Mercado vs.

Tan
337 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991
which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage.

HELD:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who
enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if
the earlier union is characterized by statute as “void.” In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted second
marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in
a bigamy charge.
 VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.
Facts:

Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by
Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was
going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether
the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was
indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite clear proof that the marriage between the
accused and private complainant had been declared null and void ab initio and without legal force and effect

Ruling:

As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable
for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since
a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per
se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage,
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. In this
case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were
over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B.
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. The decision of
the Court of Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED.
 G.R. No. 159218 March 30, 2004

SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

FACTS:

 This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of CA affirming RTC decision
 September 18, 1967 - Salvador married Narcisa Arceño at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco.
 1988 - Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992 when she learned that her husband was having an
extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home.
 Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato
 She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a certain Zenaida Biñas
before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal
 January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa
 May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.
 Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 → had 4 Children → here was no evidence of their 1955
marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989 as their son’s requirement in commission to military.

RTC Ruling

 RTC convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum. Petitioner Zenaida Biñas was acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence

CA Ruling

 Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. Appreciating the mitigating circumstance that
accused is 76 years of age and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law

ISSUE

1. WON the second marriage of Salvador to Zenaida Biñas constitute the crime bigamy

HELD/RATIO

1. YES. Salvador Abunado is guilty of Bigamy notwithstanding his contentions:

 FIRST, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995
when in fact it should have been 1989.
 The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or about and sometime in the month of
January, 1995," was an obvious typographical error, for the same information clearly states that petitioner
contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10, 1989. Petitioner’s submission,
therefore, that the information was defective is untenable.
 The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect
was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised.

 SECOND, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had the effect of absolving him of
criminal liability.
 A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action considering that a crime is committed
against the State and the crime of Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the
person affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same.
 THIRD, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question,
hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case.
 A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend
the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
 The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions
 The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
 The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required
for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage
is contracted.
 Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his
first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled

 FINALLY, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.
 Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prison mayor for bigamy.
 The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it
might be subdivided
 In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age, which is a mitigating circumstance under
Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals,
i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prison mayor, as maximum, is proper.
 LLAVE V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762
and its subsequent Resolution dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen.
Tamano) as void ab initio.

FACTS:

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27,
1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,
1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing
herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’ s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in
their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of
Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting
when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

HELD:

Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen.
Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

RATIO:

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only
law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the
law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the
law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage
is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide
for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”
HELD: The petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

Void Marriages cer had the legal authority to do so;

“Article 35. The following marriages shall be
void from the beginning:
1) Those contracted by any party below
eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents
or guardians;
2) Those solemnized by any person not legally
authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties
believing in good faith that the solemnizing offi
3) Those solemnized without a license, except
those covered by the preceding Chapter;
4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages
not falling under Article 41;
5) Those contracted through mistake of one
contracting party as to the identity of the other;
and
6) Those subsequent marriages that are void
under Article 53.”

FACTS:

 The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas
 Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August
9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.
 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his
mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men.
 He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the
Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document.
 He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he
did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area.
 Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel. 8
 In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was
asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.
 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the
marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number
of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
 For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo
and May Ann Ceriola.
 Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is
authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines. Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary. 16 After
the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the
marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.
 Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of
the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and
that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993

ISSUE:
 W/N The marriage is null and void due to the absence of a marriage license despite evidence clearly showing that there
was one.

The Ruling of the RTC

 In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license
had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona,
Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of the CA
 The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and
thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. 36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial
and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.37
 It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the
parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy.

The Ruling of the SC

 We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
 Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as
well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued,
Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was
there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such
certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record
or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
 The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the certification
used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the
certification could not be given probative value.
 To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting that in that particular
case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same
did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted
a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
 Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." 46 No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.
 WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
Domingo v. CA

Facts:

1969 – previous marriage of Roberto Domingo and Emerlina dela Paz

1976 – married Delia Soledad Domingo
1979 – present
– Delia was working in Saudi, and provided for the family while husband remained unemployed (1983-present)
– also purchased real and personal properties out of her personal earnings.
Roberto became the administrator of the properties
1983 – when Delia knew of first marriage
1989 – when she discovered he had another woman and was also selling her property without her consent.

Thus asked lower court for

▪ (1) a temporary restraining order stopping Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over the properties
▪ (2) for their marriage to be declared null and void
▪ (3) Delia be declared sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at time of their void marriage.

RTC – denied for lack of merit since marriage is seen as void in the first place thus steps aren‘t necessary

CA: held that prayer for nullity along with separation of properties may be raised however they were still denied for lack of merit.
Thus case is in SC

ISSUE:

WON respondent may recover certain real and personal property exclusively belonging to her

HELD:
YES
- Distribution and separation of property of spouses is one of the reasons why there‘s a need to judicially declare that a marriage is
void.
- Court that declares a marriage void will also provide for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of properties of spouses. It is a
necessary consequence of judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
Rules that apply: FC Art 43 and 44
Separation of property will be according to regime of property relations governing them.

CONCURRING BY VITUG
When a void marriage is still in existence (without judical declaration of nullity) neither the CPG or ACP will apply instead, property
relations shall be governed by co-ownership rules under Art 147 or Art 148 of FC.
 JOSELITA SALITA vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS
G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994

FACTS:

Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila. A year later, their union turned
sour. They separated in fact. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity which
incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter. Dissatisfied with the allegation in
the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted. Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin
specified that at the time of their marriage, Joselita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a
newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon his time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her
even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
Still petitioner was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal
conclusion, not an averment of ultimate facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not
able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She rationalizes
that her insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, place
and person does not call for information on evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot adequately and
intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of particulars filed in amplification
of the petition is sufficient.

HELD:

Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly from the basis of the primary right and duty, or which
directly make up the wrongful acts or omission of the defendant. It refers to acts which the evidence on trial will prove, and not the
evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts. The Supreme Court ruled that on the basis of the allegations, it
is evident that petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already alleged that
petitioner was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession. To demand for more details would indeed be
asking for information on evidentiary facts — facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. The additional facts called for by
petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the function of a
motion for bill of particulars.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the questioned Resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Republic v. Olaviano Molina

Facts:

1) Petition for review on certiorari under the Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 decision of CA affirming in toto the May
14, 1991 decision of the RTC of La Trinidad Benguet which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void ab initio on the ground of ―psychological capacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
2) Case filed August 16, 1990 (nullity of marriage)
3) April 14, 1985: marriage of Roridel and Reynaldo, san Agustin Church
4) Son: Andre Molina
5) After a year of marriage:
- Showed signs of immaturity
- Preferred to stay with peers and friends squandering his money
- Depended on parents for aid and assistance
- Never honest with wife about finances

6) February 1986: relieved from work

7) October 1986: intense quarrel
8) March 1987: Roridel resigned from job in Manila and went to live with parents in Baguio City
9) Few weeks later: Reynaldo left Roridel and their child and abandoned them
10) Reynaldo psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations

REYNALDO‘s CLAIMS
1) Filed August 28, 1989: contended that misunderstandings were due to:
a) Roridels‘s strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her friends even after marriage
b) Her refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals
c) Roridel‘s failure to run the household and handle their finances

THE FOLLOWING WERE STIPULATED:

1) Petitioner is not asking for support for her child and her
2) Respondent is not asking for damages
3) Parties are separated in fact for three years
4) Common child of the parties is in custody of the petitioner‘s wife

WIFE‘s WITNESSES: Friends: Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla; Ruth Lalas a social worker and Dr. Teresita
Hidalgo-Sison (psychiatrist of BGH)

TRIAL COURT‘S DECISION: May 14, 1991: declaring marriage null and void

CA: denied appeal of petitioner and affirmed in toto the RTC‘ decision

SOLICITOR GENERAL: insists that the CA made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase ―psychological
incapacity. He said that appealed decision tended to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world

- Solicitor‘s appeal was denied—RTC relying on the fact that marriage between parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities.

- SG argued that ―opposing and conflicting personalities is not equivalent to psychological capacity

- PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY: is not simply neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties but a
defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties

SC RULING: Petition is meritorious

REASONS:

1) Justice Vitug: psychological incapacity refers to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage; this condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated

2) It should be characterized by: a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence and c) incurability

3) In the present case:

- There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity—but merely a ―difficulty‖ if not outright
―refusal‖ or ―neglect‖ in the performance of some marital obligations
- Mere showing of irreconcible differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity
- It is essential to show that the parties are incapable of meeting their marital responsibilities and not mere failure
- No gravity in the problem, neither juridical antecedence nor incurability

4) Court invited two amici curiae (Most rev Oscar Cruz and Justice Ricardo Puno: their guidance:
a) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff- any doubt should be resolved in -- favor of the
validity and continuation of the marriage—permanence, solidarity and inviolability of marriage
b) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be 1) medically or clinically identified; 2) alleged in the complaint; 3)
sufficiently proven by experts and 4) clearly explained in the decision—the evidence must convince the court that the parties
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
c) The incapacity must be proven existing during the time of the celebration of the marriage
d) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable—incapacity must be relevant to
assumption of marriage obligations not necessarily those not related to marriage like exercise of profession
e) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage-
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability and not a refusal, neglect or difficulty much less ill will
f) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arts 68-71 of family code (to husband and wife) and ARTs 220,
221 and 225 (parents and their children)
g) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts—Art 36 taken from the Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law (1983)- what is decreed to be canonically void be also civilly void
h) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor general to appear as counsel for the state
DECISION OF SC: petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano and
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SEPARATE STATEMENT:
PADILLA, J
Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts—the facts in this case does not support conclusion of psychological incapacity

SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO, J.
Not mere refusal and neglect or difficulty
Neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties
short of insanity, there is the resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annullable (Art 45 family Code)
Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent, it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage
Psychological incapacity is insanity of a lesser degree
Remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry
Bases for determining void marriages:
a) Lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract
b) Reasons of public policy
c) Special cases and special situations (includes psychological incapacity)
Canon Law- valid and void marriage only
 In the case ―conflicting and opposing personalities of the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological
incapacity
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity (Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA)
Concurs that this marriage remains subsisting and valid

CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.
Should give much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory
enactment
Marriage void ab initio, Art 45- merely voidable, Art 55- legal separation
The term psychological incapacity to be ground for the nullity of the marriage under Art 36 of the FC must pass the following
tests:
a) Incapacity must be psychological or mental not physical in nature
b) Psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal to understand, assume and discharge the basic
marital obligations of living together, observing love and respect
and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support
c) Psychology condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations may occur only
thereafter and
d) The mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable
Section 2 Art. XV (marriage as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State) , Section 12, Art II ( The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution), Section 1, Article XV ( The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development) of the Constitution show how the
state regard marriage and the family
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA and Gina Lao-Tsoi

GR No. 119190 16 January 1997

FACTS:

On 22 May 1988, plaintiff and the defendant got married. Although they slept in the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15,
1989, no sexual intercourse took place. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations. She was found
healthy, normal and still a virgin. Her husband’s examination was kept confidential.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual, and that the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to
acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. The plaintiff is
not willing to reconcile with her husband.

The defendant claims that should the marriage be annulled, it is his wife’s fault. He claims no defect on his part, as he was found not
to be impotent, and any differences between the two of them can still be reconciled. He admitted that they have not had
intercourse since their marriage until their separation because his wife avoided him. He added that his wife filed this case against
him because she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewellery of his mother, and, that the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.

The trial court declared the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, the instant
petition.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner is psychologically incapacitated?

RULING:

Yes. Senseless and protracted refusal to consummate the marriage is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that
he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage’ within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. However, neither the trial court nor the
respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
But the fact remains that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may
be filed by either party, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfil the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The petition is DENIED.

Republic vs. Hamano

FACTS

This is a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage between Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national,
on the ground of psychological incapacity.

In October 1986, Lolita and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines where Lolita gave
birth to their child. Later, she and Toshio were married before a judge. However, one month after their marriage, Toshio returned to
Japan. Despite his promise to return, he did not come back. Moreover, he also stopped giving financial support and stopped all
communication with his family. Consequently, Lolita filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage.

The trial court declared the marriage null and void, holding that respondent spouse failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the
petitioner and father to his daughter. This failure was considered to be a sign of immaturity and that his behavior could be traced to
his mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.

Upon appeal, CA affirmed, concluding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his
family. Moreover, it ruled that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. CA and Molina and Santos vs. CA, because in those
cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a “mixed marriage.”

Republic, as represented by the Solicitor-General, appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations

HELD:

SC ruled in favor of petitioner.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

The guidelines in the Molina case incorporate the three basic requirements of psychological incapacity outlined in Santos:

“It must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically
identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”

Was respondent able to successfully prove Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities?

The Court found that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume
his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due
to some kind of psychological illness. There was no evidence to show that his behavior was caused by a psychological order.
Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This
respondent did not do.

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just
an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. AS we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that
a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing
so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
On issue of “Mixed Marriage”

In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in
the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national.
The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca, this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we
commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.

Petition granted. Decision of CA reversed and set aside.

*FYI*

The case of Molina outlines the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36:

• The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

• The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 requires that the incapacity must be psychological –
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

• The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

• Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.

• Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
“mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

• The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and children. Such non-complied marital obligations
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

• Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

• The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within 15 days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
Antonio vs. Reyes
GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006

FACTS:

Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first
meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child
was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she
represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for
reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage
with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void.

HELD:

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical
psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.

Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a
world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.
The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently
proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent.
It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her
but her behavior remain unchanged.

Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
G.R. No. 166579
JORDAN CHAN PAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JEANICE PAVON PAZ, Respondent.

The Facts
Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against her husband Jordan. She alleged that Jordan was
psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage such as he has uncontrollable tendency to be self-
preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices were
not satisfied. That he had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had the habit of hanging out and spending a great deal of
time with his friends. Jeanice further alleged that Jordan was heavily dependent on and attached to his mother and even demanded
from his mother a steady supply of milk and diapers for their son. And worse he threatened to hurt Jeanice and did not provide
financial support to his son when Jeanice left their conjugal home.
Jeanice claim was substantiated by Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) who testified, based on the testimonies given by Jeanice
to Gates, that Jordan was afflicted with "Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency and
instability." Gates concluded that Jordan’s psychological maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in his family background.
Gates added that with no indication of reformation, Jordan’s personality disorder appears to be grave and incorrigible.
Despite the denial of Jordan that he is not psychologically incapacitated; and that Jeanice was merely motivated by her inability to
cope with the struggles of marriage, the trial court declared the marriage null and void based on the findings of Gates.

The Issue
Whether Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Ruling
Jeanice Failed to Prove Jordan’s Psychological Incapacity
Jeanice’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial
antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be confined "to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."
In Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:

(a) Gravity – It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage;
(b) Judicial Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a
physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent evidence
adduced by the person alleging said disorder.
Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
In this case, the Court notes that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan’s psychological incapacity were based exclusively on
her interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of stenographic notes of Jeanice’s testimony before the trial court. Gates only
diagnosed Jordan from the statements of Jeanice, whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. Gates did not actually
hear, see and evaluate Jordan. Consequently, Gates’ report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no personal
knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on. Gates’ testimony should have thus been dismissed for being unscientific and
unreliable.
The incidents cited by Jeanice do not show that Jordan suffered from grave psychological maladies that paralyzed Jordan from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. The mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" does not constitute psychological incapacity. Furthermore, Gates did not
particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" which showed that Jordan indeed suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder. Gates
also failed to explain how such a personality disorder made Jordan psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a
husband nor Jordan’s condition was incurable.
Dino vs Dino
Facts:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living
together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14
January 1998, they were... married
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to
him, and had... abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her
friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become
violent and hurt him.
a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent's... disorder was
long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondent's psychological incapacity.
The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag's psychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness
stand,... clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed
acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity required of her... under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner
when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of property
Issues:
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations
of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.[7] Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void,[8] such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the
Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio
or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does... not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for
the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since... the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is
a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for
annulment of... marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-
ownership.
In this case, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36[15] of the Family Code and not under Article 40
or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on... co-
ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.[16] The rules on co-ownership apply and the... properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
"[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the...
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

FACTS:
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as
mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the
marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as
they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to
every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the
Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted
version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue of
nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the
verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which
are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to
inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the
conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void
ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician,
because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.”
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an
assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in
interpreting such other evidence on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any
probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would
not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional temperaments

The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view
and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of
the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.
The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and
treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold
that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of
Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn
from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the
petitioner’s factual premises.
 The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts,
“despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or
absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and
responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she
would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of
gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive
mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of
parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the
culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for
parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated
her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September
19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code.
Amor-Catalan v CA (Conflict of Laws)

Amor-Catalan v CA
2007

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country
in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.
BRAGANZA, Respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to
the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando
divorced in April 1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol,
petitioner Amor-Catalan filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against
Orlando and Merope.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest,
but it was denied.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC – Dagupan: declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of
bigamy.
(2) CA: reversed RTC.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had
actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.
(2) Whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the
ground of bigamy

RULING:
(1) The records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce. Before it can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which
must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
(2) Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has the
personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the
divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce
decree becomes absolute.