CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW DIGESTS

Submitted by:

Adolfo, Jane Ling

Arellano, Eula Mae

Añonuevo, Hannah Janela

Nesperos, Regina Angela

Tumaneng, Karen Pearl

Vega, Kryss Yvonne

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Table of Contents
THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL vs. THE COMMISIONERS, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT........................................................................................................................................................3
ESPINA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ZAMORA............................................................................5
BETOY vs. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION....................7
JUDGE DADOLE vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT................................................................................9
PAMATONG vs. COMELEC................................................................................................................10
AQUINO-SARMIENTO vs. MORATO.................................................................................................10
FORT BONIFACIO DEV. CORP. vs. COMMISSION ON INTERNAL REVENUE.......................12
SAGUIGUIT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES............................................................................13
DISOMANGCOP vs. DATUMANONG................................................................................................14
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA.........................................................................................16
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. PRADO.........................................................................17
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION vs. COMELEC...........................................................................18
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON vs. MENDEZ........................................................19
GEROCHI vs. DOE................................................................................................................................20
CHAVEZ vs. ROMULO.........................................................................................................................21
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DACUYCUY............................................................................22
BOC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. TEVES...............................................................................23
ALDABA vs. COMELEC.......................................................................................................................25
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. vs. COMELEC..........................................................................................26
COMELEC vs CONRADO CRUZ........................................................................................................28
Emilio A. Gonzales vs. Office of the President..............................................................................29
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. ERMITA.....................................................................................34
David v. Arroyo.....................................................................................................................................36
AQUINO VS. COMELEC.......................................................................................................................40
ALDABA VS. COMELEC......................................................................................................................41
NAVARRO VS. ERMITA.......................................................................................................................42
JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC.................................................................................................................43
MITRA VS. COMELEC..........................................................................................................................45
TAGOLINO VS. HRET...........................................................................................................................46

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ROMUALDEZ VS. MARCOS...............................................................................................................47
AQUINO VS. COMELEC.......................................................................................................................49
COQUILLA VS. COMELEC..................................................................................................................50
ABUNDO VS. COMELEC.....................................................................................................................51
PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ.................................................................................................................53
POBRE VS. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO................................................................................................55
PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS.....................................................................................................................56
TRILLANES IV VS. JUDGE PIMENTEL.............................................................................................57
LIBAN VS. GORDON............................................................................................................................58
GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY...........................................................................................60
PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN....................................................................................................62
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE..................................................................................63
BRILLANTES VS. COMELEC.............................................................................................................64
DRILON VS DE VENECIA....................................................................................................................66
ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA.................................................................................................................68
PEOPLE VS. SILTON............................................................................................................................70
SABIO VS. GORDON............................................................................................................................71
Senate of the Phil. V. Ermita..............................................................................................................73
Gudani vs. Senga..................................................................................................................................75
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers...............................................77
Balag v. Senate of the Philippines....................................................................................................79
Belgica, et. al. v. Honorable executive Secretary Ochoa, et. al.................................................81
Araullo, et. al. v. Aquino III, et, al......................................................................................................82
TESDA v. COA.......................................................................................................................................84
COMELEC v. Judge Quijano-Padilla, et. al.....................................................................................86
Tan v. Del Rosario................................................................................................................................88
Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corp.........................................................................................91
Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos.............................................................................................................92
Macalintal v. PET..................................................................................................................................93
Pimentel, Jr. v. Committee of Congress to canvass votes for Pres. And Vice Pres............95
Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo............................................................................................................97
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary..................................................................................99

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Funa v. Acting Secretary Alberto Agra..........................................................................................101
Republic v. Sandiganbayan.............................................................................................................103
Senate v. Ermita..................................................................................................................................105
Estrada v. Desierto.............................................................................................................................107
Gloria v. CA..........................................................................................................................................108
National Artist for Literature Virgilio Almario v. The Executive secretary............................109
Banda v. Ermita...................................................................................................................................110
In re: Appointment of Hon. M. Valenzuela....................................................................................111
Pimentel v. Ermita..............................................................................................................................113
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO.................................................................................................114
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO v. ROGELIO I. RAYALA................................................................116
FRANKLIN M. DRILON v. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM..................................................................116
FACTS:...............................................................................................................................................117
BANDA VS ERMITA............................................................................................................................118
PROSPERO A. PICHAY v. OFFICE OF DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE................................................................................................................120
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES vs. DENR REGION 12
EMPLOYEES........................................................................................................................................121
ANA THERESIA “RISA” HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD......122
AMPATUAN v. PUNO.........................................................................................................................123
BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION.........................................................................125
JAMAR KULAYAN vs. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN.........................................................................127
EUGENE GONZALES vs. NARCISO ABAYA................................................................................128
SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY...................................................................................130
Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.............................................................................132
LAGMAN V. MEDIALDEA..................................................................................................................134
IBP vs. Zamora....................................................................................................................................136
LACSON VS. PEREZ..........................................................................................................................138
Gonzales vs. Narvasa........................................................................................................................139
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS.............................................................................................................140
Borja vs COMELEC............................................................................................................................141

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Petitioner-Organizations v. Executive Secretary........................................................................143
Villavert vs. Desierto..........................................................................................................................144
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)....................................................................................146
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)......................................148
Cesar Bengzon vs Franklin Drilon..................................................................................................150
CASINO LABOR ASSOCIATION vs COURT OF APPEALS, PHIL. CASINO OPERATORS
CORPORATION (PCOC) and PHIL. SPECIAL SERVICES CORPORATION (PSSC).............152
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO and The CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION....................................................................................................................154
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
LABOR ARBITER CORNELIO L. LINSANGAN and CEFERINO R. LAUR...............................155
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE...................................................................................................................157
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS MELITON C. GERONIMO vs.
LT. FIDEL V. RAMOS IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF THE CONSTABULARY AND THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS........................................................................................................159
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT),Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent...................................161
GMA NETWORK, INC. vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.........................................................163
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS...................................................................164
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA v. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER.................................................166
RAMON R. YAP v. Commission ON AUDIT..................................................................................168
G.R. No. 158562...................................................................................................................................168
ELIAS V. PACETE vs. THE HONORABLE ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, THE HONORABLE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, MIGUEL PEÑALOSA,
JR., in his capacity as City Auditor and in his personal capacity; and THE CITY
TREASURER........................................................................................................................................170
ANIANO A. ALBON vs. BAYANI F. FERNANDO, City Mayor of Marikina, ENGR. ALFONSO
ESPIRITO, City Engineer of Marikina, ENGR. ANAKI MADERAL, Assistant City Engineer
of Marikina, and NATIVIDAD CABALQUINTO, City Treasurer of Marikina...........................171
DENNIS A.B. FUNA vs. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE and the
COMMISSION ON AUDIT...................................................................................................................173
ATTY. JANET D. NACION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, MA. GRACIA PULIDO-TAN,
JUANITO ESPINO AND HEIDI MENDOZA.....................................................................................175

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MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE
ON JUSTICE.........................................................................................................................................182
ROMEO ACOP, et.al. vs. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et.al......................................184
GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, vs. CONRADO VASQUEZ, et., al......................................................185
JESUS P. DISINI v. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)....186
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, INC., et. al.vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. Al.....................188
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, et., al. vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, et.,al........190
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS and VICTORIA A. SATORRE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
JENNIFER C. LEE...............................................................................................................................192
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
................................................................................................................................................................ 194
ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIAvs. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC
MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB),................................196
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty
of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court......................................................................................198
In Re Appointment of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela........................................................................200
In re: Request for Creation of a Special Division to try the Plunder Case (SB Crim. Case
no. 26558 and related cases)...........................................................................................................202
Rhonda Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College.....................................................................................204
Infant JULIAN CARAM v. SEGUI.....................................................................................................205
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., requesting exemption from payment of IBP dues. 206
Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp...........................................207
CJ Corona vs. Senate of the Philippines......................................................................................208
Maria Carolina Araullo v. Benigno Aquino III...............................................................................210
Tan v. Barrios......................................................................................................................................212
Gayo v. Verceles.................................................................................................................................214
In Re: Elections of the IBP................................................................................................................215
Republic v. CJ Sereno......................................................................................................................216
Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao........................................................................218
People v. Gacott..................................................................................................................................219
CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY v. GUERRERO.................................................................220
LIMKAICHONG vs COMELEC..........................................................................................................221

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Malacora v. Court of Appeals..........................................................................................................222
RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN...........................223
Marcelo vs Pichay..............................................................................................................................224
Brillantes vs. Yorac............................................................................................................................226
Funa v. Villar........................................................................................................................................227
Funa v. Duque III.................................................................................................................................228
Gaminde v. COA.................................................................................................................................229
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS.........230

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 THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL vs. THE COMMISIONERS,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
GR NO. 143855

Abad, J

FACTS: On December 21, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros

Occidental passsed Resolution No. 720, allocating P 4,000,000.00 of its retained
earnings for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and
employees of the province. After a public bidding, the Commitee on Awards granted the
insurance coverage to Philam Care Health Center. Province of Negros Occidental and
Philam Care then entered into a Group Health Care Agreement. After a post audit
investigation,the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension suspending the
premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the President as
provided under AO 103. Then President Joseph E. Estrada directed the COA to lift the
suspension. However, the provincial auditor ignored the directive of the President and
instead issued a Notice of Disallowance. Aggrieved, petitioner appeled to the COA. The
COA affirmed the Notice of Disallowance issued by the provincial auditor ruling that
under AO 103, no government entity, including a LGU, is exempt from securing prior
approval from the President granting additional benefits to its personnel. COA further
ruled that The insurance benefits from Philam Care, a private insurance company, was
a duplication of the benefits provided to employees under the Medicare program which
is mandated by law.

ISSUE: Did the COA committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the
Notice of Disallowance issued by the provincial auditor?

HELD: Yes. Section 1 of AO 103 provides that the President authorized all
agencies of the national government as well as LGUs to grant the maximum amount of
P2,000 productivity incentive benefit to each employee who has rendered at least one
year of service as of 31 December 1993. In Section 2 thereof, the President enjoined all
heads of government offices and agencies from granting productivity incentive benefits
or any and all similar forms of allowances and benefits without the President's prior
approval.A reading of the provisions of AO 103 would show that petitioner did not
violate the rule of prior approval from the President since Section 2 states that the

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prohibition applies only to "government offices/agencies, including government-owned
and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards.·Nowhere is
it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to LGUs.The President may
only point out that rules have not been followed but the President cannot lay down the
rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant
of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the
present case does not need the approval of the President.

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 ESPINA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ZAMORA
GR No. 156665

Peralta, J

FACTS: On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic
Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly
repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the
retail trade business. R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost
their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business
with the same rights as Filipino citizens. On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members
of the House of Representatives, questioned the constitutionality of the aforementioned
Republic Act claiming first that RA 8762 runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II
of the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national economy under the
control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote
industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair
competition and trade policies.

On the other hand, respondents countered that Constitution mandates the

regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It further argued that the
Constitution directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of investments
upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest so dictates. But it
leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such reservation. It
does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners into
certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.

ISSUE: Is RA 8761 unconstitutional?

HELD: No. The Court ruled that the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the
declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to
pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.

The Court further explained that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the ideals
of economic nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and

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patrimony and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced
goods; (2) by mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive;
and (3) by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the
economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests
from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference
in all areas of development.

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 BETOY vs. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
GR NO. 125350

Corona, J.

FACTS: On June 8, 2001, the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)
was enacted by the Congress for the purpose of restructuring the electric power
industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation.

On November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR,
the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which, among others, resolved that all
NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003and shall be entitled to
separation benefits, as provided for in the Resolution. On the same day, the NPB
passed NPB Resolution No. 2002125 which created a transition team to manage and
implement the separation program. Cabinet secretaries were designated to the position
as board of directors.

As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with
thousands of his co-employees from the NPC were terminated. Petitioner then filed a
special civil action for certiorari and supplemental petition for mandamus, specifically
assailing the two aforementioned NPB Resolutions. Petitioners argued that Section 11,
Section 48 and Section 52 of EPIRA is violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution and, therefore, unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Is the designation of secretaries as board of directors of National Power

Corporation valid?

HELD: Yes. The delegation of the said official to the respective Board of Directors
were designation by Congress of additional functions and duties to the officials
concerned. Delegation connotes an imposition of additional duties,usually by law, upon
a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. Designation
does not entail payment of additiona l benefits or grant upon the person so designated
the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment a
designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal

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basis of an employee's right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and
approved appointment to the position, and not a mere designation.

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 JUDGE DADOLE vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
GR NO. 182574

Carpio, J.

FACTS: Petitioners RTC Judges Dadole et al and MTC judges Temistocles et. al.
stationed in Mandaue City received a monthly allowance of P1, 260 each pursuant to
the yearly appropriation ordinance. Eventually, in 1991, it was increased to P1, 500 for
each judge. Subsequently, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) then
issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 which provides that the additional monthly
allowances to be given by a local government unit should not exceed Pl,000 in
provinces and cities and P700in municipalities. Acting on the said DBM directive,the
Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners in excess of
the amount authorized by said circular The additional monthly allowances of the judges
shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the amount they
received in excess of P1000 from the last six months. Thus, petitioners filed with the
Office of the City Auditor a protest, arguing among others that They argued,among
others,that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by
dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional
allowances to judges stationed therein.

ISSUE: Is DBM Local Budget Circular No. 55 unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units,
the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and
the power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution:Under
Section 4S8, of RA 7160,the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55,
allows the grant of additional allowances to judges "when the finances of the city
government allow." The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum
limit to the additional allowances granted to judges.Thus, the Court need not belabor the
point that the finances of a city government may allow the grant of additional allowances
higher than P 1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual
expenditures. Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an
inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in the aforementioned provision of RA
7160.The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over LGUs by imposing a
prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement.

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 PAMATONG vs. COMELEC
GR NO. 161872

Tinga, J.

FACTS: Petitoner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Presdiency. However,
the COMELEC declared petitioner , together with 35 others, as nuisance candidates
who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or not nominated by a political party or
are not supported by registered political party with national constituency.

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court
arguing that this was against his right to "equal access to opportunities for public
service," citing Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution. He further argued that the
COMELEC was indirectly amending the Constitution in this manner.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC's refusal of Pamatong's request for presidential

candidacy violates the right to equal access to opportunities for public service.

HELD: No. No. What is recognized in Section 26,Article II of the Constitution is merely a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain
language of the provision. which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of
the sort.

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 AQUINO-SARMIENTO vs. MORATO
GR NO. 92541

Bidin, J.

FACTS: In February 1989, petitioner, a member of respondent Movie and

Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer
requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting
slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and
television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or
classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato
on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their
decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience
votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal On February 27,
1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among
others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the
board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which
rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman.
Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips.
However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued
Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision
of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.

ISSUE : Whether or not Resolution No. 10-89 is valid.

HELD : The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an

individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or
belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large. As may be gleaned
from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no
doubt that its very existence is public is character. it is an office created to serve public
interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to
privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental
agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the
decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members
concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither
personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public

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records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental
law of the land

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 FORT BONIFACIO DEV. CORP. vs. COMMISSION ON INTERNAL REVENUE
679 SCRA 566

Del Castillo, J.

FACTS: In 1995, Fort Bonifacio Dev. Corp purchased from the national
government a portion of the Fort Bonifacio reservation. On January 1, 1996, the
enactment of RA 7716 extended the coverage of VAT to real properties held primarily
for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business. The
FBDC then sought to register by submitting to BIR an inventory of all its real properties.

In October 1996, FBDCstarted selling GlobalCity lots to interested buyers. For the first
quarter of 1997, it paid the output VAT by making cash payments to the BIR and
credited its unutilized input tax credit on purchases of goods and services. Realizing
that its 8% transitional input tax credit was not applied in computing its output VAT for
the first quarter of 1997, FBDC filed with the BlR a claim for refund of the amount
erroneously paid as output VAT for the said period.However, the CIR denied refund on
the ground that "the benefit of transitional input tax credit comes with the condition that
business taxes should have been paid first." It contends that sinee FBDC acquired the
Global City property under a VAT-free sale transaction, it cannot avail of the transitional
input tax credit.

ISSUE: Is prior payment of taxes is required in availing of the transitional input tax
credit?

HELD: No. Nothing in Sec 105 of the NIRC indicates that prior payment of taxes
is necessary to avail of the transitional input tax credit . Clearly, all it requires is for the
taxpayer to file a beginning inventory with the BIR. Courts cannot limit the application or
coverage of a law nor can it impose conditions not provided therein because to do so
constitutes judicial legislation.

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 SAGUIGUIT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
494 SCRA 128

Garcia, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Nieves A. Saguiguit was charged eight counts of violations of

B.P. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Check Laws, by the RTC and the same
decision was upheld by the CA. Petitioner then interposed instant recourse urging the
Court not only to review the factual determinations of the CA, but also to reexamine
extant jurisprudence on the Bouncing Checks Law. Petitioner argues that the case calls
for a reexamination and modification, if not abandonment, of rulings to the effect that the
mere issuance of a check which is subsequently dishonored makes the issuer liable for
violation of BP Blg. 22 regardless of the intent of the parties.

ISSUE: Is the petition meritorious?

HELD: No. The Court ruled that what the petitioner asks is for the Court to delve
into the policy behind or wisdom of a statute, i.e., B.P. Blg. 22, which, under the doctrine
of separation of powers, it cannot do, matters of legislative wisdom being within the
domain of Congress.[5] Even with the best of motives, the Court can only interpret and
apply the law and cannot, despite doubts about its wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts
of justice have no right to encroach on the prerogatives of lawmakers, as long as it has
not been shown that they have acted with grave abuse of discretion. And while the
judiciary may interpret laws and evaluate them for constitutional soundness and to strike
them down if they are proven to be infirm, this solemn power and duty do not include
the discretion to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.

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 DISOMANGCOP vs. DATUMANONG
444 SCRA 203

Tinga, J.

FACTS: Pursuant to Sections 1 and 15, Article X OF THE 1987 Philippine

Constitution, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734), entitled An Act Providing for An
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, was enacted and signed
into law on 1 August 1989. The law called for the holding of a plebiscite in the provinces
of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and
Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos,
Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite
held on 19 November 1989, only four (4) provinces voted for the creation of an
autonomous region, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These
provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The law
contains elaborate provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and the areas
of jurisdiction which are reserved for the National Government.

In accordance with R.A. 6734, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on 12 October
1990, Executive Order No. 426 (E.O. 426), entitled Placing the Control and Supervision
of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other
purposes. Sections 1 to 3 of the Executive Order are its operative provisions.

ARMM was formally organized on 6 November 1990. President Corazon C. Aquino flew
to Cotabato, the seat of the Regional Government, for the inauguration. At that point,
she had already signed seven (7) Executive Orders devolving to ARMM the powers of
seven (7) cabinet departments, namely: (1) local government; (2) labor and
employment; (3) science and technology; (4) public works and highways; (5) social
welfare and development; (6) tourism; and (7) environment and national resources

Nearly nine (9) years later, on 20 May 1999, then Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar issued D.O. 119 which creates yhe
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national
infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the
province of Lanao del Sur. Almost two years later, President Estrada approved and
signed into law R.A. 8999, establishing engineering district in lanao del sur.

20
Congress later passed R.A. 9054, entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 6734,entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, as Amended.” On 23 July 2001, petitioners addressed a petition to
DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong, seeking the revocation of D.O. 119 and the
non-implementation of R.A. 8999. No action, however, was taken on the petition.

Petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and that it
violates the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the challenged
Department Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions
that have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in
Lanao del Sur.

ISSUE: Are R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 unconstitutional?

HELD:Yes. The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy
scheme. While they areclassified as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than ordinary
statutes because they enjoy affirmationby a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof
cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A.8999 in this case. The
amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.R.A. 8999 contravenes true
decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy.

21
22
 DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA
298 SCRA 756

Panganiban, J.

FACTS: During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and
Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to
2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad
manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member
of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those
who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had
voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had
chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo
warranto.

ISSUE: Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative
procedure

HELD: The Court ruled that it may not intervene in the internal affairs of
legislature. Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are
subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said
rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence
of a majority.

23
 PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. PRADO
298 SCRA 756

Cruz, J.

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 authorizing the
Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges from the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of
Deeds, along with certain other government offices. Franking privilege is a privilege
granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge.

The reason for said Republic Act is that In 1992, a study came about
where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal service comes
from the judiciary’s use of the postal service. Hence, the postal service recommended
that the franking privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary.

ISSUE: Is Sec. 35 of RA No. 7354 constitutional?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal
protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its
operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking
needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the
franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if
the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the
judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the
other departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the
remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those
who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it
from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored,
which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The
problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

24
 PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION vs. COMELEC
605 SCRA 167

Brion, J.

FACTS: A number of petitions assail the validity of B.P Blg. 883 calling for a
special election for a President and Vice-president on February 7, 1986. Marcos gave a
conditional resignation where he shall vacate the position only when a winner has been
proclaimed and qualified by taking his oath 10 days after the proclamation. Petitioners
question the validity of Marcos’ resignation as it did not create the vacancy needed for a
special election to be held and pray for prohibition to acts in relation to B.P. Blg. 883

ISSUE: Is the B.P Blg. 883 unconstitutional?

HELD: The Court failed to have 10 votes to declare B.P. Blg. 883.
unconstitutional. Whereas the original issue on B.P Blg. 883’s constitutionality, the issue
has now transformed into a political question where only the sovereign people can
decide in a fair, clean and honest election. As such, the Court dismissed the petitions
and denied their prayers of prohibition.

25
26
 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON vs. MENDEZ
679 SCRA 614

Brion, J.

FACTS: Pursuant to Executive Order No. 353, as issued by then President Garcia,
the Municipality of San Andres was created, segregating from the municipality of
San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, and
others, along with their respective sitios.

30 years after, the Municipality of San Narciso, sought the declaration of that executive
order contending that since it was pursuant to an executive order, which was a
presidential act, it was a usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature.

The municipality of San Andres filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the case
had already become moot and academic with the enactment of the Local Government
Code which provides that municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this
Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.

ISSUE: Is the alleged unconstitutionality of the creation of the municipality of San

Andres has already been cured by the enactment of the Local Government Code?

HELD: Yes. The Local Government Code provides that municipalities existing as
of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as
such.Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to
acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have
been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual
qualification against impairment of vested rights.

27
 GEROCHI vs. DOE
469 SCRA 1

Austria-Martinez, J.

FACTS: On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric Power

Industry Act of 2001 which sought to impose a universal charge on all end-users of
electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCOR’s projects. Petitioners Romeo P.
Gerochi and company assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law for being an
undue delegation of the power of taxation. It further argued that that the imposition of
the universal charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to
taxation without representation for not giving the consumers a chance to be heard and
be represented. Section 34 provides for the imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all
electricity end users after a period of (1) one year after the effectivity of the EPIRA Law.
The universal charge to be collected would serve as payment for government debts,
missionary electrification, equalization of taxes and royalties applied to renewable
energy and imported energy, environmental charge and for a charge to account for all
forms of cross subsidies for a period not exceeding three years. The universal charge
shall be collected by the ERC on a monthly basis from all end users and will then be
managed by the PSALM Corp. through the creation of a special trust fund.

ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of power to tax on the part of the ERC?

HELD: No. What was being sought to be collected by the ERC is not a tax but an
exaction of the regulatory power (police power) of the state. The universal charge under
section 34 is incidental to the regulatory duties of the ERC, hence the provision assailed
is not for generation of revenue and therefore it cannot be considered as tax, but an
execution of the states police power thru regulation.

28
 CHAVEZ vs. ROMULO
489 SCRA 161

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

FACTS: Then President Gloria MAcapagal Arroyo delivered a speech to PNP

directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the issuance of Permit to Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying
firearms outside of residence.

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been
issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines.
However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public
respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and
Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of thePNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.

ISSUE: Is respondent Ebdane authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines?

HELD: Yes. Basic is the rule that the power to make laws is vested in the
Congress. However, this rule admits of certain exceptions. One of which is when the
legislative body delegates its licensing power to certain persons, municipal corporations,
towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors.
Such licensing power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and
regulations.

29
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DACUYCUY
140 SCRA 453

Peralta, J.

FACTS: In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4,

1975, herein private respondents, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before
the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555 for violation of Republic
Act No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. The case was then set for
arraignment and trial. During the arraignment, private respondents pleaded not guilty to
the charge, alleging that the facts charged do not constitute an offense considering that
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for being unconstitutional on the
ground that it is an undue delegation of power and it imposes cruel punishment.

Section 32 thereof provides for the penalty for violating the law, which is a fine of not
less than P100 and not more than P1000, or imprisonment in the discretion of the court.

On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch
VIII, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to restrain the Municipal Judge,
Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of
said Criminal Case No.555 upon the ground that the former Municipal Court of Hindang
had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Judge Dacuycuy, the judge of the case, ruled that the said section is a 'matter of
statutory" construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE: Is there undue delegation of powers in the case?

HELD: Yes. The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the
courts to determine as if the judicial department was a legislative department. The
exercise of judicial power is not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and
create a law but is an instance of the administration of justice and the application of
existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on
separation of powers and non delegability of legislative power.

30
 BOC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. TEVES
239 SCRA 11

Vitug, J.

FACTS: On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed

into law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was
enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It
covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status. Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the
rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set
criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose
revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with
the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5)
perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit
an annual report to Congress.

Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) directly filed a petition

for certiorari and prohibition before the SC to declare R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it
inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without
trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to
impose the penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets;
that the same is without the benefit of hearing; and that the removal from service is
immediately executory.

ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 9335 a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution?

HELD: No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals
or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder
are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a
punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.

31
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to
inflict punishment without a judicial trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the
termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences
thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the
concerned employee are amply protected.

32
 ALDABA vs. COMELEC
527 SCRA 696

Nachura J.

FACTS: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare R.A. 9591
unconstitutional, which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan.
Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act
through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986,
Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor
Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the
population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City
of Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos
has at least 250,000 actual or projected.

HEDL: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is
unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that,
as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In
relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the
demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional
Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification.

33
 ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. vs. COMELEC
431 SCRA 534

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the
Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but
primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented
sectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Did rthe COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying

the said party-list?

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to
the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new
guidelines are as follows:

In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented”

or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that

34
are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who
lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.

35
36
 COMELEC vs CONRADO CRUZ
G.R. No. 186616 November 20, 2009

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

When RA 9164 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections” was passed, questions of the constitutionality were raised against
Section 2 which states that “No barangay elective official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms in the same position: Provided however, that the term of office shall
be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official was elected.

Before the 2007 Synchronized Barangay and SK Elections, some of the then incumbent
officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for
declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the said provision as it is violative
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution in as much as the barangay officials
were singled out that there consecutive limit shall be counted retroactively.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provision in Section 2 of RA 9164 is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.

RULING:

The equal protection clause is under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution which
provides: “Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” This is
however considering equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly
situated. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials
because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective
officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction,
expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a 3-year
term and 3-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the
application of the 3-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by
Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize
substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-
uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.

37
38
 Emilio A. Gonzales vs. Office of the President
G.R. No. 196231 February 26, 2014

Brion, J.:

Facts:

A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and
physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private complainant, Christian
M.Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said
cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police
Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave
Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police
officers in the Office of the Ombudsman.

Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a
finding that the material allegations made by the complainant had not been
substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the
offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution
recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the
same police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive
hearings despite due notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales
III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of
Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed
for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final
approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S
Insp.Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23,
2010 in desperate attempt to have him reinstated in the police service. In the aftermath
of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight Hong Kong
Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando?

39
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the
creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to
determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and
executive sessions.

The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable
negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's
motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any
justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for
reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission.

The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from
service. Hence the petition.

G.R. No. 196232:

Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major
General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan
Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder and
Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major
General Garcia’s urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence
militated against the grant of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner,
Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulitand sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea
Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the
PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.

Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the
hook with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently
strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of
Representatives ‘Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At
the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted
Committee Resolution No. 3,recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner
Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her
Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having committed
acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal

40
of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.

Hence the petition.

Issue:

Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative

disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to
the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.

Ruling:

Yes. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman

and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive.

While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers

all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those
officials removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive.
Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the
Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the
other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting
provisions in R.A. No.6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had
intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary
jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions -
Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external
authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of
administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without
in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over
all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of

41
"check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the
Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative
liabilities.

By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman

and Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law. While the
removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution,
which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no
constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A.
6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in
the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2,
authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.

The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutors
Implied from his Power to Appoint. In giving the President the power to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express
terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to
appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and
effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking
into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the
military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress,
therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy
Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.

Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish
the Independence of the Office of the

Ombudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No.6770 granting the President the
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly
negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The
independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it
from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of
the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is,
essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of

42
office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are
"reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."

Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling
short of constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's
act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman
without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, is considered a manifestation of his
undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all,
taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is
part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the
"champion of the people. “The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to
the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner’s request; that administrative liability was
pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying
the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately implemented; or that the
motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot
be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the
lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the
parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no
evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable
motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner
and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed
and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to
a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority,
cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no
intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public
trust.

The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively
against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for her
removal from office as provided for under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.

43
 G.R. No. 168056, September 1,2005

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. ERMITA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:

In this case, the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 or the RVAT Law (Revitalized Value
Added Tax Law) was put into issue. It was alleged, among others, that said law was not
duly enacted.

R.A. 9337 originated as House Bill No. 3705. After 3rd reading in the lower house, it
was transmitted to the Senate where it was lodged as Senate Bill No. 1950. In the
Senate, several provisions, which were not found in the H.B. 3705, were inserted.

After 3rd reading in the Senate, the lower house found that the House version and the
Senate version have disagreeing provisions. And pursuant to Congress Rules, both
Houses agreed to form a Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) where
representatives from both Houses were sent to settle the disagreeing provisions.

Apparently however, the BCC further inserted several provisions to S.B. 1950, i.e.,
stand by power was granted to the President to raise the valued-added tax rate. Further
still, the “No pass” provision was deleted – this provision prohibited the passing of
value-added tax to consumers.

Nevertheless, said version was passed into law hence the promulgation of R.A. No.
9337.

In 2005, ABAKADA GURO Party List, headed by its officers Attys. Samson Alcantara
and Ed Vincent Albano, as well as co-petitioner [then] Congressman Francis Escudero,
questioned the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337

Respondents in this case invoked the ruling in the case of Tolentino vs Secretary of
Finance or the Enrolled Bill Doctrine. Said case relied upon by respondents state that

44
the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are
conclusive of its due enactment. As such, R.A. No. 9337 enjoys the conclusive
presumption of constitutionality and that the courts cannot go behind the enrolled bill.

ABAKADA GURO et al insists that the Tolentino ruling should be abandoned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this case.

Ruling: Yes. There is no reason to abandon the ruling in Tolentino. The Supreme Court
ruled that the Supreme Court is not the proper venue to raise concerns regarding
parliamentary procedures. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
observance the courts have no concern. Congress is the best judge of how it should
conduct its own business expeditiously and in the most orderly manner.

If a change is desired in the practice of the Bicameral Conference Committee it must be

sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but
is only an internal rule of each house. To date, Congress has not seen it fit to make
such changes adverted to by the Court. It seems, therefore, that Congress finds the
practices of the bicameral conference committee to be very useful for purposes of
prompt and efficient legislative action.

45
 David v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts:

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be
implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA
cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all

permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led
to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was
raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups.
Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On
the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however
grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos.
His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and
GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national
emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that
PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared
by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is
actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power,
take care power and take over power.

ISSUE:Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

RULING:The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting
of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected

46
due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case
at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some
provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017
and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of
the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such
power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing
‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not
primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is
not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call
upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the
overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and
rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus,
claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that

47
are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains
that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC
considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such
power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised
in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly
declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces
‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has
been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred
that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative
power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision
is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as
provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar
as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a
state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative

48
power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws
but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions
such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the
word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but
rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare
the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority
from Congress must be based on the following:

1 There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It
is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

49
 AQUINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.
Facts:
The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared
as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First (1st) and Second (2nd) Districts of the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment

Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President
Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and
apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall be
composed of 176,383 population count.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district
under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by
the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be
stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement, unless
otherwise fixed by law.

Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects:
first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Second, petitioners have no locus standi to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.

Issue:
Is R.A. No. 9716 unconstitutional?

Held:
Yes. The distinction between a city and a province was explained under the second
sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution which states that a province is entitled to a
representative, while in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first be satisfied.
In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1.6 million making the province entitled to two
additional districts from four. Based on the formulation of the Ordinance, other than
population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were
mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264.

50
 ALDABA VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Carpio, J.

Facts:
This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591
which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A.
violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a
city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented
in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House
Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a
population of 223, 069 in 2007. House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as
requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III
Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by
the year 2010. 

Issue:
Is R.A. 9591 unconstitutional?

Held:
Yes. It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for
being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by
the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this,
Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic
projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no
basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements
supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which
provides:
“The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are
declared official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated
whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.”
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the
Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated. It was also computed that the
correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of
223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010. It was
emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative
reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.

51
52
 NAVARRO VS. ERMITA
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
Nachura, J.
Facts:
Respodents allege that the province, which is composed of more than one island, is
exempted from the land area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically
paragraph 2 of Article 9 which states that “[t]he land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.” The certificate of
compliance issued by the Lands Management Bureau was also based on the exemption
under paragraph 2, Article 9 of the IRR.

Issue:
Has R.A. No. 9355 has failed to comply with either the territorial or population
requirement contained in Section 461 of the LGC?

Held:
There are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be contiguous; and
(2)the land area must be sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to
meet the requirements of its populace. A sufficient land area in the creation of a province
is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as provided by Section 461 of the Local Government
Code .Paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides two instances of exemption from the
requirement of territorial contiguity, thus:(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do
not contribute to the income of the province. However, said exemption pertains only to
the requirement of territorial contiguity. It clearly states that the requirement of territorial
contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province comprising two or more
islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province.

53
 JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193237, April 24, 2012
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City.  He migrated to Australia when he
was eight years old and acquired Australian citizenship.  In 2008, he returned to the
Philippines and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and
was issued a certificate of reacquisition of citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and
he renounced his Australian citizenship. Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private Respondent Erasmo, the barangay captain,
opposed the registration.  COMELEC approved the application and included Jalosjos in
the voter's list.  This decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at the RTC. Jalosjos then
filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010
elections.  Erasmo filed a petition to cancel the COC on the ground of failure to comply
with the one year residency requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC).
COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back
to the Philippines, he was merely a guest or transient at his brother's house in Ipil, and
for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.  Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the
elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that petitioner did not present ample
proof of a bona fide intention to establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

HELD:
NO.  The COMELEC is incorrect.  Jalosjos has successfully proven by his acts of
renouncing his Australian citizenship and by living in Ipil, that he has changed his
domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay. The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the elections.  For the purposes of
election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile:  i.e. he must
have an intention to reside in a particulaar place, but must also have personal presence
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Further, the facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon city.  When he
acquired Australian citizenship, Australia became his domicile by operation of law and
by choice.  On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to
live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent

54
to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship,
and renounced his allegiance to that country and reacquired his old citizenship by taking
an oath of allegiance to the Philippines.  By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to
live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since
lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. To hold that Jalosjos has not
established a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of
origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would
violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

55
 MITRA VS. COMELEC
January 25, 2010
BRION, J:

Facts:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra
was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then
included, among other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City.
He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and
represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of
2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second term as Representative),
Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be
a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new
status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for candidates
for elective provincial officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra
applied for the transfer of his Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of
Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of
Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of
Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the
respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC.
Issue:
Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.
Held:
YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme
Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency
requirement as mandated by the Constitution.
The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010
elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able to present a
convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitra’s evidence of effective transfer to and
residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC.
Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude
that Mitra’s statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."

56
 TAGOLINO VS. HRET
G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Facts:

On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of

candidacy (CoC) with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking
congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under
the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing
candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that
Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City,
Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-
adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one
(1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for
the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course
and/or cancelled.

On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution granting

Juntilla’s petition without any qualification. On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez
(private respondent) filed her CoC together with a Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute
candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In response to
various letter-requests submitted to the COMELEC’s Law Department (Law
Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions,
issued Resolution No. 8890 on May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the
recommendation of the said department to allow the substitution of private respondent.

Issue:
Was there a valid substitution?

Held:
Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that if an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a
person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. Evidently,
Sec. 77 requires that there be an “official candidate” before candidate substitution
proceeds.

57
 ROMUALDEZ VS. MARCOS
248 SCRA 300
Kapunan, J.
Facts:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from
1938 to 1949.  She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College
now Divine Word University also in Tacloban.  Subsequently, she taught in Leyte
Chinese School still in Tacloban.  She went to manila during 1952 to work with her
cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives.  In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was
still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter.  When Pres.
Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where
she registered as a voter.  In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila.  She served as
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections.  Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position,
filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.  The
petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which
she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.  She arrived at the seven months residency
due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

Issue:
Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

Held:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes.  The court are in
favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the

58
First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district
for the following reasons:

1.  A minor follows domicile of her parents.  Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of

origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 
2.  Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and
acts which correspond with the purpose.  In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.  
3.  A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term
“residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law.  When Imelda
married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.  
4.  Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to
the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her
domicile of choice.  To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested.  She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

59
 AQUINO VS. COMELEC
248 SCRA 400
Kapunan, J.
Facts:
Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new 2 nddistrict of Makati stating
that he has been residing there for ten months. When his candidacy was opposed he
filed another certificate of candidacy stating that he has been residing in Makati for more
than a year by virtue of a contract of lease. COMELEC dismissed petition for Aquino’s
disqualification and garnered majority vote on 1995 election. Mateo Bedon filed for
suspension of his proclamation. COMELEC decided in favour of Bedon hence the
petition for certiorari.

Issue: Has Aquino failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Held:
Yes. Aquino failed to prove that he had established not just residence but domicile of
choice in Makati. In his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, heindicated that
he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, for 52 years; he was a registered
voter of the same district; his birth certificate placesConcepcion, Tarlac, as birthplace.
Thus, his domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac; and his bare assertion of transfer
of domicile from Tarlac to Makati ishardly supported by the facts of the case.

60
 COQUILLA VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002
Mendoza, J.

Facts:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and
resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after
joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence
certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States. He
eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern
Samar which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of
candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s
certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in
Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his
oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was
proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and
ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.

Issue:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year
before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.

Held:
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of
Oras, Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The
question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a
material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to
cancellation.  In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a
candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This
is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this
case is thus fully justified.

61
 ABUNDO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 201716
Velasco, Jr., J.
Facts:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010
national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of
canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time,
performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested Torres' election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared
the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of
office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for
a period of a little over one year and one month.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat in the May 2010
elections, Torres lost no time in seeking the former's disqualification to run, predicated
on the three-consecutive term limit rule.
On June 16, 2010, COMELEC issued a Resolution finding for Abundo accordingly
proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga. Private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega)
commenced a quo warranto action to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds
Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.

Issues:
The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has consecutively served for three
terms despite the fact that he only served the remaining one year and one month of the
second... term as a result of an election protest.
whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising
from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is
considered as full service of the term for purposes of the... application of the three
consecutive term limit for elective local officials.

Held:
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo's three successive,
continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was
initially deprived of title to, and was veritably... disallowed to serve and occupy, an office
to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful
choice of the electorate.

62
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the
aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
the Court finds Abundo's case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during
which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an
interruption, which effectively removed Abundo's case from the ambit of the three-term...
limit rule.
during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election
protest in his favor,... Abundo assumed the mayoralty post... for a period of a little over
one year... and one month... it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully
the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months,... Abundo cannot
plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter
of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor... serve the functions of the said
elective office.
The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding
right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed
election winner.
Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that
time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and
serve such elective office. For... another, not having been declared winner yet, Abundo
cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a title
which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes,... Abundo
was not entitled to the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his
favor.
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and
effective interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and served barely over a
year of the remaining term.

63
 PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ
15 SCRA 479
REGALA, J.
Facts:
                Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of
RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation
and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both
Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent
the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their
term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The
same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because it allows members and
officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity
equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in
case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees
of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are
given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service,
which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick
leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are
concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in
violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or
pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the
petitioner does not constitute “forbidden compensation” within the meaning of Section
14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute
class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under
the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each
retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

Issue:
                Does Republic Act 3836 violate Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution?

Held:
                Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation
for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but
it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: “No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase.” In
other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the
National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected
subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI,
includes in the term compensation “other emoluments”. This is the pivotal point on this

64
fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic
Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term “other emoluments.”
“Emolument” is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which
is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an
office, as salary, fees and perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument,
because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office. Republic
Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on
June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without
awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore
unconstitutional.

65
 POBRE VS. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
597 SCRA 1
Velasco, Jr., J.

FACTS:
Out of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief
Justice, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago delivered a privilege speech on the Senate
floor where she was quoted as saying that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court” and calling the
Court a “Supreme Court of idiots.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege speech is actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court.

HELD:
NO, because her statements, being part of her privilege speech as a member of
Congress was covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity.
Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding
under the Rules of Court. 

66
 PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS
G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000
Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law by reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.

HELD:
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated
alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the
“mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of
inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert
that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not
a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to
the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

67
 TRILLANES IV VS. JUDGE PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Carpio Morales, J.
FACTS:
July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and
key national officials.
On the same day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to
suppress the rebellion. 
Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup
d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of Makati.
4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political
arena and won a seat in the Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on June
30, 2007.
Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of
Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests". The trial court
denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules
which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general

HELD:
No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees
for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit
their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights
more limited than those of the public.
When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during
the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be
released on bail or on recognizance.
Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political
rights.

68
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings
for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes
of the correction system.

LIBAN VS. GORDON

G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Facts:
During respondent's incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,[1] he
was elected Chairman of the PNRC
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board... of
Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution

Issue:
Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section
13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution

Held:
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions... the Philippine
government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and
does not receive any appropriation from the
Philippine Congress.[13] The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private
individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its
Board of Governors
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the
thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students.
Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable
organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an
office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

69
70
 GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
677 SCRA 750
Peralta, J.

Facts:
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all
articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This
additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude
oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the
additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous
5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%.
Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
“All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.”
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in
Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

Issue:
Are E.O.s 475 and 478 unconsitutional?

Held:
Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue
and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather
than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures,
are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by
the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
“The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and

71
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.”
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President
“subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within
specific limits” “tariff rates and other duties or imposts. In this case, it is the Tariff and
Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

72
 PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 118364, August 10, 1995

FACTS:
In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur
filed a case against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same
province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada (a
clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment
and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no
arraignment notice had ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding against
him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case
himself that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage
because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there
was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes
claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment.
Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be
charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually
denied by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by

order of the Sandiganbayan

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by
the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the
prerogatives of congress.  The SC ruled:
“x x x.  Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which
deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for
disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a
preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.”

73
 TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
235 SCRA 630
FACTS:
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known
as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill
did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section
24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that
it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in
Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred
that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and
substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the
Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to
note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)

ISSUE:
Is the EVAT laW procedurally infirm?

HELD:
No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means,
according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that
there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than
having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This
practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of
Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a
significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

74
 BRILLANTES VS. COMELEC
432 SCRA 269, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting,
counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local
elections. It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines
(ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials and adopt new electoral forms and
printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation during the May 11,
1998 presidential elections, particularly in counting the votes collected from the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, the failure of the
machines to correctly read a number of automated ballots discontinued its
implementation.

Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172 on January 24, 2003, allocating the
sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the AES in time for the May 10, 2004
elections. On February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing the release of a further
supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project of the COMELEC.

The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual voting and
counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations with companies
Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of the computerized voting/counting machines)
were discontinued. Despite this impediment, the COMELEC nevertheless continued the
electronic transmission of advanced unofficial results of the 2004 elections for national,
provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count." 

ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the COMELEC in
authorizing the use of election funds in consolidating the election results for the May 10,
2004 elections should be declared VOID, as it is unconstitutional. 

HELD:
YES. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said Resolution No. 6712 preempts the
sole authority of the Congress to canvass the votes of the election returns for the
President and the Vice-President. 

75
Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole and exclusive authority
vested in the Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-
President. It is a grave error on the part of the respondent to have ignored the
misapprehensions addressed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin Abalos during the 2004 saying that such act would be in violation of
the Constitution (section 4 of Article VII):
"any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect
constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only
would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but would also be lacking of any
constitutional authority."
The existence of an accredited Citizen’s arm: Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166,
as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436,
the accredited citizen’s arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a
copy of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of the votes,
whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity, including the respondent
COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the election returns for purposes of
conducting an "unofficial" count.
In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns, while required to be
delivered to the COMELEC under the said laws, are not intended for undertaking an
"unofficial" count. The said copies are archived and unsealed only when needed by to
verify election results in connection with resolving election disputes that may be
established.
Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code:  The Court contends that
Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the
statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latest
technological and election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the
COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties
and all candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and
electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such
devices, after failing to submit any document proving that it had notified all political
parties of the intended adoption of Resolution No. 6712.

76
 DRILON VS DE VENECIA
594 SCRA 749
Carpio Morales, J.
FACTS:
Issues involving the deprivation of a seat in the Commission on Appointments should be
lodged before the respective Houses of Congress and not with the Supreme Court. 
The Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to
the Commission on Appointments (CA). In the second week of August 2007, Franklin
Drilon et al. went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for
the Liberal Party in the CA. However, no report or recommendation was proffered by the
Legal Department, drawing Representative Tañada to request a report or
recommendation on the matter within three days. Hence spawned the filing by Drilon (in
representation of the Liberal Party), et al., alleging that the liberal party with at least
twenty (20) members who signed herein, is constitutionally entitled to one (1) seat in the
CA. Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal of PDP-Laban wrote a letter
claiming that the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation‖. The Senator avers that political parties PMP and KAMPI
were given more seats than they were entitled to in the CA and the political party PRP
and other Independents cannot be represented in the CA. The CA, speaking through its
Ex-Officio Chairman Manny Villar, advised Senator Madrigal that CA has neither the
power nor the discretion to reject a member who is elected by either House, and that
any complaints about the election of a member or members should be addressed to the
body that elected them. Villar further explained that instructions have been given to
transmit the original copies of Senator Madrigal‘s letters to the Senate Secretary for
their immediate inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate.
Madrigal, not satisfied with the CA‘s action, filed a petition with the Supreme Court for
prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/ writ of preliminary injunction against Senator Villar as Senate President and Ex-
Officio Chairman of the CA.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petition before the Supreme Court is proper.

HELD:
The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the
designation of a Liberal Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as
prayed for, the petition is withdrawn. As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it
fails. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a result of the
act complained of. Her petition does not in fact allege that she or her political party

77
PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP-Laban possesses
personal and substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi.
Senator Madrigal‘s primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of Congress and
not with this Court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the
House is necessary before she may bring her petition to court. Senator Villar‘s
invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken.

78
 ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA
G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998

Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo
made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the
Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano
moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none,
approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What
is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the
Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules
of the House 

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they
are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite
number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than

79
members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum
but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House. 

80
 PEOPLE VS. SILTON
600 SCRA 476
Ynares-Santiago, J.

Facts:
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy
pursuant toArt. 202 (2) of the RPC in two separate Informations. Accused were found
wandering and loiteringaround San Pedro and Legaspi Streets of Davao City, without
any visible means to support herself norlawful and justifiable purpose. Respondents
filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional for
being vague and overboard. The municipal trial court denied the motions,directed
respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits, and declared that the law on
vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power or the power of promoting
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property) and justified
by the Latin maxim “salus populiest suprema lex” (which calls for the subordination of
individual benefit to the interest of the greater number. Respondents filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the RTC challenging theconstitutionality of the anti-
vagrancy law and claiming that Art 202 (2) violated the equal protectionclause. The RTC
granted the petition of the herein respondents and declared Art. 202 (2)
unconstitutional.

Issue:
Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy violate the equal protection clause?

Ruling:
No. Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does
itdiscriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws
are punished not fortheir status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting
themselves under such circumstancesas to endanger the public peace or cause alarm
and apprehension in the community. Being poor orunemployed is not a license or
a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.

81
 SABIO VS. GORDON
504 SCRA 704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No.
455 “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),  =Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time,
he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is
to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited
with contempt.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

Held:
No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence
and expansive construal.  The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more
evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is
broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.”  Verily, the Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and  that “the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7 states that “the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and

82
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law”.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making
and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with
the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.

83
 Senate of the Phil. V. Ermita
488 SCRA 1: 495 SCRA 170. April 20, 2000
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts:

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, ENSURING

OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE
TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF
LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, which,
pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.

 In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives

Members Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel
Virador and Teodoro Casino, COURAGE, an organization of government
employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties (CODAL), a group of
lawyers dedicated to the promotion of justice, democracy and peace, all claiming
to have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of the
issues they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void
for being unconstitutional; that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be prohibited
from imposing, and threatening to impose sanctions on officials who appear
before Congress due to congressional summons. Additionally, petitioners claim
that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from fulfilling their
respective obligations;
 In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his
constitutional rights as a citizen, taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by
the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that E.O. 464 be declared null
and void for being unconstitutional;
 In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.[12] (ALG), alleging
that as a coalition of 17 legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged
in developmental lawyering and work with the poor and marginalized sectors in
different parts of the country, and as an organization of citizens of the Philippines
and a part of the general public, it has legal standing to institute the petition to
enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, a right
which was denied to the public by E.O. 464;
 In G.R. No. 169777, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, filed its petition for
certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the
issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material

84
 injury, as it has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since
it directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers
and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern;
 In G.R. No. 169834, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly
elected into the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar
petition for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it is affected by the challenged
E.O. 464 because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its
members in Congress, particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation
and transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis
between the executive and legislative branches of the government.

Issue: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

Held: Yes, E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress because it
deprives Congress of the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the
question of whether such withholding of information violates the Constitution,
consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known
as the power of inquiry, is in order.

85
 Gudani vs. Senga
495 SCRA 671 & 498 SCRA 671. August 15,2006.
Tinga, J:

Facts: On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several
senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security (Senate Committee) scheduled on 28 September 2005.
The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections
emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing
of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano.

Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga
(Gen. Senga) were among the several AFP officers who received a letter invitation from
Sen. Biazon to attend the 28 September 2005 hearing. On 23 September 2005, Gen.
Senga replied through a letter to Sen. Biazon that he would be unable to attend the
hearing due to a previous commitment in Brunei, but he nonetheless directed other
officers from the AFP who were invited to attend the hearing.

On 27 September 2005, Gen. Senga wrote a letter to Sen. Biazon, requesting the
postponement of the hearing scheduled for the following day, since the AFP Chief of
Staff was himself unable to attend said hearing, and that some of the invited officers
also could not attend as they were attending to other urgent operational matters. By this
time, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had already departed Baguio for Manila to
attend the hearing.

Then on the evening of 27 September 2005, at around 10:10 p.m., a message was
transmitted to the PMA Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga, stating as
follows:

PER INSTRUCTION OF HER EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL

APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER
APPROVAL. INFORM BGEN FRANCISCO F GUDANI AFP AND LTC ALEXANDER
BALUTAN PA (GSC) ACCORDINGLY.

The following day, Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time informing
the senator that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to
appear before the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the
conduct of the 2004 elections.

86
Issue: Whether or not the Petitioners violated E.O. 64.

Held: No, the Petitioners did not violated E.O. 64 which states that no AFP officer
should appear before any congressional or senate hearing without the president’s
approval. In the present case, petitioners were charged for violating the direct order of
Gen. Senga not to appear before the Senate Committee, an order that stands
independent of the executive order.

87
 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
564 SCRA 152. March 25, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication

(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.

Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain

personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among
those invited. He was summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26
and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming
he was out of town during the other dates.

In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that
several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially
approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA
acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be financed
through a loan from the Chinese Government.

On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven
(11) hours. He disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on
what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner could invoke executive privilege.

Held: Yes, the petitioner could invoke executive privilege. In Nixon, In Re Sealed Case
and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege, to wit:

1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power.

88
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor
of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
operational proximity with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege
on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under
conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary
in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and
executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

89
 Balag v. Senate of the Philippines
G.R. No. 234608. July 3, 2018.
Gesmundo, J.:

Facts:
On September 17, 2017, Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III (Horacio Ill), a first year
law student of the University of Sto. Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing
conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity (AJ Fraternity) of the same university.
On September 19, 2017, SR No. 504, was filed by Senator Juan Miguel Zubiri (Senator
Zubiri)5 condemning the death of Horacio III and directing the appropriate Senate
Committee to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, to hold those responsible
accountable.
On September 20, 2017, SR No. 510, entitled: "A Resolution Directing the Appropriate
Senate Committees to Conduct An Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into the Recent Death
of Horacio Tomas Castillo III Allegedly Due to Hazing-Related Activities" was filed by
Senator Paolo Benigno Aquino IV. Petitioner, however, did not attend the hearing
scheduled on September 25, 2017.

On October 11, 201 7, Senator Lacson as Chairman of Senate Committee on Public

Order and Dangerous Drugs, and as approved by Senate President Aquilino Pimentel
III, issued a Subpoena Ad Testifzcandum addressed to petitioner directing him to
appear before the committee and to testify as to the subject matter under inquiry.
Another Subpoena Ad Testifzcandum was issued on October 17, 2017, which was
received by petitioner on the same day, requiring him to attend the legislative hearing
on October 18, 2017. During petitioner kept on invoking his right against self-
incrimination and refuses to answer simple questions which were given to him which
held him in contempt.

Issue: whether respondent senate committees acted with grave abuse of discretion in
conducting the legislative inquiry and citing petitioner in contempt.

Held: No, respondent senate committees did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
conducting the legislative inquiry and citing petitioner in contempt. In the present case,
the court has decided that the case is already moot and academic. However, this Court
may assume jurisdiction over a case that has been rendered moot and academic by
supervening events when any of the following instances are present:

(1) Grave constitutional violations;

(2) Exceptional character of the case;
(3) Paramount public interest;
(4) The case presents an opportunity to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; or
(5) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

90
In the present case, all of these requirements are present and thus senate committee
could still conduct a legislative inquiry and cite petitioner in contempt.

91
 Belgica, et. al. v. Honorable executive Secretary Ochoa, et. al.
GR No. 208493. November 19, 2013
Perlas-Bernabe, J.:

Facts: On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of

the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining
respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective
capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of
Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds
for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called,
and from approving further releases pursuant thereto.

Issue: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provision on separation of powers.

Held: The 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional. The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily
contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and
properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution
"covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities," the "regulation and
release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget
execution cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the
three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.175
Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should
exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the
national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.

92
 Araullo, et. al. v. Aquino III, et, al.
GR No. 209135. July 01, 2014
Bersamin, J.:

Facts: On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself,
had been allotted an additional ₱50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.

Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a
public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration
Program,1 explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP,
a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic
expansion. He clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators based on their
letters of request for funding; and that it was not the first time that releases from the
DAP had been made because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up
spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic
product (GDP) to slow down. He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually
taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services;2 (2)
unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year;
and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support
faster-disbursing projects.

The DBM soon came out to claim in its website3 that the DAP releases had been
sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds;
and that the savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased
appropriations, like unreleased Personnel Services4 appropriations that would lapse at
the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and
discontinued projects per zero based budgeting findings;5 and (2) the withdrawal of
unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been
earlier released to the agencies of the National Government.

Issue: Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."

Held: Yes, the DAP violates Sec.29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. The unobligated
allotments of all agencies and departments as of June 30, 2012 that were charged
against the continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2011 and the 2012 GAA (R.A. No.
10155) were subject to withdrawal through the issuance of negative SAROs, but such
allotments could be either: (1) reissued for the original PAPs of the concerned agencies
from which they were withdrawn; or (2) realigned to cover additional funding for other
existing PAPs of the concerned agencies; or (3) used to augment existing PAPs of any
agency and to fund priority PAPs not considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be
started or implemented in 2012. Financing the other priority PAPs was made subject to

93
the approval of the President. Note here that NBC No. 541 used terminologies like
"realignment" and "augmentation" in the application of the withdrawn unobligated
allotments.

Taken together, all the issuances showed how the DAP was to be implemented and
funded, that is — (1) by declaring "savings" coming from the various departments and
agencies derived from pooling unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased
appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying the "savings" and
unprogrammed funds to augment existing PAPs or to support other priority PAPs.

94
 TESDA v. COA
GR No. 196418. February 10,2015
Bersamin, J.:

Facts: The TESDA, an instrumentality of the Government established under Republic

Act No. 7796, is an attached agency of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE). In view of the inadequate policy on basic health and safety conditions of work
experienced by government personnel, then DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas
issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 430, series of 2003, authorizing the payment of
healthcare maintenance allowance of P5,000.00 to all officials and employees of the
DOLE, including its bureaus and attached agencies. AO No. 430 was purportedly based
on Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 33, series of 1997,
and Section 34 of the General Provisions of the 2003 General Appropriations Act.

Upon post-audit, COA State Auditor IV Rosemarie A. Valenzuela issued AOM No. 04-
005 on January 26, 2004, and later endorsed the matter to the COA Director of the
LAO-National for appropriate legal action. AOM No. 04-005 stated in part the basis of
payment made by management was CSC Memorandum Circular No. 33 series of 1997
and Section 34 of the General Provisions of the 2003 General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Following these provisions, the Department of Labor and Employment issued
DOLE Administrative Order No 430, series of 2003 authorizing payment of said medical
allowance to all its personnel including those of its bureau and attached agencies at
P5,000.00 each and pro rata equivalent for those employees who have less than four
(4) months continuous service.

CSC Director Imelda Laceras of Region VII, in her letter to DOLE Region VII Auditor,
Ms. Damiana Pelino, informed the latter that there are no existing guidelines authorizing
the grant of Health Care Maintenance Allowance and medical Allowance to all
government officials and employees. In the absence therefore of specific legal authority,
payment of said benefit cannot be allowed under existing rules. Hence, DOLE
Administrative Order No. 430, series of 2003 is clearly without legal basis. Atty.
Rebecca Mislang, Officer In-Charge of the COA LAO-National, subsequently issued
Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2006-015 dated May 26, 2006, addressed to then
TESDA Director General Augusto Syjuco, indicating that the payment of the allowance
had no legal basis, it being contrary to Republic Act No. 6758 (Salary Standardization
Law of 1989). ND No. 2006-015 identified the following persons as liable for the
disallowance, namely:
Dante V. Liban, Director General, for allowing the payment of said allowance;

Sonia Lipio, Chief, HRMO, for having direct supervision over the transaction;

Raul K. Tanchico, OIC, Asst. Director OCSA, for approving the transaction;

Cariza A. Dacuma, Chief Accountant, for certifying to the completeness and propriety of
the transaction; and

95
All TESDA officials and employees per attached payroll as recipients.
The TESDA filed an appeal before the COA Commission Proper, assailing the
disallowance by the LAO-National.

However, the COA Commission Proper promulgated the now assailed decision dated
March 23, 2010, denying the appeal for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondents gravely erred in holding the authorizing officers of
petitioner personally liable for the total disallowed payment in the amount of two million
two hundred seven thousand pesos (p2,207,000.00).

Held: No, the respondents did not gravely erred in holding the authorizing officers of
petitioner personally liable for the total disallowed payment in the amount of two million
two hundred seven thousand pesos (p2,207,000.00).

It bears reminding that pursuant to Article VI Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law. Hence, the GAA should be purposeful, deliberate, and precise in its contents
and stipulations. Also, the COA was correct when it held that the provisions of the GAA
were not self-executory. This meant that the execution of the GAA was still subject to a
program of expenditure to be approved by the President, and such approved program of
expenditure was the basis for the release of funds. For that matter, Section 34, Chapter
5, Book VI of the Administrative Code (Executive Order No. 292) states that –
Section 34. Program of Expenditure - The Secretary of Budget shall recommend to
the President the year’s program of expenditure for each agency of the government on
the basis of authorized appropriations. The approved expenditure program shall
constitute the basis for fund release during the fiscal period, subject to such policies,
rules and regulations as may be approved by the President.

96
 COMELEC v. Judge Quijano-Padilla, et. al.
September 8, 2002. G. R. No. 151992
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts:
In 1996, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise
known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the modernization and
computerization of the voters' registration list and the appropriate of funds therefor "in
order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters." Pursuant
thereto, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution No. 00-
0315 approving in principle the Voter's Registration and Identification System Project
(VRIS) Project for brevity).

On September 9, 1999, the COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the
supply and installations of information technology equipment and ancillary services for
its VRIS Project. Private respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA)
pre-qualified and was allowed to participate as one of the bidders. After the public
bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA's bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos
garnered the highest total weighted score and was declared the winning bidder.
However, under Republic Act No. 8760 the budget appropriated by Congress for the
COMELECs modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual
available funds under the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief
Accountant of the COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos.

Issue: May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract

with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the
project?

Held: No, a successful bidder cannot compel a government agency to formalize a

contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by
Congress for the project.
Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that "no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."[47]
Thus, in the execution of government contracts, the precise import of this constitutional
restriction is to require the various agencies to limit their expenditures within the
appropriations made by law for each fiscal year.
Complementary to the foregoing constitutional injunction are pertinent provisions of law
and administrative issuances that are designed to effectuate the above mandate in a
detailed manner.[48] Sections 46 and 47, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as "Administrative Code of 1987," provide:
"SEC. 46. Appropriation Before Entering into Contract. - (1) No contract involving the
expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation
therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to
cover the proposed expenditure; and x x x

97
"SEC. 47 no contract involving the expenditure of public funds by any government
agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official of the
agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that
funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and that the amount necessary to
cover the proposed contract for the current calendar year is available for expenditure on
account thereof, subject to verification by the auditor concerned.
It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of
appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or
conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts. The obvious intent is
to impose such conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed contract.
In the case at bar, there seems to be an oversight of the legal requirements as early as
the bidding stage. The first step of a Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) is to determine
whether the bids comply with the requirements. The BAC shall rate a bid "passed" only
if it complies with all the requirements and the submitted price does not exceed the
approved budget for the contract."

98
 Tan v. Del Rosario
237 SCRA 324. October 3, 1994
VITUG, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner contends that the title of House Bill No. 34314, progenitor of Republic Act No.
7496, is a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed
and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession”.

The full text of the title actually reads:

“An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed
and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21
and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended.”

The pertinent provisions of Sections 21 and 29, so referred to, of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as now amended, provide:

Sec. 21. Tax on citizens or residents. —

xxx xxx xxx

(f) Simplified Net Income Tax for the Self-Employed and/or Professionals Engaged
in the Practice of Profession. — A tax is hereby imposed upon the taxable net income
as determined in Section 27 received during each taxable year from all sources, other
than income covered by paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of this section by every
individual whether
a citizen of the Philippines or an alien residing in the Philippines who is self-employed or
practices his profession herein, determined in accordance with the following schedule:

Not over P10,000 3%

Over P10,000 P300 + 9%

but not over P30,000 of excess over P10,000

Over P30,000 P2,100 + 15%

but not over P120,00 of excess over P30,000

Over P120,000 P15,600 + 20%

but not over P350,000 of excess over P120,000

Over P350,000 P61,600 + 30%

of excess over P350,000

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Sec. 29. Deductions from gross income. — In computing taxable income subject
to tax under Sections 21(a), 24(a), (b) and (c); and 25 (a)(1), there shall be allowed as
deductions the items specified in paragraphs (a) to (i) of this section: Provided,
however, That in computing taxable income subject to tax under Section 21 (f) in the
case of individuals engaged in business or practice of profession, only the following
direct costs shall be allowed as deductions:

(a) Raw materials, supplies and direct labor;

(b) Salaries of employees directly engaged in activities in the course of or pursuant

to the business or practice of their profession;

(c) Telecommunications, electricity, fuel, light and water;

(d) Business rentals;

(e) Depreciation;

(f) Contributions made to the Government and accredited relief organizations for the
rehabilitation of calamity stricken areas declared by the President; and

(g) Interest paid or accrued within a taxable year on loans contracted from
accredited financial institutions which must be proven to have been incurred in
connection with the conduct of a taxpayer's profession, trade or business.

For individuals whose cost of goods sold and direct costs are difficult to determine, a
maximum of forty per cent (40%) of their gross receipts shall be allowed as deductions
to answer for business or professional expenses as the case may be.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7496 is unconstitutional for violating the
constitutional requirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable.

Held: No, Republic Act No. 7496 is not unconstitutional. Uniformity of taxation, like the
kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan
Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend classification
as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2)
the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all
things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification
applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of
Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52).

Petitioner gives a fairly extensive discussion on the merits of the law, illustrating, in the
process, what he believes to be an imbalance between the tax liabilities of those
covered by the amendatory law and those who are not. With the legislature primarily lies
the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage

100
(subjects) and situs (place) of taxation. This court cannot freely delve into those matters
which, by constitutional fiat, rightly rest on legislative judgment. Of course, where a tax
measure becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation of
property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for, despite all its plenitude, the power
to tax cannot override constitutional proscriptions. This stage, however, has not been
demonstrated to have been reached within any appreciable distance in this controversy
before us.

101
 Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corp.
548 SCRA 485. October 22, 1999
PURISIMA, J.:

Facts:
On June 3, 1985, for the purpose of rehabilitating Philippine Planters, Inc., the then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1465 which
imposed a charge of P10.00 per bag of fertilizer on all domestic sales of fertilizer in the
Philippines.
Respondent Fertiphil Corporation, a domestic entity engaged in the fertilizer business,
questioned the constitutionality of LOI NO. 1465 and brought an action to recover its
accumulated payment thereunder in the amount of P6,698,144.00, the case docketed
as Civil Case No. 17835 before Branch 147 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

Issue: Whether or not execution pending appeal is applicable in the present case.

Held: Yes, execution pending appeal is applicable in the present case. In the present
case, the supposed good reasons relied upon by the trial court, and upheld in by the
respondent Court in granting execution pending appeal are that: 1) The appeal is
frivolous because LOI No. 1465 is unconstitutional; and 2) Fertiphil posted a bond.

Although ascertainment of the special reasons for execution pending appeal lies within
the sound discretion of the trial court, and the appellate Court should not normally
disturb such finding, intervention by the appellate court may be proper, if it is shown that
there has been an abuse of discretion. That the appeal was merely dilatory because the
assailed letter of instruction is unconstitutional, does not constitute good reason to
justify execution pending appeal. Well-settled is the rule that it is not for the trial court to
determine the merit of a decision it rendered as this is the role of the appellate Court.
Hence, it is not within the competence of the trial court, in resolving the motion for
execution pending appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the
same as the basis for finding good reason to grant the motion.

102
 Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos
253 SCRA 559. February 13, 1996

Facts:
In her motion of 16 August 1995, reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995,
Protestant Miriam Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision of ballots in the remaining
precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas
be deemed completed.
We deferred action on that motion and required the Protestant and the Protestee to
submit their respective memoranda on the issue of whether this case had been
rendered moot by the election of the Protestant as a Senator in the May 1995 election
and her assumption of office as such on 30 June 1995.
The Protestant answers this issue in the negative. She asserts that an election case
may be rendered moot only if the term of the contested office has expired, thus her
election as Senator and assumption of office as such cannot, under the rule laid down in
Moraleja vs. Relova, be construed as an abandonment of the instant protest.

Issue: Whether or not protestant has abandoned the instant protest.

Held: Yes, the protestant has abandoned the instant protest. The term of office of the
Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which
coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May
1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiagos term if she
would succeed in proving in the instant protest that she was the true winer in the 1992
elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively
abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja,
abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the
matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.

103
 Macalintal v. PET
GR No. 191618. Nov. 23, 2010
NACHURA, J.:

Facts:
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal) filed a petition that questions the
constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized
progeny of Section 4,2 Article VII of the Constitution. Grudgingly, petitioner throws us a
bone by acknowledging that the invoked constitutional provision does allow the
"appointment of additional personnel."
Further, petitioner highlights our decision in Buac v. COMELEC4 which peripherally
declared that "contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, x x x in the exercise of quasi-judicial power."
On this point, petitioner reiterates that the constitution of the PET, with the designation
of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section
12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the
Supreme Court and of other courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.

Issues:

1.) Whether the creation of the presidential electoral tribunal is unconstitutional for
being a violation of paragraph 7, section 4 of article VII of the 1987 constitution.

2.) Whether the designation of members of the Supreme Court as members of the
presidential electoral tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of section
12, article viii of the 1987 constitution.

Held:

1.) No, the creation of the presidential electoral tribunal is not unconstitutional. A
plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of
authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the
method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in
the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme
Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential
and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative
of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court
to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."

2.) No, the designation of members of the Supreme Court as members of the
presidential electoral tribunal is not unconstitutional. In the landmark case of
Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would
be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which

104
to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara
pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government."
And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded
definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, and paragraph 2 of the
present Constitution. With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has
allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial
power inherent in all courts the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by
PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law,
expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a
thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.

105
Pimentel, Jr. v. Committee of Congress to canvass votes for Pres. And Vice Pres
GR No. 163783. June 22, 2004
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts:
On May 14, 2007 national elections for 12 senatorial posts, the only remaining
contenders for the twelfth and final senatorial post were Pimentel and private
respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri (Zubiri). Public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc, acting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC), continued to
conduct canvass proceedings so as to determine the twelfth and last Senator-elect in
the May 14, 2007 elections.
Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted Special Provincial
Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (SPBOC-Maguindanao) in which the Provincial
and Municipal Certificates of Canvass (PCOC and MCOCs) from the province of
Maguindanao were respectively canvassed.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao was created because the canvass proceedings held before
the original Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (PBOC-Maguindanao),
chaired by Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) Lintang Bedol, were marred by
irregularities, and the PCOC (Bedol PCOC) and other electoral documents submitted by
the said PBOC-Maguindanao were tainted with fraud and statistical improbabilities.
Hence, the Bedol PCOC was excluded from the national canvass then being conducted
by the NBC

Issue: Whether or not pre proclamation cases are allowed in Elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives.

Held: No, pre proclamation cases are not allowed in Elections for President, Vice-
President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. elections for
President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives,
pre-proclamation cases are prohibited. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, prior to its
amendment, read:

SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-
President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. For purposes of
the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or
the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the
authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of
an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election
returns before it.

As Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 was then worded, it would appear that any pre-
proclamation case relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass, was prohibited in elections for

106
President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election,
which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. Proceedings which may
delay the proclamation of the winning candidate beyond the date set for the beginning
of his term of office must be avoided, considering that the effect of said delay is, in the
case of national offices for which there is no hold over, to leave the office without any
incumbent.

107
 Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo
GR No. 146738. March 2, 2001.
PUNO, J.:

Facts:
On the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some
ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from
life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term
commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of
problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power
started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime
friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November
13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115
representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to
the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator
Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was
unseated by Representative Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally
opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath
as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of
negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang''
Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst.
Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential
Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented
by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo
and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez. Outside the palace, there was a brief
encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-
throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the
news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent
Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.

Issue: whether petitioner Estrada resigned as a president.

Held: Yes, petitioner Estrada resigned as a president. Resignation is not a high level
legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there
must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.
The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It
can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the

108
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. On January 20, an hour later or at 2:30
p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he
would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where
he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the
presidency even at that time.

109
 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
194 SCRA 317. February 22, 1991
FERNAN, C.J.:

Facts: A petition was filed on August 9, 19881 to seek a declaration of the

unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino
on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order are:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a

member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive
officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive
the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to
ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is
the Chairman.

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other

appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is
allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the
subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than
two positions other than his primary position.

Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-

owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards
of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant
secretary.

Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation
therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,2 which
provides as follows:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies
or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

Issue: Whether or not the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the
broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general.

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Held: No, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was not
made as an exception for appointive officials in general. while all other appointive
officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions
of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-
XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public
officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.

This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions
provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said
qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the
government during their tenure. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article
VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate
the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-
ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on
the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below
Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in
the government during their tenure.

111
 Funa v. Acting Secretary Alberto Agra
GR No. 191644. February 19, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal-
Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of
Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon
Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting
Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity;1 that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his
capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to
challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations,
claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that
during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor
General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010.2

Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January 12,
2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo
designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera
who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice;3 that on March 5, 2010, President
Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary
Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress
representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then
relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the
appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting
Solicitor General.4

Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has
admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is
sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises
herein.

Issue: Whether or not there is unconstitutionality of Agra’s concurrent designation as

Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General.

Held:
Yes, there is an unconstitutionality of Agra’s Concurrent designation as Acting Secretary
of Justice and Acting Solicitor General. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular
instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a
member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in
those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the
Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

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Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article
VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could
not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor
General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided

113
 Republic v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 152154. July 15, 2003
CARPIO, J.:

Facts:
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution,
then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked
the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the
PCGG with the power (a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order and the power (h) to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order.
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP
Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). On 27
July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on
the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.

Issue: Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction to Investigate private respondents.

Held: No, PCGG doesn’t have jurisdiction to investigate Private respondent’s ill-gotten
wealth. The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two
categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have
accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by
being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking
undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence or (2) AFP
personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns
their cases to the PCGG.

Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President

Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly from his
commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or
employee during the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima
facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.

Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of
Major General does not suffice to make him a subordinate of former President Marcos
for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie

114
showing that Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same
manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President
Marcos were close to him. Such close association is manifested either by Ramas
complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the
deposed President or by former President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.

115
 Senate v. Ermita
488 SCRA 1. April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts: On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, ENSURING
OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE
TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF
LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, which,
pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
• In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives
Members Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and
Teodoro Casino, COURAGE, an organization of government employees, and Counsels
for the Defense of Liberties (CODAL), a group of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of
justice, democracy and peace, all claiming to have standing to file the suit because of
the transcendental importance of the issues they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O.
464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional; that respondent Executive
Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President
Arroyo, be prohibited from imposing, and threatening to impose sanctions on officials
who appear before Congress due to congressional summons. Additionally, petitioners
claim that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from fulfilling their
respective obligations;
• In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his
constitutional rights as a citizen, taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by the
enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void
for being unconstitutional;
• In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.[12] (ALG), alleging
that as a coalition of 17 legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged in
developmental lawyering and work with the poor and marginalized sectors in different
parts of the country, and as an organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of
the general public, it has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, a right which was denied
to the public by E.O. 464;
• In G.R. No. 169777, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, filed its petition for
certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the issue
of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has
already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes
with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and conceals
information of great public interest and concern;
• In G.R. No. 169834, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly
elected into the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition
for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464
because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in
Congress, particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental

116
issues need to be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and
legislative branches of the government.

Issue: Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.

Held: No, E. O. 464 doesn’t violate the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive
departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security
officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e.
department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National
Security Adviser), are covered by the executive privilege.The enumeration also includes
such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title of Section 2
Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege , it is evident that under the rule of
ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this provision is intended to
be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.

Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an

official is covered by the executive privilege, such official is subjected to the requirement
that he first secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress.
This requirement effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the
same is permitted by the President. The proviso allowing the President to give its
consent means nothing more than that the President may reverse a prohibition which
already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.

117
 Estrada v. Desierto
GR No. 146710-15. March 2, 2001
PUNO, J.:

Facts: On the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some
ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from
life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term
commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of
problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power
started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime
friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November
13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115
representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to
the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator
Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was
unseated by Representative Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally
opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath
as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of
negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang''
Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst.
Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential
Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented
by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo
and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez. Outside the palace, there was a brief
encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-
throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the
news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent
Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.

Issue: Whether or not President Estrada can invoke Presidential Immunity.

Held: No, President Estrada cannot invoke Presidential Immunity. According to Article
VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive department can enjoy Presidential
Immunity. However in the present case, President Estrada cannot invoke Presidential
Immunity since he already resigned and thus he should be criminally liable for receiving
millions of pesos from Jueteng Lords.

118
119
 Gloria v. CA
GR No. 119903. August 15,2000
PURISIMA, J.:

Facts: On June 29, 1989, petitioner [private respondent herein] was appointed Schools
Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City, by the then President
Corazon C. Aquino.

On October 10, 1994, respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of

the Philippines that the petitioner be reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST
[Marikina Institute of Science and Technology], to fill up the vacuum created by the
retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro, on June 17, 1994.

On October 12, 1994, the President approved the recommendation of Secretary Gloria.

On October 13, 1994, a copy of the recommendation for petitioners reassignment, as

approved by the President, was transmitted by Secretary Gloria to Director Rosas for
implementation.

On October 14, 1994, Director Rosas, informed the petitioner of his reassignment,
effective October 17, 1994.

Petitioner requested respondent Secretary Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but

the latter denied the request. The petitioner prepared a letter dated October 18, 1994 to
the President of the Philippines, asking for a reconsideration of his reassignment, and
furnished a copy of the same to the DECS. However, he subsequently changed his
mind and refrained from filing the letter with the Office of President.

On October 19, 1994, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not the present petition for prohibition is improper because the same
attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from
suit.

Held: Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is
directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are
those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may
be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the
President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

120
 National Artist for Literature Virgilio Almario v. The Executive secretary
GR No. 189028. July 16, 2013.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts:
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law Creating the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed into law. It established the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it an extensive
mandate over the development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino national
culture and arts and the Filipino cultural heritage.
All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her
discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for
the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the
Deliberation Panels. According to petitioners, the President’s discretion to name
National Artists is not absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the matter
cannot be exercised in the absence of or against the recommendation of the NCCA and
the CCP.

Issue: Whether or not the president has violated Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution in the present case.

Held: Yes, the president has violated Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution in the
present case.
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be
exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful
execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a
separate grant of power.79 It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the
cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and
execute them.80 This is precisely why the law provides that "administrative or executive
acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution."

The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a screening committee to

ensure that nominations received from the various awards committees meet two tests:
that there has not been an abuse of discretion in making the nomination, and that the
nominee is in good standing. Should a nomination meet these criteria, a
recommendation to the President for conferment shall be made.

The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the Committee on

Honors in the highest consideration when making the final decision on the conferment
of awards.

121
 Banda v. Ermita
618 SCRA 488. April 20, 2010
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts:
The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former President Corazon C.
Aquino (President Aquino), by virtue of Executive Order No. 285 which provided, among
others, the creation of the NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and
the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA).
On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No.
378, amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of government
agencies and instrumentalities.

Issue: Whether or not the president has the jurisdiction to reorganize the offices and
agencies in the executive department.

Held: We held it affirmative, the president has the jurisdiction to reorganize the offices
and agencies in the executive department.

Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted
above authorizes the President (a) to restructure the internal organization of the Office
of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another,
and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa.

It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press
Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of
the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of
the Office of the President.

122
 In re: Appointment of Hon. M. Valenzuela.
AM No. 98-5-01-SC. Nov. 9, 1998
NARVASA, CJ.:

Facts:
Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the appointments signed by His
Excellency the President under the date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of
Branch 62, Baguio City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. The
appointments were received at the Chief Justice's chambers on May 12, 1998. The
referral was made in view of the serious constitutional issue concerning said
appointments arising from the pertinent antecedents.

The issue was first ventilated at the meeting of the Judicial and Bar Council on March 9,
1998. The meeting had been called, according to the Chief Justice as Ex Officio
Chairman, to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the "constitutionality of
*** appointments" to the Court of Appeals, specifically, in light of the forthcoming
presidential elections. Attention was drawn to Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
reading as follows:

"SEC 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety."

On the other hand, appointments to fill vacancies in the Supreme court during the
period mentioned in the provision just quoted could seemingly be justified by another
provision of the same Constitution. Section 4(1) of Article VIII which states:

"SEC 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. ***. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof."

Also pertinent although not specifically discussed is Section 9 of the same Article VIII
which provides that for the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments -
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Council for every vacancy - within
ninety days from the submission of the list.

The view was then expressed by Senior associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
Consultant of the Council, who had been a member of the Committee of the Executive
Department and of the Committee on the Judicial Department of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, that on the basis of the Commission's records, the election ban had no
application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. Without any extended discussion
or any prior research and study on the part of the other Members of the JBC, this

123
hypothesis was accepted, and was then submitted to the President for consideration,
together with the Council's nominations for eight (8) vacancies in the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not the election ban had an application to appointments to the
members of the judiciary in the present case.

Held: No, the election ban had no application to appointments to the members of the
judiciary in the present case.
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted
to the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 1998) were unquestionably made during
the period of the ban. Consequently, they come within the operation of the first
prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of
buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is
undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling
reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the
other hand, as already discussed, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition
against appointments made within the period of the ban.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court Resolved to DECLARE VOID the
appointments signed by His Excellency the President under date of March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial
Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, and to
order them, forthwith on being served with notice of this decision, to forthwith CEASE
AND DESIST from discharging the office of Judge of the Courts to which they were
respectively appointed on March 30, 1998. This, without prejudice to their being
considered anew by the Judicial and Bar Council for re-nomination to the same
positions.

124
 Pimentel v. Ermita
GR No. 164978. Oct. 13, 2005
CARPIO, J.:

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) through Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael
T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa,
and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as acting secretaries of their respective departments
while the congress is in session without the consent of commission on appointments.

Issue: Whether or not it is constitutional for President Arroyo to appoint respondents as

acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while
Congress is in session.

Held: Yes, it is unconstitutional for President Arroyo to appoint respondents as acting

secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress in
in session. Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an
acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim
appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting
appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim
appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or
rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.
Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they
can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

125
 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. All the petitions now
before the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbent President
can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. That question is
undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation, because the
appointment of the Chief Justice is any Presidents most important appointment.

A precedent frequently cited is In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.

Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta, by which the Court held that Section
15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial
positions during the period therein fixed.

ISSUE: Whether the prohibition against presidential appointments under Art. VII, Sec.
15 extends to appointments in the Judiciary.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Two
constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:

 Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:

126
 Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others,
it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.

127
 MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO v. ROGELIO I. RAYALA
GR No. 155831, 2008-02-18
NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala, the chairman of NLRC. To support the
Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the incidences of sexual
harassment complained. She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched
her shoulder, part of her neck then tickled her ears. Rayala argued that his acts does
not constitute sexual harassment because for it to exist, there must be a demand,
request or requirement of sexual favor. After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for
leave of absence and asked to be immediately transferred. Thereafter, she filed the
Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative Order No. 250,
the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and
Employment. Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual
favor, demand, or request from petitioner in exchange for her continued employment or
for her promotion

ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss respondent
Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for committing acts of sexual harassment

HELD:

The Republic argues that Rayalas acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250. His
acts constitute unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of
a sexual nature, which are generally annoying or offensive to the victim. The power to
remove the NLRC Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by the
requirements under the law and the due process clause.

This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article 215 of the Labor
Code, which states that the Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age
of 65 only during good behavior . Since Rayalas security of tenure is conditioned upon
his good behavior, he may be removed from office if it is proven that he has failed to live
up to this standard.

128
 FRANKLIN M. DRILON v. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM
[ GR No. 112497, Aug 04, 1994 ]
CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:

The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code, Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And
Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The Secretary of Justice had, on
appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794,
otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy.

The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the
procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local
Government Code had indeed not been observed. the lower court had jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws
by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.

ISSUE: Whether the act of the Sec. of Justice is valid.

HELD:

YES. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality
or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these
grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he
did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not
pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did
not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal.
All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure
for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of
mere supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they
are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority

129
 BANDA VS ERMITA
(GR NO. 166620; APRIL 20, 2010)
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

The present controversy arose from a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition challenging

the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 dated October 25, 2004, issued by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit
filed on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the National Printing
Office (NPO).

The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former President Corazon C.
Aquino, by virtue of Executive Order No. 285  which provided, among others, the
creation of the NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant
printing units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA). On October 25, 2004,
President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction
of the NPO over the printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities.

ISSUE: Is it beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal

Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino?

HELD:

It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to

reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the
Presidents constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue
of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under
existing statutes.

In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its
functions to be transferred to another agency. Under the assailed Executive Order No.
378, the NPO remains the main printing arm of the government for all kinds of

130
government forms and publications but in the interest of greater economy and
encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the private sector for
certain government printing jobs. At most, there was a mere alteration of the main
function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity of its printing responsibility to election
forms.

131
 PROSPERO A. PICHAY v. OFFICE OF DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR
LEGAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE
(GR No. 196425 JULY 24, 2012)
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No.
12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with
the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft
and corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report
and recommendations to the President. On November 15, 2010, President Benigno
Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

On April 6, 2011, Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint affidavit2 for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay.

ISSUE: IS E.O. 13 UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE

LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A PUBLIC OFFICE?

HELD:

NO. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department
under E.O. 292. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including
the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof
or transferring functions from one unit to another.

132
 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES vs.
DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES.
(G.R. No. 149724  August 19, 2003)

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:

On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment

and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum3
directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued pursuant
to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H.
Cerilles.

ISSUE: Is the power to transfer the Regional Office of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) is executive in nature.

HELD:

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which recognizes the establishment of a
single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions
of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under
Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

133
 ANA THERESIA “RISA” HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TOLL REGULATORY
BOARD
GR No. 181293, Feb 23, 2015
SERENO, C.J.:

FACTS:
The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created on 31 March 1977 by Presidential Decree
No. (P.D.) 11121 in order to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government, the
collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities by the private sector.
P.D. 11132 was issued granting to the Construction and Development Corporation of
the Philippines (now Philippine National Construction Corporation or PNCC) the right,
privilege, and authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and
South Luzon Toll Expressways for a period of 30 years starting 1 May 1977.

The TRB issued the challenged Toll Operation Certificate (TOC)17 to SOM CO on 28
December 2007, authorizing the latter to operate and maintain Stage 1 of the South
Metro Manila Skyway effective 10:00 p.m. on 31December2007.
Meanwhile, on 28 December 2007, petitioner PNCC Traffic Management and Security
Department Workers Organization (PTMSDWO) filed a Notice of Strike against PSC on
the ground of unfair labor practice, specifically union busting.18 The Secretary of Labor
and Employment19 assumed jurisdiction over the dispute in an Order dated 31
December 2007 and set the initial hearing of the case on 2 January 2008.
ISSUE: Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility.

HELD:

YES. It is abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section
4 of P.D. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified person
or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and to issue the
corresponding toll operating permit or TOC. Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 and
Section 4 of P.D. 1894 amply provide the power to grant authority to operate toll
facilities.

Third, aside from having been granted the power to grant administrative franchises for
toll facility projects, TRB is also empowered to modify, amend, and impose additional
conditions on the franchise of PNCC in an appropriate contract, particularly when public
interest calls for it. This is provided under Section 3 of P.D. 1113 and Section 6 of P.D.
1894

134
 AMPATUAN v. PUNO
(June 7, 2011 G.R. No. 190259)
ABAD, J.:

FACTS:

On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women,
including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946,placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake such measures
as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents
of lawless violence in the named places.

Three days later, President Arroyo also issued AO 273 transferring supervision of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). But, due to issues raised over
the terminology used in AO 273, the President issued Administrative Order 273-A (AO
273-A) amending the former, by delegating instead of transferring supervision of the
ARMM to the DILG. Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs
autonomy, petitioners alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the
DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and seize the regional governments
powers, in violation of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 and the
Constitution. The President gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise, not merely
administrative supervision, but control over the ARMM since the latter could suspend
ARMM officials and replace them and the President had no factual basis for declaring a
state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City
of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred.

ISSUE: Did President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers?

HELD:

NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in
the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by
Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the

135
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority
to exercise the same.

136
 BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
(G. R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010)
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by
President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the
President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during
the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between
parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make
recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress
to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth
Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the
Office of the Ombudsman

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE: If E. O. No. 1 is constitutional

HELD:

137
NO. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of
the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.There
must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.

138
 JAMAR KULAYAN vs. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN
(G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012)
Sereno, J.:

FACTS:

Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter,
Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation
project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who
were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis
Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then
formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the
leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of
emergency in the province of Sulu. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and
the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct
general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure
public safety.

ISSUE: Can Tan use the calling-out powers of the President?

HELD:

NO. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive
power, it is granted to the President and no one else. As emphasized by Justice Jose P.
Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena:

With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose
which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight,
and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article
VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the
enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of
the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the
Government of the Philippines, and no other.

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 EUGENE GONZALES vs. NARCISO ABAYA
(G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006)
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:

On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that
some members of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their
designated places of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. The
President then directed the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and
arrest them.

The next day, more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the
entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue,
Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around
the building. Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red
armbands emblazoned with the emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. The
troops then, through broadcast media, announced their grievances against the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in
the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, and
the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military assistance from the US
government.

After several hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them
to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the
Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks. A total of 321
soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities. The National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the
military personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat.

ISSUE: Whether or not those charged with coup d’etat before RTC shall be charged
before military tribunal for violation of Articles of War.

HELD:

YES. The general rule is that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military
law, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other
special penal laws, or local ordinances, shall be tried by the proper civil court. Except,
when the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-
connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. The exception to
the exception is when the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs
before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

140
It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation
of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted
authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession.

141
 SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 159085, 3 Feb 2004
TINGA, J.:

FACTS:

During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown
leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the
corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government,
demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.
These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue
of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under
the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their
barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and
General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the
State of Rebellion was issued.

ISSUE: Are Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

HELD:

The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or
rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by
the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was
exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion
that the President acted without factual basis.

The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since
the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was
merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.
These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18,

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Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23
(2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be
subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

143
 Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts:

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1017,
implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency. In their
presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that
the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some
military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered
the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a
clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24,
2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune,
which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00
A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official of
the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building – were several materials for
publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as
basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was
Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in
the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

ISSUE: IS PP 1107 and G.O No. 5 valid?

HELD:

The Court rules that PP 1017 is valid insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the
provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless
violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared invalid. In
addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17,

144
Article VII of the Constitution is valid, but such declaration does not authorize the
President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is valid since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017. However, the statement whatever is “necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering
that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the
Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared invalid.

145
 LAGMAN V. MEDIALDEA
G.R. NO. 231658, JULY 5, 2017
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. In accordance with
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President, on May 25, 2017, submitted to
Congress a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.

The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and
lawless violence, which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time. The
Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant
role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed
out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the
lawless groups.

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution
No. 390 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation
No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same
Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the
same".The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned the
Supreme Court, questioning the factual basis of President Duterte’s Proclamation of
martial law.

ISSUE: Is the President required to take into account only the situation at the time of the
proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately
reported?

HELD:

As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law
and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of

146
Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a
judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is
sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or
information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration
or suspension which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the
written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation
existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past
events should be from the present depends on the President.

147
 IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional grounds the order of
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under
Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. In response to such order, the
PNP through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay issued Letter of Intent (LOI)
dated 02/2000 which detailed the joint visibility patrols called Task Force Tulungan, it
was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila through a
sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes
especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include
those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military
personnel. This was confirmed by a memorandum President Estrada issued dated 24
January 2000. On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed a petition to annul LOI 02/2000
arguing that the deployment of the Marines is unconstitutional and is an incursion by the
military on the civilian functions of government as embodied in Article II, Sec. 3 and Art.
XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Is the president’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces subject to judicial review?

HELD:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is
no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s
action to call out the armed forces.

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In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support
the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

149
 LACSON VS. PEREZ
G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001
MELO, J.:

FACTS:

On 01 May 2001, Gloria Arroyo, faced by an angry and violent mob armed with deadly
weapons assaulting and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No.
38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She
likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region.
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were
thereafter effected. On 06 May 2001 she ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state
of rebellion in Metro Manila.

The petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by Gloria Arroyo and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact
an in law. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the
information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant
petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending
warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued
against them.

ISSUE: Is the declaration of a state of rebellion is constitutional?

HELD:

President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006,

accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Petition is
dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier
adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their
behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial
warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege
of Malacañang.

150
 Gonzales vs. Narvasa
G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition
for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality
of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of
the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on
November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order “to study
and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and
the manner of implementing the same.” Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the
PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can
create by way of a law. Secondly, petitioner asserts that by creating such a body the
President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the
Constitution the amendment of the fundamental charter.

ISSUE: Does the president have the power to authorize the appropriation?

HELD:

YES. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the
legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of
the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting
apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or
dues from the State to its creditors. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from
funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives
power to transfer funds pursuant to section 25 (5) of article VI of the Constitution.

151
 MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989
EN BANC:

FACTS:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-
violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Former President Marcos,
after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the
Philippines. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to
die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various
directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly
on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without
power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits
prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right
to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

HELD:

Yes. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The President has the obligation,
under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national
interest.

The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but
is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring
domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. The
documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the

152
country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and
intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more chaos.

153
 Borja vs COMELEC
GR 133495, September 3, 1998
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January
18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor,
by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two
succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.

In 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11,
1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor,
sought Capco’s disqualification on Petitioner who was a candidate for mayor sought the
disqualification of Jose Capco Jr. on the ground of the three-term limit rule under the
constitution and local government code, hence he would be ineligible to serve for
another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the
Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor.
Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

ISSUE: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation
of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that
office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

HELD:

NO. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution provides: The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such
official[s] from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in
explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of

154
office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned]
was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation
on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a
term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official
he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now
withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

155
 Petitioner-Organizations v. Executive Secretary
G.R. Nos. 147036-37 April 10, 2012
ABAD, J.:

FACTS:

In 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961, the Coconut Industry Code, which
consolidated and codified existing laws relating to the coconut industry. The Code
provided that surpluses from the CCS Fund and the CID Fund collections, not used for
replanting and other authorized purposes, were to be invested by acquiring shares of
stock of corporations, including the San Miguel Corporation (SMC), engaged in
undertakings related to the coconut and palm oil industries. UCPB was to make such
investments and equitably distribute these for free to coconut farmers. These
investments constituted the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF). P.D. 961 also
provided that the coconut levy funds (coco-levy funds) shall be owned by the coconut
farmers in their private capacities.

ISSUE:  Whether or not petitioners special civil actions of certiorari under Rule 65

constituted the proper remedy for their actions

HELD:

UCPB insists that the Court exercises appellate jurisdiction with respect to issues of
constitutionality or validity of laws and presidential orders. But, as the Court previously
held, where there are serious allegations that a law has infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but the duty of the Court to look into such allegations and,
when warranted, uphold the supremacy of the Constitution. Moreover, where the issues
raised are of paramount importance to the public, as in this case, the Court has the
discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure.

156
 Villavert vs. Desierto
GR No. 133715, February 13, 2000
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Douglas R. Villavert is a Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu

Branch responsible for the sale and disposal of PCSO sweepstakes tickets withdrawn
by him, which are already considered sold. As Villavert is not expected to sell all
withdrawn tickets on his own, he is allowed by the PCSO to consign tickets to ticket
outlets and/or to engage the help of sales agents, usually sidewalk peddlers and
hawkers.

From 20 March to 12 June 1994, or for two (2) months of weekly draws, petitioner
Villavert incurred a total of P997,373.60 worth of unpaid PCSO tickets. On 13 October
1994 he wrote the Chairman and Acting General Manager of PCSO, Manuel L. Morato,
proposing to settle his unpaid ticket accounts.

An administrative charge for grave misconduct was filed against Villavert, Sales &
Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu Branch. The Graft Investigation Officer
recommended the dismissal of the case. However, Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas issued
a Memorandum finding Villavert guilty of the charge. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770.

ISSUE: May decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases be appealed to the

Supreme Court?

HELD:

In Fabian, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared
violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent. In
addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme

157
Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as
reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman.

158
 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as
two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is
this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the
crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory
that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and
mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term
of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,”
it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress.

ISSUE: Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members,
two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution.

HELD:

159
Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in
its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or
the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a
singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member
composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should
there be a stalemate in voting.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in
the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution
mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

160
 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

This is a consolidated case regarding the appointment of President Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo to Associate Justice Renato Corona as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice,
the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior
of the Associate Justices of the Court. The OSG contends that the incumbent President
may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII
of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that
any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence,
pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended
the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in
Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department);
and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on
the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures”.
Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

ISSUE: Whether the prohibition against presidential appointments under Art. VII, Sec.
15 (Midnight Appointment Ban), does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.

HELD:

Prohibition under Art. VII, Sec.15 does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

161
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Art. VII, Sec. 15 to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer
to the Members of the Supreme Court.

The lack of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the
independence of the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is the head of the entire
Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions absolutely significant to the life of the
nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the
Chief Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the
appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent
President to make within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification
to insist that the successor of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.

162
 Cesar Bengzon vs Franklin Drilon
G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:

In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws that were “repealed” during the time
of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement
benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions.
Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits
among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House
Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to
certain or select government officials.

A group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the
court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by
P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were
subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to
non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then
readjusted their pensions.

Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are
allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of the government; among
such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions
of the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the
GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.

HELD:

The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary of its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy.
Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition
of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.

163
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices
on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential
treatment” to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect
asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be
repealed.

164
 CASINO LABOR ASSOCIATION vs COURT OF APPEALS, PHIL. CASINO
OPERATORS CORPORATION (PCOC) and PHIL. SPECIAL SERVICES
CORPORATION (PSSC)

G.R. No. 141020, June 12, 2008

PUNO, C.J.:

FACTS: In an Order, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the consolidated cases for lack of
jurisdiction over the respondents therein, Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) and Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC).

On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission en banc issued a Resolution which dismissed
the separate appeals filed by the petitioner on the ground that the NLRC has no
jurisdiction over PAGCOR.

Petitioner then elevated the case to this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari. In a
Resolution, the Third Division of the Court dismissed the petition for failure of the
petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with this Court asserting that the NLRC First Division committed
grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the mandate of G.R. No. 85922. Petitioner argued
that, with the statement (a)ny petitions brought against private companies will have to
be brought before the appropriate agency or office of the Department of Labor and
Employment, this Court laid down the law of the case and mandated that petitions
against respondents PCOC and PSSC should be brought before the NLRC. By way of
resolution, this Court referred the case to the CA in
accordance with the ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.

The CA rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari. The CA found no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC First Division. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE: Can the Court of Appeals ignore the mandate of the honorable supreme
courts resolution in g.r. 85922, that petitions against private respondents PCOC
and PSSC should be tried by the Commission (NLRC) thru its arbitration branch?

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court agree with the CA. The statement that (a)ny
petitions brought against private companies will have to be brought before the
appropriate agency or office of the Department of Labor and Employment, upon which
petitioners entire case relies, is of no consequence. It is obiter dictum.

In this case, the Civil Service Commission is the proper venue for petitioner to ventilate
its claims.

165
The Court is not oblivious to petitioners plea for justice after waiting numerous years for
relief since it first filed its claims with the labor arbiter in 1986. However, petitioner is not
completely without fault. The 23 January 1989 Resolution in G.R. No. 85922, declaring
the lack of jurisdiction by the NLRC over PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC, became final and
executory on March 27, 1989. The petitioner did not file a second motion for
reconsideration nor did it file a motion for clarification of any statement by the Court
which petitioner might have thought was ambiguous. Neither did petitioner take the
proper course of action, as laid down in G.R. No. 85922, to file its claims before the Civil
Service Commission. Instead, petitioner pursued a protracted course of action based
solely on its erroneous understanding of a single sentence in the Courts resolution to a
motion for reconsideration.

166
 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO and The
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 88167 May 3, 1993

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS: Private respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University

of the Philippines School of Economics, was dismissed on June 22, 1982, after he was
found guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct for causing the leakage of final
examination questions in Economics 106 under Prof. Solita Monsod.

UP contends that under its charter, to wit, Act 1870, enacted on June 18, 1906, it enjoys
not only academic freedom but also institutional autonomy. Section 6(e) of the said Act
grants the UP Board of Regents the power "to appoint, on recommendation of the
president of the university, professors, instructors, lecturers, and other employees of the
university, to fix their compensation and to remove them for cause after an investigation
and hearing shall have been had." Pamplina was dismissed by virtue of this provision.

ISSUE: Does the Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction over the university which
was vested under its charter, Act No. 1870, with academic freedom and institutional
autonomy?

RULING: YES. As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly

a part of the Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so
because it was created by a special law and has an original charter. As a component of
the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 607 and administrative cases
involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.

The case cited repeatedly by the petitioners, viz., University of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, cannot apply to the present controversy. The reason is that at the time it
was promulgated on January 28, 1971, PD 807 had not yet been enacted. PD 807 took
affect only in 1975.

Article V, Section 9(j), of PD 807 simply gives the Commission the power to "hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with
Section 37 or brought to it on appeal," without the qualifiying phrase appearing in the
above-quoted provision. The petitioners cannot invoke that phrase to justify the special
power they claim under Act 1870.

167
 THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER CORNELIO L. LINSANGAN and CEFERINO R.
LAUR

G.R. No. 113212 December 29, 1995

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: Private respondent Ceferino R Laur was a patient of the then Tala
Leprosarium, having been admitted thereto in 1951 for treatment of Hansen's disease,
commonly termed leprosy. He was discharged in 1956 after he was deemed to have
been cured of his affliction.

In 1975, he was employed at the DJRMH as a patient-assistant by the then Hospital

Director, Dr. Artemio F. Runez, upon the recommendation of the Barangay Captain of
Tala. Specifically assigned as a member of the Patient-Assistant Police Force.

On September 15, 1989, complaints for Alarm and Scandal, Oral Defamation, Grave
Threats, Concealment of Deadly Weapon, Violation of the Code of Ethics of Policemen,
and Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer were filed against said private respondent,
pursuant to a report made by his Chief of Police.

Private respondent Laur again got involved in an incident the mauling of one, Jake
Bondoc, along with two policemen, Corporal Ferrer and Patrolman Berdon. Private
respondent was dismissed by the Chief of Hospital on the basis of the Public Assistance
Complaints Unit's (PACU) report/investigation finding private respondent and his
companions to have indeed mauled Jake Bondoc. The two policemen were merely
suspended. The aforesaid decision was appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed
the appeal.

ISSUE: Are the petitioners correct that the Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction
over contests relating to the civil service?

RULING: YES. As it is clearly an agency of the Government, the DJRMH falls well
within the scope and/or coverage of the Civil Service Law in accordance with paragraph
1., Section 2, Article IX B, 1987 Constitution and the provisions of Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 and Presidential Decree No.
807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines.

As the central personnel agency of the Government, the Civil Service Commission
administers the Civil Service Law. It is, therefore, the single arbiter of all contests
relating to the civil service. The discharge of this particular function was formerly lodged
in one of its offices, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which was vested with
the power, among others, "to hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving
officials and employees of the civil service and its decision shall be final except those

168
involving dismissal or separation from the service which may be appealed to the
Commission".7

Worthy to note in this connection is the fact that the Labor Code itself provides that "the
terms and conditions of employment of Government employees shall be governed by
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations".

Conformably to the foregoing, it is, indeed, the Civil Service Commission which has
jurisdiction over the present controversy. Its decisions are subject to review by the
Supreme Court.

169
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE

G.R. No. 185766

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

(A) G.R. No. 185766

On April 26, 2005, the Civil Service Commission Field Office Office of the
President (CSCFO-OP) disapproved the temporary appointment of Sarsonas as she
failed to meet the eligibility requirement for the position. CSCFO-OP certified that there
were qualified individuals who signified their interest to be appointed to the position,
namely, Mercedes Hinayon and Reynaldo Martin.

PCSO filed an appeal with the CSC-National Capital Region (CSC-NCR). The
CSC-NCR affirmed the disapproval by CSCFO-OP of the temporary appointment of
Sarsonas on the following grounds: (a) that she failed to meet the eligibility requirement;
and (b) that there were two qualified eligibles who signified their interest to be appointed
to the said position, as certified by CSCFO-OP.

(B) G.R. No. 185767

On November 25, 2004, the PCSO Board of Directors resolved to appoint

Lemuel G. Ortega (Ortega) as Assistant Department Manager II of its Planning and
Production Department. The PCSO General Manager, thus, issued a fourth renewal of
his temporary appointment.

CSCFO-OP disapproved the temporary appointment of Ortega for his failure to

meet the eligibility requirement for the position. CSCFO-OP further reasoned out that
there were other qualified third-level eligibles working in PCSO who were willing and
available to be appointed to the subject position, namely, Mercedes Hinayon and
Reynaldo Martin.

PCSO appealed to the CSC alleging that Ortega possessed all the requirements
necessary for the subject position except the needed eligibility. PCSO also claimed that
the qualified eligibles who had indicated their interest to be appointed to the position did
not possess the same training for such highly technical positions.

PCSO further reasoned out that Section 7(3), Title I, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 provides an exclusive enumeration of the specific positions covered by
the Career Executive Service (CES), all of whom are appointed by the President and
are required to have Career Service Executive (CSE) eligibility. PCSO argued that since
the position of Assistant Department Manager II does not require presidential
appointment, then it does not require CSE eligibility.

170
ISSUE: Does the position of Assistant Department Manager II falls under the CES?

RULING: No. Following the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service
Commission cases and Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation v. Civil Service
Commission, the Court is of the position that the CES covers presidential appointees
only. Corollarily, as the position of Assistant Department Manager II does not require
appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under the CES.
Therefore, the temporary appointments of Sarsonas and Ortega as Assistant
Department Manager II do not require third level eligibility pursuant to the Civil Service
Law, rules and regulations.

In the case at bench, it is undisputed that the position of Assistant Department Manager
II is not one of those enumerated under the Administrative Code of 1987. There is also
no question that the CESB has not identified the position to be of equal rank to those
enumerated. Lastly, without a doubt, the holder of the position of Assistant Department
Manager II is appointed by the PCSO General Manager, and not by the President of the
Philippines. Accordingly, the position of Assistant Department Manager II in the PCSO
is not covered by the third-level or CES, and does not require CSE eligibility.

171
 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS MELITON C.
GERONIMO vs. LT. FIDEL V. RAMOS IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF THE
CONSTABULARY AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. L-60504 May 14, 1985

GUTIERREZ, JR, J.:

FACTS: Private respondent Julian Pendre filed a petition with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo from running as a
candidate for the mayorship on the ground of political turncoatism.

After hearing the petition, the COMELEC disqualified Meliton C Geronimo. Geronimo
obtained a margin of 325 votes when he garnered 2,695 votes as against his opponent
Bayani Ferrera's 2,370 votes. The COMELEC issued a Resolution, reinstating the
proclamation made earlier by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baras, Rizal in
favor of Geronimo as the winning candidate for mayor but the proclamation was
declared temporary subject to the decision of this Court on the petition for certiorari filed
by Geronimo.

The COMELEC after hearing, issued a Resolution finding Geronimo guilty of contempt.
Sometime between the months of April and May, 1982, a series of criminal charges
were filed against Geronimo and his followers namely: Usurpation of Authority [Art. 177,
Revised Penal Code (RPC)]; Violation of Usurpation of Authority of Official (sic) [Art.
177, Revised Penal Code (RPC)]; Tumultous Affray [Art. 153, RPC]: Sedition (Art. 139,
RPC); Illegal Possession of Firearms; Disobedience to a Person in Authority or the
Agent of such Person (Art. 151, RPC) and Alarm and Scandal (Art. 155, RPC).

On May 19, 1982, Geronimo filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that there is no
legal basis for his arrest and detention since the COMELEC's resolution no. 82-605
holding him in contempt was issued with grave abuse of discretion and without
jurisdiction.

Geronimo filed another petition seeking to annul and set aside COMELEC's resolution
declaring petitioner in contempt of the COMELEC and which also dismissed petitioner's
motion to set aside COMELEC resolution nos. 82-428 and 82-429.

The third petition was filed by Geronimo and seventy-five (75) others seeking the
dismissal of the criminal complaints earlier filed against them in the months of March,
April and May 1982.

ISSUE: Did the COMELEC exceeded its power and jurisdiction when it proclaimed
Bayani A. Ferrera as mayor of Baras, Rizal, in spite of the fact that he did not obtain the
plurality of votes in the January 30, 1980 municipal elections?

172
RULING: Yes. In the case of Yason v. Comelec (G.R. No. 52731, January 31, 1985.),
we ruled that: In elections, the first consideration of every democratic polity is to give
effect to the expressed will of the majority. It is true that constitutional and statutory
provisions requiring compliance with measures intended to enhance the quality of our
democratic institutions must be obeyed. The restriction against turncoatism is one such
measure. However, even as there should be compliance with the provision on
turncoatism, an interpretation in particular cases which respects the free and
untrammelled expression of the voters' choice must be followed in its enforcement.

It is patent that the COMELEC committed a grave error when it proclaimed the defeated
candidate, Bayani Ferrera, elected to the office of mayor. After the ineligibility of
Geronimo had been ascertained and after his proclamation was set aside, the
COMELEC should have proclaimed the vice-mayor as entitled to the office and not
Ferrera who failed to obtain the plurality of votes in the election.

173
 BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND
TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 179271

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the
Party-List System.

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because [t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been
quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement
the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list
seats. There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a
memorandum on 19 July 2007.

The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution which they
proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay
Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC),
Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon
Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak
Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono.

Pursuant to NBC Resolution , the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC

Resolution No. 07-72 which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate
parties.

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and a Teacher asked the
COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as
stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the
Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the
COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed, the COMELEC proclaimed
three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat
under the Party-List System. The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod
ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for
Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with

174
Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was
deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.

ISSUES: Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify
for one seat constitutional?

RULING: No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional

basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for
a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2%
threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment.
The Supreme Court explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections.  A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties
get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million.
Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for
every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.”

175
 GMA NETWORK, INC. vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the
broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the
people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of
their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous
“per station” airtimefor political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior
COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE: Is Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates
freedom of expression, of speech and of the press?

HELD: YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits
is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of
candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here,
the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtimelimits – leveling the
playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a
substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate
their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially
so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-

based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only
composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken
among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really
reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that
he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the
people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in
different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself –
a form of suppression of his political speech.

176
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

[G.R. No. 147571. May 5, 2001]

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-
profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including
economics, politics, demography, and social development, and thereafter processing,
analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner
Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
general circulation, which features newsworthy items of information including election
surveys.

Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections
from enforcing 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:

Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an
election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days
before an election.

Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and
present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters
conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998
elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion
among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support
the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to the voting process
posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is imposed on
politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from
writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election.
Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied
access to the results of election surveys which are relatively objective.

Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No.

9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process
by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. Respondent claims
that in National Press Club v. COMELEC, [1] a total ban on political advertisements, with
candidates being merely allocated broadcast time during the so-called COMELEC
space or COMELEC hour, was upheld by this Court. In contrast, according to
respondent, it states that the prohibition in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 is much more limited.

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ISSUE: Does 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of
freedom of speech, expression, and the press.

RULING: Yes. 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on
the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the
suppression of freedom of expression.

Under the OBrien test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial

governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is not
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover, even if the purpose is
unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated
if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the
governmental purpose in question.

First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the OBrien test because the causal
connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest not
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. By prohibiting the publication of
election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine
the integrity of the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while
allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper
columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers.
In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring
personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression means that the government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.

Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the

suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental,
5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the OBrien test, namely, that the restriction
be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated,
5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon
effect, junking of weak or losing candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating
called dagdag-bawas. Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they
cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such
aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech
because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils.

178
 GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA v. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER

G. R. No. 180989

SERENO, J.:

FACTS: The Commission on Audit issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-
audit of government financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. The circular
affirmed the state policy that all resources of the government shall be managed,
expended or utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded against
loss or wastage through illegal or improper disposition, with a view to ensuring
efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the operations of government.

After the change in administration due to the February 1986 revolution, grave
irregularities and anomalies in the government's financial transactions were uncovered.
Hence, on 31 March 1986, the COA issued Circular No. 86-257, which reinstated the
pre-audit of selected government transactions. The selective pre-audit was perceived to
be an effective, although temporary, remedy against the said anomalies.

Two years later, or on 22 July 2011, COA issued Circular No. 2011-002, which lifted the
pre-audit of government transactions implemented by Circular No. 2009-002. In its
assessment, subsequent developments had shown heightened vigilance of government
agencies in safeguarding their resources.

On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges
that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular,
considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article
IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by
COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been committed, such as
the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-million call center
laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many others.

Issue: Does the Commission on Audit’s power includes the duty to conduct pre-audit?

Ruling: No. Petitioner's allegations find no support in the aforequoted Constitutional

provision. There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-
audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear
reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides
that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state
subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is
inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or
special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.

Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel
the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional

179
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit
and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room
for interpretation, only application. 19 Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly
enlarged.

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 RAMON R. YAP v. Commission ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 158562

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: Ramon R. Yap is holder of a regular position of Department Manager of the

National Development Company (NDC), a government-owned and controlled
corporation with original charter. He was appointed by the Board of Directors, Manila
Gas Corporation (MGC), a subsidiary of NDC as Vice-President for Finance effective
June 14, 1991 while remaining as a regular employee of NDC. The additional
employment entitled him to honoraria equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of his basic
salary at NDC and various allowances attached to the office. In the course of the regular
audit, the Corporate Auditor, MGC issued notices of disallowances against Mr. Ramon
R. Yap which were predicated on the ground that appellants appointment to MGC in
addition to his regular position as Department Manager III of NDC and the subsequent
receipt of the questioned allowances and reimbursements from the former directly
contravened the proscription contained in Section 7 (2) and Section 8, Article IX-b of the
Constitution.

Mr. Yap appealed the Auditors disallowances primarily contending that the
questioned benefits were all approved by the MGC Board of Directors.

Petitioners appeal was denied by the CAO II. Unperturbed, petitioner sought a
reconsideration of the CAO II ruling from respondent COA. In turn, respondent COA
denied petitioners appeal. It upheld the CAO IIs ruling that characterized the
disallowed allowances and reimbursements as prohibited by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Did RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT AFFIRMED THE DISALLOWANCES ON A GROUND [different from the
ground] RELIED UPON BY THE RESIDENT AUDITOR?

RULING: No. The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds,
vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and
expenditures and the uses of public funds and property including the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations. ]Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 echoes this constitutional mandate given to COA.

In light of these express provisions of law granting respondent COA its power
and authority, we have previously ruled that its exercise of its general audit power is
among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system
inherent in our form of government. [20] Furthermore, we have also declared that COA is
endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular,

181
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds.[21]

Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or absence of any law or
jurisprudence saying otherwise, we rule that, in resolving cases brought before it on
appeal, respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to the grounds relied
upon by a government agencys auditor with respect to disallowing certain
disbursements of public funds. In consonance with its general audit power, respondent
COA is not merely legally permitted, but is also duty-bound to make its own
assessment of the merits of the disallowed disbursement and not simply restrict itself to
reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of the government
agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render COAs vital constitutional power
unduly limited and thereby useless and ineffective.

182
 ELIAS V. PACETE vs. THE HONORABLE ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, MIGUEL PEÑALOSA, JR., in his capacity as City Auditor and in his
personal capacity; and THE CITY TREASURER

G.R. No. L-39456 May 7, 1990

CORTES, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Elias V. Pacete was appointed by the then Mayor Antonio C.
Acharon of General Santos City as City Attorney of the said city. Mayor Acharon was
charged with murder and was detained without bail. A few months later, Mayor Acharon
ran for and was reelected as City Mayor of General Santos City pending the criminal
case against him and even while he was in jail., Mayor Acharon issued Administrative
Order No. 1 designating Vice Mayor Erlindo R. Grafilo as Acting Mayor. Acharon, while
still in prison, issued another memorandum revoking the aforementioned memorandum.

In the meantime, acting Mayor Erlindo Grafilo suspended petitioner Elias V. Pacete as
City Attorney for a period of ten (10) days. Finally, notice was served on petitioner that
he had been removed as the City Attorney on the ground of loss of confidence.
Petitioner filed the present petition with essentially the following prayers: (1) payment of
backwages from the time petitioner was suspended until the final termination of his
case; and (2) payment by respondent City Auditor Miguel Penalosa, Jr. of damages for
his refusal to pass in audit petitioner's claim for backwages. The respondent Assistant
Executive Secretary, rendered an opinion stating that: (1) the termination of petitioner's
services as City Attorney by Acting Mayor Grafilo was in accordance with law and; (2)
Atty. Pacete may not rightfully demand payment of back salaries for the period during
which he was out of the service and was physically and legally not discharging his
duties as City Attorney of General Santos City.

ISSUE: Is the opinion of respondent Assistant Executive Secretary contending that the
decision of the Auditor General cannot be reviewed by the Office of the President
without violating the principles of separation of powers and non-delegation of powers
legal?

RULING: Yes. The Office of the President did not review the ruling of the Auditor
General. Instead, what transpired was the referral of petitioner's case by the Auditor
General to the Office of the President for opinion, on the basis of which the respondent
Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit, who as noted earlier took over the
functions of the Auditor General, rendered a decision disallowing petitioner's claim. In
other words, the respondent Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit did issue a
separate decision rejecting petitioner's money claim. It cannot, therefore be claimed that
the Commission on Audit (formerly the Auditor General) abdicated in favor of the Office
of the President its authority over cases involving the settlement of accounts or money
claims against the government.

183
184
 ANIANO A. ALBON vs. BAYANI F. FERNANDO, City Mayor of Marikina, ENGR.
ALFONSO ESPIRITO, City Engineer of Marikina, ENGR. ANAKI MADERAL,
Assistant City Engineer of Marikina, and NATIVIDAD CABALQUINTO, City
Treasurer of Marikina

G.R. No. 148357 ; June 30, 2006

CORONA, J.:

FACTS: In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen,
clear and repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. It was
undertaken by the city government pursuant to Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993like other
infrastructure projects relating to roads, streets and sidewalks previously undertaken by
the city.

Petitioner Aniano A. Albon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, a taxpayer’s
suit for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with damages against respondents.
Petitioner claimed that it was unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents to use
government equipment and property, and to disburse public funds, of the City of
Marikina for the grading, widening, clearing, repair and maintenance of the existing
sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. He alleged that the sidewalks were
private property because Marikina Greenheights Subdivision was owned by V.V.
Soliven, Inc. Hence, the city government could not use public resources on them. In
undertaking the project, therefore, respondents allegedly violated the constitutional
proscription against the use of public funds for private purposes as well as Sections 335
and 336 of RA 7160 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner further
alleged that there was no appropriation for the project.

The trial court denied petitioner’s application for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and writ of preliminary injunction. The appellate court sustained the ruling of the trial
court.

ISSUE: May a local government unit (LGU) validly use public funds to undertake the
widening, repair and improvement of the sidewalks of a privately-owned subdivision?

RULING: Yes. Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for
the purposes set forth in the Local Government Code (RA 7160). It is expressly vested
with police powers delegated to LGUs under the general welfare clause of RA 7160.
With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable regulations to protect the lives, health,
and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective
territorial jurisdictions.

185
Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such powers and discharge
such functions and responsibilities as may be necessary, appropriate or incidental to
efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities, including
infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their residents and
which are financed by their own funds. These infrastructure facilities include municipal
or city roads and bridges and similar facilities.

There is no question about the public nature and use of the sidewalks in the Marikina
Greenheights Subdivision. One of the "whereas clauses" of PD 1216 declares that open
spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks in a residential subdivision are for public use and
beyond the commerce of man. In conjunction herewith, PD 957, as amended by PD
1216, mandates subdivision owners to set aside open spaces which shall be devoted
exclusively for the use of the general public.

Thus, the trial and appellate courts were correct in upholding the validity of Ordinance
No. 59, s. 1993. It was enacted in the exercise of the City of Marikina’s police powers to
regulate the use of sidewalks.

186
 DENNIS A.B. FUNA vs. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE and the
COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 193462 February 4, 2014

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

The Philippines formally ended its official diplomatic relations with the government in
Taiwan when the country and the PROC expressed mutual recognition thru the Joint
Communiqué of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government
of the People’s Republic of China (Joint Communiqué). Maintaining ties with Taiwan
that is permissible by the terms of the Joint Communiqué, however, necessarily
required the Philippines, and Taiwan, to course any such relations thru offices outside of
the official or governmental organs.

Hence, despite ending their diplomatic ties, the people of Taiwan and of the Philippines
maintained an unofficial relationship facilitated by the offices of the Taipei Economic and
Cultural Office, for the former, and the MECO, for the latter.

The MECO was organized as a non-stock, non-profit corporation under Batas

Pambansa Blg. 68 or the Corporation Code. The MECO became the corporate entity
"entrusted" by the Philippine government with the responsibility of fostering "friendly"
and "unofficial" relations with the people of Taiwan. To enable it to carry out such
responsibility, the MECO was "authorized" by the government to perform certain
"consular and other functions" that relates to the promotion, protection and facilitation of
Philippine interests in Taiwan.

According to petitioner, the MECO possesses all the essential characteristics of a

GOCC and an instrumentality under the Executive Order No. (EO) 292, s. 1987 or the
Administrative Code: it is a non-stock corporation vested with governmental functions
relating to public needs; it is controlled by the government thru a board of directors
appointed by the President of the Philippines; and while not integrated within the
executive departmental framework, it is nonetheless under the operational and policy
supervision of the DTI.

The MECO emphasizes that categorizing it as a GOCC or a government instrumentality

can potentially violate the country’s commitment to the One China policy of the PROC.
Thus, the MECO cautions against applying to the present mandamus petition the
pronouncement in the Wood decision regarding the alleged auditability of the AIT in the
United States.

The COA argues that, despite being a non-governmental entity, the MECO may still be
audited with respect to the "verification fees" for overseas employment documents that
it collects from Taiwanese employers on behalf of the DOLE. The COA claims that,

187
under Joint Circular No. 3-99, the MECO is mandated to remit to the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) a portion of such "verification fees." The COA,
therefore, classifies the MECO as a non-governmental entity "required to pay xxx
government share" subject to a partial audit of its accounts under Section 26 of the
Presidential Decree No. 1445 or the State Audit Code of the Philippines (Audit Code).

ISSUE: Are the accounts of the MECO subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA?

RULING: Yes. The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui

generis private entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of
unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan without jeopardizing the country’s faithful
commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. However, despite its non-
governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the
"verification fees" it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the "consular fees" it collects
under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of
the MECO pertaining to its collection of such "verification fees" and "consular fees"
should be audited by the COA.

188
ATTY. JANET D. NACION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, MA. GRACIA PULIDO-TAN,
JUANITO ESPINO AND HEIDI MENDOZA

G.R. No. 204757, March 17, 2015

REYES, J.:

FACTS: From October 16, 2001 to September 15, 2003, Nacion was assigned by the
COA to the Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System (MWSS) as State Auditor V.
When Nacion was already holding the position of Director IV of COA, National
Government Sector, a formal charge5 against her was issued by COA Chairperson Ma.
Gracia M. Pulido Tan (Chairperson Tan) for acts found to be committed when she was
still with the MWSS.

Attached to the formal charge were investigation reports based on MWSS journal
vouchers, disbursement vouchers and claims control index. COA’s investigation of its
personnel assigned to MWSS was prompted by its receipt of a letter from then MWSS
Administrator Diosdado Jose M. Allado, who complained of unrecorded checks and
irregularly issued disbursement vouchers that were traced to refer to bonuses and other
benefits of the COA MWSS personnel. Nacion admitted that she also availed of the
MWSS Multi-Purpose Loan Program – Car Loan, upon an honest belief that she was
not prohibited from doing so. Nacion, however, denied having received bonuses and
benefits from MWSS.

On June 14, 2012, the COA rendered its Decision finding Nacion guilty of grave
misconduct and violation of reasonable rules and regulations. It cited Section 18 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, which specifically prohibits COA personnel from receiving
salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from any government
entity, local government unit, government-owned and -controlled corporations and
government financial institutions, except those compensation paid directly by the COA
out of its appropriations and contributions. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Did the Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discretion in finding
Nacion guilty of grave misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations?

RULING: No. The Court emphasized in Dycoco v. Court of Appeals that “[a]n act of a
court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such
act is done in a ‘capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.” The Court holds that no such grave abuse of discretion may be attributed
to the COA for the procedure it observed, its factual findings and conclusions in
Nacion’s case. The power of the COA to discipline its officials could not be limited by
the procedure being insisted upon by Nacion. Neither is the authority of the Chairperson
to commence the action through the issuance of the formal charge restricted by the
requirement of a prior written complaint. As may be gleaned from Section 2 of the COA

189
Memorandum No. 76-48, a written complaint under oath is demanded only when the
administrative case is commenced by a person other than the COA Chairperson.

Contrary to Nacion’s claim, the COA also did not act beyond its jurisdiction when her
case was considered by the FAIO investigating team since a separate office order was
not necessary for the audit team’s investigation of Nacion’s case. It should be
emphasized that prior to the issuance of the formal charge, the investigations conducted
by the team were merely fact-finding. The Court also finds no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COA in holding Nacion administratively liable for the offenses with
which she was charged.

It is settled that the factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling when
supported by such substantial evidence. In resolving the present petition, the Court
finds no compelling reason to deviate from this general rule. Three separate acts were
found to have been committed by Nacion, all sufficient to support the COA’s finding of
grave misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. Clearly, the
acts of Nacion were prohibited under the law. Among those covering the matter is R.A.
No. 6758, specifically Section 18 thereof. The COA personnel who have nothing to look
forward to or expect from their assigned offices in terms of extra benefits, would have
no reason to accord special treatment to the latter by closing their eyes to irregular or
unlawful expenditures or use of funds or property, or conducting a perfunctory audit.
The law realizes that such extra benefits could diminish the personnel’s seriousness
and dedication in the pursuit of their assigned tasks, affect their impartiality and provide
a continuing temptation to ingratiate themselves to the government entity, local
government unit, government-owned and controlled corporations and government
financial institutions, as the case may be. In the end, they would become ineffective
auditors.

190
 MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

G.R. No. 193459

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:

Before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-
Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an
impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List
Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.

Private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos,
Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another
impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-
List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano,
Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus. On even date, the House
of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date, the Secretary General
transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of
August 9, 2010, also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business.

Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed Atty. Artemio
Adasa, Jr. through Atty. Cesar Pareja to include the two complaints in the Order of
Business, which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the
following day, August 11, 2010.

After hearing, public respondent found the two complaints, which both allege culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The
determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent,
which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of
whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served
also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints
within 10 days. Consequently, Ombudsman Gutierrez contended that the issued the
Resolution violated the one-year bar provision under Article XI, Section 3, paragraph 5
of the Constitution

ISSUE: Is there an alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of
the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution?

RULING: No. The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of
merit, there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not
suffice. The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment

191
complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of
the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to public
respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the
House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and substance of an
impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the
compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose,
absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution provides that, no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year. The act of initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment
complaint and the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period
ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is referred to
the House Committee on Justice. Hence, in this case, the HR Committee did not violate
the one-year bar provision of the Constitution when it accepted the second
impeachment complaint after the first impeachment complaint was filed.

192
 ROMEO ACOP, et.al. vs. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et.al.

G.R. No. 120428 September 27, 1995

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS: In this case, government agencies, NCR Command, Traffic Management

Command (TMC), Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), Presidential Central
Police District Command (CPDC) and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) were
accused of summary killing 11 members of the "Kuratong Baleleng" gang by S/PO de
los Reyes of Central Intelligence Commission. He stated that there was no "shootout"
but a "summary killing instead". The complaint went up to the Office of the Ombudsman
of the Military. The Ombudsman addressed the PNP concerned to submit an "After
Operations Report" to the Panel of Investigators, also created by the Ombudsman. The
panel recommended for a preliminary investigation on a list of officers presented by the
PNP. In effect, the Ombudsman ordered the officers listed to submit their counter
affidavit. Petitioners however questioned the conduct, stating that the Ombudsman has
no jurisdiction to take preliminary investigation but the Tanod bayan has and that they
preempted the Court on ruling on the issue whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction
over the case in the first place.

ISSUE: Can the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conduct investigations involving
civilian personnel of the Government?

RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that the deliberations on the Deputy for the military
establishment do not yield conclusive evidence that such deputy is prohibited from
performing other functions or duties affecting non-military personnel. On the contrary, a
review of the relevant Constitutional provisions reveals otherwise.

As previously established, the Ombudsman "may exercise such other powers or

perform such functions or duties"as Congress may prescribe through legislation.
Therefore, nothing can prevent Congress from giving the Ombudsman supervision and
control over the Ombudsman's deputies, one being the deputy for the military
establishment.

Accordingly, the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for
investigation by the Deputy for Military Affairs. In these cases at bench, therefore, no
irregularity attended the referral by the Acting Ombudsman of the Kuratong Baleleng
case to respondent Casaclang who, in turn, created a panel of investigators.

193
 GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, vs. CONRADO VASQUEZ, et., al.

G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Gloria Lastimosa is the Assistant Provincial prosecutor of Cebu.

She and the Provincial Prosecutor refused to file a criminal charge of attempted rape
against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Thus, the Ombudsman filed an administrative complaint
against them for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty refraining
from prosecuting. The two were placed under preventive suspension. It was the
contention of the petitioner that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case of the
mayor thus, they cannot be forced to file the case against Ilustrisimo.

ISSUE: Does the Office of the Ombudsman have the power to call on the Provincial
Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor
Ilustrisimo?

RULING: Yes. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient." This power has been held to include the investigation
and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the
acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the
performance of his official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was committed by
a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a
municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.

It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the
preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary
investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his
determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject to the
approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under Section 31 of the
Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision
and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the
Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision.
Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information
as directed by the Ombudsman.

194
 JESUS P. DISINI v. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG)

G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010

ABAD, J.:

FACTS:

On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and Jesus P.

Disini (Disini) entered into an Immunity Agreement (the Immunity Agreement) under
which Disini undertook to testify for the Republic and provide its lawyers with the
information, affidavits, and documents they needed in its case against Westinghouse
Electric Corporation before the United States District Court of New Jersey and in the
arbitration case that Westinghouse International Projects Company and others filed
against the Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of
Arbitration.

Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio T. Disini (Herminio), as an

executive in the latter’s companies from 1971 to 1984. The Republic believed that the
Westinghouse contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant,
brokered by one of Herminio’s companies, had been attended by anomalies. In the
Immunity Agreement, the Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two Westinghouse
cases, it would not compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding
brought by the Republic against Herminio. Disini complied with his undertaking but 18
years later, upon the Republic’s application, the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena
against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce documents before that court in
an action that the Republic filed against Herminio. Disini moved to quash the subpoena,
invoking the Immunity Agreement. The Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a
new subpoena directing him to testify before it. Subsequently, the PCGG revoked and
nullified the Immunity Agreement insofar as it prohibited the Republic from requiring
Disini to testify against Herminio. Later on, the Sandiganbayan denied Disini’s motion to
quash the subpoena.

Disini, thus, brought the matter to the Supreme Court. The Republic maintained
that the PCGG’s power to grant immunity under Section 5 of Executive Order 14
covered only immunity from civil or criminal prosecution and did not cover immunity
from providing evidence in court. The Republic argued that Disini’s immunity from
testifying against Herminio contravened the state’s policy to recover ill-gotten wealth
acquired under the regime of former President Marcos. The Republic further argued that
under the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement which reads:
“Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini’s obligation to provide truthful information or
testimony,” Disini, despite the immunity given him against being compelled to testify in
other cases, was to “provide truthful information or testimony” in such other cases. For
his part, Disini argued that the Republic, through the PCGG, was estopped from
revoking the questioned immunity as it had made him believe that it had the authority to

195
provide such guarantee. The Republic countered by invoking Section 15, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that “(t)he right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees from them or from their nominees,
or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.”

ISSUE: Did PCGG acted within its authority when it revoked and nullified the Immunity
Agreement between respondent Republic and petitioner Disini?

RULING: No. The Court has ruled in a previous case that the scope of immunity offered
by the PCGG may vary. It has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity
depending on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution
of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to conditions expressed by
the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation.

The language of Section 5, E.O. 14, said the Court, affords latitude to the PCGG
in determining the extent of that criminal immunity. In petitioner Disinis case, respondent
Republic, acting through the PCGG, offered him not only criminal and civil immunity but
also immunity against being compelled to testify in any domestic or foreign proceeding,
other than the civil and arbitration cases identified in the Immunity Agreement, just so
he would agree to testify. Trusting in the Governments honesty and fidelity, Disini
agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the
essence of due process, should hold the Republic on to its promise.

196
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, INC., et. al.vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. Al.

G.R. No. 100588 March 7, 1994

NOCON, J.:

FACTS: Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho,
Michael Kim So and Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner
University of San Agustin (USA) who were refused re-admission of school year 1989-
1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of not lower than 80% in
Nursing 104. Its persistent refusal to re-admit them prejudiced their right to freely
choose their field of study and finish a college degree and worse, no other school within
the city and nearby areas is willing to accept them due to the difference in the
curriculum and school residency requirement. Thus, they filed a petition for mandamus
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, to command petitioner USA to re-admit
them.

Submitting a joint answer to the petition, petitioner USA and the other petitioners
admitted having barred private respondents from finishing their Nursing course but
justified the decision not to re-admit them as being in pursuance of the school's policy
that only students with grades of at least 80% in any major Nursing subject, including
Nursing 104, and two minor subjects, are allowed enrollment in the following year.
Private respondents were duly informed and forewarned of their below 80%
performance rating. To buttress petitioner's stance, they placed reliance on Section 9(2)
of the Education Act of 1982 which recognizes the right of students to freely choose
their field of study subject to existing curricula, and to continue their course up to
graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency or violation of disciplinary
regulations; and Section 13(2) thereof vesting in institutions of higher learning the right
to determine on academic grounds who shall be admitted to study, who may teach, and
what shall be the subjects of study and research.

Additionally, petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of action for
mandamus under the premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of the
latter which has been violated neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial
duty to re-admit them, since petitioner USA is a private educational institution not
performing public functions and duties. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools, petitioner USA enjoys the right to academic freedom. The trial court was not
persuaded that private respondents are entitled to the relief sought. Respondent Court
of Appeals did not agree with the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE: Can the private respondents compel the University of San Agustin to re-admit
them through mandamus?

RULING: No. The Court ruled that the special civil action of mandamus is not available
in this instance. Taking into account the admission of private respondents that they
have finished their Nursing course at the Lanting College of Nursing even before the

197
promulgation of the questioned decision, this case has clearly been overtaken by events
and should therefore be dismissed. However, the case of Eastern Broadcasting
Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans, etc., et al. is the authority for the view that even if a case
were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the
resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly
situated. We shall adhere to this view and proceed to dwell on the merits of this petition.

In the present case, private respondents have failed to satisfy the prime and
indispensable requisites of a mandamus proceeding. There is no showing that they
possess a clear legal right to be enrolled in petitioner USA. Moreover, assuming that
petitioner USA has an imperative duty to enroll them, it does not appear to this Court
that the duty is merely ministerial; rather, it is a duty involving the exercise of discretion.
This was likewise our ruling in the case of Tangonan v. Paño et al., which involves a
factual setting similar to the present petition. We adopted as our own the rationalization
of the trial court therein:

. . . . Every school has a right to determine who are the students it should
accept for enrolment. It has the right to judge the fitness of students. This
is particularly true in the case of nursing students who perform essential
health services. Over and above its responsibility to petitioner is the
responsibility of the school to the general public and the community. This
Court take (sic) judicial notice that nursing has become a popular course
because of the great demand for Filipino Nurses abroad, especially in the
United States. It is essential therefore that Nursing graduates who go
abroad and become in a sense our own ambassador (sic) should be
highly qualified to perform their tasks. This is the responsibility of our
school and in the discharge of this responsibility, they certainly should be
given the greatest latitude in formulating their admission policies.

While petitioner questions the findings of respondent school as to her

academic competence, the Court cannot find any legal jurisdiction to
interfere in the exercise of judgment of the school on this matter. . . .

The meaning of this provision is that the school, after having accepted a student for
enrollment in a given course may not expel him or refuse to re-enroll him until he
completes his course, except when he is academically deficientor has violated the rules
of discipline. He is presumed to be qualified to study there for the entire period it will
take to complete his course.

198
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, et., al. vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, et.,al

G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS: As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the

Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites for students interested in joining its ranks. As
a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa died of serious physical
injuries. Another freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized
for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on
the same occasion.

Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student

Investigating Committee2 which was tasked to investigate and submit a report
surrounding the death of Lennie Villa.. Although respondent students received a copy of
the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on
preventive suspension.

The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the

written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie
case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue
entitled "Discipline."4

In a letter, respondent students were informed that they had violated Rule No. 3 of the
Rules on Discipline contained in the Law School Catalogue.

ISSUE: Is the school within its rights in expelling students from its academic community
pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards?

RULING: Yes. Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students
and therefore it had validly exercised such power. The students do not deserve to claim
such a venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute longer for they may
foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on students currently enrolled as well as those
who come after them. This is academic freedom on the part of the school which
includes:

a. freedom to determine who may teach;

b. freedom to determine what may be taught;

c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;

199
d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.

200
 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS and VICTORIA A. SATORRE vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and JENNIFER C. LEE

G.R. No. 79237 October 18, 1988

GANCAYCO, J.:

ISSUE: Would the refusal of a university to confer honors constitute bad faith so as to
make it liable for damages?

FACTS: Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee filed an action for mandamus with damages
against petitioners University of San Carlos and Victoria A. Satorre, asking that
petitioners be compelled to confer upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science in
Commerce, major in Accounting, cum laude, retroactive to March 28, 1982, to execute
and deliver to her all necessary credentials evidencing her graduation with honors, and
to pay her moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

Private respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture, University of San Carlos

(USC), during the first semester of school year 1978-79. At the end of the second
semester of that school year, she obtained a grade of "I.C." (Incomplete) in Architecture
121, and grades of "5's" (failures) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123.

The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of Commerce of the
USC. Some of the units she had completed when she was still an architecture student
were then carried over and credited in her new course. As a commerce student, she
obtained good grades. However, she was aware of her earlier failing grades in the
College of Architecture and that the same would be taken into consideration in the
evaluation of her overall academic performance to determine if she could graduate with
honors.

So, on December 10, 1981, she wrote the Council of Deans of the USC, requesting
that her grades of 5s in Architecture 121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in the
computation of her grade average. In the 3rd Indorsement, the President of the USC
informed the MECS that the university policy was that any failing grade obtained by a
student in any course would disqualify the student for honors; that to deviate from that
policy would mean injustice to students similarly situated before who were not allowed
to graduate with honors; that the bad grades given to her were justified and could not be
deleted or removed because her subjects were not "dropped" as required; that she had
two failures and one incomplete grade which became a failure upon her inaction to
attend to the incomplete grade within one year; and that while her three failures did not
affect her graduation from the College of Commerce, they nonetheless caused her
disqualification from graduating with honors.

After trial, the lower court rendered its Decision in favor of plaintiff. The appellate court
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

201
ISSUE: May a university be compelled by mandamus to grant graduation honors to any
student who, according to the university's standards, rules and regulations, does not
qualify for such honors?

RULING: No. It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample
discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of
graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is
within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the
grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter
may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of
discretion in its exercise.

In this case, the petitioner's bulletin of information provides all students and all other
interested parties advise on the University policies and rules on enrollment and
academic achievements. Therein it is provided, among others, that a student may not
officially withdraw from subjects in the curriculum if he does not have the written
permission of his parents or guardian. For an incomplete grade, there must be an
application for completion or removal within the period announced by the school
calendar and when not removed within one (1) year, it automatically becomes final. A
"DR" (Dropped) subject which is in the same category, as a "5" disqualifies a student
from receiving honors. A candidate for honors should have earned no less than 18 units
per semester but a working student should earn no less that 12 units. A failure in any
subject disqualifies a student from honors. Good moral character and exemplary
conduct are as important criteria for honors as academic achievements.

Private respondent should know and is presumed to know those University policies and
is bound to comply therewith.

202
 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS

[G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999]

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India.

Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the
University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP).

After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private
respondent went on a two-year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme Producer
of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the International
Right to Life Federation in Rome. She returned to the Philippines to work on her
dissertation. In December 22, 1992, Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P.
Department of Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno certifying that
private respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready for her oral defense.
After going over private respondents dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean
Consuelo Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondents dissertation that
was lifted, without proper acknowledgment.

In view of the overwhelming proof of massive lifting and also on the admission of
Ms. Arokiaswamy William that she indeed plagiarized, the Committee strongly supports
the recommendation of the U.P. Diliman Council to withdraw the doctoral degree of Ms.
Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William.

On the basis of the report, the University Council recommended to the Board of
Regents that private respondent be barred in the future from admission to the University
either as a student or as an employee.

On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages. On August 6, 1996,
the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for mandamus for lack of
merit. Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the lower
court.

ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in granting the writ of
mandamus and ordering petitioners to restore respondent’s doctoral degree?

RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that at any rate, they cannot countenance the plight the
petitioner finds herself enmeshed in as a consequence of the acts complained of.
Justice and equity demand that this be rectified by restoring the degree conferred to her
after her compliance with the academic and other related requirements.

Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that [a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed
in all institutions of higher learning. This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitutionand the
203
1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the
institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out
by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is
a freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere of
authority certainly extending to the choice of students. If such institution of higher
learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine
on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained

through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it
has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the graduation
of a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the graduation of such a
student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondents
case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on
April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of
Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate.

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the
USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in
the process has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.

In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation
conducted by a committee composed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that
private respondent committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual
dishonesty in her dissertation. The Board of Regents decision to withdraw private
respondents doctorate was based.

204
 ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIAvs. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE
PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB),

G.R. No. 211362; February 24, 2015

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA. He
belonged to the "A" Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. As claimed by
petitioners he was supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive
the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an
ensign of the Philippine Navy.

On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1 CL cadets
had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations Research. Five days after, Professor
Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th period class issued a Delinquency Report (DR)
against Cadet 1 CL Cudia because he was "[/]ate for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412
class x x x. " On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical
Officers. They were logged and transmitted to the Company Tactical Officers ( CTO) for
explanation of the concerned cadets. Two days later, Cadet lCL Cudia received his DR.

In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet lCL Cudia reasoned out
that: "I came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor
Sir."

On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj. Hindang), the CTO of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, meted out to him the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.
Immediately, Cadet lCL Cudia clarified with Maj. Hindang his alleged violation. The
latter told him that the basis of the punishment was the result of his conversation with
Dr. Costales, who responded that she never dismissed her class late, and the protocol
to dismiss the class 10-15 minutes earlier than scheduled.

Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia was informed that Maj.
Hindang reported him to the HC21 for violation of the Honor Code. Cudia appealed to
the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of the PMA
ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.

Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military officers
requesting for a re-investigation. It was their claim that there were irregularities in the
investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred
to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).

205
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due
process, education, and privacy of communication.

Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of
Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.

PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition
for certiorari,prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the
said petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the
court should avoid interfering with military matters.

ISSUE: Can the PMA validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings?

RULING: Yes. Art. XIV, Section 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." This is nothing new. The
1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom
or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher
learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is
thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If
such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it
certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its
graduates. It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to develop
the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes;
nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.

The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is the
minimum standard for cadet behavior and serves as the guiding spirit behind each
cadet's action. It is the cadet's responsibility to maintain the highest standard of honor.
Throughout a cadet's stay in the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds as
well the members of the Cadet Corps from its alumni or the member of the so-called
"Long Gray Line."

In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s Honor Code violation followed the
prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. It is well settled that by reason
of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters
falling under their respective jurisdictions, the factual findings of administrative tribunals
are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Court, unless such findings are not
supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure
which led to the findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. In the case of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia, We find no reason to deviate from the general rule.

206
 Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, October 19, 2010

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: On August 9, 2010, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan,

Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison,
Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay,
Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba,
Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa
Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O.
Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C.
Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M.
Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V.
Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement on the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Courts decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty.
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo in the
face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the
allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not
only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over
Justice Del Castillos explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted
portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles
supposedly plagiarized.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern
for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack
that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against

the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of

deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of
polluted sources, the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as
the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most
basic values of decency and respect.

ISSUE: Was the statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court?

207
RULING: Yes. The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law
regarding the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was
totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public
knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such
allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the decision alleged to
contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We made it clear in the
case of In re Kelly that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the
jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or
tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is
punishable.

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free
and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only
goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become
harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust
criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must insist on being
permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice.

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less
than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya
case and undermine the Courts honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the
motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort womens claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment
against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their
obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity
and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have
taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Their
actions likewise constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

208
 In Re Appointment of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC. ,  November 9, 1998

NARVASA, CJ.

Facts: On March 9, 1998, a meeting was called by The Judicial and Bar Council  to
discuss the "constitutionality of *** appointments" to the Court of Appeals, specifically, in
light of the forthcoming presidential elections. Attention was drawn to Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution banning midnight appointments.

On April 6, 1998 the Chief Justice received an official communication from the
Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of eight (8) Associate Justices of the
Court of Appeals all of which had been duly signed on March 11, 1998 by the President-
the day immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments imposed by
Section 15, which impliedly indicated that the President's Office did not agree with the
hypothesis that appointments to the Judiciary were not covered by said ban.

On May 12, the Chief Justice received from Malacañang, the appointments of the 2
Judges of the RTC mentioned.  Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations
on this matter, the Court resolved by refraining the appointees from taking their oaths. 
However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so without
knowledge of the on-going deliberations. 

Issue: Can the President can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of
ban in line with Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII of the Constitution and in the interest
of public service?

Held: No, the President cannot appoint during the period of the ban. The Court's view is
that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution - "(t)wo months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term" - the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so;
and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to
fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by
Section 15 of Article VII.

Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan
considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code.

The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the
so-called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo,  it was held that after the

209
proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P.
Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than a "caretaker"
administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the
incoming President."

210
In re: Request for Creation of a Special Division to try the Plunder Case (SB Crim.
Case no. 26558 and related cases)
Adm. Matter No. 02-1-07-SC. January 21, 2002
BELLOSILLO, J.

Facts: On 11 January 2002 Resolution No. 01-2002 of the Sandiganbayan (En Banc)
captioned Re: Request for the Creation of a Special Division to Try the Plunder Case,
involving the cases against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and those
accused with him. The Resolution was promulgated on 8 and 11 January 2002 in
response to the Request for Re-Raffle of the defense counsel and the Opposition to
Request for Re-Raffle of the Special Prosecution Panel.

In its Request for Re-Raffle, the defense alleges that it is made "for (a) better
administration of justice" in view of the "shifting and uncertain nature of (the)
composition (of the Third Division)" to which the "Plunder Case" was originally assigned
citing as bases therefor the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Ricardo M.
Ilarde, and the indefinite leave of absence of Associate Justice Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr.
Only Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro remains as permanent member
thereof. 
On 10 January 2002 the Special Prosecution Panel filed its comment/suggestion
maintaining that the Third Division should continue hearing the Plunder Case, and to
achieve constancy in the membership of that division it recommended the creation of a
Special Third Division to be composed of the remaining permanent member of the Third
Division, Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, and two (2) other justices.
The Defense Panel argues that the creation of an Ad Hoc Special Division "may
create serious equal protection concerns and set a dangerous precedent that may come
back to haunt us." Eventually, the following were designated to the Special Division:
Acting Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario as Chairman, and Associate Justices
Edilberto G. Sandoval and Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro as members.
Issue: Is the Creation of the Special Division by the Supreme Court constitutional?
Held: Yes. Under Sec. 5, par. [5], Art. VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court
has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights and procedure in all courts, including the Sandiganbayan.
Accordingly, given the nature of the Plunder Case and cases related thereto, the
prominence of the principal accused and the importance of the immediate resolution of
the cases to the Filipino people and the Philippine Government, this Court, in the
interest of justice and the speedy disposition of cases, with due regard to the procedural
and substantive rights of the accused, deems it best to create a Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan to be composed of members mentioned in the immediately preceding
paragraph. This Special Division shall hear, try and decide with dispatch the Plunder
Case and all related cases filed or which may hereafter be filed against former

211
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and those accused with him, until they are resolved,
decided and terminated.

212
 Rhonda Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

VELASCO, JR., J.

Facts: On January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College
(STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz
and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments. Some of their classmates
reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her
students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s
Discipline Committee for appropriate action. The STC found Tan et al to have violated
the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their graduation
ceremonies. The issue went to court, whereby the RTC a TRO (temporary restraining
order) enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies,
STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. Petitioners
(Parents of the students involved) assert that the privacy of the children were unlawfully
invaded. Since the Facebook accounts of the children are set at “Friends Only”.

The RTC issued the writ and directed the respondents to file their verified written
return within 5 working days from service of the writ.Respondent denied the petitioners
allegation because there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook. Thus, the RTC dismissed the petition
for habeas data.

Issue: Will the petition for writ of habeas data prosper?

Held: No, the petition the petition will not prosper. First, the Rule on Habeas Data does
not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the
business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

However, on the matter of right to Privacy on Online Networking Sites, the Supreme
Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and
the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation
of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected
and protected. In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned
made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on
Facebook were published as “Public”.

213
 Infant JULIAN CARAM v. SEGUI
G.R. No. 193652               August 5, 2014

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Facts: Petitioner Christina became pregnant without the benefit of marriage. During this

time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children
in Parañaque City. Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial
Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical
expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of
a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. The DSWD eventually declaring Baby
Julian as “Legally Available for Adoption.” And soon after, Baby Julian was “matched”
with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was then commenced.

Soon after, Christina changed her mind about the adoption and wrote a letter to the
DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. However,
the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality,
terminating her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.
Thus, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC
seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.

Issue: Is a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and

custody of a minor child?

Held: No, The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not
proper as there was no enforced disappearance in this case, respondent
DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained
a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the
custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides,
she even admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby
Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no “enforced
disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth
elements are missing. Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly
separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without
complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly
indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority
over the child and contesting custody over him.

214
 Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., requesting exemption from payment of IBP
dues.
B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts: In his letter, dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from
payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12, 035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for
the years 1977P2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961,
he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated
to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He
maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in
the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones
profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment stating, among others,
that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer
continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a
member of the IBP.

In petitioners reply he said that the compulsion that he pays his IBP annual
membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from
the profession because of non payment of the same constitutes to the deprivation of his
property rights bereft of due process of the law.

Issue: Is the petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time
that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from
1962P1986 and he was working abroad from 1986P2003?

Held: No, the court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of
regulatory measure by the State, which is a necessary consequence for being a
member of the Philippine Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists for
as long as one remains to be a member regardless whether one is a practising lawyer
or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership fee dues is
denied.

215
 Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp.
G.R. No. 152613   ;          June 23, 2006

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts: The case involves the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area” (Diwalwal), a rich tract of
mineral land located inside the AgusanPDavaoPSurigao Forest Reserve in Davao del
Norte and Davao Oriental. Since the early 1980s, Diwalwal has been stormed by
conflicts brought about by numerous mining claims over it.

On March 10, 1986, Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) was granted an

Exploration Permit(EP 133) by the Bureau of Mines and GeoPSciences (BMG). A long
battle ensued between Apex and MMC with the latter seeking the cancellation of the
mining claims of Apex on the ground that such mining claims were within a forest
reservation. The case eventually reached the SC in 1991, the Court ruled against Apex
holding that the area is a forest reserve and thus it should have applied for a permit to
prospect with the BFD.

On February 16 1994, MMC assigned all its rights to EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corporation (SEM). BMG registered SEM’s Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) application and the Deed of Assignment. Several oppositions were
filed. The Panel of Arbitrators created by the DENR upheld the validity of EP 133.
During the pendency of the case, DENR AO No. 2002P18 was issued declaring an
emergency situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area and ordering the stoppage of all
mining operations within the territory.

Issue: Is the transfer of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC to SEM valid?

Held: No, the transfer is invalid. One of the terms and conditions of EP 133 is that “the
permit shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of the permittee or his duly authorized
agents and shall be used for mineral exploration purposes only and for no other
purpose.” While it may be true that SEM is a100% subsidiary corporation of MMC, there
is no showing that the former is the duly authorized agent of the latter. As such, the
assignment is null and void as it directly contravenes the terms and conditions of the
grant of EP 133.

216
 CJ Corona vs. Senate of the Philippines
GR No. 200242 ; July 17, 2012

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Facts: Former Chief Justice Renato Corona Filed a petition for certiorari and and
prohibition with the prayer to issue an immediate temporary restraining order (TRO) and
writ of preliminary injunction. (Filed in the Supreme Court). This is against the
impeachment case initiated by the Members of the House of representatives (HOR) and
the trial being conducted by the Senate of the Philippines.

After giving due course to the Petition, render judgment:(i) Declaring the
Impeachment Complaint null and void ab initio; (ii) Prohibiting the presentation,
reception and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment
Complaint; (iii) Annulling the Impeachment Court's Resolution dated 27 January 2012
and 6 February 2011 [sic], as well as any Subpoenae issued pursuant thereto; and (iv)
Making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction permanent.

Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said
complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were
apparently aiding the prosecution during the hearings. They argue that unless there is a
clear transgression of these constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its
power of expanded judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the
proceedings.

Issues: Did respondents commit a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack
or excess of jurisdiction which would require corrective measures from the Court?

Ruling: No, the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or
misconduct is provided in the Constitution. Impeachment, described as "the most
formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy," was foreseen as creating divisions,
partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger
that "the decision will be regulated more... by the comparative strength of parties, than
by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt." Given their concededly political
character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost
importance to ensure the effective... functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this
jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those
traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are... proper subjects of judicial
review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.

217
 Petitioner was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec.
3,... In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of
petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner
immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the
Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and
nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief
Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates short listed by
the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue... raised by petitioner had been mooted by
supervening events and his own acts.

218
 Maria Carolina Araullo v. Benigno Aquino III
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014

BERSAMIN, J.

Facts: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a
stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program
called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects.
DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the
DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once
withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was
attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé

claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an
incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed
upon the request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only
realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were
also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation
Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon
Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang

Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was DAP
is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.”

Issues: Is the Doctrine of Operative Fact applicable?

Held: Yes, The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act
prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The

219
DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If
the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more
harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the
DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the
validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to
the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate
tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

220
 Tan v. Barrios
G.R. No. 85481-82 October 18, 1990

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

Facts: On the basis of Proclamation 1081 dated 21 September 1972, then President
Marcos, thru General Order 8 dated 27 September 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of
Staff to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such
other cases as may be referred to them." In General Order 21 dated 30 September
1972, the military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with jurisdiction
among others, over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were
directly related to the quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the safety and security
of the Republic. In General Order 12-b dated 7 November 1972, "crimes against
persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were added to the
jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions.

On 17 April 1975, William Tan et al., were arrested and charged in Criminal Case
MC-1-67 before the Military Commission 1. Eventually, President Marcos, withdrew his
earlier order to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the
military court. However, William Tan et al. were acquitted of the charges, and released
on 11 June 1976.

On 17 January 1981, Proclamation 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the
military tribunals and commissions. On 22 May 1987, the Supreme Court promulgated a
decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144), vacating the
sentence rendered on 4 December 1984 by Military Commission 34 against Olaguer, et
al. and declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even
during the period of martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly
cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and functioning as they did
during the period of martial law.

On 15 November 1988, State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios was designated

Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in lieu of the regular fiscal who inhibited
himself. Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on 9
December 1988, in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2)
informations for (1) Illegal Possession of Firearm [Criminal Case 88-824]; and (2)
Murder [Criminal Case 88-825] against all the 15 original defendants in Criminal Case
MC1-67 including those who had already died. On 7 November 1988, William Tan et al.
filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the information’s in Criminal
Cases 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of Judge dated 26 October 1988 be annulled,
among others.

221
Issue: Does the re prosecution of Tan, et. al. violate their right to protection against
double jeopardy?

Held: Yes. The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against Tan, et.
al. and their co-accused before the Military Commission. The principle of absolute
invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not be allowed to
obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of Tan, et. al., the proceedings
were fair, that there were no serious violations of their constitutional right to due
process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and decided the
charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by the
Supreme Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the
Olaguer case arose and came before the Supreme Court. Because of these established
operative facts, the refiling of the information against Tan, et. al. would place them in
double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic. The doctrine of double
jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the strong arm of the State: "The
constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A single prosecution for any offense is
all the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment, enables him to treat what
had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to be
resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself
time-consuming and expense-producing for the state as well. It has been referred to as
'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once,
not whenever it pleases the state to do so."

222
 Gayo v. Verceles
G.R. No. 150477 ; February 28, 2005

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Facts: In 1977, Verceles migrated to USA with family but she retained her Filipino
citizenship. Sometime 1993 returned to the Philippines. Two years later, she registered
herself as a voter of La Union. In 1997 effectively abandoned her status as lawful
resident of USA for the May 1998 elections and on January 1998 surrendered her alien
registration. During the May 1998 elections was elected mayor and was re-elected
again in the 2001 election.

On May 26, 2001, the petitioner, also a candidate for Mayor during the May 2001
elections, filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC of Agoo, La Union. He prayed
that respondent be declared disqualified to hold the position of Mayor of Tubao, La
Union. On October 12, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition
for quo warranto and ruled that the respondent was qualified to occupy the position as
Municipal Mayor.

Issue: Did the LGC impliedly repealed Sec 68 of the OEC by the fact that LGC does not
provide waiver for status as permanent residents abroad which is provided under Sec
68 of OEC?

Held: No, since both provisions are in pari materia - they relate to the same subject
matter and thus should be construed together and each legislative intent is to be
interpreted. OEC is a catchphrase or a conditional cause on how a permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country could fall outside the coverage of prohibition.
Legislature found the inclusion of how to fall outside the prohibition in OEC is
unnecessary, hence the deletion. Thus the absence of that conditional clause in Sec. 40
(f) of the LGC 1991 may be supplied by Sec. 68 (e) of the OEC.

223
 In Re: Elections of the IBP
AM No 491 06 ; October 1989

PER CURIAM

Facts: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines held
on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center, the newly-elected
officers were set to take their oath of office on July 4, 1989 before the Supreme Court
en bane. However, disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of
the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the
adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive
electioneering and overspending by the candidates, namely, Attorney Paculdo, Nisce,
and Drilon , the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of
certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the
IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en bane, exercising its
power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the
IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.

Issue: Did the candidates violate the IBP By-Laws?

Held: Yes, the candidates and many of the participants in that election not only
violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which
imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the
constitution and the laws, the duty to “promote respect for law and legal processes" and
to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for
law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the
law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP
formulated for their observance.

224
 Republic v. CJ Sereno
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

J. Tijam

Facts: From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University
of the Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from
October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the
Republic in two international arbitrations. In her 20 years of service, only 11 SALNs
were recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the

position of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to
submit documents, among which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011”
and that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not
be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno only submitted three (3) SALNs
from the time she became an Associate Justice. Despite this, on a report to the JBC,
Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was
appointed Chief Justice.

On February 2018, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void Sereno’s
appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom.
Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition imputing actual bias for having testified against
her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.

Issue: Can the Court assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for
quo warranto?

Held: Yes, a quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has
jurisdiction. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct
resort to SC is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief Justice.
Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching
implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. An outright
dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on
impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy
squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in
character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power
to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be
abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the

225
government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through
the Senate.

226
 Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
368 SCRA 36 ; October 23, 2001

PARDO, J.

Facts: On January 15, 1996, Director Valenzuela of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao recommended that petitioner Judge Fuentes be charged before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and likewise be
administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts unbecoming of a judge for
the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution the petitioner issued. Petitioner
alleged that the respondent encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Solicitor General
submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation because the Supreme
Court is not in possession of any record which would verify the propriety of the issuance
of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court Administrator has not filed any
administrative case against petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on the
present inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.

Issue: May the Ombudsman conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise
of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme
Court?

Held: No, the Ombudsman must endorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence,
it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the
laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of
powers. Petitioner's questioned order directing the attachment of government property
and issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official
functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under the given
circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the
Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts.

227
 People v. Gacott
G.R. No. 116049 ; March 20, 1995

Bidin, J.

Facts: On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No.
108) was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and
Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that
since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under
Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or
authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-
Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of
1972. Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion
espousing the position that the Letter Of Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is
not the “law” contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another
law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994
held that the City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the case
and ordered that the case be quashed.

Issue: Does the Second Division of the SC have the competence to administratively
discipline respondent judge?

Held: Yes, the very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly
shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which
states that “the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,” is
a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the
procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that
all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court
since it would result in an absurdity. The second clause, which refers to the second
situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma,
declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of
a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted therein.” In this instance, the administrative case must be
deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all
administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed,
would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the
Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of
reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.

228
 CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY v. GUERRERO
G.R. Nos. 140743 &140745, September 17, 2009

NACHURA, J.

Facts: Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered

owner of two parcels of land. It incurred real estate tax liabilities on the said properties
for the tax years 1976 to 1983. For failure of TTTDC to settle its delinquent real estate
tax obligations, the City Government of Tagaytay offered the properties for sale at a
public auction. Being the only bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favor of the
City of Tagaytay. The City of Tagaytay filed an unnumbered petition for entry of new
certificates of title in its favor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite. RTC
granted the petition. The subject properties were later purchased by Amuerfina
Melencio-Herrera and Emiliana Melencio-Fernando (Melencios) for the amount
equivalent to the taxes and penalties due to the same. During the pendency of the case
before the CA, TTTDC filed a petition for nullification of the public auction involving the
disputed properties on the ground that the properties were not within the jurisdiction of
the City of Tagaytay and thus, beyond its taxing authority.

Issue: Is the City of Tagaytay liable for damages when it levied real estate taxes on the
subject properties?

Held: Yes, before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due to tax
delinquency, the subject property should be under its jurisdiction. The failure of the city
officials in this case to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction before levying taxes
on the same constitutes gross negligence. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
the City of Tagaytay is liable for all the necessary and natural consequences of the
negligent acts of its city officials.

229
 LIMKAICHONG vs COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 178831-32 ; July 30, 2009

PERALTA, J.

Facts: Jocelyn Limkaichong ran as a Representative in the first district of Negros

Oriental. Her rival Olivia Paras, et al. filed a disqualification case against her. The latter
allegedly was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born,
her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino, lost her citizenship by
virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s dad. During the pendency of the case, Election
Day came, and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over Paras.
Comelec after due hearing, declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Notwithstanding their
proclamation of disqualification, Comelec issued a proclamation declaring Limkaichong
as the winner in compliance with Resolution no. 8062 adopting the disqualification
cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution
of the involved cases. Paras filed petition before the Comelec questioning the
proclamation.

Issues: Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.

Held: No, the HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The
SC has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the lower house, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the
time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present
his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal
to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with
respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole”
in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores
the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members.

230
 Malacora v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-51042 September 30, 1982

DE CASTRO, J.

Facts: On April 14, 1971, the respondent court rendered a decision in CAR Case No. 6,
entitled "Dionisio Malacora and Lucia Marabulas vs. Rodrigo Libarnes and Consuelo
Libarnes", both parties in this case are hereby ordered to pay fifty-fifty the court fees,
the plaintiffs to pay their one-half share upon receipt of the payments for one-half of the
improvements as herein above ordered. Defendants, petitioners herein, appealed to the
CA (CA-G.R. No. 00658-R) which merely modified the judgment.

On October 30, 1974, the respondent Provincial Sheriff of Agusan del Norte
enforced the writ of execution by levying upon the property of petitioners. In the ensuing
auction sale conducted on December 16, 1974, the property was sold to private
respondents. As petitioners failed to exercise their right of redemption, the respondent
sheriff on February 21, 1976, executed a final deed of sale in favor of private
respondents.

On May 12, 1976, private respondents filed a motion for issuance of a writ of
possession, which motion was opposed by petitioners on the ground 'that the writ of
execution did not conform to the judgment of the court.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ordered the plaintiffs to restore/return and/or

reimburse unto defendants the sum of P1,495.00 within 15 days from receipt.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Unsatisfied, petitioners filed the instant
petition.

Issue: Should the decision of the CA be affirmed on the ground that the period of
eighteen months for deciding it, as fixed in section 11, Article X of the Constitution, had
already expired?

Held: Yes, under the provision of Article X, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution which
provides for a period of eighteen (18) months within which an appealed case should be
decided by this Court, the appealed decision may also be deemed affirmed, this case
having been submitted for decision on October 8, 1980. The provision of Article X,
Section 11 of the Constitution, is mandatory and should be complied with immediately
after the effectively of the New Constitution.

231
 RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN
A. M. No. 00-8-05-SC November 28, 2001

PARDO, J.

Facts: The IBP submitted to the court for consideration a resolution regarding the
receipt of numerous complaints from its members about serious delays in the decision
of cases and in the resolution of motions before the Sandiganbayan. The Supreme
Court then required Sandiganbayan presiding justice, Francis Garchitorena to comment
on the letter of IBP and to submit the Sandiganbayan cases pending decision or
resolution which the latter complied with. The Sandiganbayan showed a total of 415
undecided cases long beyond the reglementary period to decide. The Supreme Court
also directed Court Administrator Benipayo to conduct a judicial audit of the
Sandiganbayan and submit a report. In his report, it showed that there were indeed
investigation reports, motions and cases which have remained unacted upon despite
the lapse of considerable length of time. The Supreme Court hence considered ex mero
motu the resolution of the IBP as an administrative complaint against Presiding judge
Garchitorena for serious delays in the decision of cases and in the resolution of motions
and other pending incidents before the different divisions of the Sandiganbayan
amounting to incompetence, inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and misconduct in office
without the need to conduct a formal investigation of the charges in view of the
admission of justice Garchitrorena in his compliance report.

Issue: What is the reglementary period within which the Sandiganbayan must
decide/resolve cases falling within its jurisdiction?

Held: There are two views. The first view is that from the time a case is submitted for
decision or resolution, the Sandiganbayan has twelve (12) months to decide or resolve
it. The second view is that as a court with trial function, the Sandiganbayan has three
(3) months to decide the case from the date of submission for decision.

The law creating the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 160634 is clear on this issue. It
provides: "Sec. 6. Maximum period for termination of cases - As far as practicable, the
trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous until
terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date
the case was submitted for decision."

On September 18, 1984, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its own rules, thus: "Sec. 3
Maximum Period to Decide Cases - The judgment or final order of a division of the
Sandiganbayan shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was
submitted for decision (italics ours)."

232
 Marcelo vs Pichay
March 12, 2004 ; AM No. MTJ-13-1838

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Facts: A Joint Decision was released by Judge Pichay ordering Spouses Magopoy to
vacate and surrender the possession of the property to Spouses Marcelo. A writ of
execution was issued and later implemented. However, 6:00pm on the same day,
Spouses Magopoy re-entered the property and regained its possession. As such,
Spouses Marcelo moved to cite Spouses Magopoy in contempt for disobedience to
lawful court processes. In an order by MeTC, defendants were not cited in contempt but
was instead ordered to surrender the property to Spouses Marcelo within 10 days.
Spouses Marcelo filed an Ex Parte Constancia because of the continued refusal of
defendants to surrender the property, which prompted Judge Pichay to issue and Order
directing the Sheriff to execute the eviction within 3 days. A Motion for Reconsideration
was filed by defendants, which was opposed by complainants. However, instead of
resolving the case, Judge Pichay directed Spouses Marcelo to file their comment
regarding the motion within 5 days before the court will resolve the pending incidents.
Spouses Marcelo failed to file their comment but Judge Pichay still set the motion for
hearing.

Disappointed with Judge Pichay’s continuous inaction, Spouses Marcelo filed an

administrative complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator charging him and
Sheriff Epress with inordinate delay in the disposition of the pending incidents in relation
to the implementation of the writ of execution of the decision. Judge Pichay said that the
delay was due to the new arguments raised in the supplemental motion which may
change the situation of the parties, hence, the execution of the decision would be
inequitable. In the interest of justice and equity, Judge Pichay schedule a hearing for the
Supplemental Motion which however was reset due to the request of complainant and
because Judge Pichay went on a leave. In a Memorandum dated July 22, 2013, the
OCA recommended that Judge Pichay be held administratively liable for undue delay in
the resolution of the pending incident.

Issue: Should Judge Pichay be held administratively liable for undue delay in the
resolution of Civil Case No. 2004-286?

Held: Yes, the Constitution requires the courts to conscientiously observe the time
periods in deciding cases and resolving matters brought to their adjudication, which, for
lower courts, is three (3) months from the date they are deemed submitted for decision
or resolution. Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (1987
Constitution) states this rule, viz.: Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the
effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months
233
from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.

234
 Brillantes vs. Yorac
192 SCRA 358 ; December 18, 1990

CRUZ, J.

Facts: In December 1989, a coup attempt led President Corazon Aquino to create a
fact finding commission to be headed by Hilario Davide. Due to this, he had to vacate
his position as chairman of COMELEC. Haydee Yorac, a COMELEC associate
commissioner, was appointed by the president as a temporary substitute, appointed in
an acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. questioned such appointment invoking Art 10 of
the Constitution stating “in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity”. Brillantes further argued that the choice
of the acting chairman should not come from the President but should be resolved by
the members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the
independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.

Issue: Did the designation made by the president violate the constitutional
independence of the COMELEC?

Held: Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are
essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the president in the
discharge of their functions. The designation made by the president has dubious
justification as it was merely grounded on the quote “administrative expediency” to
present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis
on existing rules on statutes. It is the members of the COMELEC who should choose
whom to sit temporarily as acting chairman. But even though the president’s
appointment of Yorac as acting president is void, the members of COMELEC can
choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman – the point here is that, it is the
members who should elect their acting chairman pursuant to the principle that
constitutional commissions are independent bodies.

235
 Funa v. Villar
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

VELASCO, JR., J.

Facts: On February 2, 2008, Carague retired as chair, during the fourth year of Villar as
COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4
to April 14. Four days later, Villar was appointed as Chairman of the COA. On June 11
the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as
Chairman until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner, on
February 2, 2011. However, Villar argued that he should be accorded a fresh term of 7
years.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar signified his intention to step down
from office upon the appointment of his replacement., Villar vacated his position when
the President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan COA
Chairman.

Issue: Is Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after
having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, valid
in light of the term limitations imposed under Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution?

Held: Yes, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that: The Chairman and
Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner
for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary
or acting capacity. In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly
precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is
made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.

236
 Funa v. Duque III
G.R. No. 191672 ; 25 November 2014

Bersamin, J.

Facts: On October 4, 2006, President Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H.

Bautista as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications.
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente
T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator,
MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.

On October 21, 2008, Dennis Funa filed a petition challenging the

constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment arguing that Bautista’s concurrent positions
as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. During the pendency of the petition, Bautista was appointed
Administrator of the MARINA and eventually assumed office.

Issue: Is the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the
position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport a violation of the constitutional
proscription against dual or multiple offices?

Held: Yes, it is. Respondent, Bautista, being then the appointed Undersecretary of
DOTC, was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2,
Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of
the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity,
which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.

237
 Gaminde v. COA
G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000

PARDO, J.

Facts: On June 22, 1993, Thelma Gaminde assumed office as Commissioner of the
Civil Service Commission. On September 7, 1993, the Commission on Appointments
(COA) affirmed the appointment. On February 24, 1998, Gaminde, sought the Office of
the President for clarification on the expiry date of her term of office. In response to her
request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel opined that her term office will expire on
February 2, 2000 instead of February 2, 1999. However, on February 4, 1999,
Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon wrote COA requesting opinion as to whether
Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the
expiration of their appointments on February 2, 1999. The General Counsel of COA
issued an opinion on February 18, 1999 that “the term of Commissioner Gaminde has
expired on February 2, 1999.” Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor
Flovitas Felipe issued a Notice of Disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries and
emoluments of Gaminde and her co-terminus staff effective February 2, 1999. Gaminde
appealed COA’s disallowance but it was dismissed. Gaminde moved for
reconsideration, but was denied by COA.

Issue: Did Gaminde’s term of office, expire on February 2, 1999, as stated in the
appointment paper?

Held: Yes, her term of office expired on February 2, 1999. However, she served as de-
facto officer in good faith until February 2, 2000. The term of office of the Chairman and
members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under
Article IX-D, Section 1 (2): “The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold
office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” Therefore, Gaminde and her co-terminus
staff are entitled to receive their salary and other emoluments for actual service
rendered.

238
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108838 ; July 14, 1997

FRANCISCO, J.

Facts: On December 17, 1985, PAGCOR granted private respondent Philippine Casino
Operators Corporation (PCOC) sole and exclusive right to manage gambling casinos in
the entire Philippines. Not long thereafter, the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), ordered the transfer of all assets to Provident International
Resources Corp. and Philippine Casino Operators Corporation, Manila.

PAGCOR then transported the gaming and office equipment and paraphernalia
used in the Laoag casino to its Metro Manila offices for safekeeping. On June 12, 1986
while the trucks containing said equipment were enroute to PAGCOR's offices, private
respondent Eduardo Marcelo (Marcelo) intercepted said trucks and ordered the drivers
to bring the cargoes to his compound at Governor Pascual Avenue, Malabon. This
prompted PAGCOR to file a civil case before the RTC against private respondents
Marcelo, PCOC, "John Doe" and "Peter Doe" for recovery of personal property, but
Judge Logarta, claimed that they did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.

PAGCOR then filed a demurrer to evidence. Judge Logarta, acting on the

demurrer dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and lifting the writ of replevin.
PAGCOR filed two motions for reconsideration but both were denied. Upon appeal, the
CA denied due course to PAGCOR's petition. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Is the RTC correct in stating that it does not have jurisdiction over the case?

Held: Yes, the RTC and the CA on the issue of jurisdiction. The PCGG must be a party
to the suit in order that the Sandiganbayan's exclusive jurisdiction may be correctly
invoked. Section 2 of E.O. No. 14 provides: “The Presidential Commission on Good
Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan,
which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof.”

The provision speaks of the PCGG as party-plaintiff. On the other hand, the
PCGG was impleaded as co-defendant in both the "Peña" and "Nepomuceno" cases.
But here, the PCGG does not appear in either capacity, as the complaint is solely
between PAGCOR and respondents PCOC or Marcelo.

239
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