Submitted by: Algrace E.

Bellingan

Submitted to: Atty. Levy S. Estolloso

ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

REPUBLIC VS. MANALO

GR No. 221029, April 24, 2018

Facts:
Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national
named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract. A case for divorce was filed by herein
repondent in Japan and after the proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered
by the Japanese Court. The petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no longer living together and
in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband.
Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court
and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry, and to use her maiden surname.

Issue:
Whether or not a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated
to remarry.

Ruling:
YES. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. It does not demand that the alien spouse should be the
one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted.
The purpose of the provision is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. However, before a a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Thus, a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the capacity to remarry pursuant to
Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

REPUBLIC VS DAYOT
GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

Facts:
Jose came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house. On 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at
the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. In lieu of a marriage license,
Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity,
and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. On 7 July
1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity contending that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not
execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years;
and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. On the other hand, Felisa alleged that
while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990.

Issue:
Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of
the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license.

Ruling:
YES. Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by
the local civil registrar. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is indispensable.
In the case at bar, Jose and Felisa started living together barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage. The falsity of the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of
a marriage license, is beyond question. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but
a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. Thus, the
marriage of Jose and Felicita is void ab initio due to lack of marriage license.
ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

ACEBEDO VS. ARQUERO

AM No. P-94-1054, March 11, 2003

Facts:
Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC Brooke's
Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot,
Brooke's Point, Palawan. As a result of which, a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two on
May 21, 1989. By respondent's own admission, he had an illicit relationship with complainant's wife for 8
to 9 months. He justified his relationship with complainant's wife solely on the written document, a
"Kasunduan," consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to seek any partner and to live with him
or her.

Issue 1:
Whether or not the Kasunduan agreed by a married couple is enough ground to sever the marriage tie.

Ruling:
NO. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is "an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." It is an institution
of public order and policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by
stipulation of the parties. The Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the
marriage between complainant and his wife.

Issue 2:
Whether or not the entry of respondent's name as father in the baptismal certificate be used to prove
for her filiation.

Ruling:
NO. A canonical certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity with the
rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained therein which concern the relationship of the person baptized.
It cannot be used to prove for her filiation and, therefore, cannot be availed of to imply that respondent
maintained illicit relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo.
ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

NINAL VS. BAYADOG

GR No. 133778, March 14, 2000

Facts:
Pepito Niñal,the father of herein petitioners, was married to Teodulfa Bellones. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they have executed an affidavit stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing
a marriage license. When Pepito died in a car accident, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47
of the Family Code. The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code.

Issue 1:
Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab
initio.

Ruling:
YES. The applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time
of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code.
The absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio except in instances provided by law such as
when they have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day since from the time the
first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Hence, the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license and is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Issue 2:
Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage
void after his death.

Ruling:
A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place. Void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties.
In this case, their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing. Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare the
marriage an absolute nullity. Hence, for the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage.
ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

ALCANTARA VS. ALCANTARA

GR No. 167746, August 28, 2007

Facts:
The petitioner and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to Manila City Hall
and got married before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.
Three months later, Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony in a church, but
likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license
appearing on the marriage contract is a sham. After two years, respondent gave birth to two children.
Later on, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three
children.The marriage involved herein have been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and the respondent is valid despite the irregularity of their
marriage license.

Ruling:
YES. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties is
considered mere irregularity that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the
formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. The fact that neither the petitioner nor the respondent is a resident of Carmona only constitutes
an irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage, but it does not affect the validity of their marriage.
Moreover, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever
irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.
ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

ARANES VS. OCIANO

AM No. MTJ-02-1390, April 11, 2002

Facts:
Respondent judge was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo to solemnize the marriage of the
parties. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in Nabua since Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of
travelling to the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan. When respondent judge knew that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest
pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human compassion and out of fear that if he reset the wedding, it might
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he
reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it
would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they will provide
the marriage license, but failed to comply. Petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage
License on 5 January 2000, but never claimed it. Also, their wedding was not recorded in the Local Civil
Registrar. So when they tried to request for the marriage license, the office said that they cannot provide
the license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.

Issue 1:
Whether or not the judge is allowed to solemnize outside his jurisdiction due to the physical condition of
one of the parties.

Ruling:
NO. The authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial
jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law
and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability
for violating the law on marriage.

Issue 2:
Whether or not the judge is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license.

Ruling:
YES. Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
ALGRACE BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

ARANES VS. OCIANO

AM No. MTJ-02-1390, April 11, 2002

Issue 3:
Is there a valid wedding?

Ruling:
No. A valid marriage license is a formal requisite of marriage as stated in Article 3 of the Famliy Code. As
stated in Article 4, the absence of any formal requisite shall render the marriage void ab initio. In this case,
since there was no marriage license prior to the wedding, the marriage is invalid as if no marriage took
place. Also, the party cannot be exempted from getting a marriage license since they do not fall under the
exemptions since the party only had difficulty in walking, but was not in articulo mortis.
ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

REPUBLIC VS. ALBIOS

GR No. 198780, October 16, 2013

Facts:
Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage. Respondent contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship, and in return, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00. However, after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways and Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her. Two years later, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of
her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never
lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Issue:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

Ruling:
NO. Under Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. In the case at bar, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. Their consent
was conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of
the listed circumstances in Article 46. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the
parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no
further use for it.
ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

BAKSH VS CA
GR No. 97336, February 19, 1993

Facts:
The complainant, Marilou Gonzales, is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. On the other hand, the petitioner,
Gashem Shookat Baksh, is an Iranian exchange student taking a medical course and residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City. The petitioner courted and proposed to marry the complainant. The
complainant accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. The petitioner then forced
her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments. She was a virgin before she began living with him. In the
early days of October, 1987, the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. As a result of this
live-in relationship, Marilou became pregnant, but petitioner gave her some medicine to abort the fetus.
Nevertheless, she continued to live with the petitioner and kept reminding him of his promise to marry
her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City.

Issue:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.

Ruling:
YES. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, as
stated in Article 21 of the Civil Code, “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
In this case, petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private
respondent. Because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him.
Moreover, by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with
Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the
end of October 1987. Hence, the complainant can claim for damages.
ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN JULY 4, 2019

TANJANCO VS CA
GR No. L-18630, December 17, 1966

Facts:
The defendant, Apolonio Tanjanco, expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff,
Araceli Santos, who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings. In consideration of defendant's
promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge. Plaintiff
conceived a child which forced her to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. Upon being certain
of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant and pleaded with him to make good his
promises of marriage. Instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the defendant stopped
and refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959. Due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff,
as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
and social humiliation.

Issue:
Whether or not Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos for breach of his promise to marry
her.

Ruling:
NO. Seduction connotes the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the
part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. However, that definition of seduction is not
consistent with the position of Santos, who was of legal age, and granted carnal access to Tanjanco and
had sexual relations with him for one whole year. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion. Since
no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, Tanjanco cannot be held liable for a breach of promise
to marry.
ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

RONULO VS PEOPLE
GR No. 182438, July 2, 2014

Facts:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed
officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed
to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, the couple, together with their guests, proceeded to an
Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which
the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate. The
ceremony was conducted on the same day and the couple took each other as husband and wife in front
of the guests.
Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage
ceremony. The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing
the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.

Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

Ruling:
YES. Article 3(3) of the Family Code states that “A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife...” Also, Article 6 of the Family Code provides that no prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. While the petitioner may view this
merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony
qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."
Moreover, under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence
of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple
had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship. Undoubtedly, the petitioner
conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of
marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s
knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

CACHO VS PEOPLE
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004

Facts:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran
City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years. After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete lost contact with each other, but they reconnected and became sweethearts in 1984. Both agreed
to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan,
Pilar, Bohol. After a year, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court. The following year, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago. Accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. Subsequently, he filed the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19,
1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy.

Ruling:
NO. The first element of Bigamy was not present. There was no marriage ceremony. What transpired was
a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The
mere signing of the same bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration
of nullity. Since there was no marriage "from the beginning," the contract of marriage is null and bears
no legal effect.
ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner, Jennifer Cagandahan, was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth. While growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and at age
thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She then alleged that for all interests
and appearances, as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Dr. Sionzon issued a
medical certificate stating that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He further testified that
respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has
made up her mind and has adjusted to her chosen role as male. Thus, a Petition for Correction of Entries
in Birth Certificate was filed to reflect the following changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate:
(1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to
"male."

Issue:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

Ruling:
YES. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.
Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent"
and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male. The change of name from Jennifer to
Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name that will conform with the change of the
entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC

GR No. 174689, October 22, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner was born on April 4, 1962 under the registered name "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio." In his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate), his sex was registered as "male." He alleged that he is a male
transsexual and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation, and sex reassignment surgery
in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."

Issue:
Whether or not the change of petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed on the ground
of sex reassignment.

Ruling:
NO. There is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407 of the Civil Code. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. When words are not defined
in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent. Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons
who have undergone sex reassignment. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy
to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
ALGRACE E. BELLINGAN July 4, 2019

OBERGEFELL VS HUDGES
SC-USA No. 14-556, June 26, 2015

Facts:
The petitioners, 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased, filed suits in
Federal District Courts in their home States, claiming that respondent state officials violate the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully performed in another State
given full recognition.

Petitioner James Obergefell and John Arthur, both from Ohio, fell in love and started a life together,
establishing a lasting, committed relation. In 2011, however, Arthur was diagnosed with amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis, or ALS, a debilitating disease that is progressive, with no known cure. The two were
married in Maryland, where same-sex marriage was legal. After three months, Arthur died. Ohio law does
not permit Obergefell to be listed as the surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate.

April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, both nurses from Michigan, celebrated a commitment ceremony to honor
their permanent relation in 2007. In 2009, DeBoer and Rowse fostered and then adopted two baby boys
and a baby girl. Michigan, however, permits only opposite-sex married couples or single individuals to
adopt, so each child can have only one woman as his or her legal parent.

Army Reserve Sergeant First Class Ijpe DeKoe and his partner Thomas Kostura, both from Tennessee, fell
in love and were married in New York before DeKoe was deployed to Afghanistan. Upon his return, they
settled in Tennessee, but their marriage was not recognized.

Issue 1:
Whether or not same-sex marriage is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ruling:
YES. The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person. The right of same-sex
couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The
liberties protected by this Equal Protection Clause extend to choices that are central to a person’s dignity
and autonomy, including intimate choices about personal beliefs and identity. Hence, the Constitution
grants them that right.

Issue 2:
Whether or not same-sex marriage should be recognized in other states.

Ruling:
YES. The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same
sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully
licensed and performed out-of-State. If the current state of affairs is left in place, the result would be
instability and uncertainty. It follows from the decision that same-sex couples may marry in all states, that
there is no lawful basis on which a state can refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage lawfully performed
in another state because of its same-sex character.