Article 774
Administratrix.
1.) CORONEL VS. CA
Facts:
On January 19, 1985, the petitioners Coronel executed a document
entitled “Receipt of Downpayment” in favor of the respondent Ramona Alcaraz
(represented by her mother, Concepcion Alcaraz) involving a sale of an
inherited house and lot. The purchase price of the subject property amounted
to P 1.2M. In the said ROD, a DP of P 50K was paid by the respondent and
upon the said DP, the defendants bind themselves to effect the transfer in their
names from their deceased father, Constancio Coronel, the TCT immediately
upon receipt thereof. Upon the presentation of the TCT already in the names of
the defendants, they will immediately execute the deed of absolute sale of the
property and resp. RA shall immediately pay the balance of P 1.1M.
On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the name of
the deceased Constancio Coronel was transferred in the names of the
defendants.
On February 18 1985, the Coronels sold the subject property to a 3 rd
person (intervenor-appellant) Catalina Mabanag, for P1.5M after the latter has
paid P300K. For this reason, the Coronels cancelled and rescinded the contract
with Ramona A by depositing the DP of 50K. Because of this, the respondents
filed a complaint for specific performance against the Coronels and caused the
annotation of lis pendens on the title of the subject property.
On April 2, 1985, Mabanag caused the the annotation of a notice of an
adverse claim and on April 25, 1985, the Coronels executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the subject property in favor of Mabanag.
On April 14, 1988, the RTC, in decideing the action for specific
performance, ruled in favor of the respondents ordering the petitioners to
execute a Deed of Absolute sale in favor of the respondents and the latter to
pay the balance of P1.1M.
The petitioners argued that there was no perfected sale on January 19,
1985, because they were then not yet the absolute owners of the inherited
property.
Issue:
WON the defendants are the owners of the subject proeperty at the time
of sale (January 19, 1985)
Held:
Yes. They are the absolute owners by succession. Article 774 of the Civil
Code provides:
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance
of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his
will or by operation of law.
In the present case, the petitioners, being the sons and daughters of the
decedent Constancio Coronel, are compulsory heirs who were called to
succession by operation of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last
breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject property is
concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining thereto became
binding and enforceable upon them, it is expressly provided that rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
2.) ESTATE OF HEMADY VS. LUZON SURETY
Facts:
Respondent Luzon Surety filed a claim against the estate of Hemady
based on 20 different indemnity agreements or counterbonds, each subscribed
by a distinct principal and by the deceased K.H. Hemady, a surety solidarily
guarantor. The Luzon Surety prayed for allowance, as a contigent claim, of the
value of the 20 bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and
further asked for judgment for unpaid premiums and documentary stamps
affixed to the bonds, with 12% interest thereon.
On Sept. 23, 1953, the lower court dismissed the claim. One of the
grounds cited was that whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death are not
chargeable to his estate, because upon his death, he ceased to be a guarantor.
The lower court stated that Integrity, being the new requirement added for a
person to qualify as a guarantor as provided by Art. 2046 of the CC, is
something personal and is not transmissible, as contended by the
Issue:
WON a solidary guarantor’s liability is not extinguished by his death
giving Luzon Surety Co. the right to file a contingent claim for reimbursement
against the estate of Hemady
Held:
Yes. While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for
the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they
receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only
to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of
the NCC expressly so provides confirming Art. 1311 of CC:
Article 774 of the CC provides that:
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.
And Art. 776 of the CC provides that:
The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death.
The SC cited Article 1311 of the Civil Code which provides:
Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
except in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
Thus, the obligation of Hemady as a surety is not extinguished by his death:
First, the nature of the obligation of surety or guarantor does not
warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated
as a principal inducement for the contract. What was expected by Luzon Surety
when it accepted Hemady as a surety of the counterbonds was the
reimbursement of the money it might have to disburse on account of the
obligations of the principal debtors. And it was indifferent whether it be paid
Hermady himself or by someone else in his behalf so long as the money was
paid;
Second, there was no express stipulation that his obligation is
intransmissible. Hemady, not being required by the Luzon Surety to execute a
mortgage indicates nothing more than the company’s faith and confidence in
his financial stability but not that his obligation was strictly personal; and
Third, the obligation is not extimguished by operation of law because the
law does not provide that the guaranty or suretyship is extinguished upon the
death of the guarantor or surety.
The contracts of suretyship entered into by K.H. Hemady in favor of LS, not
being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by
stipulations of the contractgs themselvevs, nor by provision of law, his eventual
liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts,
therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under Rule
87.
3.) TEVES DE JAKOSALEM VS. RAFOLS
Facts:
The subject land in this case originally belonged to Juan Melgar. The
latter died at the judicial administration of is estate commenced in 1915. During
the pendency of the said administration or on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar,
daughter of the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase
to Pedro Cui, suject to stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she
would continue in possession of the land as the lessee of the purchaser.
On Dec. 12, 1920, the partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan
Melgar was made and the subject land was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In
1921, she conveyed the one-half portion in favor of resp Nicolasa Rafols.
On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui filed an action to recover the said half
portion of the land from Rafols and the other half from the other defendants.
On Aug 4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the whole subject land to one Generosa
Teves, herein plaintiff.
The lower court absolved Rafols upon the theory that Susana Melgar
could not have anything to Pedro Cui because the land was then in custodia
legis or under judicial administration.
Issue:
 WON the sale made by Susana Melgar to Pedro Cui involving an
inherited property subject to judicial administration is valid
Held:
Yes. That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia
legis, does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell the right, interest or
participation which he has or might have in the lands under administration. The
ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid
interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by an heir of
his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration,
in no wise stands in the way of such administration
Art. 440 of the CC provides that “the possession of heriditary property
is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of
the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted.”
Moreover, Art. 399 of the CC provides that every part owner may assign
or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment
or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be alloted him in the
partition upon the dissolution of the community.
Thus, in the present case, the sale made by Susana Melgar to Pedro Cui
was valid, but it would be effective only as to the portion to be adjudicated to
the vendor upon the partition of the property left by her deceased father. And
as on Dec. 12, 1920, upon the partition of said property, the subject property
was adjudicated to Susana Melgar, the sale of the whole land which the latter
made in favor of Pedro Cui was entirely confirmed. With this, the conveyance
by Susana Melgar in favor of Rafols in 1921 could no longer be done. Rafols
was sentenced to deliver to the plaintiff Jakosale the one-half portioned
conveyed to him.
4.) VITUG VS. CA
Facts:
This case involves the probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Vitug,
who dies in New York, USA on November 10, 1980.
On January 13, 1985, herein petitioner Romarico Vitug filed a motion
asking for autority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real
properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advanes to the estate in
the sum of 600K plus interests which he claimed were personal funds. The
alleged advances consisted of the payment of estate tax, deficiency estate tax
and increment. According to Mr. V itug, he withdrew said amount from a
savings account (SA) of the Bank of America, Makati.
On April 12, 1985,Rowena Corona (executrix), opposed to the motion
to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn from the subject SA were
conjugal parnertship properties and part of the estate, hence, there was no
ground for reimbursement.
Pet. Vitug insisted that the subject funds are his exclusive property
having acquired through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife
and bank on June 19, 1970. The agreement provides that all the money
deposited by either or both spouses in their joint savings account shall be the
property and withdrawable of and by all or both of them, and after death of
either or any of them, such funds shall be the sole property of the surviving
spouse.
The trial court upheld the validity of the survivorship agreement and
granted the motion of Pet. Vitug. However, the CA reversed ruling that the
agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with
the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Art. 805 of the Civil Code. And
assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under
the provisions of Article 133 of the CC.
Issue:
WON the SA is a conveyance mortis causa; WON it is a donation inter
vivos
Held:
No.
The conveance in question is not one of mortis causa, which should be
embodied in a will. A will has been defined as “a personal, solemn, revocable
and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights
and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.” in other
words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case, the monies
subject of the SA were in the nature of conjugal funds. There is no showing
that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed
to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marital
relations.
Neither the SA a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it
was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation
between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own
properties to the other. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened the
subject savings account, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a
money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which
would have arguably benn sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the
funds were conjugal, it cannot be said that one spouse could have pressured the
other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
The SA is valid and there is no demonstration that said agreement had
been executed for unlawful purposes in order to frustrate our laws on wills,
donations, and conjugal partnership.
5.) NATIVIDAD VS. NATIVIDAD
Facts:
The present petition arose from an action for recovery of sum of money
filed against herein respondents by the spouses Leandro and Juliana Natividad,
who are the predecessors of herein petitioners.
In their complaint, Leandro and Juliana alleged that sometime in 1974,
Sergio Natividad, husband of resp Juana and father of resp Jean Cruz, obtained
a loan from DBP. As security for the loan, Sergio mortgaged two parcels of
land, one of which os co-owned and registered in his name and that of his
siblings namely, Leandro, Domingo and Adoracion. This propertyis covered
by OCT 5980. Sergio’s siblings executed a SPA authorizing him to mortgage
the said property. The other mortgaged parcel of land, covered by OCT 10271,
was registered in the name of Sergio and Juana. Subsequently, Sergio died
without being able to pay his obligations with DBP. Since the loan was nearing
its maturity and the mortgaged property were in danger of being foreclosed,
Leandro paid Sergio’s loan obligations. Considering that respondents were
unable to reimburse Leandro for the advances he made in Sergio’s favor,
respondents agreed that Sergio’s share in the lot which he co-owned with his
siblings and the other parcel of land in the nameof Sergio and Juana, shall be
assigned in favor of Leandro and Juliana. Domingo was tasked to faciliatate the
transfer of ownership of the subject properties however, he died without being
able to cause such transfer. Subsequently, despite demands and several follow-
ups made by petitioners, respondents failed and refused to honor their
undertaking. One of the respondents’ contentions was that they are not parties
to the contract between Sergio and DBP.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners which the CA modified.
Issue:
WON the respondents are not liable to pay for Sergio’s loan obligations
Held:
No. Respondents cannot evade the liability by arguing that they were not
parties to the contract between Sergio and DBP. The fact that they executed
Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, respondents clearly acknowledge
Sergio’s loan onligations with the DBP. Being Sergio’s heirs, they succeed not
only to the rights but also to his obligations.
The following provisions of the CC are clear on this matter:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person
are transmitted through his death to another or others either by will or by
operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the
trasmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, but also
those which ahve accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.
In the present case, respondents, being heirs of Sergio, are now liable to settle
his transmissible obligations, which include the amount due to petitioners, prior
to the distribution of the remainder of Sergio’s estate to them, in accordance
with Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
6.) GENATO VS. BAYHON
Facts:
This case involved 2 consolidated civil cases filed before the RTC. The
first civil case (Q-90-7012) was an action for the declaration of nullity of a
dacion en pago filed by respondents herein. The dacion en pago was allegedly
executed by resp Benjamin Bayhon in favor of the petitioner William Ong
Genato. Resp Bayhon alleged that on July 3, 1989, he obtained a loan from the
petitioner amounting to P1M; that to cover the loan, he executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage (DREM) over the property covered by TCT 38052; that,
however the execution of the DREM was conditioned upon the personal
assurance of the petitioner that the said instrument is only a private
memorandum of indebtedness and that it would neither be notarized nor
enforced according to its tenor. Moreover, he assailed that the dacion en pago
is a forgery alleging that neither he or his wife who died 3 years earlier, had
executed.
The second civil case (Q-90-7551) was an action for specific
performance filed by petitioner alleging that respondent failed to pay his loan
of P 1M and executed on October 21, 1989, a dacion en pago in favor of the
petitioner. The dacion en pago was inscribed and recorded with the ROD.
Moreover, petitioner averred that despite demands, respondent refused to
execute the requisite documents to transfer to him the ownership of the lot
subject of the dacion en pago. He sought the execution of the final deed of sale
and transfer of possession of the said lot.
During the pendency of the case, Resp Bayhon died, on March 28, 2002.
The CA held that while the pricipal obligation is valid, it was extinguished by
the death of the resp. The heirs could not be ordered to pay the debts left by the
deceased.
Issue:
WON the heirs of Resp Bayhon is liable to pay his obligation despite his
death
Held:
Yes.
As a general rule, obligations derived form a contract are transmissible.
Art. 1311(1) of the NCC provides:
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and
heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising form the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
he received from the decedent.
In the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety, Co.:
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs
for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance
they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs
succeed nit only ti the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.
Arts. 774 and 776 of the NCC provide, thereby confirmaing Art. 1311
of the CC:
Article 774 of the CC provides that:
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.
And Art. 776 of the CC provides that:
The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death.
In the present case, the loan was contracted by respondent. He died while
the case was pending before the CA. While he may no longer be compelled to
pay the loan, the debt subsists against his estate. No property or portion of the
inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs unless the debt has first been
satisfied. Notably, throughout the appellate stage of this case, the estate has
been amply represented by the heirs of the deceased, who are also his co-parties.
Article 776 and Article 781
1.) Conde vs. Abaya
Facts:
This case involves the settlement of the intestate estate and distribution
of the property of the late Casiano Abaya.
Petetioner herein, Paula Conde, the mother of the natural children Jose
and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by the deceased Casiano, moved
for the settlement of the said intestate succession. An administartor was
appointed, however, Roman Abaya, the brother of Casiano, opposed to the said
appointment claiming that he is the nearest relative of the deceased. On
November 17, 1906, Roman Abaya moved the court to declare him to be the
sole heir of Casiano, to the exclusion of all other persons, esp. Paula Conde,
and to be therefore entitled with to take possession of all the property of said
estate.
On November 28, 1906, Conde filed a petition asking the court to be
declared to have preferential rights to the subject property claiming that she had
a superior right over Roman, being the mother of the natural children she had
with the deceased.
Issue:
WON petitioner may enforce an action in the acknowledgment of the
natural children in a proceeding for the administration and distribution of an
intestate estate
Held:
No. The CC (Art 659 old cc) provides that the inheritance includes all
the property, rights and obligations of a person, which are not extinguished by
his death.
The right of action for the acknowledgment of the natural children
cannot be enforced by the petitioner because the said right is not transmissible.
Article 137 of the CC provides that the actions for the acknowledgment
of natural children can be instituted only during the life of the presumed parents,
except in the ff case:
(may be enforced against the heirs of the presumed parents)
1.) If the father or mother died during the maturity of the child, in which
case the latter may institute the action before the expiration of the first 4 years
of its maturity;
2.) if, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before
unknown, should be discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged.
In this case the action must be instituted with the six months following the
discovery of such instrument.
Moreover, such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can
only be exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants or his
ascendants, for the reason that the law makes no mention of it in any case, not
even as an exception.
2.) Ledesma vs. Mclachlin, et al.
Facts:
In 1916, plaintiff Socorro lived maritally with Lorenzo Quitco. They had
a daughter named Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, the relationship between
Socorro and Lorenzo came to an end but Lorenzo executed a deed
acknowledging Ana as his natural daughter. On January 21, 1922, he issued in
favor of the plaintiff Socorro a PN in which Lorenzo promissed to pay Ledesma
an amount of P 2,000.00 under the ff terms: (1) P250 to be paid on March 1922;
(2) P250 to be paid on Nov 1, 1922; (3) the remaining P1,500 to be paid 2 years
from the date of the execution of the note.
Subsequently, Lorenzo married the defendant Conchita McLachlin, with
whom he had four children, who are also defendants in this case. On March 9,
1930, Lorenzo died and later, on December 15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco
also died. With that, an administration proceedings of the properties left by
Eusebio were instituted.
Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco, the
plaintiff Socorro filed a claim for payment on the promissory note executed by
the late Lorenzo in favor of her. However, the said claim was denied. And upon
the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Eusebio Quitco, plaintiff Ana
was declared not included among the heirs.
Issue:
WON the property inherited by the defendants from their deceased
grandfather by the right of representation, is subject to the debts and obligations
of their deceased father who died without leaving any property
Held:
No. While it is true under the provisions of Arts. 924 to 927 of the Civil
Code, a children presents his father or mother who died before him in the
properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does
not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his
deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the
Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received
with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the
properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of
Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo Quitco, are not bound
to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they did not inherit
anything.
3.) SPEED DISTRIBUTING CORP. VS. CA
Facts:
On September 20, 1953, Pastor Lim married respondent Rufina Lim.
During the early part of their marriage, Pastor organized some family
corporations using their conjugal funds. Among these corps was the Skyline
International Corp (Skyline) which was engaged in the importation of real
estate. The couple were incorporators and major stockholders of the corp and
were also employed therein. Pastor and Rufina did not a child so they adopted
Leonar and Lita Lim but no formal court adoption.
On Aug. 21, 1987, pet. Speed Distibuting Corp was registered with the
SEC with Pastor as one of the icorporators having owned 10 shares valued at
P 10.00 per share. And on June 21, 1991, the Leslim Corp was registered with
the SEC with Pastor having subscribed to 95,700 shares valued at P 9.5M.
On Aug 26, 1994, Leslim Corp executed a deed of absolute sale in favor
of Speed, represented by it VP, pet. Ireneo Marcelo, over aparcel of lot located
at Quezon City for the price of P 3.9M. pet Lita Marcelo, VP of Leslim, signed
the deed and received payment. Consequently, the title of the subject property
was transferred in the name of Speed.
On June 11, 1994, Pastor died and was survived by resp Rufina. On Mar.
17, 1995, Rufina filed a petition for the administration of the estate of the late
Pastor. She filed a motion for the annotation of a notice of lis pendens over the
properties in the name of Pastor including including the subject property under
the name of Speed. Speed and the other affected corps opposed the same and
filed motions to cancel the notice of lis pendens and for the exclusion of certain
properties from Pastor’s estate.
Meanwhile, on Aug. 1, 1995, resp Rufina filed a complaint against Speed
and other pets for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Leslim in favor of Speed. On the part of the petitioners, they alleged that resp
was not privy to the deed of sale. As such, she was not the real party-in-interest
and had no cause of action against the defendants.
Issue:
WON Resp Rufina is not a real party-in-interest to file the present action
Held:
Yes. Resp Rufina is a real party-in-interest as plaintiff. She filed the
complaint as one of the heirs of Pastor Lim, who died intestate on June 11, 1994.
She was, in fact, the surviving spouse of the deceased, co,pulsolry heir by
operation of law. The ggeneral rule under the law on succession is that
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent
and compulsory heirs are called upon to succeed by operation of law to the
inheritance without the need of further proceedings. Under Art. 776 of the NCC,
inheritance includes all the properties , rights and obligations of a party, not
extinguished by his death. Although the resp was appointed by the probate
court as a special administratrix of the estate of Pastor, she had the right, apart
from her being a special administratrix, to file the complaint against the
petitioners for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale.
4.) ESTATE OF HEMADY VS. LUZON SURETY
Facts:
Respondent Luzon Surety filed a claim against the estate of Hemady
based on 20 different indemnity agreements or counterbonds, each subscribed
by a distinct principal and by the deceased K.H. Hemady, a surety solidarily
guarantor. The Luzon Surety prayed for allowance, as a contigent claim, of the
value of the 20 bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and
further asked for judgment for unpaid premiums and documentary stamps
affixed to the bonds, with 12% interest thereon.
On Sept. 23, 1953, the lower court dismissed the claim. One of the
grounds cited was that whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death are not
chargeable to his estate, because upon his death, he ceased to be a guarantor.
The lower court stated that Integrity, being the new requirement added for a
person to qualify as a guarantor as provided by Art. 2046 of the CC, is
something personal and is not transmissible, as contended by the
Administratrix.
Issue:
WON a solidary guarantor’s liability is not extinguished by his death
giving Luzon Surety Co. the right to file a contingent claim for reimbursement
against the estate of Hemady
Held:
Yes. While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for
the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they
receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only
to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of
the NCC expressly so provides confirming Art. 1311 of CC:
Article 774 of the CC provides that:
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.
And Art. 776 of the CC provides that:
The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death.
The SC cited Article 1311 of the Civil Code which provides:
Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
except in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
Thus, the obligation of Hemady as a surety is not extinguished by his death:
First, the nature of the obligation of surety or guarantor does not
warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated
as a principal inducement for the contract. What was expected by Luzon Surety
when it accepted Hemady as a surety of the counterbonds was the
reimbursement of the money it might have to disburse on account of the
obligations of the principal debtors. And it was indifferent whether it be paid
Hermady himself or by someone else in his behalf so long as the money was
paid;
Second, there was no express stipulation that his obligation is
intransmissible. Hemady, not being required by the Luzon Surety to execute a
mortgage indicates nothing more than the company’s faith and confidence in
his financial stability but not that his obligation was strictly personal; and
Third, the obligation is not extimguished by operation of law because the
law does not provide that the guaranty or suretyship is extinguished upon the
death of the guarantor or surety.
The contracts of suretyship entered into by K.H. Hemady in favor of LS, not
being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by
stipulations of the contractgs themselvevs, nor by provision of law, his eventual
liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts,
therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under Rule
87.
5.) CABALU VS. TABU AND LAXAMANA
Facts:
This is involves a property covering 9,000 sqm located at Tarlac, which
was a portion of a property registered in the name of the late Fuastina Maslum.
Faustina died without children, she left a will dated July 27, 1939, assigning
and distributing her property to her nephews and nieces, however, the said
holographic will was not probated.
One of the heirs was the father of Domingo Laxamana, Benjamin
Laxamana, who sies in 1960. On March 5 1957, Domingo allegedly executed
a Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land disposing his share of the subject
property to Laureano Cabalu.
On Aug. 1, 1994, the holographic will took effect. As a result of which,
the forced and legitimate heirs of Faustina executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Succession with Partition in which the 9,000 sqm was imparted to Domingo.
 On Dec. 14, 1995, Domingo sold 4,500 sqm of the subj property to
Tabamo and the remaining portion was sold in favor of Renato Tabu on
Obtober 1996, two months after his death.
On Jan. 15, 1999, the resps filed an unlawful detainer against Pets
claiming that the latter were merely allowed to occupy the subject lot by their
late father, Domingo, but when asked to vacate the property, they refused to do
so.
On February 4, 2002, pets filed a case against the resps for the
nullification of the sale executed in favor of Renato Tabu. They claimed that
they were the lawful owners of the subject property bcecause it was sold to their
father Laureano Cabalu, through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 5, 1975.
hence, being the rightful owners by way of succession, they cold not be ejected
from the subj property.
The respondents contended that the deed of sale executed on March 5,
1975 was null and void because in 1975, Domingo was not yet the owner of the
property, as the same was still registered in the name of Faustina. Domingo
became the owner of the property only on Aughust 1, 1994, by virtue of the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Succession with Partition.
RTC ruled that the deed of sale executed on March 1975 and Oct 1996
was null and void. The CA affimed but Oct 1996 sale was declared valid.
Issue:
(1) WON the Deed of Undivided Parcel of land (Mar 5, 1975) is valid;
(2) WON the Deed of Sale dated Oct 1996 is void
Held:
(1) No. Both RTC and CA found out that the sale is simulated due to
disrepancies in the document. But assuming it is not simulated, still the sale
cannot be deemed valid because, at the time of the sale, Domingo was not yet
the owner of the property. Although it is not disputed that Benjamin, the father
of Domingo, appeared as one of the heirs, however, even if Benjamin died
sometime in 1960, Domingo in 1975 could yet validly dispose of the whole or
even a portion thereof for the reason that he was not the sole heir of Benjamin,
as his mother only died sometime in 1980.
Art. 1347 CC provides that “No contract may be entered into upon future
inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.
In this case, at the time the deed was executed, Faustina’s will was not
yet probated; the object of the contract, the 9,000 sqm lot still formed part of
the inheritance of his father from the estate of Faustina; and Domingo had a
mere inchoate hgeriditary right therein. Domingo became the owner of the said
property only on Aug. 1, 1994, the time of execution of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Succession with Partition by the heirs of Faustina, when the 9,000
sqm lot was adjudicated. The validity of TCT 266583 covering the 9,000 sqm
should be maintained sinec Domingo’s status as an heir of Faustina by right of
representation being undisputed.
(2) the deed executed on Oct 1996 covering the remaining portion of
4,500 sqm was void. The document itself was executed more than 2 monts after
the death of Domingo (Aug 14,1996).
6.) RIOFERO VS. CA
Facts:
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso Orfinada, Jr. Died without a will leavig
several personal and real properties located at Angeles City, Dagupan and
Kalookan. He was married to resp Esperanza Orfinada with seven children who
are also co respondents in this case. Apart from the respondents, the deceased
also left a paramour, Pet. Teodora Riofero whom they had 3 children also pets
in this case.
On Nov. 14, 1995, respondents James and Lourdes discovered that on
June 29, 1995, pet. Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of a Deceasded Person with Quitclaim involving the
properties of the estate of the decedent located at Dagupan. Moreover, they
found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P 700K from the Rural
Bank of Mangaldan by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties
subject to the extra-judicial settlement.
On Dec. 1, 1995, respondents filed a Petition for letters of administration
praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of late Alfonso
Orfinada and filed a Complaint for the annulment/rescission of the REM
against the pets.
In Answer, the pets contented that the property subject o fhte contested
deed of extra-judicial settlement belongs to the parents of Teodora and that
titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent
had managed to register them in his name and futher contented that the resps
are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso Orfinada, Jr.
The RTC held in favor of resps which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
WON the respondent heirs may bring suit to recover property of the
estate pending the appointment of an administrator
Held:
Yes.
Art. 777 of the CC provides that” the rights to succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent.” The provision inn turn is the
foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent
and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if admisnistration proceedings have already been commenced, the
heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two
(2) exceptions:
(1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit;
and
(2) When the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act
complained of and he is made a party defendant.
GR: the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the
estate during the pendency of administration proceedings.
XPN: when there is no appointed administrator
7.) GENATO VS. BAYHON
Facts:
This case involved 2 consolidated civil cases filed before the RTC. The
first civil case (Q-90-7012) was an action for the declaration of nullity of a
dacion en pago filed by respondents herein. The dacion en pago was allegedly
executed by resp Benjamin Bayhon in favor of the petitioner William Ong
Genato. Resp Bayhon alleged that on July 3, 1989, he obtained a loan from the
petitioner amounting to P1M; that to cover the loan, he executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage (DREM) over the property covered by TCT 38052; that,
however the execution of the DREM was conditioned upon the personal
assurance of the petitioner that the said instrument is only a private
memorandum of indebtedness and that it would neither be notarized nor
enforced according to its tenor. Moreover, he assailed that the dacion en pago
is a forgery alleging that neither he or his wife who died 3 years earlier, had
executed.
The second civil case (Q-90-7551) was an action for specific
performance filed by petitioner alleging that respondent failed to pay his loan
of P 1M and executed on October 21, 1989, a dacion en pago in favor of the
petitioner. The dacion en pago was inscribed and recorded with the ROD.
Moreover, petitioner averred that despite demands, respondent refused to
execute the requisite documents to transfer to him the ownership of the lot
subject of the dacion en pago. He sought the execution of the final deed of sale
and transfer of possession of the said lot.
During the pendency of the case, Resp Bayhon died, on March 28, 2002.
The CA held that while the pricipal obligation is valid, it was extinguished by
the death of the resp. The heirs could not be ordered to pay the debts left by the
deceased.
Issue:
WON the heirs of Resp Bayhon is liable to pay his obligation despite his
death
Held:
Yes.
As a general rule, obligations derived form a contract are transmissible.
Art. 1311(1) of the NCC provides:
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and
heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising form the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
he received from the decedent.
 In the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety, Co.:
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs
for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance
they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs
succeed nit only ti the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.
Arts. 774 and 776 of the NCC provide, thereby confirmaing Art. 1311
of the CC:
Article 774 of the CC provides that:
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.
And Art. 776 of the CC provides that:
The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death.
In the present case, the loan was contracted by respondent. He died while
the case was pending before the CA. While he may no longer be compelled to
pay the loan, the debt subsists against his estate. No property or portion of the
inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs unless the debt has first been
satisfied. Notably, throughout the appellate stage of this case, the estate has
been amply represented by the heirs of the deceased, who are also his co-parties.
Art. 777
1.) USON VS. DEL ROSARIO
Facts:
This is an action for the recovery of the ownership and possession of five
(5) parcels of land situated at Pangasinan filed by Pet. Maria Uson against the
resps Maria del Rosario and her children.
Pet. Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino. When Faustino died in
1945, he left the subject properties to Uson as his only heir however, she
claimed that upon the death of Faustino, his common-law wife, the resp, Maria
del Rosario, took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their
possession and enjoyment.
In Answer, the resps contended that on Feb 21, 1931, Maria Uson and
her husband, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as
husband and wife and in consideration thereof, Maria Uson was given a parcel
of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any
other property that may be left by her husband upon his death. Moreover, the
resp contended that, while it is true that the minor children are illigitimate
children of Faustino ans under the old civil code are not entitled to any
successional rights, however, under the new civil code, they are given the status
and rights of natural children and are entitled to successional rights.
Issue:
(1) WON Pet. Uson has a right over the subject lands from the moment
of the death of her husband;
(2) WON the illegitimate children of Faustino have successional rights
Held:
(1) Yes. Under the old civil code (Art 657) - the law at the time of the
death of Faustino in 1945. The property belongs to the herirs at the moment of
the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. From that moment,
therefore, the rights of inheritance of Uson over the subject lands became vestes.
It is evident that when Faustino died in 1945, the five parcels of land he was
seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to only heir, his
widow, Maria Uson.
(2) No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even
though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior
legislation only if no vested rights are impaired. Hence, since the right of
ownership of Maria Uson over the subject lands became vested in 1945 upon
the death of her late husband, the new right recognized by the new Civil Code
in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be
asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the subject
lands.
2.) IBARLE VS PO
Facts -
Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land (conjugal property)
located at Cebu to his surviving spouse Catalina Navarro and some minor
children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to the Spouses Maria Canoy
who later sold the same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle on May 24,
1947. After some time, after her appointment as guardian of her minor children,
Catalina again sold 1/2 of the subject property, which portion now belonged to
the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.
Issue -
WON the sale to defendant Po was valid
Held -
The sale to defendant is valid.
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession
of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different
language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:
The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a
definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or
contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses
between the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the
property of the inheritance because the right is always deemed to be retroactive
from the moment of death. (5 Manresa, 317.)
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina
Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-
half of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial
declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first
sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by
authority of the competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact
that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were
necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was
due to no other cause than his own opposition.
3.) TESTATE ESTATE OF TANGO VS. DE BORJA
Facts:
On October 1940, Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife, Josefa
Tangco, filed a petition for the probate of her will in the CFI of Rizal. The will
was probated on April 2, 1941. When Francisco died on April 1954, petitioner
Jose de Borja became the sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother,
Josefa. The late Franciso allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana
Ongsingco, the respondent in this case.
The estate of Josefa alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of
century. In order to pud an end all the litigations, a compromise agreement was
entered into on Oct. 12, 1963 bby and between the pet. Jose de Borja and
Tasiana Ongsingco. The compromise agreement provides that parties will sell
the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated at Rizal consisting of
1.3 hectares at the amount of P 0.30 per sqm.; that Jose obligated himself to
pay Tasiana the amount of 800K in which it shall be considered as full and
complete payment and settlement of her heriditary share in the estate of the late
Francisco as well as the estate of Josefa.
On May 16, 1996, Jose submitted the compromise agreement for Court
approval. However, Tasiana assailed the validity of the said agreement on the
ground that it cannot be entered without first probating the will of Francisco de
Borja, relying on the doctrine in Guevara vs. Guevara wherein the Court held
that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory, and that the settlement
and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a
will, is against the law and public policy.
Issue:
WON the heirs may enter into compromise agrement to convey their
share of the inheritance even before the probate of the will
Held:
Yes. Art. 777 CC provides that successional rights are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent.
SC ruled that Guevera vs Guevarra is not applicable in the present case
because as stipulated in the compromise agreement, there was no attempt to
settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto
before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana of any ang all her individual share and interest, actual
or eventual, in the estate of Franciso and Josefa. There is no stipulation as to
any other claimant, creditor, or legatee.As a hereditary share in the decedent’s
estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of the
decedent. So there was no legal bar to a successor disposing of her or his
heriditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such
share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Moreover, Tasiana, as the surviving spouse of Franciso, was considered
as a compulsory heir under the Civil code, her successional interest exist
independent of Francisco’s last Will and Testament and would exist even if
such will were not probated at all. Thus, the compromise agreement is binding
bet the parties in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract,
even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same.
4.) BONILLA VS. BARCENA
Facts:
On March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena instituted a civil action to quiet
title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. However, on August 4, 1975,
the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Fortunata Barcena
is dead, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. During the hearing of the said
motion, the counsel of the plaintiff confirmed the the death of Fortunata and
asked for substitution by her husband and minor children, who are the
petitioners herein. But the court after hearing dismissed the case on the ground
that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality
to sue.
Issue:
The heirs of Fortunata, the petitioners herein, have acquired interest in
the subject property ans became parties in interest
Held:
Yes. Art. 777 CC provides “that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.” From the moment
of death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property,
subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be
deprived of their rights thereto wexcept by the methods provided by law. The
moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs axquire a definite
right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of
the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial
declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.
In the present case, when Fortunata Barcena died, therefore, her claim or
right to the parcels of land in litigation, was not extimgyished by her death but
was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired
interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case.
Therefore, there is no reason for the respondent court not to allow their
substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
5.) Spouses ISMAEL and TERESITA MACASAET, petitioners, vs.
Spouses VICENTE and ROSARIO MACASAET, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 154391-92 September 30, 2004
Facts –
⚫ Pet Spouses and Resp Spouses are first degree relatives.
⚫ Pet Ismael is the son of Resp Spouses.
⚫ On Dec. 1997: The Resp parents filed an ejectment suit against the
children.
⚫ Rs alleged that:
⚫ 1. They were owners of the 2 parcels of land located at Lipa City
⚫ 2. By way of a verbal lease agreement, Ps occupied these lots [1922],
used them as their residence and the situs of their construction business
⚫ 3. Despite demands, Ps failed to pay the agreed rental of P500 per week
⚫ Ps denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement.
⚫ Ps claimed that: 1. Respondents had invited them to construct their
residence and business on the subject lots 2. It was the policy of
respondents to allot the land they owned as an advance grant of
inheritance in favor of their children. 3. Contended that the lot [TCT No.
T-103141] had been allotted to Ismael as advance inheritance 4. Lot
covered by TCT No. T-78521 was allegedly given to petitioners as
payment for construction materials used in the renovation of
respondent’s house
Issue –
⚫ WON the land was given as an advance inheritance to Ismael;
⚫ WON they own the same
Held –
⚫ No. The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents is merely
inchoate and is vested only upon the latters demise.
⚫ Rights of succession are transmitted only from the moment of death of
the decedent. (Art. 777)
⚫ Assuming that there was an "allotment" of inheritance, ownership
remained with respondents.
⚫ An intention to confer title to certain persons in the future is not
inconsistent with the owner’s taking back possession in the meantime
for any reason deemed sufficient.
⚫ Other than their self-serving testimonies and their affidavits, petitioners
offered no credible evidence to support their outlandish claim of
inheritance "allocation."
6.) SUAREZ VS. CA
Facts:
The petitioners in this case are brother and sisters. In 1995, thier father
died and since then his estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land has
not been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, their mother and Rizal Realty Corp
lost in the case for rescission of contract and ordered to pay P 70,000.00 for
damages.
During the execution, five (5) valuable parcesl of land (worth to be
milllions) were levied and sold on execution on June 4, 1983, in favor of the
resps as the highest bidder for the amount of P 94,170.00.
On NJuNe 21, 1984, before the expiration of the redemption period, pets
filed a reivindicatory action against resps and the sheriff for the annulment of
the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of
property. Therein, they alleged that they are being strangers to the case decided
against their mother, thus, they cannot be held liable therefor and that the five
(5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold
on execution.
Issue:
WON the resps can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-
owned by petitioners
Held:
No. Only one-half portion of the 5 parcels of land should have been the
subject of the auction.
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time
of the institution of the case.
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent."
Article 888 further provides: prLL
"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of
the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."
Article 892, par. 2 likewise provides:
"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving
spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the
legitimate children or descendants."
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the
legitime of each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is
different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-
owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right
as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any
way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own
interest.
7.) Palicte v. Ramolete
Facts –
• On July 5, 1979, a sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of
execution issued by resp judge for the satisfaction of judgment amt
P725,270.00
• 8 properties belonging to the late Don Filemon Sotto and administered by
respondent Marcelo Sotto were levied upon
• 7 of the above properties were awarded to Pilar Teves, who alone bid for
them for the amount of P217,300.00; the residential house at Lahug,
awarded to bidder A. Villarante for 10k
• Within the period for redemption, pet Matilde S. Palicte, as one of the
heirs of Don F. Sotto, redeemed from purchaser P. Teves, 4 lots for the
sum of 60k
• A deed of redemption was issued for these lots
• On July 24, 1980, petitioner Palicte filed a motion with resp Judge for
transfer to her name of the titles to 4 parcels of land covered by the deed
of redemption
• The lower court held that although Palicte is one of the declared heirs, she
does not qualify as a successor-in-interest who may redeem the real
properties sold; the lower court ruled that the deed of redemption is null
and void
• Hence this petition
Issue – WON pet Palicte may validly exercise the right of redemption under
Sec. 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Held –
We answer in the affirmative.
Under Sec. 29 of Rule 39 Subsection (a), property sold subject to redemption
may be redeemed by the judgment debtor or his successor-in-interest in the
whole or any part of the property.
Does Matilde Palicte fall within the term "successor-in-interest"?
"Successor-in-interest" includes one to whom the debtor has transferred his
statutory right of redemption
In the case at bar, petitioner Palicte is the daughter of the late Don Filemon
Sotto whose estate was levied upon on execution to satisfy the money judgment
against it. She is one of the declared heirs in Special Proceeding. As a legitimate
heir, she qualifies as a successor-in- interest.
Art. 777 of the Civil Code states that:
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent.
At the moment of the decedent's death, the heirs start to own the property,
subject to the decedent's liabilities. In fact, they may dispose of the same even
while the property is under administration.
If the heirs may dispose of their shares in the decedent's property even while it
is under administration. With more reason should the heirs be allowed to
redeem redeemable properties despite the presence of an administrator.
The lower court, therefore, erred in considering the person of the administrator
as the judgment debtor and as the only "successor-in-interest."
Although petitioner Palicte validly redeemed the properties, her motion to
transfer the titles of the 4 parcels of land covered by the Deed of Redemption
for registration to her name cannot prosper at this time.
Otherwise, to allow such transfer of title would amount to a distribution of the
estate.
In order that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be
deemed ready for final closure:
1. There should have been issued already an order of distribution or assignment
of the estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by
law, but
2. Such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the "debts, funeral
expenses, expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc., chargeable to the
estate" have been paid, which is but logical and proper
3. Such an order is usually issued upon proper and specific application for the
purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the court.
The other heirs are given 6 months period to join as co-redemptioners in the
redemption made by the pet before the motion to transfer titles to the latter's
name may be granted.
Resp court's orders reversed.
8.) LIMCOMA VS. REPUBLIC
Facts:
On Sep 24, 2001, pet. Limcoma filed with the RTC an application for
registration and confirmation of title over a parel of lan consisting of 646 sqm.
The subject lot was originally part of Lot 972 nas subsequently segregated as
Lot 972-A. Petitioner alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the subject lot
and the improvements thereon, and that it has been in the open, exclusive,
peaceful and continuous possession thereof for 30 years, reckoned from the
time if possession of its predecessor in interest.
According to the testimony of Olivia Gomez, the Assistant General Mgr
of the pet. the subject lot was bought by petitioner from the Spouses Venustiano
and Arsenia Alcantara on Sept 4, 1991. Arsenia Alcantara identified the lot 972
and declared that it was previously owner by her parents-in-law, the Sps Andres
and Trinidad who occupied ans possessed said lot, in the concept of an owner,
since 1938. In 1982, the lot was donated by the couple to their son, Venustiano.
Thereafter, the Lot 972 was segregated into Lots 972-A and 972-B. Lot
972-A was the subject of the petitioner’s application for registration before the
RTC.
The RTC granted the application, however, it was reversed by the CA
on the ground that the Spouses’ Andres’ and Trinidad’s possession of the
subject property did not redound to petitioner’s benefit
Issue:
WON petitioner may be permitted to tack possession of the subject lot
to that of the Sps. Andres and Trinidad and Venustiano
Held:
Yes.
Article 1138 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1138. In the computation of time necessary for prescription, the
following rules shall be observed:
(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for
prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor-in-
interest.
While the supposed donation of the subject lot by the Spouses Andres and
Trinidad to Venustiano was not evidenced by a written instrument, the
relationship between them is not in dispute, i.e., the former were the progenitors
of the latter. Even if the donation was void, the tacking of possession must be
allowed, considering the undisputed relationship between the Spouses Andres
and Trinidad, and Venustiano. We ruled in this wise in South City Homes, Inc.
v. Republic. 38
To emphasize, Venustiano is a compulsory heir of the Spouses Andres and
Trinidad. Intestate succession is another means by which ownership and other
real rights over property are transmitted. 39 Effectively, upon his parents' death,
ownership and real rights over the subject lot, including the right of possession,
were vested in Venustiano. Consequently, upon his sale of the subject lot to the
petitioner, he transmitted his rights thereto. Therefore, petitioner must be
permitted to tack possession of the subject lot to that of the Spouses Andres and
Trinidad, and Venustiano. DACTSa
In any event, there appears to be no legal impediment to petitioner's registrable
right over the subject lot. We find that petitioner has consolidated ownership
thereof through ordinary acquisitive prescription, specifically, good faith
possession for 10 years. 40
Prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership. 41 We have had occasion to rule
in numerous instances that open, exclusive, and continuous possession for at
least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private
property. 42 The conversion works to summon into operation Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree which, in turn, authorizes the acquisition of
private lands through prescription.
In the case at bar, petitioner proved that its predecessors-in-interest, the
Spouses Andres and Trinidad, occupied and possessed the subject lot in the
concept of owner for more than 30 years, 44 years to be exact. Prescinding
therefrom, the subject lot had already been converted to private property by
1968. Accordingly, when the petitioner bought the lot from the Spouses
Venustiano and Arsenia in 1991, under the belief, in good faith, that they were
the transferees of the original owners, it only needed to complete the 10-year
possession requirement for ordinary acquisitive prescription

Art. 795
Bona v. Briones
Facts –
• Counsel for M. Bona, the widow by 2 nd marriage of the deceased, applied
for the probate of the will which deceased husband executed during his
lifetime
• Bona's petition was granted
• Counsel for legitimate children by first marriage of the testator, opposed
the probate of the will alleging that said will was executed before two
witnesses only and under unlawful and undue pressure or influence
exercised upon person of testator who thus signed through fraud and
deceit
• judge rendered judgment, denying probate to the will
• the judge admitted the appeal; declaring Bona as a pauper
Issue –
WON in the execution of the will in question the solemnities prescribed by
sec618 of Act No. 190 have been observed.
Held –
Domingo de la Fuente on his part declared that the two said witnesses formally
swore before him on the certification which precedes the said will and,
according to this testimony as shown in the records and the testimony of the
above-mentioned witnesses, the said Domingo de la Fuente wrote and drafted
the said will Exhibit A by the order and under the direction of the testator
Francisco Briones, who signed in the presence of the witnesses, Bustilla and
Barrameda and of Notary Domingo de la Fuente, all of whom immediately
signed also in the presence of the testator, each doing it in the presence of each
other.
The name of Domingo de la Fuente appears as that of a notary who certifies as
to the certainty of the will made by Francisco Briones and of the signatures of
the testator as well as of the witnesses at its end & it cannot but be admitted
that Domingo de la Fuente intervened, attested, and signed the testament as a
witness.
He really was a witness and he attested the execution of the will during its
making until it was terminated and signed by the testator, by the witnesses, and
by himself, even though he did it in the capacity of a notary.
A general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes
are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose
and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of
doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the restrospective effect.
The language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect.
Will of Jose Riosa is valid. Order of CFI disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is
reversed
20. Bugnao v. Ubag et al
Facts –
• Appellants contend that at the time when it is alleged that the will was
executed, Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically
and mentally incapable of making a will.
Issue –
WON testator of sound mind @time of making the will.
Held –
Yes. That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our
opinion fully established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who
swore positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and
memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time
extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe
intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed;
that he needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that
during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not speak;
but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental
incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the
subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing
the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description
of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that
he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit
instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong
evidence of his testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the
transaction which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property
to be disposed of and the person who would naturally be supposed to have
claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the
instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.

This is a case in which the judicial criterion should be inspired in the sense that
it is not defeated, and if the wish of the testator is so manifest and express as in Order probating the will is hereby affirmed
the instant case, it is not proper nor just to invalidate the will of Francisco
Briones merely because of some small defect in form which is not essential nor
of great importance, such as the failure to state therein that Domingo de la
Fuente was also a witness to the said will when he signed it twice.
Judgment appealed from should be reversed.
(BUT NCC Annotated by Paras; Notary Public to whom a will was
acknowledged cannot be a witness to said will)

19. In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa

Facts –
• Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of
January, 1908, in which he disposed of an estate valued at more than
P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in
force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain
additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on
and after July 1, 1916.
• The new law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and
before the death of the testator, without the testator having left a will that
conforms to the new requirements

Issue –
Whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of the execution
of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls
ART. 804-824
Held –
1.) BALTAZAR VS. LAXA
1. will made after the date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply
2.) In re Will of Pedro Tablizo
with the provisions of this law.
3..) Avelino vs. Dela Cruz
2. The court has further held in a decision handed down by Justice Torres, as
to will executed by a testator whose death took place prior to the operative date
4.) HERNAEZ VS. HERNAEZ
of Act No. 2645, that the amendatory act is inapplicable. (Bona v. Briones,
[1918])
Facts:
In this case, the will was executed prior to enactment of Act No. 2645; death
The subject of the action is the will executed by Dona Juana Espinosa on
occurred after the enactment of this law.
Dec. 5, 1894. The action brought is for the annulment of the will upon the
ground:
(1) incapacity of the testatrix;
 (2) The incapacity of the notary, attesting witnesses and the interpreter;
and
(3) A substantial formal defect in the will
(1) the plaintiff alleged that on Dec 5, 1894, the testatrix was over 80 yo and
was so ill and prior to her death, she walked in a stooping attitude and gave
contradictory orders, as a result of her senile debility;
(2) The incapacity of the notary in that he did not understand the Visayan
dialect, the language of the testatrix. The incapacity of the attesting witnesses
has no perfect knowledge of Spanish, and the incapacity of the interpreter in
that he was a amanuensis of the notary and was the person who wrote out the
will;
(3) The substantial formal defect of the will is supposed to consist in the fact
that two physicians were not present to certify to the sanity of the testatrix at
the time of its execution, and the absence of two (2) interpreters to translate the
will, because executed in a foreign language.
Issue:
WON the will is invalid
Held:
No. The will executed by testatrix is valid and efficacious
(1) the fact that an old woman gives contradictory orders, that she walks in a
stooping position, that she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments
some days before making her will, are circumstances which even if fully
demonstrated by proof could not lead the court to establish a conclusion
contrary to the mental soundness of a person who is to be presumed to be in the
full enjoyment of the mental faculties until the contrary is conclusively proven;
(2) The notary in compliance with the reqs of Art. 695 of the CP certifies that
in his judgment the testatrix had the necessary legal capacity and the use of the
necessary mental faculties for the purposes of the execution of the will.
a) 2 systems (with respect to mental capacity):
i. That of establishing as a general rule the presumption of
soundness of the mental faculties until the contrary be
proven; under this presumption, a will made should be
declared valid in all cases, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.
ii. Or that of presuming mental weakness in the absence of
proof that the act was performed while the mental faculties
were in their normal condition. Under this presumption, a
will must be considered void upon presumption that it was
executed by a person demented, unless the contrary is
shown.
iii. The code has adopted the first system as being most rational,
by accepting the principle that mental soundness is always
to be presumed with respect to a person who has not been
previously incapacitated until the contrary is demonstrated
and proven by the proper person; in the meantime the
intervention of the notary and the witnesses constitutes a
true guaranty of the capacity of the testator, by reason of
their knowledge of the matter.
B.) the fact that the notary who legalized the will did not know the
Visayan dialect spoken by the testatrix is not a ground for annulment nor has it
been for the nullity if any one of the locality in which they performed their
duties or the special dialect of the party. With respect to the attesting witnesses
it has been fully proven by the manner in which they testified at the trial,
"without the necessity of an interpreter," as to those called as witnesses and by
conclusive evidence as to the deceased attesting witness whose signature and
competency have been completely established, that they knew the dialect of the
testatrix in accordance with section 5, article 681, of the Civil Code, and also
understood Spanish. As alleged, but not proven, their knowledge of the latter
language may not have been perfect, but this does not make them incompetent,
nor is it a ground for annulment.
(3) The presence of two physicians, as required in the case covered by article
665, was not necessary. "This precept refers clearly and expressly to the
conditions which must be complied with in order that a demented person may
make a will by availing himself of a lucid interval, and is entirely distinct from
the cases governed by article 685 when the testator has not been declared
demented." Nor was it necessary that two interpreters be present as required by
article 684 of the Civil Code. This is a requisite for the execution of a will in a
foreign language, and neither by the letter nor by the purpose of this article
could it be required with regard to the will in question.
5.) LIM VS. CHINCO
Facts:
This case involves the action for probate of the will of VictoriaVillaranda
she executed on June 9, 1929. the deceased left no descendants or ascendants
and t\he document purports to leave her estate, consisting of properties valued
at P 50,000.00, to 3 collateral relatives, Eusebia,Crispina, and Maria. The action
for probate was opposed by Resp Chinco (full sister of the deceased). The trial
court disallowed the will on the ground that the testatrix did not have
testamentary capacity at the time the instrument was executed.
Issue:
WON the supposed testatrix had testamentary capacity at the time she
executed the will
Held:
No.SC held that the deceased, on the morning of June 5, 1929, was in a
comatose condition and incapable of performing any conscious and valid act.
The testimony of Drs. Gaanan and del Castillo is sufficient and corroborated
by the Diaz and Ahorro who were the ones who took care of Victorina at the
hospital until her death. The testimony id convincing to the effect that the
patient was in a continuous stae of coma during the entire period of her stay in
Meycuayan, subsequent to the attack, she did not have sufficient command of
her faculties to enable her to do any valid act and was unable to utter intelligent
speech.
6.) ABQUILAN VS. ABQUILAN
Facts:
This case involves the probate of the will of the deceased Isidra Abquilan
who left no forced heirs and her only heirs, in case of intestacy are her siblings,
Atanasio, the proponent of the will, and Feliciana, the opponent.
The lower court refused to legalize the will on the ground that the
purported signatures of the deceased to the supposed will are forgeries and the
the will was not executed by the deceased.
Issue:
WON the subject will must be probated
Held:
The evidence clearly shows that on Nov. 6, 1924, or at the time the
deceased executed her supposed will, she was suffering from from paralysis to
cerebral hemorrhage in such degree as completely to discapacitate her for
intelligent participation in the act of making a will.
A careful comparison of the name of the testatrix as signed in two places
to the Exhibit A, with many of her authentic signatures leads to the conclusion
that the signatures to the supposed will were made by some other person.
Furthermore, the combined testimony of Juan Serato and Alejandro
Genito completely demonstrate that no will at all was made on November 6,
the date attributed to the questioned document, and that, instead an attempt was
made on the night of that day to fabricate another will, which failed of
completion because of the refusal of Alejandro Genito to be party to the making
of a will in which the testatrix took no part. The instrument before us was
undoubtedly fabricated later, probably on November 7, at a time when the
condition of the deceased was such as to make rational participation on her part
in the act of making a will impossible.
7.) TORRES VS. LOPEZ
Facts:
This case involves the will, executed on January 3, 1924, by Tomas
Rodriguez, who died on Feb. 25, 1924, leaving a considerable estate.
Petitioner Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will asked for the
probate of the will. However, it was opposed by the resp., Margarita Lopez on
the ground that the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of the
execution of the will, he suffered senile dementia.
The attending physicians, Drs. Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera, who
conduct different tests to the deceased Tomas, certified that he is suffering from
anemia, hernia inguinal, chronic dyspepsia and senility, however, as to his
mental state, his intellectual faculties are sound, except that his memory is weak
in that his memory is all right with regard to matters or facts of the past but
failed as to things of the present, due to his physical condition and old age.
Tomas Rodriguez was likewise examined by Drs. De los Angeles, Tietze,
and Burke certified that he was of unsound mind suffering from senile dementia
or mental impairment; that he not able to understand and comprehend the extent
and condition of his properties
Issue:
 WON the late Tomas was incapacitate to make a will
Held:
Yes.
The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes as a requisite to the allowance
of a will that the testator be of "sound mind". A "sound mind" is a "disposing
mind." One of the grounds for disallowing a will is "If the testator was insane
or otherwise mentally incapable of the execution." "'Testamentary capacity is
the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator
is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the
persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and
to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property
among the objects of his bounty.'"
Of the specific tests of capacity, neither old age, physical infirmities,
feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the appointment of a guardian,
nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to show testamentary
incapacity. Each case rests on its own facts and must be decided by its own
facts.
To constitute complete senile dementia, there must be such failure of the
mind as to deprive the testator of intelligent action.
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez, in our opinion comprehended the
nature of the transaction in which he was engaged. He had two conferences
with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will was to contain. The will
was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in the
proper places at the bottom and on the left margin. At that time the testator
recollected the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally
be supposed to have claims upon him While for some months prior to the
making of the will he had not manage his property he seem to have retained a
distinct recollection of what it consisted and of his income. Occasionally his
memory failed him with reference to the names of his relatives. Ordinarily, he
knew who they were, he seemed to entertain a prediliction towards Vicente F.
Lopez as would be natural since Lopez was nearest in which the instrument
distributed the property naming the objects of his bounty. His conversations
with Judge Mina disclosed as insistence on giving all of his property to the two
persons whom he specified.
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years,
may have been physically decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may have
suffered a loss of memory, may have had a guardian and may have a been
extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark of reason and of life, that
strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled
thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms "testamentary capacity."
8.) GALVEZ VS. GALVEZ
Facts:
This case involves the will (2nd will) )executed by Victor Galvez, on Aug.
12, 1910, in the presence of Juan Leoquinco and Nazaria Galvez and have been
signed by the witness Lorenzo Galvez (who was requested by Victor to sign)
below the name and surname of the testator. Santiago filed a petition for the
probate of the subject will. It appears that on the same date, another will (1 st
will) written in Tagalog was executed by Victor Galvez in the presence of the
witnesses Cirilo Paguia, Florentino Sison, and Juan Menodoza.
During the proceedings, the 1st will was presented. For the purpose of
correcting an error contained in the 1st will, he executed the 2 nd will which is
the one exhibited for probate.
However, Canuta Galvez, the daughter of the deceased opposed to the
probate of the subject will alleging that his father lacked the intellectual
capacity and clear judgment requisite for making a will owing to his very
serious sickness with cholera.
Issue:
WON the deceased Victtor Galvez was incapacitated to make a will
Held:
No.
The physician Dr. Vicente de Jesus, in his testimony, referred to the
effects and results of cholera on a patient in ordinary cases and in the regular
course of this disease; but his statements, taken in general, cannot, in the present
suit, served as a ground upon which to predicate incapacity, for the reason that
he did not examine Victor Galvez, nor did he even see him between the hours
of 12 in the morning and 3 in the afternoon of the 12th of August, 1910, during
which period the testator ordered his will drawn up and the attesting witnesses
signed it, Galvez having died at about 6 o'clock that same afternoon. It may be
true that cholera patients do, in the majority of cases, become incapacitated in
the manner described by the witness; but there may be exceptions to the general
rule, and to judge from the testimony of the witnesses who saw and
communicated with the patient Victor Galvez at the time he executed his will,
his physical and mental condition must have been an exception, since he
demonstrated that he had sufficient energy and clear intelligence to execute his
last will in accordance with the requirements of the law.1awphi1.net
Besides the attestation of the aforesaid subscribing witnesses, the
contents of the will and the testator's positive determination to rectify the error
he incurred in the execution of his first will, show that Victor Galvez was in his
sound mind and was perfectly aware of his duties in respect to the legal,
inviolable rights of his daughter and sole heir, Canuta Galvez.
Inasmuch as, in the drafting and execution of the second will (Exhibit
B), signed in the name of the testator by Lorenzo Galvez and the witnesses Juan
Dimanlig, Nazaria Galvez, and J. Leoquinco, the formalities prescribed by
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure were observed, for the testator's
name appears written at the foot of the will and under this name Lorenzo Galvez
signed by direction of the testator himself, and the instrument was also signed
by the attesting witnesses before mentioned who affirmed that they heard and
attested the dispositions made by the testator and witnessed the reading of the
will, that they were present when the said Lorenzo Galvez signed the will in
the name of the testator and that they signed it in the presence of all the persons
assembled in the latter's house, the conclusion is inevitable that Victor Galvez,
in executing his will, did so with a sound mind and the full use of his mental
faculties; therefore, the will must be admitted to probate.
9.) BAGTAS VS. PAGUIO
Facts:
This case involves the will executed by Pioquinto Paguio executed on
April 19, 1908. the testator died on September 28, 1909. The petitioner sought
the subject will to be probated, however, it was opposed by the resps on the
ground:
(1) that the will was not executed according to the formalities and
requirements of the law touching wills;
(2) The testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental
faculties ans was without the mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will
It was shown that the deceased Paguio, 14 or 15 years from his death,
suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his bidy; that his hearing became
impaired and that he lost the power of speech. However, he retained the use of
his right hand and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs
he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife ans to other members of his family.
Issue:
(1) WON the subject wil is invalid;
(2) WON the testator is incapacitated to make a will
Held:
(1) No. The subject will was in accord with the formalities required by
the Code of Civil Procedure.
According to the uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will
was executed in the following manner:
Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes
and items relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes were
in turn delivered to Señor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in
form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes
were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney
read them to the testator asking if they were his testamentary
dispositions; that the testator assented each time with an affirmative
movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written
by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator
and the witnesses; that Señor Marco gave the document to the testator;
that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in the presence of the four
subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of
the testator and each other.
These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the will and we
are in perfect accord with the judgment of the lower court that the formalities
of the Code of Civil Procedure have been fully complied with.
 (2) The testator is incapacitated to make a will.
SC ruled that the testimonies of the physicians, Drs. Basa and Viado, did
not prove that the testator lacks testamentary capacity to make a will. The Court
concluded that their testimony only confirms the fact that the testator had been
for a number of years prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence
of which his physical and mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of
them attempted to state what was the mental condition of the testator at the time
he executed the will in question. There can be no doubt that the testator's
infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite evident that his mind
was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can
not include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to
dispose of his property by will.
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the
mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or
otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning
faculties. (Campbell vs Campbell)
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will
affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure
of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend
to his immediate family or property. . . . (Wilson vs. Mitchell)
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the
same contrast as was pictured by the court in the case just quoted. The striking
change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last years of
his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to
entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the
statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the
conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably had
mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the
execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct was irrational in any
particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the
business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and
execution of the will occupied a period several hours and that the testator was
present during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again,
the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those
of a rational person.
10.) In the matter of the testate estate of the late Encarnacion Neyra
Facts:
This case involves the wills executed by the deceased Encarnacion
Neyra dated November 3, 1942 and Sept. 14, 1939. The beneficiary, Trinidad
Neyra, filed a petition for the probate of the will dated Nov. 3, 1942. However,
the resps opposed the same on the ground that:
(1) at the time of the alleged execution of the said will, the testatrix no
longer possessed testamentary capacity as she was suffering from Addison’s
disease;
(2) That the alleged will dated Nov. 3, 1942, had not been executed in
the manner and form prescribed by law; and
Subsequently, the oppositors asked for the probate of the first will dated
Sept. 14, 1939 but it was opposed by the pets Trinidad,etc.
The lower court admitted the will dated Nov. 3, 1942 and denied the
probate of the will dated Sept. 14, 1939.
The oppositors claim that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the
time that the testatrix thumbed marked the subject will, on her bed, in the sala
of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida.
Issue:
(1) WON the will is invalid;
(2) WON the testatrix had no capacity ot execute a will
Held:
(1) The will dated Nov. 2, 1942 is valid.
It has been fully shown that the attesting witnesses were present at the
time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question, in the
sala, where the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they
actually saw each other, at the time of the signing of the will, but whether they
might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting
witnesses actually saw it in this case. (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And
the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the will is equivalent to her signature.
(Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.)
(2) No. Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the
transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property
to be disposed of, and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have
claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the
instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
(Bugnao vs. Ubag. 14 Phil., 163.)
Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither
old age, nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order
that he might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will. (Amata and Almojuela vs.
Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the
nature and effects of Addison's disease, is absolutely unreliable. He had never
seen or talked to the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra.
Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly
admitted that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of
November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her and that they understood
each other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at
the time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of
persons suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain
unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they
necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like
patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their
mental faculties until the moments of their death.
ARTICLES 828 - 834
1. Testate Estate of the Late Adriana Maloto,
Aldina MALOTO CASIANO, et al., petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Panfilo MALOTO and Felino MALOTO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988
FACTS:
Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs the parties (Aldina, Constantcio, Panfilo
and Felino) in this case who are her niece and nephews. Believing that the
deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, the four (4) heirs
commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt’s estate
which was instituted in the then CFI. However, while the case was still in
progress, the heirs executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of
Adriana’s estate which provides for the division of the estate into four equal
parts among themselves. When presented before the court, said agreement was
approved. However, three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate
of Adriana’s counsel, discovered a document entitled “KATAPUSAN NGA
PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento) and purporting to be the last will and
testament of Adriana. Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will,
Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares
in the estate that what they have received by virtue of the agreement of
extrajudicial settlement. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other
parties, among them being the petitioners. Thus, Aldino and Constancio joined
by other devisees and legatees filed a motion for reconsideration and annulment
of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will. Upon denial of the
trial court, the petitioners came before the Supreme Court by way or petition
for certiorari and mandamus which were dismissed because they were not the
proper remedies. The appellate court found out that the will was burned by the
househelper of Adriana and was at the possession of the lawyer in because
Adriana was seeking the services of the lawyer in order to have a new will
drawn up.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will of Adriana Maloto had been efficiently revoked.
RULING:
Article 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
1. By implication of law; or
2. By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of
wills; or
3. By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention
of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some
other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be
established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents,
and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or
obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be
conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice.
Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective
revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or
cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his
presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show
compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned
by Adriana’s maid was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much
less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to
have been done under the express direction of Adriana and was not done in her
presence.
2. Gago vs. Mamuyac
G.R. No. L-26317
January 29, 1927
Topic/Doctrine: Revocation of a will
FACTS:
Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel
Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will
was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the
deceased executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first
will on the ground of the existence of the second will. Another petition was
filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that the
second will presented was merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the
said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the
witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified that on December
1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the testator. The lower court
denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid revocation of the will
HELD:
Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due
search, the original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found
in shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption
is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed
cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that
the testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his
death.
3. SAMSON vs NAVAL (full text)_
G.R. No. L-11823 February 11, 1918
CRISTINA SAMSON, DELFINA NAVAL, and SOR CONSOLACION
EUGENIO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
MONICA NAVAL, ROSA NAVAL, and CELESTINA NAVAL,
objectors-appellants.
Guillermo Lualhati for appellants.
Perfecto Gabriel for appellees.
ARAULLO, J.:
On September 20, 1915, attorney Perfecto Gabriel presented in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila for allowance as the will of Simeona F.
Naval, who died in said city two days previously, a document executed by her
of February 13, 1915, and in which he was appointed executor. The case was
recorded as No. 13386 and, after hearing the petition for allowance filed by said
executor, it was denied on the ground that said document was not duly executed
by the deceased as her last will and testament, inasmuch as she did not sign it
in the presence of three witness and the two witnesses did not sign it in the
presence of each other. Thereafter the nieces and legatees of the same deceased
filed in the same court for allowance as her will, another document executed
by her on October 31, 1914, and, consequently, the case was registered under
another number, which was No. 13579. The petition for allowance was opposed
by Monica Naval, Rosa Naval, and Cristina Naval on the ground that the will,
the allowance of which is asked, could not be allowed, because of the existence
of another will of subsequent date, executed during her lifetime by the same
Simeona F. Naval, and because said will has been revoked by another executed
subsequently by her during her lifetime, and further, because sail will has not
been executed with the formalities required by existing laws. Trial having taken
place, at which evidence was adduced, the court on February 8, 1916, issued
an order, admitting said second document and ordering its allowance as the last
will and testament o said deceased. From said order the opponents appealed to
this court and transmitted to us the corresponding declarations. Tow of the
opponents, that is, Rosa and Cristina Naval, assigned, as errors committed by
the court, the following:
1. The finding of the court that the will of October 31, 1914, has not been
revoked by that of February 13, 1915;
2. The act of the court in permitting the petitioner to institute and proceed
with the proceedings relative to the last case for the allowance of the will, No.
13579, notwithstanding that proceedings had already been had in the other case
No. 13386 and final judgment rendered therein; and
3. The act of the court in denying the motion for continuance of the trial on
the allowance of the will of October 31, 1914, which motion was presented for
the sole purpose of introducing evidence to show the falsity of the signature
appearing in said will and submitting said signature to the Bureau of Science
for analysis.
The other opponent, Monica Naval, assigned, besides the first two errors
already mentioned, the finding of the court that the disallowance of the will of
said deceased, dated February 13, 1915, on the ground that is was not executed
in such form that it could transmit real and personal property, according to
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, also had the effect of annulling the
revocatory clause in said will.
From the evidence it appears, as we have already stated, that the trial court
declared that the first document presented by the executor of the deceased,
Simeona F. Naval, as a will executed by her on February 13, 1915, and which
was the subject-matter of case No. 13386 of said court, could not be allowed,
on the ground that it was not executed with the requisites and formalities
prescribed by law. Article 739 of the Civil Code provides that a former will is
by operation of law revoked by another valid subsequent will, if the testator
does not state in the later will his desire that the former should subsist wholly
or partly. In harmony with this provision of substantive law, we find section
623 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that no will shall be
revoked, except by implication of law, otherwise than by some will, codicil, or
other writing executed as provided in case of wills.
Therefore, according to the legal provisions, in order that the will of February
13, 1915, that is, the first document presented as the will of the deceased
Simeona F. Naval, could have the effect of revoking that which was presented
afterwards by the petitioners as executed by the same deceased on October 31,
1914, that is, on a date previous to the execution of the first, it was necessary
and indispensable that the later will, that is, that first presented for allowance,
should be perfect or valid, that it, executed as provided by lay in case of wills.
It also appears from the record that the opponents themselves maintained that
said later will, that is, that of February 13, 1915, was not perfect, or executed
as provided by law in case of wills, and the Court of First Instance of Manila
has so held in disallowing said documents as the will of the deceased. So that
it very evident that the second will presented, that is, that of October 31, 1914,
was not and could not have been revoked by the first, and the court was not in
error in so holding in the order appealed from. We deem it unnecessary to add
a single word mere or cite well-known doctrines and opinions of jurists in
support of what has already been stated.
As to the second error assigned by the opponents, we believe it sufficient to
refer to what the court below stated in the judgment appealed from. It is as
follows:
The court finds no incongruency in the presentation of a prior will when another
will of subsequent date has been disallowed. Disregarding the fact that the
petitioners in this case were not those who presented the will in No. 13386, in
which the petition was presented by the same D. Perfecto Gabriel as executor,
it is proper to take into account that the object of a petition for allowance is to
ask for an order declaring that a will has been executed in accordance with the
requisites and formalities required by law. This is a question for the court to
decide and is out of the control of the party who presents the will. The
allowance or disallowance of a will by a competent court depends upon whether
the evidence adduced at the trial shows or does not show that the formalities
required by law have been complied with, and this cannot be determined in
advance, as a general rule, by the person who presents the testament. for he has
not always concurred in or seen the execution of the will.
If, therefore, the personal who presents a will and asks that if be allowed does
not secure its allowance, and he has in his possession another will, or has
information that another exists, he does not contradict himself by asking for the
allowance of the will of earlier date merely because the later will was declared
invalid by the proper court. If in this case there is any who adopts a
contradictory position, it is the respondent himself, inasmuch as in case No.
13386 he alleged, as a ground for the disallowance of the will then presented,
that it was not executed in accordance with the law, and now he maintains the
contrary, for he claims that said will revoked that which is now presented.
With respect to the third error, it is beyond doubt that the court did not commit
it, for it appears that when the examination of the witness, Cristina Samson,
was finished and the court told Attorney Lualhati, counsel for the respondents,
to continue adducing his evidence, he said he had no more proof, although he
added that he would ask the court to grant him permission to send the will of
1914 to the Bureau of Science, which petition was objected to by the attorney
for the proponents and denied by the court. Immediately thereafter the attorney
for the opponents asked for the continuance of the trial, which was also denied
by the court, after objection was made by the proponents. The attorney for the
opponents excepted to said ruling.
Therefore, the petition of said attorney for the remission of said will to the
Bureau of Science, in the terms in which it was made to the court, after ha had
stated that he had no more evidence to present, signified that he left it to the
discretion of the court to grant it or not. Furthermore, no exception was taken
to the order to the order denying this motion, and although the attorney for the
opponents excepted to the order denying the motion for continuance of the trial,
such exception was completely useless and ineffective for the purpose of
alleging before this court that the trial court erred in that respect, for said
resolution, being one of those left to the discretion of the court in the exercise
of it functions, according to section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it could
not be the subject of an exception, unless the court, in denying said motion,
abused its discretional power and thereby prejudiced the essential rights of the
respondents, which is not the case here.
The error which, in addition to the first two already mentioned, has been
assigned by the opponent and appellant, Monica Naval, and refers, according
to her, to the court's action in declaring that the disallowance of the will of the
deceased Simeona F. Naval, dated February 13, 1915, for the reason that it was
not executed in such manner and from that it could transmit real and personal
property, according to the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, also had the effect of annulling the revocatory clause of said will.
First of all, it is not true that the court made such statement in the terms given
in said assignment of error, that is, it is not true that the court declared that,
because said will was not executed in the form required by law in order that it
may transmit real and personal property, according to the provisions of section
618, the disallowance of said will also had the effect of annulling the revocatory
clause therein contained. In the order appealed from there is no declaration or
conclusion made in these terms. The court did not say that the annulment of the
revocatory clause in said will was the effect or consequence of the fact that it
was not allowed on the ground that it was not executed in the form required by
law in order that it may transmit real and personal property. Referring to the
construction, given by the respondent to sections 618 and 623 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, to the effect that a subsequent will may revoke a previous will,
although the later will has not been allowed by the competent court, it being
sufficient that the intention of the testator to revoke the previous will should be
clearly expressed, and that, while the requisite of allowance is necessary in
order that it may transmit property from one person to another, it is not
necessary in order that it might procedure other effects, for example, the effect
of a revocatory clause, or a clause of aknowledgment of a child, — what the
court declared, we repeat, was that although the revocation of a will should
have been effected, not by means of another will or codicil, but by mans of a
document, as authorized by said section 623, which document should have the
requisites and conditions fixed in section 618, the presentation of the document
to the court was necessary in order that the latter might allow it, by declaring
that it was executed with the formalities required by law for the execution of a
will, and finally concluding that, just as to, is to be proved that the requisites of
section 618 have been complied with in order that a will may be of value
through its allowance, so without such allowance the revocatory clause like the
other provisions of the will, has no value or effect except to show extraneous
matters, as, for example, the acknowledgment of natural children, of some debt
or obligation. In such case, the document could produce effect, but not as will,
but simply as a written admission made by the person executing it. And It is
beyond doubt that the revocatory clause contained in a document, like the
present, which contains provisions proper of a will, as those relating to legacies
and distribution of the properties of the testator after his death as well as the
appointment of executors, is not matter extraneous to the will, but merely a part
thereof, intimately connected with it as well as with the will or wills, the
revocation of which is declared in said clause; in short, the desire of the testator
declared in the revocatory clause is related to the desire of the same testator
expressed in the provisions of the testament in which said clause is found and
to that which he might have expressed in the testaments which he may have
previously executed. There is such relation between the revocatory clause and
the will which contains it, that if the will does not produce legal effects, because
it has not been executed in accordance with the provisions of the law, neither
would the revocatory clause therein produce legal effects. And if, in the present
case, the so-called will of the deceased, Simeona F. Naval, dated February 13,
1915, was not duly executed by her as her last will and testament, ad declared
by the court in its decision of November 19, 1915, in case No. 13386, for which
reason its allowance was denied, neither may it be maintained that the
revocatory clause contained in said will is the expression of the last will of said
deceased. The disallowance of the ill, therefore, produced the effect of
annulling the revocatory clause, not exactly because said will was not executed
in such from that it could transmit real and personal property, as inaccurately
alleged by the appellant, Monica Naval, to be the court's finding, upon which
said assignment of error is based, but because it was proved that said will was
not executed or signed with the formalities and requisites required by section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a cause which also produces the nullity of
the same will, according to section 634 of said law; and of course what is
invalid in law can produce no effect whatever.
If the instrument propounded as a revocation be in form a will, it must be
perfect as such, and be subscribed and attested as is required by the statute. An
instrument intended to be a will, but filing of its effect as such on account of
some imperfection in its structure or for want of due execution, cannot be set
up for the purpose of revoking a former will. (40 Cyc., p. 1177, and cases cited
therein.)
A subsequent will containing a clause revoking an earlier will must, as a general
rule, be admitted to probate before the clause of revocation can have any effect,
and the same kind, quality, and method of proof is required for the
establishment of the subsequent will as was required for the establishment of
the former will. (40 Cyc., p. 1178, and cases cited therein.)
But admitting that the will said to have been executed by the deceased Simeona
F. Naval on February 13, 1915, notwithstanding its inefficacy to transmit
property for the reason that it has not been executed, according to the provisions
of said section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should be considered as
executed by her in order to express her desire, appearing in one of its clauses,
to revoke and annul any previous will of hers, as stated in clause 13, this being
the argument adduced by the appellant, Monica naval, in support of said
assignment of error — neither could it be maintained that, the allowance of said
will having been denied by the court on November 11, 1915, said revocatory
clause subsists and the intention expressed by the testratrix therein is valid and
legally effective, for the simple reason that, in order that a will may be revoked
by a document, it is necessary, according to the conclusive provisions of section
623 of said procedural law, that such documents be executed according to the
provisions relating to will in section 618, and the will in question, or, according
to the respondent, the so-called document, was not executed according to the
provisions of said section, according to the express finding of the trial court in
its order of November 11, 1915, acquiesced in by the opponent herself, and
which is now final and executory. Therefore, the disallowance of said will and
the declaration that it was not executed according to the provisions of law as to
wills, produced the effect of annulling said revocatory clause.
In support of the argument advanced in her brief said appellant, Monica Naval,
cites the declaration made by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Wallis vs.
Wallis (114 Mass., 510, 512)m which, according to the appellant herself, was
in the following terms:
If it be shown that a later will was duly executed and attested, containing a
clause expressly revoking former will nothing else appearing as to its contents,
it is nevertheless good as a revocation, but it can only be made available by
setting it up in opposition to the probate of the earlier will.
In the decision of said case the finding referred to be by the appellant appears
not to have been made by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts.
The syllabus of said decision says:
When a will revoking a former will is in existence, it must be established in the
Probate Court; but when it has been lost or destroyed, and its contents cannot
be sufficiently proved to admit it to probate, it may nevertheless be availed of
as a revocation in opposition to the probate of the will revoked by it.:
And in the body of the decision there is a declaration, to which the appellant
must have desired to refer in her brief, which declaration says:
If it can be proved that a later will was duly executed, attested and subscribed,
and that it contained a clause expressly revoking all former wills, but evidence
of the rest of its contents cannot be obtained, it is nevertheless a good revocation;
and it can be made available only by allowing it to be set up in opposition to
the probate of the earlier will,. . . In conclusions, the doctrine laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, invoked by the appellant, Monica Naval, is in conformity with
The facts of the case in which this decision was rendered are different from the the provision of said section 623 of our procedural law and article 739 of the
facts of the case at bar. That was a case concerning a will filed by one of the Civil Code, and the will executed by the deceased Simeona F. Naval on October
children of the testatrix, Mary Wallis, as her last will, to the allowance of which 31, 1914, not having been revoked, according to these provisions, by the will
another son objected, alleging that said will had been revoked by another presented and alleged as executed by the same deceased subsequently on
executed by the same deceased subsequent to the will that was filed, and that it February 13, 1915, the allowance of which was denied by the Court of First
had been fraudulently destroyed or taken by his brother, the proponent and his Instance of Manila, the court below was not in error in ordering the allowance
wife, or by one of them, in order to deprive him of the rights conferred upon of said will, that is, of that of October 31, 1914, as the last will and testament
him by said will. Therefore, the will said to have been subsequently executed of said deceased.
by the testatrix and in which, according to the oppositor, the clause revocatory
of the former will appeared, was not presented by said oppositor, while the
previous will was, in the contrary, filed for allowance by the son of the testratrix,
who appeared to be favored therein, said oppositor having alleged that the
subsequent will, that is, that containing the revocatory clause, had been drawn,
subscribed and executed in accordance with the provisions of the law, a fact
which he was ready to prove just as he was ready to prove that it had been
destroyed or suppressed by the proponent, his brother and his wife, or one of
them. In the case at bar, the subsequent will containing the revocatory clause
of the previous will executed by the deceased Simeona F. Naval was presented
to the court for allowance and it was disallowed — a fact which gave
opportunity to the legatees of said deceased to present a previous will executed
by her on October 31, 1914, and said two wills having been successively
presented, evidence as to them was also successively adduced for their
allowance by the court.

Therefore, the declaration made by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in

Wallis vs. Wallis (supra), to the effect that a subsequent will containing a
revocatory clause of previous wills, constitutes a valid revocation and may be
used in objecting to the allowance of the previous will, even when it is not
possible to obtain proof of the remainder of the contents of said subsequent will,
refers to the case in which the latter had been taken away, destroyed or
suppressed, and it was impossible to present it for allowance, but requires for
that purpose that it be proved that said subsequent will has been executed,
attested, and subscribed in due form and that it contained, furthermore, that
revocatory clause. This is what said declaration and, in relation thereto, also
what the syllabus of the decision thereof clearly says. The court, through Chief
Justice Gray, in giving its opinion, thus began by saying:

By our law, no will can be revoked by any subsequent instrument, other than a
"will, codicil or writing, signed, attested and subscribed in the manner provided
for making a will." And when an instrument of revocation is in existence and
capable of being propounded for probate, its validity should be tried by a direct
proceeding instituted for the purpose in the Probate Court. (Loughton vs.
Atkins, 1 Pick., 535.)

It results, therefore, that while perfect parity does not exist between the case
decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, to which the appellant Monica
Naval refers, and that which is not before us, it is wholly unquestionable that,
whether the case deals with a subsequent will revocatory of a previous will,
which may possibly be presented to a probate court for allowance, or of a
subsequent will, also revocatory of a previous will, which could not be
presented for allowance, because it has been taken or hidding, or mislaid — in
order that such will may constitute a valid revocation and be utilized in the
second case, although the remaining provisions may not be proven, in
opposition to the allowance of the previous will, it is necessary to prove that it
was executed, attested, and subscribed in due form, and, of course, also that it
contained a clause expressly revoking the previous will, or, what is the same
thing, that said subsequent will has been executed according to the provisions
relating to wills, as expressed in section 623 of the procedural law in force.
There can be no doubt whatever that this applies when the revocation had been
made to appear in a writing or document susceptible of presentation for
allowance, like the so-called will of the deceased Simeona F. Naval, dated
February 13, 1915, and considered by said respondent and appellant as a mere
document of revocation, for, as already seen in said decision invoked by her,
the requisite as to signing, attesting, and subscribing in the form, required by
law for the execution of wills in order that it may revoke a previous will, is also
required in a will as well as in a codicil, or in a writing, and in referring to a
document of revocation, it is also expressed that its validity should be proved
in a direct proceeding, instituted for the purpose in a probate court. In the case
at bar, the document, executed by the deceased, Simeona F. Naval, as her last
will and testament, dated February 13, 1915, has been presented for allowance;
it validity has been proved by means of said procedure in the Court of Probate
of Manila, and that court denied its allowance, on the ground that the document
in question had not been duly executed by the deceased, as her last will and
testament, because she did not sign in the presence of three witnesses, and two
of these witnesses did not sign in the presence of each other, or what is the same
thing, that said document has not be attested and subscribed in the manner
established by law for the execution of will, or, in other words, as provided by
law in case of wills, as stated by section 623 of said procedural law, and this
resolution was acquiesced in, as already stated, by the respondents in this case,
and is, therefore, final and executory.
4. Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939.
The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will
in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife,
herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and
nieces.
2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition
for the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set
aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.
3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918
will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been
revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of
the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the
1918 will.
Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in
the subsequent disallowed 1939 will
2. Assuming that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary
consequence of the testator’s belief that the revocatory clause contained in the
subsequent will was valid and the latter would be given effect, can the earlier
will be admitted to probate?
RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval
that a subsequent will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been
disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot
produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said
revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the
testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge
of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will
can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The
doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an
instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails
of effect for some reason.
Although American authorities on the subject have a pool of conflicting
opinions perhaps because of the peculiar provisions contained in the statutes
adopted by each State in the subject of revocation of wills, the court is of the
impression from a review and the study of the pertinent authorities that the
doctrine laid down in the Samson case is still a good law.
2. YES. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of
“dependent relative revocation”. The failure of a new testamentary disposition
upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-
fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the
original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that
destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the
revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will.
5. Diaz v. De Leon
G.R. No. 17714 May 31, 1922
Facts:
1. Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in
conformance to the requirements under the law. After executing his first will,
he asked it to be immediately returned to him. As it was returned, he instructed
his servant to tear it. This was done in the testator's presence and his nurse.
After sometime, he was asked by his physician about the incident wherein he
replied that the will has already been destroyed.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will
RULING: Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was
anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he made in the first will. This
fact was shown from his own statements to the witnesses and the mother
superior of the hospital where he was subsequently confined. The original will
which was presented for probate is deemed destroyed hence, it cannot be
probated as the last will and testament of testator.
ARTICLE 837
1. G.R. No. L-46078 May 25, 1939
In the matter of the will of the deceased Mauro Salvacion.
GREGORIA REYNOSO, administratrix-appellant,
vs.
JOSE E. TOLENTINO, guardian ad litem of the minors Maurito and
Remedios Aguila,
JOAQUIN CAMPOSANO, guardian ad litem of the minor Corazon
Camposano,
VALERIO SALVACION, NUMERIANO SALVACION, AMADEO
SALVACION, and MARTINA ALLA, legatees-appellants.
Feria and La O for administratrix and appellant.
Andres Laredo, Sumulong, Lavides and Sumulong, and Elias C.
Desembrana for legatees and appellants.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
Mauro Salvacion died on June 30, 1932 in the municipality of Lucena, Province
of Tayabas, without leaving any descendant or ascendant. His widow, Gregoria
Reynoso, who survived him, is now the administratrix appointed in this testate
proceeding.
The properties left by the deceased are conjugal in nature because they were
acquired during his marriage with his widow. He left a will and a codicil upon
his death, wherein he made a partition of the conjugal properties between him
and his widow, and disposed by way of legacy of the half corresponding to him.
The attorney of the administration of this testate thereafter prepared the
partition of the properties left by the deceased between the widow and the
legatees.
The widow opposed the approval of this partition as to the coconut trees,
alleging that it is unequal not only as to the number of trees but also as to the
quality thereof. Over this opposition of the widow, the court, without affording
her an opportunity to substantiate her opposition and present evidence in
support thereof, approved the partition. To this resolution the widow expected.
The legatees, on the other hand, also opposed the approval of the partition in so
far as it casts the burden of the widow's usufruct upon one-half of what
corresponds to each one. Moreover, these legatees contend that the allowance
received by the widow during the liquidation of the conjugal properties should
be charged against her in so far as it exceeds the products of the properties
allotted to her. The court also overruled this opposition and approved the
partition in this respect.
In so far as it refers to the appeal of the widow, we are of the opinion that the
resolution of the court, approving the partition, is erroneous. The court should
have substantiated the opposition of the widow and should have given her an
opportunity to adduce evidence in its support. However, the court, relying only
upon the fact that the partition was made in accordance with the will of the
deceased, approved it. The will, in so far as the the testator alone made therein
a partition of the conjugal properties by assigning to himself those which he
liked and to the wife those which she did not like, is illegal. The conjugal
property is one between husband and wife wherein each one, except as to the
administration thereof, has equal rights. Each one has a right to one-half of
these properties and each one occupies the same position as to its ownership. It
is an encroachment upon these rights of each of the spouses if one of them
could designate which and how much these properties should correspond to
him. Any of this spouses is entitled to be heard in the partition of the conjugal
properties in order to defend his or her equal share.
As to the appeal of the legatees, the theory upon which it is based in plainly
erroneous. The usufruct which article 837 of the Civil Code gives to the widow
is upon one-half of the properties of the deceased spouse and not upon the
properties of the widow herself, such as the half of the conjugal properties
corresponding to her.
The contention that the allowance received by the widow should be charged
against her share in the conjugal properties in so far as it exceeds the fruits of
the properties corresponding to her, is perfectly legal. But we are precluded
from ruling upon this point, because there is neither showing nor allegation as
to the amount of the fruits of the properties during the liquidation. Without this,
we are not in a position to decide whether or not the widow received by way of
allowance more than that corresponding to her from the fruits of the properties.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is modified in the sense that
the court should permit the widow to substantiate her opposition and to present
evidence in support thereof, and is affirmed in all other respects, with the costs
to the defendants as appellants and legatees. So ordered.
SUBSECTION 8. ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS
ARTICLES 838 to 839
1. Tolentino v Francisco
G.R. No. L-35993
December 19, 1932
Topic/Doctrine: Formalities of a Will
FACTS:
A petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Adelaida
Tolentino de Concepcion, for the purpose of procuring probate of the will of
Gregorio Tolentino. Opposition was made to the probate of the will by Ciriaco
Francisco, Natalia Francisco, and Gervasia Francisco. the trial court overruled
the opposition, declared the will to have been properly executed, and allowed
the probate thereof. From this order the three opponents appealed.
Gregorio Tolentino was had been married to Benita Francisco (predeceased),
The pair had no children. Tolentino contemplated leaving his property mainly
to these kin of his wife, he had kept a will indicating this desire. However,
strained relations, resulting from grave disagreements, developed between
Tolentino and the Francisco relations and he determined to make a new will.
To this end, Tolentino went to an attorney Repide and informed him that he
wanted to make a new will and desired Repide to draft it for him. Tolentino
stated that he wanted the will to be signed in Repide’s office, with Repide
himself as one of the attesting witnesses. For the other two witnesses Tolentino
requested that two attorneys attached to the office. Tolentino returned to him
the draft of the will with certain corrections. Among the changes thus made was
the suppression of the names of Monzon, Sunico, and Repide as attesting
witnesses, these names being substituted by the names of Jose Syyap, Agustin
Vergel de Dios, and Vicente Legarda. Tolentino further stated to his attorney
that he had arranged with the three intending witnesses to meet at five o’clock
in the afternoon of the next day, for the purpose of executing the will.
It is a custom in the office of Repide not to number the consecutive pages of a
will, on the typewriting machine, the duty of numbering the pages being left to
the testator himself. Arriving at the place, the three entered the office of
Legarda. Tolentino asked Legarda to permit the will to be signed in his office,
and to this request Legarda acceded.
Tolentino thereupon drew two documents from his pocket saying that it was
his last will and testament, done in duplicate, and he proceeded to read the
original to the witnesses. After this had been completed, Legarda himself took
the will in hand and read it himself. He then returned it to Tolentino, who
thereupon proceeded, with pen and ink, to number the pages of the will. He
then paged the duplicate copy of the will in the same way. He next proceeded
to sign the original will and each of its pages by writing his name “G. Tolentino”
in the proper places. Following this, each of the three witnesses signed their
own respective names at the end of the will, at the end of the attesting clause,
and in the left margin of each page of the instrument. During this ceremony all
of the persons concerned in the act of attestation were present together, and all
fully advertent to the solemnity that engaged their attention.
ISSUE: whether or not the will is valid.
HELD:
Yes. A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or
more of the subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others, in
proving all the facts upon which the validity of the will rests. (Fernandez vs.
Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380.) It is sufficient if the court is satisfied from all the proof
that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law. The order
appealed from will therefore be affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
2. MERCADO v SANTOS
G.R. No. 45629
LAUREL; September 22, 1938
FACTS
In May 1931, the petitioner Atilano Mercado filed in the CFI of Pampanga a
petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa. The probate
court, in June 1931, admitted the will to probate. Almost 3 years later, 5
intervenors moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings, alleging lack of
jurisdiction of the court to probate the will and to close the proceedings, which
motion was denied.
It appears that 16 months after the probate of the will of Ines Basa, intervenor
de Leon filed 3 complaints against Mercado for falsification or forgery of the
will probated as above indicated. The 1st 2 cases were dismissed at the instance
of the complainant, while last case was dismissed on the ground that the will
alleged to have been falsified had already been probated and there was no
evidence that the petitioner had forged the signature of the testatrix appearing
thereon. Dissatisfied with the result, the provincial fiscal moved for
reinvestigation of the case. (fyi- petitioner was arrested 4 times!) The petitioner
moved to dismiss the case claiming that the will alleged to have been forged
had already been probated and, further, that the order probating the will is
conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof. The motion was
overruled.
ISSUE
WON the probate of the will of his deceased wife is a bar to the petitioner’s
criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will.
HELD
YES
- Sec.306 of our Code of CivPro:
" Effect of judgment. The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or
special proceeding before a court or judge of the Philippine Islands… may be
as follows:
Xxx in respect to the probate of a will… the judgment or order is conclusive
upon… the will or administration… Provided, That the probate of a will or
granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the
death of the testator or intestate.”
- SEC. 625. “ Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution.
No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and
allowed in the CFI, or by appeal to the SC; and the allowance by the court of a
will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution."
- Manahan vs. Manahan:
". . . The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution
thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law,
except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding. "
- The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The
provision of notice by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is
constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the
judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.
- The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem and the court
acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested, through the publication of
the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any
order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them.
- Sec. 333, par. 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an
incontrovertible presumption in favor of judgments declared by it to be
conclusive:
" The following presumptions or deductions, which the law expressly directs
to be made from particular facts, are deemed conclusive:
xxx xxx xxx
"4. The judgment or order of a court, when declared by this code to be
conclusive."
- Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so
peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof
however strong. The will in question having been probated by a competent
court, the law will not admit any proof to overthrow the legal presumption that
it is genuine and not a forgery.
- American and English cases show a conflict of authorities on the question
as to whether or not the probate of a will bars criminal prosecution of the
alleged forger of the probated will. We have examined some important cases
and have come to the conclusion that no fixed standard may be adopted or
drawn therefrom, in view of the conflict no less than of diversity of statutory
provisions obtaining in different jurisdictions. It behooves us, therefore, as the
court of last resort, to choose that rule most consistent with our statutory law,
having in view the needed stability of property rights and the public interest in
general. To be sure, we have seriously reflected upon the dangers of evasion
from punishment of culprits deserving of the severity of the law in cases where,
as here, forgery is discovered after the probate of the will and the prosecution
is had before the prescription of the offense. By and large, however, the balance
seems inclined in favor of the view that we have taken. Not only does the law
surround the execution of the will with the necessary formalities and require
probate to be made after an elaborate judicial proceeding, but section 113, not
to speak of section 513, of our Code of Civil Procedure provides for an adequate
remedy to any party who might have been adversely affected by the probate of
a forged will, much in the same way as other parties against whom a judgment
is rendered under the same or similar circumstances. The aggrieved party
may file an application for relief with the proper court within a reasonable time,
but in no case exceeding six months after said court has rendered the judgment
of probate, on the ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect. An appeal lies to review the action of a court of first instance when
that court refuses to grant relief. After a judgment allowing a will to be probated
has become final and unappealable , and after the period fixed by section 113
of the Code of Civil Procedure has expired, the law as an expression of the
legislative wisdom goes no further and the case ends there.
- Therefore, that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of
our Code of Civil Code Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this
jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate
by a court of competent jurisdiction. The petitioner is entitled to have the
criminal proceedings against him quashed.
3. Ernesto Guevara vs. Rosario Guevara
98 Phil. 249/G.R. No. L-48840
December 29, 1943
Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 8. – Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
FACTS:
This case is a sequel and aftermath of the aftermath of the case of Guevara vs.
Guevara, 74 Phil. 479. A Motion to dismiss was filed by Ernesto on the ground,
among others, that the petition for probate is barred by the Statute of
Limitations considering that the testator died on Sept. 27, 1933, and that
petition was filed 12 years after on Oct. 5, 1945. As a consequence, the lower
court dismissed the petition. The petitioner thereupon appealed to the Court of
Appeals which reversed the order of the Lower Court. The case thereafter was
elevated to the Supreme Court for review by Certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the Statute of Limitations is applicable to the Probate of the Wills.
HELD:
The Court failed to notice, that its Doctrine, was destructive of the right of
testamentary disposition and violative of the owner’s right to control his
property within the legal limits. The appeal ordered in fact leaves wills at the
mercy and whim of custodians and heirs interested in their suppression. The
Lower Court would in effect abdicate the tutelary power that passed to the
Republic from the former sovereigns, that ‘potestad suprema que en mi reside
para velarpor un punctual cumplimento de las ultimas voluntades,’ asserted as
one of the royal prerogatives in the ‘Real Cedula’ of March 18, 1776.
These decisions are of high persuasive value; they represent the trend of
authority, and enable us to conclude that reason and precedent reject the
applicability of the Statute of
Limitations to probate proceedings because these are not exclusively
established in the interest of the surviving heirs, but primarily for the protection
of the testator’s expressed wishes that are entitled to respect as an effect of his
ownership and right of disposition. If the probate of validly executed will is
required by public policy, as declared by the Supreme Court in the previous
case, the state could not have intended the statute of limitations to defeat the
policy.
4. LEONIDA CORONADO, FELIX BUENO, MELANIA RETIZOS,
BERNARDINO BUENASEDA and JOVITA
MONTEFALCON, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
JUANA BUENO ALBOVIAS, Respondents.
FACTS:
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land situated in Nagcarlan,
Laguna, containing 277 square meters.
Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias, herein private
respondent, on the one hand, and Leonida-Coronado, Felix Bueno, Melania
Retizos, Bernardino Buenseda and Jovita Montefalcon, herein petitioners, on
the other hand.
Juana Albovias claims that the property in question is a portion of a bigger lot
referred to as Parcel G in the last will and testament executed in 1918 by
Melecio Artiaga, grandfather of JUANA and that the bigger lot was inherited
under that will by JUANA and others.
She further claims that her property was included together with the two parcels
of land owned by Dalmacio Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's
successor-in-interest Leonida Coronado to Melania Retizos who in turn sold
the lots, including that one being claimed by JUANA, to the spouse Bernardino
Buenaseda and Jovita Montefalcon, now the present possessors thereof.
Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners claim that the property in question
was bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will executed by Dr. Dalmacio
Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even before the outbreak
of World War II.
Said will was probated but was opposed by Juana together with her husband.
As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question, JUANA filed
an action for quieting of title, declaratory relief and damages against
CORONADO. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of JUANA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the transfer for ownership was ineffectual since the will was
never probated.
HELD:
While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved and allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned
will, however, may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code
of 1899, which was in force at the time said document was executed by Melecio
Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as follows:
"Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act
inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33
[1986])
In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is
entitled to legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the
record is bereft of any showing that Leonida Coronado and the late Melecio
Artiaga were related to each other.
5. OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner,
vs.
CA ,PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondents.
FACTS;
Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for
probate of his will alleging that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named
in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.;
that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private
respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.
The Court is convinced that Dr. De Santos is of sound and disposing mind and
not acting on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that he signed
his Last Will and Testament on his own free and voluntary will.
The will was signed in the presence of 3 witnesses who in turn signed in the
presence of the testator and of each other and was duly notarized before a notary
public.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that,
as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L. Maloles,
Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos.
He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 61 has
lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of
an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
HELD:
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court
is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law.
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator,
so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to
issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by
petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot
entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the principle
of ambulatory nature of wills.
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for
probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
CIVIL CODE, ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having
jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's death shall
govern.
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996,
there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of
allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, §12 of the Rules of Court.
6.) SPS. PASCUAL V CA
Facts:
The petitioner Consolacion Sioson Pascual, is the niece of the deceased
Canuto Sioson who sold his shares of an undivided lot during his lifetime.
These lots are now subject of a court action .
When he died, his children confirmed this sale. REMEDIOS is the
granddaughter of Canuto’s sister Catalina. She filed a complaint against
CONSOLACION and her spouse Ricardo Pascual in the Regional Trial Court
of Malabon, Branch 165, for "Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate [of Title] and Damages."
REMEDIOS claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because
CATALINA devised these lots to her in CATALINA’s last will and testament7
("LAST WILL") dated 29 May 1964.
REMEDIOS added that CONSOLACION obtained title to these lots through
fraudulent means since the area covered by TCT (232252) 1321 is twice the
size of CANUTO’s share in Lot 2.
REMEDIOS prayed for the cancellation of CONSOLACION’s title, the
issuance of another title in her name, and the payment to her of damages.
Trial court ruled in favor of Consolacion on the ground of prescription and her
lack of legal standing. The CA reversed the judgment in favor of REMEDIOS.
ISSUE: WON prior to the probate of a will, a relationship of implied trust can
arise.
HELD: The action by REMEDIOS was dismissed for lack of cause of action.
• There was no implied trust .
• Will must be subject to probate proceedings and allowed before any
property or right can pass. I
IMPORTANT POINTS RELATED TO WILLS AND SUCCESSION:
REMEDIOS anchored her claim property on the devise of these lots to her
under CATALINA’s LAST WILL.
However, the trial court found that the probate court did not issue any order
admitting the LAST WILL to probate.
REMEDIOS does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the trial, REMEDIOS
admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 (for probate of the will) is
still pending.
Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "[N]o will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules
of Court."
The SC interpreted this provision to mean, "until admitted to probate, [a will]
has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder."
REMEDIOS anchors her right in filing this suit on her being a devisee of
CATALINA’s LAST WILL.
However, since the probate court has not admitted CATALINA’s LAST WILL,
REMEDIOS has not acquired any right under the LAST WILL.
REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action either to seek
reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce an implied trust over
these lots.
7) CAMAYA V PATULANDONG
FACTS:
❖ On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized
will wherein she devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson
Anselmo Mangulabnan (Mangulabnan)
❖
❖ During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate of
her will before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija
where it was docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 128.
❖ By Order2 of January 11, 1973, the CFI admitted the will to probate.
❖ On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying above-
quoted paragraph five of her will in this wise:
Issues:
1. WON the probate court can declare null and void and order the cancellation
of the TCTs of petitioners and the deed of sale; and
2. WON the final judgment regarding a property in a civil case bar the
allowance of the codicil.
HELD:
1ST ISSUE:
➢ The SC declared the limited jurisdiction of a probate court
➢ A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside
parties.
➢ All that said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator.
➢ If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because
the probate court cannot do so.
➢ Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the probate
court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of
the estate.
➢ It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and
ownership of the property.
➢ The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the
deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had the
effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
❖ SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. -
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot
be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law, petitioners’ titles cannot, under probate
proceedings, be declared null and void.
2nd ISSUE:
➢ The final judgment regarding a property in a civil case cannot bar the
allowance of the codicil.
➢ Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory
as it was not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion
that the decision was "without prejudice [to] ... the probate of the codicil.
➢ The rights of the prevailing parties in said case were thus subject to the
outcome of the probate of the codicil.
8. In Heirs of Rosendo Lasam, etc. v. Umengan, G.R. No. 168156,
December 6, 2006, (Callejo, J)
There was a complaint for unlawful detainer alleging that the plaintiffs were
the owners of the property. The defendants were allegedly possessing the
property by mere tolerance. In their defense, they alleged that they have a better
right because they inherited it from their father, showing a Last Will and
Testament which has not yet been probated. The lower courts (MTC and RTC)
ruled that with the will they have a better right, but the CA reversed on the
ground that the will has not yet been probated, hence, it has no passed any right.
In this case, both parties were claiming to have better right of
possession due to ownership. One party claiming that there was conveyance;
the other, having inherited it, hence, claiming a better right of possession
following the law on succession.
In upholding the CA’s ruling the SC
Held: The Last Will and Testament cannot be relied upon to establish the right
of possession without having been probated, the said last will and testament
could not be the source of any right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court
having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator’s
death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court
as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petitioner of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either
during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its
due execution.
 In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997) it was ruled
that: “a will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death,
it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit:
‘No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.’”
Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. To
probate a will means to prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law
with authority for that purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the
last will and testament of the deceased person whose testamentary act it is
alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as required
by law, and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a
proceedings to establish the validity of the will. Moreover, the presentation of
the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy. (Guevara v.
Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Baluyot v. Paño, 163 Phil. 81 (1976); Roberts v.
Leonilas, 214 Phil. 30 (1984)).
Since the will has not yet been probated, it has no effect
whatsoever and it cannot be the basis of any claim of any right of possession.
The defendants have a better right of possession based on the deed of
conveyances executed by the owner in favor of the children, the defendants
herein. (Heirs of Rolando Lasam v. Umengan, G.R. No. 168156, December 6,
2006).
9. CASE TITLE: Juan Palacios vs. Maria Catimbang Palacios
CASE #: G.R. No. L-12207
DATE: December 24, 1959
PONENTE: Bautista Angelo, J.
NATURE: Petition for approval of last will and testament.
DOCTRINE: When the testator himself probates his own will, its purpose is
merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law; therefore, no opposition can be entertained in the
proceeding.
FACTS:
Juan Palacios executed his last will and testament on June 25, 1946. He filed
on May 23, 1956 before the CFI of Batangas a petition for its approval and he
instituted as his sole heirs his natural children Antonio and Andrea C. Palacios.
On June 21, 1956, one Maria Catimbang filed an opposition to the probate of
the will alleging that she is the acknowledged, natural daughter of the petitioner
but she was completely ignored, impairing her legitime.
On July 6, 1956, the court issued an order admitting the will to probate. Another
date was set for the hearing of the opposition relative to the intrinsic validity of
the will, and after propert hereing, the court issued another order declaring
oppositor to be the natural child of the petitioner, therefore annulling the will
insofar as it impairs her legitime, with costs against the petitioner.
Because of the said order, petitioner gave notice of his intention to appeal
directly to the SC hence this case.
ISSUES: WON the opposition of Maria Catimbang will prosper?
HELD: No. Such opposition cannot be entertained in this proceeding because
its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law. If the purpose of the opposition
is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly
has been ignored in the will for issue, cannot be raised here but in a separate
action especially so when the testator is still alive and has merely filed a petition
for the allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after his death.
This is in line with our ruling in Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676, wherein
we said: "The authentication of the will decides no other questions than such
as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. It
does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency
of the provisions; that may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points
remain entirely un-affected, and may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated."
On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the lifetime of a
testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same
before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate
proceedings after the testator's death would be in order" (Report of the Code
Commission, pp. 53-54).The reason for this comment is that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent
(Article 777, new Civil Code.).
10. Pascual COSO, vs.
Fermina Fernandez DEZA, et al.,
G.R. No.L- 16763,December 22, 1921
FACTS:
The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had
illicit relations with her for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The
testator’s will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to the illegitimate son and
also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros to Rosario
Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in talking care
of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will
was set aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted
over the mind of the testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario
exercised some influence over the testator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the
will.
RULING:
Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to
invalidate a will; to have that effect, the influence must be undue. The rule as
to what constitutes undue influence has been variously stated, but the substance
of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence
exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the
testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another
rather than his own.
Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to
the execution of the will in question, either at the time of the execution of the
will, or so near thereto as to be still operative, with the object of procuring a
will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of
testamentary dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made.
And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by
one occupying an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact
that some influence is exercised by a person sustaining that relation does not
invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the
testator’s free agency.
The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence
existed at the time of its execution. While it is shown that the testator
entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her
influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy his free agency
and make him express the will of another rather than his own. Mere affection,
even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will.
Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no
imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make
an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have
contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is
voluntarily made.
11. AJERO v CA (SAND)
236 SCRA 488
PUNO; September 15, 1994
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA
FACTS
-The holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982,
was submitted for probate by the petitioners Ajero
-Named as devisees, were the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero,
private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand,
Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
-Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent;
and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence.
-TC admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate.
-On appeal, said decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of
decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." It held that the
decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and
undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and
cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE
WON the holographic will should be disallowed
HELD
No.
Sec 9 , Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, and Article 839 of the New Civil Code
are the applicable provisions with regard to disallowance of wills.
-These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
-Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be
resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's
last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary
testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the
execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
-Respondent court’s reliance on failure of the decedent to comply with Arts.
813 and 814 to disallow the will is erroneous.
-In Abangan vs. Abangan, it was held that:The object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth
and authenticity. But, on the other hand, one must not lose sight of the fact that
it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded.
-In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement
that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as
provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code
-Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance
of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
-A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement
affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not
its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the
result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however,
does not render the whole testament void.
-Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding
non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs.
Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made
by the testator in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature, . . .
the will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the
particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
SECTION 2. INSTITUTION OF HEIR
CASE UNDER ARTICLE 841
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON vs CA
(Holographic Will did not include her only surviving sister)
FACTS:
❖ A petition was filed by private respondent Atty. Hernandez seeking
the probate of the holographic will of the late Montinola who died
at the age of 70, and was unmarried, parentless and childless. In said
will, it was stated there that several of her real properties was
devised to specific persons. He also filed an urgent motion for
appointment of special administrator
❖ Petitioner Sanson, the only surviving sister of the decease but was
not named in the will, opposed the probate of the will alleging that
it was not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix
herself and the same was falsely dated or antedated; that the
testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties to make
testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon
the person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in
the win; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the
remainder of the estate.
❖ Petitioner alleges that her exclusion from the alleged holographic
demonstrating the lack of testamentary capacity of testatrix. And
that holographic will the testatrix failed to dispose of all of her estate
is an indication of the unsoundness of her mind
ISSUE :
❖ WON the testatrix is of unsound mind when she executed the will
considering that the petitioner was excluded and that the former
failed to disposed all her estate in here holographic will.
Held:
NO:
❖ It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her only sister
who is not a compulsory heir in her will. Nevertheless, the
deceased had reserved two boxes of jewelry worth P850,000.00 for
petitioner. Furthermore, petitioner's son Francis was instituted as
an heir in the contested will.
❖ Petitioner still insists that the fact that in her holographic will the
testatrix failed to dispose of all of her estate is an indication of the
unsoundness of her mind.
❖ Art. 841 of the Civil Code provides —
A will shall be valid even though it should not contain
an institution of an heir, or such institution should not
comprise the entire estate, and even though the person
so instituted should not accept the inheritance or should
be incapacitated to succeed.
In such cases, the testamentary dispositions made in
accordance with law shall be complied with and the
remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs.
Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11)
of her real properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the
testatrix was of unsound mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of shall
pass on to the heirs of the deceased in intestate succession.
Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than
compulsory heirs have been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the
Philippines, it is the testator's right to disregard non-compulsory heirs. The fact
that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither fraud or
undue influence.
CASE UNDER ARTICLE 842
In re of Dolores Coronel, deceased. LORENZO PECSON vs. AGUSTIN
CORONEL, ET AL. (exclusion of relatives)
The Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the last will and testament
of Dolores Coronel who named as her sole heir Lorenzo Pecson, the husband
of her niece.
The relatives of testatrix by consanguinity questioned the genuineness of the
will on the following grounds: (a) That the document Exhibit A does not
contain the last will of Dolores Coronel, and (b) that the attestation clause is
not in accordance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645.
Issue: W/N decedent can exclude her blood relatives in the disposition of her
estate.
Ruling: It is true that ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but
we understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not
rare. The liberty to dispose of one's estate by will when there are no forced heirs
is rendered sacred by the civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889. It is
so provided in the first paragraph of article in the following terms:
 Any person who was no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his
property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to acquire
it.
As to preference given to Lorenzo Pecson, it is not purely arbitrary, nor a
caprice or a whim of the moment. The proof adduced by this appelle, although
contradicted, shows by a preponderance of evidence that besides the services
which the opponents admit had been rendered by him to Dolores Coronel since
the year 1914, he had also rendered services prior to that time and was the
administrator and manager of the affairs of said Dolores in the last years of her
life. And that this was not a whim of the moment is shown by the fact that six
years before the execution of the will in question, said Lorenzo Pecson was
named and appointed by Dolores Coronel as her sole heir in the document
Exhibit B.
We find, therefore, nothing strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel
of her blood relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole
beneficiary. Furthermore, although the institution of the beneficiary here would
not seem the most usual and customary, still this would not be null per se.
In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute
dominion over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases
without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator
possesses the requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his
property is not affected by fraud of undue influence, the will is not rendered
invalid by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can
prevent the testator from making a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust
as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can dictate. However, as has already been
shown, the unreasonable or unjustice of a will may be considered on the
question of testamentary capacity.
The testamentary capacity of Dolores Coronel is not disputed in this case.
---Other issues not related to Art 842 but might be asked.
2) Issue: W/N the true last will of Dolores Coronel was expressed in the
testament Exhibit A. Yes.
and that should he not be able to do so, this duty would devolved upon his
substitutes.
Duty of the executor and the court. But it is not the sole duty of an executor
to distribute the estate, which in estate succession, such as the instant case, has
to be distributed with the intervention of the court. All executor has, besides,
other duties and general and special powers intended for the preservation,
defense, and liquidation of the estate so long as the same has not reached, by
order of the court, the hands of those entitled thereto.
The fact that Dolores Coronel foresaw the necessity of an executor does not
imply a negation of her desire to will all her estate to Lorenzo Pecson. It is to
be noted, furthermore, that in the will, it was ordered that her body be given a
burial in accordance with her social standing and she had a perfect right to
designate a person who should see to it that this order was complied with. One
of the functions of an executor is the fulfillment of what is ordained in the will.
Promise to will the blood relatives. It is argued that the will of the testatrix
was to will her estate to her blood relatives, for such was the promise made to
Maria Coronel, whom Rosario Coronel tends to corroborate. We do not find
such a promise to have been sufficiently proven, and much less to have been
seriously made and coupled with a positive intention on the part of Dolores
Coronel to fulfill the same. In the absence of sufficient proof of fraud, or undue
influence, we cannot take such a promise into account, for even if such a
promise was in fact made, Dolores Coronel could retract or forget it afterwards
and dispose of her estate as she pleased. Wills themselves, which contain more
than mere promises, are essentially revocable.
Diputed Phrase. The disputed phrase "in order that the latter might dispose of
the estate in the most appropriate manner" was used by the witness Reyes while
sick in a hospital and testifying in the course of the taking of his deposition.
Being a native pampango and cannot speak nor understand Spanish, we find in
this detail of translation made by the witness Reyes no sufficient reason to
believe that the will expressed by Dolores Coronel at the said interview with
Attorney Francisco was to appoint Lorenzo Pecson executor and mere
distributor of her estate among her heirs.

Not Pecson’s duty to show reasons for exclusion. As to whether or not the
History of making Dolores’ will. About the year 1916 or 1917, Dolores
burden of proof was on the petitioner to establish that he was the sole legatee
showed the document Exhibit B to Attorney Francisco who was then her legal
to the exclusion of the relatives of Dolores Coronel, we understand that it was
adviser and who, considering that in order to make the expression of her last
not his duty to show the reasons which the testatrix may have had for excluding
will more legally valid, though it necessary that the statement be prepared in
her relatives from her estate, giving preference to him. His duty was to prove
conformity with the laws in force at time of the death of the testatrix, and
that the will was voluntary and authentic and he, who alleges that the estate was
observing that the will Exhibit B lacked the extrinsic formalities required by
willed to another, has the burden of proving his allegation.
Act No. 2645 enacted after its execution, advised Dolores Coronel that the will
be remade. She followed the advice, and Attorney Francisco, after receiving
her instructions, drew the will Exhibit A in accordance therewith, and brought Atty Francisco act professionally. Attorney Francisco is charged with having
it to the house of Dolores Coronel for its execution. employed improper means of making Lorenzo Pecson appear in the will as sole
beneficiary. However, after an examination of all the proceedings had, we
cannot find anything in the behavior of this lawyer, relative to the preparation
Pablo Bartolome read Exhibit A to Dolores Coronel in her presence and that of
and execution of the will, that would justify an unfavorable conclusion as to his
the witnesses and asked her whether the will was in accordance with her wishes.
personal and professional conduct, nor that he should harbor any wrongful or
Dolores Coronel answer that it was, and requested her attorney, Mr. Francisco,
fraudulent purpose.
to sign the will for her, which the attorney accordingly did in the presence of
the witnesses, who in turn signed it before the testatrix and in the presence of
each other. We find nothing censurable in his conduct in advising Dolores Coronel to make
a new will other than the last one, Exhibit B, so that the instrument might be
executed with all the new formalities required by the laws then in force; nor in
Upon the filing of the motion for a rehearing on the first order allowing the
the preparation of the new will substantially in accordance with the old one;
probate of the will, the opponents presented an affidavit of Pablo Bartolome to
nor in the selection of attesting witnesses who were persons other than the
the effect that, following instructions of Lorenzo Pecson, he had informed the
relatives of Dolores Coronel. Knowing, as he did, that Dolores was excluding
testatrix that the contents of the will were that she entrusted Pecson with the
her blood relatives from the inheritance, in spite of her having been asked by
distribution of all her property among the relatives of the said Dolores. But
him whether their exclusion was due to a mere inadvertence, there is a
during the new trial Pablo Bartolome, in spite of being present in the court room
satisfactory explanation, compatible with honorable conduct, why said attorney
on the day of the trial, was not introduced as a witness, without such an
should prescind from such relatives in the attesting of the will, to the end that
omission having been satisfactorily accounted for.
no obstacle be placed in the way to the probating thereof.

Respondent’s contention: The fourth clause of the document which says: "I
The fact that this attorney should presume that Dolores was to ask him to sign
name and appoint my aforesaid nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, executor of all that
the will for her and that he should prepare it containing this detail is not in itself
is willed and ordained in this my will, without bond. Should he not be able to
fraudulent. There was in this case reason so to presume, and it appears that he
discharge his duties as such executor for any reason whatsoever, I name and
asked her, through Pablo Bartolome, whom she wanted to sign the document
appoint as a substitute executor my grandson Victor Pecson, resident of the
in her stead.
town of Betis, without requiring him to give bond," and contend that this clause
is repugnant to the institution of Lorenzo Pecson as sole beneficiary of all her
estate, for if such was the intention of the testatrix, there would have been no No imputation can be made to this attorney of any interest in favoring Lorenzo
necessity of appointing an executor, nor any reason for designating a substitute Pecson in the will, because the latter was already his client at the execution of
in case that the first one should not be able to discharge his duties, and they said will. Attorney Francisco denied this fact, which we cannot consider proven
perceived in this clause the idea which, according to them, was not expressed after examining the evidence.
in the document, and which was that Pecson was simply to be a mere executor
entrusted with the distribution to the estate among the relatives of the testatrix,
His attitude towards the opponents, as can be gathered from the proceedings
and especially from his letter Exhibit D, does not show any perverse or
fraudulent intent, but rather a conciliatory purpose. It is said that such a step
was well calculated to prevent every possible opposition to the probate of the
will. Even admitting that one of his objects in entering into such negotiations
was to avoid every possible to the probate of the will, such object is not
incompatible with good faith, nor does it necessarily justify the inference that
the heir instituted in the instrument was not the one whom the testatrix wanted
appointed.
Lorenzo Pecson is in good faith. As to Lorenzo Pecson, we do not find in the
record sufficient proof to believe that he should have tried, through fraud or
any undue influence, to frustrate the alleged intention of the testatrix to leave
her estate to her blood relatives.
The data furnished by the case do not show, to our mind, that Dolores Coronel
should have had the intention of giving her estate to her blood relatives instead
of to Lorenzo Pecson at the time of the execution of the will Exhibit A, nor that
fraud or whatever other illegal cause or undue influence should have intervened
in the execution of said testament. Neither fraud nor evil is presumed and the
record does not show either.
Discussion of “of others” in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2645,
Two interpretations can absolutely be given here to the expression "of
others." One, that insinuated by the appellants, namely, that it is equivalent
to "of other persons," and the other, that contended by the appellee, to wit, that
the phrase should be held to mean "of the others," the article "the" having
inadvertently been omitted.
Should the first interpretation prevail and "other persons" be taken to mean
persons different from the attesting witnesses, then one of the solemnities
required by law would be lacking. Should the second be adopted and "of
others" construed as meaning the other witnesses to the will, then the law
would have been complied with in this respect.
Including the concomitant words, the controverted phrase results thus: "each of
us signed these presents in the presence of others and of the testatrix."
If we should omit the words "of others and," the expression would be reduced
to "each of us signed these presents in the presence of the testatrix," and the
statement that the witnesses signed each in the presence of the others would be
lacking. But as a matter of fact, these words "of others and" are present. The
first theory presupposes that the one who drew the will, who is Attorney
Francisco, was an unreasonable man, which is an inadmissible hypothesis,
being repugnant to the facts shown by the record. The second theory is the
most obvious, logical and reasonable under the circumstances. It is true that the
expression proved to be deficient. The deficiency may have been caused by the
drawer of the will or by the typist. If by the typist, then it must be presumed to
have been merely accidental. If by the drawer, it is explainable taking into
account that Spanish is not only not the native language of the Filipinos, who,
in general, still speak until nowadays their own dialects, but also that such
language is not even the only official language since several years ago.
We believe it to be more reasonable to construe the disputed phrase "of
others" as meaning "of the other witnesses," and that a grammatical or clerical
error was committed consisting in the omission of the article "the".
And we understand that in the present case the interpretation we adopt is
imperative, being the most adequate and reasonable.
3) Issue: W/N the was executed in accordance with the law.
Yes. As to the question of whether or not the testatrix and witnesses signed the
document Exhibit A in accordance with the provisions of law on the matter,
that is, whether or not the testatrix signed the will, or caused it to be signed, in
the presence of the witnesses, and the latter in turn signed in her presence and
that of each other, the court, after observing the demeanor of the witnesses for
both parties, is of the opinion that those for the petitioner spoke the truth.
It is neither probable nor likely that a man versed in the law, such as Attorney
Francisco, who was present at the execution of the will in question, and to
whose conscientiousness in the matter of compliance with all the extrinsic
formalities of the execution of a will, and to nothing else, was due the fact that
the testatrix had cancelled her former will (Exhibit B) and had new one (Exhibit
A) prepared and executed, should have consented the omission of formality
compliance with which would have required little or no effort; namely, that of
seeing to it that the testatrix and the attesting witnesses were all present when
their respective signatures were affixed to the will." And the record does not
furnish us sufficient ground for deviating from the line reasoning and findings
of the trial judge.
CASE UNDER ARTICLE 850
1 Austria vs Reyes
G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970
RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO
AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO
CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and
LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.
DOCTRINE:
One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a
specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We
cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.
Article 850 of the Civil Code, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false
cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such
institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of
the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had
known the cause for it to be false.
FACTS:
On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI a petition for
probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament.
The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo
Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner,
are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however, dismissed.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass
on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto
Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by
Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate,
Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor.
Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed a petition in
intervention for partition alleging that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and
that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by
the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere
strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.
The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the entire
estate should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of
the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's will.
The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which
reads:
The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered
as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have
made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.
The tenor of the language used in the decedent’s will, the petitioners argue,
gives rise to the inference:
that the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to
bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as
the latter's legitime.
that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she would not have
instituted the respondents at all — the basis of the institution being solely her
belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the falsity of the
adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of the
estate wide to intestacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there
exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.
HELD:
YES.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil
Code, the following requisites must concur:
The cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
The cause must be shown to be false; and
It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made
such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang
tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the
impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the
testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise.
If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents,
she did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware that succession
to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes,
she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs
to their legitimes.
Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well indicate her
complete agreement with that statutory scheme. But even this, like the
petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of
the testatrix when she executed her will.
One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a
specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We
cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore
whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution
of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an
examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the
institution if he had known the cause for it to be false.
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate,2 as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that
intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail,
that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it
effect.
A probate court has found, by final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda.
de Cruz was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will executed free
from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it
becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.4
At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can
be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the
subject of a collateral attack.5
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.
CASES UNDER ARTICLE 854
1 NUGUID vs NUGUID
(1) REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,
vs. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and
appellees.
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix and
Paz, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios,
Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court a holographic
will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11
years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate .
In the said will Rosario (testatrix) stated that upon her death, all her properties
shall be given to her sister Remedios .
Felix and Paz, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground
therefor, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal
heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased
in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence
the institution is void.
The court held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce
create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed
the petition .
Petitioner came to this Court on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is void on the ground of preterition.
RULING: YES.
Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors
Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of
them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived
of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case
of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la
institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring
to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.9 The one-sentence
will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No
specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that
we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no
escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire
inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of
such institution of universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition
in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully
worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential
interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the
fabric of the statute.
We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment
notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so
expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere
institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would
give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is
inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary
disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the
nullified institution of heir. As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will
before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution,
by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.
DISTINCTION: PRETERITION vs. DISINHERITANCE (as discussed in
the case)
Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance
rather than one of preterition". From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that
Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate
the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."
Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es
siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be
"involuntaria". Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be
supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself.
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced
heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled
ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer
from preterition. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code "shall annul
the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in
addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it
may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the
case of preterition. Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to
that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally
deprived. The entire will is null.

2_IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
CHRISTENSEN
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN
June 30, 1966, GR No. L-24365
DOCTRINE: While the traditional concept of omission, based on Roman Law,
means that the compulsory heir was not instituted as an heir, the same was
abandoned so that if a compulsory heir were given a legacy by the testator in
the will (without instituting him or her as an heir), the said compulsory heir can
no longer claim the benefit of Article 854.
Facts:
Edward Christensen was a citizen of California and was domiciled in the
Philippines. When he died, he left a will which alleged that he had only one
child, Lucy Duncan, and that he was giving a devise of P 3,600 to Helen
Christensen, whom he alleged was not related to him.
In the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Helen was a natural child of the
deceased and that the properties of the decedent are to be divided equally
between Helen and Lucy pursuant to the project of partition submitted by the
administrator.
This decision was based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had been
preterited in the will, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled, and
hence the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate,
saving only legacies left in favor of other persons in accordance with with Art.
854 NCC.
Lucy argued that this is not a case of preterition, but is governed by Art. 906
NCC which states that: “Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by
any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same may
be fully satisfied,”
Moreover, considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly
denied his relationship with Helen, but left her to a legacy although less than
the amount of her legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited within the
meanng of Art. 918 NCC. Thus, under Arts. 906 and 918, Helen is only entitled
to her legitime, and not to a share equal to that of Lucy.
Issue: WON the estate should be divided equally among the two children
Held:
No. Helen should only be given her legitime since there was no preterition. The
testator did not entirely omit Helen Garcia but left her a legacy of P 3,600.
Manresa defines preteriton as the omission of the heir of the will, either by not
naming him at all, or while mentioning him as a father, son, etc., by not
instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, not assigning to him
some part of the properties.
Since there is no preterition, Art. 854 does not apply.
3 Acain
GR. NO. 72706, oCTOBER 27, 1987
Doctrine:
Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even
if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
Facts:
Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio.
The will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife
shall be given to his brother Segundo, the father of Constantino. In case
Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundo’s children.
Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.
The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the
latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir; and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited
Issue: Was there a preterition?
Ruling:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if
the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is
omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal
adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives
to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child
of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It
cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the
testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least
their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited.
This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not
result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should
stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to
the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because
the nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any other
testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at
all was written.
In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he
must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected
by it. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee
there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an
individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. At
the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However,
intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and
the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator.
He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the
deceased.
4_Solano vs CA
G.R. No. L-41971 November 29, 1983
ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and
EMETERIA S. GARCIA, respondents.
Doctrine: The case of Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al., reiterating the ruling in Neri,
et al. vs. Akutin, et al., which held that where the institution of a universal heir
is null and void due to pretention, the Will is a complete nullity and intestate
succession ensues, is not applicable herein because in the Nuguid case, only a
one-sentence Will was involved with no other provision except the institution
of the sole and universal heir; there was no specification of individual property;
there were no specific legacies or bequests.
FACTS:
Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia (GARCIAS), claiming to be
illegitimate children of Dr. Meliton SOLANO, filed an action for recognition
against him. In his Answer, SOLANO denied paternity. During the pendency
of the suit, SOLANO died. Petitioner ZONIA Ana Solano was ordered
substituted for the DECEDENT as the only surviving heir mentioned in his Last
Will and Testament.
The GARCIAS filed their reply impugning the recognition of ZONIA as an
acknowledged natural child. The Trial Court rendered judgment declaring
Sonia Ana Tuagnon as the illegitimate children of the late Dr. Meliton Solano
and the institution of Sonia Ana Solano as sole and universal heir of the said
deceased in the will null and void. Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in
toto.
In his will, Solano instituted Zonia as his universal heir to all his personal and
real properties in Camalig, Tabaco and Malinao, all in the province of Albay,
except for five parcels of land in Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay, which were given
to Trinidad Tuagnon in usufruct Upon SOLANO's petition.
Issue:
(1) WON the respondents were preterited?
(2) WON the probated will is void and total intestacy resulted there from?
Ruling:
1.Yes. Being compulsory heirs, the GARCIAS were, in fact, preterited from
SOLANO's Last' Will and Testament; and that as a result of said preterition,
the institution of ZONIA as sole heir by SOLANO is null and void pursuant to
Article 854 of the Civil Code.
As provided in the forgoing provision, the disposition in the Will giving the
usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the five parcels of land in Bantayan,
Tabaco, Albay, is a legacy, recognized in Article 563 of the Civil Code, and
should be respected in so far as it is not inofficious.
2.No. The case of Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al., reiterating the ruling in Neri, et al.
vs. Akutin, et al., which held that where the institution of a universal heir is null
and void due to pretention, the Will is a complete nullity and intestate
succession ensues, is not applicable herein because in the Nuguid case, only a
one-sentence Will was involved with no other provision except the institution
of the sole and universal heir; there was no specification of individual property;
there were no specific legacies or bequests.
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is a specific bequest or legacy so that Article
854 of the Civil Code, supra, applies merely annulling the "institution of heir".
5_Maninang Vs. CA
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA,
respondents.
Doctrine:
Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein,
or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
FACTS:
Clemencia Aseneta, 81, Single died at the Manila Sanitarium
Hospital, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall be
inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived
continuously for the last 30 years. The will also provided that she does not
consider Bernardo Aseneta as his adopted son.
Petitioner filed for the probate of the will. Bernardo,, filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the holographic will was null and void beacause
as the adopted son of Clemencia, he is a compulsory heir and that he was
preterited, therefore, intestacy should ensue.
In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad
averred that it is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's
area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic
validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited
by the decedent.
The CFI ordered the dismissal of the testate case. Hence , this petition
for review.
ISSUE:
Was Bernardo preterited?
HELD:
By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination
of that controversial issue, that is, WON Bernardo was preterited has not been
thoroughly considered. The conclusion of the trial court was that Bernardo has
been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however, that from the face of the will,
that conclusion is not indubitable. Such preterition is still questionable. The
Special Proceeding is REMANDED to the lower court.
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is
whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been
preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance.
Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein,
or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
Section 3 - Substitution of heirs
CASES UNDER ARTICLE 859
1_TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ
Doctrine:
1. “Dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it
also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art.
859 of the Civil Code.”
2. “Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution
"provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted.”
Facts: On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as
follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part
shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the
other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda
propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the
widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of
Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect
to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V.
Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs
Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for
fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not
related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in
Article 863 of the Civil Code
Issue 1: WON the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with
Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski
and Horace v. Ramirez is valid?
Ruling 1: YES. They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void
because Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because she did not
predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case for
vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the
inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar
substitution is valid.
Issue 2: WON the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect is void
Ruling 2: YES it is VOID, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void
for the following reasons
The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related
to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond
one degree from the heir originally instituted.
There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. ) There is no
absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as
required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits
"that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary
substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold
upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners."
2_PCIB VS ESCOLIN digest
CASE TITLE: PCIB VS ESCOLIN
CASE NUMBER: 2
DOCTRINE: WIFE who predeceased her husband wanted in her last will to
have her siblings inherit her shares in their conjugal property upon the death of
his husband
LONG TITLE:
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of
the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No.
1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK, administrator-appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL,
SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO,
PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS
JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION
PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA
PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the
last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
FACTS:
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as
well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by about
five years and a half.
Mrs Hodges stipulated in her will that her share of the conjugal partnership was
to be inherited by her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband,
during his natural lifetime" and that "at the death of my said husband, I give,
devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real
and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share alike"
On May 27, Mr. Hodges was appointed special administrator of her estate.
On December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had been probated and Mr.
Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as Executor, the trial court
ordered all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left
by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton
Hodges are hereby APPROVED
On December 25, 1962, Hodges died.
Avelina A. Magno, she was appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
And when Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges,
as next of kin of the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator
of said estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and
Davies, only to be in turn replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
PCIB used to secure at the beginning the conformity to and signature of Magno
in transactions it wanted to enter into and submitted the same to the court for
approval as their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow, however,
differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each of them began acting
later on separately and independently of each other.
Eventually, the differences reached a point wherein Magno, who was more
cognizant than anyone else about the ins and outs of the businesses and
properties of the deceased spouses because of her long and intimate association
with them, made it difficult for PCIB to perform normally its functions as
administrator separately from her. Thus, legal complications arose and the
present judicial controversies came about.
PCIB has come to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition
praying that the lower court's orders allowing respondent Magno to continue
acting as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges be set aside. PCIB
maintains that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and
sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a testamentary
substitution, but inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective and
may not be enforced.
Magno on the other hand argues that what was given by Mrs. Hodges to her
husband under the provision in question was a lifetime usufruct of her share of
the conjugal partnership, with the naked ownership passing directly to her
brothers and sisters.
ISSUE: WON the provision in the will in question constitute an ineffective
testamentary substitution.
NO
HELD:
We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor
of her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. But
neither are We sustaining, on the other hand, Magno's pose that it gave Hodges
only a lifetime usufruct.
We hold that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her
brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however,
that the latter would have complete rights of dominion over the whole estate
during his lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the
remainder thereof at the time of Hodges' death.
In other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case of default of Hodges,
on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them.
Clearly then, the essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent;
The provision in question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous
institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial
resolutory condition the operative contingency of which is coincidental with
that of the suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-
law, which manner of institution is not prohibited by law.
Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of
the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally
adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their
conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his
lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the
uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal
partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained
earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of
third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB,
under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the
Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be
her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her
husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
Case was remanded to the trial court for the determination of the proper
application of the renvoi principle (conflict of laws between Philippines and
Texas law), and the proper distribution of Spouses Hodges estates.
CASES UNDER ARTICLE 863
1 DE PEREZ vs GARCHITORENA
G.R. No. L-31703
De Perez vs Garchitorena
Substitution of Heirs : 895
Facts :
Ana Maria Alcantara – deceased
Carmen De Perez - universal heiress to the estate of the deceased and said to
be the husband Joaquin Perez Alcantara.
Mariano Garchitorena – the defendant appellant represented his father Andres
Garchitorena, Joaquin Perez owed the latter and this is the issue in this case.
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff’s name with La Urbana
in Manila (association). Andres Garchitorena ask for P7,872.23 from the
association claiming that Joaquin the husband of the plaintiff owes him.
The Plaintiff contends that the money is on fideicommissary substitution (she
or his husband is not the owner of the whole estate but only a part thereof).
The defendant contends that the money held by the association is a “trust”
Issue :
WON the fund held by the association is a trust or a fideicommissary
substitution?
Held :
The fund held by the association is a fideicommissary substitution.
The requisite of a fideicommissary substitution are as follows :
(Article 774 of the Civil Code.)
1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third
person the whole or a part of the estate.
3. A second heir.
It is note worthy that there are clauses in the will of the testatrix. He exclude
Andres from the will because his character is not adapted to management and
administration. To wit :
Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that my whole
estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving children; and should any of these
die, his share shall serve to increase the portions of his surviving brothers (and
sisters) by accretion, in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the
hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible.
Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena, die after me
while her children are still in their minority, I order that my estate be
administered by my executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default, by
Attorney Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son Ramon Salinas; but the
direction herein given must not be considered as an indication of lack of
confidence in my nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I relieve from the
duties of administering my estate, because I recognize that his character is not
adapted to management and administration.
In the case at bar, we find that the requisite of a fideicommissary is complied
with:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the
plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate,
according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a
third person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in
clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her
(heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to
dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in case she
dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress
instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in case she should die
after the testatrix.
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred
to as such second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.
Finally, the requisite added by the decision of November 18, 1918, to wit, that
the fideicommissarius or second heir should be entitled to the estate from the
time of the testator's death, which in the instant case, is, rather than a requisite,
a necessary consequence derived from the nature of the fideicommissary
substitution, in which the second heir does not inherit from the heir first
instituted, but from the testator.
By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to
the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her
children, from the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.
Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning,
which is on deposit with the association known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's
name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it be subject to the execution of
the judgment against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary
heirs.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
2. IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
REV. FATHER TEODORO ARANAS, RAMONA B. VDA. DE ARANAS,
ADELIA B. ARANAS-FERNANDEZ, HEIRS OF THE LATE
RODULFO B. ARANAS, ETC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE B. ARANAS AND HON. LUIS B. MANTA, respondents.
G. R. No. L-56249 May 29, 1987
DOCTRINE:
To void the designation of Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator
is to defeat the desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his
faithful and unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator was
seriously ill or bed-ridden. The proviso must be respected and be given effect
until the death or until the refusal to act as such of the instituted
usufructuary/administrator, after which period, the property can be properly
disposed of, subject to the limitations provided in Art. 863 of the Civil Code
concerning a fideicommissary substitution.
FACTS:
Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January
19, 1953. He had executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament which
was admitted to probate on August 31, 1956. In said Last Will and Testament,
Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated under Group C:
C. The special administration of the remainder of the estate of the testator by
Vicente Aranas, a faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also as
recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after deducting the expenses
for the administration. Said pertinent provision reads as follows:
Fourth. It is my will that the lands I had bought from other persons should be
converged and placed under a "special administrator." The special
administrator of these lands, for his office, should receive one half of all the
produce from which shall be deducted the expenses for the administration,
Vicente B. Aranas (Tingting), because he is a faithful and serviceable nephew,
should be the first special administrator of said properties, without bond, until
his death or until he should not want to hold the said office anymore. Anyone
of the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the said office of special
administrator, and none other than they. Their father, my brother Carmelo
Aranas shall be the one to decide who among them shall hold the said office,
but upon the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his said sons will have
power to select the one among them ourselves. The special administration is
perpetual.
The lower court in its Order ruled that the "perpetual inalienability and
administration of the portion of the estate of the late Rev. Fr. Teodoro Aranas,
administered by Vicente Aranas, is null and void after twenty years from
January 19, 1954 ... " and declared in the same order the heirs of the late Fr.
Teodoro Aranas.
The court ruled in its questioned order that this particular group of properties
(Group "C") is subject to the following:
1. Remunerative legacy by way of usufruct of the net proceeds of 1/2 of the
estate after deducting expenses for administration in favor of Vicente Aranas,
during his lifetime and shall continue an administrator of the estate, and, who,
upon his death or refusal to continue such usufruct, may be succeeded by any
of the brothers of the administrator as selected by their father, Carmelo Aranas,
if still alive or one selected by his sons if, he, Carmelo, is dead; Pursuant to the
Will.
Assailing the aforementioned ruling, petitioners rely heavily on the doctrine
laid down in Art. 870 of the New Civil Code to wit:
Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the institution of Vicente Aranas as heir is valid.
HELD:
YES.
A cursory reading of the English translation of the Last Will and Testament
shows that it was the sincere intention and desire of the testator to reward his
nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services by allowing him
to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's third group of properties until
Vicente's death and/or refusal to act as administrator in which case, the
administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his sons
and upon Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select one among
themselves.
Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right to enjoy the property
of his uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal enjoyment (or
exploitation) of another's property, with the obligation to return, at the
designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This
right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and therefore
not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal.
Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties is limited by his
refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil
Code relied upon by the petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not
prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the usufruct.
Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of
which has been given to
Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without
prejudice of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct. To void the designation of
Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the desire and
the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and unselfish
services rendered during the time when said testator was seriously ill or bed-
ridden. The proviso must be respected and be given effect until the death or
until the refusal to act as such of the instituted usufructuary/administrator, after
which period, the property can be properly disposed of, subject to the
limitations provided in Art. 863 of the Civil Code concerning a
fideicommissary substitution, said Article says:
A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second
heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect,
provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the
second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.

CASE UNDER ARTICLE 864
1. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD
CHRISTENSEN,
ADOLFO AZNAR (EXECUTOR) V. LUCY DUNCAN AND HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, 17
SCRA 590 (1966)
DOCTRINE:
The concept of total omission from the hereditary estate is further explained in
this case. While the traditional concept of omission, based on Roman Law,
means that the compulsory heir was not instituted as an heir, the same was
abandoned so that if a compulsory heir were given a legacy by the testator in
the will (without instituting him or her as an heir), the said compulsory heir can
no longer claim the benefit of Article 854.
It is the institution of substitute heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan
in the event she should die without living issue. This substitution results in
effect from the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled only to
the income from said estate, unless prior to her decease she should have living
issue, in which event she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the
property will go to the other relatives of the testator named in the will
One point deserves some consideration. Admittedly, the testator was a citizen
of the State of California. Under the present Civil Code, "testate and intestate
succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall
be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration." (Article 16, Civil Code) In the foregoing case, the estate of the
testator was distributed in accordance with Philippine law, taking into account
the fact that Article 854 was made
to apply. This point needs clarification.
FACTS:
Edward Christensen was a citizen of California and was domiciled in the
Philippines. When he died he left a will which alleged that he had only one
child (Lucy Duncan), and that he was giving a devise of P3,600 to Helen
Christensen (whom he alleged was not related to him).
1. In the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Helen was a natural child of
the deceased and that the properties of the decedent are to be divided equally
between Helen and Lucy pursuant to the project of partition submitted by the
administrator.
2. Lucy argued that this is not a case of preterition, but is governed by Art 906
NCC which states that: ―Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left
by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same
may be fully satisfied. Moreover, considering the provisions of the will
whereby the testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen, but left her
to a legacy although less than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect
defectively disinherited within the meaning of Art 918 NCC.
Thus, under Arts 906 and 918, Helen is only entitled to her legitime, and not to
a share
equal to that of Lucy
ISSUE:
Whether the estate should be divided equally among the two children (Art 854)
OR whether Lucy‘s share should just be reduced to meet the legitime of Helen
(Art 906)
HELD:
Helen should only be given her legitime since there was no preterition.
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir of the will, either by
not naming him at all, or while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not
instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, not assigning to him
some part of the properties.
The decision in Neri v. Akutin is not applicable, because it referred to a will
where "the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his
second marriage, and (that) without expressly disinheriting the children by his
first marriage, he left nothing to them, or at least, some of them." In the case at
bar the testator did not entirely omit oppositor -appellee Helen Garcia, but left
her a legacy of P3,600.00.
It is the institution of substitute heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan
in the event she should die without living issue. This substitution results in
effect from the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled only to
the income from said estate, unless prior to her decease she should have living
issue, in which event she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the
property will go to the other relatives of the testator named in the will. Without
deciding this, point, since it is not one of the issues raised before us, we might
call attention to the limitations imposed by law upon this kind of substitution,
particularly that which says that it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864 Civil
Code), which means that the legitime must descend to the heir concerned in fee
simple.
CASES UNDER ARTICLE 867
01_ ORENDAIN vs. TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOÑA
MARGARITA
ORENDAIN vs. TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOÑA
MARGARITA (Trusteeship with a prohibition of alienating and mortgaging
than 20 years) and (Trustee not designated as heirs are entitled to inherit the
property held in their trust)
FACTS:
The decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez left a last will and testament. The
decedent left no compulsory or forced heirs and consequently free to dispose
of her properties without regard to legitimes as provided in her will.
The will was admitted to probate by virtue and the project of partition presented
by the executor of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s will was approved.
Some of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s testamentary dispositions contemplated
the creation of a trust to manage the income from her properties for distribution
to beneficiaries.
Under Clause 10 of the will, it explicitly prohibits the alienation or mortgage
of the properties specified therein. In all, the decedent did not contemplate the
disposition of these properties, but only sought to bequeath the income derived
therefrom to various sets of beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER THE TRUSTEESHIP OVER THE PROPERTIES LEFT BY
DOÑA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ CAN BE DISSOLVED APPLYING
ARTICLES 867 AND 870 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
2. WON the trust designated in clause 10 are designated as heirs
HELD:
YES.
The trust stipulated in the decedent’s will prohibiting perpetual alienation or
mortgage of the properties violated Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code. It
is still valid, but only insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned.
2. NO
Although correct in moving for the dissolution of the trust after the twenty-year
period, are not necessarily declared as intestate heirs of the decedent.
Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the decedent intended any of the
trust’s designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties.
The decedent’s will did not institute any heir thereto, as clearly shown by the
following in clause 10 as she only intended to create a trust.
As regards these properties, intestacy should apply as the decedent did not
institute an heir therefor.
The intestate heirs of Doña Margarita Rodriguez, with the nearest relative of
the decedent entitled to inherit the remaining properties.
CASES UNDER ARTICLE 870
01_ ORENDAIN vs. TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOÑA
MARGARITA
ORENDAIN vs. TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOÑA
MARGARITA (Trusteeship with a prohibition of alienating and mortgaging
than 20 years) and (Trustee not designated as heirs are entitled to inherit the
property held in their trust)
FACTS:
The decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez left a last will and testament. The
decedent left no compulsory or forced heirs and consequently free to dispose
of her properties without regard to legitimes as provided in her will.
The will was admitted to probate by virtue and the project of partition presented
by the executor of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s will was approved.
Some of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s testamentary dispositions contemplated
the creation of a trust to manage the income from her properties for distribution
to beneficiaries.
Under Clause 10 of the will, it explicitly prohibits the alienation or mortgage
of the properties specified therein. In all, the decedent did not contemplate the
disposition of these properties, but only sought to bequeath the income derived
therefrom to various sets of beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER THE TRUSTEESHIP OVER THE PROPERTIES LEFT BY
DOÑA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ CAN BE DISSOLVED APPLYING
ARTICLES 867 AND 870 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
2. WON the trust designated in clause 10 are designated as heirs
HELD:
YES.
The trust stipulated in the decedent’s will prohibiting perpetual alienation or
mortgage of the properties violated Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code. It
is still valid, but only insofar as the first twenty-year period is concerned.
2. NO
Although correct in moving for the dissolution of the trust after the twenty-year
period, are not necessarily declared as intestate heirs of the decedent.
Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the decedent intended any of the
trust’s designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties.
The decedent’s will did not institute any heir thereto, as clearly shown by the
following in clause 10 as she only intended to create a trust.
As regards these properties, intestacy should apply as the decedent did not
institute an heir therefor.
The intestate heirs of Doña Margarita Rodriguez, with the nearest relative of
the decedent entitled to inherit the remaining properties.
2 IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED REV. FATHER TEODORO ARANAS, RAMONA B. VDA.
DE ARANAS, ADELIA B. ARANAS-FERNANDEZ, HEIRS OF THE
LATE RODULFO B. ARANAS, ETC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE B. ARANAS AND HON. LUIS B. MANTA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-56249 May 29, 1987
DOCTRINE:
To void the designation of Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator
is to defeat the desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his
faithful and unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator was
seriously ill or bed-ridden. The proviso must be respected and be given effect
until the death or until the refusal to act as such of the instituted
usufructuary/administrator, after which period, the property can be properly
disposed of, subject to the limitations provided in Art. 863 of the Civil Code
concerning a fideicommissary substitution.
FACTS:
Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January
19, 1953. He had executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament which
was admitted to probate on August 31, 1956. In said Last Will and Testament,
Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated under Group C:
C. The special administration of the remainder of the estate of the testator by
Vicente Aranas, a faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also as
recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after deducting the expenses
for the administration. Said pertinent provision reads as follows:
Fourth. It is my will that the lands I had bought from other persons should be
converged and placed under a "special administrator." The special
administrator of these lands, for his office, should receive one half of all the
produce from which shall be deducted the expenses for the administration,
Vicente B. Aranas (Tingting), because he is a faithful and serviceable nephew,
should be the first special administrator of said properties, without bond, until
his death or until he should not want to hold the said office anymore. Anyone
of the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the said office of special
administrator, and none other than they. Their father, my brother Carmelo
Aranas shall be the one to decide who among them shall hold the said office,
but upon the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his said sons will have
power to select the one among them ourselves. The special administration is
perpetual.
The lower court in its Order ruled that the "perpetual inalienability and
administration of the portion of the estate of the late Rev. Fr. Teodoro Aranas,
administered by Vicente Aranas, is null and void after twenty years from
January 19, 1954 ... " and declared in the same order the heirs of the late Fr.
Teodoro Aranas.
The court ruled in its questioned order that this particular group of properties
(Group "C") is subject to the following:
1. Remunerative legacy by way of usufruct of the net proceeds of 1/2 of the
estate after deducting expenses for administration in favor of Vicente Aranas,
during his lifetime and shall continue an administrator of the estate, and, who,
upon his death or refusal to continue such usufruct, may be succeeded by any
of the brothers of the administrator as selected by their father, Carmelo Aranas,
if still alive or one selected by his sons if, he, Carmelo, is dead; Pursuant to the
Will.
Assailing the aforementioned ruling, petitioners rely heavily on the doctrine
laid down in Art. 870 of the New Civil Code to wit:
Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the institution of Vicente Aranas as heir is valid.
HELD:
YES.
A cursory reading of the English translation of the Last Will and Testament
shows that it was the sincere intention and desire of the testator to reward his
nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services by allowing him
to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's third group of properties until
Vicente's death and/or refusal to act as administrator in which case, the
administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his sons
and upon Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select one among
themselves.
Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right to enjoy the property
of his uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal enjoyment (or
exploitation) of another's property, with the obligation to return, at the
designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This
right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and therefore
not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal.
Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties is limited by his
refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil
Code relied upon by the petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not
prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the usufruct.
Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of
which has been given to Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of said
naked ownership without prejudice of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct.
To void the designation of Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator
is to defeat the desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his
faithful and unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator was
seriously ill or bed-ridden. The proviso must be respected and be given effect
until the death or until the refusal to act as such of the instituted
usufructuary/administrator, after which period, the property can be properly
disposed of, subject to the limitations provided in Art. 863 of the Civil Code
concerning a fideicommissary substitution, said Article says:
A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second
heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect,
provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the
second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
Remedios NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs.
Felix NUGUID and Paz Salonga NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966
FACTS:
Remedios NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs.
Felix NUGUID and Paz Salonga NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid, testator in the holographic will, died single and without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six brothers and sisters,
namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all
surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, sister of Rosario, filed in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid
on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her death. The will stated as
follows:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory,
having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and
bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister
Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness
whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen
hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her. This was opposed by the
parents of Rosario, Felix and Paz.
The parents opposed on the ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal decided in
favor of the parents and declared that there was indeed preterition of
compulsory heirs.
Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively
disinherited and that they are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the
institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so
instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes.
ISSUE:
May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to still
be valid with respect to the free portion of the will?
RULING:
No, preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of
the Civil Code states that “(T)he preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious.”
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents. The will
completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing by the testament;
tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly
disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are therein
provided for. It is in this posture that the Supreme Court held that the nullity is
complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
Remedios’ claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the
legitime and that she should thus be considered a devisee or legatee is without
merit. The law requires that the institution of devisees and legatees must be
expressly stated in the will. Such was not present.
Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form of
disinheritance as the law also requires that, for disinheritance to be proper, the
disinheritance should be clearly and expressly stated in the will. Absent that,
no inference of disinheritance may be had.
SECTION 3. SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS
Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico ORENDAIN, represented by Fe D. ORENDAIN,
petitioners, vs.
Trusteeship of the Estate of Doña Margarita RODRIGUEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 168660, June 30, 2009
FACTS:
On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez, died in Manila,
leaving a last will and testament. The will was admitted to probate. At the time
of her death, the decedent left no compulsory or forced heirs and, consequently,
was completely free to dispose of her properties, without regard to legitimes,
as provided in her will. Some of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s testamentary
dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the properties and
the income from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the
will.
Thus, the following pertinent items in the will paint the desire of the decedent:
1. Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;
2. Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from specified properties, after
the necessary deductions for expenses, including the estate tax, be deposited in
a fund with a bank;
3. Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in trust for perpetual
administration (pangasiwaan sa habang panahon);
4. Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the properties ought to be
divided among, and distributed to the different beneficiaries; and
5. Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide medical support to certain
beneficiaries, to be deducted from the fund deposits in the bank mentioned in
Clauses 2 and 3.
Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain,
heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the
decedent’s will, moved to dissolve the trust on the decedent’s estate, which they
argued had been in existence for more than twenty years, in violation of Articles
867 and 870 of the Civil Code.
The trustees argued that the trust instituted may be perpetual citing the case of
Palad, et al. v. Governor of Quezon Province where the trust holding the two
estate of one Luis Palad was allowed to exist even after the lapse of twenty
years.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a trust may be perpetual.
2. Whether or not the named trustees may be considered as heirs to the
estate.
RULING:
The general rule remains that upon the expiration of the twenty-year allowable
period, the estate may be disposed of under Article 870 of the New Civil Code,
which regards as void any disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the
estate inalienable for more than 20 years.
The Palad Case is not violative of such provision of the law by the trust
constituted by Luis Palad because the will of the testator does not interdict the
alienation of the parcels devised. The will merely directs that the income of
said two parcels be utilized for the establishment, maintenance and operation
of the high school.
Said Article 870 was designed to give more impetus to the socialization of the
ownership of property and to prevent the perpetuation of large holdings which
give rise to agrarian troubles. The trust involved in the Palad case covers only
two lots, which have not been shown to be a large landholding. And the income
derived therefrom is being devoted to a public and social purpose – the
education of the youth of the land. The use of said parcels therefore is in a sense
socialized.
In the present case, however, there is a different situation as the testatrix
specifically prohibited the alienation or mortgage of her properties which were
definitely more than the two (2) properties, unlike in the Palad case. The herein
testatrix’s large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust because
the ownership thereof would then effectively remain with her even in the
afterlife.
Apparent from the decedent’s last will and testament is the creation of a trust
on a specific set of properties and the income accruing therefrom. Nowhere in
the will can it be ascertained that the decedent intended any of the trust’s
designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties. Therefore, the probate court
must admit the case to determine the properties to be subject to intestate
succession as well as the nearest relative of the deceased that may inherit the
said properties under the perpetual trust.
SECTION 6. DISINHERITANCE
DY YIENG SEANGIO, et. al., vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES
G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006
Facts:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the late Segundo Seangio before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioners
opposed contending that Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting one of
the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause, thus, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings
for the probate of the will. A petition for the probate of the holographic will of
Segundo was subsequently filed by petitioners before the RTC. Private
respondents moved for its dismissal on the ground that the document purporting
to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under
Article 783 of the Civil Code as the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance and nothing else. Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion
to dismiss contending that disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate
of a decedent and that the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundo’s
will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or
more compulsory heirs. The RTC issued its order dismissing the petition for
probate proceedings as the will clearly shows that there is preterition since the
other heirs were omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies.
Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Issue: WON the will executed is a holographic will.
Ruling:
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition
of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition
of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in
the absence of Alfredo. Holographic wills, therefore, should be construed in
a manner where the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument
and the intention of the testator should be taken into account. Considering that
the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. It is
settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
CHAPTER 3. LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION
AGUINALDO-SUNTAY v. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
G.R. No. 183053
June 16, 2010
FACTS:
1. On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina),
married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate.
a. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I),
predeceased both Cristina and Federico.
b. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico,
and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III
(Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
2. Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children,
namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II
3. Emilio I’s marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled.
Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita, by
two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
4. Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived
with their mother, separately from their father and paternal grandparents.
5. After the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights
over his grandchildren. It was altogether stopped because of a manifestation
filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits
of her grandparents.
6. After the death of his spouse, Federico, adopted their illegitimate
grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita
7. On October 26, 1995, respondent Isabela filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration in her favor. Federico filed his opposition. Being the
surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and he
should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass
of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in
the administration
8. After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably,
Federico filed a Manifestation, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as
administrator of the decedent’s estate on his behalf. Subsequently, the trial
court granted Emilio III’s Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his
interest in the outcome of the case.
9. In the course of the proceedings, Federico died.
10. The trial court rendered a decision, appointing petitioner Emilio III, as
administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. The RTC ruled that what
matters most at this time is the welfare of the estate of the decedent in the light
of such unfortunate and bitter estrangement. The Court honestly believes that
to appoint the petitioner would go against the wishes of the decedent who raised
Emilio III from infancy as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the
wishes of the surviving spouse who nominated Emilio III for appointment as
administrator.
11. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration
issued to Emilio III. The CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s status as an illegitimate
child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in the
estate of the latter’s legitimate mother, the decedent. That he cannot be
appointed for the ff reasons:
a. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e.,
Federico’s appointment as administrator of the estate. The death of Federico
before his appointment rendered the nomination of Emilio III inoperative.
b. As between the legitimate offspring (Isabel) and illegitimate offspring
(Emilio III) of decedent’s son, Emilio I, Isabel is preferred, being the "next of
kin" referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
c. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the Civil Code
bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother.
ISSUE : Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act
as administrator of the decedent's estate.
HELD:
1. The Court cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling excluding
Emilio III in the administration of the decedent’s undivided estate. The
underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference
to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective
will.
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain
bar rule, is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual
relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III. Both
spouses acknowledged Emilio III as their grandchild. Cristina’s properties
forming part of her estate are still commingled with that of her husband,
Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon
her death, remains undetermined and unliquidated. Emilio III is a legally
adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the latter’s
estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply representing his
deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
3. It is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the
administration of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s
interest in the estate of Cristina is as much as the interest therein of Isabel.
Considering that the CA even declared that "under the law, Federico, being the
surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal
partnership."
4. However, the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator
of an estate found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances of each case.
5. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in
the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the attendant facts and
circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by
both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate.
6. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the
interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does
not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in
the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.
a. The subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs,
including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita
Tañedo.
Other issue:
1. Petitioner argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar
between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply
in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary – Emilio III,
an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent
and her husband as their own son.
a. Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of
intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not
distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did
her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from
an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child.
b. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by
counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the
Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and
illegitimate descendants of a deceased. It must be pointed out that judicial
restraint impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and
distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and
Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties
of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.

CHAPTER 4. Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession
SECTION 2. Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy
Article 1028
Nepomuceno v. CA
139 SCRA 206
FACTS:
Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before
he died. Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will
that he was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the
testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner were married despite the subsisting first
marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to petitioner. On
August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975,
Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and
improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution
of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having
admitted her living in concubinage with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator
admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court
declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is
null and void.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will
and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass
upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision.
HELD:
No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the
Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general
rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule,
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears
to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)
The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1)
Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at
the time of the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in
Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary
provisions.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage
when Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate
the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a
person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
SECTION 6. Partition and Distribution of the Estate
SUBSECTION 1. Partition
Article 1080
BALANAY v MARTINEZ
64 SCRA 452
AQUINO; June 27, 1975
NATURE
Appeal by Certiorari
FACTS
-Leodegaria Julian died leaving her husband Felix Sr., and six legitimate
children, Felix, Jr. Avelina, Beatriz, Carolina, Delia, and Emilia.
-She left a notarial will and in paragraph 5 of the will she said that after the
death of Felix Sr. her land and all conjugal lands should be divided in the
manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned of in the
will her husband’s one-half share of the conjugal assets.
-Felix Sr and Avelina opposed.
-Subsequently, Felix Sr withdrew and he conformed and renounced his
hereditary rights. However, Avelina continued on with her opposition.
-The lower court declared the will as void and converted the testate proceeding
to an intestate proceeding. Felix, Jr. appealed.
ISSUE
1. WON the will should first be determined to be intrinsically valid prior to the
determination of its allowance or formal validity
2. WON the declaration that the will was void is proper
3. WON the renunciation of Felix, Sr. of his hereditary rights is valid
4. WIN Felix, Sr. will was intrinsically void because it preterited him
HELD
1. Yes, it was correct in passing upon the question of intrinsic validity first. The
court was of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will
(i.e. paragraph 5), which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to
withdraw the petition for probate. It was correct to pass upon the will’s intrinsic
validity even before its formal validity is established. The probate of a will
might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical consideration demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
2. No, it was not proper. The invalidity of one of the several dispositions does
not affect the validity of the other dispositions. Except if the other dispositions
is dependent on the first invalid disposition that has been made. The valid parts
should be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating
the intention of the testator or interfering with the general scheme, or doing
injustice to the beneficiaries.
3. Yes, it was valid. Art. 793 of the Civil Code states that Property acquired
after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed
it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such
was his intention and Art. 930 The legacy or devise of a thing belonging to
another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing
pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the
testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the
disposition shall take effect. The partition then has become valid.
4. No, Felix, Sr.’s case In the case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse.
His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity
to his wife’s will and renounced his hereditary rights. Thus it is different from
the Nuguid case because where the testatrix as heir her sister and preterited her
parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory
heirs in the direct line. Art. 854 of the Civil Code provides, “The preterition or
omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should
die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the
right of representation.” Since the preterition of the parents annulled the
institution of the sister as testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total
intestacy resulted.
Moreover, testacy is preferable to intestacy. Doubts are resolved in favor of
intestacy. As far as legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must
be followed and the dispositions in the will should be followed.