G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004 Republic of The Philippines, Petitioner, LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, Respondent

G.R. No.
149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the
decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the
marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They
later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of
1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of
Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After
sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several
times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address.
Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by
publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by
a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication,
respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial
court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed between
the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the
evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to
present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered
documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and
Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make proper
entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s psychological incapacity, the trial court held
that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband
of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over
the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation
of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person.
Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of entering into
marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the
Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which
read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the
matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of
the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration of the
marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese
citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the
letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the
other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support"
pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of
a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where
the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life
and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a
"mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of
Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondent’s failure to comply with the
guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not
automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the
personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and
incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought
the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100,
June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In
fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshio’s psychological incapacity to
fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He
abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never
replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified
on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by
a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would
have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his
illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.16 There was no showing that the
case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of
the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present
case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving
psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be
lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes
and protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not
necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which
dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang
Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A). 2 Three children were born to them,
namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B), 3 Lyra, born on May 22, 1985
(Exh. C), 4 and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D). 5
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking
the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She
alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to
perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most
of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they
were married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with
different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting
her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible,
immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the
family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00
every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a
parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite, purchased during the
marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June
12, 1992. 6
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondent's failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an order
directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion
between the
parties. 7 Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor
found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial. 8
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:9
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and
botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They became
sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer private respondent's teacher. On January 1, 1981, they
were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while
petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came from petitioner's salary
as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling
"Tupperware" products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help
petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift
and had other women, petitioner's business suffered. Private respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees
with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered
two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married
student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he
admitted having an extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship
with private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his
promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent
came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondent's infidelity in the hope of saving their
marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines,
Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March
31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the company. He received
P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent
spent the money on himself and consumed the entire amount within four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and
womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different
women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an operator of a billiard
hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master Driver's School in Bayan,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter
named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh. E). 10 When petitioner confronted private
respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined at the De la
Salle University Medical Center in Dasmariñas, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh.
F). 11
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of
1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received treatment
at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987
(Exhs. G & H). 12
Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was
then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and
hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J) 13 with F & C Realty Corporation whereby
she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal,
Dasmariñas, Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of the
amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale(Exh. K) 14 was
executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M) 15 was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten

letter 16 to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their marriage
proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney 17
and to divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of her
intention to fill a petition for the annulment of their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioner's letter. By this time, he had already
abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the
Middle East. Since then, private respondent's whereabouts had been unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University, testified during
the hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private
respondent to her (Alfaro) as the former's sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not impressed with private respondent
who was her student in accounting. She observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time
with campus friends. In November 1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at
her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because
she thought private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough,
although the couple appeared happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that
private respondent started drinking with his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated
petitioner's claim that private respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on relationships with different
women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized
because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first year of petitioner's marriage, Alfaro tried to talk
to private respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private
respondent was not close to his children and that he had abandoned petitioner. 18
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision 19 dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed
by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads: 20
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support
of her claim that respondent was "psychologically incapacitated" to marry her are among the
grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the
Family Code) — not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof.
Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more

than one year.
xxx xxx xxx
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological
incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the
above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have
been enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under
Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the
"gonorrhea" transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5)
years after petitioner's marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions of
Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45,
paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would
require the existence of this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence,
the annulment of petitioner's marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved
in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the
decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 21 the Court of Appeals held: 22
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a
ground for declaration of nullify of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of
marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs
are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondent-
husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Certainly, petitioner-appellant's declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-
husband's character was on the "borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-
lucky," could not constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the
Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-
husband's youth and very good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitioner-
appellant who, herself, happened to be the college professor of her respondent-husband.
Petitioner-appellant even described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a
normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and
there is no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage
to constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred —
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE

PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE
CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE

AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO
PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING

THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE
AMOUNT OF P3,000,00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY
PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on
the ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that private
respondent's psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the
fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the celebration of their marriage
should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. 23
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 24 we held:
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality, disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of
the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of
the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of
the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.
If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder,
indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that
may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity
is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time
they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of
the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of
Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic
marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the
outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondent's
parents and petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job,
he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he received
on himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the
initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his family.
Petitioner concludes that private respondent's condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union
and defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, and not merely due to private respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as
the appellate court held. As pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: 25
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salaita v. Magtolis,
supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the
1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the
family. 26 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 27
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming
the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondent's psychological incapacity at the
time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality. 28 Only where it is shown that such findings
are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's contentions on the issue
of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive
ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate
proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may
bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality
of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared
valid."2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos,
solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the
Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the
same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children.
In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the
visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the
marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was
solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983
which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command
Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C,
D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred
to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos,
on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa
Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort
of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone
conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a
housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different
business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their
children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to
engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her.
He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on
their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times
during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in
the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacañang. When she was
discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness
Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they
were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw
him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on
her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children
left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center
where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason
for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Parañaque, while
the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and
physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh.
YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations
mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and
their children, x x x."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the
evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity
which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in
the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and
Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in
the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The
psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews
conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if
only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of
the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In
fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of
his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological
illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the
appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that
he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the
marriage and [was] incurable."4
Hence, this Petition.5
Issues
In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial
Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the
basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she
presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine
respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed
aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that
the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of
information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself
to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9 were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as
the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxx xxx xxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The
at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxx xxx xxx
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."10
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain
a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not
lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects"
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk,
failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage.
Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is
gainfully employed as a taxi driver.1âwphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.12 At best, the evidence presented
by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure
to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring
personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166738 August 14, 2009
ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, Petitioner,

vs.
EDWARD RUMBAUA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges, through her petition for review on certiorari,1 the
decision dated June 25, 20042 and the resolution dated January 18, 20053 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 75095. The challenged decision reversed the decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
declaring the marriage of the petitioner and respondent Edward Rumbaua (respondent) null and void on the
ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner’s complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
against the respondent before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner alleged that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the
following circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise to live with her under one roof after finding
work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her for his mother’s death; he represented himself
as single in his transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another
woman in Novaliches, Quezon City.
Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service, as personal service proved futile. 5 The
RTC ordered the provincial prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties and to ensure that
no fabrication or suppression of evidence would take place.6 Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongson’s report negated
the presence of collusion between the parties.7
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition.8 The OSG entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya to assist in
all hearings of the case.9
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate her charges.
The petitioner related that she and the respondent were childhood neighbors in Dupax del Norte, Nueva
Vizcaya. Sometime in 1987, they met again and became sweethearts but the respondent’s family did not
approve of their relationship. After graduation from college in 1991, the respondent promised to marry the
petitioner as soon as he found a job. The job came in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted the
respondent as a computer engineer. The respondent proposed to the petitioner that they first have a "secret
marriage" in order not to antagonize his parents. The petitioner agreed; they were married in Manila on
February 23, 1993. The petitioner and the respondent, however, never lived together; the petitioner stayed with
her sister in Fairview, Quezon City, while the respondent lived with his parents in Novaliches.
The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day during the first six months of their marriage. At that
point, the respondent refused to live with the petitioner for fear that public knowledge of their marriage would
affect his application for a PAL scholarship. Seven months into their marriage, the couple’s daily meetings
became occasional visits to the petitioner’s house in Fairview; they would have sexual trysts in motels. Later
that year, the respondent enrolled at FEATI University after he lost his employment with PAL.10
In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret marriage. The respondent’s mother tried to
convince him to go to the United States, but he refused. To appease his mother, he continued living separately
from the petitioner. The respondent forgot to greet the petitioner during her birthday in 1992 and likewise failed
to send her greeting cards on special occasions. The respondent indicated as well in his visa application that he
was single.
In April 1995, the respondent’s mother died. The respondent blamed the petitioner, associating his mother’s
death to the pain that the discovery of his secret marriage brought. Pained by the respondent’s action, the
petitioner severed her relationship with the respondent. They eventually reconciled through the help of the
petitioner’s father, although they still lived separately.
In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a job in Davao. A year later, the petitioner and
her mother went to the respondent’s house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia
Villanueva (Cynthia). When she confronted the respondent about it, he denied having an affair with Cynthia.11
The petitioner apparently did not believe the respondents and moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the
pain and anguish that her discovery brought.12
The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that communication between her and respondent had
ceased. Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage
contract;13 and the testimony, curriculum vitae,14 and psychological report15 of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy
Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the following tests on the petitioner: a Revised
Beta Examination; a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a Draw a Person
Test; a Sach’s Sentence Completion Test; and MMPI.16 She thereafter prepared a psychological report with the
following findings:
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an average intellectual level. Logic and reasoning
remained intact. She is seen to be the type of woman who adjusts fairly well into most situations especially if it
is within her interests. She is pictured to be faithful to her commitments and had reservations from negative
criticisms such that she normally adheres to social norms, behavior-wise. Her age speaks of maturity, both
intellectually and emotionally. Her one fault lies in her compliant attitude which makes her a subject for
manipulation and deception such that of respondent. In all the years of their relationship, she opted to endure his
irresponsibility largely because of the mere belief that someday things will be much better for them. But upon
the advent of her husband’s infidelity, she gradually lost hope as well as the sense of self-respect, that she has
finally taken her tool to be assertive to the point of being aggressive and very cautious at times – so as to fight
with the frustration and insecurity she had especially regarding her failed marriage.
Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a very self-centered manner as he believes that the
world revolves around him. His egocentrism made it so easy for him to deceitfully use others for his own
advancement with an extreme air of confidence and dominance. He would do actions without any
remorse or guilt feelings towards others especially to that of petitioner.
REMARKS
Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes beyond the expectations people tagged with
it. In love, "age does matter." People love in order to be secure that one will share his/her life with another and
that he/she will not die alone. Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow or let love die – it is a
choice one had to face when love is not the love he/she expected.
In the case presented by petitioner, it is very apparent that love really happened for her towards the young
respondent – who used "love" as a disguise or deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence she extended
towards him. He made her believe that he is responsible, true, caring and thoughtful – only to reveal himself
contrary to what was mentioned. He lacked the commitment, faithfulness, and remorse that he was able to
engage himself to promiscuous acts that made petitioner look like an innocent fool. His character traits reveal
him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder - declared to be grave, severe and incurable.17 [Emphasis
supplied.]
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of April 19, 2002. The trial court saw merit in the
testimonies of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, and concluded as follows:
xxxx
Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of his wife. Respondent imposed limited or block
[sic] out communication with his wife, forgetting special occasions, like petitioner’s birthdays and Valentine’s
Day; going out only on occasions despite their living separately and to go to a motel to have sexual intercourse.
It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant facts in this case which show the psychological
incapacity of respondent, at the time of the celebration of the marriage of the parties, to enter into lawful
marriage and to discharge his marital responsibilities (See Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This incapacity is
"declared grave, severe and incurable."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage between petitioner Rowena Padilla Rumbaua and
respondent Edwin Rumbaua is hereby declared annulled.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA Decision
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA.19 The CA decision of June 25, 2004
reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and denied the nullification of the parties’ marriage.20
In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not mention the cause of the respondent’s
so-called "narcissistic personality disorder;" it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and thus failed to give
the court an insight into the respondent’s developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she
came to the conclusion that the respondent’s incapacity was "deep-seated" and "incurable."
The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the incapacity to be psychological, although its
manifestations may be physical. Moreover, the evidence presented must show that the incapacitated party was
mentally or physically ill so that he or she could not have known the marital obligations assumed, knowing
them, could not have assumed them. In other words, the illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty to perform the essential obligations of marriage. In the present case,
the petitioner suffered because the respondent adamantly refused to live with her because of his parents’
objection to their marriage.
The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her motion in its resolution of January 18,
2005. 21
The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner argues in the present petition that –
1. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v. Molina22 (the Molina case) cannot be dispensed
with because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the requirement, took effect only on March 15,
2003;
2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the RTC to recall her expert
witness and cure the defects in her testimony, as well as to present additional evidence, would temper
justice with mercy; and
3. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric report.
The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be reversed and set aside, and the case be remanded
to the RTC for further proceedings; in the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s decision be set aside
and the RTC’s decision be reinstated.
The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC was applicable although it took effect
after the promulgation of Molina; (b) invalidating the trial court’s decision and remanding the case for further
proceedings were not proper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.23
The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the memoranda they filed.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable
In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the OSG; they are to appear
as counsel for the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095. [Emphasis supplied.]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC24 -- which this Court promulgated on March 15, 2003 and duly published -- is geared
towards the relaxation of the OSG certification that Molina required. Section 18 of this remedial regulation
provides:
SEC. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the
Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated.lawphil.net It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for
decision, with or without the memoranda.
The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19, 2002 should be vacated for prematurity, as it was
rendered despite the absence of the required OSG certification specified in Molina. According to the petitioner,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which took effect only on March 15, 2003, cannot overturn the requirements of Molina
that was promulgated as early as February 13, 1997.
The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.
The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural or remedial in character; it does not
create or remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmation of already existing
rights. The settled rule is that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect,25 as we held in De Los Santos v.
Vda. de Mangubat:26
Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statues - they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may
be applied retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural
lapse on the certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v. Reyes27 and Navales v. Navales28
have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the
matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to
ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the presence of the
prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From this perspective, the
petitioner’s objection regarding the Molina guideline on certification lacks merit.
A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper
The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts’ decisions and the remand of the case to the RTC for
further reception of evidence are procedurally permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence
during the trial was the fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding the case to
the RTC would allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in this regard that while mistakes of
counsel bind a party, the rule should be liberally construed in her favor to serve the ends of justice.
We do not find her arguments convincing.
A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not
procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court
to set aside a judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an
appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which
the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with
reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would
probably alter the result if presented.
In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel as basis
for a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of
nullity prima facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent in handling the case. Granting
arguendo that the petitioner’s counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be
excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that the
petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation where we
explained:29
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance,
inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as
valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be
employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned.
This will put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing
new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant case.
Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s requested remand.
Petitioner failed to establish the respondent’s psychological incapacity
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides
that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization." In Santos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court first declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
The defect should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code
in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we said:
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
"as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
a profession or employment in a job. x x x
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. To reiterate, psychological
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.31 These
requisites must be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Furthermore, since the Family Code does not define "psychological incapacity," fleshing out its terms is left to
us to do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.32 We emphasized this approach in the recent case of
Ting v. Velez-Ting33 when we explained:
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application
of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence
insufficient to prove that the respondent is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband.
a. Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of respondent’s condition
The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a) reneged on his promise to cohabit with her;
(b) visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting
cards during special occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e) blamed her for the
death of his mother; and (f) told her he was working in Davao when in fact he was cohabiting with another
woman in 1997.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and
should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations that characterize some marriages. In Bier v. Bier,34 we ruled that it was not enough that
respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an
adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly
irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. As the petitioner’s testimony
reveals, respondent merely refused to cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing his application for a scholarship,
and later due to his fear of antagonizing his family. The respondent’s failure to greet the petitioner on her
birthday and to send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner for his mother’s
death and of representing himself as single in his visa application, could only at best amount to forgetfulness,
insensitivity or emotional immaturity, not necessarily psychological incapacity. Likewise, the respondent’s act
of living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when they
were going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later.
To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character flaws. The presence of these
imperfections, however, does not necessarily warrant a conclusion that he had a psychological malady at the
time of the marriage that rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties and obligations. To use the words of
Navales v. Navales:35
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on
the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article
36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.
b. Dr. Tayag’s psychological report and court testimony
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s psychological incapacity were
based on the information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot
be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report,
testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner
we discussed above.36 For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party
account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and
responded to the doctor’s probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and on this basis characterized the
respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who "believes that the world revolves
around him"; and who "used love as a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended
towards him." Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea of "love"; made a generalization that respondent was a
person who "lacked commitment, faithfulness, and remorse," and who engaged "in promiscuous acts that made
the petitioner look like a fool"; and finally concluded that the respondent’s character traits reveal "him to suffer
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and
incurable."
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality
disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to
some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s
conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of
Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable" – is an unfounded statement, not a
necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests
administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition,
this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to
our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.
Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayag’s subsequent testimony in court cured whatever deficiencies
attended her psychological report.
We do not share this view.
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the parties
were married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she came to
the conclusion that respondent’s condition was grave and incurable. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:
Q: I would like to call your attention to the Report already marked as Exh. "E-7", there is a statement to the
effect that his character traits begin to suffer narcissistic personality disorder with traces of antisocial
personality disorder. What do you mean? Can you please explain in layman’s word, Madam Witness?
DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:
A: Actually, in a layman’s term, narcissistic personality disorder cannot accept that there is something wrong
with his own behavioral manifestation. [sic] They feel that they can rule the world; they are eccentric; they are
exemplary, demanding financial and emotional support, and this is clearly manifested by the fact that
respondent abused and used petitioner’s love. Along the line, a narcissistic person cannot give empathy; cannot
give love simply because they love themselves more than anybody else; and thirdly, narcissistic person cannot
support his own personal need and gratification without the help of others and this is where the petitioner set in.
Q: Can you please describe the personal [sic] disorder?
A: Clinically, considering that label, the respondent behavioral manifestation under personality disorder [sic]
this is already considered grave, serious, and treatment will be impossible [sic]. As I say this, a kind of
developmental disorder wherein it all started during the early formative years and brought about by one familiar
relationship the way he was reared and cared by the family. Environmental exposure is also part and parcel of
the child disorder. [sic]
Q: You mean to say, from the formative [years] up to the present?

A: Actually, the respondent behavioral manner was [present] long before he entered marriage. [Un]fortunately,
on the part of the petitioner, she never realized that such behavioral manifestation of the respondent connotes
pathology. [sic]
xxxx
Q: So in the representation of the petitioner that the respondent is now lying [sic] with somebody else, how will
you describe the character of this respondent who is living with somebody else?
A: This is where the antisocial personality trait of the respondent [sic] because an antisocial person is one who
indulge in philandering activities, who do not have any feeling of guilt at the expense of another person, and
this [is] again a buy-product of deep seated psychological incapacity.
Q: And this psychological incapacity based on this particular deep seated [sic], how would you describe the
psychological incapacity? [sic]
A: As I said there is a deep seated psychological dilemma, so I would say incurable in nature and at this time
and again [sic] the psychological pathology of the respondent. One plays a major factor of not being able to give
meaning to a relationship in terms of sincerity and endurance.
Q: And if this psychological disorder exists before the marriage of the respondent and the petitioner, Madam
Witness?
A: Clinically, any disorder are usually rooted from the early formative years and so if it takes enough that such
psychological incapacity of respondent already existed long before he entered marriage, because if you analyze
how he was reared by her parents particularly by the mother, there is already an unhealthy symbiosis developed
between the two, and this creates a major emotional havoc when he reached adult age.
Q: How about the gravity?
A: This is already grave simply because from the very start respondent never had an inkling that his behavioral
manifestation connotes pathology and second ground [sic], respondent will never admit again that such
behavior of his connotes again pathology simply because the disorder of the respondent is not detrimental to
himself but, more often than not, it is detrimental to other party involved.
xxxx
PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:
Q: You were not able to personally examine the respondent here?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: Efforts were made by the psychologist but unfortunately, the respondent never appeared at my clinic.
Q: On the basis of those examinations conducted with the petitioning wife to annul their marriage with her
husband in general, what can you say about the respondent?
A: That from the very start respondent has no emotional intent to give meaning to their relationship. If you
analyze their marital relationship they never lived under one room. From the very start of the [marriage], the
respondent to have petitioner to engage in secret marriage until that time their family knew of their marriage
[sic]. Respondent completely refused, completely relinquished his marital obligation to the petitioner.
xxxx
COURT:
Q: Because you have interviewed or you have questioned the petitioner, can you really enumerate the specific
traits of the respondent?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: One is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the respondent and the dependent attitude of the respondent.
Q: Even if he is already eligible for employment?
A: He remains to be at the mercy of his mother. He is a happy-go-lucky simply because he never had a set of
responsibility. I think that he finished his education but he never had a stable job because he completely relied
on the support of his mother.
Q: You give a more thorough interview so I am asking you something specific?
A: The happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly dependent attitude on the part of the mother merely because
respondent happened to be the only son. I said that there is a unhealthy symbiosis relationship [sic] developed
between the son and the mother simply because the mother always pampered completely, pampered to the point
that respondent failed to develop his own sense of assertion or responsibility particularly during that stage and
there is also presence of the simple lying act particularly his responsibility in terms of handling emotional
imbalance and it is clearly manifested by the fact that respondent refused to build a home together with the
petitioner when in fact they are legally married. Thirdly, respondent never felt or completely ignored the
feelings of the petitioner; he never felt guilty hurting the petitioner because on the part of the petitioner,
knowing that respondent indulge with another woman it is very, very traumatic on her part yet respondent never
had the guts to feel guilty or to atone said act he committed in their relationship, and clinically this falls under
antisocial personality. 37
In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayag’s answer was very vague and inconclusive, thus:
xxxx
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO
Q: Can this personally be cured, madam witness?
DR. NEDY TAYAG
A: Clinically, if persons suffering from personality disorder curable, up to this very moment, no scientific could
be upheld to alleviate their kind of personality disorder; Secondly, again respondent or other person suffering
from any kind of disorder particularly narcissistic personality will never admit that they are suffering from this
kind of disorder, and then again curability will always be a question. [sic]38
This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the general characteristics of a person suffering
from a narcissistic personality disorder, she did not really show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited
these traits. She mentioned the buzz words that jurisprudence requires for the nullity of a marriage – namely,
gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the marriage, psychological incapacity relating to marriage – and
in her own limited way, related these to the medical condition she generally described. The testimony, together
with her report, however, suffers from very basic flaws.
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondent’s exact condition except
in a very general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short
on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic
personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was
already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s awareness
of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the
success of the petitioner’s case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what
the petitioner related to her. As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the
respondent, only the petitioner. Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires, of course, that the person
sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.39 If a psychological disorder can
be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and
given credit.40 No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this
case, particularly about the respondent’s early life and associations, and about events on or about the
time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no
more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meager facts that the petitioner related,
and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the
marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and given
focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus on
having a job, his determination to improve himself through studies, his care and attention in the first six
months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also what character and qualities
the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the respondent’s family opposed the marriage
and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation
is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have failed, not because of
psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and
marital developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity. The continued separation of the
spouses likewise never appeared to have been factored in. Not a few married couples have likewise
permanently separated simply because they have "fallen out of love," or have outgrown the attraction
that drew them together in their younger years.
Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to secure a remand of this case to the trial
courts for the introduction of additional evidence; the petitioner’s evidence in its present state is woefully
insufficient to support the conclusion that the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent should be nullified on the
ground of the respondent’s psychological incapacity.
The Court commiserates with the petitioner’s marital predicament. The respondent may indeed be unwilling to
discharge his marital obligations, particularly the obligation to live with one’s spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot
presume psychological defect from the mere fact that respondent refuses to comply with his marital duties. As
we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological
illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.41
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 25, 2004 and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
75095.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005
JAIME F. VILLALON, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition1 for the annulment of his marriage to respondent
Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it was docketed as JDRC No.
3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his psychological incapacity which he
claimed existed even prior to his marriage.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to
maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity
and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his
desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the
fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his
marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab initio.
On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer2 denying petitioner’s allegations. She asserted that her 18-
year marriage to petitioner has been "fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth
in their relationship" and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community standards. Petitioner’s
success in his professional life aided him in performing his role as husband, father, and provider. Respondent
claimed that petitioner’s commitment to his paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was
collusion between the parties.3 The report submitted to the trial court stated that there was no such collusion.4
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently entered its appearance in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines5 and submitted an opposition6 to the petition on September 23, 1997. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in the early seventies when he applied for a job at
Metrobank, where respondent was employed as a foreign exchange trader. They began dating in 1975 and had a
romantic relationship soon thereafter.7 After going steady for about two years, petitioner and respondent were
married at the San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978. Petitioner claimed that he married
respondent because he believed that it was the right time to raise a family and that she would be a good mother
to his children.8
In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate from respondent. According to him, their marriage reached
a point where there was no longer any communication between them and their relationship became devoid of
love, affection, support and respect due to his constant urge to see other women.9 Moreover, their relationship
tended to be "one-sided" since respondent was unresponsive and hardly ever showed her love, needs, wants and
emotions.10
Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He
also saw other women even when he became engaged to and, later on, married respondent.11 Respondent
learned of his affairs but reacted in a subdued manner.12 Petitioner surmised that it was respondent’s nature to
be silent and withdrawn.13
In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and moved into an apartment located five to ten minutes
away. Before he left, he and his wife spoke to their three children who, at that time, were 14, 8, and 6 years old,
respectively.14 Petitioner consulted a child psychologist before talking to his children.15 He considered himself
as a good and loving father and described his relationship with the children as "great".16
Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit his children who stayed with him on alternate weekends.
He voluntarily gave monthly support to the children and paid for their tuition fees. He also shouldered the
children’s medical expenses as well as the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode.17
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological
disorder of "Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder" with "Casanova Complex". Dr. Dayan described the
said disorder as "a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and occupational functioning" with main
symptoms of "grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always be
the one followed, the I personality." A person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify
his emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with "Casanova
Complex" exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another.18
Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both petitioner and respondent based on clinical interviews and
psychological tests.19
Respondent testified that she first learned of her husband’s infidelity in 1980. She discovered that he was having
an affair with one of her friends who worked as a trader in her husband’s company. The affair was cut short
when the woman left for the United States to work. Eventually, she and petitioner were able to rebuild their
relationship and overcome the crisis.20
When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband, respondent averred that she did not know whether her
husband’s acts could be deemed "womanizing" since there were only two instances of infidelity which occurred
13 years apart.21 She also theorized that petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled so he could marry her
old friend.22 She stated that she has not closed her doors to petitioner but the latter would have to give up his
extra-marital relationship.23
To controvert the findings of petitioner’s expert witness, respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia
Villegas, who testified that Dr. Dayan’s findings were incomplete because a "team approach" was necessary in
evaluating an individual’s personality. An evaluation of one’s psychological capacity requires the expertise of a
psychiatrist and social worker. 24
Upon order of the trial court, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.25 The OSG likewise filed a
certification26 pursuant to Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals.27 In due course, the trial court rendered
judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent Ma.
Corazon N. Villalon celebrated on April 22, 1978, as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of the petitioner pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal assets and liabilities are hereby ordered to be liquidated and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains be effected in accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code.
As petitioner manifested that he wishes to maintain the custody arrangement now existing, the custody of the
three (3) children – Miguel Alberto, Fernando Alfonso, and Ma. Joanna Victoria – shall remain with the
respondent subject to visitation rights of petitioner as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties.
In order to cancel the registration of the Marriage Contract between herein parties appearing in the Book of
Marriage of the city of Manila, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila as
well as the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO), CRD Legal Department, EDSA, Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.28
Respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an appeal from the decision of the trial court, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 74354. On March 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 12, 2001 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and a new judgment entered DISMISSING the petitioner’s petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.29
Contrary to the trial court’s findings, the appellate court held that petitioner failed to prove the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged psychological incapacity. Although Dr. Dayan testified that
petitioner’s psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, she failed to give sufficient basis for such a
finding. Dr. Dayan also stated that parental marital instability was the root cause of petitioner’s psychological
incapacity but failed to elaborate thereon or link the two variables. Moreover, petitioner’s sexual infidelity was
made to appear as symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder when, in reality, the same merely resulted
from a general dissatisfaction with the marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision which was denied in an order
dated October 28, 2004.30 Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting that
the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The petition has no merit.
The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a
good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their separation, a loving father to their
children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions,
the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage
rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioner’s personal history.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,31 the court held that psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage, must be characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability.32 It should –
... [R]efer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated....33
In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered from Narcissistic Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the marriage and thus had the tendency to cheat on his wife, such
conclusion was not sufficiently backed by concrete evidence showing that petitioner indeed had several affairs
and finds it difficult to be faithful. Except for petitioner’s general claim that on certain occasions he had two
girlfriends at the same time, no details or explanations were given of such circumstances that would
demonstrate petitioner’s inability to be faithful to respondent either before or at the time of the celebration of
their marriage.
Similarly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of
his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic
Histrionic Personality Disorder as "self-centered", "characterized by grandiose ideation" and "lack of empathy
in relating to others", and one with Casanova Complex as a "serial adulterer", the evidence on record betrays the
presence of any of these symptoms.
Moreover, we are not convinced that petitioner is a "serial or habitual adulterer", as he wants the court to
believe. As stated by respondent herself, it cannot be said that two instances of infidelity which occurred 13
years apart could be deemed "womanizing", especially considering that these instances involved the same
woman. In fact, at the time of respondent’s testimony, petitioner’s illicit relationship has been going on for six
years. This is not consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering from "Casanova Complex" who, according
to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It
must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.34 The evidence on record fails to
convince us that petitioner’s marital indiscretions are symptomatic of psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code. On the contrary, the evidence reveals that petitioner was a good husband most of the time
when he was living with respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good provider.
In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,35 we held that the cause of the alleged psychological incapacity must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Further –
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.36
In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for respondent and has consequently
refused to stay married to her. As revealed by his own testimony, petitioner felt that he was no longer part of
respondent’s life and that the latter did not need or want him.37 Respondent’s uncommunicative and withdrawn
nature apparently led to petitioner’s discontentment with the marital relationship.
However, as held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,38 refusal to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of the law. The policy of the State is to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.39
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 23, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74354 and its October 28, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner,

vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March 2007
Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They
started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided
to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her
marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing
instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition,
was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an
answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for
divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on
25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V.
Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion
between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since
her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent’s disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag’s psychological report, the
allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological
incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed
petitioner and the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity
required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned
petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO
on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s]
50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the City
Prosecutor, Las Piñas City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of
property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October 2006
Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO
on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information and
guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, 8 such as
petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution
of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also
apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of
the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with
the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the
date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional
rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties
already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their
legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted.1avvphil Under Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Thus we
ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a
final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are
valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. 12 In both
instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property13 or
conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and
not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a
void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance
with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made
by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of
a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition
after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of
the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab
initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates
the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for
review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in
the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect
under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This
is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law
considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with,
one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least
five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace
in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority,
and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to
marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire
five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years
without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
"husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In
other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and
continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later
use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to
be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the
two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall
forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment
to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple
marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or
where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that
the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e.,
bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even
assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's
marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the
trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party"
is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place
21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in
a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared
by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in
relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between
him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage
bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as
if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of
a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or
to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake
of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is
as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can
be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any
civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and
the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the
same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground
for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than
to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159218 March 30, 2004
SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 26135 which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San
Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case No. 2803 convicting petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.
The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceño at the Manila City Hall before
Rev. Pedro Tiangco.2 In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she
learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also
discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a certain Zenaida Biñas before
Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.3
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. 4 On May 18, 1995, a case for
bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.5
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial court judge in
Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared however that
there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the
request of their son for the purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in the military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum.
Petitioner Zenaida Biñas was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed but AFFIRMED in
all other respects. Appreciating the mitigating circumstance that accused is 76 years of age and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as Minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as Maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.
First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage was contracted in
1995 when in fact it should have been 1989.
Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.8 It is
required that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the
Information.9
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or
designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of
which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary
to be alleged in the Information must be determined by reference to the definition and essential elements of the
specific crimes.10
The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage with another woman while his first
marriage was subsisting.
The information against petitioner alleges:
That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal place (sic)
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been legally married to
complainant Narcisa Abunado on September 16, 1967 which has not been legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10,
1989 which has all the essential requisites of a valid marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or about and sometime in the month of
January, 1995," was an obvious typographical error, for the same information clearly states that petitioner
contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10, 1989. Petitioner’s submission,
therefore, that the information was defective is untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect was
cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised.12 It should be remembered that
bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which are a previous marriage
and a subsequent marriage which possesses all the requisites for validity. 13 All of these have been sufficiently
established by the prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the
Information during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had the effect of absolving
him of criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:
x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of complainant when he entered into a bigamous
marriage, the same was likewise not established by clear and convincing evidence. But then, a pardon by the
offended party does not extinguish criminal action considering that a crime is committed against the State and
the crime of Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the person affected thereby but
even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same.14
Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial
question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the
annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Narcisa on October 29, 1999.15
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.16
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only
delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.17
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for
the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.18
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.19 In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his
first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the
first marriage was annulled.
Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor for bigamy. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty next lower would be based on the penalty prescribed by the
Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.20
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age,21 which is a mitigating circumstance under
Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
taken from prision mayor in its minimum period which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8)
years, while the minimum term should be taken from prision correccional in any of its periods which ranges
from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26135,
finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy, and sentencing
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI,
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the Order,1
dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057,
granting reconsideration of its Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents’ Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-
Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and
petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were
married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.3 They begot seven children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo,
Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.4 On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26 August
2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10
February 2005, Eulogio passed away.7
In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into without the
requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 348 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman
who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage
license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the
circumstances required by said provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was
dissolved only upon the latter’s death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of
marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of
marriage ceremony due to Eulogio’s serious illness which made its performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for
21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From
their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30
October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal
Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the
dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of
action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as
basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15,
2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which states that such a
petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband
or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this
Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the
heirs of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null
and void.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her Comment to
the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005.
Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Niñal
v. Bayadog,15 which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to
assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC,
which provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living. 16 Where one or both
parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC
expounded on its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the
Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of
his marriage after his death. The Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Niñal vs.
Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter
referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has rejected the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog by approving the
Rule on Nullity of Void Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the
only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal
and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the
Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile,
the Court will have to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person
who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their successional rights. During
the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence,
during the lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed to
file a petition to declare his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already a
vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of
procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then,
have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially when the
marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union because the guilty parties
will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance
of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the death of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage
is applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the
guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the Rule
is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure
which shall be applicable.17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate
this case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the
RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised therein.19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question of whether
the case law as embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the
case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the hierarchy of
courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court. 20 Instead,
they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should not
be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary
writ is concurrently within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the
principle of hierarchy of courts.21 However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power to
brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant
the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.22 Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition
for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case
grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario, respondents posit that it
is Niñal which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse
of discretion.
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration
of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however,
apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two
marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 23 What
we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio
was celebrated in 2004.1âwphi1
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Niñal, because they vary in scope and application. As has been
emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it
squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is
clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the
husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already
without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale
of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the
marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of
the RTC, Brach 139, Makati City, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and set aside
the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the
Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The
said Order denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge
Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on
the ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife
constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.1
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children,2 petitioner filed a petition for
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before
Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.3
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.4 Charmaine
subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage5 under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against
petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September
16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information6 against them. The case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.1awphi1
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to
Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that
the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the
determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order7
dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied
in an Order dated December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998
and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.8 In an Order9 dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for
certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the civil case
for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare
the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit
petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided,
if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's
marriage is declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in
the subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in
the criminal case because he was never before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
11
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of
the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of
remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence
is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said Decision read:
. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as
an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not
be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment
declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other
than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is
void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova 1 cited in Donato vs. Luna 14 where this Court held that:
. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact
would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman
not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a
criminal case for concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188775 August 24, 2011
CENON R. TEVES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DANILO R. BONGALON, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Review seeks the reversal of the 21 January 2009 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 31125 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos
City in Criminal Case No. 2070-M-2006. The RTC decision2 found petitioner Cenon R. Teves guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
THE FACTS
On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves
(Thelma) at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.3
After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to the Philippines for vacations.
While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita
Calderon (Edita). To verify the information, she went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of the
Certificate of Marriage4 indicating that her husband and Edita contracted marriage on 10 December 2001 at the
Divine Trust Consulting Services, Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On 13 February 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint5 accusing petitioner of committing bigamy.
Petitioner was charged on 8 June 2006 with bigamy defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in an Information6 which reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2001 up to the present, in the municipality of Meycauayan,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Cenon R. Teves
being previously united in lawful marriage on November 26, 1992 with Thelma B. Jaime and without the said
marriage having legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with one Edita T. Calderon, who knowing of the criminal design of accused Cenon R. Teves to marry
her and in concurrence thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cooperate in the
execution of the offense by marrying Cenon R. Teves, knowing fully well of the existence of the marriage of
the latter with Thelma B. Jaime.
During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the Regional Trial Court , Branch 130, Caloocan City,
rendered a decision7 dated 4 May 2006 declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the
ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code. Said decision became final by virtue of a Certification of Finality8 issued on 27
June 2006.
On 15 August 2007, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Cenon R. Teves, also
known as Cenon Avelino R. Teves, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the Information dated June 8, 2006. Pursuant to the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum.9
Refusing to accept such verdict, petitioner appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals contending that
the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal action or liability had already been extinguished. He also
claimed that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of Bigamy despite the defective Information filed by the
prosecution.10
On 21 January 2009, the CA promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated August 15, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 2070-
M-2006 is AFFIRMED in TOTO.11
On 11 February 2009, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. 12 This however, was denied
by the CA in a resolution issued on 2 July 2009.13
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, "there is in effect no marriage at
all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of."14 He differentiates a previous valid or voidable marriage from a
marriage null and void ab initio, and posits that the former requires a judicial dissolution before one can validly
contract a second marriage but a void marriage, for the same purpose, need not be judicially determined.
Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan 15 is inapplicable in his case because in
the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was
filed. In petitioner’s case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was
filed in court.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. There is nothing in the law that would sustain petitioner’s
contention.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.16
The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the
conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is
noted that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June
2006 or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of
petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of
such subsequent marriage.17
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His contention that he cannot be charged
with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has
settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void.18
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the
Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.19
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse
who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the
nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.20 1avvphi1
In numerous cases,21 this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable
decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in petitioner’s case
the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information
that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioner’s argument, even
assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability
provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such
cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the
Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court.
Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and
from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing of
the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for determining prescription. 22 The
crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with
Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma
cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 21 January 2009 of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011
ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner,

vs.
MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution2 dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated January 4, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 01-6302. The RTC had granted
petitioner’s prayer that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on the ground that he is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. They were classmates but
initially, petitioner was not interested in respondent. He only became attracted to her after they happened to sit
beside each other in a passenger bus. Petitioner courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts
even though petitioner already had a girl friend. Later, respondent discovered petitioner’s other relationship and
demanded more time and attention from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that he appreciated this gesture like a
child longing for love, time and attention.
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before
Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the
Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with five children.
As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common
occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it. The frequency of their
quarrels increased when their eldest daughter transferred from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct.
It became worse still when their daughter had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious
attention petitioner gave to his children also made things worse for them as it not only spoiled some of them,
but it also became another cause for the incessant quarrelling between him and respondent.
Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent
learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their
quarrels aggravated. Also, their business ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them was
further eroded by their frequent arguments and verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was
unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. When he could not
bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up
all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and
their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women.
On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a petition4 for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the
essential responsibilities of marital life.
In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships of
farm life at an early age. His father, although responsible and supportive, was a compulsive gambler and
womanizer. His father left their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven other children. This
caused petitioner’s mother and siblings to suffer immensely. Thus, petitioner became obsessed with attention
and worked hard to excel so he would be noticed.
Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the company he joined.
He rose from the ranks at Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc., and became Senior Executive Vice
President and Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite his success at work, he alleged that his misery and
loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report5 of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical
psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayag’s report stated that petitioner is suffering
from "Antisocial Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness,
impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioner’s
personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his
experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayag’s conclusion that petitioner
is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent on the ground of
petitioner’s psychological incapacity.
Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between the parties is declared valid and subsisting.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of petitioner’s
psychological incapacity. The CA noted that Dr. Tayag did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor
did she give a concrete explanation as to how she arrived at a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. The
appellate court emphasized that the root cause of petitioner’s psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. In addition, the
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s decision.
Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential marital obligations was clearly
proven and correctly appreciated by the trial court. Petitioner relies heavily on the psychological evaluation
conducted by Dr. Tayag and quotes the latter’s findings:
Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his family to the present affairs that he
[has]. This need had afforded him to find avenues straight or not, just to fulfill this need. He used charm, deceit,
lies, violence, [and] authority just so to accom[m]odate and justify his acts. Finally, he is using religions to
support his claim for a much better personal and married life which is really out of context. Rebellious and
impulsive as he is, emotional instability is apparent that it would be difficult for him to harmonize with life in
general and changes. Changes must come from within, it is not purely external.
Clinically, petitioner’s self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and incurable nature of Antisocial
Personality Disorder. Such disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness,
impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse.
The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional antecedence as it existed even
before the said marital union. It is also profoundly rooted, grave and incurable. The root cause of which is deep
feelings of rejection starting from family to peers. This insecure feelings had made him so self-absorbed for
needed attention. Carrying it until his marital life. Said psychological incapacity had deeply marred his
adjustment and severed the relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of the
psychological incapacity.7
According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag declared that his psychological
incapacity is profoundly rooted and has the characteristics of juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that his psychological incapacity has been medically identified and sufficiently
proven. The State, on the other hand, never presented another psychologist to rebut Dr. Tayag’s findings. Also,
petitioner maintains that the psychological evaluation would show that the marriage failed not solely because of
irreconcilable differences between the spouses, but due to petitioner’s personality disorder which rendered him
unable to comply with his marital obligations. To the mind of petitioner, the assailed decision compelled the
parties to continue to live under a "non-existent marriage."
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment8 maintaining that petitioner failed to prove his psychological
incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag failed to explain specifically how she arrived at the conclusion
that petitioner suffers from an anti-social personality disorder and that it is grave and incurable. In fact, contrary
to his claim, it even appears that petitioner acted responsibly throughout their marriage. Despite financial
difficulties, he and respondent had blissful moments together. He was a good father and provider to his children.
Thus, the OSG argues that there was no reason to describe petitioner as a self-centered, remorseless, rebellious,
impulsive and socially deviant person.
Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish his psychological
incapacity, the State is not required to present an expert witness where the testimony of petitioner’s
psychologist was insufficient and inconclusive. The OSG adds that petitioner was not able to substantiate his
claim that his infidelity was due to some psychological disorder, as the real cause of petitioner’s alleged
incapacity appears to be his general dissatisfaction with his marriage. At most he was able to prove infidelity on
his part and the existence of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities." These, however, do not
constitute psychological incapacity.
Respondent also filed her Comment9 and Memorandum10 stressing that psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage should contemplate downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the essential marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse.
The appeal has no merit.
The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of the RTC for lack of legal and
factual bases.
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. 11
These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and
significance to the marriage he or she has contracted.12 Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.13
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36. The Court held,
nullity.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
obligations of marriage.1avvphi1
parents and their children.
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on
him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag
however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven
to exist from the inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag
failed to explain the root cause of petitioner’s alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag
merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there
was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-
centered and deceitful.
As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,15 the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties
by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can
rely on as basis to declare as void petitioner’s marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by Dr. Tayag’s
evaluation which became the trial court’s basis for concluding that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated,
for the report did not clearly specify the actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological
incapacity. More importantly, there was no established link between petitioner’s acts to his alleged
psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the
acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.16
For sure, the spouses’ frequent marital squabbles17 and differences in handling finances and managing their
business affairs, as well as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are not manifestations of psychological
incapacity which may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. Petitioner even admitted that despite their
financial difficulties, they had happy moments together. Also, the records would show that the petitioner acted
responsibly during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, most especially
his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the
reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he
became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder
rooted in his personal history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be
due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the records show that
when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately terminated it. In short, petitioner’s marital infidelity does
not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his
spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that
petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.18 It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage.19 That not being the case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must
fail. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v.
Court of Appeals,20 the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.21
All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid and
subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioner’s psychological
incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws
are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him
who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No.
42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion
for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its
decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros
Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed
to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept
on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between
them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first
week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an
uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in
Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them,
since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking
chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May
22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a
urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that
of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed
for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No
treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis.
She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing
cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire
or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal
man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he
loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically
capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two
of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some
incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any
defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant,
was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he
forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she
did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and
these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and,
(2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there
is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio
Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of
impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection
and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the
defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a
soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in
that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the
plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy
of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties
without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully
satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of
proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-
coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of
petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to
invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in
their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and
that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is
annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings.
When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the
trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony.
After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that
since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse
between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides
that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule
19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows
that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent)
have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the
relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with
magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts.
The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital
obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record.
Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner
and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points
out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological
incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as
aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that
there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be
filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with
the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering
from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that
the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her
what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her.
He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the
problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not
psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to
prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the
same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not
having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I
Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the
fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case
was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's
inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would
expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is
reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and
who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless
situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the
basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is
useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is
to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has
nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope
of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared
feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy
but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each
other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor
gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its
mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November
29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed
into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to
the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any
trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
(respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of
age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the Manila City
Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro
Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5)
months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He
anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent

persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other
events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead introduced the boy
to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when
petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no
such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her
friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group.
In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and
even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of
said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to
petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial
industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent
the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos
and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or
connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she
earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from
a famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other
people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He
tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr.
Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondent’s persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached
the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with
another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the
needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies
and invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David’s
act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig
Catholic School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done
three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and
Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under
contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a
luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not
fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos
was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s
whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies
attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the
evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations
anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant, 33
together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he
himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies,
and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not
elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was
not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of
only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying
about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been
duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 37
During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed
with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only
respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court
reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been
satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends
herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to
the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the
trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate
their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute
the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence
was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial
question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set
for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were
definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina
case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46
Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only
one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of
the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding
cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the
declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not
foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental
incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full
enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as
void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A
party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a marriage where
"either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the
Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under the
divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a
marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a
voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds
for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45
(2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on
consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial common consensus on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of
consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted
the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may
have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the
marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code
committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only
voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the
marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity
to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the
marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the
Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court,
through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of
Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by
this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must,
as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision
committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be
informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological
and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers
that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has
proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear
legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this
evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the
disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion
of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that
the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived
from canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already
annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the
influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the
Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must
be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36.
Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and
subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on
psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting
psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions
of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that
"[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of
the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution
and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage
and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems
proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through
the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal
effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for
declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be
taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated
person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the
avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped
to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their
will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions
for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the
guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his
reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with
following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion
is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for
declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from
the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great
weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute
the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many
material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication
sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina
guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse.
Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior,
and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed
respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the
field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological
incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the
appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to
establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered
as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise
requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus,
even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence,
any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The
initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of
peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing
letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational
attainment, and family background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by
expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr.
Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals, 82
testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of
things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated
over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or
pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of
love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is
based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and
feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And
therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned.
Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and
fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner,
testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of
the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the
transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis
on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is
pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but
everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that
the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having
an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform
the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent,
but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she
continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial
transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses
did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal
examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically
incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical
conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological
incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since
the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the
conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological
incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has
that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing
abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She
practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and
significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent
undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As
concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and
amounts to psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even
before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage
as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a
year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the
degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as
borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce
petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth
from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on
respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to
them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the
legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal
or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced.
Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay
extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to even
comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the
marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be
annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit
as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent
and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of
the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles
68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an
inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of
the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to
bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage
in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of
respondent.90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and
the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another
marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective
and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a
discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of
the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and
implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of
the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent
made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to
the substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the
integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted
with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an
adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding
matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave
lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by
canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this
case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of
petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate
court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished
persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical
courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition
was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make
their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie,
fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that
respondent’s condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is incurable? It
would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly,
it would have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable.
Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10
August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the
requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing
the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s
opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological
incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in
formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to
incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling
that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not
clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration
of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent
promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose
only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not
apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that
law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical
considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case,
there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was
curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the
appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there
would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate
review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to
adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity
of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-
to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical
diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect
at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we
are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by
the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which
indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently
convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was
warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article
36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been
inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with
petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed
undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these
cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the
legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenging the
October 7, 2005 amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004
decision3 (original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5,
2002 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The
Factual Antecedents
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To support
his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi
Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991, 7 Lolita
allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been
separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity
of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.8
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her
promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home
because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.9
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family
home.10 He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he
learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.11
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the
National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major
psychiatric illness,"13 but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting
marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-
workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad
signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship."16
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to
declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and
infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to comply
with her marital obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity is
only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set aside
its original decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its amended decision,20 the CA
found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross
infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful
and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering
from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and
abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her grave and
incurable psychological incapacity.
The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to
Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations"; 21 not
merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 22 The plaintiff bears
the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage),
gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.23
Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the
dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home,24 as well as his
continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, 25 but he merely
mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26 To constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered
personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. 27 No
evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were
manifestations of any psychological illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged
psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any
major psychiatric illness.28 Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our
mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage –
psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a
wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship;
workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring
from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for them to
be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr.
Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go
with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship30 is a mere generalization
unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s psychological incapacity; thus, the CA
committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its original decision.1âwphi1
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. 32 It
cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the
marriage.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.
Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004
DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, Respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.
DECISION
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the advertising
business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of
marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.1 The civil marriage was ratified in a
church wedding on May 20, 1967.2
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968;3 Stephanie Janice born
on September 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;5 and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.6 The
conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and
mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical
psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the
Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However,
when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by
Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter,
on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since
then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking
the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of
the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by
publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that
Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines.7
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of
petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and
projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for
remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity
and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family
are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage.8
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and
SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a
regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with
Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that –
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A
VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION

HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA
CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage.10
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant
petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion
that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2)
psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or
incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity
suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of
respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term "psychological incapacity?"
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined
and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful
or even desirable.13
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive
phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly
qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.14 It appears that
respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by
the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four
children.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown that these acts are manifestations
of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 5517 of the
Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal
separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In
short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a
marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church
marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court
of the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court.1âwphi1 We cannot deny the grief,
frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like
in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.19
While we sympathize with petitioner’s marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no
matter how harsh it may be.20
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is
Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into
fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1
and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his
marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met
Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La
Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The
ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference
by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel"
over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's
parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to
so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first
time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989.
She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately
tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case
No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court,
Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more
than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married
life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is
psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import
of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested
that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say
"wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting
in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking
in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment
would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment
is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null
and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be
modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why
is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it
is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the
very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with
which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice
(Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that
this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio
marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid
intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally
incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as
if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of
providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in
the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are
cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it
as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed
that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations
attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different.
Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that
it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should
be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not
been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it
should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response,
Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice
Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice
Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are
also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice
Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the
marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of
marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances
the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated
that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a
different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can
also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if
already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio.
Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the
marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however,
stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity
continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice
Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot
argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in
degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or
consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or
mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from
vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of
the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages
arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because
it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law,
are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or
declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled
in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in
application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of
church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand,
Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee
approved the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision
with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application.
Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue
N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular
effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot
be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal
provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095
has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended,
indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to
contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf.

SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095,
3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of
the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy
person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological
causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and
LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb.
5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage
to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity
of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined
and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our
society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family,
and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree
a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every
individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006

vs.
NORMA CUISON-MELGAR, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 11, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, which affirmed in toto the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City (RTC) nullifying the marriage of respondents Norma
Cuison-Melgar (Norma) and Eulogio A. Melgar2 (Eulogio) pursuant to Article 363 of the Family Code.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in Dagupan City. Their union
begot five children, namely, Arneldo, Fermin, Norman, Marion Joy, and Eulogio III. On August 19, 1996,
Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to
comply with his essential marital obligations.4 According to Norma, the manifestations of Eulogio’s
psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment,
constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served by personal service on Eulogio on October 21,
1996 by the sheriff.5 Eulogio failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period.
On November 25, 1996, the RTC ordered the Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation on the case to
determine whether or not there exists collusion between the contending parties.6 On December 18, 1996, Public
Prosecutor Joven M. Maramba submitted his Manifestation to the effect that no collusion existed between the
contending parties.7 On December 19, 1996, the RTC set the reception of evidence on January 8, 1997.8
On January 8, 1997, upon motion of Norma’s counsel, the RTC allowed the presentation of evidence before the
Clerk of Court.9 Norma testified that since the birth of their firstborn, Eulogio has been a habitual alcoholic;
when he is drunk he (a) sometimes sleeps on the streets, (b) every so often, he goes to her office, utters
unwholesome remarks against her and drags her home, (c) he usually lays a hand on her, (d) he often scolds
their children without justifiable reason; his liquor drinking habit has brought shame and embarrassment on
their family; when she would refuse to give him money for his compulsive drinking habit, he would beat her up
and threaten her; he has not been employed since he was dismissed from work and he refuses to look for a job;
she has been the one supporting the family, providing for the education and the basic needs of their children out
of her salary as a government employee; on December 27, 1985, because of unbearable jealousy to her male
officemates, Eulogio went to her office, dragged her home and then beat her up; her brothers saw this, came to
her rescue and then told Eulogio to get out of the house; and since then, Eulogio has not visited or
communicated with his family such that reconciliation is very unlikely. 10 The Public Prosecutor thereafter
conducted a brief cross-examination of Norma.11
Twelve days later, or on January 20, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision nullifying the marriage of Norma and
Eulogio. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant petition for being impressed with merit. As such,
pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the marriage between Norma L. Cuison-Melgar and
Eulogio A. Melgar, Jr. is declared an ABSOLUTE NULLITY.
The Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City is therefore ordered to cancel the Marriage Contract of the parties
bearing Registry No. 180 in the Marriage Registry of said Office after payment of the required fees.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the following offices: The City Prosecution Office, Dagupan City, the
Solicitor General, and the Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC reasoned that:
With the testimony of the petitioner, the Court is convinced that defendant has been incorrigible in his vices
such as habitual alcoholism, subjecting his family to physical maltreatment and many times caused them to be
scandalized, his being indolent by not at least trying to look for a job so that he could also help his wife in
supporting his family, and also his uncalled for display of his jealousy. These are clear manifestation of his
psychological incapacity to perform his marital obligation to his wife such as showing respect, understanding
and love to her. Defendant also became indifferent to the needs of his own children who really longed for a
father who is willing to make the sacrifice in looking for a job so as to support them. Without any
communication to his family since 1985, certaining [sic] reconciliation and love would be improbable. The
attendant circumstances in this case really point to the fact that defendant was unprepared to comply with his
responsibilities as a good and responsible husband to his wife and a loving father to his children x x x.13
Petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an appeal with the CA, contending
that the evidence presented are not sufficient to declare the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.14
On August 11, 1999, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the decision of the RTC. 15 The CA, quoting
extensively Norma’s testimony, ratiocinated:
[I]t has been adequately established that the decree of annulment is proper not simply because of defendant’s
habitual alcoholism but likewise because of other causes amounting to psychological incapacity as a result of
which defendant has failed to perform his obligations under Articles 68-72, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code x x x.
Contrary to the submission of the appellant Republic, the grant of annulment is not based merely on defendant’s
habitual alcoholism but also because of his inability to cope with his other essential marital obligations foremost
of which is his obligation to live together with his wife, observe mutual love, respect, fidelity and render mutual
help and support.
For the whole duration of their marriage, that is, the period when they actually lived together as husband and
wide and even thereafter, defendant has miserably failed to perform his obligations for which reason the
plaintiff should not be made to suffer any longer. The contention of the Republic that plaintiff never showed
that she exerted effort to seek medical help for her husband is stretching the obligations of the plaintiff beyond
its limits. To our mind, it is equivalent to saying that plaintiff deserves to be punished for all the inabilities of
defendant to perform his concomitant duties as a husband and a father all of which inabilities in the first place
are in no way attributable to the herein plaintiff.16
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
In its Petition,17 the OSG poses a sole issue for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT IS IN THE

NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.18
The OSG contends that the law does not contemplate mere inability to perform the essential marital obligations
as equivalent to or evidence of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; that such inability
must be due to causes that are psychological in nature; that no psychiatrist or psychologist testified during the
trial that a psychological disorder is the cause of Eulogio's inability to look for a job, his resulting drunkenness,
unbearable jealousy and other disagreeable behavior; and that the decision failed to state the nature, gravity or
seriousness, and incurability of Eulogio’s alleged psychological incapacity.
In her Comment,19 Norma maintains that her testimony pointing to the facts and circumstances of Eulogio’s
immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness and indolence are
more than enough proof of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations,
which justifies the dissolution of their marriage.
In its Reply,20 the OSG submits that Norma’s comments are irrelevant and not responsive to the arguments in
the petition. Nonetheless, the OSG reiterates that Norma’s evidence fell short of the requirements of the law
since no competent evidence was presented during the trial to prove that Eulogio’s inability to look for a job, his
resulting drunkenness, jealousy and other disagreeable behavior are manifestations of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.21 Our family law is based on
the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The
State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our
social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.22
In this regard, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates:
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of Court,23 the rule then applicable, provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. - If the defendant in an action
for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for
the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Molina,24 the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and the OSG to
appear as counsel for the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.25 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the case at the trial level. Other than the
Public Prosecutor’s Manifestation26 that no collusion existed between the contending parties and the brief cross-
examination27 which had barely scratched the surface, no pleading, motion, or position paper was filed by the
Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting
evidence before the judgment was rendered.28 Truly, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the
OSG will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression
of evidence.29
Be that as it may, the totality of evidence presented by Norma is completely insufficient to sustain a finding that
Eulogio is psychologically incapacitated.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.31 It should refer to "no less than a mental, not physical,
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."32 The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.33
Subsequently, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Molina34 the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.35
(Emphasis supplied)
Later, the Court clarified in Marcos v. Marcos36 that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however,
must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.37
In the present case, Norma alone testified in support of her complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. She failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, Eulogio
was already suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. In fact, Norma admitted in her testimony that
her marital woes and Eulogio’s disagreeable behavior started only after the birth of their firstborn and when
Eulogio lost his job.38
Further, no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was not cognizant of the basic marital
obligations as outlined in Articles 68 to 72,39 220,40 221,41 and 22542 of the Family Code. It was not sufficiently
proved that Eulogio was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological
nature, and not merely physical.lawphil.net
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact of Eulogio’s immaturity, habitual
alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family. These
circumstances by themselves cannot be equated with psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
Eulogio completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.43
At best, the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 44 of the
Family Code. As the Court ruled in Republic of the Philippines v. Molina,45 it is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person, it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.46
All told, in order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered a mere fabrication,
evidence other than Norma’s lone testimony should have been adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity,47 an expert
witness would have strengthened Norma’s claim of Eulogio’s alleged psychological incapacity. Norma’s
omission to present one is fatal to her position. There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where
there is absolutely no showing that the "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable.48
The Court commiserates with Norma’s marital predicament, but as a court, even as the highest one, it can only
apply the letter and the spirit of the law; it cannot reinvent or modify it. Unfortunately, law and jurisprudence
are ranged against Norma’s stance. The Court has no choice but to apply them accordingly, if it must be true to
its mission under the rule of law. The Court’s first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it
may be.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August
11, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan
City in Civil Case No. CV-96-01061-D, dated January 20, 1997, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint of Norma Cuison-Melgar in Civil Case No. CV-96-01061-D is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168328 February 28, 2007

vs.
LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE and MANOLITO SAN JOSE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondents Laila Tanyag-San Jose (Laila) and Manolito San Jose (Manolito) were married on June 12, 1988.
Laila was 19 years and 4 months old, while Manolito was 20 years and 10 months old.1
The couple begot two children: Joana Marie who was born on January 3, 1989,2 and Norman who was born on
March 14, 1997.3
For nine years, the couple stayed with Manolito’s parents. Manolito was jobless and was hooked to gambling
and drugs. As for Laila, she sold fish at the wet market of Taguig.4
On August 20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and transferred to her parents’ house.5
On March 9, 1999, Laila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,6 under Article 367 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig where
it was docketed as JDRC Case No. 4862.
Testifying for Laila, Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist at the National Center for Mental Health, declared
that from the psychological test and clinical interview she conducted on Laila, she found Manolito, whom she
did not personally examine, to be psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties of a husband.
Dr. Tayag’s May 28, 1999 Report on the Psychological Condition of LAILA T. SAN JOSE8 was submitted in
evidence. The pertinent portions of the Report read:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
xxxx
. . . [Laila’s] association with [Manolito] started with the game of basketball. As a youngster, petitioner often
spent her free time seeking fun in the outdoors. She was then beginning to cast her interests on basketball games
and eventually became one of the avid spectators when a minor league was staged at their place. Respondent
happened to be one of the cagers who, with his hardcourt skills, greatly impressed petitioner. The latter then
became a fan of respondent. Eventually acquiring the upper hand, respondent introduced himself personally to
his admirers and their initial encounter with petitioner proved to be a milestone for both of their fates. Courtship
followed and after a short period, they were already steadies.
Savoring the momentum, petitioner and respondent decided to formally seal their union. They entered marriage
on June 12, 1989 under religious ceremonies held in Taguig. After the occasion, the newlyweds then went on to
lead a life of their own making. However, contrary to what was expected, their marriage turned out to be rocky
right from the very start.
Claimed, respondent refused to get himself a job. Instead, he spent most of his available time with his friends
drinking intoxicating substances and gambling activities. Petitioner was left without much choice but to flex her
muscles and venture on several areas which could be a source of income. She tried to endure the situation with
the hope that respondent would change for the better in no time. Their first child, Joana Marie, was born of
January 3, 1989. Petitioner was apparently happy with the birth of their first born, thinking that her presence
would make a difference in the family, particularly on the part of respondent.
Years had passed but no improvement was seen on respondent’s behavior. He turned out to be worse instead
and it was only later that petitioner discovered that he was into drugs. Said, he prefers to be with his friends
rather than his own family. He seemed oblivious to the efforts rendered by petitioner just to make ends meet.
She was the breadwinner of the family and whenever an argument occurred between her and respondent, she
often received the brunt of her husband’s irrationality. On one of such incidents, she decided to separate from
respondent. The latter however pursued her and pleaded for another chance. He promised that he would change
his behavior if only petitioner would give him a son. Seeing his sincerity and unwilling to give up the marriage,
petitioner agreed to the compromise.
They reconciled and she did gave birth to a son, Norman, on March of 1997. Respondent was happy but his
show of good nature was superficial. Briefly after the birth of their second child, respondent resumed his old
ways and made them even worse.
Still, petitioner remained hopeful that something will turn out right in their union. However, with respondent’s
continuing irresponsibility, she realized that all her efforts proved nonsense to him. On August 20, 1998,
respondent went out of their dwelling for his usual late night stints but he never came back the following
morning. They never lived together since.
Respondent is MANOLITO SAN JOSE, 31 years old with last known address at 14-D Ibayo, Tipas, Taguig,
Metro Manila. He is unemployed and stayed in school only to finish his secondary education. He was described
to be a happy-go-lucky individual spending most of his time hanging out with friends. Considered to be a bad
influence, he was into gambling, drinking sprees and prohibited drugs as well.
xxxx
REMARKS:
Through the evaluation of test data, correlated with clinical interviews and description of their marital plight, it
is the opinion of the undersigned that the disintegration of the marriage between petitioner and respondent was
caused primarily by the latter’s psychological incapacity to perform the essential roles and obligations of a
married man and a father.
His behavioral pattern characterized mainly by constant irresponsibility, lack of concern for the welfare of
others, self-centered orientation, absence of remorse, violent tendencies and his involvement in activities
defying social and moral ethics; suits under the classification of Anti-Social Personality Disorder.
Such disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply [immersed] within the system. It continues to influence
the individual until the later stage of life.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Branch 70 of the RTC of Pasig, by Decision of July 17, 2001, citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals10 and Leouel Santos v. CA, et al.11 denied Laila’s petition in this wise:
In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina (268 SCRA
198), the Supreme Court, reiterated its ruling [in] the earlier case of [Leouel] Santos vs. Court of Appeals (240
SCRA 20), to the effect that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical
incapacity x x x) and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorder clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage and that such incapacity
"must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
Viewed in the light of the above guidelines, the present petition must necessarily be denied.
Petitioner’s portrayal of respondent as jobless and irresponsible is not enough. As the Supreme Court said
in the Molina case (supra), "(I)t is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness."
Petitioner’s case is not in any way enhanced by the psychological evaluation and assessment done by
psychologist Nedy Tayag as per her Psychological Report (Exhs. "C" to "C-1"). Although the body of the report
mentions that the respondent is affected with "Anti-Social Personality Disorder", the same cannot sway this
Court from its above disposition. There is no showing that [Dr.] Tayag was able to interview the
respondent or any of his relatives in order to arrive at the above conclusion. Obviously, the data upon
which the finding or conclusion was based is inadequate.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Laila’s motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision was, by Order of November 13, 2001, 13 denied.
Laila thus appealed to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. CV No. 73286, faulting the trial court
in holding that she failed to comply with the guidelines enumerated in Molina.
By Decision dated February 15, 2005,14 the appellate court, finding Manolito psychologically incapacitated
after considering "the totality of the evidence," reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage
between him and Laila void ab initio. Thus the appellate court held:
. . . We perused the records of the present case and unearthed that the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case – including the testimony of the petitioner, were enough to sustain a finding that Manolito San Jose
is psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of the Family Code. We believe that his
(respondent’s) defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. If being
jobless (since the commencement of the marriage up to the filing of the present petition) and worse, a
gambler, can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill – what then can We describe such acts?
Are these normal manners of a married man? We are not at all swayed that a union affirmed in church rites
and subsequently having children, are proofs that either of the spouses is mature and responsible enough to
assume marital responsibilities.1awphi1.net
Accordingly, We can safely conclude that said deficiency is so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. This Court, finding
the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but to declare the marriage between the herein
petitioner and the respondent herein dissolved. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity ([A]rticle 68 of the Family Code), however, what is
there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as an
inviolable social institution. In fine, Laila Tanyag-San Jose must be allowed to rise from the ashes and begin a
new life—freed from a marriage which, to Us, was hopeless from the beginning and where the bonding could
not have been possible.
xxxx
While We may not have strictly adhered to the ruling in the Molina case in arriving at Our present conclusion –
We have reason to deviate from the same. In view of the peculiar circumstances attendant in this case, We were
constrained to take exception from the Molina case. Note that the "(c) ommittee did not give any example of
psychological incapacity for the fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to apply the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decision of Church tribunals which although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." (page 37, Handbook of the Family Code of the
Philippines, Sempio-Diy, 1991 reprinted). Hence, whether or not psychological incapacity exists is for Us to
establish, as there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what maybe considered indicia of
psychological incapacity. To Our mind there are sufficient grounds for Us to conclude that indeed psychological
incapacity exists so as to warrant declaration of the marriage void ab initio.15 (Italics and underscoring in the
original; emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the appellate court’s decision
which was denied, by Resolution dated June 2, 2005,17 hence, its present Petition for Review,18 positing that:
IT WAS NOT PROVEN THAT MANOLITO’S ALLEGED DEFECTS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
AND THAT THE SAME HAS JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE[, AND]
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ADHERING TO THE RULING
OF THE MOLINA CASE AND THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS.19
Petitioner contends that Laila failed to prove that Manolito is psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations as she merely relied on the report of Dr. Tayag; and granted that the psychological
examination of Manolito is not a requirement for a declaration of his psychological incapacity, the totality of the
evidence presented does not show Manolito’s psychological incapacity.
Petitioner further contends that the appellate court erred in believing that the "defects" of Manolito already
existed at the inception of the marriage or are incurable; and in any event, "belief" cannot substitute for proof
which the law and jurisprudence require.
Petitioner finally contends that a deviation from the Molina ruling is not proper in the present case.
Laila, as petitioner, had the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of marriage, has been succinctly expounded in the recent case
of Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris (Ferraris),20 thus:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.
It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or
isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained[.] (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
As the earlier-quoted Report of Dr. Tayag shows, her conclusion about Manolito’s psychological incapacity was
based on the information supplied by Laila which she found to be "factual." That Laila supplied the basis of her
conclusion, Dr. Tayag confirmed at the witness stand:
Q [Atty. Revilla, Jr.]: What was your conclusion, what w[ere] your findings with respect to the respondent?
A [Dr. Tayag]: Base[d] on the narration made by [Laila], which I found the narration to be factual,
regarding her marital relationship with the petitioner (should have been respondent), I came up with a
conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. The one which I found in him is his anti-social
personality disorder because of the following overt manipulations: the presence of drug, the absence of
remourse [sic], the constant incapacity in terms of maintaining the marital relationship, the lack of concern to
his family, his self-centeredness, lack of remourse, in addition to the womanizing, respondent which clearly
connotes the defiant of moral and personality disorder, he is tantamount to a person under the level, under our
diagnostic criteria labeled as anti-social personality disorder, sir.
Q: So you would like to impress this Court that your findings with respect to this case were only base[d] on the
information given to you by [Laila], is that correct?
A: Yes, wherein I found the narration made by [Laila] to be factual, sir.21 (Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, the doctor’s conclusion is hearsay. It is "unscientific and unreliable," so this Court declared in
Choa v. Choa22 where the assessment of the therein party sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated
was based merely on the information communicated to the doctor by the therein respondent-spouse:
. . . [T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by
respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to
have done so. In fact, his Professional Opinion began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his
wife Leni is true, . . ."
xxxx
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been
relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand
information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and
unreliable.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, Dr. Tayag’s Psychological Report does not even show that the alleged anti-social personality
disorder of Manolito was already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable. Neither does it
explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor identify its root cause. It merely states that "[s]uch
disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply [immersed] within the system [and] continues to influence the
individual until the later stage of life."
There is of course no requirement that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. 24
If it can be proven by independent means that one is psychologically incapacitated, there is no reason why the
same should not be credited.
In the present case, the only proof which bears on the claim that Manolito is psychologically incapacitated is the
following testimony of Laila, in answer to the clarificatory questions propounded by the trial court:
Q [Court]: Now, so aside from what you said that your husband is a drug user and that he is jobless and was not
able to support your family, what other reasons do you have for saying that your husband is psychologically
incapacitated from performing his marital obligations?
A [Laila]: He cannot give us a brighter future because he is jobless, your honor.
Q: Apart from these two reasons which is for alleged use or possession of drugs and his inability to get a job
and support his family you have no other basis to show for the declaration of nullity of your marriage?
A: Yes, your honor.25 (Underscoring supplied)
Manolito’s alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as well as his
inability to support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Manolito’s state or condition or attitude has not been shown, however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on
some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition.
In Molina, where the therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than with his family, this
Court found the same to be more of a "difficulty" if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations.
In Ferraris,26 this Court held:
We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the- house" attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of
support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Underscoring supplied)
Also in Ferraris, this Court held that habitual alcoholism, just like sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment, does not by itself constitute ground for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity.27 Neither is emotional immaturity and irresponsibility.28 Or failure or refusal to meet duties and
responsibilities of a married man if it is not shown to be due to some psychological (not physical) illness.29
While Molina then is not set in stone,30 the facts and circumstances attendant to this case do not warrant a
deviation from it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 15, 2005 Decision and June 2, 2005 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV No. 73286 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The July 17, 2001
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in JDRC Case No. 4862 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner,

vs.
REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated 24 May 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica
Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,2 docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by petitioner before the RTC on 22 August
2002. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev.
Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latter’s residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived
for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the
newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s abode at 2601-C Jose
Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not
communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but
respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed
petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not
advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go
home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his
parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was
not aware of respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was
informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus,
petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her,
providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner
and respondent.
Per the Sheriff’s Return3 dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a copy of petitioner’s Complaint, was
served upon respondent on 30 September 2002.4
On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion5 to direct the public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.
As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November 2002 an Order6 directing the public
prosecutor to conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to submit a report
thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that evidence was not fabricated or
suppressed.
On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her Report
manifesting that she had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in January 2003,
but respondent never participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that no collusion took place
between the parties, and measures were taken to prevent suppression of evidence between them. She then
recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine whether petitioner’s Complaint was meritorious
or not.
Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.
On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical
psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.
Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in her Complaint. Cabacungan
corroborated petitioner’s testimony.
Petitioner’s third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of petitioner and respondent:
After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner is found to be free from any
underlying personality aberration neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits, which may possibly
impede her normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm
opinion that the sudden breakdown of marital life between petitioner and respondent was clearly due to the
diagnosed personality disorder that the respondent is harboring, making him psychologically incapacitated to
properly assume and comply [with] essential roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically
classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long lasting in
proportion and incurable by any treatment.
People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in
fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a
variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:
1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and talents, expect to be recognized
as superior without commensurate achievements)
2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love
3. believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or should associate
with, other special or high status people (institutions)
4. requires excessive admiration
5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or automatic
compliance with his or her expectations
6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends
7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others
8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her
9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.
The root cause of respondent’s personality disorder can be attributed to his early childhood years with
predisposing psychosocial factors that influence[d] his development. It was recounted that respondent is the first
child of his mother’s second family. Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation composed his immediate
environment in his growing up years. Respondent had undergone a severe longing for attention from his father
who had been unfaithful to them and had died early in life, that he was left alone to fend for the family needs.
More so that they were coping against poverty, his caregivers failed to validate his needs, wishes or responses
and overlooked the love and attention he yearned which led to develop a pathological need for self-object to
help him maintain a cohesive sense of self-such so great that everything other people offer is "consumed."
Hence, he is unable to develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is no capacity for empathy
sharing, or loving others.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence as it already existed
long before he entered into marriage. Since it already started early in life, it is deeply engrained within his
system and becomes a[n] integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such to be permanent and
incurable.7
Tayag concluded in the end that:
As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the fact that it has long been (sic) ceased to exist
and have their different life priorities. Reconciliation between them is regarded to be (sic). The essential
obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual help and support,
and commitment, did not and will no lon[g]er exist between them. With due consideration of the above-
mentioned findings, the undersigned recommends, the declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and
respondent.8
On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa
(Lagrosa), who replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to the admission of petitioner’s
evidence and manifested that she would no longer present evidence for the State.
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioner’s Complaint for annulment of her marriage
to respondent, holding in substance that:
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not
living with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to
a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were
already present at the inception of their marriage or that these are incurable.
That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED.9
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 but it was denied by the RTC in an Order11 dated 19 August
2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a
Decision12 dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove respondent’s psychological
incapacity. Other than petitioner’s bare allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove respondent’s
personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,13 the appellate court ruled that the evidence should be able to establish that
at least one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that said person could not have
known the marital obligations to be assumed; or knowing the marital obligations, could not have validly
assumed the same. At most, respondent’s abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for legal separation
under Article 5 of the Family Code.1avvphi1
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution 14 dated 28 August
2008.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS. 15
At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the RTC was for
annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.16 Incapacity to consummate denotes the
permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.17 Non-
consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical
or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or
fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes,
where such mental block or disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing
the marriage act.18
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically incapable to
consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and
respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously
being no physical incapacity on respondent’s part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioner’s marriage to
respondent. Petitioner’s Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence presented by
petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually
seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latter’s psychological incapacity to
comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsel’s mistake or
gross ignorance.19 But even said reason cannot save petitioner’s Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this
jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural
technique.20 Although this rule is not a hard and fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of
counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the violation of his client’s substantive rights,21
petitioner failed to convince us that such exceptional circumstances exist herein.
Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based on
Article 36 of the Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the
evidence presented by petitioner during the trial.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.23
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article
36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,24 to wit:
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b)
alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may
be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we scrutinized
the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s testimonies, merely established that respondent left
petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a
year and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with
petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad.
These testimonies though do not give us much insight into respondent’s psychological state.
Tayag’s psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioner’s cause. It must be noted
that Tayag was not able to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear for examination despite
Tayag’s invitation.25 Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on information provided
by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of
respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.
Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to
the latter’s experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said conclusion.
Tayag did not particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" that showed that respondent indeed had a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain how such a personality disorder made
respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. We emphasize that the
burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also
that such psychological disorder renders him "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."26 Psychological incapacity must
be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.
In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into petitioner’s marital life and,
as a result, we perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each
other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his
wife.
To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological illness;
neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot
to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our
laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation – a relationship where no marriage
could have validly been concluded because the parties; or where one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of
marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage.271avvphi1
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos28]:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.
Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no
wise constitute psychological incapacity.29
As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and
sexual infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion30 dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner
claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the same barangay as respondent in
Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-in with another woman named "Sally."
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state.31
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.32 Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.33 In the case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that respondent’s failure to
communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning
to the country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or complying with the
essential obligations of marriage.
We are not downplaying petitioner’s frustration and misery in finding herself shackled, so to speak, to a
marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.34
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint in Civil
Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No.
34378, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90
declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the
Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage certificate was issued by the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M.
Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of their
in-laws.4 A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear
for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he was with his
family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.5
On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to
look for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that
Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.7 A certification
therefor dated February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to
date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. 8 Since
Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of
general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17, 1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish
jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda
and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only
witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo City but
they spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda
and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couple's house. She knew that
Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and the children.10
Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until
January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that
should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was
no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of
evidence.11
On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5,
1990, the trial court rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36
of the Family Code, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage
celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to
be null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of Marriage
this declaration after this decision shall have become final and executory .
SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the
decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was
presenting controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground
that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial
court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows:13
"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated December
27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere
alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough to show psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment.
These are common in marriage. There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from psychological
incapacity existing at the time of celebration of the marriage.’
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children since 1983.
The defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support
his family for the same period of time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the husband to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage defined and enumerated under Article 68 of
the Family Code. These findings of facts are uncontroverted. 1âwphi1.nêt
Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became manifest only
after the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and
appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the family members are now left to fend for
themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the
more numerous church, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order
to dissolve marriages that exist only in name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO

DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN
PROVEN TO EXIST.14
On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision15 affirming the decision of the trial court,
disposing thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and
obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic,
and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial declaration
of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of
any of such obligations is continously (sic) destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with
the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)."16
Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an incorrect application thereof to the facts
of the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were
proven by preponderance of evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity
as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides -
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.18
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
and unity of the family. x x x
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13,
1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In other words, there is a
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code20 as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code 21 in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."22
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned
evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the
allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he
was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to
present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and Court of
Appeals of the petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained
therein that -
"Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is
mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV,
Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing Republic
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra. )"24
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157610 October 19, 2007
ORLANDO G. TONGOL, Petitioner,

vs.
FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245, and its Resolution of March
19, 2003, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The CA Decision affirmed, in toto, the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149, which dismissed the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage filed by herein petitioner Orlando Tongol.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. Tongol (Filipinas) were married on August 27, 1967. Out of
their union, they begot four children, namely: Crisanto, born in 1968; Olivia, born in 1969; Frederick, born in
1971, and; Ma. Cecilia, born in 1972.
On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains,
which was granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations.
In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got married over the objection of the latter's family;
their marriage was not a happy one because of her parents' continued interference and attempt to break up their
union; greatly influenced by her parents, Filipinas, even at the early stages of their marriage, already treated
Orlando with contempt and without the love and respect due him as her husband; when Orlando started a junk
shop business, Filipinas ridiculed him instead of giving him encouragement; later on, his business became
successful and he was able to embark upon another business venture; he put up a pharmaceutical company
which also became profitable; Filipinas then became interested and began to interfere in the operation of the
business; however, because of her bad attitude, the employees were aloof; she also resented the fact that her
husband got along well with the employees; as a result, she quarreled with her husband causing the latter
embarrassment; she even suspected that the income of the business was being given to her husband's relatives;
their continued fighting persisted and affected their children; efforts at reconciliation proved futile because their
differences had become irreconcilable and their marriage impossible; in 1990, Orlando decided to live
separately from Filipinas; in 1994, the spouses filed a petition for dissolution of their property relationship; and
the petition was granted in 1995.
In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that
their marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando who is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a married man.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol, and of Annaliza
Guevara, an employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol. Orlando also presented
Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological examination of both parties. Orlando
submitted documents evidencing their marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC decision granting the
petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the written evaluation of Dr. Villegas
regarding the spouses' psychological examination. On the other hand, record shows that evidence for Filipinas
only consisted of her own testimony.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.
On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
1. "WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT DRA. CECILIA VILLEGAS FAILED TO
STATE WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S INADEQUATE PERSONALITY DISORDER WAS
GRAVE, PERMANENT AND INCURABLE" (par. 12, p. 3, Annex "A", hereof).
2. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
APPEAL" (p. 7, ibid.).
3. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION" (Annex "B", hereof).2
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case is enough to sustain a finding that herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,3 the term psychological incapacity was defined as:
[N]o less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x4
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.5
While the CA has already extensively quoted the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,6 wherein the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 367 of the Family Code was laid
down, this Court finds it significant to reproduce the same quoted portion, to wit:
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.8
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,9
which took effect on March 15, 2003, the foregoing guidelines have been modified. Section 2(d) of the said
Rule provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.-
xxxx
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
The new Rule dispensed with the certification from the Solicitor General, stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition. Attachment of expert opinions to the petition is also dispensed with.
In the instant case, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the conclusion of the examining psychiatrist, Dr.
Villegas, that respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder. However, both courts ruled that the
behavior exhibited by respondent does not amount to psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36
of the Family Code.
This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assessment of the RTC and the CA for the following
reasons:
First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas who made the following written evaluation
regarding respondent's psychological makeup:
xxxx
On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas Mendoza-Tongol belonged to a matriarchal family where the mother assumed
a more active and dominant role. She was left to the care of her aunt and developed a basic feeling a (sic)
rejection.
The only college graduate among 7 children her operating intellectual ability is low-average. Sudden change
overwhelmed her. When seized by an impulse, she is likely to give way, even minor pressures upset her and
when this happens, emotional control could not be relied upon.
In marriage when her husband shows good relationship with their employees, especially with females, she
became (sic) suspicious, jealous, and threatened, and this is related to her basic feelings of rejection in early life.
She coped (sic) up with her uncomfortable feelings by exhibiting temper tantrums, irritability and dominance, a
replica of her mother's attitude, but to the distaste of her husband.
At present she is depressed, though hostile, and now living in the expectation of further rejection. Additionally,
she is threatened by a neurological illness (tremor of the hands) for which she is consulting a neurologist.
Based on the above findings, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Mr. Orlando Tongol is suffering from
some depressive features, which seems to be a recent development as a result of marital problems. On the other
hand, Mrs. Tongol is suffering from an Inadequate Personality Disorder, with hysterical coloring, which renders
her psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. She is unable to cope
with the sudden work and environmental shifts, that overwhelmed her, due to insufficient psychological inner
resources.10
In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained respondent's personality disorder in this wise:
ATTY. VILLAREAL -
xxxx
Q- What exactly do you mean [by] inadequate personality disorder?
A- Inadequate personality disorder means, there are not times that in all aspects of her life, she could not
function in the way that she feels or she is confident. She has always been very much in doubt of her own
capabilities, Sir.
Q- What about hysterical coloring?
A- Hysterical coloring means, there is always an exaggeration of her psychological reactions to any stresses,
Sir.
Q- Exaggeration in what aspect?
A- Exaggeration in any emotional reactions or situations like if she would be seeing the husband talking to
some employees then, she is suddenly irritable and would present some tantrums. In short, she cannot control
her emotion at the moment of stresses circulations, Sir.11
When asked how such personality disorder affects respondent's capacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage, Dr. Villegas expounded as follows:
ATTY. RENDOR -
xxxx
Q- How about Mrs. Tongol, what are your findings?
A- Mrs. Tongol is a college graduate and she finished commerce. Basically, she has a feeling of rejection from
the start of her development and this was carried on into her adult life. When the husband started having some
good relationship with his employees, then she started to get jealous and she would embarrass him in front of
their employees and insulted him and would go into tantrums and this was very much resented by Mr. Tongol,
Sir.
ATTY. RENDOR -
Q- In your expert opinion, Doctor, can you tell us the reason why Mrs. Tongol acted in such a way?
A- Because of her basic rejection at that time, Sir. She was afraid that Mr. Tongol was already rejecting her as a
wife and being attracted to other people, but it is the way of how Mrs. Tongol reacted to her own feelings of
rejection, Sir.
xxxx
Q- What made you say that because of inadequate personality disorder, Mrs. Tongol rendered her psychological
(sic) incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of the marriage. What is your basis in saying that?
A- She belongs to a very matriarchal family. The mother was very dominant. She always gets what she wanted
in the house. In short, she was the authority in the house and during her growing up stage, she was given up to
the aunt, for the aunt to take care of her. She only came back to the family when she was already a sort of an
early teenager. With this, there has always been a feeling of rejection during her personality development.
Besides, she feels that she is one of those not favor (sic) by the mother during her growing up stage, Sir.
Q- Based on your examination of the spouses, what do you recommend as far as the marriage is concerned,
considering that this is a petition for the annulment of marriage?
A- I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be sufferings from (sic) both
of them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also
suffering from some depression, Sir.12
The Court can only gather from the foregoing explanations of Dr. Villegas that as a child, Filipinas had always
felt rejected, especially by her mother; that she never got rid of those feelings of rejection even when she
became an adult and got married; that her fits of jealousy and temper tantrums, every time she sees her husband
having a good interaction with their employees, are ways of coping up with her feelings of rejection. However,
Dr. Villegas failed to link respondent's personality disorder to her conclusion that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform her obligations as wife and mother. The Court cannot see how respondent's personality
disorder which, according to Dr. Villegas, is inextricably linked to her feelings of rejection, would render her
unaware of the essential marital obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos, "to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."
What has been established in the instant case is that, by reason of her feelings of inadequacy and rejection,
respondent not only encounters a lot of difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her obligations towards
her husband, such as respect, help and support for him. However, this Court has ruled that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations.13 As held in Santos:
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.14
Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder of respondent is
grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Petitioner contends
that respondent's exaggerated reactions to normal situations, her unreasonable feelings of rejection brought
about by her dysfunctional upbringing, are all indications of the gravity of her psychological condition. Even
granting that respondent's psychological disorder is serious, the fact remains that there is no evidence to prove
that such condition is of such nature as to render respondent incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage.
Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written evaluation nor in her
testimony did Dr. Villegas categorically and conclusively characterize respondent's inadequate personality
disorder as permanent or incurable. Dr. Villegas was not sure of the permanence or incurability of respondent's
illness as shown by her following statement:
I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be sufferings from (sic) both of
them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also
suffering from some depression, Sir.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.16 The fourth guideline in Molina requires that the psychological
incapacity as understood under Article 36 of the Family Code must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. In the present case, the testimonies of both petitioner and respondent as well as the other witnesses
regarding the spouses' differences and misunderstanding basically revolve around and are limited to their
disagreement regarding the management of their business. In fact, respondent herself, in her Memorandum
submitted to the trial court, claimed that their quarrels arose solely from their disagreement on how to run their
business.17 This is confirmed by the testimony of petitioner's sister who lived with the spouses for a
considerable period of time.18 However, a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.19
In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under the Family Code
include the mutual responsibility of the spouses to manage the household and provide support for the family,
which means that compliance with this obligation necessarily entails the management of the income and
expenses of the household. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of
one's marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient ground to declare a marriage null
and void. In the present case, respondent's disagreement with her husband's handling of the family's business
and finances and her propensity to start a fight with petitioner spouse regarding these matters can hardly be
considered as a manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the
Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements regarding money matters is a
common, and even normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.
Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to the other spouse but also one's obligation
toward their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that respondent had been remiss in
performing her obligations toward their children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code.20
It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.21 It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of marriage.22 It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. 23 In the instant
case, the Court finds no error in the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the aversive behavior of
petitioner and respondent towards each other is a mere indication of incompatibility brought about by their
different family backgrounds as well as their attitudes, which developed after their marriage.
In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological disorder.1âwphi1 However, the
totality of the evidence presented in the present case does not show that her personality disorder is of the kind
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render her psychologically
incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution.24 Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2002 Decision and March 19, 2003 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, Petitioner,

vs.
ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.2 The reversed RTC decision nullified
Jocelyn’s marriage with respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents of Laguna at that
time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for
three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to Biñan,
Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito’s marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3,
1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Biñan.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito’s parents after their
marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelito’s relatives
as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged
Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyn’s efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since
lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above
historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her complaint:
xxxx
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their relationship had been marred
with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff because
defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they had a troublesome encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his indolence and
his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations
making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their separation in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their marriage and became very
apparent as time went and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;
xxxx
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological examination
with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed between the parties.
Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the alleged incidents of
physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these declarations but
significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before they were married.
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married?
A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.
Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his behavioural (sic) pattern
before you got married?
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you got married (sic), is
there any signs (sic) of violence?
A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.
Q. Even to other people?
A. He also quarrel (sic).3
Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:
Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the marriage the
respondent is suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious and severe apparently
incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-standing before the marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?
A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when I examined her,
the petitioner was found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital relationship with
respondent.
Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which is your report there is a statement rather on the last page, last
paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that marriage between the two, had
already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the actual celebration of marriage. Respondent(’s) immature,
irresponsible and callous emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful
relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social
Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to
provide love, caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic and long-standing
in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the wedding and became
manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He apparently grew up in a dysfunctional
family. Could you explain what does chronic mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long before he entered
marriage apparently, it came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic).
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).
A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because psychological disorder are not
detrimental to men but to others particularly and this (sic) because the person who have this kind of
disorder do not know that they have this kind of disorder.
Q. So in other words, permanent?
A. Permanent and incurable.
Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or at the time of the
wedding or became manifest thereafter?
A. Yes, ma’am."
xxxx
Court:
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?
A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality Disorder (sic).
Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?
A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment exploitative and silent
(sic) on the part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.
Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)?
A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are suffering that kind
of disorder (sic).
Court:
Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?
A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?
A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often than not he even
shouted at them for no apparent reason (sic).
Court:
Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. How was the petitioner tortured?
A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Why did you know?
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is not aware that this
kind of personality affect the other party (sic).
Court:
Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?
A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under the influence of
alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious relationship during the less than one year and one thing
what is significant, respondent allowed wife to work as housemaid instead of he who should provide and
the petitioner never receive and enjoy her earning for the five months that she work and it is also the
petitioner who took sustainance of the vices. (sic)
Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner?
A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital relationship but what he need
is to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).
Court:
Q. What are the vices?
A. Alcohol and gambling.
Court:
Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?
A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality Disorder, he is good
for nothing person.4
The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report pertinently states:5
Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for "Nullity of Marriage" versus
ANGELITO D. SUAZO
GENERAL DATA
[This pertains to Jocelyn’s]
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
xxxx
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest
among 4 siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler.
While mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their vicinity that she was also involved in an
illicit relationship. Familial relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and squabbles
were part and parcel of their day to day living.
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately suppressed so much so that it does
not create inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and motivation particularly in
uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She may be sensitive yet capable of
containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in goodstead (sic) with her immediate
environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future in spite of difficulties she had
gone through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that she set simple life goals which is
(sic) commensurate with her capabilities and limitations. However, she needs to prioritize her interest in order
to direct her energy toward specific goals. Her tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping
mechanism that she is able to discharge negative trends appropriately.
REMARKS :
[Already cited in full in the psychologist’s testimony quoted above]6
The Office of the Solicitor General – representing the Republic of the Philippines – strongly opposed the
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the
psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said about him was purely hearsay.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered as psychologically
incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person to be unfit to comply with his
marital obligation, such as "immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility,
otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on
parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next
drink and the next drinks" (The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one
thing – that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with the respondent. On the contrary, the
respondent has not shown love and respect to the petitioner manifested by the former’s being irresponsible,
immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all – a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer
the misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one year and four months of messy days, to leave
the respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life with the respondent,
she already suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her and that she was the one who
worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain the latter’s niece (sic) and because they were
living with her husband’s family, she was obliged to do the household chores – an indication that she is a
battered wife coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in his (sic) husband’s family.
This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the time of their marriage,
she and her husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage by her relatives. The petitioner and the
respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect, instead, the respondent blamed the petitioner’s
family for said early marriage and not to his own liking.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals,7 the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist’ testimony quoted above] would only tend
to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity which is not only grave but
also incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA
198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the
psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting that there is psychological
incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations has been sufficiently
and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the respondent is a speculation and
conjecture and without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner
will still be using the surname of the respondent, although they are now separated, and a grim and sad reminder
of her husband who made here a slave and a punching bag during the short span of her marriage with him. The
law on annulment should be liberally construed in favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law
will be an instrument to protect persons with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein
respondent.8
THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and
Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of evidence approach which allows the
fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the root causes
of the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the
aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be
sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the
person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was psychologically incapable
of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential duties of marriage due to an underlying
psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is
inconclusive. As observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material support
to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of
a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that
the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the
product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner,
anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA
588, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that
he had been forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a permanent
compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive work and more stable
relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the defining characteristic
of psychological incapacity is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married life of the petitioner
with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be extinguished. As the
Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability of the
marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of
psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to
separate and divorce.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA ruling based on
the following arguments:
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the legal basis of the
RTC in declaring the marriage null and void – Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should
be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that "the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-
existence of petitioner’s psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us
(the Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial court’s factual findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of private respondent’s witnesses vis-à-vis petitioner’s defenses are clearly
and manifestly erroneous";
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission was intentional
to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by statutory parameters.
Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives three
conditions that would make a person unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity as follows:
"1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and
duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;
(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic
nature."
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC, being clothed with
discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the
law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to define what constitutes psychological
incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on generalities without being specific on why it
is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that actually exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC
decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code and its related jurisprudence.
The Law, Molina and Te
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely introduced an abstract concept –
psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage – without any
concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on how
the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals9 declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage."10
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in Republic v.
Court of Appeals11 (Molina) as follows:
parties or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts x x x
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of Santos.13
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,14 further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.15
Pesca v. Pesca16 clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending, under the
reasoning that the court’s interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the
law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted,
that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit."
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules
pertinently provides:
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented, including expert
opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b)
requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the advisability of receiving expert testimony and
such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the
grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
All cases – involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code – that came to us were invariably decided
based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the
Court decided Te v. Yu-Te17 (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.18 Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so
designed to allow some resiliency in its application.19
Te then sustained Santos’ doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a
party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower court’s judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the
appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings,
the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the
lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which the concept
should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina.
Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that,
following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting20 follows Te’s lead
when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the
relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages:21
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to
attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too
expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are
provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent
requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist
or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during
the pre-trial conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,22 merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also
noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must
not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.23 [Underscoring supplied]
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.24
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of the Family Code,
what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception
of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.25 It is not enough that the respondent,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was
unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral
element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations – must be shown.26 Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.27
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos’ juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos’ continuing doctrinal validity.
The Present Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyn’s evidence insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity to
perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own examination of the evidence on record,
which we were compelled to undertake because of the differences in the trial court and the appellate court’s
appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyn’s presented evidence.
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root cause,
gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence – the psychologist’s
testimony and the psychological evaluation report – that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open
court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she derived
all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be
doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must
evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and
stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave,
severe and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement.
While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the
oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a determination though of a party’s complete personality
profile, information coming from persons intimately related to him (such as the party’s close relatives and
friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same
time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based
entirely on doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information coming from a directly
interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed
an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be
conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate
a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that
the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.1avvphi1
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a
general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of
this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases
for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. These particulars are simply
not in the Report, and neither can they be found in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelito’s personality disorder is chronic or incurable; Angelito has
long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental
stage, as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support this declaration with any factual basis. In
her Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional
family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologist’s own equivocation on this point – she was not firm in her
conclusion for she herself may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is
highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyn’s assumed knowledge of Angelito’s family background and
upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent was Angelito’s
personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on Angelito’s awareness of and his
capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns or requisites of
psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyn’s cause.
b. Jocelyn’s Testimony
The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the psychologist’s testimony
impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyn’s testimony, to find out whether she provided the court with
sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelito’s psychological incapacity.
Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn’s testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s habitual
drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him – all of
which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of
violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the
earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not
before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took
place – whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear
evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the
psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not,
by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to
perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of
psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While we may concede that
physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence, standing
alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the
psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyn’s account of the physical beatings
she received from Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related
jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now find to be clearly and
manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual findings of the trial court in
Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyn’s main anchor in her present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this
case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts
and the evidence of the present case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the appealed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,

vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our
laws, has become a clichéd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with
much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by
which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was
formulated—free in form and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition
further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged
decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to
Rowena’s close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That
was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree of
closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked
Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however,
made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and
she, purchasing the boat ticket.4
However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily
sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila.
Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and
Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with
Rowena at her uncle’s place.5
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and
she, 20.6 The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place where Edward was treated like a prisoner—he was
not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to
leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they
should stay at their parents’ home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested
that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but
the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then
hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his
parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties. 12 In the meantime, on
July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to
appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was
collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and made
the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian
at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed.
He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a
psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds
of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his parents are also
in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to
be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly
remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of
Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did
not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a
pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read
the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to
have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that
with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of their
intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems
with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to
get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live
together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she
insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996,
respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu.
Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the
house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an
apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they
should go back and seek help from petitioner’s parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all
of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime
while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by
phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at their house,
respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even
threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone
every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of
threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how
he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage.
Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondent’s uncle
brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage
Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But
when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was
threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he
should persist in going home, they will commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even
made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[‫]ۥ‬
and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his
parents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner,
however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,]
petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner
offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioner’s parents while they are still studying. Respondent
refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own
and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever
he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that]
the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent refused to live with
petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his
parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able
to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting
petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded.
The break-up was caused by both parties[’] unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the
state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach’s Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing
to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit
himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an
introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other
individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit
himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves.
As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a
solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She
is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on
marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich
family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow
weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the
relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting to marital
vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by
religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties
have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely
introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other
hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her
strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during
marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on
the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.17 The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision19 in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed
and set aside the trial court’s ruling.20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of
respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information
provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.22 The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of
the OSG briefly stating therein the OSG’s reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be,
the petition.23 The CA later denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19,
2004 Resolution.24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the
Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.25
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological
incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no
requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by
the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all
the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the annulment petition filed before the RTC contains
no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically
identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes
that the requirements in Molina29 were not satisfied.30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage
between the parties is null and void.31
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence
interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article
36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her
separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:33
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated
April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code
Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the
inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce
in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law
Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a)
five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding
joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the
definition of marriage as —
‘a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law.’
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people
as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and
also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic
Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action
for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought
that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging
problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code
and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the
Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code
decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result
was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present
Civil Code, to wit:
‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient
use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.’
‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.’
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or annulled
on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages,
thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of
the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring
marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would
be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some
personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who
refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work
that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like
inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psychosexual anomaly.34
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient
use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest
after the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even
before the session was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to "mentally
incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent,
"it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity
is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity
of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar
Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined
that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is:
"Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone
of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but
Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine
curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be
cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno
and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence, its
special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that
even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands
valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to
fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the
relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those)
who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage"
provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to
their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void,
i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a
properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by
the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal
hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to
capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not
being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married
couples have found themselves in limbo—freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but
yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons
contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision
Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code—and
classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for
psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons:
"Canon #1081 required persons to be ‘capable according to law’ in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082
required that persons ‘be at least not ignorant’ of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087
(the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be
valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called ‘lack of due
discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability
to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence
means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the
wedding ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity
to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the
Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what
came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.36
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it
might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired
that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon
Law.37 The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application.38
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as expressed by Article 6840 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it
to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon
Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between the
second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the
incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an
ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they
are capable according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the
house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was
gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of
the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving consent because it has
been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of
their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract
which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological
act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which is not
available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of
consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but
he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with
respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand as
ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially
the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical
jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are
there sexual anomalies that are purely so – that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the
hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these
persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal,
either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism,
masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher
faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what
marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though
is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to
understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues
from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by
church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the
object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under such an
irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of
reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible
compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks
the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible
impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect
is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly
more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can
understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be
juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus
to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent
may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot
deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly through this
tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one
hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually
understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no
difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an
intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne,
another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the
object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an
affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the
object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited,
supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person
with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of
things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have
difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the
matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming
the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of
marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral
impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some
anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the
intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the
impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in
a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential
obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile
tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not capable of
initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so
self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union with the other,
let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the
spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance
of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of
the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is
capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx
would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite
capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the
bonum conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual
description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a person
diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may have
understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming
them because of his "constitutional immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is
determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the moment of execution of
decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of
the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be factored into the question of
whether a person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of
the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but
also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the
incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the
person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of
others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this
personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A
sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise
common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve one’s ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the
right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good of
the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may
give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which
interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships
in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was
understood to be invalidating of marriage – that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the inability
to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively,
however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that
by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is
to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same
rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the
consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon
that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional
cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity,
and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual
anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person
is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial
contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of
consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the
canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the
personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is
only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his
capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by
C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have
something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit
deeply engrained in one’s consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating
incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the development of
the habit, while one accepts as given one’s psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the
source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.42
Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether a
party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower court’s judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the
appellate courts.44
Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings,
the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45 explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the
lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition
of a set of strict standards in Molina,46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may
be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally— subject to our law on
evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and
another three—including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero—took pains to compose their individual separate
opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’
as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."48
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too
much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in
resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the
"most liberal divorce procedure in the world."50 The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its
toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions.
Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be
bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the
sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders
of the said individuals.51
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public
prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.52 The Court should
rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and
incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing
the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a
person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital
obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence,
constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to
speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration
of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the Court.
First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of
psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have
become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be
spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latter’s disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare
that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, 55 there is need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for
emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in
March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert
testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder.56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must
not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented
to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of
the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of
valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new
grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology
during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a
marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a
covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to
both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary
prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the
spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole
of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning
of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as
meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person;
that the spouses must be ‘other oriented’ since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and
that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a
physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage
depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity
for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to
the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity;
(5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a
marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of
the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are
the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality
where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits
very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally
the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack
of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family
almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the
marriage was entered into."581avvphi1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
And as Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity.61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the
acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. 62 Parenthetically, the Court, at
this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-
appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the
parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to
present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the
findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of
Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows—
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a person’s recent and long-term
functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply
ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to
interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable
by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An
individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is
the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some
individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even
criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other
people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems.
Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely,
isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction
with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality
disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain personality types.
Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.)
are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and
passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality,
rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic
stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate relationships.lawphil.net
However, later researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of
development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial
and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some
family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that low
cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and
a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine
oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial
personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients
reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major
clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals

who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified," that can be used for
other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality
disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be
long-term.64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner—
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others’ comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be
unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most
of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are
wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning
in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied
with fears of being abandoned.65 and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows—
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of
others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child
or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a façade of charm and even
sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who are
prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be
hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term described
immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.lawphil.net
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d
ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality disorders, the others
being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as
decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the
parties is null and void on ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial
court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses’ deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is
unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has
difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons
around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into
account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her
tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society. 68
Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage
which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003
Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004 Republic of The Philippines, Petitioner, LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, Respondent

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G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004 Republic of The Philippines, Petitioner, LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, Respondent

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G.R. No.

149498 May 20, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

We rule in favor of petitioner.

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner,

According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

xxx xxx xxx

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more

xxx xxx xxx

I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE

II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT

III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE

IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING

Art. 36 of the Family Code states:

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 24 we held:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED.

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Hence, this Petition.5

The Court's Ruling

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

xxx xxx xxx

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, Petitioner,

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

The RTC Ruling

The Petition and the Issues

THE COURT’S RULING

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable

The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.

A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper

We do not find her arguments convincing.

Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s requested remand.

Petitioner failed to establish the respondent’s psychological incapacity

b. Dr. Tayag’s psychological report and court testimony

We do not share this view.

ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:

DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:

Q: Can you please describe the personal [sic] disorder?

Q: You mean to say, from the formative [years] up to the present?

Q: How about the gravity?

PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:

Q: You were not able to personally examine the respondent here?

DR. NEDY TAYAG:

DR. NEDY TAYAG:

Q: Even if he is already eligible for employment?

Q: You give a more thorough interview so I am asking you something specific?

ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO

Q: Can this personally be cured, madam witness?

DR. NEDY TAYAG

JAIME F. VILLALON, Petitioner,

The petition has no merit.

ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner,

The Antecedent Facts

The Decision of the Trial Court

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads: