This study was conducted to determine and compare Supreme Court decisions invoking the Regalian Doctrine and i

implications regarding different principles of law in a period of ten (10) years or from 2002-2011 involving different
It also aims to determine the proper interpretation of law, quantum of evidence and related principles and doctrines
titles and registration proceedings. This is a qualitative study using content analysis research design. The study inclu
Supreme Court decisions regarding land registration cases in which the Regalian Doctrine was invoked and was put
issue. From 2002-2011, there have been 46 cases which either sustained or did not uphold the Regalian Doctrine. A
cases were studied, compared and analysed. The results showed that the Regalian Doctrine has been strictly applie
upheld in land ownership. There being a presumption under jura regalia that all lands belong to the State, the burd
overturn such presumption lies with the applicant of land registration by clear, positive and convincing evidence of
ownership by any of the modes of acquisition and provided that the land applied for forms part of the alienable land
State. The State may dispose of agricultural lands by any of the following: 1) homestead patent; 2) sale; 3) lease; a
by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. To rebut the ix presumption under the Regalian Doctrine, t
applicant must prove that he acquired the land by any of the modes provided above. The cases in which the Regalia
Doctrine is frequently placed in issue is the mode of acquisition by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete t
The applicant must prove the following: (a) that the land forms part ofthe alienable and disposable agricultural land
public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.The land must be d
to be alienable and disposable by a positive act of the government. Mere casual cultivation is insufficient to prove
possession in the concept of an owner. Tax declarations are not proofs of ownership but are merely indicia of owne
for no one in his right mind would pay taxes of property which he is not in possession of. Unless the aforementione
proven by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption under the Regalian Doctrine remains. If ownership of the land
been transferred to a private person under fraud or misrepresentation, the State can institute an action for reversio
the Regalian Doctrine, the State being the rightful owner.

dc.format.extent

G.R. No. 212938

THE HEIRS OF ALFREDO CULLADO ; namely LOLITA CULLADO, DOMINADOR CULLADO,

*

ROMEO CULLADO, NOEL CULLADO, REBECCA LAMBINICIO, MARY JANE BAUTISTA and
JIMMY CULLADO, Petitioners
vs.
DOMINIC V. GUTIERREZ, Respondent

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
1

Decision  of the Court of Appeals  (CA) dated December 6, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 121737 and the
2 3
Resolution  dated May 27, 2014 denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, the heirs
4

of Alfredo Cullado.

Facts

The Decision of the CA dated December 6, 2013 states the facts as follows:  5

The evidence on record shows that on May 10, 1995, Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. [(OCT
No.)] P-61499 which covered a parcel of land measuring 18,280 m2 located at Aneg, Delfin Albano,
Isabela, was issued in [Dominic Gutierrez 's favor.
6

On May 5, 1997, [Dominic]'s father, Dominador L. Gutierrez, representing [Dominic] who was then
still a minor, filed [before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22 of Cabagan, Isabela (RTC)] an
action  for recovery of ownership,  possession with damages with prayer for preliminary mandatory
7 8

injunction and temporary restraining order against Alfredo C[u]llado (C[u]llado).

In the action for recovery of ownership, [Dominic] maintained that C[u]llado had been squatting on
the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P- 61499 as early as 1977, and that despite repeated
demands, C[u]llado refused to vacate the said lot.

C[u]llado, in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss[,] interposed the special and affirmative defenses of
his actual possession and cultivation of the subject parcel of land in an open, adverse and
continuous manner. He likewise asked for the reconveyance of the property, considering that
[Dominic] and his father fraudulently had the subject property titled in [Dominic]'s name. [As his
counterclaim, he wanted to recover "incidental litigation expenses in the amount to be determined
during the trial."
9

C[u]llado died during the course of the trial and was substituted by his heirs, [composed of his wife
Lolita Cullado and their children, Dominador Cullado, Romeo Cullado, Noel Cullado, Rebecca
Lambinicio, Mary Jane Bautista, and Jimmy Cullado  . 10

Dominic]'s counsel repeatedly failed to attend the scheduled hearings, and as a consequence, [the
heirs of Cullado] were eventually allowed to present their evidence after [Dominic] was deemed to
have waived his right to cross-examine [the] witness [ of the heirs of Cullado].

On May 18, 2010, the RTC rendered [a] Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the [heirs of
Cullado] and against [Dominic], as follows:

1. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint.

2. Ordering x x x Dominic Gutierrez to reconvey in favor of the Heirs of Alfredo C[u]llado the land
covered and embraced by Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P- 61499.

SO DECIDED.

On March 18, 2011, [Dominic] filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment wherein he alleged, among
others, that his counsel's negligence in handling his case prevented him from participating therein
and from filing his appeal. However, the same was denied by the R TC for having been filed out of
time.
On October 18, 2011, [Dominic] filed with [the CA a] petition for annulment of judgment on the
ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. [The CA] initially dismissed   the petition but
11

reinstated the same upon [Dominic]'s motion for reconsideration and gave it due course in [the CA]
October 23, 2012 Resolution.  12

The CA granted the petition on the following grounds:

In the action for recovery of possession filed by [Dominic], [the heirs of Cullado] in their Answer
[ raised as affirmative defense and not as a counterclaim, and] asked for[,] the reconveyance of the
lot in issue as the same was supposedly fraudulently titled in [Dominic]' s name, considering that
neither [Dominic] nor his father actually possessed or cultivated the same. These allegations
constitute a collateral attack against [Dominic]'s title, which cannot be allowed in an accion
publiciana. In sum, the defenses and grounds raised by [the heirs of Cullado] ascribe errors
in [Dominic]'s title that would require a review of the registration decree made in [Dominic]'s
favor.

xxxx

Clearly then, the court a quo had no jurisdiction to resolve the twin issues of reconveyance and
fraudulence raised by [the heirs of Cullado] before the trial court.   (Emphasis supplied)
13

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 18, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela in Civil Case No. 22-805
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.  14

The heirs of Cullado filed a Motion for Reconsideration   and Dominic filed a Comment/Opposition
15

(To Private Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration).  16

The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution   dated May 27, 2014.
17

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue

Whether the CA erred in reversing the Decision of the R TC and in granting Dominic's petition for
annulment of judgment.

The Court's Ruling

Before delving into the sole substantive issue raised before the Court by the heirs of Cullado, the
preliminary question that needs to be addressed is whether Dominic's availment of the exceptional
remedy of annulment of judgment before the CA was proper.

Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that the remedy of annulment by the CA of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial Courts can only be
availed of where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. Thus, a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party,
without fault on his part, had failed to avail of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by
law; and such action is never resorted to as a substitute for a party's own neglect in not promptly
availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.  18

As to the grounds, Section 2, Rule 4 7 of the Rules of Court states that:

SEC. 2. Grounds for annulment. - The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.

The applicable period for filing the petition for annulment of judgment depends upon the ground. If
based on extrinsic fraud, the petition must be filed within four years from its discovery and if based
on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. 
19

As to the remedy of annulment of judgment, the CA correctly ruled: "considering that [Dominic] had
already availed himself of the remedy of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, raising the
issue of extrinsic fraud with the trial comi, he is effectively barred from raising the same issue via [his
petition for annulment of judgment]."  The CA, however, further ruled: "[h ]owever, the same cannot
20

be said for the ground of lack of jurisdiction. x x x [C]onsidering that [Dominic] immediately resorted
to court action - i.e. a petition for relief from judgment and the x x x petition for annulment of
judgment - upon learning of the unfavorable Decision dated May 18, 2010 of the [trial court], he
cannot be deemed guilty of laches nor placed in estoppel. Thus, if [Dominic] is able to prove that the
trial court indeed went beyond its jurisdiction in issuing its Decision, nothing prevents him from
asking for its annulment."21

The Court agrees with the CA that the RTC, as will be explained, was bereft of jurisdiction to rule
with finality on the issue of ownership and consequently was without the power to order the
reconveyance of the subject land to the heirs of Cullado given the fact that the original complaint
was only an accion publiciana.  Accordingly, the CA was correct in upholding the remedy of a
22

petition for annulment of judgment.

Proceeding now to the main issue, it may be recalled that the three usual actions to recover
possession of real property are:

1. Accion interdictal or a summary ejectment proceeding, which may be either for forcible entry
(detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), for the recovery of physical or material possession
(possession de facto) where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be
brought in the proper inferior court;23

2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the better right of possession (possession de
jure), which should be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial Court (depending upon
the value of the property)  when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year (or for less
24

than a year in cases other than those mentioned in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court) ; and
25

3. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion or reivindicatory action, which is an action for

recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial Court
(depending upon the value of the property). 26
Cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are governed by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Under
Section 1 of Rule 70, "a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the
right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal
Trial Com1 against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
damages and costs."

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are governed by the rules on summary procedure.  The 27

judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is conclusive with respect to
the possession only, will not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building, and will not
bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.  When the issue of
28

ownership is raised by the defendant in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession. 29

When the ejectment court thus resolves the issue of ownership based on a certificate of title to
determine the issue of possession, the question is posed: is this a situation where the Torrens title is
being subjected to a collateral attack proscribed by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1529  or the Property Registration Decree, viz.: "A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
30

attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law." The answer to this is "No" because there is no real attack, whether direct or collateral, on the
certificate of title in question for the simple reason that the resolution by the ejectment court cannot
alter, modify, or cancel the certificate of title. Thus, the issue of whether the attack on a Torrens title
is collateral or direct is immaterial in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases because the
resolution of the issue of ownership is allowed by the Rules of Court on a provisional basis only. To
repeat: when the issue of ownership is raised by the defendant in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall
be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.  31

In an accion reivindicatoria, the cause of action of the plaintiff is to recover possession by virtue of
his ownership of the land subject of the dispute. This follows that universe of rights conferred to
the owner of property, or more commonly known as the attributes of ownership.  In classical Roman
32

law terms, they are:

1. Jus possidendi or the right to possess;

2. Jus utendi or the right to use and enjoy;

3. Jus fruendi or the right to the fruits;

4. Jus accessionis or right to accessories;

5. Jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use;

6. Jus disponendi or the right to dispose or alienate; and

7. Jus vindicandi or the right to vindicate or recover. 33

Jus vindicandi is expressly recognized in paragraph 2 of Article 428, Civil Code, viz.: "The owner has
also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it."

If the plaintiffs claim of ownership (and necessarily, possession or jus possidendi) is based on his
Torrens title and the defendant disputes the validity of this Torrens title, then the issue of whether
there is a direct or collateral attack on the plaintiffs title is also irrelevant. This is because the court
where the reivindicatory or reconveyance suit is filed has the requisite jurisdiction to rule definitively
or with finality on the issue of ownership - it can pass upon the validity of the plaintiffs certificate of
title.

In this connection, the court's jurisdiction to determine the validity of the Torrens title in question is
limited by Section 32 of PD 1529, which provides:

SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. - The decree of registration
shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person
adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject,
however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof: deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by
actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. x x
x

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title
issued shall become incontrove1iible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any
case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons
responsible for the fraud.

In the consolidated cases of Catindig v. Vda. de Meneses  (Catindig) and Roxas, Sr. v. Court of
34

Appeals,  the Court reiterated that:

35

x x x [I]t is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence
of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described
therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to
possession thereof. In addition, as the registered owner, [the] right to evict any person illegally
occupying [the] property is imprescriptible. In the recent case of Gaudencio Labrador, represented
by Lulu Labrador Uson, as Attorney-in-Fact v. Sps. Ildefonso Perlas and Pacencia Perlas and Sps.
Rogelio Pobre and Melinda Fogata Pobre, the Court held that:

As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his property. This
right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches. In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we held,
thus:

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were
aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession,
the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the
possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches. 36
In turn, the imprescriptible right to evict ostensibly proceeds from paragraph 2 of Article 1126  of the
37

Civil Code in relation to Section 47 of PD 1529, which provides:

SEC. 47. Registered land not subject to prescription. - No title to registered land in derogation of the
title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

Section 47 of PD 1529 retains most of the wordings of its predecessor Section 46  of Act No.
38

496  or the Land Registration Act of 1902.

39

In an ordinary ejectment suit, the certificate of title is never imperiled because the decision of the
ejectment court on the issue of ownership is merely provisional. On the other hand, in a
reivindicatory suit, where the Torrens title or certificate of title is the basis of the complaint's cause of
action, there is always a direct attack on the certificate of title the moment the defendant disputes its
validity in a counterclaim or a negative defense.

As to accion publiciana, this is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of real property independently of title.  It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the
1âшphi1

expiration of one year

from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of

possession of the real property.  40

However, it should be noted that, unlike forcible entry and unlawful detainer which are procedurally
acknowledged,  accion publiciana is not. Indeed, there was even a doubt as to whether it continued
41

to exist after the passage of the old Civil Code. In the 1906 case of The Bishop of Cebu v.
Mangaron  (The Bishop of Cebu) the Court observed:
42

But the doubt which now exists is whether, after the promulgation of the Civil Code, the accion
publiciana continued to exist.

The doubt arises from the provisions of article 460 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

"The possessor may lose his possession-

"l. By the abandonment of the thing.

"2. By transfer to another for a good or valuable consideration.

"3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing or by the thing becoming unmarketable.

"4. By the possession of another, even against the will of the former possessor, if the new
possession has lasted more than one year."

The last provision of this article has given rise to the doubt whether possession which is lost by the
occupation of another against the will of the former possessor is merely possession de facto or
possession de jure.

The most powerful reason why it is thought that it refers to possession both de facto and de jure is
that, whereas the two are equally lost in the manner indicated in the first three provisions of this
article, it would be rather strange that the fourth provision should only refer to possession de facto.  43
Article 460 of the old Civil Code was amended and became Article 555 of the new Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:

(1) By the abandonment of the thing;

(2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or gratuitous title;

(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or because it goes out of commerce;

(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has
lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years.

Article 555 of the new Civil Code recognizes that a possessor may lose his possession de facto by
the possession of another when the latter's possession has lasted longer than one year. However,
his real right of possession is not lost until after the lapse of 10 years. This same Article 555 thus
recognizes the registered owner's remedy to institute an accion publiciana within the said 10-year
period. Thus, the doubt expressed in The Bishop of Cebu was resolved in favor of the subsistence
of accion publiciana.

The issue in an accion publiciana is the "better right of possession" of real property independently of
title. This "better right of possession" may or may not proceed from a Torrens title. Thus, a lessee, by
virtue of a registered lease contract or an unregistered lease contract with a term longer than one
year, can file, as against the owner or intruder, an accion publiciana if he has been dispossessed for
more than one year. In the same manner, a registered owner or one with a Torrens title can likewise
file an accion publiciana to recover possession if the one-year prescriptive period for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer has already passed.

While there is no express grant in the Rules of Court that the court wherein an accion publiciana is
lodged can provisionally resolve the issue of ownership, unlike an ordinary ejectment court which is
expressly conferred  such authority (albeit in a limited or provisional manner only, i.e., for purposes
44

of resolving the issue of possession), there is ample jurisprudential support for upholding the power
of a court hearing an accion publiciana to also rule on the issue of ownership.

In Supapo v. Sps. de Jesus  (Supapo), the Court stated:

45

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the
subject lot but they based their better right of possession on a claim of ownership [based on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. C-28441 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's names . 46

This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession
only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass
upon the issue

to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property.

This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive
on the issue of ownership. 47
The Court, recognizing the nature of accion publiciana as enunciated above, did not dwell on
whether the attack on Spouses Supapo's title was direct or collateral. It simply, and rightly,
proceeded to resolve the conflicting claims of ownership. The Court's pronouncement
in Supapo upholding the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of Spouses Supapo's title was,
however, subject to a Final Note that emphasized that even this resolution on the question of
ownership was not a final and binding determination of ownership, but merely provisional:

Final Note

As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining who
between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and binding
determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or even third
persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership.  48

From the foregoing, the Court thus clarifies here that in an accion publiciana, the defense of
ownership (i.e., that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner) will not trigger a
collateral attack on the plaintiffs Torrens or certificate of title because the resolution of the issue of
ownership is done only to determine the issue of possession.

In the present case, the Answer  of Cullado raised, as "special and affirmative defenses" to
49

Dominic's accion publiciana,   the issue of fraud in obtaining Dominic's certificate of title on the
50

ground that "neither he nor his father [had] been in actual possession and cultivation of the [subject
parcel of land]" and that Dominic was not qualified as he was then a minor.  51

In this regard, there is no dispute that Dominic was awarded a patent (no. 023118 95 10606) on May
10, 1995 and Original Certificate of Title  No. (OCT) P-61499 was issued in his name pursuant to the
52

said patent on May 17, 1995.  Cullado's Answer, filed on August 18, 1997, questioned the OCT
53

issued in Dominic's name. At that time, Dominic's OCT had already become incontrovertible upon
the lapse of the one-year period to question it by reason of actual fraud as provided in Section 32 of
PD 1529, viz.:

SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. - The decree of registration
shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person
adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject,
however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by
actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree,
it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title
issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any
case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons
responsible for the fraud.

In Wee v. Mardo  (Wee) the Court reiterated that: "A public land patent, when registered in the
54

corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens title, and becomes as indefeasible upon the
expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance thereof. Said title, like one issued pursuant to a
judicial decree, is subject to review within one (1) year from the date of the issuance of the patent.
This rule is embodied in Section 103 of PD 1529,"  viz.:
55

SEC. 103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents. - Whenever public land is by the Government
alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Decree. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant,
patent or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument to be filed with the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies, and to be there registered like other
deeds and conveyance, whereupon a certificate of title shall be entered as in other cases of
registered land, and an owner's duplicate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, patent or
instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance
or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee and
as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of registration that
shall be the operative act to effect and convey the land, and in all cases under this Decree,
registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land
lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee. After due registration and issuance of the
certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to be registered land to all intents and purposes under
this Decree.

The Court further stated in Wee that the issue as to whether title was procured by falsification or
fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose and a Torrens title can be
attacked only for fraud within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration.  56

Since the period of one year had already lapsed when Cullado questioned the OCT's validity on the
ground of fraud (i.e., counted from the issuance on May 17, 1995 of the OCT in the name of
Dominic), via his Answer filed on August 18, 1997, then Dominic's OCT had already become
indefeasible and, until cancelled in an appropriate direct proceeding, remains to be valid.

Applying Supapo and Catindig, Dominic has a better right of possession because his right is based
on ownership recognized by OCT P-61499 registered and titled under his name. The age-old rule
that the person who has a Torrens title over the land is entitled to possession thereof squarely
applies in his favor.

In view of the foregoing, the RTC was clearly without jurisdiction in ruling that Cullado had become
the owner of the land in controversy "through the medium of acquisitive prescription" having been in
possession by himself and with his wife for 36 years  and that Dominic must reconvey the land in
57

favor of the heirs of C[u]llado.  While the RTC could have resolved the issue of ownership
58

provisionally to determine the "better right of possession," which is allowed in an accion publiciana, it
was without any power or jurisdiction to order the reconveyance of the land in dispute
because that can be done only upon a definitive ruling on the said issue - something that cannot be
done in an accion publiciana.

More than that, the RTC's ruling that Cull ado had become owner by acquisitive prescription is
likewise without basis since the evidence adduced by the heirs of Cullado, as summarized in the trial
court's Decision, do not show that "the land which contains an area of more than one
hectare"  which Cullado was claiming was already private land at the time Cullado started his
59

possession thereof. It must be recalled that the land in dispute was acquired through a free patent,
which presupposes that it was initially public agricultural land pursuant to Commonwealth Act No.
(C.A.) 141   or the Public Land Act. While the RTC's Decision reckoned the year 1974 as the
60

beginning of Cullado's possession, it was conjectural to conclude that Cullado acquired the same by
virtue of prescription in the absence of any clear indication as to when the land claimed by him was
declared alienable and disposable. To be sure, the land in dispute can be said to have become
private land only when Dominic was issued his OCT in May 1995.

Furthermore, the discrepancy in area of the "more than one hectare" land being claimed by Cullado
and the almost two hectares or 18,280 square meters land appearing in Dominic's OCT was not
satisfactorily reconciled in the RTC's Decision. The metes and bounds of the land being claimed by
Cullado being unclear, it could not be determined if it is within the boundaries of the land technically
described in Dominic's OCT. As required under Article 434 of the Civil Code, "[i]n an action to
recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not
on the weakness of the defendant's claim." The heirs of Cullado have failed to properly and
sufficiently identify the property they are claiming as their own.

The Court notes that while the CA did not provisionally rule on the issue of ownership, it nonetheless
arrived at the same result, i.e., that the RTC had no jurisdiction to order the reconveyance of the
land covered by OCT P-61499 in the name of Dominic to the heirs of Cullado and effectively nullify
the said certificate of title. As concluded by the CA, the RTC erred in allowing a collateral attack
against Dominic's Torrens or certificate of title because it acted contrary to Section 48 of PD 1529.
The CA properly relied on the ruling in Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court  as it applies
61

squarely to the present case, viz.:

It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of Title issued to private
respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for recovery of
possession filed by the registered owner of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in their
answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, issued pursuant to the investigatory
power of the Director of Lands under Section 91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as amended). Such a
defense partakes of the nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of title brought under
the operation of the Torrens system of registration pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration
Act, now Section 103 of P .D. 1529. The case law on the matter does not allow a collateral
attack on the Torrens certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud. The rule now finds
expression in Section 48 of P.O. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree.   (Emphasis in the original)
62

Since the special and affirmative defenses raised by the heirs of Cullado in the Answer pertain to
discrepancies or errors in Dominic's certificate of title, which necessarily entails a review of the
decree made in Dominic's favor, the RTC was bereft of any jurisdiction to rule on such defenses in
an action for recovery of possession or accion publiciana initiated by the registered owner. The RTC
even ruled on the issue of the nullity of Dominic's certificate of title on the ground of his minority at
the time of the issuance of the free patent in his favor - an issue that clearly involved a collateral
attack on Dominic's Torrens title, which "is beyond the province of this proceeding and not within the
jurisdiction of [the trial c]ourt."
63

Given the nature of an accion publiciana, the heirs of Cullado could have only raised the fraud
allegedly committed by Dominic and his father and the reconveyance of title as permissive
counterclaims  because the evidence required to prove them differ from the evidence to establish
64

Dominic's demand for recovery of possession.  However, had the heirs of Cullado raised the same
65

as permissive counterclaims, and not as special and affirmative defenses, then they should have
fully paid the prescribed docket fee to vest the RTC with jurisdiction.  Unfortunately, there is no proof
66

on record that the heirs of Cullado had paid the prescribed docket fee. Given the foregoing, the mere
invocation by the heirs of Cullado in their prayer for an order for reconveyance of the subject land in
their favor will not be sufficient to vest the RTC with jurisdiction over their belatedly intended
counterclaims where the complaint involves an accion publiciana.
The predicament on the non-payment of the legal fees regarding permissive counterclaims has been
resolved with the express requirement under Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court that they
should be assessed by the Clerk of Court "[f]or filing x x x a permissive or compulsory counterclaim x
x x and/or in cases involving property [based on] the fair market value of the real property in litigation
stated in the current tax declaration or current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
whichever is higher, or if there is none, the stated value of the property x x x."   The payment of "the
67

new rates of the legal fees under Rule 141 x x x [for] Compulsory counterclaims" was, however,
suspended effective September 21, 2004 pursuant to A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC.

The Court notes that while the heirs of Cullado interposed the fraud purportedly committed by
Dominic and his father in the acquisition of Dominic's OCT and pleaded their open, adverse and
continuous possession and cultivation of the subject land as "special and affirmative defenses," such
allegations are, in reality, not affirmative defenses. As defined, an affirmative defense is an
allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the
pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery.  Such allegations do not
68

"hypothetically admit" the material allegations of Dominic in his complaint. Rather, such allegations
are, in actuality, negative defenses. A negative defense, as defined, is the specific denial of the
material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or causes of
action.  Also, "special defenses" are not expressly recognized by the Rules of Court. Section 5, Rule
69

6 of the Rules of Court provides that defenses may either be negative or positive.

It is observed that the Court has recognized two approaches in dealing with the claim of ownership
raised in the defendant's answer in an accion publiciana, namely: (1) to allow the provisional
resolution of the issue of ownership to determine the "better right of possession," or (2) not to allow
its resolution because the accion publiciana court is bereft of jurisdiction to rule with finality on the
issue of ownership and the attack on a certificate of title is deemed a collateral one that is therefore
proscribed.

While the CA took the second or "collateral attack" approach, and not the first or "provisional
determination of ownership" approach, it was correct in reversing and setting aside the
Decision   dated May 18, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela in Civil
70

Case No. 22- 805. Accordingly, the heirs of Cullado and all persons claiming under them should be
ordered to vacate and surrender the land subject matter of the case to Dominic.

That held, the Court, having taken the first approach, also adopts the Final Note in Supapo that the
ruling in this case, being one of accion publiciana, is limited only to the issue of determining who
between the parties has a better right to possession - and this adjudication is not a final and binding
determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or even third
persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership.

Indeed, the bedrock of the Torrens system is the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of a land title
where there can be full faith reliance thereon. Verily, the Government has adopted the Torrens
system due to its being the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.  To the
71

registered owner, the Torrens system gives him complete peace of mind, in order that he will be
secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered
land.  On the part of a person transacting with a registered land, like a purchaser, he can rely on the
72

registered owner's title and he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition or
transaction was ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair to him, but will also erode public
confidence in the system and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not
necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. 73
However, registration under the Torrens system is not one of the modes of acquiring ownership and
does not create or vest title or ownership. The Torrens certificate of title is just an evidence of
ownership or title in the realty technically described therein. Thus, the issuance of the Torrens or
certificate of title does not preclude the possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be
co-owners with the person named therein, or that the registered owner may be holding the property
in trust for another person. 74

The State may still bring an action under Section 101   of C.A. 141 for the reversion to the public
75

domain of land which has been fraudulently granted to private individuals and such action is not
barred by prescription.  The basis of the action for reversion is Section 91 of C .A. 141, which
76

provides: "The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and
parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false
statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts
set fmih in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material
facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or
permit granted. x x x"

Section 53 of PD 1529 (formerly Section 55 of Act No. 496) affords a party defrauded in a
registration case certain remedies, viz.: "In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may
pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice,
however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title."

In Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal,  the Court stated: "The sole
77

remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's
name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, x x x, but,
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in
the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, for damages." 78

It is settled that in an action for reconveyance or accion reivindicatoria, the free patent and the
Torrens or certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible and what is sought instead is the
transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant's
name. All that the plaintiff must allege in the complaint are two facts which, admitting them to be
true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that the plaintiff was
the owner of the land, and (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the same.   The 79

action for reconveyance can be based on implied trust where the defendant acquires the disputed
property through mistake or fraud so that he would be bound to hold the property for the benefit of
the person who is truly entitled to it and reconvey it to him. 80

As a final note, the Court adopts Supapo:

As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining who
between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and binding
determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or even third
persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership. 81

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
December 6, 2013 and Resolution dated May 27, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 121737 are
hereby AFFIRMED. The petitioners, the heirs of Alfredo Cullado, and all persons claiming under
them are ORDERED to vacate and surrender the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
61499 to its registered owner, respondent Dominic V. Gutierrez.
SO ORDERED.

Bersamin (C.J.), Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr.,
Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, and Inting, JJ., concur.

A. Reyes, Jr., J., on official leave.

Footnotes

*
 Also stated as "Collado" in most parts of the rollo.

1
 Rollo. pp. 12-30, excluding Annexes.

 Id. at 224-2311. Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate

2

Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Samuel H. Gaerlan concurring.

3
 Former Special Former Eighth Division.

4
 Rollo, pp. 243-245. Rendered by the Former Special Former Eighth Division

5
 Id. at 224-226.

6
 Hereinafter referred to as "Dominic".

7
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 22-805.

 While the Complaint is captioned as an action "For: OWNERSHIP, POSSESSION WITH

8

DAMAGES, etc.," the allegations and prayer of the Complaint do not include recovery of
ownership. Thus, the Complaint is essentially one for recovery of possession.

9
 Rollo, p. 74.

 Id. at 13. Lolita Cullado and her children are hereinafter referred to as "the heirs of
10

Cullado."

 Resolution dated November 21, 2011 of the CA, Eighth Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
11

121737, penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices Marlene
Gonzales-Sison and Leoncia R. Dimagiba concurring; rollo, pp. 121-123.

 Resolution dated October 23, 2012 of the CA, Special Former Eighth Division in CA-G.R.
12

SP No. 121737, penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices
Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Samuel H. Gaerlan concurring; id. at 147-150.

13
 Rollo, pp. 229-230.

14
 Id. at 230.
  Id. at 231-236.
15

 ld. at 237-241.
16

 Id. at 243-245.
17

 Republic v. Spouses De Castro, 656 Phil. 601, 605 (2011), citing Lazaro v. Rural Bank of
18

Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc., 456 Phil. 414, 421-422 (2003).

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 47, Sec. 3.

19

 Resolution dated November 21, 2011 of the CA, Eighth Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
20

121737, rollo, p. 122.

 Resolution dated October 23, 2012 of the CA, Special Former Eighth Division in CA-G.R.
21

SP No. 121737, id. at 148-149.

 See rollo, p. 150.
22

 Section 33, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, March 25,
23

1994 (BP 129) provides:

SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and

Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue or ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession[.]

 Sections 19 and 33, BP 129 provide:

24

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:

xxxx

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts[.]

xxxx
 SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in
cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (Emphasis supplied)

 See Gumiran v. Gumiran, 21 Phil. 174, 179 (1912), citations omitted. Rule 70 of the Rules
25

of Court was formerly section 80 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, as amended by
Act No. 1778.

 See II Paras, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED (17th ed., 2013), pp. 91-
26

136; Encarnacion v. Amigo, 533 Phil. 466, 472 (2006).

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Sec. 3.

27

 Id., Rule 70, Sec. 18.

28

 Id., Rule 70, Sec. 16.

29

 AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF

30

PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Sec. 16.

31

 De Leon and De Leon, Jr., COMMENTS AND CASES ON PROPERTY (5th ed., 2011), pp.
32

77, 78.

 Id. at 77.
33

 G.R. No. 165851, 656 Phil. 361 (2011).

34

 G.R. No. 168875, id.

35

 Id. at 373-374; citations omitted.

36

 Article 1126 of the Civil Code states: ART. 1126. Against a title recorded in the Registry of
37

Property, ordinary prescription of ownership or real rights shall not take place to the prejudice
of a third person, except in virtue of another title also recorded; and the time shall begin to
run from the recording of the latter.

As to lands registered under the Land Registration Act, the provisions of that
special law shall govern. (Emphasis supplied)
  Section 46 of Act No. 496 provides that "[n]o title to registered land in derogation to that of
38

the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession."

 AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ADJUDICATION AND REGISTRATION OF TITLES TO

39

LANDS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

 Encarnacion v. Amigo, supra note 26, at 474, citing Lopez v. David, Jr., 470 Phil. 386, 396
40

(2004).

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 70.

41

 6 Phil. 286 (1906).

42

 Id. at 292.
43

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Sec. 16 provides:

44

SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. - When the defendant raises the defense
of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.

 758 Phil. 444 (2015). It must be noted that while accion publiciana was the remedy sought
45

by Spouses Supapo, the Court, through Justice Brion, ruled that their position that their
cause of action was imprescriptible since the subject property was registered and titled under
the Torrens system was legally correct. Id. at 460.

 Id. at 449-450.
46

 Id. at 456; citations omitted.

47

 Id. at 467.
48

 Answer with Motion to Dismiss, rollo, pp. 73-75.

49

 Although the Complaint filed by respondent is "For: OWNERSHIP, POSSESSION WITH

50

DAMAGES AND PRAYER x x x FOR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION and

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER," it is essentially an accion publiciana, considering
the allegation therein that: "as early as 1977, the defendant squatted on the x xx property
without the prior notice and consent of the plaintiff x x x[.]" Rollo, pp. 60, 61.

 Rollo, p. 74.
51

 Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo.

52

 Rollo, p. 72.
53

 735 Phil. 420 (2014).

54

 Id. at 429; citation omitted.

55
  Id. at 431.
56

 RTC Decision, rollo, p. 88.

57

 Id. at 90.
58

 Id. at 86.
59

 AN ACT TO AMEND AND COMPILE THE LAWS RELATIVE TO LANDS OF THE PUBLIC
60

DOMAIN.

 272 Phil. 586,594 (1991).

61

 Rollo, p. 229.
62

 RTC Resolution dated April 17, 2002, rollo, p. 77.

63

 As opposed to a compulsory counterclaim which is one that arises out of or is connected

64

with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the
court both as to the amount and the nature thereof. (Emphasis supplied) See RULES OF
COURT, Rule 6, Sec. 7.

 See Urieta Vda. De Aguilar v. Spouses Alfaro, 63 7 Phil. 131, 146 (2010).

65

 See id. at 146.

66

 Riano, CIVIL PROCEDURE VOLUME I THE BAR LECTURE SERIES (2011 Bantam
67

Edition), pp. 340-341, citing Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Lerma, 566 Phil. 1, 20 (2008).

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 6, Sec. 5(b).

68

 Id., Rule 6, Sec. 5(a).

69

 Rollo, pp. 85-90. Penned by Judge Felipe Jesus Torio II.

70

 Casimiro Development Corp. v. Mateo, 670 Phil. 311,323 (2011).

71

 Id. at 323; citations omitted.

72

 Id.; citations omitted.

73

 Id. at 324; citations omitted.

74

 SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
75

improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
  Heirs of Alcaraz v. Republic, 502 Phil. 521, 532 (2005), citing Baguio v. Republic, 361 Phil.
76

374, 379- 380 (1999), further citing The Director of Lands v. De Luna, 110 Phil. 28, 33
(1960).

 92 Phil. 826 (1953).

77

 Id. at 831.
78

 Spouses Galang v. Spouses Reyes, 692 Phil. 652, 662 (2012).

79

 Id. at 662-663.
80

 Supra note 45, at 467.

81

Philippine Supreme Court

Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1921 > July 1921 Decisions > G.R. No.
17540 July 23, 1921 - JUAN FERY v. MUNICIPALITY OF CABANATUAN

042 Phil 28:

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 17540. July 23, 1921. ]

JUAN FERY, Petitioner, v. THE MUNICIPALITY OF CABANATUAN, NUEVA

ECIJA, Respondent.

C. de la Fuente for Petitioner.

Provincial Fiscal De la Costa for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

EMINENT DOMAIN; EXPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY; ABANDONMENT OF USE OF LAND

EXPROPRIATED; EFFECT OF SUCH ABANDONMENT. — When private land is
expropriated for a particular public use, the same does not return to its former owner
upon an abandonment of the particular use for which the land was expropriated. When
land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of the right of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
right in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to
a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion
to the former owner.

DECISION

JOHNSON, J. :

This is an original action for the writ of mandamus, commenced in the Supreme Court.
The respondent presented a demurrer to the petition.

The important facts admitted and found in the petition may be stated as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That sometime prior to the 3d day of October, 1913, the municipality of Cabanatuan,
of the Province of Nueva Ecija, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of
said province, for the purpose of expropriating certain pieces or parcels of land for a
public market. The action was known as No. 950 and was entitled "El Municipio de
Cabanatuan v. Gregorio Crisostomo y otros." cralaw virtua1aw library

2. That on the 9th day of July, 1915, the Court of First Instance rendered a final
judgment in said action, granting to said municipality the pieces or parcels of land in
question without condition, and ordered said municipality to pay to the various owners
of said parcels of land the specific amounts which were mentioned in the dispositive
part of the decision.

3. That later (the exact date not appearing of record) the said municipality constructed
upon said land houses to be rented.

The petitioner herein now alleges that, in view of the fact that the municipality
expropriated the parcel of land in question for the purpose of a public market and that
it abandoned that purpose, it thereby lost its right to the parcel of land so appropriated.
The petitioner prayed that the writ of mandamus be issued requiring the said
municipality to return said land to its former owner — the petitioner herein. The
petitioner further alleged that he has not been paid the amount due him as the value of
his land.

The question presented by the petition and demurrer is this: When private land is
expropriated for a particular public use, and that particular public use is abandoned,
does the land so expropriated return to its former owner?

The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by the
expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a corporation which
has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If, for example,
land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose
is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course,
when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the
property so expropriated. If, for example, land is expropriated for a public street and
the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public
street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to
the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. Many other
similar examples might be given. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of
expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes
the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or
municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the
title acquired by the expropriation proceedings. (10 R. C. L., 240, sec. 202; 20 C. J.,
1234, secs. 593-599, and numerous cases cited; Reichling v. Covington Lumber Co., 57
Wash., 225; 13., Am. St. Rep., 976; McConihay v. Wright, 121 U. S., 201.)

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the
land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different
use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the
former owner. (Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore, etc. Ry. Co., 132 Ind., 558; 18 L. R. A.,
367.)

The petitioner having admitted that the municipality of Cabanatuan, in the year 1915,
had acquired a fee simple title to the land in question, it (the municipality) is the owner
of the land in question, notwithstanding the fact that it is making a use of the same
other than that for which it was expropriated.

If the petitioner has not been paid for his land, that is another question, and he has his
remedy by an ordinary action.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the demurrer presented by the prosecuting attorney of
the Province of Nueva Ecija is hereby sustained, and it is hereby ordered that a final
decree be issued in accordance herewith, with costs, unless the petitioner amends his
petition within five days from the notice hereof. So ordered.

Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177384               December 8, 2009

JOSEPHINE WEE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In land registration cases, the applicant has the burden to show that he or she is the real and
absolute owner in fee simple of the land sought to be registered.1 It is also important to bear in mind
that one who seeks registration of title must prove his or her claim with "well-nigh incontrovertible"
evidence.2 In this case, petitioner miserably failed to show that she is the real and absolute owner in
fee simple of the land sought to be registered.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the April
28, 2006 Decision4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its subsequent Resolution5 dated April 3, 2007
in CA-G.R. CV No. 76519. Said Decision and Resolution reversed and set aside the April 2, 2002
Judgment6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 and held that petitioner
was not entitled to the requested registration of title.

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

On December 22, 1994, petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title7 over a 4,870-square
meter parcel of land situated in Barangay Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite, designated as Lot No. 8349
(Cadastral Lot. No. 452-D).

In brief, petitioner alleged in her application that she is the owner in fee simple of the subject
property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale8 dated February 1, 1993 executed by Julian Gonzales
in her favor. Petitioner claimed the benefits of the Property Registration Decree9 or, should said
Decree be inapplicable, the benefits of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936),10 because
she and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and adverse
possession of the land since time immemorial.

On March 15, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed its Opposition11 alleging that neither the petitioner nor her predecessor-in-interest has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 8349 since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. The OSG likewise averred that the muniments of title and tax
payment receipts submitted by the petitioner do not constitute competent or sufficient evidence of
a bona fide acquisition of the subject lot, or of the petitioner’s open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto. It asserted that Lot No. 8349 is part of the public domain and consequently prayed for the
dismissal of the application for registration.

Petitioner presented the following pieces of documentary evidence before the trial court:

1) Deed of Absolute Sale between Josephine Wee and Julian Gonzales dated February 1,
1993;12
 2) Tax Declarations in the name of Julian Gonzales for the years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980,
and 1985;13

3) Tax Declarations in the name of Josephine Wee from 1993 onwards;14

4) Receipts for tax payments made by Josephine Wee from 1993-1999;15

5) Affidavit of Seller-Transferor executed by Julian Gonzales on February 10, 1993;16

6) Affidavit of Ownership, Aggregate Land Holding and Non-Tenancy executed by Julian

Gonzales on February 10, 1993;17

7) Affidavit of Non-Tenancy executed by Julian Gonzales on February 10, 1993;18

8) Salaysay executed by Juana Macatangay Gonzales, Erlinda Gonzales Batingal and

Remedios Gonzales Bayan;19

9) Certification dated March 2, 2000 by the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR) stating that Lot No. 8349 was shown to be within the Alienable or
Disposable Land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under FAO-4-1656 on
March 15, 1982;20

10) Survey Plan of Lot No. 8349;21 and

11) Surveyor’s Certificate, Technical Description and Tracing Cloth.22

She also presented the testimonies of the following witnesses who were all cross-examined by the
Republic through the public prosecutor:

1) Josephine Wee, who testified that she purchased Lot No. 8349 from Julian Gonzales
through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 1, 1993 and immediately took possession
thereof after the sale; that she did not cultivate it because it is planted with coffee; that she
paid for all the real property taxes subsequent to the sale; that she caused the preparation of
a survey plan; that the property is not part of the public domain or any river or military
reservation; that there are no adverse claimants and no cases were filed against her after
the sale involving said lot and that she is not doing anything with the property because it is
not "productive".23

2) Juana Gonzales, the 75-year old widow of Julian Gonzales, who declared that she and
her husband sold Lot No. 8349 to the petitioner and identified her husband’s signature and
her own thumbmark. She testified that she and her late husband had been in possession of
Lot No. 8349 prior to the sale to Josephine Wee; that her husband inherited the property
from his parents "a long time ago"; that her husband already had the property when they got
married and that she and Julian Gonzales began living together in 1946. She also identified
and affirmed the due execution and authenticity of her Salaysay, as well as the documents
signed by her husband.24

3) Remedios Gonzales Bayan, the 39-year old daughter of Julian and Juana Gonzales, who
testified that she witnessed the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale between her father
whose signature she identified and the applicant in February 1993. She also identified and
affirmed the due execution and authenticity of her Salaysay.25
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 2, 2002, the RTC promulgated in favor of the petitioner a Judgment,26 pertinent portions of
which read:

Culled from the evidence on record, both testimonial and documentary, are facts which satisfactorily
establish applicant’s ownership in fee simple of the parcel of land, subject matter of the instant
proceedings, to wit: that by means of an appropriate deed of sale, the applicant has acquired said
property by purchase from Julian Gonzales on February 1, 1993; that the same parcel was declared
for taxation purposes; that all the realty taxes due thereon have been duly paid. Likewise, this Court
could well-discern from the survey plan covering the same property and other documents presented,
more particularly the tracing cloth plan which was presented as additional evidence in support of the
application, that the land sought to be registered is agricultural and not within any forest zone or the
public domain; that the land is not covered by any public land application/patent, and that there is no
other adverse claimant thereof; and further, that tacking her predecessors-in-interest’s possession to
applicant’s, the latter appears to be in continuous and public possession thereof for more than thirty
(30) years.

On the basis of the foregoing facts and considering that applicant is a Filipino citizen not otherwise
disqualified from owning real property, this Court finds that she has satisfied all the conditions
essential to the grant of her application pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Law, as
amended. 1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Ap-04-010262, Lot 8349 and containing an area of Four Thousand Eight
Hundred Seventy (4,870) Square Meters as supported by its technical description now forming part
of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of JOSEPHINE WEE, who
is of legal age, single and with residence at 1345 Claro M. Recto Avenue, Sta, Cruz, Manila.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Unsatisfied, the Republic, through the OSG, filed its Notice of Appeal on April 26, 2002, alleging that
the RTC erred in granting the application for registration considering that petitioner failed to comply
with all the legal requirements for judicial confirmation of her alleged title. In particular, the OSG
claimed that Lot No. 8349 was classified as alienable and disposable land only on March 15, 1982,
as per Certification issued by the DENR. Thus, petitioner and her predecessor-in-interest could not
have been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The OSG also pointed out
that the tax declarations presented by petitioner are fairly recent and do not show petitioner and her
predecessor-in-interest’s nature of possession. Furthermore, the original tracing cloth plan was not
presented in evidence.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA reversed the RTC Judgment. It held that petitioner failed to prove that she and her
predecessor-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject lot under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. Thus:

In granting the application for registration of title, the court a quo merely relied on the deed of sale
executed by Julian Gonzales, in favor of applicant-appellee on February 1, 1993, the tax
declarations and tax receipts. It is interesting to note that Juana Gonzales, widow of Julian
Gonzales, after identifying the deed of sale executed by her deceased husband in favor of applicant-
appellee, merely stated that the lot subject thereof was inherited by Julian from his parents a long
time ago and that Julian was in possession of the lot since 1946 when they started living together.
For her part, applicant-appellee testified that she immediately took possession of the subject lot,
which was planted with coffee, after acquiring the same and that she is not doing anything on the lot
because it is not productive. As pointed out by the Republic, applicant-appellee and Juana Gonzales
failed to specify what acts of development, cultivation, and maintenance were done by them on the
subject lot. x x x

xxxx

In the case at bar, applicant-appellee merely claimed that the subject lot is planted with coffee.
However, no evidence was presented by her as to who planted the coffee trees thereon. In fact,
applicant-appellee admitted that she is not doing anything on the subject lot because it is not
productive, thereby implying that she is not taking care of the coffee trees thereon. Moreover, tax
declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership but are merely indicia of a
claim of ownership, aside from the fact that the same are of recent vintage.27

Hence, this petition.

Issues

Petitioner’s arguments

1) The testimony of Juana Gonzales proves that petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Julian

Gonzales, occupied Lot No. 8349 even prior to 1946;

2) The fact that the property is planted with coffee, a fruit bearing tree, reveals that the lot is
planted, cultivated and cared for. Thus, there was not only effective and active possession
and occupation but actual cultivation and tending of the coffee plantation; and

3) The fact that the land was declared for tax purposes as early as 1957 shows that the land
was actively possessed and occupied by petitioner and her predecessor-in-interest.

Respondent’s arguments:

1) Since Lot No. 8349 became part of the alienable and disposable land only on March 15,
1982, petitioner could not have been considered as having been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of subject property under a bona
fide claim of ownership; and

2) There is no proof that petitioner or Julian Gonzales undertook any clear act of dominion or
ownership over Lot No. 8349, since there are no structures, improvements, or plantings on
the property.
 Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner failed to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
property.

In Director, Land Management Bureau v. Court of Appeals,28 we explained that –

x x x The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner," by which
characteristics private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere
conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the
private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged
possession of his parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations
without more, do not amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the
oppositor.

Here, we find that petitioner’s possession of the lot has not been of the character and length of time
required by law. The relevant provision of the Property Registration Decree relied upon by petitioner
reads –

SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
1avvphi1

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions
of existing laws. x x x

Unfortunately, petitioner failed to prove that she and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

First, there is nothing in the records which would substantiate her claim that Julian Gonzales was in
possession of Lot No. 8349 since 1945, other than the bare allegations of Juana
Gonzales.29 Certainly, these unsubstantiated statements do not meet the required quantum of
evidence in land registration cases. In fact, contrary to her testimony that her late husband inherited
the property from his parents "a long time ago", or even prior to 1945, the earliest tax declaration
that was presented in this case is one declared by Julian Gonzales only in 1957 – long after June
1945.

It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the years 1957, 1961, 1967,
1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45 years (1945-1993). This
type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in the absence of other competent
evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively establish either possession or declarant’s right to
registration of title.30
Petitioner failed to prove possession in the concept of an owner.

Second, and more importantly, we agree with the CA that petitioner was unable to demonstrate that
the alleged possession was in the concept of an owner, since she could not point to any acts of
occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance over the property. Petitioner claims that
because the property is planted with coffee, a fruit-bearing tree, it automatically follows that the lot is
cultivated, showing actual possession and occupation. However, petitioner failed to explain who
planted the coffee, whether these plants are maintained or harvested or if any other acts were
undertaken by petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest to cultivate the property.

Even if we were to assume that the coffee was planted by petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, "mere
casual cultivation" of the land does not amount to exclusive and notorious possession that would
give rise to ownership.31 The presence of an unspecified number of coffee plants, without proof that
petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest actually and deliberately cultivated them is not sufficient to
support a claim of title. In fact, the five tax declarations in the name of Julian Gonzales described the
lot as "unirrigated riceland". No improvements or plantings were declared or noted in any of these
tax declarations. It was only in petitioner’s 1993 tax declaration that the land was described as
planted with coffee. We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the mere existence of an
unspecified number of coffee plants, sans any evidence as to who planted them, when they were
planted, whether cultivation or harvesting was made or what other acts of occupation and ownership
were undertaken, is not sufficient to demonstrate petitioner’s right to the registration of title in her
favor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ April 28, 2006 Decision in CA-G.R. CV
No. 76519 and its Resolution dated April 3, 2007 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration are
both AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO** ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 775 dated November 3, 2009.

** Additional member per Special Order No. 776 dated November 3, 2009.

1
 Diaz-Enriquez v. Republic of the Phils., 480 Phil. 787, 800 (2004).

2
 Turquesa v. Valera, 379 Phil. 618, 631 (2000).

3
 Rollo, pp. 9-33.

 CA rollo, pp. 94-101; penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by

4

Associate Justices Aurora Santiago-Lagman and Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok.

5
 Id. at 135-137.

6
 Records, pp. 241-242, penned by Presiding Judge Alfonso S. Garcia.

7
 Id. at 1-12. Petitioner attached the following documents to her Application: Plan Ap. 04-
006774 in tracing cloth and blueprint, technical descriptions, tax declaration no. 32282-A,
receipts of payments of real estate taxes and the Deed of Absolute Sale between Julian
Gonzales and Josephine Wee.

8
 Id. at 7-9.

9
 Presidential Decree No. 1529 (1978).

10
 The Public Land Act.

11
 Records, pp. 17-19.

12
 Id. at 7-9.
13
 Id. at 103-109.

14
 Id. at 110-113.

15
 Id. at 114-121.

 Id. at 130, stating that the land sold to Josephine Wee is his only land owned, in
16

compliance with Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 1 (series 1989).

17
 Id. at 131, indicating the technical description of Lot No. 8349.

18
 Id. at 132, stating that Julian Gonzales is the "absolute and register[ed] owner of a certain
parcel of land situated at Puting Kahoy, Silang Cavite covered by Tax Declaration 15196 of
the Assessor’s Office of Silang x x x".

 Id. at 125-126, affirming the due execution and authenticity of the documents signed by
19

Julian Gonzales.

20
 Id. at 202.

21
 Id.

22
 Id. at 211-213.

23
 TSN, February 24, 2000, pp. 1-25.

24
 TSN, March 9, 2000, pp. 1-16.

25
 TSN, May 18, 2000, pp. 1-8.

26
 Records, pp. 241-242; reference as to exhibits were omitted.

27
 CA rollo, pp. 99-101.

28
 381 Phil. 761, 772 (2000).

29
 In the hearing on March 9, 2000 (TSN, pp. 14-15), Juana Gonzales testified as follows:

Q. How did you and your husband, Mr. Julian Gonzales, acquire the
property?
A. My husband inherited it from his parents, sir.
Q. Can you recall, more or less, when your husband inherited this
property?
A. Long time ago, sir.
COURT When you were already married to him or before your marriage?
A. When we got married, it was already with him, sir.
 FISCAL VELAZCO: And do you still recall when you got married with Mr. Julian Gonzales?
WITNESS Since the year 1946, we started living together, sir.
FISCAL VELAZCO: And you continuously owned and possessed this property up to the time
you sold the same?
A. Yes, sir.

30
 Director of Forestry v. Villareal, 252 Phil. 622, 635 (1989); Government of the Philippine
Islands v. Adriano, 41 Phil. 112 (1920); Cruado v. Bustos and Escaler, 34 Phil. 17
(1916); Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil 607 (1907).

31
 Director of Lands v. Judge Reyes, 160-A Phil. 832, 851 (1975); Ramirez v. Director of
lands, 60 Phil. 114 (1934).