.

1aшphi1 Conflict of interest "exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is wheth The requisites for each of the aforementioned grounds are more
specifically described in the Family Code and in cases decided by the Supreme Court.The Court in the
case of Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359nullity of the previous marriageThe declaration of nullity
of marriage applies to marriages that are null and void from bigamous marriages (FC, Article 41); and
(e) void subsequent marriage, when one of the spouses remarry without complying with the recordal
requirement of the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the previous
marriageThe declaration of nullity of marriage applies to marriages that are null and void from the
beginning (void ab initio), due to the absence of at least one of the essential or formal requisites of
marriages. It is convenient to classify these void ab initio marriages into five categories: (a) void
marriages due to lack of requisites (Family Code [“FC”], Article 35); (b) void marriages due
to psychological incapacity (FC, Article 36); (c) incestuous marriages (FC, Article 37); (d) marriages
against public policy (FC, Article 38); (e) bigamous marriages (FC, Article 41); and (e) void subsequent
marriage, when one of the spouses remarry without complying with the recordal requirement of the
judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the previous marriage, etc. (FC, Article 52 and 53).,
unanimously modified the interpretation of the requirements of psychological incapacity as a ground
for declaration of nullity of marriage found in Article 36 of the Family Code,” the Supreme Court said
in a press statement on Wednesday, May 12.As to the claim that Atty. Bundang-Ortiz had a conflict of
interest when she represented Alfredo in court, we find that Irene failed to substantiate
this.1aшphi1 Conflict of interest "exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client."87

As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,

 the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely
on as basis to declare as void petitioner’s marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by Dr.
Tayag’s evaluation which became the trial court’s basis for concluding that petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not clearly specify the actions of petitioner which are
indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity. More importantly, there was no established link
between petitioner’s acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

SO ORDERED.

The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of
petitioner’s psychological incapacity. The CA noted that Dr. Tayag did not fully explain the root cause
of the disorder nor did she give a concrete explanation as to how she arrived at a conclusion as to its
gravity or permanence. The appellate court emphasized that the root cause of petitioner’s
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision. In addition, the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time
of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It
must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the
company he joined. He rose from the ranks at Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc., and became
Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite his success at work, he
alleged that his misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship
with his own family.

In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report

Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman.
Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But despite the end of
the short-lived affair, their quarrels aggravated. Also, their business ventures failed. Any amount of
respect remaining between them was further eroded by their frequent arguments and verbal abuses
infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this
made him indifferent towards respondent. When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left
the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and
respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he
converted to Islam after dating several women.

On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay,
Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the
Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with five children.

In a landmark ruling, the Supreme Court has modified the interpretation of psychological incapacity as a g
annul a marriage, with discussions on how it will ease the requirements to end one of the most protected u
predominantly Catholic Philippines.

Rosalino L. Marable vs. Myrna F. Marable

G.R. No. 178741

ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner,

- versus -

MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, J.:
 On appeal is the Decision

 dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution

 dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed and set aside the

 dated January 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 01-6302
had granted petitioner’s prayer that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on the ground t
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. They were classmates but i
petitioner was not interested in respondent. He only became attracted to her after they happened to sit bes
other in a passenger bus. Petitioner courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts even t
petitioner already had a girl friend. Later, respondent discovered petitioner’s other relationship and deman
time and attention from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that he appreciated this gesture like a child longing for
and attention.

On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal befo
Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bili
and their marriage was blessed with five children.

As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common oc
They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it. The frequency of their quarrels incre
their eldest daughter transferred from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct. It became worse
their daughter had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious attention petitioner gave to h
also made things worse for them as it not only spoiled some of them, but it also became another cause
incessant quarrelling between him and respondent.

Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Responden
about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their q
aggravated. Also, their business ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them was furthe
their frequent arguments and verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unw
unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. When he could not bear his lot any longer
left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and r
had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Is
dating several women.

On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a petition

 for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to pe
essential responsibilities of marital life.

In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships
at an early age. His father, although responsible and supportive, was a compulsive gambler and womanizer
left their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven other children. This caused petitioner’s
siblings to suffer immensely. Thus, petitioner became obsessed with attention and worked hard to excel so h
noticed.
 Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the company he j
rose from the ranks at Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc., and became Senior Executive Vice Pres
Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite his success at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness a
lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family.

In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report

 of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayag’s report
petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive pattern of social
rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also reveal
petitioner’s personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, an
experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayag’s conclusion that peti
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent on the ground of pe
psychological incapacity.

Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision as follow

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision hereby REVER
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between the parties is declared valid and subsisting. No cos

SO ORDERED.

The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of pet
psychological incapacity. The CA noted that Dr. Tayag did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder n
give a concrete explanation as to how she arrived at a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. The appe
emphasized that the root cause of petitioner’s psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically id
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. In addition, the incapacity must be pro
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or i
must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligat
marriage.

On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s decis

Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential marital obligations was clearly p
correctly appreciated by the trial court. Petitioner relies heavily on the psychological evaluation conducted b
and quotes the latter’s findings:

Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his family to the present affairs that
This need had afforded him to find avenues straight or not, just to fulfill this need. He used charm, deceit, lie
[and] authority just so to accom[m]odate and justify his acts. Finally, he is using religions to support his c
much better personal and married life which is really out of context. Rebellious and impulsive as he is, em
instability is apparent that it would be difficult for him to harmonize with life in general and changes. Chan
come from within, it is not purely external.

Clinically, petitioner’s self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and incurable nature of Antisocial P
Disorder. Such disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsi
 centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse.

The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional antecedence as it existed even
said marital union. It is also profoundly rooted, grave and incurable. The root cause of which is deep fee
rejection starting from family to peers. This insecure feelings had made him so self-absorbed for needed a
Carrying it until his marital life. Said psychological incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and sev
relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of the psychological incap

According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag declared that his psychologica
is profoundly rooted and has the characteristics of juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. Moreover
asserts that his psychological incapacity has been medically identified and sufficiently proven. The State, o
hand, never presented another psychologist to rebut Dr. Tayag’s findings. Also, petitioner maintains th
psychological evaluation would show that the marriage failed not solely because of irreconcilable difference
the spouses, but due to petitioner’s personality disorder which rendered him unable to comply with his
obligations. To the mind of petitioner, the assailed decision compelled the parties to continue to live unde
existent marriage."

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment

 maintaining that petitioner failed to prove his psychological incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag
explain specifically how she arrived at the conclusion that petitioner suffers from an anti-social personality
and that it is grave and incurable. In fact, contrary to his claim, it even appears that petitioner acted resp
throughout their marriage. Despite financial difficulties, he and respondent had blissful moments together.
good father and provider to his children. Thus, the OSG argues that there was no reason to describe petition
centered, remorseless, rebellious, impulsive and socially deviant person.

Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish his psychological
the State is not required to present an expert witness where the testimony of petitioner’s psychologist was i
and inconclusive. The OSG adds that petitioner was not able to substantiate his claim that his infidelity wa
some psychological disorder, as the real cause of petitioner’s alleged incapacity appears to be his ge
dissatisfaction with his marriage. At most he was able to prove infidelity on his part and the existence of "irr
differences" and "conflicting personalities." These, however, do not constitute psychological incapac

Respondent also filed her Comment

 and Memorandum

 stressing that psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage should contemplate dow
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the essential marital obligations, not a mere refu
or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

The appeal has no merit.

The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of the RTC for lack of legal and fac

Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapa
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity b
 manifest only after its solemnization.

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Fam
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriag

 These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give mean
significance to the marriage he or she has contracted.

 Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party t
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the par
marriage.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,

 the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. The Court hel

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be re
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) allege
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obli
marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as r
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their ch

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philipp
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as coun
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be qu
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the p

In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr. Tayag
establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag howe
insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on A
the Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the i
the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root
petitioner’s alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclus
petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the f
petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.
 As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,

 the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological in
presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a co
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr.
short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioner’s marriage to re
In fact, we are baffled by Dr. Tayag’s evaluation which became the trial court’s basis for concluding that pet
psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not clearly specify the actions of petitioner which are indica
alleged psychological incapacity. More importantly, there was no established link between petitioner’s ac
alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

For sure, the spouses’ frequent marital squabbles

 and differences in handling finances and managing their business affairs, as well as their conflicts on how t
children, are not manifestations of psychological incapacity which may be a ground for declaring their marr
Petitioner even admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they had happy moments together. Also, th
would show that the petitioner acted responsibly during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide fo
of his family, most especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder tan
psychological incapacity.

Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the re
he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfa
result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his perso
His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be due to causes of a psyc
nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the records show that when respondent learned of hi
immediately terminated it. In short, petitioner’s marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a
psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. It has been held
cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological in

 It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

 That not being the case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressin
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of s
obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psych
illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,

 the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious ca
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significa
marriage.

All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid and s
The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioner’s psychological incapacity to f
essential marital obligations.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals
CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.
 No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was as
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I cert
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the w
opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

HIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 209278, September 15, 2021 ]

IRENE CONSTANTINO DATU, PETITIONER, VS. ALFREDO FABIAN DATU, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Psychological incapacity, a ground to void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, is a legal, not a medical, con
such, it is enough that parties prove that an enduring part of their personality renders them incapable of performing th
marital obligations. That the psychological incapacity be rooted in a particular psychological illness is no longer neces

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appe
affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision4 that voided the marriage between Irene Constantino Datu (Irene) and Alfr
Datu (Alfredo) due to the latter's psychological incapacity.

Irene and Alfredo were married on December 15, 1980 in Subic, Zambales.5 Together, they had two children.6

On January 3, 2005, Alfredo filed before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a Complaint7 for declaration of nu
marriage due to psychological incapacity. On September 6, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City, after having
deputized to appear on behalf of the Republic, manifested that "no evidence of collusion exists between the parties."8
her Answer on April 25, 2006, which was later amended on July 5, 2006.9

During trial, Alfredo testified that he was formerly employed by the United States Navy in 1978. However, after only 1
service, he was discharged for medical and psychiatric reasons. Specifically, after undergoing psychiatric and medica
evaluations, he was found to have been suffering from schizophrenia.10

Alfredo had already been discharged when he was introduced to Irene by some of her friends at church, the Assemb
God.11 They had already been acquainted when Alfredo fetched Irene at Shakey's Pizza, Olongapo City where Irene
They then went to Irene's boarding house and ended up sleeping together.12

The next morning, Irene was washing some clothes when her older sister dropped by and saw that Alfredo was sleep
bed. Irene's sister then demanded that the two get married, which led to their civil marriage. They then lived together
boarding house and eventually had a church wedding.13

Alfredo also recalled an incident that happened before their church wedding, where Irene suddenly got angry at him f
what she was cooking. Her "disgusting attitude"14 made Alfredo leave, but when Irene apologized, he accepted her a
the sake of religion."15

Alfredo said that he likewise thought that Irene violated her marital covenant because she did not submit to him as wa
the Book of Ephesians. Irene allegedly became materialistic, forcing him to loan money to build their conjugal home.
allegedly a nagger, because of which, he did not find peace and contentment in his marital life.16

Alfredo believed that his utterances come from God. According to him, he had himself discharged from the United Sta
because of a premonition that he would suffer a severe tragedy. He also refused to work or to engage in business to
prophecy. To answer to this higher calling, he left Irene. Alfredo said that he has been living with his maid and has no
marrying again.17

Alfredo's aunt, Policornia Dela Cruz Fabian (Policornia), likewise testified for Alfredo. She corroborated his testimony
discharged from the United States Navy for medical and psychiatric reasons.18 She described her niece-in-law Irene
as "inggitera,"19 "mukhang pera,"20 and "tsismosa."21 She recounted incidents when Irene would allegedly ask Alfre
borrow money from her. She added that Irene allegedly spread rumors about her husband's laziness. There were tim
Policornia advised Irene to be more patient with Alfredo. Policornia also testified that Alfredo recited spiritual messag
allegedly directs his actions.22

Alfredo also offered in evidence, among others, the expert opinion of clinical psychologist Martha Johanna D. Dela C
Cruz). The psychologist testified that Alfredo had gone to her office in Olongapo City for a psychological evaluation. S
contacted Irene for an evaluation, but Irene, in writing, declined her invitation.23
Dela Cruz's assessment of Alfredo's mental status revealed that he "[did] not have any psychomotor agitation but his
[was] impaired."24 She found that Alfredo's psychosis was due to schizophrenia, paranoid type. She likewise said tha
no cure for Alfredo's psychosis, although Alfredo was already under medication for his schizophrenia. She maintained
time she testified in court, Alfredo was still suffering from schizophrenia.25

Dela Cruz likewise analyzed the letter Irene sent declining her invitation for psychological evaluation. Based on the le
determined that Irene was suffering from shared psychotic disorder, concluding that the spouses cannot live together
become suicidal.26

For her part, Irene testified that she was a junior supervisor at Shakey's Pizza in Olongapo City before marrying Alfre
resigned to become a full-time wife and mother. When she testified in court, Irene admitted that she separated hersel
Alfredo because he has already found another woman in his life.27

According to Irene, she and Alfredo executed an agreement where Alfredo would give her 60% of his salary as month
However, Alfredo eventually failed to comply with the agreement, refusing to give support despite Irene's requests. Th
to do her best to support herself and her children, including securing scholarships for their children when they were in
Also, with the help of an investigator from the United States Veterans Affairs Office, she was able to claim $400.00 as
for being Alfredo's legal wife. Irene said that she used the money for daily expenses, no longer insisting on asking for
from Alfredo, who had allegedly insulted her.28

Irene admitted that she and Alfredo have different religious beliefs, and that Alfredo believed himself to be the son of
can have as many wives as he pleases. Irene also said that Alfredo indeed believed that wives should be submissive
husbands. As for their children, Irene admitted that her children are on speaking terms with their father and that he gi
money personally.29

On re-direct examination, Irene admitted that she did not want her marriage voided because the financial support she
receiving might be cut off. Finally, on re-cross examination, Irene admitted that the benefit she receives from the Unit
Veterans Affairs Office was due to her husband's schizophrenia.30

The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor Alfredo, finding that he was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his e
marital obligations to Irene. In so ruling, the trial court emphasized that the multiple expert opinions Alfredo offered in
sufficiently proved that he had schizophrenia even before he married Irene, and that the mental disorder was a manif
his psychological incapacity.31

These pieces of evidence included a medical certificate from Dr. Jose Rommel T. Soriano (Dr. Soriano), a psychiatris
stated that Alfredo was suffering from schizophrenia; written findings by the United States Veteran Affairs Office conf
psychosis; and the report from Dela Cruz, the psychologist who testified that Alfredo has exhibited symptoms of
schizophrenia.32 The trial court held:

Plaintiff has sufficiently proven that he is suffering from schizophrenia (paranoid type) even before they got married. N
three expert opinions were offered in evidence to prove the same.

Convincing documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence were presented to show that the plaintiff was discharged
U.S. Navy because of such mental disorder. There is admission on re-cross examination from the defendant (wife) th
receiving monthly apportionment from the U.S. Veterans Affairs due to her husband's mental illness of schizophrenia

....

The question now is whether or not the plaintiff's mental disorder can be considered as a psychological incapacity wit
context of Article 36 of the Family Code.

....

It was unanimously proven by different expert opinions that the plaintiff's schizophrenic behavior includes his delusion
emissary of God, who may have several wives and when he decided to leave the defendant, he believes that it was G
order. . . .

....

The pieces of evidence presented by both parties indicate that the plaintiff indeed failed to comply with his essential m
obligations, such as his failure to live with his wife due to his belief that God ordered him to leave his wife and that he
many women to live with him, like King Solomon. He also failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity to his wife
his hallucinations that God has been speaking to him. He also failed to support his children because he believes that
ordered him not to work. These facts are bolstered by the testimony of his wife and the evaluations of the expert witn

. . . The fact that his condition has never improved for almost thirty years, which includes the period of the subsistenc
marriage to the defendant bespeaks of the gravity of his illness.

. . . Staying together as a couple no longer served the core purpose of their union. Having each other proved to be of
anymore to the condition of the plaintiff. In fact, the defendant admitted on re-direct examination that she only wanted
marriage to subsist because of the monthly apportionment that she gets from the plaintiff's disability benefits. Both of
admitted that life was better off without each other because of the mental disposition of both parties. These things ind
the plaintiff’s incapacity is beyond medical help if he would be with the defendant.

In view of all these, the Court finds that the plaintiff is indeed psychologically incapacitated to assume his essential m
obligations to the defendant.33

The trial court, however, found no evidence of juridical antecedence and incurability of Irene's psychological incapaci
psychologist, Dela Cruz, found that Irene acquired shared psychotic disorder after she had married Alfredo, it held tha
mental disorder had no juridical antecedence and only existed after Irene had married Alfredo.34

Finally, the trial court held that despite the marriage being void, Alfredo's obligation to support his two children subsis
still be fulfilled.35

The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court's September 25, 2007 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of herein parties null and void due to the psycho
incapacity of the plaintiff to assume his essential marital obligations to the defendant.

The plaintiff is, however, obliged to continuously provide support to his two (2) children with the defendant and the lat
entitled to his visitation rights.

Upon finality of this Decision, let copies thereof be furnished [to] the Municipal Civil Registrar of Subic, Zambales, and
National Statistic Office, Quezon City, for proper annotation in its Book of Marriages, after payment of the necessary

SO ORDERED.36 (Emphasis in the original)

On October 23, 2007, Irene filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground of collusion, conflict of interest on the part of A
counsel, and fraud which allegedly caused the grant of Alfredo's Complaint.37

The trial court, however, denied the Motion for New Trial in its December 27, 2007 Order,38 finding that none of the g
under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court were present in this case. The trial court noted how Irene actively participated in
proceedings, with the trial court even admitting her late amended Answer. As such, "[t]o raise howl about the proceed
after the case was decided against her interest makes her claim look like an afterthought."39

Furthermore, the trial court refused to believe that Alfredo's psychological incapacity was merely "feigned" given the "
corroborated testimonies of the psychologist and [Alfredo], as well as [Irene], convincingly proving [Alfredo's] persona
aberration."40

This caused Irene to file an appeal, which was nevertheless denied by the Court of Appeals in its September 28, 201
Decision.41

The Court of Appeals echoed the trial court's findings, upholding that Alfredo suffered from schizophrenia. It highlight
Irene herself admitted that the pension she receives from the United States Veterans Affairs Office was due to Alfred
schizophrenia.42 It also gave credence to the evidence offered by Alfredo to confirm his schizophrenia.43 The Court
then held that Alfredo's schizophrenia, from which he had been suffering even before his marriage to Irene, justified t
marriage's dissolution.44

On Irene's claims that the trial proceedings were tainted by fraud, collusion between the parties, and conflict of intere
part of Alfredo's counsel, the Court of Appeals said that these were baseless and self-serving.45 As to the prosecuto
lackadaisical performance of duty, the Court of Appeals found this observation subjective and could not be considere
so as to grant the appeal.46

The dispositive portion of the September 28, 2012 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.47 (Emphasis in the original)

Irene moved for reconsideration,48 but the Court of Appeals denied it in the September 18, 2013 Resolution.49

Irene filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari on October 16, 2013.50 Upon the directive of this Court,51 Alfredo file
Comment,52 to which Irene filed a Reply.53

Irene takes exception from the Court of Appeals' declaration that it had made independent findings of fact, stating tha
"contented itself in merely lifting portions of the trial court's decision as well as those stated in Alfredo's Petition witho
considering the basis and veracity thereof."54 She also disputes the competence of Alfredo's documentary evidence,
the written findings of the United States Veterans Affairs Office and the medical certificate issued by Dr. Soriano. Acc
Irene, nothing in the written findings of the United States Veterans Affairs Office provided that Alfredo was discharged
schizophrenia, and worse, these written findings were not even authenticated in court, just like Dr. Soriano's medical
Thus, Irene insists that the trial court and the Court of Appeals should not have relied on these pieces of evidence.55

Irene likewise impugns Dela Cruz's evaluation of Alfredo, saying that the psychologist allegedly only paraphrased the
descriptions stated in Dr. Soriano's medical certificate.56 Irene says her findings, along with those of the United State
Affairs office and Dr. Soriano, did not even conform with the symptoms of schizophrenia as described in People v.
Madarang.57 As such, she insists that the lower courts had no basis to rule that Alfredo suffered from schizophrenia.

Because Alfredo allegedly did not have schizophrenia, Irene argues that the characteristics of psychological incapaci
juridical antecedence, and incurability59—are not present. With no competent evidence of Alfredo's schizophrenia, sh
that gravity and incurability were not proven. Furthermore, with no evidence that, prior to his marriage, Alfredo was di
from the United States Navy due to schizophrenia, Irene says juridical antecedence was likewise absent.60

Lastly, Irene insists that the trial proceedings were tainted by fraud, collusion, and conflict of interest on the part of Alf
counsel. According to her, the prosecutor halfheartedly performed his duty when he submitted a one-page manifestat
lack of collusion between the parties. She also emphasizes that she had to write the court for the prosecutor to file an
her behalf. As for respondent's counsel, she alleges that she was the first to engage the services of Atty. Alreuela M.
Ortiz (Atty. Bundang-Ortiz), consulting the latter about her marital problems. It was even Atty. Bundang-Ortiz who alle
drafted the agreement of support that the spouses executed. Thus, the lawyer allegedly had a conflict of interest whe
as counsel for Alfredo.61

Countering Irene, Alfredo mainly argues that the issues raised in the Petition were substantially factual, which are not
by this Court. As such, he says the findings that he was discharged from the United States Navy due to schizophrenia
he has been suffering from the disorder even before he married Irene may no longer be disturbed.62

Alfredo maintains that his psychological condition rendered him psychologically incapacitated to comply with his esse
obligations. He argues that he has clearly shown that his inability was attended by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability.63

Lastly, Alfredo argues that the trial proceedings were not tainted by fraud and collusion. For one, Irene failed to subst
claims. As for the alleged conflict of interest, he says all that Atty. Bundang-Ortiz did was notarize the agreement of s
between the parties, which did not make her a counsel for either party at that time.64

The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not respondent Alfredo Fabian Datu indeed suffered from schizophrenia;

Second, whether or not all the elements of psychological incapacity have been proven by respondent Alfredo Fabian

Finally, whether or not the proceedings before the trial court were tainted by fraud, warranting a reversal of the assail

The Petition for Review on Certiorari is denied.

Rule 45, Section 165 of the Rules of Court is clear that only questions of law, or those pertaining to the law applicable
set of facts, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. This Court is not a trier of facts and, therefore, is gene
by the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals.66

Of course, there are exceptions to this rule. In some instances, this Court may take cognizance of questions of fact, o
requiring a "review [of] the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of the parties"67 or an "assessment of the 'probativ
the evidence presented."'68 A question of fact is also involved when this Court is asked to determine "the correctness
lower courts' appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties."69 These exceptions are:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inferenc
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is b
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its fi
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) Th
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without ci
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner 's ma
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on t
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.70 (Citation omitted)

Here, Irene asks this Court to review the truthfulness of Alfredo's allegation that he was discharged from the United S
because of schizophrenia, and that he already had the disorder even before he married her. Irene also assails the as
both of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, of the evidence presented by Alfredo, specifically, the written findings
United States Veterans Affairs Office, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Soriano, and the psychiatric evaluation an
of Dela Cruz. Obviously, Irene raises factual issues, which this Court finds no reason to review.

For one, the lower courts' factual findings are the same. It is true that the Court of Appeals heavily lifted portions of th
Trial Court Decision in making its findings, but this only means that it agreed with the trial court's findings.

Also, the finding that Alfredo suffered from schizophrenia is sufficiently supported by evidence. Even if we disregard t
purportedly unauthenticated documents issued by the United States Veteran Affairs Office and Dr. Soriano, we find th
Cruz's expert testimony sufficiently proved that Alfredo suffered from schizophrenia. Irene herself, on re-cross examin
trial, admitted that she receives pension from the Veterans Affairs Office because of Alfredo's schizophrenia.

Given that Alfredo's disorder was sufficiently established, this Court has no reason to review, much less overturn, this
finding.

II

Irene nevertheless claims that Alfredo's schizophrenia does not make him automatically psychologically incapacitated
Article 36 of the Family Code, which provides:

ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitate
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest onl
solemnization.

Irene is correct in the sense that psychological incapacity is not a medical illness. That a person is suffering from a ce
psychosis, such as schizophrenia, will not make them automatically psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
marital obligations under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code.71 This was clear in Tan-Andal v. Andal,72 where this C
emphatically declared that psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not a medical one.

The erroneous medical orientation toward defining psychological incapacity originated from Republic v. Court of Appe
Molina,73 which explicitly required in its second guideline that the root cause of the psychological incapacity "be iden
psychological illness[.]"74

Tan-Andal, however, clarified that psychological incapacity, as envisioned by the Family Code Revision Committee, i
legal concept.75 Instead of being a medical illness, psychological incapacity is "[a] durable or enduring [aspect] of a p
personality, called 'personality structure,' which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines
The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to com
or her essential marital obligations."76

As a legal concept, psychological incapacity cannot be characterized as incurable.77 Instead, it is permanent relative

specific partner. However, psychological incapacity can be grave, not in the sense that it is a serious or dangerous m
but that it excludes "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts[.]"78 The inc
be shown to be due to a genuinely serious psychic cause.79 And, as explicitly required by the law, the incapacity mu
existed before or during the celebration of the marriage.

Here, this Court finds that Alfredo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations, not
suffers from schizophrenia per se, but because his psychosis has been found to be an enduring part of his personalit
This psychosis, in turn, led him to do clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermined Irene and their family. As the lowe
found, Alfredo believes himself to be the son of God. In his mind, his refusal to live with Irene and to provide for the fa
God's will. He also believes that he can have as many wives as he wants, which is not only illegal but is in utter disres
disregard of his marital vow to Irene. His incapacity is grave, not a "mild characteriological peculiarity," a ''mood chan
"occasional emotional outburst"; his psychosis was grave enough for him to be discharged from military service.

Irene insinuates that Alfredo might just be faking his illness and, relatedly, his psychological incapacity, saying that "it
feign and manipulate insanity on the basis of what one says his beliefs and ideals are."80 She also argues that the do
and testimonial evidence Alfredo offered did not show that he exhibited the symptoms of schizophrenia as this Court
in People v. Madarang.81 In Madarang:

Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between f
reality and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most com
of psychosis. Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent
or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently directed. The
interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusions and hallucinations. In the most disorga
of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes place and is associated with serious thought disorder and
habit deterioration in which the usual social customs are disregarded. During the initial stage, the common early symp
aloofness, a withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would se
preoccupied and dreamy and may appear "faraway." He does not empathize with the feelings of others and manifests
concern about the realities of life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and an intolerable la
respect. He withdraws from emotional involvement with other people to protect himself from painful relationships. The
shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a loss of spontaneity. Frequently, he becomes negl
personal care and cleanliness. A variety of subjective experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting anxiety
precede the earliest behavioral changes and oddities. He becomes aware of increasing tension and confusion and be
distracted in conversation manifested by his inability to maintain a train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly, th
noticed as blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not speak or respond appropriately to his comp
may look fixedly away, or he may appear to stare, as he does not regularly blink his eyes in his attempt to hold his
attention.82 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Madarang, however, is a criminal case where the accused had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he indeed suff
schizophrenia to justify his exoneration of parricide. Such strict level of scrutiny is not required here, where only clear
convincing evidence is the required quantum of proof.83 We need not even focus on whether the evidence presented
Alfredo indeed suffered from schizophrenia because, to reiterate, psychological incapacity need not be identified as a
psychological illness. What is clear, however, is that Alfredo, due to a genuine psychic cause, failed to comply with hi
marital obligations. As the trial court said:

The pieces of evidence presented by both parties indicate that the plaintiff indeed failed to comply with his essential m
obligations, such as, his failure to live with his wife due to his belief that God ordered him to leave his wife and that he
many women to live with him, like King Solomon. He also failed to observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity to his wif
of his hallucinations that God has been speaking to him. He also failed to support his children because he believes th
ordered him not to work. These facts are bolstered by the testimony of his wife and the evaluations of the expert witn

Consequently, Alfredo and Irene's marriage is void due to Alfredo's psychological incapacity.

III
Finally, we find no evidence of extrinsic fraud to warrant Irene a new trial85 of the case. Fraud, as a ground for filing a
new trial:

. . . refers to a fraud committed to the unsuccessful party by [their] opponent preventing [their] from fully exhibiting [th
keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or when an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his
defeat.86 (Citation omitted)

Here, there is no evidence that Alfredo committed fraud to prevent Irene from fully exhibiting her case in court. Neithe
any evidence of a false promise or compromise. On the contrary, Irene was fully informed of the trial proceedings, inc
filing of the Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. When Irene initially had no means to avail herself of legal
the trial court allowed her to file a belated Answer with the assistance of the Public Attorney's Office.

As to the claim that Atty. Bundang-Ortiz had a conflict of interest when she represented Alfredo in court, we find that
to substantiate this.  Conflict of interest "exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposi
1aшphi1

The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
for the other client."87

Here, there is no evidence that Atty. Bundang-Ortiz had ever represented Irene before she represented Alfredo. As to
lawyer's admission that she notarized the agreement of support between the parties, we see no conflict of interest, fo
represent either of the parties in her capacity as a notary public.

With no evidence of the fraud she alleges, Irene's Motion for New Trial was correctly denied.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The September 28, 2012 Decision and September 1
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93166 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carandang, Zalameda, Rosario, and J. Lopez,* JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2836.

1 Rollo, pp. 3-33.

2 Id. at 35-49. The September 28, 2012 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 93166 was penned by Associate
Michael P. Elbinias and was concurred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Nina G. Anton
Valenzuela of the Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3 Id. at 69-70. The September 18, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 93166 was penned by Associa
Michael P. Elbinias and was concurred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Nina G. Anton
Valenzuela of the Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

4 Id. at 71-79. The September 25, 2007 Decision in Civil Case No. 02-0-2005 was penned by Assistin
Judge Consuelo Amog Bocar of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73.

5 Id. at 35. Court of Appeals Decision.

6 Id.

7 Id. at 37.

8 Id. at 38.

9 Id. at 73. Regional Trial Court Decision.

10 Id. at 72-73.

11 Id. at 72.

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 73.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id.

26 Id.

27 Id. at 74.
28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Id.

31 Id. at 75-76.

32 Id.

33 Id. at 75-78.

34 Id. at 78.

35 Id. at 79.

36 Id.

37 Id. at 40, Court of Appeals Decision.

38 Id. at 80-81.

39 Id. at 80.

40 Id. at 81.

41 Id. at 35-39.

42 Id. at 43.

43 Id. at 44.

44 Id. at 46.

45 Id. at 47.

46 Id. at 47-48.

47 Id. at 48.

48 Id. at 50-67.

49 Id. at 69-70.

50 Id. at 3.

51 Id. at 82. Resolution dated December 9, 2013.

52 Id. at 89-93.

53 Id. at 96-100.

54 Id. at 16, Petition for Review on Certiorari.

55 Id. at 18-19.

56 Id. at 19-20.

57 387 Phil. 846 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division].

58 Id. at 22.

59 See Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

60 Rollo, pp. 24-26, Petition for Review on Certiorari.

61 Id. at 26-30.

62 Id. at 89-91.

63 Id.

64 Id. at 91.

65 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judg
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Region
Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provis
remedies and shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may s
same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during
pendency.

66 Id. at 182.

67 Id. at 183.

68 Id.

69 Id.

70 Id. at 182-133.

71 See Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 678 (1997) [Per J. Pangban, En Banc
Court held that "[t]he essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of t
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in rega
parents and their children." These provisions are as follows:

ARTICLE 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fid
render mutual help and support.

ARTICLE 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court sh
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there ar
and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is no
with the solidarity of the family.

ARTICLE 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such
and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof,
income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruit
obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties.

ARTICLE 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The
for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.

....

ARTICLE 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and
example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, sel
self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them com
the duties of citizenship;

(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities
and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring
detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;

(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;

(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and

(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.

ARTICLE 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the inj
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
....

ARTICLE 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardian ship over the property o
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement,
decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the paren
shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten p
(10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations
for general guardians.

A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the chil
or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any p
is situated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues reg
performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and re

The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitu
authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on
guardianship shall apply.

72 G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2011, [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

73 335 Phil. 664 ( 1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc).

74 Id. at 677.

75 Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021, [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

76 Id. at 31.

77 Id. at 33.

78 Id. at 34 citing Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban,

79 Id.

80 Rollo, p. 26, Petition for Review on Certiorari.

81 387 Phil. 846 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division].

82 Id. at 859-860.

83 Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021, 27 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

84 Rollo, p. 77, Regional Trial Court Decision.

 85 RULES OF COURT, Rule 37, sec. 1 partly provides:

Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. — Within th
taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or fin
grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rig
party:

(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights

(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovere
produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.

86 Baclaran Marketing Corp. v. Nieva, 809 Phil. 92, 103 (2017) [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division].

87 Paces Indusrrial Corp. v. Atty. Salandanan, 814 Phil. 93, 98 (2017) (Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

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