Domingo vs Court of Appeals

FACTS:

Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela Paz.

He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been working in
Saudi Arabia, for support and subsistence.

Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983.

In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing
of some of her properties without her knowledge and consent.

In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto
and separation of property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.

RULING:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
the said projected marriage is free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.

The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot
be charged with bigamy.
SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
Facts:
During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with
Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offspring (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan
Yee Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988,
Santiago passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao was able to
collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for
collection of sum of money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with
Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was solemnized without the required
marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of
acquired death benefits (void). The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of
marriage license.
Ruling:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof,
subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the
marriage does not fall within any of those exceptionsand a marriage license therefore
was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and
Carino has been sufficientlyovercome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is
void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the
time it was contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-
ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Nolasco

FACTS:

Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that, she lived with
him on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought her to his
hometown in San Jose, Antique.  They got married in January 1982.

After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and left the province. In
January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to
their son, she left. He cut short his contract  to find Janet. He returned home in November 1983.

He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He wrote several
letters to the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were returned to him. He claimed that he
inquired from his friends but they too had no news about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before
the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.

RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed to the CA,
contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco had
failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. CA affirmed the
trial court's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

RULING:
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under the
Article 41 of the Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet is
already dead.

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to 4 years;
however, there is a need for judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to marry. However,   Article 41 imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive
death of one spouse. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before
a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about Janet's
whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead.

Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local authorities or of
the British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged refusal to give any
information about her was too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. He did not
explain why he took him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his
captain. He refused to identify his friends whom he inquired from. When the Court asked
Nolasco about the returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in London,
he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife.

The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it very
difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one.
SSS v.Jarque, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006

FACTS:
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage in Barcelona,
Sorsogon. On October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the CFI of Sorsogon a petition to declare
Alice presumptively dead. On December 10, 1970, the CFI granted the petition. Close to 13
years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque in Casiguran, Sorsogon. She was designated as SSS
beneficiary of Bailon. SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly
pension for death benefits on the basis of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her
marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted during the subsistence of Bailon’s marriage
with Alice. Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits
asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as
bigamous or unlawful. Hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent Teresita Jarque
may terminate by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon

HELD:
The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until
annulled. It is only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to
Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which
action for annulment may be filed. The two marriages involved here falls under the Civil
Code. Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by
final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or
by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage. Under the Family Code, no judicial
proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof
provides the subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of
the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. If the absentee reappears, but no step is
taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such
absentee‘s mere reappearance will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage
has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouse‘s physical reappearance. In the case at bar, as no
step was taken to nullify Bailon & Jargue’s marriage, Teresita is proclaimed to be rightfully the
dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS v. REPUBLIC AUTHOR: Reyes, Brixton

OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018
TOPIC: Judicial Declaration of Presumptive
Death
PONENTE: J. Velasco
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 Judicial declaration of presumptive death is only applicable for the purpose of contracting
a valid subsequent marriage under Art. 41 of the Family Code.

 Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code involve a presumption of death already established
by law. There is no need to file such petition under said provisions before the court.
FACTS:
1. Estrellita Tadeo-Matias (Petitioner) was married to Wilfredo Matias who was a
member of the Philippine Constabulary and assigned in Araya, Pampanga. They were
married on January 7, 1968.

2. On September 15, 1979, Wilfred left their conjugal home at San Miguel, Tarlac City in
order to serve his duties. He was never seen or heard from again and has never made
contact with any of his or Petitioner’s relatives. Petitioner constantly sought updates
from the Philippine Constabulary regarding the whereabouts of her husband to no
avail.

3. After 3 decades of waiting, Petitioner sought for a claim of death benefits under P.D.
1638 from the Philippine Veteran’s Affair Office (PVAO) of the AFP. One of its
requirements is a judicial declaration of presumptive death.

4. RTC: Affirmed Petitioner and declared Petitioner’s husband presumptively dead under
Art. 41 of the Family Code.

5. CA: Reversed RTC ruling since Art. 41only allows such declaration in cases of
remarriage which Petitioner did not seek.
ISSUE(S): Whether Petitioner can validly be granted the judicial declaration of presumptive
death.

HELD: No. Petitioner erred in filing for judicial declaration of presumptive death which is not a
viable suit.
RATIO:
 Article 41 of the FC involves that presumption of death established therein is only
applicable for the
Purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage.

 The RTC erred in considering said petition because it was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage under the FC but Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
 Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absence still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession. The absentee
shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of
five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate
among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing
for four
years;
(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.

 Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action
brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said
articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. The
presumption in the said articles is already established by law. In short, the petition is not
authorized by law.

 It is unnecessary for Petitioner to file for judicial declaration of presumptive death to

claim death benefits from the PVAO or the AFP. What is only required is evidence of the
claimant that the concerned soldier had been missing for a number of years and or under
the circumstance prescribed under Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.

LEGAL SEPARATION

Ong Eng Kiam a.k.a. William Ong vs Lucita Ong

G.R. No. 153206

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:

William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when Lucita filed a
complaint for Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code.

Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her husband William subjected her to
physical violence like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her head against the
concrete wall.and been violent towards their three children. He would scold them using his belt
buckle to beat them. One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several
different parts of her body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house which she did.

Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim.
Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the day after she left her conjugal home also
testified about her injuries.

The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal separation which the CA affirmed

William then filed this petition for review on certiorari

-On the decision denying all of Lucita’s allegations and that he never inflicted physical harm on
her or their children.

-He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the complaint is to deprive
him of his control and ownership over his conjugal properties with Lucita.

-That the CA overlooked some facts of the case which warrant an exception to the general rule
that questions of fact cannot be the subject for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

-The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and their parents’ doctor Dr.
ElinZano since their testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud and since Lucita
abandoned the family home she has also given a ground for legal separation and therefore
should NOT- be granted one pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of The family code – Where both parties
have given ground for legal separation

ISSUE: WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation

HELD:

The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take control of the
conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated physical violence
and grossly abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were
brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly established. He can derive no personal gain from
pushing for the financial interests of her family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and
the companionship of her husband and children

The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses is given great respect.
Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and label a witness’ testimony as biased and
unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward
testimonies the court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for
more than one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated in the said provision

PETITION DENIED: Lucita should be granted a decree of legal separation

G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010 MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO GOZON, et al.,
Respondents. G.R. No. 169977 INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner, vs. MARIO
SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, et al., Respondents. CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

Elvira Gozon filed with the RTC Cavite a petition for legal separation against her husband
Alfredo Gozon.

Then, while the pending case of Legal Separation of both parties, Alfredo and Mario entered
into Agreement of Buy and Sell involving their conjugal property for the price of 18 million pesos.
Mario pays the partial payment of the said price and he took the possession of the property.

When the Court granted the legal separation of Elvira and Mario, their property was dissolved
and liquidated. Being the offending spouse, Alfredo is deprived of his share in the net profits and
the same is awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to Elvira.

On Oct, 26, 1994 Alfredo sold that property into Inter Dimensional Realty Inc. for 18 million
pesos in his favor by Winnifred. And the IDRI paid it in full payment.

Because of that Mario, filed a complaint with RTC Malabon for specific performance and
damages, annulment of donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction
and/or temporary restraining order.

The Court held, the agreement between Alfredo and IDRI is null and void for their attempt of
commission or continuance of their wrongful acts, further alienating or disposing of the subject
property. Also the agreement of Alfredo and Mario is null and void, for the absence of written
consent of Elvira Gozon for her property rights to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal
property of this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the offending spouse, Alfredo Gozon has right to sell their conjugal partnership
without the consent of the other spouse, and share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership.

Held:

No,

The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the
portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the
other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s
written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. And the offending spouse in an
action for legal separation is deprived of his share in the net profits of the conjugal properties.

Under Article 63 (2) of the Family Code, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of
the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be
forfeited in accordance with the provisions of article
QUIAO V. QUIAO

G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012]

FACTS:

Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody
of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally
between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or
after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before
the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”

RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of
the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It
further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the
net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family
Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no
other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a
result of legal separation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art 129 will govern.

2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal
partnership– NO.

3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with
the computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute community? NO.

RATIO:

1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the
default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall
govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is
already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far
as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of
the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by
the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested
rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of
the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in
common by the husband and wife.”

While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due
process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-
aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded
to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community
assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after
the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the
decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s
ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the
Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife
become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse
brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under
Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the
couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the
spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established,
irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that
the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply
the “net profits.” And since the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the
net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under
Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the
couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or
merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete
separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no
separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are
considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed
properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.
However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits
of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2)
of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing
will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no
separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife

Ilusorio v. Bildner

G.R. No. 139789, 12 May 2000

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. For many years, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten
6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and
Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he
was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On
the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in
Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose
Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with
RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and
visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

RULING:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a
person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where
there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.It is
devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.The essential object and purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s
liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the
capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may
not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of
his right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife
to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he
is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture
is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.