Marriage: Nature – Lifetime Commitment

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

GR No. 112019. January 4, 1995

Facts:

Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the marriage, the
couple when quarreling over a number of things including the interference of Julia’s parents
into their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the United States. Leouel was
then unable to communicate with her for a period of five years and she had then virtually
abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The Regional Trial Courtdismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should be appreciated.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
The psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated and must be
incurable. Mere abandonmentcannot therefore qualify as psychological incapacity on the
part of Julia.
Marriage: Essential Requisites - Consent

Antonio vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

Facts: Leonilo Antonio, petitioner, filed a petition to have his marriage to Marie Reyes,
respondent, declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the
Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at
the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that

respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things.

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a
clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand,
they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or
pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It
reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that
petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s
propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities
and her income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court,
respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to
live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered
her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus
declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychological incapacity as to

render the marriage null and void.

Ruling: It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a
failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the
truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate
proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them,
were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality
would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its
psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including
parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal
or emotional commitments.

Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable. From the totality of the
evidence, however, the court is sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner.
Marriage: Formal Requisite – Marriage License

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL,
INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

Facts:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was
filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner’s successional rights.

Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the
Family Code.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least five years
exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.

(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of
the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time
of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead

Ruling:

(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years
without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis
of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common law cohabitation period, which
is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should be the years immediately before
the day the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning
no third party was involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—that is, unbroken.
Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is computed without any distinction as to whether
the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them
on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the
death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid.
Marriage: Formal Requisite – Authority of Solemnizing Officer

ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000

Facts:

Judge Daguman solemnized the marriage of Zenaida Beso with Nardito A. Yman out from
his jurisdiction as a judge. After the marriage was solemnized, the man justabandoned his
wife without any light or reason. Because of this, the woman had to go to the registrar to
secure their marriage contract but to her surprised, no marriage contract that has been
registered in the office of the registrar, so, however, the registrar gave advice to
Zenaida Beso to write the judge who solemnized their marriage but likewise to her
surprised, judge Daguman who solemnized their marriage told her that her husband got sall
the copies of their marriage certificateand none was even left to him or was retained to the
judge.

This is the reason why Zenaida learned that the judge solemnized their marriage out of
his jurisdiction and was negligent in not retaining a copy and likewise in not registering their
marriage to the civil registrar as prescribed by law.

Issue:

Whether or not the effect of good faith is acceptable in the case at bar as a solemnizing officer.

Held:

No, good faith is not a defense because to abide with the law is what matters most and good
faith is not acceptable if it violates the law how noble is your intention. A judge is, presumed
to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdictionof his court. A judge
solemnized a marriage out from his jurisdiction shows an irregularity in the formal requisite
laid down in art.3 which while it may not affect the validity of marriage of marriage but may
subject the officiating officer to administrative authority.

The judge was fined at the amount of 5,000 pesos and any repetition with the
same offense will be dealt severely
Marriage: Formal Requisite – Marriage Ceremony

Morigo vs. People of the Philippines

G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004

Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card
from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they
became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to
work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came
back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed
to get married. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant
which was granted by the court. Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at
Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity
of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by
the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Issue: Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith.

Ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a

subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity
before he contracts a subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is
mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under
the circumstances of the present case, Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed
bigamy and that it need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or
lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
Persons: Marriage before a judge outside his court

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLOA. VILLAMORA,

complainants, v. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B.
ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, respondents.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721. September 30, 1994.

Facts:

Complainants Juvy n. Cosca, Edmund B. Eralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and ApolloVillamora, are
Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Cler II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy
are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.

In administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992,
herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of
marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of
an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the
custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.

Complainants alleged that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage licenses. Thus, the following couples were able o get married by the simple expedient of
paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. In addition,
respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization,
the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties
which was usually several days after the ceremony. The marriage contracts were not filed with the
local civil registrar.

It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the
month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void;
that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July,
1992, but the Notarial Registrar will show that there were notarized during that month; and that
respondents reported a notarial fee of only P 18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected
P 20.00 therefore and failed to account for the difference.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent are guilty of violating the provision of Article 4 of the Family Code.

Held:

On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code patiently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein.
Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential requisites shall generally render
the marriage void ab initio and that, while and irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages,
and what the court provides for pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without
prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that priests or ministers
of any religious denominationor sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.This is
of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
Persons: Marriage – Religious rites, no form required

EUGENIO v. VELEZ
Padilla, J.NCC 42: Effects of Deaths on Rights and Obligations

DOCTRINE:
Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is
determined by law, by contract and by will.

CASE SUMMARY:
Before learning of her death, Vitaliana’s brothers and sisters filed for habeas corpus against Tomas Eugenio, Sr. who was
alleged to have forcibly taken Vitaliana and kept her in his residence where she eventually died. Refusing to surrender
Vitaliana’s body, Eugenio claimed that the court had no jurisdiction over Vitaliana’s body and that he, as her common
law husband, had the right to bury her. After a review of facts, the RTC was found to have jurisdiction over the
proceedings by virtue of BP 192 and that Vitaliana’s siblings were the rightful custodians of her remains by virtue of
Article 294 of the Civil Code.

FACTS:

On September 27, 1988, unaware of her death, Vitaliana’s brothers and sisters filed for a petition of habeas
corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental, alleging that:

Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence by petitioner Eugenio and brought to petitioner’s residence where
she has held and deprived of her liberty. RTC issued writ but was returned unsatisfied as Eugenio refused to surrender
the body of Vitaliana, who was alleged to have died of heart failure because of toxemia of pregnancy on died August 28,
1988. Petitioner filed for a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the court had a lack of jurisdiction over the nature of
theaction; and that habeas corpus was applicable only to illegal confinement or detention of a living person and not a
deceased’s body. Petitioner also claimed to have legal custody of the body by virtue of his being her common law
husband. Vitaliana’s brothers and sisters alleged that petitioner was not in any way related to the deceased and
thatpetitioner was interfering with their duty as the deceased’s siblings to properly bury her body

ISSUE:
1. W/N court had jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus over the deceased;
2. W/N custody of the deceased’s body should be given to the deceased’s siblings

RULING:
1. Yes, Court did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and matter of the case because it could entertain thecase
through allegations of the petition as to who should be given the custody of the deceased’s body by virtue of Batas
Pambansa Bld. 129.

2. Yes, Article 294 used as basis; Since the deceased had no surviving spouse, children, or ascendants, custody of the
body fell onto her siblings because Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages. While there exist
laws that govern such, the man and woman living together must not be in any way in capacitated to contract marriage
for such laws to affect them. Eugenio was in a subsisting marriage with another woman - a legal impediment that
would nothave in any case let him and Vitaliana get married

DISPOSITION:
SC affirms decision appealed from. October 5, 1988 Petition for Certiorari (G.R. No. 851470) and Petition for Review
and Application of Restraining Order (G.R. No. 86470) DISMISSED. No costs.

NOTES:

BP Bld. 129 Section 19(5): “RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction [over]: …(5) in all
actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.”

Article 294:
“The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in the following
order: Among descendants and ascendants the order in which they are called to the intestate succession of the person
who has a right to claim support shall be observed.”