Article 35

Capili v. People (G.R. No. 189805, Jul. 3, 2013)

Facts:

Respondent charged herein petitioner Capili with the crimebigamy before the Pasig RTC.
Respondents claim that asecond marriage was contracted before the first marriagewas declared
void. Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspendalleging that there is currently a pending civil case
fordeclaration of nullity of the second marriage before theRTC of Antipolo filed by Karla Medina-
Capili. Thearraignment was therefore reset. Ultimately, RTC Antipolodeclared the second
marriage void. Because the secondmarriage was ultimately declared to be void,
petitionerargues that there cannot be any crime of bigamy.

Issue

: WON Petitioner is liable for bigamy, considering that the second marriage was declared to be
void?

Held:

YES. Petitioner is still guilty of bigamy despite declaration of second marriage as void.

The crime of bigamy exists so long as a second marriage was contracted during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. This is true even if the second marriage was declared to be
a nullity.

According to the RPC, the elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows:

the offender has been legally married;

the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity

In the present case, all the elements are present. At the outset, it is therefore clear that the
Petitioner is liable for bigamy. Additionally, the second marriage was contracted during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second
marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy. Even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long
as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated, there is still
a crime of bigamy.

In Jarillo v. People held that:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterialbecause
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [privatecomplainant]
had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guiltin the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

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Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan ( G.R. No. 201061, Jul. 3,2013)

Facts:

Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) alleged that he was married to Azucena Alegre (Azucena),
where they had three children. However, Benjamindeveloped a romantic relationship with Sally
Go-Bangayan (Sally) who was acustomer in the business owned by Benjamin’s family.
Sometime after Azucenaleft for America, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and
wife. Theysign a purported marriage contract even though Sally knew of Benjamin’s marital
status. Sally assured him that the marriage contract would not beregistered. Benjamin and
Sally’s cohabitation produced two children.When the relationship ended, Sally went to Canada
bringing with hertheir 2 children. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification
ofpublic documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contractas evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existentmarriage and/or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the trial court.

Issue:

WON the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was valid

Held:

No. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into the purportedmarriage, the marriage between
Benjamin and Azucena was still validand subsisting.Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena was duly
establishedbefore the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriagecontract.

Furthermore, the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally had no validmarriage license
because the Local Civil Registrar confirmed that theMarriage License of Benjamin and Sally did
not match the MarriageLicense series issued for the month of February 1982. The Civil
Registraralso said that it did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 (the allegedMarriage
License of Benjamin and Sally) to the couple. Such certificationfrom the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of amarriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certificationenjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under
the lawto keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized withouta license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license isnecessary, "shall be void from the beginning."

In this case, themarriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license.Therefore, it is clear that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally wasnull and void ab
initio and non-existent.

Montanez v. Cipriano (G.R. No. 181089, Oct. 22, 2012)

Facts:

On April 8, 1976, Lourdes married Socrates. On January 24, 1983, while the first marriage has
not yet been judicially dissolved, Lourdes married Silverio. Lourdes filed a petition in 2001 to
annul her marriage with Socrates for psychological incapacity. The first marriage was declared
null and void on 2003 On May 14, 2004, Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, the petitioner and
Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed a bigamy complaint against Lourse. Attached to
the complaint was a marked and signed affidavit of Silverio stating that Lourdes concealed her
marriage to Socrates. On July 24, 2007, Lourdes alleged that since her marriage was declared
void ab initio in 2003, there can be no bigamy in the absence of two valid marriage, is therefore
wanting. RTC ruled that bigamy was not committed by the respondent. The subsequent
marriage was solemnized in 1983 prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; hence, the existing
law at that time did not require judicial declaration of nullity as a condition to remarry. Due to the
unsettled state of Jurisprudence, RTC interpreted the law liberally in favor of the accused.

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Issue:

WON the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of the on for
bigamy filed against her.

Held:

No, the declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not justify the dismissal of the bigamy
case.

In Jarillov. People, the Court ruled that when an accused contracted a subsequent marriage
without the prior marriage having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was
already consummated. This is so because the first marriage which had not yet been declared
null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.

The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that
she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. As long as
there is no judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage is presumed to be existing. Therefore,
he/she who contracts a subsequent marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage can be prosecuted for bigamy. Yes, what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy
is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.

People v. Odtuhan (G.R. No. 191566, Jul. 17, 2013)

Facts:

Respondent contracted marriage with Jasmin in 1980. Thirteen years thereafter, he married
Eleanor. However, his first marriage was declared void ab initio because it was celebrated
without a marriage license. Meanwhile, the second spouse died. Respondent was charged with
bigamy. He raises the defense that the facts in the information do not charge an offense of
bigamy since his first marriage was void ab initio; hence, there is an absence of an essential
element in the crime of bigamy.

Issue:

WON respondent is guilty of bigamy.

Held:

Yes, what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

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Article 36

Mendoza v. Republic (G.R. No. 157649, Nov. 12, 2012)

Facts:

Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza met in 1989, as next-door neighbors in the apartelle they were
renting while both were still in college. Arabelle became pregnant with their daughter, Allysa
Bianca. On her eighth month of pregnancy, they got married in civil rites in Pasay. Dominic had
to borrow funds from Arabelle’s best friend to settle the hospital bill for their baby’s delivery.
Thereafter, he remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished
college.

Arabelle took on various job’s to meet the family’s needs. Being the one with fixed income, she
shouldered all of the family’s expenses. On the other hand, Dominic sold encyclopedias after his
graduation, then worked as a car salesman for Toyota. Ironically, he spent his first sales
commission on a celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she shouldered all the
household expenses and their child’s schooling because his irregular income could not be
depended upon.

Arabelle discovered Dominic’s illicit relationship with his co-employee. This then affected their
communication and sexual relationship. Dominic gave Arabelle a car as a birthday present, and
told Arabelle to issue him 2 blank checks that he claimed would be for the car’s insurance. She
later not only found out that he used the check for his personal needs, but also that he did not
pay for the car itself, forcing her to both rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car
and for her to bear the balance. Dominic was later fired from his employment after he ran away
with P164,000 belonging to his employer, and charged and arrested for violation of BP 22 and
estafa.

Dominic subsequently abandoned the conjugal abode. A month later, she

refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. Arabelle
then filed in the RTC a petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with
Dominic based on psychological incapacity, which the OSG opposed.

Arabelle presented herself as a witness together with a psychiatrist Dr. Samson and Professor
Jimenez. Meanwhile, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence. RTC
found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and
incurability, as set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina), were attendant, establishing
Dominic’s psychological incapacity.

Upon appeal, Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and refused to be
bound by the findings and conclusions of Dr. Samson, which were concluded only on the
basis of information given by Arabelle herself. It held that the Arabelle's testimonies
failed to establish Dominic’s psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious
nature that it was medically or clinically rooted, citing Republic v. Dagdag, Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals, and Pesca v. Pesca. Additionally, the husband's immaturity, sexual
infidelity, and being a suspect for estafa and violation of BP 22 do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity.

Issue: WON CA erred in its refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and evaluation and their
reliance on the Dagdag, Hernandez, and Pesca cases

Held:

NO. The findings of the expert were one-sided, given that Dominic himself was not subjected to
such, and that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were
solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him rendered
by the petitioner and her witnesses (those whom the petitioner herself referred).

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 CA’s reliance in Dagdag, Hernandez, and Pesca were not misplaced. Based on the doctrines
established in these 3 cases, it was not the absence of the medical expert’s testimony alone
that was crucial but rather the petitioner’s failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden the
showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage.

The totality of evidence of proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was
the crucial consideration. To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her
marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's
psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.

Republic v. Encelan (G.R. No. 170022, Jan. 9, 2013)

Facts:

In 1979, Cesar Encelan married Lolita, and they bore two children. In 1984, Cesar left for Saudi
for work and 2 years later, he found out that Lolita was having an illicit affair with Alvin. In 1991,
Lolita left the conjugal home with the children and lived with Alvin. In 1995, Cesar filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.

Lolita denies all allegations of infidelity and psychological incapacity.

Lolita’s psychological evaluation report stated that she:

 Was not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness

 Had not been able to provide the expectations expected of her for a good land lasting marital
relationship, as she refused to go abroad with Cesar

 Was transferring from one job to the other, which depicts some interpersonal problems with
co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions

Issue: WON psychological incapacity exists

Held:

NO.Psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance

of and to assume basic marital obligations, not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

For sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling to constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the
essential marital obligations. Otherwise, the alleged sexual infidelity and abandonment are
merely grounds for legal separation.

Interpersonal problems with co-workers does not conclude that Lolita, at the time of the
marriage, was psychologically incapacitated. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work
relationship. Their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for
them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another.

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Article 41

Republic v. Narceda (G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013)

Facts:

Robert P. Narceda and Marina Narceda got married on July 22, 198 m/

For purposes of remarriage, on May 16, 2002 Robert filed a Petition for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death and/or absence of Marina. The RTC granted the petition and declared the
Presumptive death of Marina. Petitioner appealed the decision with the Court of Appeals on the
guround that respondent failed to conduct a diligent search of his wife and there was no well-
founded belief that Marina was dead. The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and ruling that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death is a
summary proceeding under the Family Code, being such the judgments herein shall be
immediately final and executory.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was also denied
hence, this petition. 25

Issue: WON the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of Robert Narcedo.

Held:

Art. 41(2) states: For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

No appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration
of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. The OSG
availed the wrong remedy when it filed its notice of appeal. The wrong filing did not toll the
running of the period for filing the Petition for Certiorari, which has lapsed. As a result,
petitioner's contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his
absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this Court.

Article 48

Chan v. Chan (G.R. No. 179786, Jul. 24, 2013)

Facts:

Petitioner Wife filed against Respondent Husband a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, with the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of
their children to her, claiming that Respondent Husband failed to care for and support his family
and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and
excessive use of prohibited drugs.

Respondent Husband claims that it was the Wife who failed in her duties. And that he initially
agreed to marriage counseling to save their marriage, but upon arriving at the hospital, two men
forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. He attached a Philhealth
Claim Form to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a
hospital. However, that same form carried a physician’s handwritten note that the Husband
suffered from ―”methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.”

Based on the physician’s handwritten statement, Petitioner Wife requested for the issuance of a
subpoena ducestecumaddressed to Medical City, for the production of the Husband’s medical

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records. The Husband opposed, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-
patient privilege.

The request of Petitioner Wife was denied and her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration on
the matter was also denied. She then filed a Petitioner for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
but this was also dismissed. Her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration with the CA was also
denied.

Issue: WON CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena
ducestecumcovering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the
privileged character of the physician-patient communication

Held:

Issuance of a subpoena ducestecum is premature. Petitioner Wife made the request before trial
started. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a
subpoena ducestecumcovering her husband’s hospital records. It is when those records are
produced for examination at the trial, that the husband may opt to object, not just to their
admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.

Petitioner Wife’s motion for the issuance of the subpoena ducestecum also cannot be treated as
a motion for production of documents as a mode of discovery because Rule 27, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court is only limited to disclosure of documents which are NOT PRIVILEGED.

Petitioner Wife claims that the documents are not privileged because it is the TESTIMONY of
the physician that is supposed to be privileged. This contention is wrong. Section 24(c) of Rule
130 states that the physician ―cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined‖ regarding their (physician-patient) professional conversation. To allow the disclosure
during discovery procedure of the hospital records (including the results of tests that the
physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment given)
would, in effect, be tantamount to allowing access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patient’s consent. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify
on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

Lastly, Petitioner Wife argues that her Husband already admitted in his answer that he had been
confined in a hospital. However, as already mentioned above, trial in the case had not yet
begun. Since trial had not yet begun, it cannot be said the Husband had already presented said
Philhealth claim form as evidence. The Husband was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the
case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be
premature.