1.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALBERTO TABARNERO and GARY

TABARNERO, Accused-Appellants.

FACTS:

Gary testified that he stayed in Ernesto’s house as he and Mary Jane were living together. Mary Jane is
the daughter of Teresita Acibar, the wife7 of Ernesto. However, Gary left the house because of a
misunderstanding with Ernesto when the latter allegedly stopped the planned marriage of Gary and
Mary Jane, who was pregnant at that time.

Overcome with emotion over being separated from Mary Jane, Gary then went to Ernesto’s house, but
was not able to enter as no one went out of the house to let him in. He instead shouted his pleas from
the outside, asking Ernesto what he had done wrong that caused Ernesto to break him and Mary Jane
up, and voicing out several times that he loved Mary Jane and was ready to marry her. When Gary was
about to leave, the gate opened and Ernesto purportedly struck him with a lead pipe. Ernesto was
aiming at Gary’s head, but the latter blocked the blow with his hands, causing his left index finger to be
broken. Gary embraced Ernesto, but the latter strangled him. At that point, Gary felt that there was a
bladed weapon tucked at Ernesto’s back. Losing control of himself, Gary took the bladed weapon and
stabbed Ernesto, although he cannot recall how many times he did so.

According to Gary, Ernesto fell to the ground, and pleaded, "saklolo, tulungan niyo po ako" three times.
Gary was stunned, and did not notice his father, co-appellant Alberto, coming. Alberto asked Gary,
"anak, ano ang nangyari?" To which Gary responded "nasaksak ko po yata si Ka Erning," referring to
Ernesto. Gary and Alberto fled, ran, since they were afraid allegedly out of fear.

SPO2 Morales saw Ernesto in the operating room, very weak due to multiple injuries. While in the
presence of thetwo doctors on duty, SPO2 Morales asked Ernesto who stabbed him. Ernesto answered
that the assailants were the father and son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan.25

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ernesto’s statement is considered as a dying declaration?

RULING:

Yes, Ernesto’s statement is considered as a dying declaration.

Sec. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence
of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by the decedent that his
demise or at least, its imminence -- not so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is at hand. This may
be proven by the statement of the deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent
of the decedent’s wounds, or other relevant circumstances.
In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab wounds which caused his death within the next 48 hours. At
the time he uttered his statement accusing Gary and Alberto of stabbing him, his body was already
very rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his inability to speak and write towards the end of the
questioning.

We have considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for no person who
knows of his impending death would make a careless or false accusation. When a person is at the point
of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
consideration to speak the truth.54 It is hard to fathom that Ernesto, very weak as he was and with his
body already manifesting an impending demise, would summon every remaining strength he had just
to lie about his true assailants, whom he obviously would want to bring to justice.

2. CELESTINO MARTURILLAS, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Lito Santos saw his neighbor and ‘kumpare’ Artemio Pantinople arrive on board a jeepney. Cecilia
Santos, Lito’s wife, called him and Artemio for supper. Artemio obliged. Lito, opting to eat later, served
Artemio and Cecilia the food. After eating, Artemio returned to the bench and sat together with his tree
(3) children.

Lito was eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a gunshot. From a distance of about ten (10)
meters, he also noticed smoke and fire coming from the muzzle of a big gun. Moments later, he saw
Artemio clasping his chest and staggering backwards to the direction of his (Lito’s) kitchen. Artemio
shouted to him, ‘Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan,’ meaning ‘Help me, Pre, I was shot by the
captain.’ However, Lito did not approach Artemio right after the shooting incident because Cecilia
warned him that he might also be shot.

"Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from her house towards the direction
where Artemio was sprawled on the ground. Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, ‘Kapitan,
bakit mo binaril and aking asawa.’ She also repeatedly cried for help.

ISSUE:
Whether or not statement of victim is considered as res gestae or dying declaration?

RULING:
The statement of the victim is both res gestae and dying declaration. The fact that the victim’s
statement constituted a dying declaration does not preclude it from being admitted as part of the res
gestae, if the elements of both are present

To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the
declarant’s death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made freely and
voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in
which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant
competent to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to testify.42
The statement of the deceased certainly concerned the cause and circumstances surrounding his
death. He pointed to the person who had shot him. As established by the prosecution, petitioner was
the only person referred to as kapitan in their place.43 It was also established that the declarant, at the
time he had given the dying declaration, was under a consciousness of his impending death.

True, he made no express statement showing that he was conscious of his impending death. The law,
however, does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death.
Even if the declarant did not make an explicit statement of that realization, the degree and seriousness
of the words and the fact that death occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient
evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of being in a dying
condition.

On the other hand, A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule, when the following requisites concur: 1) the principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.52

All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the shooting, was a startling occurrence.
Immediately after, while he was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence, the victim
made the declaration without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner. Also, the
declaration concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latter’s statement was correctly
appreciated as part of the res gestae.

Aside from the victim’s statement, which is part of the res gestae, that of Ernita -- "Kapitan, ngano
nimo gipatay ang akong bana?" ("Captain, why did you shoot my husband?") -- may be considered to
be in the same category. Her statement was about the same startling occurrence; it was uttered
spontaneously, right after the shooting, while she had no opportunity to concoct a story against
petitioner; and it related to the circumstances of the shooting.

3. SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. ERIC GAN

FACTS:
Eric Gan opened a current account with petitioner. Petitioner alleged that it had an agreement with
respondent wherein the latter would deposit an initial amount in his current account. Furthermore,
under a special arrangement, respondent was allowed to transfer funds from his account to another
person’s account. Respondent availed of such arrangement several times.

Later on, the respondent purportedly incurred an overdraft or negative balance in his account. To
prove its claim, petitioner presented Patricio Mercado who was the bookkeeper who handled the
account of respondent and recorded his transactions in a ledger. Based on the ledger, respondent
allegedly had a negative balance.

Respondent denied liability to petitioner for the said amount. He contended that the alleged
overdraft resulted from transactions done without his knowledge and consent.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not petitioner has established substantial evidence that respondent is liable for the
overdraft on his account.

RULING:
The entries in the ledger, as testified to by Mercado, were not competent evidence to prove that
respondent consented to the transfers of funds. These entries merely showed that the transfers were
indeed made.
Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of entries in corporate
books required the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.
Mercado, petitioner’s bookkeeper who prepared the entries, was presented to testify on the
transactions pertaining to the account of respondent. It was in the course of his testimony that the
ledger entries were presented. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the
presentation of the entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court.16
Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entries, particularly
those entries which resulted in the negative balance. He had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of
these entries.

4. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Hon. SECRETARY OF LABOR LEONARDO

QUISUMBING and MERALCO EMPLOYEES and WORKERS ASSOCIATION
(MEWA), respondent.

FACTS:
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) and its union Meralco Employees and Workers Association
(MEWA) renegotiated its 1992-1997 CBA insofar as the last two-year period was concerned. The
Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and granted the arbitral awards. There was no question that
these arbitral awards were to be given retroactive effect. However, the parties dispute the reckoning
period when retroaction shall commence.
Meralco claims that the award should retroact only from such time that the Secretary of Labor
rendered the award. The union argues should retroact to such time granted by the Secretary who
has plenary and discretionary power to determine the effectivity of the arbitral award.
The union cited the case of St. Luke’s and Mindanao Terminal where the Secretary ordered the
retroaction of the CBA to the date of expiration of the previous CBA. While MERALCO relies to All Asia
Capital report to support its position that if the wage increase as ordered by the secretary, it would
simply pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers through an increase in the rate of
electricity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the All Asia Capital report may be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of
the rate of wage issue.
 RULING:

No, the All Asia Capital report may not be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of
wage issue.

Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation
is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon
by them therein.
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical, may be admitted only "if
that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used
and relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited
report is a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or
opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to
support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. Besides, no evidence was
presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the market and that
it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these
reports are not admissible

5. DOMINGO, Petitioners, vs. DOMINGO, LEONORA DOMINGO-CASTRO and her spouse

JUANITO CASTRO, NUNCIA DOMINGO-BALABIS, ABELLA DOMINGO VALENCERINA and
the REGISTER OF DEEDS, QUEZON CITY, Respondents.

FACTS:
Bruno Domingo was the registered owner of house and lot. Bruno needed money for his medical
expenses, so he sold said properties. He signed a Deed of Absolute Sale to his children Leonora,
Nuncia, and Jose.
Bruno died on April 6, 1975. Petitioner, who is the oldest of the five children of the late Bruno,
who by then was residing on the disputed property, learned of the existence of the assailed Deed of
Absolute Sale when an ejectment suit was filed against him. Upon advice of his counsel, he had the
then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP, now Philippine National Police or PNP)
Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City compare the signature of Bruno on the said deed
against specimen signatures of his father. As a result, the police issued him Questioned Document
Report to the effect that the questioned signature and the standard signatures were written by two
different persons. Another Questioned Document Report, subsequently issued by the police came up
with the same conclusion.
Petitioner filed a complaint for forgery, falsification by notary public, and falsification by private
individuals against his siblings. But after it conducted an examination of the questioned documents, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came up with the conclusion that the questioned signature and
the specimen signatures were written by one and the same person, Bruno B. Domingo. The public
prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint.
Petitioner instituted Civil Case for the declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale. Petitioner
alleged that the Bruno Domingo’s signature on the deed in question was forged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court errs when it held that the trial court correctly applied the rules of evidence in
disregarding the conflicting PC-INP and NBI questioned document reports.

RULING:
No, Under the Rules of Court, the genuineness of a handwriting may be proved by the following:
(1) A witness who actually saw the person writing the instrument;13
(2) A witness familiar with such handwriting and who can give his opinion thereon,14 such opinion being
an exception to the opinion rule;15
(3) A comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and admitted genuine specimen
thereof;16 and
(4) Expert evidence.
The courts are not bound to give probative value or evidentiary value to the opinions of
handwriting experts, as resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory.
The PC-INP used as standards of comparison the alleged signatures of Bruno in two documents,
namely: letter to the Bureau of Treasury dated April 1, 1958 and Republic Bank Check No. 414356
dated November 2, 1962. These documents precede by more than eight years the questioned Deed
which was executed on December 30, 1970. This circumstance makes the PC-INP’s finding
questionable.20
The passage of time and a person’s increase in age may have decisive influence in his
handwriting characteristics. Thus, in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the
standards of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. 21 As
correctly found by the appellate court, the examination conducted by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory did
not conform to the foregoing standard. Recall that in the case, the signatures analyzed by the police
experts were on documents executed several years apart. A signature affixed in 1958 or in 1962 may
involve characteristics different from those borne by a signature affixed in 1970. Hence, neither the
trial court nor the appellate court may be faulted for refusing to place any weight whatsoever on the
PC-INP questioned document report.

6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOEL LEE, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Herminia Marquez, the mother of the victim, Joseph were in the living room of their house
watching a basketball game on television. Herminia looked away from the game and casually glanced
at her son. To her complete surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open window
behind Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee peering through the window and
holding the gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the
window, and simultaneously, appellant fired his gun hitting Joseph’s head. Herminia filed a complaint
for murder against accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant makes capital of Joseph’s bad reputation in their community. He alleges that
the victim’s drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have been shot by any of the
persons from whom he had stolen.30 As proof of Joseph’s bad character, appellant presented
Herminia’s letter to Mayor Malonzo seeking his assistance for Joseph’s rehabilitation from drugs. On
rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter to Mayor Malonzo but denied anything about her
son’s thievery.

ISSUE:
Whether proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or
improbability of his killing?

RULING:
Yes, the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of
his killing. The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in
determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible.

Under the Rules on Evidence "Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:--
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense
charged.

In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing. There is no connection between the deceased’s drug addiction
and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive
eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victim’s bad character he could have been killed by
any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation.

Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed with
treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman “While good or bad moral character may be availed
of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15,
Rule 123), such is not necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is committed through
treachery or premeditation”

In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through treachery and evident
premeditation. The evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph was sitting in his living room
watching television when accused-appellant peeped through the window and, without any warning,
shot him twice in the head. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to defend himself or retaliate
against his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured his death without risk
to the assailant.

7. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. KAKINGCIO CAÑETE, appellant.

FACTS:

Spouses Cañete had 3 children, one of whom was Alma. Spouses decided to live separately.
Thereafter, Paquito decided to live with his older brother, Kakingcio Cañete, and the latter’s
common-law wife. Paquito became blind and a paralytic.
 On Feb. 1, 1996, Alma was awakened when she felt someone caressing her. When she opened
her eyes, she saw her uncle Kakingcio.

On February 3, 1996, at 8:00 in the evening, Alma was asleep in the sala of their house. She
was awakened when she felt her pants being pulled down. She was aghast when she saw
Kakingcio beside her pulling down her pants. She resisted and ran out of the house to escape
from Kakingcio. She rushed to the house of a neighbor Ka Caring to whom Alma revealed that her
uncle raped her and that he was about to rape her again. Caring adviced Alma not to return to
their house. Alma slept in the house of Caring. Alma returned to their house the next day,
February 4, 1996. By then, Kakingcio was no longer in the house. Alma revealed to Alejandra that
her husband raped here.

Appellants avers that the prosecution had a difficulty proving that the appellant raped the
private complainant in light of her testimony that when the appellant mounted her, he still had his
short pants on. Worse, the presiding judge posed leading questions to the private complainant.
The presiding judge was biased and partial to the prosecution.

ISSUE:
Whether the Trial Court erred in giving undue weight and credence to the incredible testimony of
the private complainant and in disregarding the evidence adduced by the defense.

RULING:
No, The Court finds nothing improper in the questions posed by the trial court. Neither are the
questions prejudicial to the appellant or suggestive of any partiality of the trial court. It bears
stressing that from the testimony of the private complainant, the appellant was wearing his short
pants before he mounted her and even when he was already on top of her and managed to
penetrate her sexual organ with his penis. The public prosecutor wanted the private complainant
to explain to the court how the appellant could have inserted his penis into her vagina
considering that he was still wearing his short pants. Although crudely and ungrammatically
phrased, the question of the public prosecutor "where did he let his penis exit considering that he
is then wearing a short pants" was not leading. The trial court should have overruled the
objection and allowed the private complainant to answer the question.

Parenthetically, under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which

took effect on December 15, 2000, child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading
questions may be allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will
further the interest of justice. Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not to
mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child:

Sec. 19. Mode of questioning. – The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children
so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure that questions are stated in a
form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) protect children from harassment
or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time.

The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.9
While it may be true that it was dark when the appellant ravished the private complainant in his
house, it cannot, however, be gainsaid that the private complainant could have sufficiently
identified the appellant as the culprit. The appellant was the uncle of the private complainant.
 She and her father Paquito had been living with the appellant and his family off and on for
years.The private complainant was thus familiar not only with the physical build of the appellant
but also with his voice and peculiar smell. A person may be identified by these factors. Once a
person has gained familiarity with another, identification is quite an easy task.

8. MANONGSONG VS ESTIMO
FACTS:

Petitioners Milagros and Carlito Manongsong filed a complaint alleging that they are the
owners pro indiviso of the contested parcel of land being the surviving heir of Vicente Lopez,
one of the children of spouses Guevarra. Petitioners prayed for the partition and award to them
of an area equivalent to 1/5 of the property.
Jumaquio sisters opposed the claim. They contended that Navarro, the mother of
Guevarra, sold the property to her daughter Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio. Jumaquio sisters
presented provincial Tax Declaration in the sole name of Navarro and also the notarized
Kasulata sa Bilihan ng Lupa.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners were able to prove, by the requisite quantum of evidence, that
Manongsong is a co-owner of the Property and therefore entitled to demand for its partition.

RULING:
No, as explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals :23
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and
upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial
in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must
be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing,
that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public
document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail the
authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, the evidence must be clear, convincing
and more than merely preponderant.24 Otherwise the authenticity and due execution of the
document should be upheld.25 The trial court itself held that "(n)o countervailing proof was
adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the document’s legality or its validity."26
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document and
thus still presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in
the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion.
It appears, on its face, to be genuine.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed to
refute by clear and convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were not able to prove
by preponderance of evidence that the Property belonged to Guevarra’s estate. There is
therefore no legal basis for petitioners’ complaint for partition of the Property.
9. PHILTRUST BANK vs SHANGRILIA REALTY CORPORATION

FACTS:
Petitioner Philtrust, a domestic commercial banking corporation filed a complaint against
Shangrila Realty Corporation together with Tan and Gabinete alleging that petitioner granted
Shangrila application for a renewal of its billing discounting line. The said loan was conditioned
on the execution of a Continuing Suretyship Agreement with Shangrila as borrower and Tan and
Gabinete as sureties, primarily to guaranty jointly and severally the payment of loan.

Shangrila failed to pay Philtrust, rendering the entire principal loan, due and demandable. Thus,
Philtrust filed a petition for Extra Judicial Foreclosure of the real estate mortgage wherein
Philtrust was the highest bidder.

Despite the foreclosure, respondents failed to settle the deficiency to fully satisfy the obligation.
On May 29, 2007, Philtrust filed a Motion to Declare Shangrila, Tan and respondent Gabinete in
default.

After the cross-examination and re-direct examination of Philtrust's witness and after
respondent Gabinete testified, the latter, filed a motion praying that the court direct the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an analysis of respondent Gabinete's
signature appearing in the Continuing Suretyship Agreement which the RTC granted. A senior
document examiner of the NBI, Efren Flores, testified that he evaluated and made a
comparative examination of the submitted specimen and the document containing the
questioned signature to determine whether they were written by one and the same person and
after a thorough examination, it was found that the questioned signatures and the standard
sample signatures were not written by one and the same person.

ISSUE:
WON respondent able to prove the fact that his signature was forged?

RULING:
No. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.26 One who alleges
forgery has the burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which
is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.27 In this
case, the respondent was not able to prove the fact that his signature was forged.
He who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a public document bears the
responsibility to present evidence to that effect. Mere disclaimer is not sufficient. At the very
least, he should present corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he should
present an expert witness. This is because as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be
proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery.
Petitioners, left with no other recourse than their self-serving declarations for lack of
corroborating evidence, seek redemption through the lone testimony of the NBI handwriting
 expert, who understandably is the sole disinterested witness for the petitioners. This, however,
cannot suffice.

10.