tecla Padua
G.R. No. 72873, May 28, 1987
FACTS: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel
of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. In 1963, one of them
sold his undivided share to herein petitioners. In 1964, another sold her share to
the same vendees. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied an area
equivalent to two-fifths of the lot and proceeded to enclose it with a fence. In
1975, the vendee’s son constructed a semi-concrete house on a part of the
enclosed area.
In 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the co-heirs, sought to redeem the lot
sold to spouses Alonzo but it was dismissed when it appeared that he was a US
citizen. In 1977, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, invoked her right of redemption.
ISSUES: Whether or not the 30-day period to redeem has begun and lapsed
when there was no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court has deviated from the strict letter of the
law in this case in view of its peculiar circumstances.
Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so
within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor.

The co-heirs were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in

writing was given to them. There is then no doubt that the 30-day period began
and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the
complaint in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption.
Although it cannot be declared when the 30-day period commenced, we can say
that between the time when the sales happened and the time when the first
complaint was filed, the co-heirs were actually informed, and thereafter the
period started running and ultimately expired.
The court cannot accept the pretense that the respondents were unaware
of the sales made by their brother or sister. The other co-heirs were living on the
same lot which is only 604 square meters including the partitions bought by the
petitioners. A co-heir who sold his portion is even living in the same house as
Tecla.
It stands that the purpose of the law, which is to make sure the
redemptioners are duly notified, is sufficiently satisfied.