Ninal vs.

Badayog

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Facts:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.

Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among
the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:

1. WON the subsequent marriage of petitioner’s father void ab initio

2. WON petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?

Ruling:

1. Yes, their marriage is void ab initio. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said
that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito
and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their
five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived
with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage
even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
2. Yes, the petitioners have legal personality. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration
of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
 Jarillo v. People
Facts:

Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C.
Tanyag.This marriage was followed by a church solemnization. Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter,
Rachelle. Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy
filed against the appellant for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.Thereafter, appellant
Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.Jarillo filed against Alocillo, for
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Then, Jarillo was found guilty of bigamy.

Jarillo then filed a motion for reconsideration alleging primarily that For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1)
her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain
Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and
void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo
as far back as 1978.

Issue: WON there was a prejudicial question, WON judicial proceeding was necessary

Ruling:

The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase
the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the
civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the
prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void
and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon
the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage
was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.

2nd Jarillo case:

Facts: This resolves petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration after having been convicted of bigamy. Petitioner is moving
for reconsideration of the Decision, arguing that since petitioner’s marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the
Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family
Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent
marriage.

Issue: WON the contention of the petitioner is meritorious.

Runilng: No, the petition lacks merit. The Court already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure,
should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said “Code shall have
retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.” The Court went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws

Cha-Tan vs Tan

Facts:

The parties were married in Manila Cathedral and were blessed with two children. 12 years after the marriage Susie filed
for DNM. Jesse Tan and Susie Tan’s marriage was declared void under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Incorporated in such
decision of the RTC was the approval of the Compromise Agreement of the parties.

Jesse filed an omnibus motion seeking the main custody of the children because without his knowledge Susie brought their
children out of the country without prior authority form the RTC and Susie failed to pay the remaining balance for the
megaworld property which will prejudice the interest of the children. The trial court awarded main custody to Jesse.

She claimed that she was forced to leave the country because she was being beaten down by Jesse and that she was deprived
of due process.

Issue: WON the decision of the RTC has become final and executor

Yes.

Clearly, despite her counsel’s efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter disinterest in the hearings on
respondent’s omnibus motion seeking, among others, custody of the children. The trial judge was left with
no other recourse but to proceed with the hearings and rule on the motion based on the evidence presented by respondent.
Petitioner cannot now come to this Court crying denial of due process. As for the applicability to petitioner’s motion
to dismiss of Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, petitioner is correct. Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides: “SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss.—No motion to dismiss
the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the
parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be
raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.” (Emphasis supplied) The clear intent of the provision is
to allow the respondent to ventilate all possible defenses in an answer, instead of a mere motion to dismiss, so that
judgment may be made on the merits. In construing a statute, the purpose or object of the law is an important
factor to be considered.32 Further, the letter of the law admits of no other interpretation but that the provision
applies only to a respondent, not a petitioner. Only a respondent in a petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage files an answer where any ground that may
warrant a dismissal may be raised as an affirmative defense pursuant to the provision. The only logical conclusion
is that Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to a motion to dismiss filed by the party who initiated the petition for
the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage. Since petitioner is
not the respondent in the petition for the annulment of the marriage, Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to the
motion to dismiss filed by her. Section 7 of the Rule not being applicable, petitioner’s claim that it is unconstitutional
for allegedly setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family is without basis. Section 1 of the Rule states
that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage. In this connection, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court allows dismissal
of the action upon notice or upon motion of the plaintiff.

The Facts:
Noel Lasanas (petitioner), and Socorro were married by Judge Carlos Salazar in 1968, without the benefit of a marriage
license or an affidavit of cohabitation. They renewed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo
Tamayo in Iloilo City, again without attaching a marriage license or an affidavit of cohabitation. They separated in 1982,
however, due to irreconcilable differences. Noel then married Josefa Esteban in a religious ceremony solemnised by Fr.
Ramon Sequito in Iloilo City. Noel’s marriage status was indicated in the marriage certificate as “single”. On July 26,
1996, Noel filed a complaint for annulment of marriages and damages against Socorro, alleging that the latter employed
deceit, misrepresentation and fraud in securing his consent to their marriage. Soccoro then filed a criminal case for
bigamy against Noel, and the corresponding information filed against him. His complaint for declaration of nullity was
dismissed on November 24, 1998. Meanwhile, in the criminal case for bigamy, Noel was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court as charged. He appealed to the CA, but the latter affirmed the RTC judgment. Thus, Noel filed the instant petition
for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. He argues that the first element of bigamy was not duly proved, as his
marriage to Socorro was null and void for lack of marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation; he acted in good faith; and
had the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage before he could
contract a subsequent marriage. He argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, asserting that the civil law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial
declaration of nullity before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely criminal
prosecution; that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent
marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in Article 53 in
relation to Article 52 of the Family Code; that, consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the
subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking; and that his good faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve
him of criminal liability.
The Issue:
Whether or not Noel should be held liable for bigamy.
The Ruling:
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant Patingo was void
because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding
ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for
to do so, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites is a valid
marriage license except in those instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license
nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be
treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his
void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but after his
marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing pursuant to Mañozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA
625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all respect.⁠2
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior
to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:⁠3
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the Family
Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her
marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately
filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein
before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the first
marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity
of his first marriage. Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this
case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the
Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or
inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court.
Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accused’s conviction for bigamy is affirmed. The crime of bigamy was consummated from the
moment he contracted the second marriage without his marriage to Socorro being first judicially declared null and void,
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and
subsisting due to such marriage not being yet declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction.⁠4 “What makes a
person criminally liable for bigamy,” according to People v. Odtuhan:⁠5
x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration especially because the records show that he
had filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the criminal complaint
against him but after he had already contracted his second marriage with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon
him because the RTC (Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of marriage after the information for bigamy
had already been filed against him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro.
Considering that the accused’s subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was
established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of
nullity of marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was he himself who failed to secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of his previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals⁠6, the Court has explained that “[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. ⁠7 The
Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People:⁠8
x x x Nollora may not impugn his [subsequent] marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability;
otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we
stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.