Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26737 July 31, 1969

LAURA CORPUS, and the minors RICARDO, TERESITA and CORAZON, all surnamed MARCIA and
represented by their mother LAURA CORPUS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELARDO PAJE and THE VICTORY LINER TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., defendants-appellees.

Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for plaintiffs-appellants.

Flores, Macapagal, Ocampo and Balbastro for defendants-appellees.

CAPISTRANO, J.:

This is a direct appeal on questions of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 6880 of that court.

On December 23, 1956, a passenger bus of the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by Felardo Paje, collided
within the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and
in physical injuries to two other persons.

An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against
Felardo Paje in the Court First Instance of Pampanga. The heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their right to institute a
separate civil action for damages. On November 7, 1960, the accused, Felardo Paje, was found guilty and convicted of
the crime charged in the information. Said defendant appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. On
November 21, 1961, while defendant's appeal was pending decision in the Court of Appeals, Clemente Marcia's heirs,
namely, his widow, Laura Corpus, and their minor children, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a separate
civil action (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence against Felardo
Paje and the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., defendants, praying that said defendants be ordered to pay jointly
and severally the amounts of damages claimed by the plaintiffs. On November 9, 1962, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision in the appeal of Felardo Paje reversing the appealed judgment and acquitting the appellant
after finding that the reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist, and that the collision was a case of pure
accident.

On December 29, 1962, the defendants filed in the civil action a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was
barred by the acquittal by the Court of Appeals of the defendant Felardo Paje in the criminal action. The motion was
denied.

At the pre-trial of the civil case, the defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of
action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and eleven
months after the collision and that according to Article 1144 of the Civil Code an action based upon a quasi-delict
must be instituted within four years. The lower court, in its order of May 31, 1966, dismissed the complaint on the
ground that plaintiffs' action was based upon a quasi-delict and that it had prescribed. The plaintiffs appealed direct to
this Court on questions of law from the order dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiffs-appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint. The contention is unmeritorious in
view of the following considerations.

(1) The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the ground that the
reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a case of pure
accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the
same criminal negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action. In the celebrated
case of Chantangco vs. Abaroa, which was an appeal from the Philippine Supreme Court to the United States
Supreme Court, 218 U.S. 476; 54 L. Ed. 1116; 40 Phil. 1056, Mr. Justice Lurton, speaking for the Supreme Court of
the United States, said:
 It is true that one of the plaintiffs in the present case reserved whatever right he may have had to bring a civil
action. This was obviously of no avail, inasmuch as there resulted a judgment for the defendant, and the plain
inference from the foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal must carry with it exemption from civil
responsibility.

Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil
Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence. Said article mentions only the crimes of defamation, fraud (estafa) and physical injuries.
Although in the case of Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco, et al., G.R. No. L-9623, January 22, 1957, this Court held that the term
"physical injuries" used in article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide, 1 it is to be borne in mind that the charge
against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and not for homicide and physical injuries. In
the case of People vs. Buan, G.R. No. L-25366, March 29, 1968, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for the Supreme
Court, said that the "offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution
of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus
the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense." It is, therefore, clear that the charge against
Felardo Paje was not for homicide but for reckless imprudence, that is, criminal negligence resulting in homicide
(death of Clemente Marcia) and double physical injuries suffered by two other persons. As reckless imprudence or
criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent
civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with said offense. Hence, homicide through reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal
action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party
reserved 2 his right to institute a separate civil action (Chantangco vs. Abaroa, supra). In the language of the Rules of
Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the
criminal act charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based upon
the same act.

(2) Assuming, arguendo, that the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia was based upon a quasi-
delict, 3 the trial court's finding that on that basis the action had prescribed is correct. An action upon a quasi-delict
must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). The four-year prescriptive period began to run
from the day the quasi-delict was committed, or from December 23, 1956, and the running of the said period was not
interrupted by the institution of the criminal action for reckless imprudence. (Paulan vs. Sarabia, G.R. No. L-10542,
July 31, 1958.)

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is affirmed, with special pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Castro, Fernando and Barredo, JJ., concur.

1äwphï1.ñët Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez and Teehankee, JJ., concur in the result.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Zaldivar, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes

1
This and the following footnotes express my opinion on certain controversial articles of the New Civil Code,
which was drafted when I was a member of the Code Commission.

(a) The holding in the case of Dyogi, et al. vs. Yatco, etc., et al., supra, at the term "physical injuries" used in
Article 33 of the Civil Code includes homicide or murder, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law. I recall
that when the draft of what is now Article 33 of the New Civil Code was presented for deliberation by Code
Commission Chairman Dean Jorge C. Bocobo, a great civilian, before the Code Commission (then composed
of besides Chairman Bocobo, Professor Guillermo B. Guevarra, Dean Pedro Y. Ylagan, and Dean Francisco
R. Capistrano, members), said Chairman made, in substance, the following remarks: In America the injured
party in crime has the initiative, through his lawyer he immediately files a civil action for damages against the
offender. In the Philippines the offended party depends upon the fiscal to demand in the criminal action the
damages he has suffered. I think it is about time to educate our people the American way by giving the injured
party in crime the initiative to go to court through his lawyer to demand damages, and for this purpose we
should give him an independent civil action for damages. Let us begin with just three crimes which are of
common occurrence, namely, defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. Depending upon the success of the
experiment, when the new Civil Code may come up for revision about fifty (50) or one hundred (100) years
from now, it will be up to our successors in the Code Commission to add more crimes to the three already
mentioned or make the provision comprise all crimes causing damages to the injured party. This civil action,
as in America, should proceed independently of the criminal action and should be proved only by
preponderance of evidence. Defamation may be oral or written. Fraud comprises all forms of estafa. Physical
Injuries is to be understood in its ordinary meaning and does not include homicide or murder because where
physical injuries result in homicide or murder, the reason for the law (namely, to give the injured party
personally the initiative to demand damages by an independent civil action) ceases, for the reason that a dead
person can no longer personally, through his lawyer institute an independent civil action for damages. (All the
members of the Code Commission agreed with the Chairman and the draft of the article was unanimously
approved.)

In the Revised Penal Code, the crime of homicide is treated in Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons), Chapter
One (Destruction of life), while the crime of physical injuries is separately treated in Chapter Two of the same
title. This shows that the two crimes are distinct from each other, that physical injuries is not included in
homicide.

(b) Article 32 (drafted by Code Commission Chairman Bocobo) of the Civil Code is also intended, insofar as
it provides for an independent civil action, to educate the Filipino the American way by going immediately to
the courts to file a civil action for damages in vindication of his constitutional rights and liberties enumerated
in the article in case of violation of any of them.

(c) Article 34 of the Civil Code, insofar as it authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, is also
intended for the same purpose.

2
(a) The crime of reckless imprudence resulting in the death of Clemente Marcia and physical injuries to two
other persons not being one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the
institution of an independent civil action for damages, the heirs of the deceased correctly reserved their right
to institute a separate civil action for damages against the bus driver, Felardo Paje, who stood charged with the
crime of homicide and double physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The reservation was in
accordance with what is now Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Institution of criminal and civil action. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of
a civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

The civil action for damages against Felardo Paje was prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, Section 3,
which, in part, provides:

Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action.

At any rate, said civil action was correctly suspended in the Court of First Instance until final judgment by the
Court of Appeals in the criminal action was rendered pursuant to Section 3(b) of said Rule 111 which
provides that:

After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted,
and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered.

The decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the appellant Felardo Paje of the crime of reckless
imprudence charged against him on the ground that it did not exist, extinguished the civil action for damages
filed against him, in accordance with Section 3(c) of Rule 111 which states that:

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from
a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. ....

This rule finds support in the celebrated case of Chantangco vs. Abaroa, supra.

(b) Section 2 of Rule 111 which provides:

Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

is defective and imperfect in many ways:

First. Article 31 of the Civil Code does not provide for an independent civil action. An independent civil
action is an action that is based upon the same criminal act as in the case of Articles 32, 33 and 34. When the
civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action being based upon an obligation not arising from the criminal act but from a different source, is not an
independent civil action within the meaning of Articles 32, 33 and 34. Article 31 (drafted by Code
Commissioner Capistrano) which provides that:

When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.

states a self-explanatory rule different and distinct from that laid down in Articles 32, 33 and 34. For example:
A is prosecuted for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The heirs of the deceased institute
a civil action for damages against him based upon quasi-delict, under Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which is
separate and distinct from criminal negligence punished as a crime or delict under the Revised Penal Code.
Quasi-delict is culpa aquiliana and is separate and distinct from criminal negligence, which is a delict. The
distinction is made in Article 2177 itself which in part provides that:

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.

Code Commission Chairman Bocobo, who drafted Article 2177 of the New Civil Code, took the distinction
from modern authorities in civil law. Accordingly, the report of the Code Commission on the Project of Civil
Code makes reference to the sources of the distinction, thus:

The foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the
exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter, is
a distinct and independent negligence, which is the 'culpa aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having
always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or 'quasi-delict' has been sustained by decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound, and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding
Spanish jurist." .

Therefore, under the proposed article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from
criminal negligence, but for damages due to a 'quasi-delict' or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a
double recovery. (Capistrano, Civil Code of the Philippines, With Comments and Annotations, Vol. 4, p. 470.)

Second. As above explained, Article 2177 of the Civil Code does not provide for an independent civil action
in crime. The article precisely distinguishes quasi-delict or civil negligence from criminal negligence (reckless
imprudence) and authorizes the institution of a civil action for damages based upon quasi-delict and not upon
criminal negligence, which is a delict and not a quasi-delict. In accordance with Article 31, the civil action for
damages based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal
negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, even if the defendant is acquitted in the criminal
action of the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, the civil action for damages for the death of
the deceased based upon quasi-delict may proceed to judgment.

Third. The proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111, with reference to the correctly cited Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the
Civil Code, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted for the purpose
explained in footnote one and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now
Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment
of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required
in the proviso.

In view of all the foregoing, Section 2 of Rule 111 should be amended so as to read as follows:

Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party before or after the criminal action is instituted. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Notice shall be
given in the criminal action of the institution of the civil action or of the intention to institute the same.

3
The prayer of the complaint in the civil action asked that the defendants, Felardo Paje and the Victory Liner
Transportation Co., Inc., be ordered to pay jointly and severally the damages claimed by plaintiffs. This
prayer, considering the action as one upon a quasi-delict, is not in accordance with law. In quasi-delict,
according to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to pay damages is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The article then, in part
continues: "The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise, are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed, or on the occasion
of their functions." Hence, the bus driver, Felardo Paje, was responsible for the quasi-delict, he being, in the
language of the American law, a tort-feasor. Likewise, the bus operator, Victory Liner Transportation Co.,
Inc., was liable for the quasi-delict of its bus driver. This liability is not solidary but primary, with right to full
reimbursement pursuant to Article 2181, which provides: .

Whoever pays for the damages caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he
has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.

The prayer of the complaint, based upon a quasi-delict, against the bus driver, Felardo Paje, and the bus
operator, Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., should have been that the plaintiffs recover the damages
claimed from either of them. The bus operator defendant Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., could have
filed a third-party complaint against the defendant bus driver, pleading its right for reimbursement under
Article 2181.

When is the bus operator solidarily liable with the bus driver? Article 2184 of the Civil Code provides:

In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. .... "If the owner was not in the motor
vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable.

This article (drafted by Code Commission Chairman Bocobo) is intended to cover only the owners of private
motor vehicles for private use. It is not generally applicable to motor vehicles for public use and convenience
because the operator thereof, usually a corporation, cannot in the very nature of things, be in the motor vehicle
at the time of the mishap. However, if the manager of the bus company was in the bus at the time of the
mishap, Article 2184 may be applied by analogy.

In the case of De Leon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-15247, February 28, 1962,
it was held that in quasi-delict, the bus operator is solidarily liable with the bus driver in view of article 2194
of the Civil Code which provides:

"The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.

This article (drafted by Code Commissioner Capistrano) merely restates the basic rule in American law that
joint tort-feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort. In the case of a quasi-delict committed by a bus
driver, he alone is the tort-feasor; the bus operator is not a joint tort-feasor. For this reason the liability of the
bus operator is not governed by Article 2194 but by Article 2180.

Joint tort-feasors in American law are the same as co-authors or co-principals of a quasi-delict in the civil law,
and it is only to them that Article 2194 is applicable. A bus operator is not a co-author or co-principal of the
tort committed by its bus driver; hence, it cannot be made solidarily liable with the bus driver under Article
 2194. Its liability is that of an employer under Article 2180, with right to full reimbursement under Article
2181.

To make the bus operator solidarily liable with the driver would diminish its right to full reimbursement from
the driver because in passive solidarity, the solidary debtors share equally in the obligation (Article 1208,
Civil Code). Consequently, if the bus operator's liability were solidary, in the event of full payment by it of the
obligation, its right to reimbursement from the bus driver would only be of one-half of the obligation because
its share of the solidary obligation would be one-half. This would result in reducing by one-half its right to full
reimbursement under Article 2181.

The prayer for solidary liability in the complaint against the defendants Felardo Paje and the Victory Liner
Transportation Co. Inc., considering the complaint as based upon criminal negligence, is likewise not in the
accordance with law. In crime committed by an employee within the scope of his duties, the employer's
liability is subsidiary, not solidary, in accordance with Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:.

ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge
of their duties.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997

HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES CUEVAS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 20, which ordered respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, to
pay various amounts in damages to petitioners, the heirs of the late Teodoro Guaring, Jr.

This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7, 1987, along the North
Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by
Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas,
and a Toyota Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was heading north, at the speed of 80 to
90 kilometers per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the other
hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the opposite lane, bound for Manila.

Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages, based on quasi delict, in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. Their evidence tended to show that the Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guaring's car by passing on the
right shoulder of the road and that in so doing it hit the right rear portion of Guaring's Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact
caused the Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of which it collided with the Toyota Cressida car
coming from the opposite direction.

With Teodoro Guaring, Jr. in the Lancer, seated beside him in front, was Bonifacio Clemente. Riding in the Toyota
Cressida driven by Sgt. Eligio Enriquez was his mother, Dolores Enriquez, who was seated beside him. Seated at the
back were his daughter Katherine (who was directly behind him), his wife Lilian, and his nephew Felix Candelaria.
Killed in the collision were Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who was driving the Lancer, and Dolores Enriquez, who was riding
in the Cressida, while injured were Bonifacio Clemente and the occupants of the Toyota Cressida.

Private respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence tending to show that the accident was due to the negligence
of the deceased Guaring. They claimed that it was Guaring who tried to overtake the vehicle ahead of him on the
highway and that in doing so he encroached on the south-bound lane and collided with the oncoming Cressida of U.S.
Air Force Sgt. Enriquez. Private respondents claim that as a result of the collision the Lancer was thrown back to its
lane where it crashed into the Rabbit bus.

On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its
driver, Angeles Cuevas, at fault, and holding them solidarily liable for damages to petitioners. The dispositive portion
of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants,
ordering the latter to pay the former, jointly and severally, the sum of:

1. P500,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased Teodoro Guaring, Jr.;

2. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

3. P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

4. Costs of suit.

From this judgment, private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. appealed, contending:

1. The lower court erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the collision was Guaring's
negligence in attempting to overtake the car in front of him.

2. The lower court erred in not holding that PRBL exercised due diligence in the supervision of its
employees.

3. The lower court erred in awarding the amount of P500,000.00 in favor of plaintiffs-appellees
representing Guaring's loss of earning capacity.

4. The lower court erred in awarding moral damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.

5. The lower court erred in awarding attorney's fees in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.

On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila in the civil action for damages and dismissing the complaint against private respondents Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Cuevas, on the strength of a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court at San
Fernando, Pampanga, in the criminal case, acquitting the bus driver Angeles Cuevas of reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property and double homicide. The appellate court held that since the basis of petitioners' action was the
alleged negligence of the bus driver, the latter's acquittal in the criminal case rendered the civil case based on quasi
delict untenable.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that

[1] EVIDENCE IN ONE CASE IS INADMISSIBLE IN ANOTHER CASE AGAINST A PERSON

NOT A PARTY IN THE FIRST CASE AND TO HOLD OTHERWISE IS VIOLATIVE OF
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

[2] THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS WITHOUT FACTUAL FINDINGS
AND DID NOT RESOLVE SQUARELY THE ASSIGNED ERRORS AND IS THEREFORE A
VOID JUDGMENT.
 [3] ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, WHETHER ON
REASONABLE DOUBT OR NOT, IS NO BAR TO THE PROSECUTION FOR DAMAGES
BASED ON QUASI-DELICT.

The question is whether the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private respondent Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr. In absolving
private respondents from liability, the Court of Appeals reasoned:1

Since the appellee's civil action is predicated upon the negligence of the accused which does not exist
as found by the trial court in the said criminal case, it necessarily follows that the acquittal of the
accused in the criminal case carries with it the extinction of the civil responsibility arising therefrom.
Otherwise stated, the fact from which the civil action might arise, that is, the negligence of the
accused, did not exist.

The finding in the criminal case that accused Cuevas was not negligent and the proximate cause of the
accident was the act of deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him likewise
exonerates PRB from any civil liability.

Although it did not say so expressly, the appellate court appears to have based its ruling on Rule 111, §2(b) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.

This provision contemplates, however, a civil action arising from crime, whereas the present action was instituted
pursuant to Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. Thus, in Tayag v. Alcantara,2 it was held:

. . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c), Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule 111,
§2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened
or has not been committed by the accused. . . .

It is noteworthy that the accident in that case also involved a Philippine Rabbit bus and that, as in this case, the
acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt. We held that the civil case for damages was not barred
since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi delict.

Again, in Gula v. Dianala it was held:3

Since the cause of action of plaintiffs-appellants is based on culpa aquiliana and not culpa criminal,
thus precluding the application of the exception in Sec. 3(c) of Rule 111 [now Rule 111, §2(b)], and
the fact that it can be inferred from the criminal case that defendant-accused, Pedro Dianala, was
acquitted on reasonable doubt because of dearth of evidence and lack of veracity of the two principal
witnesses, the doctrine in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, will not find application. In that case,
the acquittal was not based on reasonable doubt and the cause of action was based on culpa criminal,
for which reason we held the suit for damages barred.
Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar
recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable
doubt. Thus, it has been held: 4

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes
a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil.
286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares
that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil.
558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal
Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which
the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).

In the present case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC in the criminal case reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court, entertaining reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the accused is hereby
acquitted, of the offense of reckless imprudence resulting to double homicide and damage to property
as charged in the Information, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5

It was thus error for the appellate court to skip the review of the evidence in this case and instead base its decision on
the findings of the trial court in the criminal case. In so doing, the appellate court disregarded the fact that this case
had been instituted independently of the criminal case and that petitioners herein took no part in the criminal
prosecution. In fact this action was filed below before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action. The
attention of the Court of Appeals was called to the decision in the criminal case, which was decided on September 7,
1990, only when the decision of the trial court in this case was already pending review before it (the Court of
Appeals).

The appellate court did not even have before it the evidence in the criminal case. What it did was simply to cite
findings contained in the decision of the criminal court. Worse, what the criminal court considered was reasonable
doubt concerning the liability of the bus driver the appellate court regarded as a categorical finding that the driver was
not negligent and, on that basis, declared in this case that "the proximate cause of the accident was the act of deceased
Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him." The notion that an action for quasi delict is separate and distinct
from the criminal action was thus set aside.

This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case. This is important because the criminal court
appears to have based its decision, acquitting the bus driver on the ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what it
perceived to be the relative capacity for observation of the prosecution and defense witnesses.6 The prosecution did
not call Bonifacio Clemente to testify despite the fact that shortly after the accident he gave a statement to the police,
pinning the blame for the accident on the Philippine Rabbit bus driver. Indeed, the civil case involved a different set of
witnesses. Petitioners presented Eligio Enriquez who was driving the Cressida, and Bonifacio Clemente, who was a
passenger in Guaring's car. Thus, both had full view of the accident

It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal action when the fact is that they did not take part therein.
That the witnesses presented on behalf of the petitioners are different from those presented by the prosecution should
have brought home to the appellate court the fundamental unfairness of considering the decision in the criminal case
conclusive of the civil case.

Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case, this case should be remanded to it so that
it may render another decision in accordance with the law and the evidence. The issues raised by the petitioners are
essentially factual and require the evaluation of evidence, which is the function of the Court of Appeals in the exercise
of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in this Court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals with instruction to render judgment with reasonable dispatch in accordance with law and the evidence
presented in Civil Case No. 88-43860.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 60.

2 98 SCRA 723, 728 (1980) (emphasis added).

3 132 SCRA 245, 248-249 (1984).

4 Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558, 565-566 (1984).

5 RTC decision, p. 31; Rollo, p. 46 (emphasis added).

6 This is apparent from the following excerpt from the decision in the criminal case which the Court
of Appeals quoted:

While Edgardo Sobrevilla was seated in the conductor's seat in the front portion of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus, Mrs. Lilian Enriquez was at the back seat of the Cressida car. As between them, it is in
accord with ordinary human experience that Edgardo Sobrevilla was in a better position to see the
actual occur[r]ence of the incident.

Confirmatory to the testimony of Edgardo Sobrevilla are the sketches (Exhs. "A" and "A-1") drawn
by Pat. Danilo Gonzales, the investigating Policeman, which reveal no fallen debris on the North
bound lane. Fallen debris could have surely occur[r]ed in the North-bound lane if there was a violent
contact between the Mitsubishi Lancer car and the Philippine Rabbit bus in the North bound lane
before the Lancer car left its lane to encroach on the South bound lane. The sketches (Exh. "A"' and
"A-1") reveal very clearly that fallen debris are on the concrete pavement and asphalt shoulder of the
South-bound lane, clearly indicative that the collision between the Lancer and the Cressida occur[r]ed
in the lane of the latter.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47167, which affirmed the
September 29, 1997 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina, Branch 272, in Civil Case No. 97-341-
MK, denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The complaint filed by respondent sought to recover damages for the
alleged violation of its constitutional rights arising from petitioner’s issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No.
37-93 (RMC 37-93), which the Court declared invalid in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.3

Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune
Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior
to its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad
valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner
issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a
foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.4 RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion"
cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142,5 (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which
are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the
minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."6

On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC
37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received,
by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993.7 The same letter
assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-
93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof.8 On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for
review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the
implementation of RMC 37-93.9 In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective,
invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued
pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.10 It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen
short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint11 for damages against petitioner in her private
capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without
due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss12 contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she
issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that
she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the
complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum
shopping was signed by respondent’s counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who
should sign the same.

On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of
petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence. It
further held that the defect in the certification against forum shopping was cured by respondent’s submission of the
corporate secretary’s certificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping. The
dispositive portion thereof, states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Liwayway
Vinzons-Chato and the motion to strike out and expunge from the record the said motion to dismiss filed by
plaintiff Fortune Tobacco Corporation are both denied on the grounds aforecited. The defendant is ordered to
file her answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

SO ORDERED.13

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was
dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act
with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the
general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the
instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the
ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the
corporate secretary’s certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the same.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done in the
performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which
should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence. She further averred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages
for violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public officers’ liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the
instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to state a cause
of action. As to the defect of the certification against forum shopping, she urged the Court to strictly construe the rules
and to dismiss the complaint.

Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public officers’ "acts" from which civil
liability may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers’ violation of
constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine whether the complaint states a cause of action or
not. Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon,14 respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough
that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not required that said public officer should
have acted with malice or in bad faith. Hence, it concluded that even granting that the complaint failed to allege bad
faith or malice, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action should be denied inasmuch as bad faith or
malice are not necessary to hold petitioner liable.

The issues for resolution are as follows:

(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the
discharge of the functions of his/her office?

(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should
govern in determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action?

(3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on certification against forum
shopping?

(4) May petitioner be held liable for damages?

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising
from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.15 An officer who acts within
his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been
caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent.16 However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by
the mantle of immunity for official actions.17

Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Section 39 of the same Book, civil
liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. Thus –

Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. – (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the
performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.

xxxx

Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. – No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable
for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or
negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acts
under orders or instructions of his superior.

In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,18 that a public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even
if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith,
or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the decisive
provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.
A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally
belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular
persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the state only.19

A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read
together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts,
one of which is special and particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter
and thus conflict with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly
than that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of
the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all. 20

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. Where the
special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the
general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed
expressly or by necessary implication.21

Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico,22 the Court held that Article 2189 of the Civil Code which holds provinces, cities,
and municipalities civilly liable for death or injuries by reason of defective conditions of roads and other public works,
is a special provision and should prevail over Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409, the Charter of Manila, in
determining the liability for defective street conditions. Under said Charter, the city shall not be held for damages or
injuries arising from the failure of the local officials to enforce the provision of the charter, law, or ordinance, or from
negligence while enforcing or attempting to enforce the same. As explained by the Court:

Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409 is a
special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to
the entire Philippines.

The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its
territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general
legislation; but, as regards the subject matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or
property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or
injury suffered by, any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said
section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas
Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based
upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.23

In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez,24 the issue was which law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the
City Charter of Manila, a special act which treats ordinances in general and which requires their publication before
enactment and after approval, or the Tax Code, a general law, which deals in particular with "ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges," and which demands publication only after approval. In holding that it is the
Tax Code which should prevail, the Court elucidated that:

There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the
City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local
governments. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special
law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class. And the rule commonly said is that a prior special
law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general
creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a
general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a
situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in
particular. Th[is] exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope
thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes,
fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it
 approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular.
There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular
provision. Special provision governs.

Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

xxxx

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

xxxx

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

xxxx

The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code Commission, as follows:

"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32
be so amended as to make a public official liable for violation of another person’s constitutional rights only if
the public official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion for these
reasons:

"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that
there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32
which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on
the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the
Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the
nature of a tort.

"Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the New Civil Code to
implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a public official is abusing and we made the article so
strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that
official is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who openly and
definitely abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to
enforce the law to comply with one’s duty. And so, if we should limit the scope of this article, that would
practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses
which are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual
rights."25

The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable
for violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under this
Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective
protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff. 26

Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law.27 A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as
the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property, or reputation.28 There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the
motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the
mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was
wrongful.29 Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is
otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant acted
without evil intent.30
The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation
of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.31 This is a fundamental innovation in the
Civil Code, and in enacting the Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then President
Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil liberties.

In Aberca v. Ver,32 it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle of accountability of public officials
under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official
relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to
answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the
citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the
government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While
it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of
facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes
the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression, joint tortfeasors.

On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of
superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both superior and
subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make them
liable for damages. Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of government officials, the
subject thereof is general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action or
omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.

Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act" that
may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties.
Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public
officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code.
While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is
a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of
wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code,
which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is
the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of
constitutional rights.

The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and
malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same
will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a
constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping, the subsequent submission of the secretary’s
certificate authorizing the counsel to sign and execute the certification against forum shopping cured the defect of
respondent’s complaint. Besides, the merits of the instant case justify the liberal application of the rules.33

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May
7, 1999 which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, denying petitioner’s motion to
dismiss, is AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, is
hereby DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 49588. December 21, 1990.]

DIONG BI CHU, alias PATRICK CHANG, CHANG KA HEE and LU LIONG CORPORATION, Petitioners,
 v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, as Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI; JAIME NAVOA and MILAGROS DE LEOS, Respondents.

Neri, De Leon & Caldito, for Petitioners.

Recto Law Offices for Private Respondents.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the 16 October 1978 resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
08363-SP. The antecedent facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In a complaint filed by private respondents Jaime Navoa and Milagros de Leos before Military Commission No. 3,
docketed as Criminal Case No. MC-3-57, petitioners Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang" and Chang Ka Hi alias
"Chang Ka Hee", were charged with estafa for violation of Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. It was
alleged in the complaint that thru false pretenses and fraudulent acts, petitioners Diong Bi Chu and Chang Ka Hee
succeeded in inducing private respondents to mortgage a parcel of land belonging to and registered in the name of
Jaime Navoa, and that they (petitioners) misappropriated the proceeds therefrom, causing damages to private
respondents in the amount of P670,000.00.

After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, a demurrer to evidence was filed by Chang Ka
Hee. The charge against him was dismissed on the ground that he had nothing to do with the transaction. 2

On 3 August 1977, Military Commission No. 3 rendered judgment acquitting petitioner Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick
Chang", holding that the transaction between the parties was a joint venture, requiring each party to contribute to a
common fund and that —

"There was no fraus (sic) nor deceit on the part of the accused Diong Bi Chu since it was admitted that Industria Phils.
Inc., did have a contract with the PVTA for the exportation of foreign leaf tobacco for blending purpose.
Unfortunately, after the initial shipment, and for the subsequent shipments, the President prohibited the importation of
Virgina leaf tobacco, and for the loss suffered, no one is to blame. This is one of the attendant risks in a joint venture
which could not be foreseen.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

"WHEREFORE, it is the sentence of this Commission that the transaction being a joint venture, with the accused
Diong Bi Chu alias Patrick Chang, acting in good faith and without fault nor negligence, for which he can not in any
way be held liable, should and is hereby acquitted of the charge." 3

As an offshoot of the criminal case, on 31 March 1978, private respondents filed a civil action 4 against Diong Bi
Chu, Chang Ka Hee and Lu Liong Corporation for recovery of damages arising from guaranty and fraud, before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 21, docketed as Civil Case No. 29077. Petitioners Diong Bi Chu and Chang
Ka Hee were the majority stockholders of Lu Liong Corporation.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the civil action for damages filed against them, on the ground that the same is
barred by the prior judgment of Military Commission No. 3 and by private respondents’ failure to reserve their right to
file a separate civil action. 5 On 30 May 1978, the court denied said motion to dismiss. 6 Petitioners’ first and second
motions for reconsideration were likewise denied on 10 July and 31 August 1978, respectively. 7

A petition for certiorari was then filed by herein petitioners before the Court of Appeals, assailing the aforesaid orders
of the court a quo. In a resolution dated 16 October 1978, the appellate court dismissed said petition, holding that the
civil action for damages under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is independent of the criminal case and that the dismissal of
the criminal case against petitioner Chang Ka Hee and the acquittal of petitioner Diong Bi Chu do not constitute a bar
to the prosecution of the civil action for damages against them. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of said
resolution, but the same was denied in a resolution dated 29 December 1978. 8

Not satisfied with the foregoing rulings of the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed the petition at bar, raising the sole
issue of whether or not a civil action for damages based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is barred by a prior
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.

Art. 33 of the Civil Code provides that" (I)n cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."cralaw
virtua1aw library

To hold a person liable for damages under the foregoing provision, only a preponderance of evidence is required. An
acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar to the filing of an action for civil damages, for one may not be criminally liable
and still be civilly liable. Thus, the outcome or result of the criminal case, whether an acquittal or conviction, is really
inconsequential and will be of no moment in the civil action.chanrobles law library : red

To subordinate the civil action contemplated in Arts. 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code to the result of the criminal
prosecution would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action when, on the contrary, the law
provides that such civil action "may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding and regardless of the result of
the latter." Art. 33 of the Civil Code contemplates a civil action for recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to
the purely criminal aspect of the case. This is the reason why only a preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond
reasonable doubt is deemed sufficient in such civil action. 9

The civil action under Art. 33 need not be reserved because the law itself already makes the reservation. 10 In the case
of Bonite v. Zosa, 11 it was held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure that there be a
reservation in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action, has been declared as not in
accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to the substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which
does not require such a reservation. In fact, the reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been
deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this
Court declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, dismissal of the criminal case against Chang Ka Hee and acquittal of Diong Bi Chu before Military Commission
No. 3 for the charge of estafa is not a bar to the civil action for damages against them, based on fraud.

While a military commission or tribunal was declared to have no jurisdiction to try, even during the period of martial
law, civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them, as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, 12
however, such ruling applies only to future cases or cases still on-going or not yet final —

"In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to
future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no
retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against
civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State.
Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the
Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible,
the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional
rights and denial of due process." 13

Applying the foregoing principles, despite the validity of the acquittal of Diong Bi Chu and the dismissal of the
criminal case against Chang Ka Hee by Military Commission No. 3, such fact does not deprive private respondents of
their right to recover civil damages against said persons based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil
Code.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the case is hereby remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983

CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.

Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.

Gorgonio T. Alvarez for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused
of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining
witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L.
Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)

The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the
same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which
reads:têñ.£îhqwâ£

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding section
the following rules shall be observed:

(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action. ...

According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil
action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.)

The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is highly impressed with merit.

Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. The
two enactments are quoted hereinbelow:têñ.£îhqwâ£

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule
111, Rules of Court.)

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. (Civil Code,)

There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the provision which
uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the comment of the
Code Commission, thus:têñ.£îhqwâ£

The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce his
rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the State attorney. It is not
conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and initiative to habituate the citizens to
depend upon the government for the vindication of their own private rights. It is true that in many of
the cases referred to in the provision cited, a criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be
remembered that while the State is the complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is the
one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be permitted to demand
reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. (Report, p. 46.)

And Tolentino says:têñ.£îhqwâ£

The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present articles
creates an exception to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these
cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no
reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the
claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended
until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the
result of the civil action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])

2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised
Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.têñ.£îhqwâ£

The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and
fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal
Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and
fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines,
but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms
'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised
Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same
article-some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term 'physical
injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, bacause the
terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission recommended that the
civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law,
and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article
intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received
by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states,
the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated
homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death," (Carandang vs. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].)

Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in
the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result.

In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the
criminal action against her.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside; no special
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on article 100
of the Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are
assumed in article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant" (Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs. CA,
L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).

The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent civil
action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).

The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included in
article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four
Justices concurred in the result.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil action based on article 100
of the Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are
assumed in article 2177 of the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant" (Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs. CA,
L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).

The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent civil
action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).

The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence is not included in
article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four
Justices concurred in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983

MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA, and
RENATO YAP, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY LINER, INC., respondents.

Ricardo J. Francisco, for petitioners.

Flors, Macapagal, Ocampo & Dizon for private respondents.

RELOVA, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by tile petitioners against private respondents in the concept of an
independent civil action for damages for physical injuries resulting from reckless imprudence.

On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated by private respondent
Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee. private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by
Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato
Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against
Felardo Paje in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745).

On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by
Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective parents. against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje,
alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus.

While said Civil Case No. 4425 was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the criminal action proceeded
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745). The accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the
offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted in a decision promulgated on
November 3, 1982, based on the findings, to wit:

1 That the Victory Liner bus left its post, kilometer post no. 156, in San Marcelino, Zambales, at
about 2:00 AM

2 That on the highway at Lubao, Pampanga, between Posts Nos. 83 and 84, the appellant driver
thereof, saw a cargo truck parked in the middle of the right lane of the road to Manila, without

3 That appellant slackened the speed of his truck from 60 km. p.h. to 35 or 40 km. p. h. in order to
pass said truck;

4 That the appellant did not see the oncoming jeep until it swerved to the left.

5 That the jeep was still far so appellant attempted to pass the truck but before he could do so, the jeep
came very fast at the center of the road and out of its lane.

6 That the passengers of the bus shouted at the appellant to bring the bus to the side so as to avoid a
frontal collision with he jeep, and appellant brought his bus to the right shoulder of the road going to
Bataan;

7 That the jeep driven by the deceased Clemente Marcia was running at a fast pace for which reason
the driver lost control and veered sharply to the right shoulder of the road and crashed into the bus,
parked thereat a few seconds before.

8 That appellant was not speeding, was diligent, and hence, not liable for the collision which at the
least, was a fortuitous event for which no one was responsible.

and the conclusion that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was NOT even
guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE, Insofar as appellant was concerned, it was a case of PURE ACCIDENT."

As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case No. 4425 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting Felardo Paje
and citing Section I (d), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court now Section 3 (c), Rule I I I of the New Rules of Court),
which reads:
 SECTION 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. — Except as otherwise provided by
law, the following rules shall be observed:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. In the other cases, the persons entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and
in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and
reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and, thereafter, continued to hear defendants' (herein private respondents)
evidence. The following were presented as defendants' evidence in chief:

(a) the whole record of Criminal Case No. 2745 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in which
defendant Felardo Paje was by reason of the occurrence prosecuted criminally and convicted of
homicide with serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence;

(b) the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01691 Cr, acquitting the accused; and

(c) copy of the brief of the said defendant as accused-appellant in the said Court of Appeals case.

On August 10, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint against
the defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, without pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioners appealed the case to the (Court of Appeals CA-G.R. No. 38964-R) alleging that the acquittal of Paje in the
criminal action for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence "is not a ground for dismissing the
complaint in the instant civil action; that the instant civil action is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action and shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, so that whatever may have been the result of the
criminal action is irrelevant to this civil action; that Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and not Section 3,
paragraph (c) of the said rule applies; that the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the criminal action
that defendant Paje as accused therein was not guilty of civil negligence is without the jurisdiction of the said Court to
make and is to be completely disregarded as an extraneous, officious and void statement which cannot affect in any
way the instant civil action; that the records of the criminal action against defendant Paje are inadmissible evidence;
that it has been established in the case at bar, not only by preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted, conclusive
evidence that petitioners suffered damages as a proximate result of the negligence of respondent Paje and that it has
been established, not only by preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted, conclusive evidence, that the damages
suffered by petitioners as a result of the negligence of private respondents is in the amount of P250,817.96, and that
the latter should be sentenced, jointly and severally, to pay the same to petitioner.

In the meantime, the heirs of Clemente Marcia who, as aforesaid, died as a result of the collision, instituted a separate
civil action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based on the alleged reckless
imprudence of bus driver Felardo Paje, praying that the driver and the Victory Liner, Inc. be ordered to pay jointly and
severally the amount of damages claimed. The complaint of the heirs of Clemente Marcia was dismissed by the trial
court. Appeal on questions of law was taken to this Court (Laura Corpus et al vs. Felardo Paje at al, 28 SCRA 1062)
which, however, affirmed the order for the reason, among others, that "(1) The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje
by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence
charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for
damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal negligence of which the
defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action."

Following the ruling of this Court in the Corpus vs. Paje decision, respondent Court of Appeals held that the private
respondents Cannot be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that negligence was wanting and that
the collision was a case of pure accident.

Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners have come to US alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:

I.
 IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES RESULTING FROM
NEGLIGENCE IS AN INDEPENDENT ONE, ENTIRELY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM
THE CRIMINAL ACTION, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 33, 2176 AND 2177 OF
THE NEW (CIVIL CODE AND SECTION 2 OF RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT. AND IN
INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT ACTION IS NOT AMONG THE INDEPENDENT
CIVIL ACTIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE SAID PROVISIONS.

II.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF RESPONDENT FELARDO PAJE, DRIVER OF

RESPONDENT VICTORY LINER, INC., IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION BASED ON THE SAID
PHYSICAL INJURIES AND NEGLIGENCE IS ENTIRELY IRRELEVANT TO THE INSTANT
CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES BY VIRTUE OF THE AFORECITED PROVISIONS OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE RULES OF COURT, AND IN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE
SAID ACQUITTAL IS A BAR TO THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION UNDER SECTION 3 (c) OF
RULE I I I AND SECTION 49 (c) OF RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

III.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE

INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES, CONSISTING OF THE RECORDS OF THE
CRIMINAL ACTION IN THE TRIAL COURT, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
ACQUITTING RESPONDENT PAJE AND THE COPY OF THE BRIEF OF THE SAID
RESPONDENT AS ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ARE INADMISSIBLE IN THE INSTANT CIVIL
ACTION FOR DAMAGES.

IV.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR, NOT ONLY
BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE, THAT PETITIONERS SUFFERED DAMAGES AS A PROXIMATE RESULT OF
THE NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENT PAJE.

V.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, NOT ONLY BY PREPONDERANCE

OF EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, THAT THE
DAMAGES SUFFERED BY PETITIONERS AS A RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF
DEFENDANTS IS IN THE AMOUNT OF P250,817.96, AND IN NOT SENTENCING PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY TO PAY THE SAME TO PETITIONERS.

It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c) thereof, should
apply in the case at bar.

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

We do not agree, Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action without waiting
for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence to prosper and not
proof beyond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in criminal cases. However, an acquittal based on the
finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based
on the crime. As early as 1952, We have held in the case of Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company 91 Phil. 672, that
"the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court
declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the court states
'that the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused
cannot be held responsible,' this declaration fits well into the exception of the rule which exempts the accused, from
civil liability. " Likewise, in Albornoz vs. Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785, it was the ruling that "where the judgment in a
criminal action contains an express declaration that the basis of claimant's action did not exist, the latter's action for
civil liability is barred under section 1 (d) Rule 107 of the Rules of Court." And, in De Mesa vs. Priela 24 SCRA 582,
this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in
the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and
reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered (Sec. 3 [c], Rule 111, Rules of Court.)"

As held in Corpus vs. Paje, supra, reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes
mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners
were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil
action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. Further, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
states that "(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist." Otherwise
stated, unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be nonexistent in the final judgment, the
extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. Thus, if a person is charged
with homicide and successfully pleaded self-defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his civil liability.
He has not incurred any criminal liability. On the other hand, if his acquittal is, for instance, due to the fact that he was
not sufficiently Identified to be the assailant, a civil action for damages may be maintained. His acquittal is not due to
non-existence of the crime from which civil liability might arise, but because he was not, in the eyes of the court,
sufficiently Identified as the perpetrator of the crime.

In People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said that "the essence of
the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes the negligent
or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense.

The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and
Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.

The case of Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje (supra) is the same as the case at bar, the only difference being the party-
plaintiffs or petitioners. Clemente Marcia died, while Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap suffered physical injuries in the
same accident. The heirs of Clemente Marcia filed Civil Case No. 6880 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against
herein respondents. The case was dismissed and appealed directly to this Court.1äwphï1.ñët The order appealed from
was affirmed, as recorded in Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje, 28 SCRA 1062.

The case at bar (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap against the same defendants in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. After trial, the case was dismissed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is now
before Us on appeal by certiorari from the said decision.

Relative to the admissibility of the documents, to wit; (a) the records of the criminal case against Paje, (b) the decision
of the Court of Appeals acquitting the latter; and (c) copy of the brief of the respondent Paje as accused-appellant,
suffice it to say that since petitioners' cause of action is based on the alleged recklessness and imprudence of
respondent Paje it necessarily follows that his acquittal by the Court of Appeals and its declaration that the mishap was
"pure accident" are relevant and material evidence. In fact, the lower court may even take judicial notice of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in said criminal case.
Finally, with respect to the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, well settled is the rule that the same are final and
cannot be disturbed by Us, particularly where they are based, as they are in the case at bar, upon substantial evidence.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.