G.R. No.

200233

JULY 15, 2015

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566. The CA affirmed
the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 convicting her
of bigamy.
1

THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative
husband escaped the criminal suit.
3

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2
June 1974, asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married
Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she
wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without responsibility."
6

Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime
of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got
married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her
should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void
due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation
and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already
married Santos.
1wphi1

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of
his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos.
8

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an

admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage." Thus, the
trial court convicted petitioner as follows:
9

10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one
(1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio
for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an
exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case,
petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five years
prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively
rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:

11

Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court
to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do.
The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment
of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these
proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known
of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply
stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy.
12

THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because
she was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara, she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence
of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages
exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as
husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married
Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year
requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.
13

In the Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the
argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her
husband's subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first
marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the
courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
14

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
15

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d)
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in
the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno,
Jr. instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v.
Archilla likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing
prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes
her responsible as an accomplice.
16

17

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other
while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno:
18

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on
the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage
of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of
the following circumstances: (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of
her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person
like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that
she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
19

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of
the R TC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important
opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial.
20

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly
charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty
on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of
prision correctional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla holds that the second spouse, if
indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B.
Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who
knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as
an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an
accomplice to the crime.
21

22

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the
criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree, prision correctional, which has a duration of six months and one day
to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and
two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled
to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a
duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
23

24

The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. If the accused wants to
raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of
evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. In this case, petitioner has consistently questioned
below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the
essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.
25

26

27

28

Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not
pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack
her union with Santos was in vain.
1wphi1

On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, and given
that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, this Court now resolves to
correct the error of the courts a quo.
29

30

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their
Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.
31

Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 and
that after six months of courtship, she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the
prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija,
prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of
her in-laws, and her children from her previous marriage disliked him. On cross examination,
respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an
agent who sold her piglets.
32

33

34

35

36

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only
less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five
years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the
records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented
that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately,
subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, in which the solemnizing
officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
37

The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an
anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions
of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the
cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an
effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, we had the occasion to emphasize that the
State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
38

39

deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and,
in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery
of the sanctity of marriage.
40

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded." If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. As a result, litigants
shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
41

42

43

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage.
In violation of our law against illegal marriages, petitioner married Santos while knowing full well
that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the
Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use
her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
44

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground
that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that
when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil
Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was
celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract
a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage,
and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike
our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the
crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." It must be safeguarded from the
whims and caprices of the contracting parties. in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy,
this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy
45

46

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the

indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 139789

July 19, 2001

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO,

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE
DOES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on expectancy in fabled
fortune.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her
husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals 1 for habeas corpus to have
custody of her husband in consortium.

On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of
unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari
pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. 2 This case was
consolidated with another case3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and
Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never
refused to see her.
On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus 4 for lack of merit, and granted the
petition5 to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7
What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision. 8
On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000, at 10:00
a. m., without requiring the mandatory presence of the parties.
In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit:
(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner Potenciano
Ilusorio;
(b) Whether the same is relevant; and
(c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same. 9
The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its resolution, enjoined the parties and
their lawyers to initiate steps towards an amicable settlement of the case through mediation and
other means.
On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and compliance of the parties with the
resolution of October 11, 2000.10
On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion praying that
Potenciano Ilusorio be produced before the Court and be medically examined by a team of medical
experts appointed by the Court.11
On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Court's order of
January 31 , 2001.12
The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for reconsideration are mere reiterations of her
arguments that have been resolved in the decision.
Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus:
First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in
consortium and that Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, the very root cause of the

entire petition is her desire to have her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that
she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.
Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents
Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property
rights out of pure greed.14 She claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to
sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also
argued that since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine
Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and
Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.15
The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March
23, 1999.16Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing
anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did
not have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be
brought before the Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state.
We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to
see his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that may
be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.
Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the facts found by
the Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and
incomplete. We see no reason why the High Court of the land need go to such length. The hornbook
doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court. 17 We
emphasize, it is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again.18 Although there are exceptions to
the rule,19 Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance.
Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family
Code support her position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live
together and care for each other. We agree.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. 21
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having
separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between
husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem"
respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.22

On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his Creator and Supreme
Judge. Let his soul rest in peace and his survivors continue the much prolonged fracas ex aequo et
bono.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the case has been
rendered moot by the death of subject.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146683

November 22, 2001

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C.
TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE,
BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No. 4593, declaring as void a deed of donation inter
vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its subsequent resolution 3 denying
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered
owners of Lot No. 437-A located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street) and
Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot
was 418 square meters.4 After the death of Zosima on October 3, 1980, Francisco and his mother-inlaw, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in

which the latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to Francisco. 5 On
June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds. 6
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia
Bellosillo,7 the latter's cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian,8 and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to
take care of his house, as well as the store inside. 9
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and
Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same
room,10 while Erlinda Tabancura,11another niece of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that
Cirila was his mistress.12 On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who could enter the
master's bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that Francisco in any case was too old
for her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse.13
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of
Francisco.14 Cirila testified that she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old
widower when she began working for the latter; that he could still walk with her assistance at that
time;15 and that his health eventually deteriorated and he became bedridden. 16 Erlinda Tabancura
testified that Francisco's sole source of income consisted of rentals from his lot near the public
streets.17 He did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper , though he provided her family
with food and lodging.18
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument
denominated "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of
150 square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same
instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that
the donation was being made in consideration of "the faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered
over the past ten (10) years." The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.19 and later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner .20
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, the lot which Cirila received from
Francisco had a market value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00. 21
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a
deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the
decedent's nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the
common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each
other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding the
donation void under this provision of the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based
on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of one "Cirila
Comille." The documents were (1) an application for a business permit to operate as real estate
lessor, dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the signature "Cirila Comille"; 22 (2) a sanitary

permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate showing the signature "Cirila Comille"
in black ink;23 and (3) the death certificate of the decedent with the signature "Cirila A. Comille"
written in black ink.24 The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille
recorded as Doc. No. 7; Page No. 3; Book No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of
Notary Public Vic T. Lacaya (Annex " A " to the Complaint) null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and lot subject of the deed unto
the plaintiffs within thirty (30) days after finality of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision subject
of this appeal. As already stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was based
on (1) the testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly showing
Cirila's use of Francisco's surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of
rentals to Cirila as Francisco's common-law wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular
cash wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the common-law wife of the late
Francisco Comille is not correct and is a reversible error because it is based on a
misapprehension of facts, and unduly breaks the chain of circumstances detailed by the
totality of the evidence, its findings being predicated on totally incompetent or hearsay
evidence, and grounded on mere speculation, conjecture or possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez,
33 SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts and their J urisdictions,
1993 ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence from the plaintiff to
defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in away probably not in accord with law or with
the applicable jurisprudence in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102
Phil. 577, 584.26
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to
the circumstances of this case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment

is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on
record; and G) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 27 It appearing
that the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented by both parties, the general rule
should apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan,28 we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife"
means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation,
of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old
and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man
and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding
themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if
often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. 29 In this
jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations
between the parties,30 a conviction of concubinage,31 or the existence of legitimate children.32
Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco
resided under one roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two consummated their
relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same
bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of
caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there
are other indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura
presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As previously stated,
these are an application for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor,33 a sanitary permit
to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate, 34 and the death certificate of
Francisco.35 These documents show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife,
otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Francisco's
lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC Civil Case
No.4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as "the common-law spouse of
Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She
was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law.36 It is difficult to believe that she stayed
with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the
conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together
as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made
by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.